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THIRD SERIES:

COMMENCING WITH THE ACCESSION OF

WILLIAM IV.

42° VICTORIÆ, 1878-9.

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TO

THE TWENTY-EIGHTH DAY OF FEBRUARY 1879.

First Volume of the Session.

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After short debate, Motion *agreed to*:—Bill read a second time, and *committed* for *Monday* next.

MOTIONS.

LAND TITLES AND TRANSFER—

Select Committee of last Session, "to inquire and report whether any and what steps ought to be taken to simplify the Title to Land, and to facilitate the transfer thereof, and to prevent frauds on purchasers and mortgagees of Land," *re-appointed*:—List of the Committee 631

Joint Stock Banks (Auditing of Accounts) (Scotland) Bill—*Ordered* (*Mr. M'Laren, Sir Alexander Gordon, Sir George Balfour, Mr. Whitwell*); *presented*, and read the first time [Bill 58] 631

Bankruptcy (Scotland) Bill—*Ordered* (*Dr. Cameron, Mr. Baxter, Mr. Mackintosh, Mr. M'Laren, Mr. Ramsay*); *presented*, and read the first time [Bill 59] 631

Prenuptial Contracts Bill—*Ordered* (*Mr. O'Shaughnessy, Mr. Courtney, Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Joseph Cowen*); *presented*, and read the first time [Bill 60] 631

COMMONS, THURSDAY, DECEMBER 12.

QUESTIONS.

AFGHANISTAN—THE RUSSIAN ENVOY AT CABUL—Question, Sir William Harcourt; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer 632

ARMY—THE ARMY MEDICAL DEPARTMENT—Questions, Mr. Lyon Playfair, Mr. Errington; Answers, Colonel Stanley 632

RAILWAYS—RAILWAY BRAKES—Questions, Mr. Baxter, Mr. D. Taylor; Answers, Mr. J. G. Talbot 633

AFGHANISTAN — COST OF MILITARY OPERATIONS — Question, Sir Henry Havelock; Answer, Mr. E. Stanhope 634

INDIA—AUGMENTATION OF THE MILITARY FORCES—Question, Sir Henry Havelock; Answer, Mr. E. Stanhope 635

SOUTH AFRICA—EXPENSES OF THE WAR—Questions, Mr. Whitwell, Mr. Childers; Answers, The Chancellor of the Exchequer 636

POOR LAW — DEPORTATION OF IRISH POOR — Question, Mr. M'Carthy Downing; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth 636

ISLAND OF CYPRUS—MR. DI CESNOLA—Questions, Sir Charles W. Dilke, Sir William Harcourt; Answers, Mr. Bourke 636

ARMY (INDIA)—OFFICERS' SICK LEAVE—Question, Major O'Beirne; Answer, Mr. E. Stanhope 638

CHINA—THE CHEFOO CONVENTION—Question, Mr. Evelyn Ashley; Answer, Mr. Bourke 638

PEACE PRESERVATION (IRELAND) ACT, 1875 — DONEGAL — Question, Mr. O'Donnell; Answer, Mr. J. Lowther 639

THE RAILWAY COMMISSIONERS—LEGISLATION—Question, Mr. A. Mills; Answer, Mr. J. G. Talbot 639

ORDER OF THE DAY.

THE ADDRESS IN ANSWER TO THE QUEEN'S SPEECH. ADDRESS REPORTED. AMENDMENT (MR. WHITBREAD)—ADJOURNED DEBATE—[THIRD NIGHT]—

Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Amendment proposed to Question [9th December], "That the said Address be now read a second time."

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THE ADDRESS IN ANSWER TO THE QUEEN'S SPEECH. ADDRESS REPORTED. AMENDMENT (MR. WHITBREAD)—ADJOURNED DEBATE—[THIRD NIGHT]—*continued.*

Question again proposed:—Debate *resumed* 639

After long debate, *Moved,* "That the Debate be now adjourned,"—(*Earl Percy*:)—Motion *agreed to*:—Debate *further adjourned* till *Friday.*

Medical Appointments Qualification Bill—*Ordered* (*Mr. Errington, Mr. Blennerhassett*); *presented,* and read the first time [Bill 61] 734

Public Health Act (1875) Amendment (Interments) Bill—*Ordered* (*Mr. Marten, Mr. Greene, Mr. Cole*); *presented,* and read the first time [Bill 62] 734

COMMONS, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 13.

TURKEY—THE RHODOPE DISTRICT—GRANT IN AID—Notice of Resolution, The Chancellor of the Exchequer; Notice of Amendment, Mr. Anderson 735

QUESTIONS.

THE LUNACY LAWS—LEGISLATION—Question, Mr. P. A. Taylor; Answer, Mr. Assheton Cross 735

41 & 42 VICT. c. 49—WEIGHTS AND MEASURES ACT—LEGISLATION—Question, Mr. J. Cowen; Answer, Viscount Sandon 736

THE "PRINCESS ALICE" CALAMITY—Question, Captain Pim; Answer, Mr. Assheton Cross 737

AFGHANISTAN—STATEMENT OF THE VICEROY (LORD LYTTON) 10TH OCTOBER—Question, Mr. Ernest Noel; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer 737

RUSSIA AND PERSIA—Question, Sir John Hay; Answer, Mr. Bourke .. 738

LAW AND JUSTICE (SCOTLAND)—JUDICIAL ARRANGEMENTS—Question, Colonel Mure; Answer, Mr. Assheton Cross 739

THE MERCANTILE MARINE—ARMED MERCHANT VESSELS—Question, Sir Edward Watkin; Answer, Mr. W. H. Smith 739

INDIA—FRONTIER MAPS—Question, Captain Pim; Answer, Mr. E. Stanhope 740

THE CHARITY COMMISSION—Question, Mr. W. H. James; Answer, Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson 740

LAW AND JUSTICE (SCOTLAND)—JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF NAIRNSHIRE—Question, Mr. Fraser-Mackintosh; Answer, The Lord Advocate .. 741

THE COMMISSARIAT DEPARTMENT—Question, Sir Henry Havelock; Answer, Colonel Stanley 741

LAW AND JUSTICE (IRELAND)—COURT OF BANKRUPTCY—Question, Sir Joseph M'Kenna; Answer, Mr. J. Lowther 741

AFGHANISTAN—THE CONFERENCES AT UMBALLA—Question, Mr. Rylands; Answer, Mr. E. Stanhope 742

TURKEY — PROTECTORATE OF CONSTANTINOPLE — Question, Mr. H. Samuelson; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer .. 742

POOR LAW—LIVERPOOL—ALLEGED MISCONDUCT—Question, Mr. Stansfeld; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth 742

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Thames Traffic Regulation—Question, Mr. Gourley; Answer, Viscount Sandon 743

Cyprus—Afghanistan—The late Debates—Explanations, Mr. Bourke, Mr. E. Stanhope 744

ORDER OF THE DAY.

The Address in Answer to the Queen's Speech. Address Reported. Amendment (Mr. Whitbread) — Adjourned Debate — [Fourth Night]—

Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Amendment proposed to Question [9th December], "That the said Address be now read a second time."

Question again proposed :—Debate *resumed* 745

After long debate, Question put:—The House *divided;* Ayes 328, Noes 227; Majority 101.

Division List, Ayes and Noes 847

Main Question put, and *agreed to.*

Address accordingly read a second time:—Address *agreed to*:—To be presented by Privy Councillors.

Supply—*Resolved,* "That this House will, upon Monday next, resolve itself into a Committee to consider of the Supply to be granted to Her Majesty."

Ways and Means—*Resolved,* "That this House will, upon Monday next, resolve itself into a Committee to consider of the Ways and Means for raising the Supply to be granted to Her Majesty."

Burial Grounds Bill—*Ordered* (*Mr. Wilbraham Egerton, Earl Percy, Mr. Heygate, Mr. Birley*); *presented,* and read the first time [Bill 63] 852

Bankruptcy Act (1869) Amendment Bill—*Ordered* (*Mr. Sampson Lloyd, Mr. Norwood, Mr. Whitwell, Mr. Ripley*); *presented,* and read the first time [Bill 64] .. 852

COMMONS, MONDAY, DECEMBER 16.

QUESTIONS.

Afghanistan (Military Operations)—Press Correspondence—Question, Major Nolan; Answer, Mr. E. Stanhope 852

Married Women's Property Act, 1870—Case of Mrs. M'Carthy—Question, Mr. P. A. Taylor; Answer, The Attorney General .. 853

Friendly Societies Act, 1875—Legislation—Question, Sir Charles W. Dilke; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer 854

Medical Act, 1858—Legislation—Question, Mr. A. Mills; Answer, Lord George Hamilton 854

Education Acts — The Revised Code — Returns — Question, Mr. Mundella; Answer, Lord George Hamilton 854

South Africa—The Transvaal and Zululand—The Boundary Dispute —Question, Mr. Whitbread; Answer, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach .. 855

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THE RAILWAY COMMISSION — LEGISLATION — Question, Mr. D. Taylor; Answer, Viscount Sandon 856
ROYAL HIBERNIAN MILITARY SCHOOL (DUBLIN) — Question, Major O'Beirne; Answer, Mr. J. Lowther 856
JAPAN—CASE OF JOHN HARTLEY—Question, Mr. Mark Stewart; Answer, Mr. Bourke 856
EGYPT—THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE DAIRA LANDS—Question, Mr. B. Samuelson; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer .. 857
PARLIAMENTARY REPORTING—RE-APPOINTMENT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE—Question, Mr. Newdegate; Answer, Mr. W. H. Smith 857
TURKEY — RUMOURED ANGLO-TURKISH CONVENTION — Question, Mr. Dillwyn; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer 858
SOUTH AFRICA — THE ZULU KING — Questions, Mr. Courtney, Mr. Whitwell; Answers, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach 858
ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS—THE DEAN OF ARCHES—Question, Mr. Newdegate; Answer, The Attorney General 859

MOTIONS.

HER ROYAL HIGHNESS THE GRAND DUCHESS OF HESSE (PRINCESS ALICE)—ADDRESS OF CONDOLENCE—

Moved, "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, to express the deep concern of this House at the great loss which Her Majesty has sustained by the death of Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Hesse, Princess Alice of Great Britain and Ireland, second daughter of Her Majesty the Queen, and to condole with Her Majesty on this melancholy occasion.
"To assure Her Majesty that this House will ever feel the warmest interest in whatever concerns Her Majesty's domestic Relations; and to declare the ardent wishes of this House for the happiness of Her Majesty and of Her Family,"—(*Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer*) 859

After short debate, Address *agreed to:* — To be presented by Privy Councillors.

THE RHODOPE COMMISSION—Withdrawal of Notice 862

Moved, "That the Orders of the Day be postponed until after the Notice of Motion relating to the Expenses of the Military Operations in Afghanistan,"—(*Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer.*)

After short debate, Motion *agreed to.*

AFGHANISTAN (EXPENSES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS)—APPLICATION OF THE REVENUES OF INDIA—RESOLUTION—

Moved, "That, Her Majesty having directed a Military expedition of Her Forces charged upon Indian Revenues to be despatched against the Ameer of Afghanistan, this House consents that the Revenues of India shall be applied to defray the expenses of the Military operations which may be carried on beyond the external frontiers of Her Majesty's Indian Possessions,"—(*Mr. Edward Stanhope*) 876

Amendment proposed,

To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "this House is of opinion that it would be unjust that the Revenues of India should be applied to defray the extraordinary expenses of the Military operations now being carried on against the Ameer of Afghanistan," — (*Mr. Fawcett,*)—instead thereof."

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

After long debate, *Moved,* "That the Debate be now adjourned,"—(*Mr. Lyon Playfair:*)—After further short debate, Motion *agreed to:*—Debate adjourned till *To-morrow.*

ORDER OF THE DAY.

Disqualification by Medical Relief Bill [Bill 22]—

Order for Committee read :—*Moved,* "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair,"—(*Mr. Rathbone*) 943

Moved, "That the Debate be now adjourned,"—(*Mr. Serjeant Spinks* :)—After short debate, Question put, and *negatived.*

Original Question put, and *agreed to* :—Bill *considered* in Committee, and *reported;* as amended, to be considered *To-morrow.*

Bankers' Books (Evidence) Bill—*Ordered* (*Sir John Lubbock, Mr. Herschell, Sir Charles Mills, Mr. Rodwell*); *presented,* and read the first time [Bill 65] 944

Dispensaries (Ireland) Bill—*Ordered* (*Mr. Bruen, Mr. Downing, Mr. Mulholland, Dr. Ward*); *presented,* and read the first time [Bill 66] 944

KITCHEN AND REFRESHMENT ROOMS (HOUSE OF COMMONS)—

Ordered, That a Standing Committee be appointed to control the arrangements of the Kitchen and Refreshment Rooms, in the department of the Serjeant at Arms attending this House :—List of the Committee 944

LORDS, TUESDAY, DECEMBER 17.

HER ROYAL HIGHNESS THE GRAND DUCHESS OF HESSE (PRINCESS ALICE)—ADDRESS OF CONDOLENCE—

Moved, "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, to express the deep concern of this House at the great loss which Her Majesty has sustained by the death of Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Hesse, Princess Alice of Great Britain and Ireland, second daughter of Her Majesty the Queen, and to condole with Her Majesty on this melancholy occasion.

"To assure Her Majesty that this House will ever feel the warmest interest in whatever concerns Her Majesty's domestic relations; and to declare the ardent wishes of this House for the happiness of Her Majesty and of her family,"—(*The Earl of Beaconsfield*) 945

After short debate, on Question, *agreed to, nemine dissentiente.*

Ordered, That the said Address be presented to Her Majesty by the Lords with White Staves.

House adjourned to Thursday, the 13th day of February next.

COMMONS, TUESDAY, DECEMBER 17.

QUESTIONS.

POOR LAW—METROPOLITAN UNIONS—OAKUM PICKING BY FEMALE PAUPERS—Question, Mr. Cole; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth 948

CONDITION OF THE COUNTRY—THE PREVALENT DISTRESS—Questions, Mr. J. G. Hubbard, Mr. Mundella, Mr. Anderson, Mr. Hanbury Tracy; Answers, Mr. Assheton Cross, Mr. Sclater-Booth 949

THE SLAVE TRADE — ZANZIBAR—Question, Mr. Whitwell; Answer, Mr. Bourke 951

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TURKEY — RUMOURED GUARANTEED LOAN—Question, Mr. H. Samuelson; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer 951

THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN—INDIAN FINANCE—BOMBAY—Question, Mr. Mundella; Answer, Mr. E. Stanhope 952

TURKEY — COMMERCIAL TREATIES—Question, Mr. Whitwell; Answer, Mr. Bourke 952

AFGHANISTAN — NORTH-WEST FRONTIER—LORD NAPIER OF MAGDALA—Question, Mr. Leith; Answer, Colonel Stanley 953

PARLIAMENT—QUESTIONS—STANDING ORDERS—Question, Colonel Beresford: —Short debate thereon 954

INDIA — FINANCIAL CONDITION—Question, Lord Francis Hervey; Answer, Mr. E. Stanhope 956

ARMY — THE AUXILIARY FORCES — Question, Colonel Kennard; Answer, Colonel Stanley 956

AFGHANISTAN (EXPENSES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS)—Question, Mr. J. G. Hubbard; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer 957

ADJOURNMENT—

Moved, "That this House will, at the rising of the House this day, adjourn till Thursday the 13th day of February next,"—(*Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer.*)

THE RHODOPE COMMISSION—Observations, Mr. Rylands 958

After short debate, *Moved*, "That the Debate be now adjourned,"—(*Mr. Chamberlain*:)—After further short debate, Motion, by leave, *withdrawn.*

Original Question put, and *agreed to.*

ORDERS OF THE DAY.

Ancient Monuments Bill [Bill 52]—

Moved, "That the Bill be now read a second time,"—(*Sir John Lubbock*) 967

After short debate, Motion *agreed to*:—Bill read a second time, and *committed* for *Thursday* 13th February.

AFGHANISTAN (EXPENSES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS)—ADJOURNED DEBATE RESUMED—

Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Amendment proposed to Question [16th December].

Question again proposed:—Debate *resumed* 968

QUEEN'S SPEECH—HER MAJESTY'S ANSWER TO THE ADDRESS *reported* .. 1018

AFGHANISTAN (EXPENSES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS)—

Question again proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question:"—After long debate, Question put: — The House *divided;* Ayes 235, Noes 125; Majority 110.

Division List, Ayes and Noes 1035

Main Question put, and *agreed to.*

House adjourned till Thursday, 13th February.

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BUSINESS OF PARLIAMENT—Ministerial Statement, The Earl of Beaconsfield:—Debate thereon 1041

Cathedral Statutes Bill [H.L.]—*Presented* (*The Lord Bishop of Carlisle*); read 1ª (No. 4) 1071

COMMONS, THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 13.

QUESTIONS.

BOARD OF WORKS (IRELAND)—COLONEL M'KERLIE—Questions, Major O'Beirne; Answers, Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson, Colonel Stanley .. 1071

JOINT STOCK BANKS—LEGISLATION—Question, Mr. Coope; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer 1072

SOUTH AFRICA—THE ZULU WAR—THE RE-INFORCEMENTS—Questions, Colonel Mure; Answers, The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach 1072

HIGHWAYS AND LOCOMOTIVES (AMENDMENT) ACT, 1878—Question, Mr. Pell; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth 1074

ELECTIONS—NEW WRITS ISSUED DURING THE RECESS—

Mr. SPEAKER acquainted the House that he had issued Warrants for New Writs—

For Norfolk County (Northern Division), *v.* Colonel James Duff, deceased; *for* Cambridge County, *v.* Honble. Eliot Constantine Yorke, deceased; *for* Cork County, *v.* Timothy M'Carthy Downing, esquire, deceased.

ORDERS OF THE DAY.

SUPPLY—Order for Committee read:—

BUSINESS OF PARLIAMENT—MINISTERIAL STATEMENT—

Moved, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair,"—(*Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer*) 1076

After long debate, Amendment proposed,

To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "the omission of all reference to legislation on the questions of Reform in the Land Laws and of the University Education of Ireland, both in the Queen's Speech and in the Statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer this evening, is calculated to produce great discontent in Ireland, and is an ill return for the increased burthens which the warlike policy of the Government is calculated to entail on the Irish as well as on the British people,"—(*Major Nolan,*)—instead thereof 1143

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question:"—After further debate, Question put:—The House *divided;* Ayes 72, Noes 25; Majority 47.—(Div. List, No. 3.)

Main Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair:"—Motion, by leave, *withdrawn:*—Committee *deferred* till *To-morrow.*

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Bankers' Books (Evidence) Bill [Bill 65]—

Moved, "That the Bill be now read a second time," — (*Sir John Lubbock*) 1158

After short debate, Question put, and *agreed to*:—Bill read a second time, and *committed* for *Monday* next.

Habitual Drunkards Bill [Bill 47]—

Moved, "That the Bill be now read a second time,"—(*Dr. Cameron*) .. 1159

[House counted out.]

LORDS, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 14.

AFGHANISTAN—THE RUSSIAN MISSION AT CABUL—Observations, Question, Earl Granville; Reply, The Marquess of Salisbury 1161

THE VOLUNTEER FORCE—FINANCE AND ORGANIZATION—REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE—Observations, Viscount Bury:—Short debate thereon .. 1162

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THE PLAGUE IN RUSSIA—SANITARY PRECAUTIONS—Question, Observations, The Earl of Carnarvon; Reply, The Duke of Richmond and Gordon 1184

INTEMPERANCE—MOTION FOR A SELECT COMMITTEE—

Moved that a Select Committee be appointed for the purpose of inquiring into the prevalence of habits of intemperance, and into the manner in which those habits have been affected by recent legislation and other causes,—(*The Lord Aberdare*) .. 1187

Motion *agreed to*:—List of the Committee.

COMMONS, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 14.

QUESTIONS.

AFGHANISTAN — DECLARATION OF GENERAL ROBERTS—Question, Sir George Campbell; Answer, Mr. E. Stanhope 1188

CONTAGIOUS DISEASES (ANIMALS) ACT, 1878—CATTLE FROM THE UNITED STATES—Questions, Mr. Rathbone, Mr. Chaplin, Mr. Mundella, Mr. W. E. Forster; Answers, Lord George Hamilton 1189

ARMY—BREECH-LOADING ORDNANCE—Question, Major Nolan; Answer, Lord Eustace Cecil 1192

HIGHWAYS AND LOCOMOTIVES ACT, 1878—Question, Mr. Estcourt; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth 1192

SOUTH AFRICA — THE ZULU WAR — THE RE-INFORCEMENTS —Question, Colonel Mure; Answer, Colonel Stanley 1192

SOUTH AFRICA—CAPE COLONY—THE MOUNTED POLICE—Question, Lord Randolph Churchill; Answer, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach .. 1193

POST OFFICE SAVINGS BANKS—Question, Mr. Wait; Answer, Lord John Manners 1193

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POOR LAW (IRELAND)—REMOVAL OF IRISH POOR—Question, Mr. O'Reilly; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth 1196

INDIA — REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE—THE INDIAN BUDGET—Question, General Sir George Balfour; Answer, Mr. E. Stanhope .. 1197

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HIGHWAYS AND LOCOMOTIVES (AMENDMENT) ACT, 1878 — Question, Sir Henry Jackson; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth 1198

NATIONAL EDUCATION (IRELAND)—NATIONAL SCHOOL TEACHERS—Question, Mr. Meldon; Answer, Mr. J. Lowther 1198

FLOODS AND CONSERVANCY BOARDS—LEGISLATION—Question, Mr. Chaplin; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer 1198

ORDERS OF THE DAY.

SUPPLY—Order for Committee read; Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair:"—

BOROUGH FRANCHISE (IRELAND)—RESOLUTION—Amendment proposed,

To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "the restricted nature of the Borough Franchise in Ireland as compared with that existing in England and Scotland is a subject deserving the immediate attention of Parliament, with a view of establishing a fair and just equality of the Franchise in the three Countries,"—(*Mr. Meldon,*)—instead thereof 1199

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question:"—After long debate, Question put:—The House *divided;* Ayes 256, Noes 187; Majority 69.—(Div. List, No. 4.)

Main Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair:"—Motion, by leave, *withdrawn:*—Committee *deferred* till *Monday* next.

Racecourses (Metropolis) Bill [Bill 48]—

Moved, "That the Bill be now read a second time,"—(*Mr. Anderson*) .. 1265

Amendment proposed, to leave out the word "now," and at the end of the Question to add the words "upon this day six months,"—(*Mr. Onslow.*)

Question proposed, "That the word 'now' stand part of the Question:" —After short debate, Question put:—The House *divided;* Ayes 102, Noes 53; Majority 49.—(Div. List, No. 5.)

Main Question put, and *agreed to:*—Bill read a second time, and *committed* for *Monday* next.

Sale of Food and Drugs Act (1875) Amendment Bill [Bill 56]—

Moved, "That the Bill be now read a second time,"—(*Mr. Anderson*) .. 1273

After short debate, Motion *agreed to:*—Bill read a second time, and *committed* to a Select Committee.

Ancient Monuments Bill [Bill 52]—

Order for Committee read:—*Moved,* "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair,"—(*Sir John Lubbock*) 1273

Moved, "That the Debate be now adjourned,"—(*Earl Percy:*)—After short debate, Question put:—The House *divided;* Ayes 33, Noes 81; Majority 48.—(Div. List, No. 6.)

Question again proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair:" —*Moved,* "That this House do now adjourn,"—(*Mr. Onslow:*)—Motion, by leave, *withdrawn.*

Original Question put, and *agreed to:*—Bill *considered* in Committee.

Committee report Progress; to sit again upon *Friday* next.

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Disqualification by Medical Relief Bill [Bill 22]—

Moved, "That the Bill be now read the third time,"—(*Mr. Rathbone*) .. 1276

Amendment proposed, to leave out the words "now read the third time," in order to add the word "re-committed,"—(*Mr. Pell,*)—instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words 'now read the third time' stand part of the Question:"—After short debate, Question put:—The House *divided;* Ayes 65, Noes 40; Majority 25.—(Div. List, No. 7.)

Main Question put, and *agreed to*:—Bill read the third time, and *passed*, with an amended Title.

STANDING ORDERS—

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MOTIONS.

Election Petitions (Costs) Bill—*Ordered* (*Major Nolan, Mr. Gray, Mr. Macdonald, Mr. Patrick Martin*); *presented*, and read the first time [Bill 72] 1281

Valuation of Property Bill—(*Mr. Sclater-Booth, Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Salt*); *presented*, and read the first time [Bill 71] 1281

Banking Laws Amendment Bill—*Considered* in Committee:—Resolution *agreed to*, and *reported*:—Bill *ordered* (*Mr. James Barclay, Mr. Baxter, Mr. James Cowan, Mr. Courtney*); *presented*, and read the first time [Bill 73] 1281

Municipal Franchise (Ireland) Bill—*Ordered* (*Major O'Gorman, Sir Joseph M'Kenna, Mr. Richard Power, Mr. Blennerhassett*); *presented*, and read the first time [Bill 74] 1282

Employers' Liability for Injuries to Servants Bill—*Ordered* (*Mr. Brassey, Mr. Morley, Mr. M. Bass, Mr. Sullivan*); *presented*, and read the first time [Bill 75] .. 1282

Summary Jurisdiction Bill—*Ordered* (*Mr. Secretary Cross, Mr. Attorney General, Mr. Solicitor General, Sir Matthew Ridley*); *presented*, and read the first time [Bill 69] .. 1282

Prosecution of Offences Bill—*Ordered* (*Mr. Secretary Cross, Mr. Attorney General, Mr. Solicitor General, Sir Matthew Ridley*); *presented*, and read the first time [Bill 68] .. 1282

Coroners Bill—*Ordered* (*Mr. Secretary Cross, Mr. Attorney General, Mr. Solicitor General, Sir Matthew Ridley*); *presented*, and read the first time [Bill 67] 1282

Public Works Loans Bill—*Ordered* (*Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson*); *presented*, and read the first time [Bill 70] 1282

LORDS, MONDAY, FEBRUARY 17.

MASTERS AND WORKMEN—
Workman's Compensation Bill—

Bill to amend the law relative to the liability of employers to make compensation for injuries caused by accidents to persons in their service—*Presented* (*The Earl De La Warr*) 1283

After short debate, Bill read 1ª (No. 7.)

Bankruptcy Law Amendment Bill—

Bill to consolidate and amend the law of Bankruptcy, and for other purposes relating thereto—*Presented* (*The Lord Chancellor*) 1286

After short debate, Bill read 1ª (No. 8.)

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Debtors Act, 1869, Amendment Bill [H.L.]—*Presented* (*The Lord Chancellor*); read 1ª (No. 9) 1301

CONSERVANCY OF RIVERS—LEGISLATION—Question, The Marquess of Ripon; Answer, The Duke of Richmond and Gordon 1301

COMMONS, MONDAY, FEBRUARY 17.

QUESTIONS.

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RUSSIA AND TURKEY—THE DEFINITIVE TREATY—Question, Mr. Otway; Answer, Mr. Bourke 1303

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ISLAND OF CYPRUS—CHART OF SURVEYS—Question, Mr. Dodson; Answer, Mr. A. F. Egerton 1306

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RIVERS CONSERVANCY AND PREVENTION OF FLOODS—Question, Mr. Arthur Peel; Answer, Mr. Assheton Cross 1306

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TURKEY — FINANCIAL REFORM—M. DE TOCQUEVILLE—Question, Mr. E. Jenkins; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer 1307

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THE LUNACY LAW—LEGISLATION—Question, Mr. Dillwyn; Answer, Mr. Assheton Cross 1308

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TURKEY—TREATY OF BERLIN—Question, Mr. W. Cartwright; Answer, Mr. Bourke 1310

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SPAIN — THE "LARK" AND THE "OCTAVIA" —Question, Mr. Serjeant Simon; Answer, Mr. Bourke 1316

DIVINITY SCHOOL, DUBLIN UNIVERSITY—Question, Mr. Plunket; Answer, Mr. J. Lowther 1317

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SOUTH AFRICA—THE PAPERS—Question, Observations, The Marquess of Hartington; Reply, The Chancellor of the Exchequer 1317

ORDERS OF THE DAY—

Moved, "That the Orders of the Day be postponed until after the Notice of Motion relating to the Business of the House,"—(*Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer*) .. 1318

After short debate, Amendment proposed,

To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "this House will forthwith resolve itself into a Committee to consider the Resolutions of Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer on the Business of the House,"—(*Mr. Rylands*,)—instead thereof 1331

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question:"—After further short debate, Question put:—The House *divided;* Ayes 192, Noes 75; Majority 117.—(Div. List, No. 8.)

Main Question put:—The House *divided;* Ayes 185, Noes 53; Majority 132.—(Div. List, No. 9.)

MOTIONS.

PARLIAMENT—BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE—RESOLUTIONS—

Moved, "That, whenever the Committee of Supply or the Committee of Ways and Means stands as the first Order of the Day on a Monday, Mr. Speaker shall leave the Chair without putting any question,"—(*Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer*) 1337

After short debate, Amendment proposed, to leave out the words "or the Committee of Ways and Means,"—(*Mr. Dillwyn*) 1351

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question:"—After further short debate, Question put, and *negatived.*

Amendment proposed,

After the word "Supply," to insert the words "appointed for the consideration of the ordinary Army, Navy, and Civil Service Estimates,"—(*The Marquess of Hartington*) 1361

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted:"—After short debate, Question put, and *agreed to.*

Amendment proposed, to insert, at the end of the last Amendment, the words "excepting Votes on Account,"—(*Mr. Edward Jenkins*) .. 1375

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted:"—After short debate, *Moved*, "That the Debate be now adjourned,"—(*Mr. Henry Samuelson:*)—After further short debate, Motion, by leave, *withdrawn.*

Original Question put:—The House *divided;* Ayes 69, Noes 143; Majority 74.—(Div. List, No. 10.)

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PARLIAMENT—BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE—RESOLUTIONS—*continued.*

Amendment proposed,

After the word "Monday," to insert the words "and the Motion being made, That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair,"—(*Mr. Beresford Hope*) .. 1381

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted:"—*Moved,* "That the Debate be now adjourned,"—(*Mr. Jacob Bright:*)—After short debate, Question put, and *agreed to:*—Debate *adjourned* till *To-morrow.*

ORDERS OF THE DAY.

Habitual Drunkards Bill [Bill 47]—

Moved, "That the Bill be now read a second time,"—(*Dr. Cameron*) .. 1384

Amendment proposed, to leave out the word "now," and at the end of the Question to add the words "upon this day six months,"—(*Mr. Dillwyn.*)

Question proposed, "That the word 'now' stand part of the Question:"—After short debate, Question put, and *agreed to.*

Main Question put, and *agreed to:*—Bill read a second time, and *committed* for *Monday* next.

Racecourses (Metropolis) Bill [Bill 48]—

Order for Committee read:—*Moved,* "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair,"—(*Mr. Anderson*) 1387

Amendment proposed,

To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words, "this House will, upon this day six months, resolve itself into the said Committee,"—(*Mr. Onslow,*)—instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question:"—After short debate, Question put:—The House *divided;* Ayes 64, Noes 30; Majority 34.—(Div. List, No. 11.)

Question again proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair:"—*Moved,* "That the Debate be now adjourned,"—(*Mr. Stacpoole:*)—Question put:—The House *divided;* Ayes 24, Noes 61; Majority 37.—(Div. List, No. 12.)

Question again proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair:"—*Moved,* "That this House do now adjourn,"—(*Major O'Gorman:*)—Question put:—The House *divided;* Ayes 18, Noes 64; Majority 46.—(Div. List, No. 13.)

Original Question put, and *agreed to:*—Bill *considered* in Committee.

After short time spent therein, Committee report Progress; to sit again *To-morrow.*

MOTIONS.

Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices Bill—

Motion for Leave (*Mr. Attorney General*) 1391

After short debate, Motion *agreed to:*—Bill to amend and continue the Acts relating to Election Petitions, and to the prevention of Corrupt Practices at Parliamentary Elections, *ordered* (*Mr. Attorney General, Mr. Secretary Cross, Mr. Solicitor General*); *presented,* and read the first time [Bill 78.]

Oyster and Mussel Fisheries Order (Blackwater, Essex) Bill—*Ordered* (*Mr. J. G. Talbot, Viscount Sandon*); *presented,* and read the first time [Bill 76] .. 1392

Patents for Inventions Bill—*Ordered* (*Mr. Attorney General, Mr. Secretary Cross, Mr. Solicitor General*); *presented,* and read the first time [Bill 77] 1392

District Auditors Bill—*Ordered* (*Mr. Sclater-Booth, Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson, Mr. Salt*); *presented*, and read the first time [Bill 79] 1392

Employers' Liability for Injuries to Servants Bill—*Ordered* (*Mr. Macdonald, Dr. Cameron, Mr. Meldon, Mr. Earp, Mr. Burt*); *presented*, and read the first time [Bill 80] 1392

LORDS, TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 18.

AFGHANISTAN — THE WAR — ADDRESS OF GENERAL ROBERTS—Question, The Marquess of Ripon; Answer, Viscount Cranbrook 1393

PARLIAMENT—PUBLIC BUSINESS—Question, Earl Granville; Answer, The Duke of Richmond and Gordon 1393

Supreme Court of Judicature Acts Amendment Bill—

Bill for amending the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts—*Presented* (*The Lord Chancellor*); read 1ª (No. 11) 1394

JURISDICTION OF COUNTY COURTS ENGLAND—
County Courts Bill—

Bill to extend the jurisdiction of the County Courts, and to amend the Acts relating or giving jurisdiction thereto—*Presented* (*The Lord Chancellor*); read 1ª (No. 12) 1394

SOUTH AFRICA—THE RE-INFORCEMENTS—CONDITION OF THE REGIMENTS—ADDRESS FOR A RETURN—

Moved, "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for a Return in a Tabular form showing (1) ages, (2) length of service, (3) number of privates who have not completed their drill and musketry instruction, of the non-commissioned officers, corporals, and privates of 2nd-21st, 58th, 3rd-60th, Rifles, 91st, and 94th, at present under orders for the Cape of Good Hope, as they embark for active service; also the number of men from each regiment left at home on account of physical unfitness, and the number drawn from other regiments to complete the battalions," (*Lord Truro*) 1400

After short debate, Motion *agreed to.*

SOUTH AFRICA — THE RE-INFORCEMENTS — DISEMBARKATION — Question, Observations, Viscount Sidmouth; Reply, Lord Elphinstone .. 1401

COMMONS, TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 18.

QUESTIONS.

MINES REGULATION ACT, 1872 — THE DINAS MINE — Question, Mr. Macdonald; Answer, Mr. Assheton Cross 1403

THE NEW LAW COURTS—Question, Mr. Osborne Morgan; Answer, Mr. Gerard Noel 1404

INDIA — THE MAHARAJAH OF CASHMERE—Question, Mr. Grant Duff; Answer, Mr. E. Stanhope 1404

BAR EDUCATION AND DISCIPLINE BILL — Question, Dr. Kenealy; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer 1405

METROPOLITAN IMPROVEMENTS ACT—ARTIZANS' DWELLINGS—GRAY'S INN ROAD—Question, Mr. Hopwood; Answer, Mr. Assheton Cross .. 1405

SCOTLAND—AGRICULTURAL HYPOTHEC AND OFFICE OF LORD CLERK REGISTER —Question, Mr. J. W. Barclay; Answer, Mr. Assheton Cross .. 1406

CATTLE DISEASE — THE AMERICAN CATTLE TRADE—Question, Mr. Bruen; Answer, Mr. J. Lowther 1407

GRENADA — ILL-TREATMENT OF COOLIES — THE PAPERS — Question, Mr. Errington; Answer, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach 1407

South Africa—Massacre of Kaffirs in Griqualand—Question, Dr. Cameron; Answer, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach 1407

South Africa—The Zulu War—The Native Contingent—Question, Sir Alexander Gordon; Answer, Lord Eustace Cecil 1409

MOTIONS.

Civil Service Estimates—Motion for a Select Committee—

Moved, "That a Select Committee be appointed to consider and report upon the Civil Service Estimates in the order in which they appear,"—(*Mr. Dillwyn*) .. 1409

After debate, Question put:—The House *divided;* Ayes 95, Noes 158; Majority 63.—(Div. List, No. 14.)

Parliament—Public Business (Half-past Twelve Rule)—Resolution—

Moved, "That, except for a Money Bill, no Order of the Day or Notice of Motion be taken after half-past Twelve of the clock at night, with respect to which Order or Notice of Motion a Notice of Opposition or Amendment shall have been printed on the Notice Paper, or if such Notice of Motion shall only have been given the next previous day of sitting, and objection shall be taken when such Notice is called,"—(*Mr. Mowbray*) 1435

Amendment proposed,

In line 1, after the word "Bill," to insert the words "or a Bill which has passed through Committee of the whole House,"—(*Sir John Lubbock.*)

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted."

After short debate, Question put:—The House *divided;* Ayes 57, Noes 81; Majority 24.—(Div. List, No. 15.)

Main Question put, and *agreed to.*

Moved, "That the said Resolution be a Standing Order of the House," —(*Mr. Mowbray*:)—After short debate, Question put:—The House *divided;* Ayes 79, Noes 36; Majority 43.—(Div. List, No. 16.)

Land Titles and Transfer—

Ordered, That the Evidence taken before the Select Committee on Land Titles and Transfer, of Session 1878, be referred to the Select Committee on Land Titles and Transfer,—(*Mr. Osborne Morgan.*)

Public Petitions—

Select Committee *appointed:*—List of the Committee 1444

Public Accounts—Nomination of Select Committee—

Sir Walter Barttelot, Lord Frederick Cavendish, Mr. Cubitt, Mr. Goldney, nominated Members of the Committee of Public Accounts.

Moved, "That Mr. Hankey be one other Member of the said Committee," —(*Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson*) 1445

After short debate, [House counted out.]

COMMONS, WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 19.

ORDER OF THE DAY.

Burial Law Amendment Bill [Bill 10]—

Moved, "That the Bill be now read a second time,"—(*Mr. Balfour*) .. 1447

Amendment proposed, to leave out the word "now," and at the end of the Question to add the words "upon this day six months,"—(*Mr. Beresford Hope.*)

Burial Law Amendment Bill—continued.

Question proposed, "That the word 'now' stand part of the Question."
After long debate, it being a quarter of an hour before Six of the clock, the Debate stood adjourned till *To-morrow.*

QUESTION.

Parliament—Business of the House—Question, Mr. Beresford Hope; Answer, Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson 1499

MOTIONS.

East India (Public Works)—

Ordered, That a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into and report as to the expediency of constructing Public Works in India with money raised on loan, both as regards financial results and the prevention of famine:—That the Committee do consist of Seventeen Members:—List of the Committee 1499

Parliamentary Reporting—

Ordered, That the Select Committee of last Session on Parliamentary Reporting be re-appointed:—List of the Committee 1500
Ordered, That the Evidence taken before the Select Committee on Parliamentary Reporting, of Session 1878, be referred to the Select Committee on Parliamentary Reporting,—(*Mr. William Henry Smith.*)

Jurors' Remuneration Bill—*Ordered* (*Mr. H. B. Sheridan, Sir Henry Jackson, Mr. Joseph Cowen, Mr. Whitwell, Mr. Burt, Mr. Wheelhouse, Mr. O'Connor Power*); *presented,* and read the first time [Bill 81] 1500

Licensing Boards (Scotland) (No. 2) Bill—*Ordered* (*Mr. Fortescue Harrison, Sir George Balfour, Dr. Cameron*); *presented,* and read the first time [Bill 82] .. 1500

Assizes Bill—*Ordered* (*Sir Matthew Ridley, Mr. Secretary Cross*); *presented,* and read the first time [Bill 83] 1500

LORDS, THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 20.

South Africa — The Zulu War — Question, Earl Granville; Answer, Earl Cadogan 1501

Tramways—Motion for a Select Committee—

Moved, That a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the regulations which it may be desirable to impose in relation to the construction and use of Tramways,—(*The Earl of Redesdale*) 1501
Moved after the word ("Tramways") to add ("and the relation of Tramways on which carriages are conveyed by steam to the present imposition of the passenger duty,")—(*The Lord Houghton.*)

On Question, That the words proposed to be added stand part of the Motion? *Resolved* in the *Negative.*
Then the Original Motion *agreed to:*—List of the Committee .. 1502

South Africa—Zululand—Importation of Arms and Munitions—Question, Observations, Viscount Sidmouth; Reply, Earl Cadogan:—Short debate thereon 1502

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QUESTIONS.

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ECCLESIASTICAL SALARIES (INDIA)—Question, Mr. Baxter; Answer, Mr. E. Stanhope 1508

ARMY—ARMY RESERVES — MILITIA — Question, Mr. J. Holms; Answer, Colonel Stanley 1508

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URBAN AND RURAL SANITARY DISTRICTS—COUNTY MAPS—Question, Mr. Stansfeld; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth 1509

SOUTH AFRICA—THE ZULU KING—NEGOTIATIONS—Question, Mr. James; Answer, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach 1510

PUBLIC HEALTH ACT — BACK-TO-BACK HOUSES—Question, Sir Sydney Waterlow; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth 1511

THE METROPOLITAN FIRE BRIGADE—LEGISLATION—Question, Mr. Ritchie; Answer, Mr. Assheton Cross 1511

BOARD OF WORKS (IRELAND)—CLARE CASTLE PIER AND HARBOUR—Question, Mr. Stacpoole; Answer, Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson .. 1512

ARMY (INDIA)—OFFICERS ON SICK LEAVE—Question, Major O'Beirne; Answer, Mr. E. Stanhope 1512

WATER COMPANIES BILLS—PUBLIC HEALTH ACTS—Question, Mr. A. H. Brown; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth 1513

ARMY — THE 24TH REGIMENT — Question, Major O'Gorman; Answer, Colonel Stanley 1514

THE TICHBORNE CASE — SIR ROGER D. TICHBORNE — Question, Major O'Gorman; Answer, Mr. Assheton Cross 1514

PARLIAMENT—RULES AND ORDERS—ALTERATION OF QUESTION —Observations, Major O'Gorman; Reply, Mr. Speaker 1515

HIGHWAY ACT, 1878—CLAUSE 16—Question, Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth 1515

NOXIOUS VAPOURS—LEGISLATION—Question, Viscount Newport; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth 1516

TURKEY—PAPERS AND CORRESPONDENCE—Question, Sir William Harcourt; Answer, Mr. Bourke 1517

SOUTH AFRICA — THE ZULU WAR — THE RE-INFORCEMENTS — CATHOLIC CHAPLAINS—Question, Mr. Errington; Answer, Colonel Stanley .. 1517

ARMY—LONGFORD BARRACKS—Question, Mr. Errington; Answer, Colonel Stanley 1517

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CRIMINAL LAW—CASE OF JOHN NOLAN—Question, Dr. Kenealy; Answer, Mr. Assheton Cross 1519

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ORDER OF THE DAY.

PARLIAMENT—BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE—RESOLUTION—[ADJOURNED DEBATE]—

Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Amendment proposed to the First Resolution, as amended [17th February]—

Question again proposed:—Debate *resumed* 1524

After long debate, Amendment (*Mr. Beresford Hope*), by leave, *withdrawn.*

Amendment proposed,

After the word "Monday," to insert the words "in the months of June, July, and August,"—(*Major Nolan*) 1573

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted:"—After short debate, Question put:—The House *divided;* Ayes 68, Noes 161; Majority 93.—(Div. List, No. 17.)

Amendment proposed,

After the word "Monday," to insert the words "provided there be not on the Paper any Amendment relevant to the class of Estimates about to be discussed,"—(*Mr. Anderson*) 1574

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted:"—*Moved,* "That the Debate be now adjourned,"—(*Sir George Bowyer:*)—After short debate, Question put:—The House *divided;* Ayes 57, Noes 143; Majority 86.—(Div. List, No. 18.)

Original Question again proposed:—*Moved,* "That this House do now adjourn,"—(*Mr. Rylands:*)—After short debate, Question put:—The House *divided;* Ayes 43, Noes 121; Majority 78.—(Div. List, No. 19.)

Original Question again proposed:—*Moved,* "That the Debate be now adjourned,"—(*Mr. Dillwyn:*)—Motion *agreed to:*—Debate *adjourned* till *Monday* next.

EAST INDIA (PUBLIC WORKS)—

Ordered, That the Minutes of the Evidence taken before the Select Committee on East India (Public Works), in the last Session of Parliament, be referred to the Select Committee on East India (Public Works,)—(*Mr. Edward Stanhope.*)

MOTION.

PUBLIC ACCOUNTS—INSTRUCTION TO THE COMMITTEE—

Moved, "That it be an Instruction to the Committee of Public Accounts, That they have power to consider whether any alteration in the Law is desirable, providing that a statement in each case in which the Naval and Military Departments have obtained the sanction of the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury to any expenditure not provided for in the sums appropriated to such services in the Votes contained in the Appropriation Act, setting forth the representation made to them by the respective Department, shall be laid upon the Table of the House within a limited period after such sanction shall have been given,"—(*Mr. Monk.*) .. 1595

After short debate, [House counted out.]

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Ordered, That this House will not receive any petition for a Private Bill after *Friday* the 14*th day of March* next, unless such Private Bill shall have been approved by the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice; nor any petition for a Private Bill approved by the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice after *Friday* the 2*nd day of May* next:

That this House will not receive any report from the Judges upon petitions presented to this House for Private Bills after *Friday* the 2*nd day of May* next.

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Army—Volunteer Force—Courts of Inquiry—Address for a Return—

Moved, That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for Return showing the number of courts of inquiry held in each year in the volunteer force since its establishment; the number of volunteers of all ranks, the number of adjutants, and the number of instructors in each year on which such were held, and the several offences charged,—(*The Lord Truro*) 1600

After short debate, Motion (by Leave of the House) *withdrawn*.

South Africa—The Zulu War—The Re-inforcements—The Cavalry Equipments—Question, Observations, Lord Ellenborough; Reply Viscount Bury:—Observations, The Duke of Cambridge .. 1600

COMMONS, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 21.

QUESTIONS.

Railways—Continuous Footboards—Question, Mr. Thomson Hankey; Answer, Viscount Sandon 1602

Treaty of Berlin—The Greek Frontier—Question, Sir Charles W. Dilke; Answer, Mr. Bourke 1603

Army—The Zulu War—The Army Reserve—Question, Sir Henry Havelock; Answer, Colonel Stanley 1603

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ORDERS OF THE DAY.

Supply—Order for Committee read:—Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair:"—

Education Department—School Inspectors—Resolution—

Amendment proposed,

To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "in the opinion of this House, arrangements ought to be at once made to provide that in future, before being appointed to an independent post, newly appointed School Inspectors should have one year's training under an experienced Inspector, unless they have been previously engaged in the education of children for a sufficient time to make this unnecessary,"—(*Mr. Rathbone*,)—instead thereof .. 1607

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question:"—After short debate, Question put, and *agreed to*.

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THE NEW FOREST — STONY CROSS INCLOSURE—Question, Mr. Fawcett; Answer, Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson 1654

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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS—REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION—Question, Mr. Hanbury-Tracy; Answer, Mr. Stephen Cave 1655

CORONERS BILL—THE SELECT COMMITTEE—Question, Mr. Pell; Answer, Mr. Assheton Cross 1655

FACTORY LEGISLATION (INDIA)—Question, Mr. Anderson; Answer, Mr. E. Stanhope 1656

THE SLAVE TRADE IN THE RED SEA—Question, Mr. Anderson; Answer, Mr. Bourke 1656

FINANCE—EXCHEQUER BONDS—Questions, Mr. Whitwell, Mr. Childers; Answers, The Chancellor of the Exchequer 1657

THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS—THE PERAK EXPEDITION—MEDALS—Question, Colonel North; Answer, Colonel Stanley 1657

DIVINITY SCHOOL—DUBLIN UNIVERSITY—Question, Mr. Plunket; Answer, Mr. J. Lowther 1658

ORDERS OF THE DAY.

PARLIAMENT — BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE — RESOLUTION. [ADJOURNED DEBATE]—

Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Amendment proposed to the First Resolution, as amended [20th February].

Question again proposed:—Debate *resumed* 1658

After short debate, Amendment proposed to the said proposed Amendment, to insert, after the word "Amendment," the words "or Notice,"—(*Sir Charles W. Dilke.*)

Question proposed, "That the words 'or Notice' be there inserted:"—After further short debate, Amendment to the proposed Amendment, and Original Amendment, by leave, *withdrawn.*

Amendment proposed,

After the word "shall," in line 3, of the First Resolution, to insert the words "except on first going into Committee on the ordinary Army, Navy, or Civil Service Estimates respectively,"—(*Sir Charles W. Dilke*) 1666

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted:"—After short debate, Amendment, by leave, *withdrawn.*

Amendment proposed,

At the end of the First Resolution, to add the words "except an Amendment relative to the Class of Estimates which has been set down for consideration on that day be moved, in which case Mr. Speaker shall be bound to propose the question in respect of such Amendment: Provided always, That the Member of the Government who proposes to move the Estimates upon that day may make his statement with Mr. Speaker in the Chair,"—(*Mr. Beresford Hope*) 1669

Question proposed, "That those words be there added:"—After short debate, Question put:—The House *divided;* Ayes 79, Noes 191; Majority 112.—(Div. List, No. 20.)

Amendment proposed,

At the end of the First Resolution, to add the words "unless on going into Committee an Amendment be moved or Question asked relevant to the Votes to be considered on that day,"—(*Sir Charles W. Dilke*) 1674

Question proposed, "That those words be there added:"—After short debate, Amendment, by leave, *withdrawn.*

Amendment proposed,

At the end of the First Resolution, to add the words "unless an Amendment be moved relating to the Class of Estimates proposed to be taken in Supply on first going into Committee on the Army, Navy, and Civil Services respectively,"—(*Sir Walter B. Barttelot*) 1676

Question proposed, "That those words be there added."

PARLIAMENT—BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE—RESOLUTION—*continued.*

Amendment proposed to the said proposed Amendment, after the word "moved," to insert the words "or Question raised,"—(*Sir Charles W. Dilke.*)

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted:"—Question put, and *agreed to.*

Question again proposed,

"That the words 'unless an Amendment be moved or Question raised relating to the Class of Estimates proposed to be taken in Supply on first going into Committee on the Army, Navy, and Civil Services respectively,' be there added" .. 1677

Amendment proposed, to leave out the words "Class of,"—(*Mr. Whitwell.*)

Question, "That the words 'Class of' stand part of the proposed Amendment," put, and *negatived.*

Question again proposed,

"That the words, 'unless an Amendment be moved or Question raised relating to the Estimates proposed to be taken in Supply on first going into Committee on the Army, Navy, and Civil Services respectively,' be there added."

Amendment proposed,

After the words "Navy and," to insert the words "the several Classes of the,"—(*Mr. Mitchell Henry.*)

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted:"—After short debate, Question put:—The House *divided;* Ayes 49, Noes 88; Majority 39.—(Div. List, No. 21.)

Question again proposed,

"That the words, unless an Amendment be moved or Question raised relating to the Estimates proposed to be taken in Supply on first going into Committee on the Army, Navy, and Civil Services respectively,' be there added" 1684

Amendment proposed to the said proposed Amendment,

After the word "Services," to insert the words "and the Classes relating to Law, Justice, Education, and Public Works in Ireland,"—(*Mr. O'Donnell.*)

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted:"—After short debate, Question put:—The House *divided;* Ayes 31, Noes 131; Majority 100.—(Div. List, No. 22.)

Question,

"That the words 'unless an Amendment be moved relating to the Estimates proposed to be taken in Supply, on first going into Committee on the Army, Navy, and Civil Services respectively,' be added to the First Resolution,"

—put, and *agreed to.*

Main Question, as amended, proposed,

"That, whenever the Committee of Supply appointed for the consideration of the ordinary Army, Navy, and Civil Service Estimates stands as the first Order of the Day on a Monday, Mr. Speaker shall leave the Chair without putting any Question, unless an Amendment be moved or Question raised relating to the Estimates proposed to be taken in Supply on first going into Committee on the Army, Navy, and Civil Services respectively" 1693

Amendment proposed,

At the end of the Question, to add the words "unless Notice has been given of an Amendment to be offered to the Question calling attention to any grievance arising out of the conduct of the Government or the administration of the Laws,"—(*Mr. Parnell.*)

Question proposed, "That those words be there added:"—After short debate, Question put:—The House *divided;* Ayes 47, Noes 139; Majority 92.—(Div. List, No. 23.)

Main Question, as amended, again proposed.

PARLIAMENT—BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE—RESOLUTION—*continued.*

Amendment proposed,

At the end of the Question, to add the words "and on Fridays Notices of Motion shall have precedence of Orders of the Day,"—(*Mr. O'Connor Power*) 1697

Question proposed, "That those words be there added:"—After short debate, Question put:—The House *divided;* Ayes 50, Noes 139; Majority 89.—(Div. List, No. 24.)

Main Question, as amended, again proposed.

Amendment proposed,

At the end of the Question, to add the words "Provided always, That when Notice of a Motion has been given which, but for this Rule, would have been moved on a Monday, the next succeeding Committee of Ways and Means shall be a first Order of the Day, and Notices applicable on going into Committee of Supply on Monday shall be transferred to going into Committee on Ways and Means,"—(*Mr. Biggar*) .. 1700

Question proposed, "That those words be there added:"—After short debate, Amendment, by leave, *withdrawn.*

Main Question, as amended, put:—The House *divided;* Ayes 130, Noes 50; Majority 80.—(Div. List, No. 25.)

After short debate, Further Consideration of Resolutions relating to the Business of the House *deferred* till *Thursday* 6th March.

Assizes Bill [Bill 83]—

Moved, "That the Bill be now read a second time,"—(*Sir Matthew Ridley*) 1702

After short debate, Motion *agreed to*:—Bill read a second time, and *committed* for *Thursday.*

HABITUAL DRUNKARDS [SALARIES, STAMP DUTY, &C.]—

Considered in Committee 1704

Resolution *agreed to;* to be reported *To-morrow.*

Habitual Drunkards Bill [Bill 47]—

Order for Committee read:—*Moved,* "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair,"—(*Dr. Cameron*) 1704

Motion *agreed to*:—Bill *considered* in Committee.

After some time spent therein, Committee report Progress; to sit again upon *Wednesday.*

Prenuptial Contracts Bill [Bill 60]—

Order for Second Reading read 1721

Second Reading *deferred* till *Wednesday.* [House counted out.]

LORDS, TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 25.

Medical Act, 1858, Amendment Bill—

Bill to amend the Medical Act, 1858—*Presented* (*The Lord President*) .. 1722

After short debate, Bill read 1ª (No. 16.)

RAILWAYS—WRIT OF ELEGIT—Question, Observations, The Duke of St. Albans; Reply, The Earl of Redesdale 1727

COMMONS, TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 25.

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PRIVATE BUSINESS.

Leadenhall Market and Improvements Bill (*by Order*)—

Moved, "That the Bill be now read a second time,"—(*Sir Charles Forster*) 1729

Amendment proposed, to leave out the word "now," and at the end of the Question to add the words "upon this day six months,"—(*Sir Charles W. Dilke.*)

Question proposed, "That the word 'now' stand part of the Question:" —After short debate, Amendment, by leave, *withdrawn.*

Main Question put, and *agreed to* :—Bill read a second time.

Moved, "That the Bill be committed to a Select Committee,"—(*Mr. James* :)—Question put:—The House *divided;* Ayes 83, Noes 137; Majority 54.—(Div. List, No. 28 :)—Bill *committed.*

QUESTIONS.

CRIMINAL LAW—THE REV. H. J. DODWELL—Question, Mr. J. Cowen; Answer, Mr. Assheton Cross 1748

PAROCHIAL BOARD (SCOTLAND)—LEGISLATION—Question, Mr. Hibbert; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth 1749

SOUTH AFRICA — THE ZULU WAR — PRESBYTERIAN AND WESLEYAN CHAPLAINS—Questions, Mr. Cowan, Mr. Waddy; Answers, Colonel Stanley 1749

EMPLOYERS LIABILITY—Question, Mr. Macdonald; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer 1750

NAVY PROMOTION — ORDER IN COUNCIL, 1872—Question, Mr. Serjeant Simon; Answer, Mr. W. H. Smith 1750

EDUCATION DEPARTMENT — INDUSTRIAL SCHOOLS—Questions, Mr. W. E. Forster; Answers, Lord George Hamilton 1751

EGYPT—DESPATCH OF SHIPS OF WAR—Question, Mr. Elliot; Answer, Mr. W. H. Smith 1752

ARMY — THE 24TH REGIMENT — OFFICERS — Question, Major O'Gorman; Answer, Colonel Stanley 1752

EDUCATION DEPARTMENT — OFFENDING TEACHERS —Question, Mr. J. C. Brown; Answer, Lord George Hamilton 1752

CONTAGIOUS DISEASES (ANIMALS) ACT, 1878—MERSEY DOCK AND HARBOUR BOARD—Question, Mr. Mac Iver; Answer, Lord George Hamilton .. 1753

MEETING OF THE HOUSE—

Resolved, That this House will meet To-morrow at Two of the clock,—(*Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer.*)

MOTIONS.

BANK DEPOSITS—RESOLUTION—

Moved, "That, in the opinion of this House, it is worthy of the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, whether a moderate and discriminating scale of Stamp or composition Duties may, with advantage to the interests of the Country and of the Banks, be hereafter applied to all interest-bearing deposits in the Banks of the United Kingdom, and whether a Bill on the subject should be introduced to Parliament at an early date,"—(*Sir Joseph M'Kenna*) 1754

After debate, Motion, by leave, *withdrawn.*

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LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE WATER SUPPLY—MOTION FOR AN ADDRESS—
Moved, "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying Her Majesty to issue a Royal Commission to inquire into the supply of water to the manufacturing districts of Lancashire and the West of Yorkshire, and any deficiencies likely to arise therein; and, whether it is necessary or expedient to resort to the Westmoreland and Cumberland Lakes to make good any deficiencies in such supply; and, if so, to what extent, and under what conditions, such resort should be sanctioned,"—(*Mr. Edward Howard*) 1773
After short debate, Motion, by leave, *withdrawn.*

PUBLIC ACCOUNTS—Members nominated to the Committee 1790

Parliamentary Franchise Bill—*Ordered* (*Mr. Elliot, Mr. Rodwell, Mr. Serjeant Spinks*) 1790

Friendly Societies Act (1875) Amendment Bill—*Ordered* (*Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson*) 1790

[House counted out.]

COMMONS, WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 26.

ORDER OF THE DAY.

Consecration of Churchyards Act (1867) Amendment Bill—
Moved, "That the Bill be now read a second time,"—(*Mr. Monk*) .. 1791
Amendment proposed, to leave out the word "now," and at the end of the Question to add the words "upon this day six months,"—(*Mr. Ernest Noel.*)
Question proposed, "That the word 'now' stand part of the Question:" —After debate, Question put:—The House *divided;* Ayes 129, Noes 160; Majority 31.—(Div. List, No. 29.)
Words *added*:—Main Question, as amended, put, and *agreed to*:—Second Reading *put off* for six months.

MOTIONS.

HALL-MARKING (GOLD AND SILVER)—
Select Committee *appointed*, "to inquire into the operation of the Acts relating to the Hall-Marking of Gold and Silver manufactures,"—(*Sir Henry Jackson.*)
And, on March 5, Committee *nominated*:—List of the Committee .. 1822

Medical Act (1858) Amendment (No. 2) Bill—*Ordered* (*Mr. Arthur Mills, Mr. Childers, Mr. Goldney*); *presented*, and read the first time [Bill 86] 1822

Watch-Cases (Hall-Marking) Bill—*Considered* in Committee:—Resolution *agreed to*, and *reported*:—Bill *ordered* (*Sir Henry Jackson, Mr. Eaton, Sir Andrew Lusk, Mr. Torr*); *presented*, and read the first time [Bill 87] 1822

LORDS, THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 27.

THE PLAGUE IN RUSSIA—SANITARY PRECAUTIONS—Question, Observations, The Earl of Carnarvon; Reply, The Duke of Richmond and Gordon .. 1823
SOUTH AFRICA—THE ZULU WAR—DESPATCHES—Question, Earl Granville; Answer, Earl Cadogan 1825
FAIRS AND MARKETS (IRELAND) — Question, Observations, Viscount Midleton; Reply, The Duke of Richmond and Gordon 1826

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PRIVATE BILLS—
Standing Orders Committee *appointed*:—List of the Committee .. 1827

OPPOSED PRIVATE BILLS—
Committee *appointed*:—List of the Committee 1827

OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF THE PARLIAMENTS AND OFFICE OF THE GENTLEMAN USHER OF THE BLACK ROD—
Select Committee *appointed*:—List of the Committee 1827

COMMONS, THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 27.

QUESTIONS.

FRENCH LAW OF BANKRUPTCY—THE BANKRUPTCY BILL—Question, Sir George Bowyer; Answer, Mr. Assheton Cross 1828
ARMY—MILITIA FINES—Question, Colonel Naghten; Answer, Colonel Stanley 1829
TURKEY—LOANS—Question, Sir George Campbell; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer 1829
CRIMINAL LAW (SCOTLAND)—CASE OF MR. BARR—Question, Mr. J. W. Barclay; Answer, The Lord Advocate 1829
SOUTH AFRICA—THE DESPATCHES—Question, Lord Robert Montagu; Answer, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach 1830
CRIMINAL LAW PUNISHMENT—ADMISSION OF THE PRESS—Questions, Mr. P. A. Taylor, Mr. Paget; Answers, Mr. Assheton Cross .. 1831
ARMY—MILITIA TRAINING—Question, Viscount Emlyn; Answer, Colonel Stanley 1832
ARMY (INDIA)—PAYMENT OF TRAVELLING EXPENSES—THE 3RD HUSSARS—Question, Major O'Beirne; Answer, Mr. E. Stanhope 1832
POLICE SUPERANNUATION—LEGISLATION—Question, Sir Charles Russell; Answer, Mr. Assheton Cross 1833
CUSTOMS BILL OF ENTRY—THE COMMISSION ON OFFICIAL STATISTICS—Question, Mr. Rylands; Answer, Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson .. 1833
ENGLAND AND PORTUGAL—THE COMMERCIAL RELATIONS—Question, Mr. W. Cartwright; Answer, Mr. Bourke 1833
THE PLAGUE IN RUSSIA — SANITARY PRECAUTIONS — Question, Mr. Puleston; Answer, Lord George Hamilton 1834
SOUTH AFRICA—THE ZULU WAR—THE DESPATCHES—Question, Sir Charles W. Dilke; Answer, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach 1834
POOR LAW (IRELAND) — REMOVAL OF IRISH PAUPERS — Question, Mr. O'Donnell; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth 1835
THE TREATY OF BERLIN—RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN BULGARIA—Question, Mr. O'Donnell; Answer, Mr. Bourke 1835
ARMY — THE 24TH REGIMENT — APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS—Question, Major O'Gorman; Answer, Colonel Stanley 1836
IRELAND—CORK AND MACROOM RAILWAY—ACTION AGAINST DIRECTORS—Question, Major O'Gorman [No Answer] 1837
SUPPLY—SUPPLEMENTARY VOTE OF CREDIT—THE QUEEN'S COLLEGES IN IRELAND — Question, Major Nolan; Answer, Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson 1837
ARMY — THE TRANSPORT SERVICE — Question, Sir Baldwyn Leighton; Answer, Colonel Stanley 1837
ARMY—SERGEANT INSTRUCTORS OF VOLUNTEERS—Question, Colonel Barne; Answer, Colonel Stanley 1838
SOUTH AFRICA—THE ZULU WAR — THE RE-INFORCEMENTS—Question, Mr. Whitwell; Answer, Colonel Stanley 1838

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SUPPLY—THE SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATES, 1878—THE KAFFIR WAR—Question, Mr. Whitwell; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer .. 1838

CRIMINAL LAW—THE CONVICT CASTRO OR ORTON—Question, Dr. Kenealy; Answer, Mr. Assheton Cross 1840

PARLIAMENT—PRIVILEGE—THE PRESS—Observations, Mr. Mitchell Henry 1841

Moved, "That the said article contains libellous reflections upon certain Members of this House in breach of the Privileges of this House,"—(*Mr. Mitchell Henry*) .. 1847

After short debate, Motion, by leave, *withdrawn.*

ORDERS OF THE DAY—

Moved, "That the Orders of the Day subsequent to Supply be postponed until after the Order of Leave for a Bill relating to the Discipline and Regulation of the Army,"—(*Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer*) 1853

After short debate, Motion *agreed to.*

ORDERS OF THE DAY.

SUPPLY—Order for Committee read:—

SOUTH AFRICA—THE ZULU WAR—THE VOTE OF CREDIT—Observations, The Chancellor of the Exchequer 1854

Moved, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair,"—(*Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer*:)—Short debate thereon.

ARMY—THE ARTILLERY—BREECH-LOADING AND MUZZLE-LOADING GUNS—RESOLUTION—Amendment proposed,

To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "the great difference which exists between our cannon and those which find favour with Foreign Powers calls for careful investigation, and that it would be unwise to further postpone experiments on such classes of breech-loading guns as are now possessed by other Powers,"—(*Major Nolan,*)—instead thereof .. 1861

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question:—After short debate, Motion, by leave, *withdrawn.*

ARMY ORGANIZATION—THE BRIGADE DEPÔT SYSTEM—RESOLUTION—

Amendment proposed,

To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "in the opinion of this House, the Brigade Depôt system requires amendment, as it is costly, unsatisfactory, and inadequate to the requirements of home and foreign service,"—(*Major O'Beirne,*)—instead thereof 1872

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question:"—After short debate, Question put, and *agreed to.*

PUBLIC BUSINESS—QUESTION OF PROCEDURE—Observations, Mr. Rylands 1878

Main Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," put, and *agreed to.*

SUPPLY—*considered* in Committee—EXCHEQUER BONDS.

(In the Committee.)

(1.) £2,750,000, Exchequer Bonds.—After short debate, Vote *agreed to* .. 1881

(2.) £1,500,000, War in South Africa (Vote of Credit).—After debate, Vote *agreed to* 1888

Resolutions to be reported *To-morrow;* Committee to sit again *To-morrow.*

MOTION.

Army Discipline and Regulation Bill—

Moved, "That leave be given to bring in a Bill to amend the Law relating to Discipline and Regulation of the Army,"—(*Colonel Stanley*) 1909

After short debate, Question put, and *agreed to*:—Bill *ordered* (*Mr. Secretary Stanley, Mr. Secretary Cross, Mr. William Henry Smith, The Judge Advocate General.*)

ORDERS OF THE DAY.

Assizes Bill [Bill 83]—

Order for Committee read 1935

After short debate, Bill *considered* in Committee.

After short time spent therein, Bill *reported*, without Amendment; to be read the third time *To-morrow.*

Summary Jurisdiction Bill [Bill 69]—

Moved, "That the Bill be now read a second time,"—(*Mr. Assheton Cross*) 1939

After short debate, Motion *agreed to*:—Bill read a second time, and *committed* to a Select Committee.

And, on March 18, Committee *nominated*:—List of the Committee .. 1940

Ancient Monuments Bill [Bill 52]—

Committee [*Progress* 14*th February*] 1941

Committee *deferred* till *To-morrow.* [House counted out.]

LORDS, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 28.

ARMY EDUCATION — LITERARY AND PHYSICAL COMPETITIONS—Observations, Earl Fortescue; Reply, Viscount Bury:—Debate thereon .. 1941

COMMONS, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 28.

PRIVATE BUSINESS.

Thames River (*Prevention of Floods*) *Bill* (*by Order*)—

Moved, "That the Bill be now read a second time,"—(*Sir James M'Garel-Hogg*) 1958

After short debate, Motion *agreed to*:—Bill read a second time.

Moved, "That the Bill be committed to a Select Committee of Eleven Members, Six to be appointed by the House, and Five by the Committee of Selection, and that the Report of the Select Committee of 1877 be referred to the said Committee:—That all Petitions against the Bill be referred to the Committee, and that such Petitioners as pray to be heard by themselves, their Counsel, or Agents, be heard upon their Petitions, if they think fit, and Counsel heard in favour of the Bill against such Petitioners:—That the Committee have power to alter and modify the Bill as regards the incidence of taxation for the works proposed to be authorized by the Bill."

Amendment proposed,

In line 5, after the word "Bill," to insert the words "presented on or before the 8th day of March,"—(*Sir James M'Garel-Hogg.*)

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted."

Question put, and *agreed to*:—Main Question, as amended, put, and *agreed to.*

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QUESTIONS.

Representation of the City—The Fanmakers Company—Question, Mr. W. H. James; Answer, Mr. Assheton Cross 1973

Ireland — Report of the Poor Law and Lunacy Commissioners—Question, Mr. French; Answer, Mr. J. Lowther 1974

South Africa—The Zulu War—Further Despatches—Question, The Marquess of Hartington; Answer, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach .. 1974

ORDERS OF THE DAY.

Supply—Order for Committee read; Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair:"—

Indian Finance—The Government of India Act, 1858—Motion for a Select Committee—Amendment proposed,

To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into and report upon the operation of 'The Government of India Act, 1858,' and the other Acts amending the same,"—(*Mr. Fawcett,*)—instead thereof 1975

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question:"—After long debate, Question put:—The House *divided;* Ayes 139, Noes 100; Majority 39.—(Div. List, No. 30.)

Main Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," by leave, *withdrawn:*—Committee *deferred* till *Monday* next.

Supply—Report—Resolutions [27th February] *reported* 2034

Our Policy in South Africa—Observations, Mr. O'Donnell .. 2034

Resolutions *agreed to.*

Valuation of Property Bill [Bill 71]—

Moved, "That the Bill be now read a second time,"—(*Mr. Sclater-Booth*) 2036

Amendment proposed,

To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "no Valuation Bill, providing in a Valuation List a common authority for the assessment of rates and taxes, can be satisfactory unless it provide a common measure of value for such assessment by levying Imperial taxes as well as local rates upon the rateable value,"—(*Mr. Hubbard,*)—instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question:"—After short debate, Amendment, by leave, *withdrawn.*

Main Question put, and *agreed to:*—Bill read a second time, and *committed* for *Thursday* next.

Assizes Bill [Bill 83]—

Bill read the third time 2048

Moved, "That the Bill do pass,"—(*Sir Matthew Ridley.*)

Moved, "That the Debate be now adjourned,"—(*Mr. Cole:*)—After short debate, Motion, by leave, *withdrawn.*

Original Question put, and *agreed to:*—Bill *passed.*

Select Vestries Bill [Bill 54]—

Moed, "That the Bill be now read a second time,"—(*Mr. James*) .. 2052

Moved, "That the Debate be now adjourned,"—(*Mr. Sclater-Boooth:*)—After short debate, Motion *agreed to:*—Debate adjourned till *Friday* next.

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Ancient Monuments Bill [Bill 50]—

Bill *considered* in Committee [*Progress 21st February*] 2053

After short time spent therein, Bill *reported;* as amended, to be considered upon *Monday* 10th March, and to be *printed.* [Bill 89.]

MOTION.

ARMY OFFICERS (GUARDS AND LINE)—MOTION FOR AN ADDRESS—

Moved, "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying Her Majesty that She will be graciously pleased to give directions that there be laid before this House a Return of the nominal roll of all Officers (Guards and Line) who have volunteered for service at the Cape, distinguishing those who have passed the Staff College,"—(*Major O'Gorman*) 2063

After short debate, Question put:—The House *divided;* Ayes None, Noes 53—(Div. List, No. 34.)

ORDER OF THE DAY.

WAYS AND MEANS—

Considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

(1.) *Resolved,* That, towards raising the Supply granted to Her Majesty, the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury be authorised to raise on or before the 31st March 1879, any sum of money not exceeding £4,250,000, by an issue of Exchequer Bonds.

(2.) *Resolved,* That the principal of all Exchequer Bonds which may be so issued shall be paid off at par, at the expiration of one year from the date of such Bonds.

(3.) *Resolved,* That the interest of such Exchequer Bonds shall be payable half-yearly, and shall be charged upon and issued out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom, or the growing produce thereof.

(4.) *Resolved,* That, towards making good the Supply granted to Her Majesty for the service of the year ending on the 31st day of March 1879, the sum of £4,250,000 be granted out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom.

Resolutions *agreed to,* to be reported upon *Monday* next; Committee to sit again upon *Monday* next.

MOTIONS.

Petty Customs (Scotland) Abolition Act Amendment Bill—*Ordered* (*Mr. James Barclay, Mr. Cowan*); *presented,* and read the first time [Bill 91] 2064

Vaccination Acts (Ireland) Amendment Bill—*Ordered* (*Mr. James Lowther, Mr. Attorney General for Ireland*); *presented,* and read the first time [Bill 90] .. 2064

TWENTY-FIRST PARLIAMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM.

LORDS.

Friday, December 6, 1878.

Hugh MacCalmont Lord Cairns, Lord Chancellor of Great Britain, created a Viscount and Earl of the United Kingdom, by the style and title of Viscount Garmoyle in the County of Antrim, and Earl Cairns.

SAT FIRST.

Monday, December 9, 1878.

The Lord Windsor.

COMMONS.

NEW WRITS ISSUED.

During Recess—

For *Truro City*, *v.* Sir Frederick Martin Williams, baronet, deceased.
For *Peterborough Borough*, *v.* George Hammond Whalley, esquire, deceased.

Thursday, December 5, 1878.

For *Maldon*, *v.* George Montagu Warren Sandford, esquire, Manor of Northstead.
For *Bristol*, *v.* Kirkman Daniel Hodgson, esquire, Chiltern Hundreds.

Monday, December 9.

For *Londonderry County*, *v.* Richard Smyth, esquire, deceased.
For *Borough of New Ross*, *v.* John Dunbar, esquire, deceased.

Thursday, February 13, 1879.

For *Norfolk County* (*Northern Division*), *v.* Colonel James Duff, deceased.
For *Cambridge County*, *v.* Hon. Eliot Constantine Yorke, deceased.
For *Cork County*, *v.* Timothy M'Carthy Downing, esquire, deceased.
For *South Warwickshire*, *v.* Earl of Yarmouth, Controller of Her Majesty's Household.
For *Haddington District of Burghs*, *v.* Lord William Hay, now Marquess of Tweeddale.

NEW MEMBERS SWORN.

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1878.

Peterborough—Honble. William John Wentworth Fitz-William.
County of Argyll—Lord Colin Campbell.
Newcastle-under-Lyme—Samuel Rathbone Edge, esquire.
Truro—Arthur Tremayne, esquire.

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 12.

Maldon—George Courtauld, esquire.

MONDAY, DECEMBER 16.

Bristol—Lewis Fry, esquire.

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 1879.

Norfolk County (*Northern Division*)—Edward Birkbeck, esquire.
Cambridge County—Edward Hicks, esquire.

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 14.

New Ross Borough—Lieutenant Colonel Charles George Tottenham.
Londonderry County—Sir Thomas M'Clure, baronet.

FRIDAY FEBRUARY 21.

Warwick County (*Southern Division*)—Earl of Yarmouth.
Cork County—Colonel Daniel La Zouche Colthurst.

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 27.

Haddington District of Burghs—Sir David Wedderburn, baronet.

THE MINISTRY

Of the Right Honourable the Earl of BEACONSFIELD,

At the Commencement of the Sixth Session of the 21st Parliament,

December 5, 1878.

THE CABINET.

First Lord of the Treasury	Right Hon. Earl of Beaconsfield, K.G.
Lord Chancellor	Right Hon. Earl Cairns.
President of the Council	His Grace the Duke of Richmond and Gordon, K.G.
Lord Privy Seal	His Grace the Duke of Northumberland.
Chancellor of the Exchequer.	Right Hon. Sir Stafford Henry Northcote, Bt.
Secretary of State, Home Department	Right Hon. Richard Assheton Cross.
Secretary of State, Foreign Department	Most Hon. Marquess of Salisbury.
Secretary of State for the Colonies	Right Hon. Sir Michael Edward Hicks-Beach, Bt.
Secretary of State for War	Right Hon. Frederick Arthur Stanley.
Secretary of State for India	Right Hon. Viscount Cranbrook.
First Lord of the Admiralty	Right Hon. William Henry Smith.
Postmaster General	Right Hon. Lord John J. R. Manners.
President of the Board of Trade	Right Hon. Viscount Sandon.

NOT IN THE CABINET.

Field Marshal Commanding in Chief	H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, K.G.
Chief Commissioner of Works and Public Buildings	Right Hon. Gerard James Noel.
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster	Right Hon. Thomas Edward Taylor.
Vice President of the Committee of Council for Education	Right Hon. Lord George Hamilton.
President of the Local Government Board	Right Hon. George Sclater-Booth.
Lords of the Treasury	Viscount Crichton. Rowland Winn, Esq. Sir James Dalrymple Horn Elphinstone, Bt.
Lords of the Admiralty	Admiral George Greville Wellesley, Rear Admiral A. W. A. Hood, Rear Admiral Lord Gilford, and Sir Massey Lopes, Bart.
Joint Secretaries of the Treasury	Sir William Hart Dyke, Bart. Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson, Bt.
Secretary of the Admiralty	Hon. Algernon T. Fulke Egerton.
Secretary to the Board of Trade	J. G. Talbot, Esq.
Secretary to the Local Government Board	Thomas Salt, Esq.
Under Secretary, Home Department	Sir Matthew White Ridley, Bt.
Under Secretary, Foreign Department	Hon. Robert Bourke.
Under Secretary for Colonies	Right Hon. Earl Cadogan.
Under Secretary for War	Right Hon. Viscount Bury.
Under Secretary for India	Hon. Edward Stanhope.
Paymaster General	Right Hon. Stephen Cave.
Judge Advocate	Right Hon. George A. F. C. Bentinck.
Attorney General	Sir John Holker, Knt.
Solicitor General	Sir Hardinge S. Giffard, Knt.

SCOTLAND.

Lord Advocate	Right Hon. William Watson.
Solicitor General	John Hay A. Macdonald, Esq.

IRELAND.

Lord Lieutenant	His Grace the Duke of Marlborough, K.G.
Lord Chancellor	Right Hon. John Thomas Ball.
Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant	Right Hon. James Lowther.
Attorney General	Right Hon. Edward Gibson.
Solicitor General	H. Holmes, Esq.

QUEEN'S HOUSEHOLD.

Lord Steward	Right Hon. Earl Beauchamp.
Lord Chamberlain	Most Hon. Marquess of Hertford.
Master of the Horse	Right Hon. Earl of Bradford.
Treasurer of the Household	Right Hon. Lord Henry Thynne.
Comptroller of the Household	Right Hon. Lord Henry Somerset.
Vice Chamberlain of the Household	Viscount Barrington.
Captain of the Corps of Gentlemen at Arms	Right Hon. Earl of Coventry.
Captain of the Yeomen of the Guard	Right Hon. Lord Skelmersdale.
Master of the Buckhounds	Right Hon. Earl of Hardwicke.
Chief Equerry and Clerk Marshal	Lord Alfred H. Paget.
Mistress of the Robes	Her Grace the Duchess of Wellington.

ROLL OF THE
LORDS SPIRITUAL AND TEMPORAL

In the Sixth Session of the Twenty-first Parliament of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.

42_{o} VICTORIÆ 1878.

Mem.—*According to the Usage of Parliament, when the House appoints a Select Committee, the Lords appointed to serve upon it are named in the Order of their Rank, beginning with the Highest; and so, when the House sends a Committee to a Conference with the Commons, the Lord highest in Rank is called first, and the rest go forth in like Order: But when the Whole House is called over for any Purpose within the House, or for the Purpose of proceeding forth to Westminster Hall, or upon any public Solemnity, the Call begins invariably with the Junior Baron.*

His Royal Highness The Prince of Wales.
His Royal Highness Alfred Ernest Albert Duke of Edinburgh.
His Royal Highness Arthur William Patrick Albert Duke of Connaught and Strathearn.
His Royal Highness George William Frederick Charles Duke of Cambridge.
Archibald Campbell Archbishop of Canterbury.
Hugh Mac Calmont Earl Cairns, *Lord Chancellor.*
William Archbishop of York.
Charles Henry Duke of Richmond, *Lord President of the Council.*
Algernon George Duke of Northumberland, *Lord Privy Seal.*

Henry Duke of Norfolk, *Earl Marshal of England.*
Edward Adolphus Duke of Somerset.
Charles Henry Duke of Richmond. (*In another Place as Lord President of the Council.*)
William Henry Duke of Grafton.
Henry Charles Fitzroy Duke of Beaufort.
William Amelius Aubrey de Vere Duke of Saint Albans.
George Godolphin Duke of Leeds.
Francis Charles Hastings Duke of Bedford.
William Duke of Devonshire.
John Winston Duke of Marlborough.
Charles Cecil John Duke of Rutland.
William Alexander Louis Stephen Duke of Brandon. (*Duke of Hamilton.*)
William John Duke of Portland.
William Drogo Duke of Manchester.
Henry Pelham Alexander Duke of Newcastle.
Algernon George Duke of Northumberland. (*In another Place as Lord Privy Seal.*)
His Royal Highness Ernest Augustus William Adolphus George Frederick Duke of Cumberland and Teviotdale.
Arthur Richard Duke of Wellington.
Richard Plantagenet Campbell Duke of Buckingham and Chandos.
George Granville William Duke of Sutherland.
Harry George Duke of Cleveland.
Hugh Lupus Duke of Westminster.

Francis Hugh George Marquess of Hertford, *Lord Chamberlain of the Household.*
John Marquess of Winchester.
John Sholto Marquess of Queensberry. (*Elected for Scotland.*)
Henry Charles Keith Marquess of Lansdowne.
John Villiers Stuart Marquess Townshend.
Robert Arthur Talbot Marquess of Salisbury.
John Alexander Marquess of Bath.
James Marquess of Abercorn. (*Duke of Abercorn.*)
Francis Hugh George Marquess of Hertford. (*In another Place as Lord Chamberlain of the Household.*)
John Patrick Marquess of Bute.
William Alleyne Marquess of Exeter.

William Marquess of Northampton.
John Charles Marquess Camden.
Henry William George Marquess of Anglesey.
William Henry Hugh Marquess of Cholmondeley.
Ernest Augustus Charles Marquess of Ailesbury.
Frederick William John Marquess of Bristol.
Archibald Marquess of Ailsa.
George Augustus Constantine Marquess of Normanby.
George Frederick Samuel Marquess of Ripon.
William Marquess of Abergavenny.

Frederick Earl Beauchamp, *Lord Steward of the Household.*
Charles Henry John Earl of Shrewsbury.
Edward Henry Earl of Derby.
Francis Power Plantagenet Earl of Huntingdon.
George Robert Charles Earl of Pembroke and Montgomery.
William Reginald Earl of Devon.
Henry Charles Earl of Suffolk and Berkshire.
Rudolph William Basil Earl of Denbigh.
Francis William Henry Earl of Westmorland.
Montague Earl of Lindsey.
George Harry Earl of Stamford and Warrington.
George James Earl of Winchilsea and Nottingham.
George Philip Earl of Chesterfield.
John William Earl of Sandwich.
Arthur Algernon Earl of Essex.
William George Earl of Carlisle.
Walter Francis Earl of Doncaster. (*Duke of Buccleuch and Queensberry.*)
Anthony Earl of Shaftesbury.
——— Earl of Berkeley.
Montagu Earl of Abingdon.
Richard George Earl of Scarbrough.
George Thomas Earl of Albemarle.
George William Earl of Coventry.
Victor Albert George Earl of Jersey.
William Henry Earl Poulett.
Sholto John Earl of Morton. (*Elected for Scotland.*)
Walter Henry Earl of Mar and Kellie. (*Elected for Scotland.*)
Claude Earl of Strathmore and Kinghorn. (*Elected for Scotland.*)
George Earl of Haddington. (*Elected for Scotland.*)
David Graham Drummond Earl of Airlie. (*Elected for Scotland.*)
Dunbar James Earl of Selkirk. (*Elected for Scotland.*)
Sewallis Edward Earl Ferrers.
William Walter Earl of Dartmouth.
Charles Earl of Tankerville.
Heneage Earl of Aylesford.
Francis Thomas De Grey Earl Cowper.
Arthur Philip Earl Stanhope.
Thomas Augustus Wolstenholme Earl of Macclesfield.
Douglas Beresford Malise Ronald Earl Graham. (*Duke of Montrose.*)
William Frederick Earl Waldegrave.
Bertram Earl of Ashburnham.
Charles Wyndham Earl of Harrington.
Isaac Newton Earl of Portsmouth.
George Guy Earl Brooke and Earl of Warwick.
Augustus Edward Earl of Buckinghamshire.
William Thomas Spencer Earl Fitzwilliam.
Dudley Francis Earl of Guilford.
Charles Philip Earl of Hardwicke.
Henry Edward Earl of Ilchester.
Reginald Windsor Earl De La Warr.
Jacob Earl of Radnor.
John Poyntz Earl Spencer.
Allen Alexander Earl Bathurst.
Arthur Wills John Wellington Blundell Trumbull Earl of Hillsborough. (*Marquess of Downshire.*)
Edward Hyde Earl of Clarendon.
William David Earl of Mansfield.
John James Hugh Henry Earl Strange. (*Duke of Atholl.*)
William Henry Earl of Mount Edgcumbe.
Hugh Earl Fortescue.
Henry Howard Molyneux Earl of Carnarvon.
George Henry Earl Cadogan.
James Howard Earl of Malmesbury.

John Vansittart Danvers Earl of Lanesborough. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

Stephen Earl of Mount Cashell. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

Henry John Reuben Earl of Portarlington. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

Hugh Earl of Annesley. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

John Earl of Erne. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

Charles Francis Arnold Earl of Wicklow. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

John Henry Reginald Earl of Clonmell. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

George Charles Earl of Lucan. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

Somerset Richard Earl of Belmore. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

James Earl of Caledon. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

Francis Robert Earl of Rosslyn.

George Grimston Earl of Craven.

William Hillier Earl of Onslow.

Charles Earl of Romney.

Henry Thomas Earl of Chichester.

Thomas Earl of Wilton.

Edward James Earl of Powis.

Horatio Earl Nelson.

Lawrence Earl of Rosse. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

Sydney William Herbert Earl Manvers.

Horatio Earl of Orford.

Henry Earl Grey.

St. George Henry Earl of Lonsdale.

Dudley Earl of Harrowby.

Henry Thynne Earl of Harewood.

William Hugh Earl of Minto.

Alan Frederick Earl Cathcart.

James Walter Earl of Verulam.

Adelbert Wellington Brownlow Earl Brownlow.

William Gordon Cornwallis Earl of Saint Germans.

Albert Edmund Earl of Morley.

Orlando George Charles Earl of Bradford.

Frederick Earl Beauchamp. (*In another Place as Lord Steward of the Household.*)

William Henry Hare Earl of Bantry. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

John Earl of Eldon.

Richard William Penn Earl Howe.

Charles Somers Earl Somers.

John Edward Cornwallis Earl of Stradbroke.

George Henry Robert Charles William Earl Vane. (*Marquess of Londonderry.*)

William Pitt Earl Amherst.

John Frederick Vaughan Earl Cawdor.

William George Earl of Munster.

Robert Adam Philips Haldane Earl of Camperdown.

Thomas George Earl of Lichfield.

George Frederick D'Arcy Earl of Durham.

Granville George Earl Granville.

Henry Earl of Effingham.

Henry John Earl of Ducie.

Charles Alfred Worsley Earl of Yarborough.

James Henry Robert Earl Innes. (*Duke of Roxburghe.*)

Thomas William Earl of Leicester.

William Earl of Lovelace.

Lawrence Earl of Zetland.

Charles George Earl of Gainsborough.

Francis Charles Granville Earl of Ellesmere.

George Stevens Earl of Strafford.

William John Earl of Cottenham.

Henry Richard Charles Earl Cowley.

Archibald William Earl of Winton. (*Earl of Eglintoun.*)

William Earl of Dudley.

John Francis Stanley Earl Russell.

John Earl of Kimberley.

Richard Earl of Dartrey.

William Ernest Earl of Feversham.

Frederick Temple Earl of Dufferin.

John Robert Earl Sydney.

Henry George Earl of Ravensworth.

Edward Montagu Stuart Granville Earl of Wharncliffe.

Thomas George Earl of Northbrook.

Benjamin Earl of Beaconsfield.

John Thomas Earl of Redesdale.

Hugh Mac Calmont Earl Cairns. (*In another Place as Lord Chancellor.*)

Robert Viscount Hereford.

William Henry Viscount Strathallan. (*Elected for Scotland.*)

Henry Viscount Bolingbroke and St. John.

Evelyn Viscount Falmouth.

George Viscount Torrington.

Charles William Viscount Leinster. (*Duke of Leinster.*)

Francis Wheler Viscount Hood.

Mervyn Viscount Powerscourt. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

James Viscount Lifford. (*Elected for Ireland.*)
Edward Viscount Bangor. (*Elected for Ireland.*)
Hayes Viscount Doneraile. (*Elected for Ireland.*)
Cornwallis Viscount Hawarden. (*Elected for Ireland.*)
Carnegie Robert John Viscount St. Vincent.
Robert Viscount Melville.
William Wells Viscount Sidmouth.
George Frederick Viscount Templetown. (*Elected for Ireland.*)
John Campbell Viscount Gordon. (*Earl of Aberdeen.*)
Edward Fleetwood John Viscount Exmouth.
John Luke George Viscount Hutchinson. (*Earl of Donoughmore.*)
Richard Somerset Viscount Clancarty. (*Earl of Clancarty.*)
Wellington Henry Viscount Combermere.
Henry Charles Viscount Canterbury.
Rowland Clegg Viscount Hill.
Charles Stewart Viscount Hardinge.
George Stephens Viscount Gough.
Stratford Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe.
Charles Viscount Eversley.
Charles Viscount Halifax.
Alexander Nelson Viscount Bridport.
Edward Berkeley Viscount Portman.
Edward Viscount Cardwell.
Gathorne Viscount Cranbrook.

John Bishop of London.
Charles Bishop of Durham.
Edward Harold Bishop of Winchester.
Alfred Bishop of Llandaff.
Robert Bishop of Ripon.
John Thomas Bishop of Norwich.
James Colquhoun Bishop of Bangor.
Henry Bishop of Worcester.
Charles John Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol.
William Bishop of Chester.
Thomas Legh Bishop of St. Albans.
James Bishop of Hereford.
William Connor Bishop of Peterborough.
Christopher Bishop of Lincoln.
George Bishop of Salisbury.
Harvey Bishop of Carlisle.
Frederick Bishop of Exeter.
Arthur Charles Bishop of Bath and Wells.
John Fielder Bishop of Oxford.
James Bishop of Manchester.
Richard Bishop of Chichester.
Joshua Bishop of St. Asaph.
James Russell Bishop of Ely.
William Basil Bishop of St. David's.

Dudley Charles Lord De Ros.
Alfred Joseph Lord Mowbray.
George Manners, Lord Hastings.
Edward Southwell Lord De Clifford.
Thomas Crosby William Lord Dacre.
Charles Henry Rolle Lord Clinton.
Robert Nathaniel Cecil George Lord Zouche of Haryngworth.
Charles Edward Hastings Lord Botreaux. (*Earl of Loudoun.*)
Thomas Lord Camoys.
Henry Lord Beaumont.
Charles Edward Hastings Lord Hastings. (*Earl of Loudoun.*) (*In another Place as Lord Botreaux.*)
Henry Lord Willoughby de Broke.
Sackville George Lord Conyers.
George Lord Vaux of Harrowden.
Ralph Gordon Lord Wentworth.
Robert George Lord Windsor.
St. Andrew Lord St. John of Bletso.
Frederick George Lord Howard de Walden.
William Bernard Lord Petre.
Frederick Benjamin Lord Saye and Sele.
John Francis Lord Arundell of Wardour.
John Stuart Lord Clifton. (*Earl of Darnley.*)
John Baptist Joseph Lord Dormer.
George Henry Lord Teynham.
Henry Valentine Lord Stafford.
George Frederick William Lord Byron.
Charles Hugh Lord Clifford of Chudleigh.
William Coutts Lord Ashford.
Horace Courtenay Lord Forbes. (*Elected for Scotland.*)
Alexander Lord Saltoun. (*Elected for Scotland.*)
James Lord Sinclair. (*Elected for Scotland.*)
William Buller Fullerton Lord Elphinstone. (*Elected for Scotland.*)

Charles Lord Blantyre. (*Elected for Scotland.*)

Charles John Lord Colville of Culross. (*Elected for Scotland.*)

Alexander Hugh Lord Balfour of Burley. (*Elected for Scotland.*)

Richard Edmund Saint Lawrence Lord Boyle. (*Earl of Cork and Orrery.*)

George Lord Hay. (*Earl of Kinnoul.*)

Digby Wentworth Bayard Lord Middleton.

William John Lord Monson.

John George Brabazon Lord Ponsonby. (*Earl of Bessborough.*)

George Watson Lord Sondes.

Alfred Nathaniel Holden Lord Scarsdale.

George Florance Lord Boston.

Charles George Lord Lovel and Holland. (*Earl of Egmont.*)

Augustus Henry Lord Vernon.

Edward St. Vincent Lord Digby.

George Douglas Lord Sundridge. (*Duke of Argyll.*)

Edward Henry Julius Lord Hawke.

Henry Thomas Lord Foley.

Arthur de Cardonnel Lord Dinevor.

Thomas Lord Walsingham.

William Lord Bagot.

Charles Henry Lord Southampton.

John Richard Brinsley Lord Grantley.

George Bridges Harley Dennett Lord Rodney.

William Lord Berwick.

James Henry Legge Lord Sherborne.

John Henry De La Poer Lord Tyrone. (*Marquess of Waterford.*)

Henry Bentinck Lord Carleton. (*Earl of Shannon.*)

Charles Lord Suffield.

Dudley Wilmot Lord Dorchester.

Lloyd Lord Kenyon.

Charles Cornwallis Lord Braybrooke.

George Hamilton Lord Fisherwick. (*Marquess of Donegal.*)

Henry Charles Lord Gage. (*Viscount Gage.*)

Thomas John Lord Thurlow.

William George Lord Auckland.

Charles George Lord Lyttelton.

Henry George Lord Mendip. (*Viscount Clifden.*)

George Lord Stuart of Castle Stuart. (*Earl of Moray.*)

Alan Plantagenet Lord Stewart of Garlies. (*Earl of Galloway.*)

James George Henry Lord Saltersford. (*Earl of Courtown.*)

William Lord Brodrick. (*Viscount Midleton.*)

Frederick Henry William Lord Calthorpe.

Peter Robert Lord Gwydir.

Charles Robert Lord Carrington.

William Henry Lord Bolton.

George Lord Northwick.

Thomas Lyttleton Lord Lilford.

Thomas Lord Ribblesdale.

Edward Lord Dunsany. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

Theobald Fitz-Walter Lord Dunboyne. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

Edward Donough Lord Inchiquin. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

John Thomas William Lord Massy. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

Robert Lord Clonbrock. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

Edward Henry Churchill Lord Crofton. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

Dayrolles Blakeney Lord Ventry. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

Henry Francis Seymour Lord Moore. (*Marquess of Drogheda.*)

John Henry Wellington Graham Lord Loftus. (*Marquess of Ely.*)

William Lord Carysfort. (*Earl of Carysfort.*)

George Ralph Lord Abercromby.

Horace Lord Rivers.

Charles Edmund Lord Ellenborough.

Augustus Frederick Arthur Lord Sandys

Henry North Lord Sheffield. (*Earl of Sheffield.*)

John Cadwallader Lord Erskine.

George John Lord Monteagle. (*Marquess of Sligo.*)

George Arthur Hastings Lord Granard. (*Earl of Granard.*)

Hungerford Lord Crewe.

Alan Legge Lord Gardner.

John Thomas Lord Manners.

John Adrian Louis Lord Hopetoun. (*Earl of Hopetoun.*)

Richard Lord Castlemaine. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

Charles Lord Meldrum. (*Marquess of Huntly.*)

George Frederick Lord Ross. (*Earl of Glasgow.*)

William Willoughby Lord Grinstead. (*Earl of Enniskillen.*)

William Hale John Charles Lord Foxford. (*Earl of Limerick.*)

Francis George Lord Churchill.

George Robert Canning Lord Harris.

Reginald Charles Edward Lord Colchester.

Schomberg Henry Lord Ker. (*Marquess of Lothian.*)

George Henry Lord Minster. (*Marquess Conyngham.*)

James Edward William Theobald Lord Ormonde. (*Marquess of Ormonde.*)

Francis Lord Wemyss. (*Earl of Wemyss.*)

Robert Lord Clanbrassill. (*Earl of Roden.*)

William Lygon Lord Silchester. (*Earl of Longford.*)

Clotworthy John Eyre Lord Oriel. (*Viscount Massereene.*)

Hugh Lord Delamere.

George Cecil Weld Lord Forester.

John William Lord Rayleigh.

Edric Frederic Lord Gifford.

Hubert Lord Somerhill. (*Marquess of Clanricarde.*)

Alexander William Crawford Lord Wigan. (*Earl of Crawford and Balcarres.*)

Uchter John Mark Lord Ranfurly. (*Earl of Ranfurly.*)

George Lord De Tabley.

Charles Stuart Aubrey Lord Tenterden.

William Conyngham Lord Plunket.

William Henry Ashe Lord Heytesbury.

Archibald Philip Lord Rosebery. (*Earl of Rosebery.*)

Richard Lord Clanwilliam. (*Earl of Clanwilliam.*)

Edward Lord Skelmersdale.

William Draper Mortimer Lord Wynford.

William Henry Lord Kilmarnock. (*Earl of Erroll.*)

Arthur James Lord Fingall. (*Earl of Fingall.*)

William Philip Lord Sefton. (*Earl of Sefton.*)

Robert Bermingham Lord Clements. (*Earl of Leitrim.*)

Thomas Lord Kenlis. (*Marquess of Headfort.*)

William Lord Chaworth. (*Earl of Meath.*)

Charles Adolphus Lord Dunmore. (*Earl of Dunmore.*)

Augustus Frederick George Warwick Lord Poltimore.

Edward Mostyn Lord Mostyn.

Henry Spencer Lord Templemore.

Valentine Frederick Lord Cloncurry.

John St. Vincent Lord De Saumarez.

Lucius Bentinck Lord Hunsdon. (*Viscount Falkland.*)

Thomas Lord Denman.

William Frederick Lord Abinger.

Philip Lord De L'Isle and Dudley.

Alexander Hugh Lord Ashburton.

Edward Richard Lord Hatherton.

George Henry Charles Lord Strafford.

Archibald Brabazon Sparrow Lord Worlingham. (*Earl of Gosford.*)

William Frederick Lord Stratheden.

Geoffrey Dominick Augustus Frederick Lord Oranmore and Browne. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

Simon Lord Lovat.

William Bateman Lord Bateman.

James Molyneux Lord Charlemont. (*Earl of Charlemont.*)

Francis Alexander Lord Kintore. (*Earl of Kintore.*)

George Ponsonby Lord Lismore. (*Viscount Lismore.*)

Derrick Warner William Lord Rossmore.

Robert Shapland Lord Carew.

Charles Frederick Ashley Cooper Lord De Mauley.

Arthur Lord Wrottesley.

Charles Douglas Richard Lord Sudeley.

Frederick Henry Paul Lord Methuen.

Henry Edward John Lord Stanley of Alderley.

William Henry Lord Leigh.

Beilby Richard Lord Wenlock.

Charles Lord Lurgan.

Thomas Spring Lord Monteagle of Brandon.

James Lord Seaton.

Edward Arthur Wellington Lord Keane.

John Lord Oxenfoord. (*Earl of Stair.*)

Charles Crespigny Lord Vivian.

John Lord Congleton.

Denis St. George Lord Dunsandle and Clanconal. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

Victor Alexander Lord Elgin. (*Earl of Elgin and Kincardine.*)
William Henry Forester Lord Londesborough.
Samuel Jones Lord Overstone.
Charles Robert Claude Lord Truro.
Arthur Lord De Freyne.
Edward Burtenshaw Lord Saint Leonards.
Richard Henry Fitz-Roy Lord Raglan.
Gilbert Henry Lord Aveland.
Valentine Augustus Lord Kenmare. (*Earl of Kenmare.*)
Richard Bickerton Pemell Lord Lyons.
Edward Lord Belper.
James Lord Talbot de Malahide.
Robert Lord Ebury.
James Lord Skene. (*Earl Fife.*)
William George Lord Chesham.
Frederic Augustus Lord Chelmsford.
John Lord Churston.
John Charles Lord Strathspey. (*Earl of Seafield.*)
Henry Lord Leconfield.
William Tatton Lord Egerton.
Godfrey Charles Lord Tredegar.
Fitz Patrick Henry Lord Lyveden.
William Lord Brougham and Vaux.
Richard Luttrell Pilkington Lord Westbury.
Francis William Fitzhardinge Lord Fitzhardinge.
Luke George Lord Annaly.
Richard Monckton Lord Houghton.
William Lord Romilly.
James Lord Barrogill. (*Earl of Caithness.*)
Thomas Lord Clermont.
James Herbert Gustavus Meredyth Lord Meredyth. (*Lord Athlumney.*)
Windham Thomas Lord Kenry. (*Earl of Dunraven and Mount-Earl.*)
Charles Stanley Lord Monck. (*Viscount Monck.*)
John Major Lord Hartismere. (*Lord Henniker.*)
Edward Robert Lytton Lord Lytton.
Hedworth Hylton Lord Hylton.
Hugh Henry Lord Strathnairn.
Edward Gordon Lord Penrhyn.
Gustavus Russell Lord Brancepeth. (*Viscount Boyne.*)
John Henry Lord Kesteven.
John Lord Ormathwaite.
William Lord O'Neill.
Robert Cornelis Lord Napier.
Jenico William Joseph Lord Gormanston. (*Viscount Gormanston.*)
William Page Lord Hatherley.
John Laird Mair Lord Lawrence.
James Plaisted Lord Penzance.
John Lord Dunning. (*Lord Rollo.*)
James Lord Balinhard. (*Earl of Southesk.*)
William Lord Hare. (*Earl of Listowel.*)
Edward George Lord Howard of Glossop.
John Lord Castletown.
John Emerich Edward Lord Acton.
Thomas James Lord Robartes.
George Grenfell Lord Wolverton.
Fulke Southwell Lord Greville.
Thomas Lord O'Hagan.
William Lord Sandhurst.
John Arthur Douglas Lord Bloomfield.
Frederic Lord Blachford.
Francis Lord Ettrick. (*Lord Napier.*)
John Lord Hanmer.
Roundell Lord Selborne.
Gavin Lord Breadalbane. (*Earl of Breadalbane.*)
James Charles Herbert Welbore Ellis Lord Somerton. (*Earl of Normanton.*)
Robert Alexander Shafto Lord Waveney.
Henry Austin Lord Aberdare.
Edward Granville George Lord Lanerton.
James Lord Moncreiff.
John Duke Lord Coleridge.
William Lord Emly.
Chichester Samuel Lord Carlingford.
Thomas Francis Lord Cottesloe.
Edmund Lord Hammond.
John Somerset Lord Hampton.
John Lord Winmarleigh.
Cospatrick Alexander Lord Douglas. (*Earl of Home.*)
George Lord Ramsay. (*Earl of Dalhousie.*)
Arthur Edward Holland Grey Lord Grey de Radcliffe.
John Lord Fermanagh. (*In another Place as Earl of Erne.*)
William Richard Lord Harlech.
Henry Gerard Lord Alington.
John Lord Tollemache.
Robert Tolver Lord Gerard.
Mortimer Lord Sackville.
Colin Lord Blackburn. (*A Lord of Appeal in Ordinary.*)
Edward Strathearn Lord Gordon of Drumearn. (*A Lord of Appeal in Ordinary.*)
Richard Lord Airey.
Charles Bowyer Lord Norton.

LIST OF THE COMMONS.

THE NAMES OF MEMBERS

Returned to serve in the Twenty-first Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, summoned to meet at Westminster the Fifth Day of March, One Thousand Eight Hundred and Seventy-four, as by the several Returns filed in the Office of the Clerk of the Crown in Chancery appears: amended to the Opening of the Sixth Session on the 5th Day of December, 1878.

BEDFORD COUNTY.

Sir Richard Thomas Gilpin, bt.
Marquess of Tavistock.

BEDFORD.

Samuel Whitbread,
Frederick Charles Polhill-Turner.

BERKS COUNTY.

Robert Loyd-Lindsay,
John Walter,
Philip Wroughton.

READING.

George John Shaw Lefevre,
George Palmer.

WINDSOR (NEW).

Robert Richardson Gardner.

WALLINGFORD.

Edward Wells.

ABINGDON.

John Creemer Clarke.

BUCKINGHAM COUNTY.

Sir Robert Bateson Harvey, bt.,
Nathaniel Grace Lambert,
Hon. Thomas Francis Fremantle.

AYLESBURY.

Sir Nathaniel Mayer de Rothschild, bt.,
Samuel George Smith.

BUCKINGHAM.

Egerton Hubbard.

MARLOW (GREAT).

Thomas Owen Wethered.

WYCOMBE (CHEPPING).

Hon. William Henry Peregrine Carington.

CAMBRIDGE COUNTY.

Rt. hon. Henry Bouverie William Brand,
Hon. Eliot Constantine Yorke,
Benjamin Bridges Hunter Rodwell.

CAMBRIDGE (UNIVERSITY).

Rt. hon. Spencer Horatio Walpole,
Alexander James Beresford Beresford-Hope.

CAMBRIDGE.

Alfred George Marten,
Patrick Boyle Smollett.

EAST CHESHIRE.

William John Legh,
William Cunliffe Brooks.

MID CHESHIRE.

Hon. Wilbraham Egerton,
Piers Egerton Warburton.

WEST CHESHIRE.

Sir Philip de Malpas Grey Egerton, bt.,
Hon. Wilbraham Frederick Tollemache.

MACCLESFIELD.

William Coare Brocklehurst,
David Chadwick.

STOCKPORT.

Charles Henry Hopwood,
Frederick Pennington.

BIRKENHEAD.

David Mac Iver.

CHESTER.

Henry Cecil Raikes,
Rt. hon. John George Dodson.

CORNWALL COUNTY.

(Eastern Division.)

Sir Colman Rashleigh, bt.,
John Tremayne.

(Western Division.)

Sir John Saint Aubyn, bt.,
Arthur Pendarves Vivian.

TRURO.

Sir James M'Garel-Hogg, bt.,
Arthur Tremayne.

PENRYN AND FALMOUTH.

David James Jenkins,
Henry Thomas Cole.

BODMIN.

Hon. Edward Frederic Leveson-Gower.

LAUNCESTON.

Sir Hardinge Stanley Giffard, knt.

LISKEARD.

Leonard Henry Courtney.

HELSTON.

Adolphus William Young.

ST. IVES.

Charles Tyringham Praed.

CUMBERLAND COUNTY.

(Eastern Division.)

Hon. Charles Wentworth George Howard,
Edward Stafford Howard.

(Western Division.)

Hon. Percy Scawen Wyndham,
Rt. Hon. Jocelyn Francis Lord Muncaster.

CARLISLE.

Robert Ferguson,
Sir Wilfrid Lawson, bt.

COCKERMOUTH.

Isaac Fletcher.

WHITEHAVEN.

Rt. hon. George Augustus Frederick Cavendish Bentinck.

DERBY COUNTY.

(*North Derbyshire.*)

Lord George Henry Cavendish,
Augustus Peter Arkwright.

(*South Derbyshire.*)

Sir Henry Wilmot, bt.,
Thomas William Evans.

(*East Derbyshire.*)

Hon. Francis Egerton,
Francis Arkwright.

DERBY.

Michael Thomas Bass,
Samuel Plimsoll.

DEVON COUNTY.

(*North Devonshire.*)

Rt. hon. Sir Stafford Henry Northcote, bt.,
Sir Thomas Dyke Acland, bt.

(*East Devonshire.*)

Sir Lawrence Palk, bt.,
Sir John Henry Kennaway, bt.

(*South Devonshire.*)

Sir Lopes Massey Lopes, bt.,
John Carpenter Garnier.

TIVERTON.

Sir John Heathcoat Amory, bt.
Rt. hon. William Nathaniel Massey.

PLYMOUTH.

Edward Bates,
Sampson Samuel Lloyd.

BARNSTAPLE.

Thomas Cave,
Samuel Danks Waddy.

DEVONPORT.

John Henry Puleston,
George Edward Price.

TAVISTOCK.

Lord Arthur John Edward Russell.

EXETER.

Arthur Mills,
John George Johnson.

DORSET COUNTY.

John Floyer,
Hon. William Henry Berkeley Portman,
Hon. Edward Trafalgar Digby.

WEYMOUTH AND MELCOMBE REGIS.

Henry Edwards,
Sir Frederick John William Johnstone, bt.

DORCHESTER.

William Ernest Brymer.

BRIDPORT.

Pandeli Ralli.

SHAFTESBURY.

Vere Fane Benett-Stanford.

WAREHAM.

John Samuel Wanley Sawbridge Erle-Drax.

POOLE.

Hon. Anthony Evelyn Melbourne Ashley.

DURHAM COUNTY.

(*Northern Division.*)

Charles Mark Palmer,
Sir George Elliot, bt.

(*Southern Division.*)

Joseph Whitwell Pease,
Frederick Edward Blackett Beaumont.

DURHAM (CITY).

Farrer Herschell,
Sir Arthur Edward Middleton, bt.

SUNDERLAND.

Edward Temperley Gourley,
Sir Henry Marshman Havelock, bt.

GATESHEAD.

Walter Henry James.

SHIELDS (SOUTH).

James Cochran Stevenson.

DARLINGTON.

Edmund Backhouse.

HARTLEPOOL.

Isaac Lowthian Bell.

STOCKTON.

Joseph Dodds.

ESSEX COUNTY.

(*West Essex.*)

Sir Henry John Selwin Ibbetson, bt.,
Lord Eustace Henry Brownlow Gascoyne Cecil.

ESSEX COUNTY—*cont.*

(*East Essex.*)

James Round,
Samuel Brise Ruggles-Brise.

(*South Essex.*)

Thomas Charles Baring,
William Thomas Makins.

COLCHESTER.

Alexander Learmonth,
Herbert Bulkeley Praed.

MALDON.

George Montagu Warren Sandford.

HARWICH.

Henry Jervis White Jervis.

GLOUCESTER COUNTY.

(*Eastern Division.*)

Rt. hon. Sir Michael Edward Hicks-Beach, bt.
John Reginald Yorke.

(*Western Division.*)

Hon. Randall Edward Sherborne Plunkett,
Robert Nigel Fitzhardinge Kingscote.

STROUD.

Alfred John Stanton.
Samuel Stephens Marling.

TEWKESBURY.

William Edwin Price.

CIRENCESTER.

Thomas William Chester Master.

CHELTENHAM.

James Tynte Agg-Gardner.

GLOUCESTER.

William Killigrew Wait,
Charles James Monk.

HEREFORD COUNTY.

Sir Joseph Russell Bailey, bt.,
Michael Biddulph,
Daniel Peploe Peploe.

HEREFORD.

George Clive,
George Arbuthnot.

LEOMINSTER.

Thomas Blake.

HERTFORD COUNTY.

Thomas Frederick Halsey,
Abel Smith,
Hon. Henry Frederick Cowper.

HERTFORD.

Arthur James Balfour.

HUNTINGDON COUNTY.

Edward Fellowes,
Viscount Mandeville.

HUNTINGDON.

Viscount Hinchingbrook.

KENT COUNTY.

(Eastern Division.)

Edward Leigh Pemberton,
William Deedes.

(West Kent.)

Sir Charles Henry Mills, bt.,
Viscount Lewisham.

(Mid Kent.)

Hon. William Archer (Amherst) Viscount Holmesdale,
Sir William Hart Dyke, bt.

ROCHESTER.

Sir Julian Goldsmid, bt.,
Arthur John Otway.

MAIDSTONE.

Sir John Lubbock, bt.,
Sir Sydney Hedley Waterlow, bt.

GREENWICH.

Thomas William Boord,
Rt. hon. William Ewart Gladstone.

CHATHAM.

John Eldon Gorst.

GRAVESEND.

Bedford Clapperton Trevelyan Pim.

CANTERBURY.

Lewis Ashurst Majendie,
Hon. Alfred Erskine Gathorne-Hardy

LANCASTER COUNTY.

(North Lancashire.)

Rt. Hon. Frederick Arthur Stanley,
Thomas Henry Clifton.

(North-east Lancashire.)

James Maden Holt,
John Pierce Chamberlain Starkie.

LANCASTER COUNTY—*cont.*

(South-east Lancashire.)

Hon. Algernon Fulke Egerton,
Edward Hardcastle.

(South-west Lancashire.)

Rt. hon. Richard Assheton Cross,
John Ireland Blackburne.

LIVERPOOL.

Right hon. Dudley Francis Stuart (Ryder) Viscount Sandon,
John Torr,
William Rathbone.

MANCHESTER.

Hugh Birley,
Sir Thomas Bazley, bt.,
Jacob Bright.

PRESTON.

Edward Hermon,
Sir John Holker, knt.

WIGAN.

Hon. Lord Lindsay,
Thomas Knowles.

BOLTON.

John Hick,
John Kynaston Cross.

BLACKBURN.

William Edward Briggs.
Daniel Thwaites.

OLDHAM.

Frederick Lowten Spinks,
John Tomlinson Hibbert.

SALFORD.

William Thomas Charley,
Oliver Ormerod Walker.

CLITHEROE.

Ralph Assheton.

ASHTON-UNDER-LYNE.

Thomas Walton Mellor.

BURY.

Robert Needham Philips.

ROCHDALE.

Thomas Bayley Potter.

WARRINGTON.

Sir Gilbert Greenall, bt.

BURNLEY.

Peter Rylands.

STALEYBRIDGE.

Tom Harrop Sidebottom.

LEICESTER COUNTY.

(Northern Division.)

Rt. hon. Lord John James Robert Manners,
Samuel William Clowes.

(Southern Division.)

Albert Pell,
William Unwin Heygate.

LEICESTER.

Peter Alfred Taylor,
Alexander M'Arthur.

LINCOLN COUNTY.

(North Lincolnshire.)

Sir John Dugdale Astley, bt.,
Rowland Winn.

(Mid Lincolnshire.)

Henry Chaplin,
Hon. Edward Stanhope.

(South Lincolnshire.)

Sir William Earle Welby-Gregory, bt.,
Edmund Turnor.

GRANTHAM.

Sir Hugh Arthur Henry Cholmeley, bt.,
Henry Francis Cockayne Cust.

BOSTON.

William James Ingram,
Thomas Garfit.

STAMFORD.

Rt. hon. Sir John Charles Dalrymple Hay, bt.

GRIMSBY (GREAT).

Alfred Mellor Watkin.

LINCOLN.

Edward Chaplin,
Charles Seely.

MIDDLESEX COUNTY.

Rt. Hon. Lord George Francis Hamilton,
Octavius Edward Coope.

WESTMINSTER.

Rt. hon. William Henry Smith,
Sir Charles Russell, bt.

TOWER HAMLETS.

Charles Thompson Ritchie,
Joseph D'Aguilar Samuda.

HACKNEY.

John Holms,
Henry Fawcett.

FINSBURY.

William Torrens M'Cullagh Torrens,
Sir Andrew Lusk, bt.

MARYLEBONE.

William Forsyth,
Sir Thomas Chambers, knt.

CHELSEA.

Sir Charles Wentworth Dilke, bt.,
William Gordon.

LONDON (UNIVERSITY).
Rt. hon. Robert Lowe.

LONDON.
William James Richmond Cotton,
Philip Twells,
Rt. hon. John Gellibrand Hubbard,
Rt. hon. George Joachim Goschen.

MONMOUTH COUNTY.
Rt. Hon. Lord Henry Richard Charles Somerset,
Hon. Frederick Courtenay Morgan.

MONMOUTH.
Thomas Cordes.

NORFOLK COUNTY.
(*West Norfolk.*)
Sir William Bagge, bt.,
George William Pierrepont Bentinck.

(*North Norfolk.*)
Sir Edmund Henry Knowles Lacon, bt.,
James Duff.

(*South Norfolk.*)
Clare Sewell Read,
Sir Robert Jacob Buxton, bt.

LYNN REGIS.
Hon. Robert Bourke,
Lord Claud John Hamilton.

NORWICH.
Jeremiah James Colman,

NORTHAMPTON COUNTY.
(*Northern Division.*)
Sackville George Stopford-Sackville,
Hon. Lord Burghley.

(*Southern Division.*)
Sir Rainald Knightley, bt.,
Fairfax William Cartwright.

PETERBOROUGH.
Thompson Hankey,
Hon. William John Wentworth Fitzwilliam.

NORTHAMPTON.
Pickering Phipps,
Charles George Merewether.

NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY.
(*Northern Division.*)
Rt. hon. Henry George (Percy) Earl Percy,
Sir Matthew White Ridley, bt.

NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY —*cont.*
(*Southern Division.*)
Wentworth Blackett Beaumont,
Edward Ridley.

MORPETH.
Thomas Burt.

TYNEMOUTH.
Thomas Eustace Smith.

NEWCASTLE-UPON-TYNE.
Joseph Cowen,
Charles Frederick Hamond.

BERWICK-UPON-TWEED.
Sir Dudley Coutts Marjoribanks, bt.,
David Milne Home.

NOTTINGHAM COUNTY.
(*Northern Division.*)
Frederick Chatfield Smith,
Viscount Galway.

(*Southern Division*).
Thomas Blackborne Thoroton Hildyard,
George Storer.

NEWARK-UPON-TRENT.
Thomas Earp,
Samuel Boteler Bristowe.

RETFORD (EAST).
Francis John Savile Foljambe,
William Beckett Denison.

NOTTINGHAM.
William Evelyn Denison,
Saul Isaac.

OXFORD COUNTY.
John Sidney North,
William Cornwallis Cartwright,
Edward William Harcourt.

OXFORD (UNIVERSITY).
Rt. hon. John Robert Mowbray,
John Gilbert Talbot.

OXFORD (CITY).
Sir William George Granville Venables Vernon-Harcourt, knt.,
Alexander William Hall.

WOODSTOCK.
Lord Randolph Henry Spencer Churchill.

BANBURY.
Bernhard Samuelson.

RUTLAND COUNTY.
Rt. hon. Gerard James Noel,
George Henry Finch.

SALOP COUNTY.
(*Northern Division.*)
Hon. George Cecil Orlando (Bridgeman) Viscount Newport,
Stanley Leighton.

(*Southern Division.*)
John Edmund Severne,
Sir Baldwyn Leighton, bt.

SHREWSBURY.
Charles Cecil Cotes,
Henry Robertson.

WENLOCK.
Alexander Hargreaves Brown,
Cecil Theodore Weld Forester.

LUDLOW.
Hon. George Herbert Windsor Windsor-Clive.

BRIDGNORTH.
William Henry Foster.

SOMERSET COUNTY.
(*East Somerset.*)
Ralph Shuttleworth Allen,
Sir Philip John William Miles, bt.

(*Mid Somerset.*)
Richard Horner Paget,
William Stephen Gore-Langton

(*West Somerset.*)
Hon. Arthur Wellington Alexander Nelson Hood,
Vaughan Hanning Vaughan-Lee.

BATH.
Arthur Divett Hayter,
Nathaniel George Philips Bousfield.

TAUNTON.
Alexander Charles Barclay,
Sir Henry James, knt.

FROME.
Henry Bernhard Samuelson.

BRISTOL.
Kirkman Daniel Hodgson,
Samuel Morley.

SOUTHAMPTON COUNTY.

(Northern Division.)

Rt. hon. George Sclater-Booth,
William Wither Bramston Beach.

(Southern Division.)

Lord Henry John Montagu-Douglas-Scott,
Rt. hon. William Francis Cowper-Temple.

WINCHESTER.

William Barrow Simonds,
Arthur Robert Naghten.

PORTSMOUTH.

Sir James Dalrymple Horn Elphinstone, bt.,
Hon. Thomas Charles Bruce,

LYMINGTON.

Edmund Hegan Kennard.

ANDOVER.

Henry Wellesley.

CHRISTCHURCH.

Sir Henry Drummond Wolff.

PETERSFIELD.

Hon. Sydney Hylton Jolliffe.

SOUTHAMPTON.

Sir Frederick Perkins, knt.,
Alfred Giles

STAFFORD COUNTY.

(North Staffordshire.)

Colin Minton Campbell,
Robert William Hanbury.

(West Staffordshire.)

Alexander Staveley Hill,
Francis Monckton.

(East Staffordshire.)

Samuel Charles Allsopp,
Michael Arthur Bass.

STAFFORD.

Thomas Salt,
Alexander Macdonald.

TAMWORTH.

Rt. hon. Sir Robert Peel, bt.,
Hamar Alfred Bass.

NEWCASTLE-UNDER-LYME.

William Shepherd Allen,
Samuel Rathbone Edge.

WOLVERHAMPTON.

Rt. hon. Charles Pelham Villiers,
Thomas Matthias Weguelin.

STOKE-UPON-TRENT.

Robert Heath,
Edward Vaughan Kenealy.

WALSALL.

Sir Charles Forster, bt.

WEDNESBURY.

Alexander Brogden.

LICHFIELD.

Richard Dyott.

SUFFOLK COUNTY.

(Eastern Division.)

Frederick Brook (Thellusson) Lord Rendlesham,
Frederick St. John Newdegate Barne.

(Western Division.)

Windsor Parker,
Thomas Thornhill.

IPSWICH.

Thomas Clement Cobbold,
James Redfoord Bulwer.

BURY ST. EDMUNDS.

Edward Greene,
Lord Francis Hervey.

EYE.

Rt. hon. George William Viscount Barrington.

SURREY COUNTY.

(East Surrey.)

James Watney,
William Grantham.

(Mid Surrey.)

Sir Henry William Peek, bt.
Sir James John Trevor Lawrence, bt.

(West Surrey.)

George Cubitt,
Lee Steere.

SOUTHWARK.

John Locke,
Francis Marcus Beresford.

LAMBETH.

Sir James Clarke Lawrence, bt.
William McArthur.

GUILDFORD.

Denzil Roberts Onslow.

SUSSEX COUNTY.

(Eastern Division.)

George Burrow Gregory,
Montagu David Scott.

(Western Division.)

Sir Walter Barttelot Barttelot, bt.,
Hon. Charles Henry (Gordon Lennox) Earl of March.

SHOREHAM (NEW).

Rt. hon. Stephen Cave,
Sir Walter Wm. Burrell, bt.

BRIGHTHELMSTONE.

James Lloyd Ashbury,
Charles Cameron Shute.

CHICHESTER.

Rt. hon. Lord Henry George Charles Gordon Lennox.

LEWES.

William Langham Christie.

HORSHAM.

James Clifton Brown.

MIDHURST.

Sir Henry Thurston Holland, bt.

WARWICK COUNTY.

(Northern Division.)

Charles Newdigate Newdegate,
William Bromley Davenport.

(Southern Division.)

Hugh (de Grey Seymour) Earl of Yarmouth.
Sir John Eardley Eardley Wilmot, bt.

BIRMINGHAM.

Philip Henry Muntz,
Rt. hon. John Bright,
Joseph Chamberlain.

WARWICK.

George William John Repton,
Arthur Wellesley Peel.

COVENTRY.

Henry William Eaton,
Sir Henry Mather Jackson, bt.

WESTMORELAND COUNTY.

Hon. Thomas (Taylour) Earl of Bective,
Hon. William Lowther.

KENDAL.

John Whitwell.

(WIGHT) ISLE OF.

Alexander Dundas Wishart Ross Baillie Cochrane.

NEWPORT, ISLE OF WIGHT.

Charles Cavendish Clifford.

WILTS COUNTY.

(Northern Division.)

George Sotheron Estcourt,
Sir George Samuel Jenkinson, bt.

(Southern Division.)

Rt. hon. Lord Henry Frederick Thynne,
Hon. (William Pleydell Bouverie) Viscount Folkestone.

NEW SARUM (SALISBURY).

Granville Richard Ryder,
John Alfred Lush.

CRICKLADE.

Sir Daniel Gooch, bt.,
Ambrose Lethbridge Goddard.

DEVIZES.
Sir Thomas Bateson, bt.

MARLBOROUGH.
Lord Charles William Bruce.

CHIPPENHAM.
Gabriel Goldney.

CALNE.
Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice.

MALMESBURY.
Walter Powell.

WESTBURY.
Abraham Laverton.

WILTON.
Hon. Sidney Herbert.

WORCESTER COUNTY.

(Eastern Division.)

Henry Allsopp,
Thomas Eades Walker.

(Western Division.)

Frederick Winn Knight,
Sir Edmund Anthoney Harley Lechmere, bt.

EVESHAM.
James Bourne.

DROITWICH.
John Corbett.

BEWDLEY.
Charles Harrison.

DUDLEY.
Henry Brinsley Sheridan.

KIDDERMINSTER.
Sir William Augustus Fraser, bt.

WORCESTER.
Thomas Rowley Hill,
John Derby Allcroft.

YORK COUNTY.

(North Riding.)

Rt. hon. William Reginald (Duncombe) Viscount Helmsley,
Frederick Acclom Milbank.

(East Riding.)

Christopher Sykes,
William Henry Harrison Broadley.

(West Riding, Northern Division.)

Lord Frederick Charles Cavendish,
Sir Matthew Wilson, bt.

(West Riding, Eastern Division.)

Christopher Beckett Denison,
Joshua Fielden.

(West Riding, Southern Division.)

Walter Thomas William Spencer Stanhope,
Lewis Randal Starkey.

YORK COUNTY—*cont.*

LEEDS.
William St. James Wheelhouse,
Robert Tennant,
John Barran.

PONTEFRACT.
Rt. hon. Hugh Culling Eardley Childers,
Samuel Waterhouse.

SCARBOROUGH.
Sir Charles Legard, bt.,
Sir Harcourt Vanden Bempde Johnstone, bt.

SHEFFIELD.
John Arthur Roebuck,
Anthony John Mundella.

BRADFORD.
Rt. hon. William Edward Forster,
Henry William Ripley.

HALIFAX.
Rt. hon. James Stansfeld,
John Dyson Hutchinson.

KNARESBOROUGH.
Basil Thomas Woodd.

MALTON.
Hon. Charles William Wentworth-Fitzwilliam.

RICHMOND.
Hon. John Charles Dundas.

RIPON.
Rt. hon. Frederick Oliver (Robinson) Earl de Grey.

HUDDERSFIELD.
Edward Aldam Leatham.

THIRSK.
Sir William Payne Gallwey, bt.

NORTHALLERTON.
George William Elliot.

WAKEFIELD.
Thomas Kemp Sanderson.

WHITBY.
William Henry Gladstone.

YORK CITY.
George Leeman,
Rt. hon. James Lowther.

MIDDLESBOROUGH.
Isaac Wilson.

DEWSBURY.
John Simon.

KINGSTON-UPON-HULL.
Charles Henry Wilson,
Charles Morgan Norwood.

BARONS OF THE CINQUE PORTS.

DOVER.
Charles Kaye Freshfield,
Alexander George Dickson.

BARONS OF THE CINQUE PORTS—*cont.*

HASTINGS.
Thomas Brassey,
Sir Ughtred James Kay-Shuttleworth, bt.

SANDWICH.
Henry Arthur Brassey,
Rt. hon. Edward Hugessen Knatchbull-Hugessen.

HYTHE.
Sir Edward William Watkin.

RYE.
Hon. John Stewart Gathorne-Hardy.

WALES.

ANGLESEA COUNTY.
Richard Davies.

BEAUMARIS.
Morgan Lloyd.

BRECKNOCK COUNTY.
William Fuller Maitland.

BRECKNOCK.
James Price William Gwynne Holford.

CARDIGAN COUNTY.
Thomas Edward Lloyd.

CARDIGAN, &c.
David Davies.

CARMARTHEN COUNTY.
Hon. (Frederick Archibald Vaughan Campbell) Viscount Emlyn,
John Jones.

CARMARTHEN, &c.
Benjamin Thomas Williams.

CARNARVON COUNTY.
Hon. George Sholto Douglas Pennant.

CARNARVON, &c.
William Bulkeley Hughes.

DENBIGH COUNTY.
Sir Watkin Williams Wynn, bt.,
George Osborne Morgan.

DENBIGH, &c.
Watkin Williams.

FLINT COUNTY.
Hon. Lord Richard de Aquila Grosvenor.

FLINT, &c.
John Roberts.

GLAMORGAN COUNTY.
Henry Hussey Vivian,
Christopher Rice Mansel Talbot.

GLAMORGAN COUNTY—*cont.*

MERTHYR TYDVIL.

Henry Richard,
Richard Fothergill.

CARDIFF, &c.

James Frederick Dudley Crichton-Stuart.

SWANSEA, &c.

Lewis Llewelyn Dillwyn.

MERIONETH COUNTY.

Samuel Holland.

MONTGOMERY COUNTY.

Charles Watkin Williams Wynn.

MONTGOMERY, &c.

Hon. Frederick Stephen Archibald Hanbury-Tracy.

PEMBROKE COUNTY.

James Bevan Bowen.

PEMBROKE, &c.

Edward James Reed, C.B.

HAVERFORDWEST.

Hon. William Baron Kensington.

RADNOR COUNTY.

Hon. Arthur Walsh.

NEW RADNOR.

Rt. hon. Spencer Compton (Cavendish) Marquess of Hartington.

SCOTLAND.

ABERDEENSHIRE.

(*East Aberdeenshire.*)
Sir Alexander Hamilton Gordon, knt.

(*West Aberdeenshire.*)
Lord William Douglas Cope Gordon.

ABERDEEN.

John Farley Leith.

ARGYLE.

Lord Colin Campbell.

AYR.

(*North Ayrshire.*)
Roger Montgomerie.

(*South Ayrshire.*)
Claud Alexander.

KILMARNOCK, RENFREW, &c.

James Fortescue Harrison.

BURGHS OF AYR, &c.

Sir William James Montgomery Cuninghame, bt.

BANFF.

Robert William Duff.

BERWICK.

Hon. Rbt. Baillie-Hamilton

BUTE.

Charles Dalrymple.

CAITHNESSSHIRE.

Sir John George Tollemache Sinclair, bt.

WICK, KIRKWALL, &c.

John Pender.

CLACKMANNAN AND KINROSS.

Rt. hon. William Patrick Adam.

DUMBARTON.

Archibald Orr Ewing.

DUMFRIESSHIRE.

John James Hope-Johnstone.

DUMFRIES, &c.

Ernest Noel.

EDINBURGHSHIRE.

Rt. hon. William Henry (Montagu Douglas Scott) Earl of Dalkeith.

EDINBURGH.

Duncan McLaren,
James Cowan.

UNIVERSITIES OF EDINBURGH AND ST. ANDREWS.

Rt. hon. Lyon Playfair.

BURGHS OF LEITH, &c.

Andrew Grant.

ELGIN AND NAIRN.

Hon. Alexander William George (Duff) Viscount Macduff.

BURGHS OF ELGIN, &c.

Mountstuart Elphinstone Grant Duff.

FALKIRK, &c. BURGHS.

John Ramsay.

FIFE.

Sir Robert Anstruther, bt.

BURGHS OF ST. ANDREWS.

Edward Ellice.

KIRKCALDY, DYSART, &c.

Sir George Campbell, knt.

FORFAR.

James William Barclay.

TOWN OF DUNDEE.

James Yeaman,
Edward Jenkins.

MONTROSE, &c.

Rt. hon. William Edward Baxter.

HADDINGTON.

Hon. Francis Wemyss (Charteris) Lord Elcho.

HADDINGTON BURGHS.

Lord William Montagu Hay.

INVERNESS.

Donald Cameron.

INVERNESS, &c.

Charles Fraser Mackintosh.

KINCARDINESHIRE.

Sir George Balfour, K.C.B.

KIRKCUDBRIGHT.

John Maitland.

LANARK.

(*North Lanarkshire.*)
Sir Thomas Edward Colebrooke, bt.

(*South Lanarkshire.*)
Sir Windham Charles James Carmichael-Anstruther, bt.

GLASGOW.

Charles Cameron,
George Anderson,
Alexander Whitelaw.

UNIVERSITIES OF GLASGOW AND ABERDEEN.

Rt. hon. William Watson.

LINLITHGOW.

Peter McLagan.

ORKNEY AND SHETLAND.

Samuel Laing.

PEEBLES AND SELKIRK.

Sir Graham Graham Montgomery, bt.

PERTH.

Henry Edward Stirling Home Drummond Moray.

TOWN OF PERTH.

Charles Stuart Parker.

RENFREWSHIRE.

William Mure.

PAISLEY.

William Holms.

GREENOCK.

James Stewart.

ROSS AND CROMARTY.

Alexander Matheson.

ROXBURGH.

Sir George Henry Scott Douglas, bt.

HAWICK, SELKIRK, &c.

George Otto Trevelyan.

STIRLING.

Sir William Edmonstone, bt.

STIRLING, &c.

Henry Campbell-Bannerman.

SUTHERLAND.

Hon. (Cromartie Leveson Gower) Marquess of Stafford.

WIGTON.

Robert Vans Agnew.

WIGTON, &c. BURGHS.

Mark John Stewart.

IRELAND.

ANTRIM COUNTY.

James Chaine,
Hon. Edward O'Neill.

BELFAST.

James Porter Corry,
William Ewart.

LISBURN.
Sir Richard Wallace, bt.

CARRICKFERGUS.
Marriott Robert Dalway.

ARMAGH COUNTY.
Edward Wingfield Verner,
Maxwell Charles Close.

ARMAGH (CITY).
George De La Poer Beresford.

CARLOW COUNTY.
Henry Bruen,
Arthur MacMorrough Kavanagh.

CARLOW (BOROUGH).
Henry Owen Lewis.

CAVAN COUNTY.
Charles Joseph Fay,
Joseph Gillis Biggar.

CLARE COUNTY.
Rt. hon. Lord Francis Conyngham,
Sir Bryan O'Loghlen, bt.

ENNIS.
William Stacpoole.

CORK COUNTY.
McCarthy Downing,
William Shaw.

CORK (CITY).
Nicholas Daniel Murphy.
William Goulding.

BANDON BRIDGE.
Alexander Swanston.

YOUGHAL.
Sir Joseph Neale McKenna, knt.

KINSALE.
Eugene Collins.

MALLOW.
John George MacCarthy.

DONEGAL COUNTY.
Hon. James (Hamilton) Marquess of Hamilton,
William Wilson.

DOWN COUNTY.
Hon. Lord Arthur Edwin Hill-Trevor,
Viscount Castlereagh.

NEWRY.
William Whitworth.

DOWNPATRICK.
John Mulholland.

DUBLIN COUNTY.
Ion Trant Hamilton,
Rt. hon. Thomas Edward Taylor.

DUBLIN (CITY).
Sir Arthur Edward Guinness, bt.,
Maurice Brooks.

DUBLIN UNIVERSITY.
Hon. David Rbt. Plunket,
Rt. hon. Edward Gibson.

FERMANAGH.
William Humphrys Archdall,
Hon. Henry Arthur Cole.

ENNISKILLEN.
Hon. John Henry (Crichton) Viscount Crichton.

GALWAY COUNTY.
John Philip Nolan,
Mitchell Henry.

GALWAY (BOROUGH).
George Morris,
Michael Francis Ward.

KERRY.
Henry Arthur Herbert,
Rowland Ponsonby Blennerhassett.

TRALEE.
Daniel O'Donoghue, (The O'Donoghue).

KILDARE.
Charles Henry Meldon,
Rt. hon. William Henry Ford Cogan.

KILKENNY.
George Leopold Bryan,
Patrick Martin.

KILKENNY (CITY).
Benjamin Whitworth.

KING'S COUNTY.
Sir Patrick O'Brien, bt.,
David Sherlock.

LEITRIM COUNTY.
John Brady,
Francis O'Beirne.

LIMERICK COUNTY.
William Henry O'Sullivan,
Edmund John Synan.

LIMERICK (CITY).
Isaac Butt,
Richard O'Shaughnessy.

LONDONDERRY COUNTY.
Richard Smyth,
Rt. hon. Hugh Law.

COLERAINE.
Daniel Taylor.

LONDONDERRY (CITY).
Charles Edward Lewis.

LONGFORD COUNTY.
Myles William O'Reilly,
George Errington.

LOUTH COUNTY.
Alexander Martin Sullivan,
George Harley Kirk.

DUNDALK.
Philip Callan.

DROGHEDA.
William Hagarty O'Leary.

MAYO COUNTY.
George Ekins Browne,
John O'Connor Power.

MEATH COUNTY.
Nicholas Ennis,
Charles Stewart Parnell.

MONAGHAN COUNTY.
Sir John Leslie, bt.,
Sewallis Evelyn Shirley.

QUEEN'S COUNTY.
Kenelm Thomas Digby,
Edmund Dease.

PORTARLINGTON.
Lionel Seymour William Dawson-Damer.

ROSCOMMON COUNTY.
Charles Owen O'Conor (The O'Conor Don),
Hon. Charles French.

SLIGO COUNTY.
Denis Maurice O'Conor.
Edward Robert King Harman.

TIPPERARY COUNTY.
Stephen Moore,
Edmond Dwyer Gray.

CLONMEL.
Arthur John Moore.

TYRONE COUNTY.
John William Ellison Macartney,
Hon. Henry William Lowry-Corry.

DUNGANNON.
Thomas Alexander Dickson.

WATERFORD COUNTY.
Lord Charles William De la Poer Beresford,
James Delahunty.

DUNGARVAN.
Frank Hugh O'Donnell.

WATERFORD (CITY).
Richard Power,
Purcell O'Gorman.

WESTMEATH COUNTY.
Patrick James Smyth,
Rt. hon. Lord Robert Montagu.

ATHLONE.
Edward Sheil.

WEXFORD COUNTY.
Sir George Bowyer, bt.,
Keyes O'Clery.

WEXFORD (BOROUGH).
William Archer Redmond.

NEW ROSS.
John Dunbar.

WICKLOW COUNTY.
William Richard O'Byrne,
William Wentworth Fitzwilliam Dick.

HANSARD'S

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES,

IN THE

SIXTH SESSION OF THE *TWENTY-FIRST PARLIAMENT* OF THE
UNITED KINGDOM OF *GREAT BRITAIN* AND *IRELAND*,
APPOINTED TO MEET 5 MARCH, 1874, AND THENCE CONTINUED
TILL 5 DECEMBER, 1878, IN THE FORTY-SECOND YEAR OF
THE REIGN OF

HER MAJESTY QUEEN VICTORIA.

FIRST VOLUME OF THE SESSION.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Thursday, 5th December, 1878.

THE PARLIAMENT, which had been Prorogued in the usual form from the 16th day of August to the 2nd day of November; and thence to the 30th day of November; was now commanded to assemble on the 5th day of December for Despatch of Business by Proclamation, as follows:—

"*BY THE QUEEN—A PROCLAMATION.*

"VICTORIA R.

"Whereas Our Parliament stands prorogued to *Saturday* the Thirtieth Day of *November* instant: We, by and with the Advice of Our Privy Council, hereby issue Our Royal Proclamation, and publish and declare, that the said Parliament be further prorogued to *Thursday* the Fifth Day of *December* One thousand eight hundred and seventy-eight; and We do hereby further, with the Advice aforesaid, declare Our Royal Will and Pleasure that the said Parliament shall, on the said *Thursday* the Fifth Day of *December* One thousand eight hundred and seventy-eight, assemble and be holden for the Despatch of divers urgent and important Affairs; And the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses, and the Commissioners for Shires and Burghs of the House of Commons, are hereby required and commanded to give their Attendance accordingly, at *Westminster*, on the said *Thursday* the Fifth Day of *December* One thousand eight hundred and seventy-eight.

"Given at Our Court at *Windsor*, this Twenty-seventh Day of *November* in the Year of our Lord One thousand eight hundred and seventy-eight, and in the Forty-second Year of Our Reign.

"God save the Queen."

And the PARLIAMENT having met accordingly, the Session was opened by Commission.

The HOUSE OF LORDS being met;

THE LORD CHANCELLOR acquainted the House,

"That it not being convenient for Her Majesty to be personally present here this day, She has been pleased to cause a Commission under the Great Seal to be prepared, in order to the holding of this Parliament."

Then Five of the LORDS COMMISSIONERS —namely, The LORD CHANCELLOR; The LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (The Duke of Richmond and Gordon); The LORD PRIVY SEAL (The Duke of Northumberland); The LORD STEWARD (Earl Beauchamp); and The LORD SKELMERSDALE—being in their Robes, and seated on a Form placed between the Throne and the Woolsack, commanded the Gentleman Usher of the Black Rod to let the Commons know "The Lords Commissioners desire their immediate attendance in this House, to hear the Commission read."

And the COMMONS being at the Bar, with their Speaker:—The Commission was read by the Clerk:—Then

THE QUEEN'S SPEECH.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR *delivered* HER MAJESTY'S SPEECH to both Houses of Parliament, as follows:—

"*My Lords, and Gentlemen,*

"I REGRET that I have been obliged to call for your attendance at an unusual and, probably, to most of you, an inconvenient season.

"The hostility towards my Indian Government manifested by the Ameer of Afghanistan, and the manner in which he repulsed my friendly Mission, left me no alternative but to make a peremptory demand for redress.

"This demand having been disregarded, I have directed an expedition to be sent into his territory, and I have taken the earliest opportunity of calling you together, and making to you the communication required by Law.

"I have directed that Papers on the subject shall be laid before you.

"I receive from all foreign Powers assurances of their friendly feelings, and I have every reason to believe that the arrangements for the pacification of Europe, made by the Treaty of Berlin, will be successfully carried into effect.

"*Gentlemen of the House of Commons,*

"The Estimates for the ensuing year are in course of preparation, and will in due time be submitted to you.

"*My Lords, and Gentlemen,*

"I propose that after full deliberation upon the matters which have led me to anticipate your usual time of meeting, and after a suitable recess, you should proceed to the consideration of various measures for the public benefit which will then be laid before you.

"I confidently commit to your wisdom the great interests of my Empire, and I pray that the blessing of Almighty God may attend your counsels."

Then the Commons withdrew.

House adjourned during pleasure.

House resumed.

PRAYERS.

ROLL OF THE LORDS—Garter King of Arms attending, *delivered* at the Table (in the usual manner) a List of the Lords Temporal in the Sixth Session of the Twenty-first Parliament of the United Kingdom: The same was ordered to lie on the Table.

SELECT VESTRIES — Bill, *pro formâ*, read 1^a.

AFGHANISTAN (EXPENSES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS).

NOTICE OF MOTION.

VISCOUNT CRANBROOK: My Lords, I beg to give Notice that on Monday next I shall move—

> "That Her Majesty, having directed a Military expedition of Her Forces charged upon Indian Revenues to be despatched against the Ameer of Afghanistan, this House consents that the Revenues of India shall be applied to defray the expenses of the Military operations which may be carried on beyond the external frontiers of Her Majesty's Indian possessions."

THE QUEEN'S SPEECH.

ADDRESS IN ANSWER TO HER MAJESTY'S MOST GRACIOUS SPEECH.

The QUEEN'S SPEECH *reported* by The LORD CHANCELLOR.

THE EARL OF RAVENSWORTH, in rising to move that an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty in answer to Her Majesty's Most Gracious Speech, said: My Lords, on rising for the first time to address your Lordships I must claim your indulgence, I am afraid for some time, on two grounds—upon general grounds, my Lords, and upon special grounds; because, though I cannot allege entire inexperience in public business or in debate, having served a considerable apprenticeship in "another place," I cannot disguise from myself that within this Chamber popular passion and prejudice have no influence. My Lords, to woo and to win the popular ear is not the ambition of many of your Lordships; but that fact does not render the task of addressing you for the first time any easier. It is, therefore, on general grounds that I claim your indulgence, and there are special grounds likewise upon which I shall claim it.

This is a special summons to Parliament, and it has met for a special purpose. The subject which you have to discuss is one of no ordinary importance; and in attempting to address your Lordships upon it I cannot but consider for a moment the circumstances that have occurred. I see before me statesmen of profound and lengthened experience; I see before me old and skilled diplomatists; I see Secretaries and ex-Secretaries and ex-Viceroys of India; and I see, likewise, military men of the highest and most exalted rank, and profound in the science and the arts and strategy of war. To render my task more than ordinarily difficult, I feel that the atmosphere of the House of Lords, though essentially calm and judicial, is, at the same time, a critical one. My Lords, exactly 10 years ago an eminent Indian statesman wrote thus from Calcutta, as Viceroy, to the then Secretary of State for India. He said—

> "No man can doubt that the approach of Russia towards the North-Western Frontier of India may involve us in great difficulties."

My Lords, the Viceroy who wrote this was Sir John Lawrence, and the Secretary of State for India was the Duke of Argyll; and I venture, my Lords, to allude to these plain words, because I think they are fitting words to open the discussion of the subject which you are about to deal with. They were prophetic words then, my Lords, and they have come true now; they are the "keynote" of this debate.

Now, my Lords, I trust that in discussing this matter we shall not blink this question, because it is a question upon which we should not speak with bated breath; and I think—in fact, I firmly believe—that a plain outspoken Parliamentary debate upon the question of Central Asia will do more than anything else to effect that which every statesman and lover of his country ought to desire—namely, to bring about an understanding between Russia and England upon that question. I venture to think, my Lords, that plain speaking will do more to accomplish that end than the whispers of Cabinets, the words of Generals, or the wiles of diplomacy. My Lords, the Frontier policy—or rather the policy that should guide us with respect to the Frontier of our North-Western Provinces in India—is a question that has occupied and taxed the energies of our greatest statesmen, and for years almost has appeared to baffle their efforts at solution. I should like to remind your Lordships that there has existed for a long time two distinct schools of policy on that subject; and they are, if I may use the expression for the sake of argument, what I may term the backward school and the forward school of Indian politicians. To give some idea of the bent of mind of the backward school, I would draw your Lordships' attention to an event of some importance as far back as the year 1857, when an eminent Indian statesman proposed the abandonment of Peshawur and the cession of it and a portion of the neighbouring district to Dost Mahomed. I do not allude to that matter now by way of criticism, for that is unnecessary; but I may mention, in passing, that this rather remarkable proposal was stoutly combatted at the time by Sir Sidney Cotton, and that great and good man, Colonel Edwards, afterwards Sir Herbert Edwards, and the Viceroy of that day, Lord Canning, rejected the proposal. I allude to this as an indication of the length to which the disciples of the backward school have been, and may be now, prepared to go. My Lords, when doctors differ the patient suffers, and in this case the patient is the Indian Empire. I think he would be a bold statesman who would get up and attempt, looking at the intrigues and conspiracies, the insurrections, the mischief, and the danger that might result to our Indian Empire from delay, to recommend that we should wait until these two schools had settled their differences. I venture to think, my Lords, that the time for argument has passed—that the time for action has arrived.

Now, my Lords, to speak plainly. Her Majesty's Gracious Speech has informed us that we are at war in Afghanistan, and I venture to call your Lordships' attention to that little word "in," for I am rejoiced that we are not at war with Afghanistan—we are at war with the Ameer, but not with his subjects; and if we can trust the Manifesto which has been issued by the Government of India it is not a war of ambition—it is not a war of aggression, it is not a war of annexation—but it is a war for the support of the honour of the Crown, the dignity of the nation, and the safety of our Indian Empire. Now, my Lords, very serious accusations have been largely and liberally levelled at Her Majesty's Ministers for some time past. They have been accused of having entered into this war recklessly, hastily, and without justification, and even, my Lords, wickedly, for I have seen the word wickedly used, and by a noble Lord who I did not expect would use such an expression. My Lords, these are grave charges. They are more than charges—they are impeachments—and if they be just and true, I think it is time that the High Court of Parliament should ascertain, by careful examination, whether they are true or not. My Lords, I am here to-night charged with the duty of opening the case for the defence against these charges, and I must ask your Lordships' indulgence once again while I do so.

In the first place, allow me to refer to my own position for one moment. I can assure your Lordships, with all sincerity, that I would not have allowed myself to be placed in this prominent position if I did not entertain the firm conviction and belief that Her Majesty's Government were justified in the course that they have taken, and I go beyond that and say that there was no other course which in honour they could have pursued. Now, my Lords, in order to make good the position that I have ventured to take, I must begin by asking your Lordships' permission to review and give a brief history of the past position of affairs, and to make a short retrospect of our relations with Shere Ali. First of all, my Lords, it is my duty to remind you that so far back as 1855 a Treaty was concluded between the old East India Company and the father of the present Ameer, Dost Mahomed. It was short and simple, and in its terms it was a Treaty of friendship and amity. It was a Treaty that bound both signatories to respect the integrity of each other's territories; but it is to the third portion of that Treaty to which I particularly wish to refer. It bound the Ameer to be the friend of our friends and the enemy of our enemies; but there was no such obligation on our part, and it is clear that the Ameer always considered the Treaty as a one-sided instrument. Moreover, my Lords, Lord Canning himself has so described that Treaty, and it is important to bear that fact in mind. In 1856 an important engagement was entered into between the Government of India and the old Ameer, which had reference mainly to the war with Persia, then going on, and there were certain engagements as to a subsidy, which I shall have to allude to by-and-bye. In 1863 Dost Mahomed died, and the Ameer—Shere Ali—notified the event to our Government in a very proper and respectful manner. He informed the Indian Government of the death of his father; but it so happened from some reason or other, of which I am not aware, that for six months after that important communication was received no notice whatever was taken of it, and I think your Lordships will agree with me that that was a very unfortunate start to make with a man of the peculiar temper of the Ameer. If Shere Ali had been an angel on earth—and certainly I believe he is far from that—he must have felt very much annoyed at such a delay. Then broke out the civil war, in which at first Shere Ali was successful, his brothers, Mahomed Ufzul Khan, Azim Khan, and a son of Ufzul, Abdul Rahman Khan, being in arms against him. In 1865 he gained a very considerable victory over his elder brother and against his nephew, the son of Ufzul Khan; and that victory appears to have been gained in a very gallant manner, but not without a severe loss to the Ameer, because he lost his favourite son, who was shot in the battle by his own uncle. I do not allude to this as a great political event, but as a very great event in the life of the Ameer, and it appears, from the testimony of writers of the time, that it had a very great effect on the mind of the Ameer. It is even uncertain whether that effect has entirely disappeared at the present time. Moreover, my Lords, I might remind you that the sorrow which was caused by that event has been re-opened very lately by the death of Abdoolla Jan, the youngest and favourite son of Shere Ali. In 1864 the war went on. Soon after his brother gained so great an advantage over him that Shere Ali was almost forced into banishment, and he fled to Herat with a few followers. Then came a curious portion of the history of our relations with Afghanistan. Ufzul Khan ascended the Throne of Cabul, and Shere Ali remained in possession of Herat, and at that time the Viceroy of India wrote a letter to the actual Ameer, who had located himself at Cabul, while the other dethroned Ameer was at Herat. It began by saying—

> "I am very sorry for the Ameer; he is a very old friend of mine, and I never had any occasion of quarrel against him. I am sorry for his degradation;"

but it goes on to say—

> "I am delighted to congratulate you (Afzul) on the victory you have gained, and I have no doubt that you will be my friend."

There were at that time not one, but two Rulers of Afghanistan—one at Cabul and one at Herat—and the letter concluded by recognizing both. Now, that letter recognized a principle against which Shere Ali had a great objection, and that was, the recognition of a *de facto* Ruler. Shere Ali has always said—"If you recognize a *de facto* Ruler, the effect of it will be to encourage everyone who is opposed to me to rise up against me, and if he succeeds in getting upon the Throne, you will immediately recognize him." What Shere Ali wanted was the adoption of another principle. He wanted the *de jure* principle, and he wanted us to recognize his absolute right to the Throne, and he said—"I not only want you to recognize my right to the Throne, but my son's right to the succession. I want him recognized as the heir to the Throne *de jure*." Now, Ufzul having shortly afterwards died, then came Shere Ali's famous victory, in 1867, in Candahar, which led to his re-entering Cabul in 1868. After that I find a letter written by the Ameer to the Viceroy, and there appeared to be a curious strain of irony running through it. It was to this effect—"Here I am at last; thank God for it; but no thanks to you." It is evidently in an ironical spirit that the Ameer wrote that letter. Now, I may remind your Lordships that the subsidy of six lacs of rupees which had been formerly given to the Ameer was allowed to go on, and there was also a valuable annual present of arms. I now come to a part of the narrative to which I refer with very great pain, and I am sure that your Lordships will share with me in the sorrow with which I mention the name of the Viceroy—my late dear and lamented Friend, Lord Mayo. He arranged matters with Shere Ali at a meeting at Umballa, and for some considerable time our relations with the Ameer became comparatively friendly—they were peaceable, at least, and so far they were satisfactory—and the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll), who I regret to see is not in his place, in an interesting letter which he has lately written, has paid a noble and graceful tribute to the late Lord Mayo, to the effect that the influence which we obtained at that time over the mind of Shere Ali was owing to his exertions, his manly presence, his genial, openhearted countenance, and his transparent sincerity of character. My Lords, *Non cuivis homini contingit adire Corinthum;* and while I mention that our relations with Shere Ali at that time became more satisfactory than at any other time, it is no disparagement to the noble Lord the late Viceroy (Lord Northbrook) to say that during his tenure of office he did not get on quite so well with the Ameer. I merely mention that as a fact. There is no doubt of the abilities of my noble Friend as an administrator under trying difficulties; but, at the same time, I feel bound to state the circumstances. Some very curious things came out upon the occasion of the Conference at Umballa. At that time we had an insight into the mind of the Ameer. He was very sore then upon one or two points. He was sore at the premature recognition of his brother Azim, and he made various observations upon the one-sided character of the Treaty of 1855; he wanted the succession recognized of the son whom he had chosen to succeed him. He did not get all that he wanted upon that occasion; but he obtained something. In point of fact he got a great deal, because Lord Mayo promised him that the British Government would view with displeasure any attempt to disturb the Ameer, and he presented him with two batteries of artillery, and a considerable stand of arms; and no doubt the Ameer and Lord Mayo left the Conference in a very good humour one with the other. The Ameer wrote a very striking letter afterwards, in which he said—

> "I strongly hope that the British Government will always do good and be kind to me, and keep me under its protection."—*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 91.]

That was what the Ameer wanted; but it was what he never could get. There were many other matters discussed upon the occasion, and among them the presence of British officers in Afghanistan, and I think that there was very good reason at that time to hope that the Ameer would have consented to the presence of British officers at Herat, Candahar, and Balkh; but he certainly would not have consented to the presence of British Residents at Cabul, because he said it might embarrass him with his subjects: I do certainly think that he would have given his consent to the presence of Residents in the other towns that I have mentioned. Her Majesty's Government, however, at the time, did not altogether approve of what had been done at the Conference, and they insisted upon certain conditions being inserted —certain reservations and certain provisions being made.

I pass now from that point, and come down to the year 1873, and it is an important epoch in the history of our relations. We found the Ameer still friendly, but, at the same time, he was less attentive to our representations than he had shown himself before. Now, what had occurred in the interval? Very great events had occurred. What had been styled the bugbear of the Indian Government—namely, the Russian advance—had become a stern reality. The Russian troops had advanced through Central Asia; Russia had made her influence paramount at Samarcand and in Bokhara; she was now upon the Oxus, and Khiva had been annexed. That caused very great alarm, and the annexation of Khiva especially shook, I hope not for ever, the confidence of England in Russian promises. The Ameer was alarmed, and he wrote to us that he should be glad to have a Conference with the Viceroy. The Conference was held at Simla. Now, my Lords, I must call your attention for one moment to the circumstances in which the Ameer found himself placed, and I think the best way to do so is to refer to two telegrams that passed between the Viceroy and the Secretary of State. The Viceroy telegraphed on the 24th of July, 1873, to the Secretary of State for India, as follows:—

> "Ameer of Cabul alarmed at Russian progress, dissatisfied with general assurance, and anxious to know definitely how far he may rely on our help if invaded. I propose assuring him that if he unreservedly accepts and acts on our advice in all external relations we will help him with money, arms, and troops, if necessary, to expel unprovoked invasion. We to be the judge of the necessity."—[*Ibid.* p. 108.]

The reply of the Secretary of State to that telegram, on the 26th of July, was as follows:—

> "Cabinet thinks you should inform Ameer that we do not at all share his alarm, and consider there is no cause for it: but you may assure him we shall maintain our settled policy in favour of Afghanistan, if he abides by our advice in external affairs."—[*Ibid.*]

Now, there are two or three very important considerations with reference to those telegrams. The continuance of the subsidy was one of the topics of consideration between the Ameer and the Viceroy, and the record of the conversations is certainly very puzzling reading. In the first instance, we were to negotiate in the event of invasion; but if the negotiations failed, we were to take another course, and if hostilities broke out we undertook to give the Ameer material assistance. But if the granting of the subsidy was to continue, it was to continue not only upon the condition of the Ameer's conduct towards the British Government, but upon the manner in which he treated his own subjects. Now, the withdrawal of the subsidy on such a ground would be a very difficult and delicate operation. It appears to me that it would be a very difficult thing, indeed, to treat with a Sovereign when you have deprived yourselves of the opportunity of obtaining the information that is necessary to enable a proper opinion to be formed. We have no British officers in Afghanistan, and therefore no person on whom we can fairly rely for obtaining such information; and it was not the policy of the then Government to place Residents in the Frontier towns, so that we could ascertain from them what was going on in the country, and the general treatment by the Ameer of his subjects. There is another point which had reference to the continuance of the subsidy. The assistance of our troops was to depend upon the implicit acceptance by the Ameer of our advice in all the external relations of his country. Then what becomes of the independence of the Ameer, which was another stringent principle insisted on, if at that time we were to be absolute judges of his foreign policy? Now I go on, and I may mention, in passing, that a careful record of these conversations was kept and sent to the Ameer, accompanied by a letter from the Viceroy telling him that Her Majesty's Government was bound by their substance; and I can quite understand, having read the despatches, that the Ameer was puzzled when he read the Correspondence, and I can quite imagine that he should have said when he got up from the perusal of them—"I don't understand these Englishmen. I don't know what they mean to do or what they don't mean to do; but one thing seems clear, and that is that they are not friendly to me, and I will have nothing more to do with them." If he did not say that, that was the spirit in which he seems to have acted. Now, the next thing which I wish to allude to is the Conference which took place in 1877 at Peshawur. That was intended to be a friendly Conference, and Sir Lewis Pelly was empowered to make many important concessions. At that Conference a great deal was said on the part of the Ameer with reference to the necessity of recognising the succession of his younger son, on which he had set his mind; but, after all, the Conference was an abortive one. The Afghan Envoy was ill almost all the time the proceedings were going on, and he died before the Conference ought to have ended. But I think it is the true solution of the failure to say that it was too late; that the Ameer had made up his mind as to who should be his friend, and had made choice of Russia, and not of us. Then, or shortly after, confidential communications with Cabul took place from Tashkend. And long before these Papers were produced to us, we have the evidence of an independent witness upon the subject. That witness is M. Vambéry, the traveller, and he tells us that on the 13th of August of this year—which was the very day that the Treaty of Berlin was signed—a Russian Mission started from Tashkend, and a Russian General remained five weeks at Cabul, and was treated with every consideration, in fact received with open arms. Then it was that we resolved to send a friendly Mission to Cabul, and informed the Ameer of our intention, telling him that it was sent with a friendly object. We were, however, stopped and looked upon as intruders, and your Lordships will remember the reception it met with at the entrance of the Khyber Pass, and you will also remember the words that were addressed by the Afghan Sirdar to our Envoy—"If it were not for my personal friendship for you I should have fired upon you, and if you go farther I shall do so." Now, my Lords, I have concluded this long, and I am afraid tedious, review of our relations with the Ameer, and I come to the inference that I wish to draw from that retrospect. The inference I draw is, I think, the true one, and I assure your Lordships that I have no wish to treat the subject in a narrow Party spirit; but I want to get at the truth, and the truth is simply this—that the Ameer never was a friend to England in our acceptation of the term, and we were never friends to the Ameer in his acceptation of the term. The cold and neutral tinted policy which we had too long pursued in India had no attraction for the Ameer; he wanted brighter colours and a warmer tone. He sought for them at Simla, but he found them in Turkestan.

My Lords, statesmen must, as school children must, submit to be judged by results. If a certain policy proves a failure we are not to be debarred from condemning it by such high-sounding terms as "benevolent neutrality," or "non-intervention," or "non-interference." My Lords, non-interference is an excellent rule in private life, so long as nobody shows a disposition to interfere with you; but if another man is interfering with your business you must interfere with him. Caution is a very desirable thing; but over-caution leads a man into quite as great straits, as rashness and over-caution is apt to be regarded by semi-civilized communities and Sovereigns as timidity. We all know, if we know anything of human nature, that nobody cares for a timid man. My Lords, I would ask, with the greatest possible respect, but, at the same time, with the greatest possible confidence, whether any noble Lord who sits on the opposite benches will get up and say that after the insult which was offered to our Envoy any English Cabinet could have stood motionless, and tamely submitted to that insult? Knowing that Russian influence was dominant in Afghanistan; feeling, as every English Cabinet must feel, that it was responsible for the honour of the Crown, the dignity of the nation, the tranquillity of the Frontier, and the tranquillity of a country numbering 200,000,000 of inhabitants within its Frontiers, will any noble Lord get up and say that an English Cabinet could, under such circumstances, have tamely submitted to that insult? If there is one man in this House so hardy and so bold as to say that, I would venture to tell him that he must settle his account with his countrymen—he must be responsible to them for such advice.

Now, my Lords, I have done, or nearly done. Since the outbreak of hostilities in Afghanistan our noble soldiers and our gallant and instructed officers have done what English soldiers have ever done—their duty. It is too early to speak of results. I am not going to attempt to foretel what will be the issue of the present war. The matter is in the hands of Providence, and we must abide the result with hope and confidence. It has been said that we have failed to make a friend of the Ameer, and, before quitting the subject, I would remark that he does not appear to have been able to make very good friends of his feudatory clans.

There is another paragraph in the Most Gracious Speech of Her Majesty upon which I wish to say one or two words. Her Majesty says—

> "I have every reason to believe that the arrangements for the pacification of Europe, made by the Treaty of Berlin, will be successfully carried into effect."

That statement will, I think, be regarded by the country with great satisfaction, because it implies the sanctity of Treaties. I hope the time is far distant when the sanctity of Treaties will cease to be recognized. Treaties are, my Lords, the title deeds of Empires; they are the guarantees of the independence, liberty, and safety of smaller and weaker States; which in turn may be regarded as neutral zones, marked out by the negotiations of diplomatists and statesmen, and established as barriers againt the encroachments of the greater and more powerful States. Of all countries, England is the last that ought lightly to regard Treaty obligations. I believe that in insisting on a firm adherence to the stipulations in the Articles of the Treaty of Berlin, England will receive the support of Europe. At any rate, England is bound to regard the obligations of Treaties even more than any other State that could be named, because it has always been our boast that an Englishman's word is his bond.

I wish to allude for a moment to one subject which is not mentioned in Her Majesty's most gracious Speech. Having been connected for many years with large mining, manufacturing, and agricultural districts, and with the commerce of the country, I wish to ask your Lordships' permission to express—as I do from the bottom of my heart—my sympathy for the thousands, I fear I must say the millions, of my fellow-countrymen who are suffering hardship, privation, and misery from the depression in the chief industries of the country. In the expression of that sympathy I am sure every noble Lord who hears me will heartily join. Probably the reason why the subject is not referred to in Her Majesty's most gracious Speech is, that the Government felt that unless they could afford relief, it would be better not to introduce the subject; besides which they may have felt that, under the circumstances, it would be wise to concentrate the attention of Parliament on the special topic of the war in Afghanistan. I may add that I should not have ventured to make this allusion to it, had I not felt that I might possibly pour a drop of comfort even among the disheartened millions of whom I have spoken. My Lords, there may be a ray of light amid the deepest gloom. A ray of light has not appeared on our horizon yet; but one has appeared on the horizon of a distant and a friendly State. The President of the United States, in his Message the other day, told his countrymen that he saw symptoms of improvement of returning prosperity, and of a revival of trade; and I believe that when a revival of trade occurs in America, it will not be long before it reaches our own shores. Our American friends have proved very good prophets in the prediction of atmospheric changes; and I hope the President's prophecy will prove equally well founded.

And now, my Lords, it only remains for me to thank you—as I do from the bottom of my heart—for the large measure of indulgence and kind attention which you have accorded to me, and to apologize for the length, and to many noble Lords the tedium, of the remarks which I have made. I now move that an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, thanking Her Majesty for Her Majesty's Most Gracious Speech from the Throne, as follows:—

"MOST GRACIOUS SOVEREIGN,

"WE, Your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, in Parliament assembled, beg leave to offer our humble thanks to Your Majesty for the most gracious Speech which Your Majesty has addressed to both Houses of Parliament.

"We humbly thank Your Majesty for the gracious expression of your regret that Your Majesty has found it necessary to call for our attendance at an unusual, and, as Your Majesty is pleased to say, probably at an inconvenient time.

"We humbly thank Your Majesty for informing us that the hostility manifested towards Your Majesty's Indian Government by the Ameer of Afghanistan, and the manner in which he has repulsed Your Majesty's friendly Mission, has left Your Majesty no alternative but to make a peremptory demand for redress.

"We humbly thank Your Majesty for informing us that in consequence of this demand having been disregarded, Your Majesty has directed an expedition to be sent into his territory, and has taken the earliest opportunity of calling us together, and making to us the communication required by Law.

"We thank Your Majesty for directing that Papers on the subject shall be laid before us.

"We rejoice to learn that Your Majesty receives from all Foreign Powers assurances of their friendly feelings, and that Your Majesty has every reason to believe that the arrangements for the pacification of Europe, made by the Treaty of Berlin, will be successfully carried into effect.

"We humbly assure Your Majesty that after full deliberation upon the matters which have led Your Majesty to anticipate our usual time of meeting, we shall be prepared to give our careful consideration to such measures for the public benefit as Your Majesty may hereafter direct to be submitted to us.

"We humbly assure Your Majesty that our best care shall be devoted to the maintenance of the great interests of Your Majesty's Empire, and we unite with Your Majesty in praying that the blessing of the Almighty may attend our counsels."

LORD INCHIQUIN: In rising to second the Address, which has just been moved by my noble Friend (the Earl of Ravensworth) in answer to Her Majesty's most Gracious Speech, I wish, in the first place, briefly to refer to some of the events which took place during the late war between Russia and Turkey, and to those events which immediately preceded the signature of the Treaty of Berlin; because it appears to me that in order rightly to appreciate the circumstances which have led to the declaration of war with Afghanistan, it is essential to bear in mind the occurrences which have recently taken place in Europe as well as in Asia.

I think it will be conceded on all sides that the task which Her Majesty's Government have had before them in carrying out the foreign policy of the country has been lately one of unexampled difficulty and danger; and that they have carried that policy out with honour to themselves and satisfaction to the country, I think has been sufficiently proved by the reception which the First Minister of the Crown and the Foreign Secretary received on their return from the Berlin Congress, and also by the overwhelming majority with which the other House of Parliament pronounced a decision in their favour. My Lords, the difficulties which they have had to encounter have proceeded, in a great measure, from the aggressive policy which has been pursued by Russia, and by the threatening attitude which that country has on more than one occasion assumed towards England, and also from the pledges and assurances which have been given by her, and which, like the proverbial pie-crust, seem to have been made only to be broken. My Lords, the astounding revelations of diplomatic unscrupulousness and intrigue which are contained in the volume which has just been issued upon affairs in Central Asia have shown that Her Majesty's Government have not without sufficient cause pursued the course they have done with regard to Afghanistan. But, my Lords, the difficulties which they have had to encounter have not only proceeded from without. They have also, in great measure, proceeded from within. I allude especially to the agitation which took place in this country before and during the late war. I think it cannot be doubted that those agitations had a most injurious effect, and that they made it exceedingly difficult for Her Majesty's Government to act with that decision and promptitude which they otherwise would have used. My Lords, these internal difficulties and agitations undoubtedly had a most injurious effect during the late war. They produced an effect upon Russia which made her imagine that she had nothing to do but to go on with her conquests, without taking into consideration the possibility of England's interference, and led her to pursue her victorious course up to the very walls of Constantinople. But, nevertheless, all this time Her Majesty's Government were keeping a watchful eye upon the interests of this country. They were only waiting until the time arrived to intervene, and when it did arrive they interfered with so much effect that the Treaty of San Stefano, which completely abrogated Turkish power in Europe, was submitted to the assembled Powers of Europe at the Congress of Berlin, and the result was the conclusion of the Treaty of Berlin. By that Treaty, Turkey was re-established as an European Power; and I think it will be a source of immense gratification to everyone in this country to hear the announcement which Her Majesty has made in Her most gracious Speech, that she has every reason to believe that this Treaty will be faithfully carried out.

My Lords, while these affairs were going on in Europe, Russia was not idle in Asia. She had for years been pursuing a policy of interference, pressing on her arms in every quarter, and annexing first one country and then another; and, my Lords, at the very time that the Treaty of Berlin was signed she was intriguing with the Ameer of Afghanistan, in order that she might, in the event of war breaking out between her and England, send an army into his dominions for the purpose of making a descent on India. I would recommend those who read the Papers upon the Afghan Question to judge of the intentions of Russia. But, my Lords, I must draw your attention to one special incident recorded in the Central Asian Papers. I allude to the publication of the letters from General Kaufmann to the Ameer. The publication of those letters, following as they did the categorical denial of their existence, given first by Prince Gortchakoff, and subsequently by General Kaufmann himself, form a curious and interesting commentary on the repeated assurances given by Russian statesmen, and even by the Emperor himself, that Afghanistan lay outside the sphere of Russian action.

My Lords, I shall endeavour, as shortly and as briefly as I can, to touch on the subject of Afghanistan. It has been so fully dealt with by my noble Friend that I shall not attempt to go over the ground again; but, in the first place, I wish to say, that after carefully perusing the Papers which have been placed in our hands, it appears to me that the despatch of the Secretary of State for India is most fully justified upon examination of those Papers. It appears to me that no inference is drawn in that despatch which is not borne out by the Papers. The whole matter may, I think, be stated in two simple questions—first of all, have we been fair in our dealings with the Ameer throughout? and, secondly, are we justified now in declaring war against him? I think the first question must be answered in the negative, and the last in the affirmative. It appears to me that if instead of pursuing that course of masterly inactivity and timidity which marked our dealings with Afghanistan in the early part of the Ameer's reign, we had come boldly forward and told him that we would recognize him as the *de jure* as well as the *de facto* Ruler of Afghanistan, and if, guarding ourselves against interfering in his domestic affairs, we had promised to assist him in defending himself against foreign enemies, he would still have been our staunch ally. But it is a remarkable fact that Lord Mayo appears to have been the only Viceroy who really inspired confidence in Shere Ali. He certainly established an immense influence over him, and especially at the time of the Umballa Conference. But it is also remarkable that after the Umballa Conference a letter was written by the then Secretary of State for India (the Duke of Argyll) to Lord Mayo, disapproving in a certain measure of what he had done there. My Lords, the fact is that we have always been unwilling to take any risk upon ourselves. We have asked from the Ameer everything, and on our part we have been unwilling to grant anything in return. But the same error appears on our part in our dealings with the Ameer in 1873. That year was a very remarkable one, though I will not dwell on it on account of my noble Friend having so fully called attention to it; but I may say that there is no doubt that that year was the turning point in our negotiations with Shere Ali. He had become alarmed at the rapid advance of Russia in Central Asia, and at the taking of Khiva, and appealed to us for more explicit assurances of our protection; but the Viceroy, Lord Northbrook, was not authorised by the Home Government to give these promises. Again, after the Conference between the Viceroy and Shere Ali's Envoy at Simla the same difficulty arose. The Viceroy was not able, on account of the orders which he had received from England, to give Shere Ali those assurances which he sought. This was the state of affairs when the present Government came into Office; and the first thing which Lord Salisbury did was to write to Lord Northbrook, the then Viceroy, stating what scanty information was being received from Afghanistan, and suggesting that a British Agent should be established at Herat and Candahar. Now, my Lords, it will probably be in your recollection that Shere Ali had assented to this proposition before; but what was the answer which the Viceroy sent? He sent an answer saying that he and his Council considered that the policy which had been previously pursued was much better than that suggested by the Secretary of State. A short time after that the Secretary of State again writes, saying that if it was injudicious to send a British Agent, he suggested, under the circumstances, that the best thing to do was to send a British Mission. This, again, was declined by the Indian Government; and it was not until Lord Lytton came into office that a real attempt was made to establish a British Mission, and to find out whether Shere Ali was willing to give the necessary consent. And, my Lords, Lord Lytton, when he went out, was instructed to offer the assistance which Shere Ali had before appealed for in vain. But it was too late. The mischief had been done, and it was impossible to undo it. Things remained in this way until July and August of this very year, when a notice came to say that a Russian Mission was at that moment in Cabul; and the Viceroy telegraphed home to know whether the matter was to be treated as an Imperial question, or one which concerned the Indian Government. Having been told that it was to be dealt with in the latter capacity, he informed the Ameer that a British Mission would be sent immediately to Cabul, and with what result is well known to your Lordships. It was impossible for the Government to put up with such an open insult; and I have no hesitation in saying Her Majesty's Government had no other course open to them than that which they have taken. There may be people who will say "Perish India," and would rather sacrifice their own country than sacrifice their particular views as to our relations with the Ameer; but I believe the people who are of that way of thinking are very few: and I am sure that your Lordships and the bulk of the people of England will tolerate no interference with our Empire, but will sacrifice blood and treasure to maintain it, and will be prepared to say "England's friends are our friends, and England's enemies are our enemies." I beg to second the Address. [See p. 17.]

EARL GRANVILLE: My Lords, it has been my lot not unfrequently during the existence of the present Government, on the occasion of the opening of Parliament, to express the great pleasure I have felt at the ability with which the Address to Her Majesty in answer to Her Majesty's Most Gracious Speech have been moved and seconded in this House by young Peers. The noble Lord who has just seconded the Address (Lord Inchiquin) we have often had the pleasure of hearing before; and with regard to my noble Friend who moved it, he is an old soldier in debate whom we gladly welcome, though coming from another regiment. I hope that neither of my noble Friends, nor any of your Lordships, will think I am wanting in courtesy to those noble Lords, or that I do not consider the topics with which they have dealt of the greatest importance and gravity, if I do not follow them in detail in the statements they have made, and which I shall avoid doing for the reasons I shall shortly give. I observe, though I do not complain of it, that neither of the noble Lords has followed the usual practice of adverting to each of the points mentioned in the Speech from the Throne. With regard to home matters there is, indeed, very little to be said—for there are only two points in it. The first is the reference to the inevitable, and, I am afraid, the annually increasing Estimates; and there is also an announcement of certain anonymous Bills to be introduced into Parliament after a suitable Recess. I own that after the experience I have had of the announcement of Bills in Queen's Speeches in the last two years and the results, I am able to wait with indifference till February next to know the names of the new friends or the old friends with new faces, as the case may be. The noble Earl who moved the Address appeared to me to hit a very serious blot, which had struck me on reading the Queen's Speech. We all know the warm and active sympathy which Her Majesty evinces when any calamity happens to any class, or even to individuals, among her subjects; and I do think it is somewhat strange that Her Majesty's Ministers should entirely omit to insert a single word of sympathy on the part of Her Majesty with the great distress which indubitably exists among the trading, the manufacturing, and the agricultural classes of this country. The noble Earl spoke with great feeling, as becomes his great knowledge of this subject; and I am happy to agree with him in the hopes of improvement which he expressed as to the future. No doubt the depression has arisen mainly from causes with which Her Majesty's Government have nothing to do. First, there was the inflation of a few years ago, against the dangers of which the Leader of the late Government so eloquently warned the public. Then there was the commercial disturbance caused by the Russo-Turkish War. I do not know how far it can be said that Her Majesty's Government had nothing to do with that, for the Prime Minister told us last year that if the Government had taken a course they did not take that war might have been prevented, while others think there was a different course which might have had the same effect. Her Majesty's Government have nothing to do with bad harvests, nor with the folly of the enormous loans to insolvent States, enabling them for a short period to buy the produce of our labour. My firm belief at this moment is that these causes are diminished, if not removed, and that the one thing wanted is confidence. With confidence there would be a return of gradually increasing prosperity; but how far Her Majesty's Government, by their acts, are contributing to restore that confidence it is not for me to say. It is quite clear that a Government which describes every diplomatic move as a diplomatic triumph; which announces — with perfect truth — that this country is able from year to year to sustain the strains of war without being exhausted; which startles the country with great responsibilities for which it is utterly unprepared, even if it follows a policy that may be wise—may be popular—it does not contribute to bring about the sort of confidence which is essential to the prosperity of trade and manufactures. I do not complain of the Speech being short; but there are some very singular omissions to which I must allude. While a most serious war is raging in our dominion of South Africa, and we are despatching troops thither, it does seem to me that in a communication from Her Majesty to Her Parliament there should be some reference to the state of affairs in that important Colony. There is, indeed, an allusion to the Treaty of Berlin—a very satisfactory allusion it is; and I am ready to admit with great pleasure that if Her Majesty's Government, in concert with the other European Powers, have, by judicious diplomatic measures, contributed in any degree to induce Russia and Turkey to execute all their engagements under that Treaty, not excluding any, they will have done a very great and important work. I am very glad, indeed, Her Majesty's Government are able to inform us that they think those two countries will execute the Treaty, and that it will work satisfactorily, though of this I require more information to be convinced. But there is another matter which affects this country much more vitally than the Treaty of Berlin, and that is the Anglo-Turkish Convention; we are not quite sure how that is being carried out. That came upon us all with a surprise. As the result of that Convention we found ourselves in possession of Cyprus, and loaded with immense responsibilities—the government of Asia Minor and the Protectorate of Turkey. My Lords, we who dared last year to criticize the value of Cyprus were stigmatized as unpatriotic. I admit that many people thought that it was a great success at the moment and for a particular purpose. I am told—though I do not know whether it is true—that a great Continental statesman, who has constantly recommended annexation to this country, when he heard of it said—"It will succeed; it will be popular in England; they will call it progress, but it is acquisition." My Lords, we have heard a great deal of Russian aggression of late; but I find in these Papers a Governor General declaring of India that we fear no aggression and desire no acquisition; and the late Foreign Secretary (the Earl of Derby) said that the strength of this country consisted in this—that we feared nobody and wanted nothing. It appeared to me to be a proud and true assertion. I am afraid that these former truths can hardly now be maintained. I rather gather that the acquisition of Cyprus, even apart from the mode in which it was made, is not now considered of such high value by those who made it as it was at first. I judge this from the different manner in which they defend it. One Minister states that it is to be considered a model school of good government for the Turks. I very much doubt whether many Pashas will be sent to Cyprus to study our administration more than they have been sent to Malta, to England, or to the Ionian Islands. The Prime Minister has spoken of Cyprus as "a place of arms;" but before it becomes so I am afraid many improvements will have to be carried out and much expense incurred. It is, indeed, a little out of the way; but by the time it is fortified, harbours provided, and the pestilential climate rendered salubrious, I trust it may turn out to be of some use. But then it seems there is some further consolation in store for us. A right rev. Prelate (the Bishop of Gloucester) has spoken of our possession of Cyprus as a providential dispensation that would promote the spread of the Christian religion. Nobody would be more delighted than I should be if such an object could be attained; but I confess I do not quite understand how that brilliant and gallant soldier Sir Garnet Wolseley, administering Mahommedan law in that Island, will promote in any very sensible degree the advancement of the Christian religion. I hope the Government will succeed in their endeavours to introduce better government into Asia Minor; but I am disappointed that they did not think it worth while to mention the subject in the Royal Speech.

I now, my Lords, come to the subject to which both the noble Earl and the noble Lord so properly devoted their attention. No doubt your Lordships have a perfectly Constitutional right to move an Amendment to the Address in answer to the Speech from the Throne; but, my Lords, it is a right which for the last 20 years has not been exercised. It is a right the exercise of which statesmen have always deemed it well to avoid if possible, it being desirable, out of respect to the Sovereign, that in our Address to the Throne we should be as unanimous as possible. An Amendment is all the more unnecessary when an Address does not commit the House, and we have simply to thank Her Majesty for the information we have received. There is another reason, my Lords, why I think an Amendment on this occasion is almost impossible, with due regard for the convenience of Peers. Parliament has been summoned very suddenly; but the Papers bearing upon the causes of that summons have been delivered to us only a very few days ago, and we have had no time to study them in detail. I think the House will expect some explanation why the Central Asia Papers, which were promised before the close of last Session, have been withheld from your Lordships and the country till the beginning of this week. With regard to the Afghan Papers, they consist of so large a mass that some considerable time must be required to master them—I venture to say that the great majority of your Lordships here present have not had the time requisite to master their details. I therefore at once wish to state that it is not my intention to move any Amendment to the Address; but I beg it to be clearly understood that I think there are matters of the very greatest importance with which we have to deal, and that it will be impossible for this House not fully to discuss the whole subject, and to express an opinion upon it. Speaking of what has been achieved in the field, I must say it is to me a source of very great pleasure to hear of the brilliant dash and courage of our troops which have led them on to success. Whatever may be the cause, or in whatever part of the world, our troops never fail, whether on land or sea; and the fact of their success will enable us, so far as the Opposition is concerned, all the more thoroughly to discuss and debate the policy of the Government, which the noble Lord who seconded the Address stated turned on two points—first, whether the conduct of the English Government had been just to the Ameer; and, secondly, whether the war itself was just. I agree with him in thinking the first question must be answered in the negative, and I should have thought that the two questions were somewhat connected. This, my Lords, is the great question which has called Parliament together. I had no great anxiety about the meeting of Parliament. I felt perfectly certain it would be called together. Not that it makes any great difference to Parliament whether it meets now or in February, so far as it may exercise any influence after the mischief has been done — after a war has already commenced. Once you cut the jugular vein, it does not much matter whether you send for the surgeon at once or a week afterwards. There are great Constitutional questions connected with it. No one denies the absolute Prerogative of the Crown to declare war and make peace; but there are questions connected with every Prerogative of the Crown, with regard to the discretion and the extent to which it is used; and it is perfectly clear to me, that if year after year you take the country and Parliament perfectly by surprise and throw on them the responsibility of measures, without the means of forming a judgment having been afforded, you do weaken the foundations on which the principle of Prerogative rests, and you may do a great deal of mischief thereby. I do not wish to enter into the Constitutional question—it rather belongs to the whole merits of the case, on which I do not wish to dwell to-night. But there is this peculiarity in the case—there has been a great change of policy on this most important matter. During the last three years, not only has Parliament not been taken into confidence on the subject, but Parliament has actually been led to take a wrong view of what was the policy of the Cabinet. During that period had Parliament any reason to suppose that the policy of the Government with regard to Afghanistan was different from that of all the Secretaries of State, and of all Governors General from the time of Lord Dalhousie to the time when the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury) took the Seals of the India Office? It is not my habit to trouble your Lordships by reading long extracts from Blue Books; but I must trouble your Lordships with a few. In the first place, what were the general principles held by the Conservative Party upon this subject nine years ago, when they were in power? Sir Stafford

Northcote, when at the India Office, said in the House of Commons, on the 9th of July, 1869—

"Looking at it from an Indian point of view, this debate had been eminently satisfactory, both in the opinions that had been expressed and the opinions that had not been expressed. There had been no advocacy of a policy of annexation, of a policy of extending the British dominions, or of a policy of advancing in order to meet Russia midway between our Frontier and hers. The general feeling evidently was in favour of the policy of keeping within our own Frontiers—of developing the internal defences, extending the existing railways, and improving the harbour of Kurrachee, rather than attempting to go into the country of Afghanistan. In addition to the other reasons which might be stated against such a proceeding as the latter, there was the danger of creating suspicion in the minds of the natives. He believed the hon. Member for Gravesend had given expression to the feelings of Englishmen of all parties, when he said that we ought to keep free from the imbroglio of Afghan policy. There was a general feeling that we ought not to repeat the mistakes we made in 1840; that we ought to keep ourselves entirely free from entangling alliances. What we should do was to maintain friendly relations with the natives on our borders, to desire the existence of a good Government in Afghanistan. It was a misapprehension to suppose that we wanted to erect Cabul into a bulwark against Russia."—[3 *Hansard*, cxcvii. 1578-9.]

No doubt Sir Stafford Northcote fairly represented the opinions of the Government on that occasion. I will not quote the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby), speaking in behalf of the noble Marquess in 1874, but he certainly gave no indication of any change of policy. But in 1877 there arose considerable disquietude on this subject among those conversant with India, and on June 11 of that year the noble Marquess said—

"I can assure the noble Lord that any danger of a Russian inroad on the Frontier of British India is not quite so far advanced as he seems to imagine. The nearest point on the Caspian at which supplies could be gathered by Russia is over a thousand miles from our Indian Frontier. The consideration of the danger to which the noble Lord refers may possibly interest a future generation of statesmen; but that calamity is not of such imminence as to render necessary the Motion by which the noble Lord seeks to avert it. I will not dwell longer on the geographical circumstances, except to protest against the statement of the noble Lord that the Empire of British India knows no bounds. My Lords, the bounds of that Empire are very minutely marked out, especially on the North-Western side. Whatever the Empire of Russia may be, there is no doubt whatever as to what the Frontier of British India is. It is perfectly well known. I cannot help thinking that in discussions of this kind a great deal of misapprehension arises from the popular use of maps on a small scale. As with such maps you are able to put a thumb on India and a finger on Russia, some persons at once think that the political situation is alarming, and that India must be looked to. If the noble Lord would use a larger map—say one on the scale of the Ordnance Map of England—he would find that the distance between Russia and British India is not to be measured by the finger and thumb, but by a rule. There are between them deserts and mountainous chains measured by thousands of miles, and these are serious obstacles to any advance by Russia, however well planned such an advance might be."—[3 *Hansard*, ccxxxiv. 1564-5.]

Do such sentiments appear to be those of a Minister who was making a great change in the Indian policy, out of fear of Russia? Not very long after that the Duke of Argyll put a Question to the noble Marquess. I may say, in passing, that the Duke of Argyll greatly regrets that an important question like this, in which he takes so much interest, should be discussed when he is unable from ill-health to be present. Lord Salisbury answered—

"With respect to the information asked for by the noble Duke, I can hardly give him much positive knowledge; but I think I can give him some negative information. He has derived from the sources open to him the following statement, as I understood him:—that we had tried to force an Envoy upon the Ameer at Cabul; that we had selected for that purpose Sir Lewis Pelly, whose vigour of mind and action might possibly inspire apprehension in the Councils of a Native Prince; that we had supported this demand by a large assemblage of troops on the North-Western Frontier; and that we were preparing boats upon the Indus. Now, we have not tried to force an Envoy upon the Ameer at Cabul; we have not suggested Sir Lewis Pelly as an Envoy to Cabul; the troops were assembled on the North-Western Frontier without the slightest reference to any such demand; and with regard to the boats on the Indus, I never heard of them until to-day."—[*Ibid.* 1835.]

With regard to sending Envoys, the noble Marquess stated that he referred to Candahar and Herat, and not to Cabul; but in the Papers it is distinctly shown that it was announced to the Ameer that it was intended to send Sir Lewis Pelly to Cabul. The Papers say nothing about the massing of troops on the Frontier, and I do not know from the Papers what was the reason for which they were sent. Then the noble Marquess continued—

"Our relations with the Ameer of Cabul have undergone no material change since last year. I do not believe that he is worse disposed towards us than hitherto, or that his feelings are in any way more embittered towards the British Government."—[*Ibid.*]

My Lords, I shall listen with great anxiety to the explanation of the noble Marquess; but I must ask, after all that had happened, how was it possible to say that our relations with the Ameer had undergone no material change, and that the feelings of the Ameer were not more embittered towards the British Government? Well, my Lords, a despatch from Lord Lytton was sent on the 20th of February, 1876; the next Paper to it is the answer, on the 10th of May—not the 10th of May, 1876, but the 10th of May, 1877. Now, I really want to know what passed all this time. Are we really to believe that during these 14 months, when such important transactions were going on, not a single communication passed between the Secretary of State and the Viceroy of India? That seems almost impossible; but if there were a number of such despatches, I presume that they will be produced. Or are we to understand that the system of Correspondence known as "private and personal communications," and which, when attempted in the Foreign Office, exploded in the Warner police case, was adopted during that period? As I said before, I shall listen with anxiety to the explanation of the noble Marquess, how it was that during all that time there were no communications between the two Governments? But, however long that despatch of Lord Lytton was in coming, it must have been in the hands of the noble Marquess a week or a fortnight before the day when he gave the reply to which I have referred; and how, then, was it possible to say that there was no change in the position when at the time we had broken off all diplomatic relations with the Ameer, and we gave him to understand that he was not to entertain any hope of help against Russia? The noble Marquess having given this explanation, what happened? The noble Lord (Lord Lawrence), a former Governor General of India, whom I have always found the most courteous of men, did not acquiesce. He said that—

> "So far as Central Asia was concerned, there was nothing to be desired beyond the statement of the noble Marquess to the House, coupled with that made 'elsewhere' on the previous Monday; but, with regard to our policy on the North-West Frontier and our relations with Cabul, he feared that something more had occurred than had yet been heard of. It seemed unlikely that all the doubts, forebodings, and suggestions which had appeared in the Indian papers should have so little basis as contended for in the explanations of the noble Marquess. It was clear from the Indian papers, and he included those which supported the action of the Indian Government, that something of very considerable importance had occurred to cause agitation on the North-West Frontier of India."—[*Ibid.* 1836.]

What did my noble Friend (the Earl of Northbrook) say? He said—

> "It is with great satisfaction, therefore, that I have heard the assurance of the noble Marquess that the policy I have referred to Her Majesty's Government will continue to pursue. I am satisfied that he has given us that assurance in perfect good faith, and that we may trust him to resist any attempt to put it aside."—[*Ibid.* 1843.]

I may add, with regard to this point, that it was through the advice of my noble Friend (the Earl of Northbrook), and through his influence upon us, that we entirely gave up the idea of taking Parliamentary action on this subject.

Now, I come to another question, to which I have been invited by the noble Lord who seconded the Address—I do not pretend, however, that I should not have referred to it even if the noble Lord had not done so. The noble Lord says that, in the despatch of the 18th of November, the Secretary of State for India gave a perfectly correct statement of all that had happened. Now, my Lords, I must say that a certain portion of the despatch of the noble Viscount (Viscount Cranbrook) conveyed the most erroneous impression possible of what had occurred. When a subject interests the public they resort to every device to get easy information upon it; they fly to the newspapers, to abstracts, digests, &c. to get at the matter without great labour. Very few men are gluttons of Blue Books. Now, I do not blame the noble Viscount in the slightest degree for writing and publishing the despatch—I think he was perfectly right in taking an opportunity of stating his own case. But in producing such a statement, which he knew would be read by hundreds of thousands who would never dream of reading two pages of a Blue Book, surely it was incumbent on him to use special care and accuracy in respect of everything? I do not undervalue the difficulty of making a *précis* of such a multitude of Papers, and this is very able, very clear, and very interesting; but what did the noble Viscount do? He gave a short historical sketch of what had happened with regard to this question in previous stages and under different Governors General. I am not aware that any fault can be found with that part of the despatch. My noble Friend behind me (Lord Lawrence) will correct me if I am wrong; but I think the description of his policy was perfectly fair and accurate. But when the noble Viscount came to deal with the policy of the late Government the case was very different. The ninth paragraph of the despatch contains the part to which I refer, and I will read it to your Lordships. Paragraph 9 says—

> "Finding that the object of the Ameer was to ascertain definitely how far he might rely on the help of the British Government if his territories were threatened by Russia, Lord Northbrook's Government was prepared to assure him that, under certain conditions, the Government of India would assist him to repel unprovoked aggression. But Her Majesty's Government at home did not share His Highness's apprehension, and the Viceroy ultimately informed the Ameer that the discussion of the question would be best postponed to a more convenient season."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 262.]

Now, I venture to appeal to your Lordships—and I found my appeal on what has appeared in the public Press and on the comments generally made—and to these I must add the reproaches addressed to me by political Friends—I put it to your Lordships whether that paragraph was not likely to lead to the erroneous impression that Lord Northbrook desired to make an engagement somewhat similar to that which the Ameer desired, but before doing so he referred home for permission; that he got instructions, which were opposed to his proposal; that, therefore, he did not give the assurances which he wished to give, and that he postponed the discussion to a more convenient season? I appeal to your Lordships, whether Liberal or Conservative, who have read the despatch, whether that description is correct? But the truth is exactly the reverse. My noble Friend did not propose to give what the Ameer desired; but he wrote home for permission to give an assurance which he thought sufficient. Those instructions were not of a dissenting character to withhold any assurances which he desired to give, but of an assenting character to the assurances which he desired to give; and those assurances he accordingly gave. He did not postpone anything owing to instructions, but spontaneously, in consequence of the Envoy not being ready to negotiate on one point. I state the case as it is, leaving it to the noble Viscount to make an explanation. There is one point with which I think the noble Viscount has not dealt sufficiently, and that is the result of the interview between Sir Lewis Pelly and the Ameer's Representative in 1876. The result of this interview is described in these words—

> "Although the Ameer had been informed in writing, both of the concessions which the British Government was ready to grant to him and the conditions attached to them, and although, at the same time, it was signified to him that it would be of no avail for him to send his Envoy to Peshawur unless His Highness were prepared to agree to those conditions as the bases of the proposed Treaty, it became apparent in the course of the Conference that the Minister had received no specific authority to accept them. As, moreover, the language and conduct of Shere Ali, which had so long been dubious, became openly inimical, you judiciously took advantage of the sudden death of His Highness's Envoy to discontinue negotiations, the bases of which had been practically rejected."—[*Ibid.* p. 264.]

This does not, however, convey all that may be found in the other Papers. There is an extract from a cipher telegram, dated the 30th of March, 1877, from the Viceroy at Calcutta to Sir Lewis Pelly at Peshawur. The Viceroy says—

> "Close Conference immediately, on ground that basis on which we agreed to negotiate has not been acknowledged by Ameer; that, Mir Akhor not being authorized to negotiate on that basis, nor you on any other, Conference is terminated *ipso facto;* and that you will leave Peshawur on a stated day. The date of it you will fix yourself, but it should be as early as conveniently possible, in order to show we are in earnest and avoid further entanglement. Let your language to Mir Akhor be most friendly. If, in the meanwhile, new Envoys or messengers arrive to continue negotiation you will tell them that your powers are terminated. On closing Conference, write to Ameer friendly letter notifying the fact. I entirely approve your letter to Ameer."—[*Ibid.* p. 222.]

Now, my Lords, what is the description given by Lord Lytton himself in his long and able despatch of the 10th of May? His Lordship says—

> "Apparently the Ameer, whose object was still to gain time, was much surprised and embarrassed by this step. At the moment when Sir Lewis Pelly was closing the Conference, His Highness was sending to the Mir Akhor instructions to prolong it by every means in his power; a fresh Envoy was already on the way from Cabul to Peshawur; and it was reported that this Envoy had authority to accept eventually all the conditions of the British Government. The Viceroy was aware of these facts when he instructed our Envoy to close the Conference. But it appeared to his Excellency that liabilities which the British Government might properly have contracted on behalf of the present Ameer of Cabul, if that Prince had shown any eagerness to deserve and reciprocate its friendship, could not be advantageously, or even safely, accepted in face of the situation revealed by Sir Lewis Pelly's energetic investigations. Under these circumstances, the prolongation of the Peshawur Conference could only lead to embarrassments and entanglements best avoided by the timely termination of it."—[*Ibid.* pp. 170-71.]

I think that is a most important fact, and I am not arguing now whether Lord Lytton was right or wrong—I am not arguing the merits of the case in the slightest degree; but I do think that the description in the despatch of November 18 does not fully set forth these important facts. And here I wish to give noble Lords a caution as to the epithets used by the noble Viscount in describing the conduct of Lord Lytton. Lord Lytton has gained all his experience in life in diplomatic circles, and has had no experience of administrative business either in Parliamentary, official, or commercial life; but I must say he sometimes seems to do business in a rather peculiar manner. Now, there is one very curious Paper. I have known all the Viceroys of India for a very long time, and I cannot imagine one of them—Lord Dalhousie, Lord Canning, Lord Elgin, Lord Mayo, or the noble Earl and Baron now in the House—sitting down, as Lord Lytton appears to have done, with a shorthand writer at his back, making a magniloquent speech, interspersed with metaphors of a more or less Oriental character, to his own Envoy, and desiring that Envoy to deliver faithfully that speech, which had taken half or three quarters of an hour in delivery, to the Ameer when he returned to him. The special qualities on which the noble Viscount complimented Lord Lytton are his discretion, consideration, and the conciliation with which he treated the Ameer. Now just let us look at this. As regards his discretion, let us take a few sentences. We find Lord Lytton saying—

> "The moment we cease to regard Afghanistan as a friendly and firmly allied State, what is there to prevent us from providing for the security of our Frontier by an understanding with Russia, which might have the effect of wiping Afghanistan out of the map altogether? If the Ameer does not desire to come to a speedy understanding with us, Russia does; and she desires it at his expense."—[*Ibid.* p. 183.]

Now, I am perfectly ignorant as to whether there is a foundation or not for that declaration of Lord Lytton. I do not know whether the noble Viscount opposite thought it necessary to enter into negotiations with Count Schouvaloff in regard to the partition of Afghanistan. But if it is true, what do you think of Lord Lytton, who was selected from diplomacy of all professions, making such a declaration as this to the Ameer? The Viceroy tells the Ameer that Russia has negotiated with us. Is not that the greatest inducement you can offer to the Ameer to place himself also in communication with Russia? I must, therefore, caution your Lordships against believing in the absolute discretion of Lord Lytton. Then Lord Lytton is praised for the moderation of his monitions to the Ameer. Well—it appears that—

> "The Viceroy then said that, if the Ameer remained our friend, this military power could be spread round him as a ring of iron, and, if he became our enemy, it could break him as a reed."—[*Ibid.*]

A very pleasant alternative indeed! Placing the Ameer in such a position as this reminds me of the alternative suggested by the historic mottoes of the Colonna and Orsini families, one of which I unworthily possess—"You can break, but you cannot bend me," the other being—"You can bend me, but you cannot break me." I do not see how this can be described as great consideration. Then it is said Lord Lytton is so conciliatory. Well, in a subsequent sentence we find Lord Lytton, speaking of the Ameer, saying—

> "This is the man who pretends to hold the balance between England and Russia independent of either! His position is rather that of an earthen pipkin between two iron pots."—[*Ibid.*]

That is not the language of conciliation. There is an omission in the Papers to which I wish to call the attention of the noble Viscount. I refer to the omission of four very important letters, as to which the noble Viscount will no doubt give an explanation, as it was stated that their terms were unusually harsh and had produced a most pernicious effect. The noble Viscount says he never received them. But it is an extraordinary thing that he did not remark the omission of such important documents, which caused the Ameer to describe them as making it impossible for him to accept the proposal. Then, again, I think we should have had the Report of our Envoy the Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan, on his return to Simla, which does not appear in the Papers. My Lords, I said just now that I could not go into the merits of the question, though I think the noble Lords opposite were quite right in doing so. As it is our intention, when the noble Viscount (Viscount Halifax) brings forward his Resolution, to raise the question, I think it is more becoming on the present occasion to abstain. One reproach is frequently addressed to those who belong to the Opposition. We were placed in a very difficult position last year; and one of the complaints made against us was—"You attack the Government, but you do not state your own policy." Now, I entirely deny that anybody has a right to demand—and it would be easy to quote Sir Robert Peel or the present Prime Minister on this subject—an explanation of our policy. I, therefore, deny that I can be called upon to state exactly what I should have done after each false step that has been taken. It often happens in private life that a man comes to you and says—"I have got into a difficulty; what am I to do now?" The answer is—"If you had come to me only a week ago, I think I could have given you very fair advice; but after what you have written and done and said, it is impossible for me to do more than tell you what I think is the least of two evils." If your Lordships would think it worth while to know generally what my policy is, I can state it in a very few words. My policy with regard to the North-Western Frontier of India is the same as that which has been the policy of all the greatest authorities and the most experienced men in India up to the time when the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury) took the Seals of the India Office. That is enough to say as to our general policy. If you say all that is passed—we have changed all that, and we are now in a very different position—I can only say at this moment that my policy—and I think I should have the concurrence of my Friends in this—would be that, however strong our opinion may be of the injustice of the conduct of the Government towards the Ameer; however disastrous and unnecessary may have been the bringing about of this war; however much we are convinced that you have effectually played into the hands of our great rival in the East, yet at this moment, the emergency having been created, I would use every effort to induce your Lordships—who, I am sure, need no such persuasion—to co-operate in the strongest manner with the other House of Parliament in making the most ample provision for the sake of the brave and gallant troops with whom we sympathize so entirely. I would go further, and I would press on the Government the consideration whether they really have taken all the precautions that are required—because we could not be certain of the success they would meet with—whether they have sent them sufficient reinforcements, with all the requisites which should be furnished to them. I would also urge the Government to be perfectly frank and open with Parliament, and to tell us the amount of money they require, and the manner in which it is to be raised. I would especially advise them to guard against fallacious Estimates, such as those which were at first produced, and afterwards doubled or nearly trebled, in the case of the Abyssinian War. I would have them explain how far they would leave saddled on the people of India, and how far on the people of this country, the cost of a war which they themselves declare not to be an Indian, but an Imperial one.

VISCOUNT CRANBROOK: My Lords, I am deeply indebted to the noble Earl (Earl Granville) for giving me an opportunity, which I might not otherwise have had, of saying what I wish to say in reference to this despatch of the 18th of November. I take upon myself the whole and entire responsibility of that despatch, and I neither apologize for nor retract a single sentence of it. The noble Earl has adopted a different tone from that which has been held out-of-doors. I sat with hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite to me in the other House of Parliament for 20 years, and on no occasion have I known my conduct to be impugned for honesty and integrity. But now, one of those right hon. Gentlemen, in the coarsest invective, has charged me with falsehood, and another has, with more poisonous insinuations, held me up as guilty of that offence. If I have committed the offence which they allege in publishing that despatch—if in writing that despatch I have wantonly or deliberately prejudiced the public mind against a former Ministry without truth and without reason, and with the knowledge that it was false—then I would admit the justice of all the attacks which have been made upon me. But, my Lords, the question is, not whether I have arrived at a right or a wrong conclusion, but whether I took such fair and reasonable means as I was bound to do in arriving at the conclusions stated in that despatch—whether I put down that which would fairly arise in one's mind from an examination of the Papers before me? And in a few moments I think I can prove to your Lordships that what I said in Paragraph 9 is true. I do not deny that what the noble Earl affirms may be the true reading; but I do say that to an outsider reading these Papers the conclusion which I came to is the only legitimate and fair conclusion at which an honest and impartial mind can arrive. That is a fair and open statement, and I propose to vindicate myself upon it. Why did I publish that despatch? For this reason. I am not going now to discuss the question of policy. One noble Lord, an ex-Viceroy of India, has gone about the country spreading his opinions in respect of this matter in letters and speeches, and a noble Earl, another ex-Governor General, has lately spoken upon it at a meeting at Winchester. I make no complaint of that. A right hon. Gentleman, a Member of the other House and a man of the greatest possible influence, has also made a speech, in which he declared the state of things which existed when his Ministry was in Office. Every sort of imputation and insinuation have been directed against the conduct of Her Majesty's Government; and I thought it was only fair that a simple and true historical statement of the case should be given to the public. In preparing that document I sought to conceal nothing on the part of my own Government, and I said nothing offensive—or nothing that was intended to be offensive—against the Government of my Predecessors. I only desired to give a simple, plain, and honest statement, and one which would be justified by the Papers, the production of which was to follow it in a very few days. And when people impute to you that you are a knave, they might at least give you the credit for not being a fool also; for one would hardly give in the margin of a despatch that was false the references to the Papers which would so soon convict it of falsehood. That is an imputation, therefore, which corrects itself. With respect to what has taken place in this House, I have no complaint to make. The noble Earl (the Earl of Northbrook), in a letter addressed to the newspapers, says that I have come to an incorrect conclusion. An incorrect conclusion is one thing; a wilfully false representation is quite another. The noble Earl had a right to speak, and was, I suppose, speaking, of his own policy, and his interpretation of his instructions. All I attempted to do, in my despatch, was to present the version which I thought the Papers would justify. What I wrote had reference to events in 1873, when he was Viceroy; and, first, I would call attention to a despatch which he sent home on the 27th June, 1873. That despatch he sent home with a view of calling the attention, as he said (paragraph 18), of the Government of Russia to what he thought was our policy in Afghanistan. That part of the case has not been spoken of, but it is most material to my view of the case. That paragraph was to this effect—

> "Although we have abstained from entering into any Treaty engagement to support the Ameer by British troops, in the event of Afghanistan being attacked from without, yet the complete independence of Afghanistan is so important to the interests of British India that the Government of India could not look upon an attack upon Afghanistan with indifference. So long as the Ameer continues, as he has hitherto done, to act in accordance with our advice in his relations with his neighbours, he would naturally look for material assistance from us; and circumstances might occur under which we should consider it incumbent upon us to recommend Her Majesty's Government to render him such assistance."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 107.]

Lord Northbrook wished his despatch, with that passage, to be communicated to Russia; and he says—"I propose to inform Cabul Envoy of sense of this paragraph." That was his proposition—that when the Cabul Envoy came to Simla he would inform him of the intentions of the Government. That despatch was sent home by the Viceroy to the Secretary of State in London, and he got an answer from the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll), whose absence I deplore, because he has written a letter to which I would much rather refer in his presence than in his absence. It is a great disadvantage to me that I am not face to face with him, for he would, I am sure, argue the point fairly. The Secretary of State telegraphed to the Viceroy thus—

> "Your telegram of the 27th June. I do not object to the general sense of the paragraph, which you quote as a communication to Russia from the Foreign Office, but great caution is necessary in assuring Ameer of material assistance which may raise undue and unfounded expectation. He already shows symptoms of claiming more than we may wish to give."—[*Ibid.* p. 108.]

That was sent on the 1st of July, 1873. Now, what happened? That despatch was sent to the Foreign Office with the view of being communicated to the Russian Government. Was it communicated to the Russian Government? The Duke of Argyll said he did not object to that; but that he did object to statements being made on the subject to the Ameer's Envoy without great caution. In estimating what the opinion of Her Majesty's Government was as to what was to be communicated to the Ameer, it is material that we should see what the Foreign Office said on the subject—because that would indicate what their intentions were about the material assistance which was to be given to the Ameer. Well, the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary (Earl Granville), writing on the 25th of August, 1873, said—

> "I am to request that you will state to the Duke of Argyll that Lord Granville would not think it desirable to communicate with the Russian Government, as suggested by the Indian Government, a copy of the former despatch (June 30, 1873), and so convey to it indirectly an intimation that any aggression by it on Afghanistan would be resisted by Great Britain with force of arms."—[*Central Asia*, No. 1, p. 206.]

And the noble Earl added that this had reference to present propriety in not indicating a desire to modify our policy with regard to Central Asia, and with respect to Afghanistan in particular. But when I am judging of what the Government of that day meant and intended to do, I must look to the whole of their proceedings. That was in August, after the telegram was received. Thus the Government, which, according to the noble Earl, had sanctioned conditional and material assistance being given to the Ameer, now said that it would not communicate to the Russian Government a copy of the former despatch (of June 30, 1873), and so convey to it indirectly an intimation that any aggression by it on Afghanistan would be resisted by Great Britain by force of arms. If the noble Earl means to put it that he would not submit that communication to Russia, on the ground that Russia would take it as an intimation of an offensive character, all that I can say is that Russia had been informed again and again that we could not view these things with indifference—in fact, the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary had already told the Government of that country that we could not view the question of an advance on Merv with indifference. My view of the transaction was that, in August, 1873, the Government had not come to any determination as to the circumstances in which they could give material assistance in men, arms, and money to the Ameer of Afghanistan. Now, my Lords, I will go a little further. What is the telegram of the noble Duke, which, it is said, has been misrepresented in this despatch? The telegram from the Viceroy to the noble Duke is dated July 24, 1873, and it is to this effect—

> "Ameer of Cabul alarmed at Russian progress, dissatisfied with general assurance, and anxious to know definitely how far he may rely on our help if invaded. I propose assuring him that if he unreservedly accepts and acts on our advice in all external relations we will help him with money, arms, and troops, if necessary, to expel unprovoked invasion. We to be the judge of the necessity. Answer by telegraph quickly."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 108.]

The Viceroy of India either knew the "settled policy" of his Government at home at the time or he did not. If he knew that it was the settled policy of his Government to give material assistance to the Ameer on certain conditions, why did he send this telegram to the noble Duke asking for a speedy answer? He had received one answer, telling him he must exercise great discretion in the matter—he had had a conversation with the Envoy, and had said that it was probable that, under certain circumstances, assistance would be given.

Now to that telegram, asking for further assurances and for help in money and arms, what was the answer? The reply of the noble Duke was this—

> "Cabinet thinks you should inform Ameer that we do not at all share his alarm, and consider there is no cause for it; but you may assure him we shall maintain our settled policy in favour of Afghanistan, if he abides by our advice in external affairs."—[*Ibid.*]

"Our settled policy in favour of Afghanistan!" Where is it to be found? I cannot find it. The noble Earl (Earl Granville) has complained that during a certain period of late date no despatches appear to have passed between the Home and the Indian Governments; but I think your Lordships will view with astonishment the fact that during the whole of the time that the Duke of Argyll was Secretary of State for India, and the noble Earl (the Earl of Northbrook) was Viceroy, not a single despatch on this subject sent by the noble Duke to the noble Earl the Viceroy can be found, and that the only indication of the policy of the Duke of Argyll on the matter is to be found in the telegram now before us. That, my Lords, is something startling—and yet the noble Duke is amazed and indignant that I should have misrepresented him. The only other document in which the noble Duke refers to Afghanistan is his letter to Lord Mayo, and that merely deals with questions connected with the internal affairs of that country, without in any way touching upon its external relations with other nations. There is certainly no despatch from the noble Duke which indicates any "settled policy" with regard to furnishing material assistance in men, arms, and money to the Ameer. There is no despatch—and it is a remarkable thing that though there is this despatch of the Viceroy, of June 13, there is no despatch of the noble Duke acknowledging it. Going a little further, let us see what really did pass between the noble Earl and the Envoy of the Ameer. In page 112 of the Papers it will be found that the Viceroy observed—

> "That if in the event of any aggression from without, British influence were invoked and failed by negotiation to effect a satisfactory settlement, it was probable that the British Government would in that case afford the Ruler of Afghanistan material assistance in repelling an invader. Such assistance would, of course, be conditional on the Ameer following the advice of the British Government, and having himself abstained from aggression."—[*Ibid.* 112.]

That was the statement in the first conversation, which was subsequent to the first telegram. Then we come to the second conversation, which occurred after the receipt of the noble Duke's telegram. It appears from the Papers—

> "That his Excellency proceeded to say that Lord Mayo had assured the Ameer that any representation he might make would 'always be treated with consideration and respect,' and his Excellency was quite prepared to maintain the policy of Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, and to entertain in a similar spirit the request now preferred."—[*Ibid.* 113.]

Now, Lord Mayo had never done anything with regard to the external affairs of the country, and Lord Lawrence had, so far as I know, given no promise with regard to material assistance to the Ameer. Then there is the further point as to what the noble Earl said to the Envoy. On page 114, in reply to the Envoy, who was pressing for definite promises of assistance, it appears that—

> "His Excellency the Viceroy replied that the British Government did not share the Ameer's apprehensions, but that as already mentioned in the previous conversation, it would be the duty of the Ameer, in case of any actual or threatened aggression, to refer the question to the British Government, who would endeavour by negotiation and by every means in their power to settle the matter and avert hostilities. It was not intended, by insisting on such previous reference to the British Government, to restrict or interfere with the power of the Ameer as an independent Ruler to take such steps as might be necessary to repel any aggression on his territories; but such reference was a preliminary and essential condition of the British Government assisting him. In such event, should those endeavours of the British Government to bring about an amicable settlement prove fruitless, the British Government are prepared to assure the Ameer that they will afford him assistance in the shape of arms and money, and will also in case of necessity aid him with troops. The British Government holds itself perfectly free to decide as to the occasion when such assistance should be rendered, and also as to its nature and extent: moreover, the assistance will be conditional upon the Ameer himself abstaining from aggression, and on his unreserved acceptance of the advice of the British Government in regard to his external relations."—[*Ibid.* 114.]

Well, my Lords, if it seemed probable to the Ameer in the former conversation that he was to get the assistance of the British Government, I think that when he heard all the guarding and cautioning that were laid down in the second conversation he would have considered it very problematical whether he was to get any assistance at all. It will be observed that there is not a word in that second conversation about our "settled policy." I can only say that I think the inference I have drawn from the language of the noble Lord a perfectly just one. On the 6th of September, 1873, he writes to the Ameer—

> "I have had some conversation with your Envoy on the subject of the policy which the British Government would pursue in the event of an attack on your Highness's territories. A copy of the record of these conversations is attached to this letter. But the question is in my opinion one of such importance that the discussion of it should be postponed to a more suitable opportunity."—[*Ibid.* 816.]

Thus nothing was done except in the way of conversation—nothing definitely settled. Nothing is said in that letter about promises or assurances; and, therefore, nothing having been done, nothing settled, nothing complete, I consider that the inference which I drew was a just and legitimate one, and that I fairly expressed it in the ninth paragraph of the despatch. The Government said in a telegram that they did not agree with the alarms of the Viceroy about the Ameer. If they had, the telegram would have been direct in its answer, instead of being general terms, such as "your proposals approved" would have been used; and this view of the telegram is supported by the letter of the Viceroy, who said that he would give no assurances, and that the whole question would be postponed for future consideration. I do not pretend to be infallible; I may be mistaken: but I consider that the view which I took was a perfectly legitimate view. There was a statement made by the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) in the debate which took place in June, 1877, and I gather from what he then said, as I gathered from these Papers, that he was in favour of a policy of masterly inactivity; that they were desirous of being on friendly terms with the Ameer; but that they should not bind themselves by any obligations to him beyond being generally friendly, and giving him assistance in arms and money in order to consolidate his strength. The noble Duke said—

> "The policy of the last three Viceroys of India towards that country had been one of watchfulness and friendly support. We do not wish to tangle ourselves in any permanent arrangements towards that Sovereign.' — [3 *Hansard*, ccxxxiv. 1831.]

I look to the Papers, and the deduction I draw from them is, I think, a fair and just conclusion, and is borne out by that observation of the noble Duke. My only object in this discussion has been to vindicate myself from the charge of unfairness. I can say most sincerely that when I was told that paragraph 9 had been found fault with, I searched in every direction to see what the ground of complaint was; and it was not till I read some of the violent speeches made that I at all imagined what it was I was supposed to have mis-stated. I have given you my reasons for coming to the conclusion I did; and I say most distinctly that if I had to re-write that paragraph with the same Papers before me, I should re-write it in the terms I originally adopted. I have already said that I accept the noble Earl's statement of the understanding which he put upon the noble Duke's telegram. With regard to the Commissioner's letters to which allusion has been made, I have only to say that they were not letters addressed to the Ameer personally, but to Gholam Hussein and the Mustaufi, and that they have now been placed on the Table with certain other Papers. It is complained that Parliament has never been informed of these things; but I would point out that none of these Papers relating to Afghanistan previous to 1874—and they were very important—were put before Parliament by our Predecessors. Nothing was said about them. That, however, is a question of policy, and I do not mean to go into it. The Viceroy's speeches form another subject into which I need not now enter. They were delivered at a time when I was not Secretary of State for India; and my present object, as I have already said, is only to vindicate myself, not to go into questions of policy. I think it will be an evil day for this country if one Party begins to make personal charges against the Gentlemen sitting opposite them; and it will not tend to the friendly intercourse which I have had with those who have been opposed to me. In becoming a Member of a Government succeeding another, I cannot call to mind that in one instance —though I may have differed from the policy of my Predecessors—I have ever imputed to them anything wilfully wrong in their action. In the present case I contend that I have full justification for the language I have used, and upon that point I have given evidence which, from my point of view, appears conclusive. If I have arrived at an incorrect conclusion with regard to the policy of the noble Lord opposite, I maintain that it was a fair and reasonable conclusion, and one which might have been taken by any one conscientiously studying the question.

EARL GREY, who rose with Lord Northbrook and was very imperfectly heard, was understood to say that he was sorry to interfere with his noble Friend, who was no doubt anxious to vindicate his own conduct as Viceroy of India; but he thought there was a question of far higher national importance than that as to the comparative merits and faults of different Ministries and Governors General of India, which could best be discussed on this occasion, and to which it was high time to come. The question to which he adverted was whether Ministers, in omitting to advise Her Majesty to consult Parliament when they considered it necessary to order preparations to be made for entering upon hostilities with the Ameer, had acted as they ought to have done? The question seemed to him one of such importance that it was his intention to raise it formally by an Amendment on the Address. The noble Earl (Earl Granville) had said that to move an Amendment on the Address was an inconvenient course; but with that he (Earl Grey) was not disposed to agree. There were questions which could only properly be brought under discussion by an Amendment on the Address. The old Parliamentary practice of moving Amendments on the Address was a right and proper practice; and it was invariably followed in the best periods of our Parliamentary history, and it ought not to be abandoned. At the same time, he agreed that the whole question of the justice and policy of this war might, perhaps, be best discussed on the Motion of which the noble Viscount the Secretary of State for India had given Notice, and he would not, therefore, enter into it at present. The question to which he wished to call their Lordships' attention was this—Was it right that this country should be involved in a terrible war—for it was a terrible war they had now in hand — without an opportunity having been afforded to Parliament of expressing an opinion upon its justice or expediency? He was quite aware that it was the Prerogative of the Crown to declare war; and he was strongly of opinion that that power was properly placed in the hands of the Sovereign. He believed that detriment to the national interest would result if a large discretionary power was not intrusted to the Executive Government. At the same time, although it was the Prerogative of the Crown to declare war, it had, formerly at least, been held to be equally the duty of the Ministers of the Crown not to exercise that great Prerogative without giving Parliament the earliest information on the subject, and without calling for the opinion of Parliament and asking its approval of the course they had decided to take. He could point out many instances in which that rule had been acted upon; indeed, he could not recollect any instance in the best times of our Parliamentary history when a different course had been followed. The practice — as he believed the invariable practice—had been that when the servants of the Crown found that a necessity for war was about to arise they advised the Sovereign, by formal Message, to announce that to Parliament, and to ask for its support. Thus, when the great Revolutionary War broke out, Mr. Pitt did not wait for the commencement of hostilities in order to communicate with Parliament. On the contrary, on the 23rd of January, 1793, a Message from the Crown was sent to the House of Commons in reference to the relations between England and France, and recommending Parliament that provision might be made for an augmentation of the Forces; and it was not until a fortnight after that war had actually began that Mr. Pitt brought down another Message saying that war had been declared by France against England. In like manner, after the Peace of Amiens, when the relations between this country and France were again embarrassed, a Message was brought down on the 8th of March stating that danger of war rendered desirable an increase of the Forces, and it was not until the 16th of May that a further announcement was made. Those two instances would prove to their Lordships that when this country was involved in danger of war, the announcement to Parliament was not deferred until the war had begun; but when the danger became serious, it was at once made known to Parliament, and the support of Parliament requested. And the advantage of that practice was also illustrated by two cases in which no war actually followed after Messages from the Crown to announce its probability, and in which the sending of those Messages contributed much to avert the threatened danger. In 1790 great indignation was excited in this country by the seizure by Spain of two British ships in Nootka Sound, and on the 5th of May Parliament was informed by a Message from the Crown that no satisfaction had been made or offered by Spain for this outrage, and

> "His Majesty has judged it indispensably necessary to give orders for making such preparations as may put it in His Majesty's power to act with vigour."—[*Parl. History*, vol. 28, p. 765.]

This appeal was promptly and unanimously answered; and the Spanish Government, influenced probably by the determination of the country and the Legislature to support its Government, gave way, and war was avoided. In the following year the British Government was disposed to interfere between Russia and Turkey, in order to obtain better terms than Russia was inclined to grant, and a Message was sent to Parliament asking for a grant of money to increase our Naval Force to enforce our mediation. But that proposal was met with strong opposition in Parliament and the country. The Government carried the Vote it had proposed, and Resolutions which were moved against its intended measures were rejected, but by majorities so small, in comparison with those that Mr. Pitt was usually supported by, that, although the Naval Force was for a short time augmented, it was speedily reduced, and it was not used in the manner the Government originally intended, and the policy of the Government was very considerably modified, so much so, that when the subject was referred to in the following Session Lord Hawkesbury said it had been clear that the opinion of the country had been against war with Russia, and Ministers were not ashamed of deferring to it. These two cases showed completely the great importance of Parliament being informed in due time of what was intended. In the one case, the support of Parliament induced Spain to give way, and to abandon an untenable position; and in the other, such a manifestation of opinion was produced that so powerful a Minister as Mr. Pitt thought it proper and necessary to yield to the opinion of the country; so that in both instances the practice of making a timely communication to Parliament had been the means of saving the nation from the calamity of war. Nothing could more clearly support the principle for which he contended—that Parliament ought not to be committed to a war without timely information, so that it might judge of the necessity and justice of the war. He maintained that when war was imminent the announcement to Parliament should not be deferred until hostilities had actually commenced; but that, when danger became so serious as to make warlike preparations necessary, it should be made known, and the support of the Legislature invited. Parliament ought not to be led into a war without timely information, so that, if its judgment should be against hostilities, it might have an opportunity of interfering; and he felt so strongly on this subject—believing the old Constitutional principle for which he contended to be so important, and holding that the departure from it, in the present instance, had been accompanied with so much injury to the country—that it was his intention now to move, as he did in a similar case in 1857, an Amendment to the Address in reply to the Speech from the Throne. His Amendment was to insert after the first paragraph the following words:—

> ("We beg humbly to express to your Majesty our sorrow that the great calamity should have occurred of a war with the Ameer of Afghanistan, and we feel it to be our duty very respectfully to express to your Majesty our regret that as soon as your Majesty's servants were satisfied that war had become so probable as to impose upon them the necessity of ordering costly preparations for it to be commenced, they did not advise your Majesty to summon Parliament to meet with the least possible delay, in order that due provision might be made for the expense to be incurred, and that an opportunity might be offered to Parliament, before the war was begun, of considering the grounds on which it was to be undertaken, and of forming a judgment as to its justice and necessity.")

That Amendment was, he thought, couched in moderate and respectful terms; at the same time, it might be of service in upholding what he believed to be a great Constitutional principle. He asserted the right of Parliament to be consulted upon a matter of this kind, and especially to express an opinion upon the objects of a war. He agreed that they must now postpone a discussion of the policy and justice of the war; but though he could not then state his reasons for so doing, he would not shrink from taking this earliest opportunity of expressing his strong opinion that the war in which they were now engaged was flagrantly unjust, and as impolitic as it was unjust—so impolitic that even if its success were complete the consequences might be only less disastrous and injurious to the country than defeat. For what would happen—what would be the result of success? It must, however successful it might prove, cause an expense which, in the present state of the finances, both of England and of India, would be most inconvenient; and, at the same time, it would have the effect of totally alienating Afghanistan from us, and making its population our bitter enemies, driving them to throw themselves into the arms of that very great Power of whom we were so much afraid—Russia. That was not his own opinion only; it was the opinion entertained and publicly expressed by men of far greater knowledge, whose opinions and judgment were entitled to far greater weight than his own. It was the opinion entertained by a very large number of people in this country; and though you might prove it to be wrong, he maintained that before we were involved in a war of this kind Parliament ought to have had an opportunity of discussing the question. Nor would it have been difficult to afford Parliament that opportunity. It appeared, from the Papers before the House, that as early as the end of September, or the beginning of October, measures for collecting troops and other measures of a preparatory nature were actually in progress. This, therefore, was the time when, according to the practice of former times and the conduct pursued by Governments in earlier periods, what was going on ought to have been made known to Parliament, and Parliament ought to have been enabled to pronounce its judgment. If every Cabinet, no matter of what Party it might be composed, were to be entitled, without the slightest previous warning or intimation, to enter on a war which might extend indefinitely, as this war might extend, from hostilities with the Ameer to hostilities with Russia, then there was virtually an end of anything like a free Constitution. In regard to the present war, Parliament and the country had been kept entirely in the dark; and not only that, but they had been expressly assured that there was no change of policy on the part of Her Majesty's Government which was likely to involve us in such a war. So late as 1877 a positive assurance was given by the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury) that there was no such change intended; although it was now perfectly clear from the Papers on the Table that already a great change had actually taken place. Whereas formerly the Ameer of Afghanistan had been assured that he would not be pressed to receive a British Agent, that course was ultimately pressed upon him in such a manner as to lead to the war now going on. Looking at the practice of former times and Governments, he maintained that the course adopted by Her Majesty's Ministers in the present instance was a fatal departure from that practice, and that the country ought not to have been involved in an unjust and impolitic war in a secret and clandestine manner; but that proper notice ought to have been given of what was taking place, so that Parliament might have had an opportunity of discussing the matter. Entertaining that feeling so strongly, he felt it his duty to submit his Amendment, as expressing his strong disapproval of, and protest against, the course which had been adopted by Her Majesty's Government.

Amendment *moved*, to insert after the first paragraph—

("We beg humbly to express to your Majesty our sorrow that the great calamity should have occurred of a war with the Ameer of Afghanistan, and we feel it to be our duty very respectfully to express to your Majesty our regret that as soon as your Majesty's servants were satisfied that war had become so probable as to impose upon them the necessity of ordering costly preparations for it to be commenced, they did not advise your Majesty to summon Parliament to meet with the least possible delay, in order that due provision might be made for the expense to be incurred, and that an opportunity might be offered to Parliament, before the war was begun, of considering the grounds on which it was to be undertaken, and of forming a judgment as to its justice and necessity.")—(*The Earl Grey.*)

THE DUKE OF SOMERSET: My Lords, I cannot approve the noble Earl's Amendment. It appears to me that the propositions laid down in that Amendment interfere with the Prerogative of the Crown and diminish the responsibility of Ministers. The noble Earl has mentioned several precedents. He quoted the case of 1793; but in that case we did not declare war. The war was declared on the opposite side of the Channel: that precedent, therefore, was inapplicable. In the case of the Abyssinian War there was a debate in the House of Commons, and on that occasion Mr. Gladstone stated that it was the right course—that it was the duty of Ministers to take the responsibility of declaring war upon themselves, coming to Parliament afterwards. I shall not go into the personal question to-night. It would take some time; but surely nobody can suppose that the noble Lord the Secretary of State for India would intentionally mis-state the case. He has tried to do what, no doubt, is very difficult—to draw up a *précis* of the opinion of the opposite party—and he only failed where all historians have failed. Going into details, it would not be difficult to show that every history is untrue in some respects; and, for my own part, I do not know any history that is perfectly true. But I come to the more serious question—the question of this war. I cannot agree with the speech of my noble Friend below me (Earl Grey). He says it is an unjust war—not only an unjust, but an impolitic war—a war which, whatever its result, you will be worse off at the end of than you are now; but, on the other hand, the noble Earl (Earl Granville) said he would go on with it, and although it was contrary to justice and to policy, and likely to be profitless, nevertheless, he would urge the country to give every assistance to carry it through. There seems to me, my Lords, a very serious contradiction there. If I thought a war both unjust and impolitic, I would do what I could to prevent it. As to Russian aggression, I remember in 1873 my noble Friend, representing Mr. Gladstone's Government, stated that Russia coming to Khiva was to be looked upon with great concern, not only on account of England, but on account of India. But surely if Russia reached Cabul, there would be still more danger. And what did the late and the present Government say? Both the former and the present Government had agreed that Russia could not be allowed to have a preponderating influence in Afghanistan. Will you, my Lords, allow it? If you will, then say so. There was a neutral zone; but that is gone. What, then, are you asked to do? You must make some other provision. I confess, my Lords, much as I regret it, this war appears to me to be unavoidable. I do not see how the Government could take any other course than that they have taken. I say so with deep feeling, because I well remember the disasters and the deplorable mismanagement that occurred in 1838. My Lords, then we were united; now, I am sorry to say, there has been formed what is called "an Afghan Committee," who are anxious to encourage the Ameer and the enemies of the Queen. I think it a misfortune that any such Committee should have been formed; and I deeply deplore that a noble Lord who has been Governor General, and who is peculiarly acquainted with that country (Lord Lawrence), should have thought fit, no doubt conscientiously, to put himself at the head of that Committee. I regret it, because that noble Lord was an ornament to India, and is an ornament to your Lordships' House. In speaking thus I do not mean to pledge myself that all the measures taken from 1873 to the present time were judicious in all respects. Far from it. But the great question of all is, What are we to do? I, for one, give my cordial assent to the policy of the Government, because I do not see what else they could do. It is not speeches that are wanted, but action; and I hope that vigorous action on their part will bring the war to a successful issue.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, after the small personal details to which we have had to listen this evening, your Lordships must have listened with pleasure to the courageous and patriotic speech which we have just heard. I wish it may produce the same effect upon others who share the general political opinions of the Speaker, but who have not been able to imitate his patriotism. But, my Lords, that speech makes me the more regret that I am compelled, on personal grounds, to pursue another course. I deeply feel the wretchedness of the small personal details which I am obliged, out of deference to others, to bring before your Lordships, but I have no other alternative. I have often noticed the singular skill of the Leader of the Opposition and noble Lords on the other side. Perhaps some might have thought that when the fallacies employed were being exposed by my noble Friend (Viscount Cranbrook) the noble Earl opposite would have felt discomfited; but I traced no sense of discomfiture upon his countenance. He is too well satisfied with the result of the stratagem to which recourse has been had. The noble Earl's policy is to draw aside the attention of the country from the broad issues before it, and, if possible, to conceal the fact that his favourite, his most attached, political Friends have been taking the side of the enemies of their country. That is a matter upon which the traditions of the Party to which he belongs naturally make him sensitive. The noble Earl has shown singular judgment and astuteness at this, perhaps the most important, political juncture which this country has witnessed in this generation, in turning your debates almost entirely upon questions of small personal attack. I admit, however, that though the imputations which he had to make were not of a very pleasant nature, he put them in words to which no exception can be taken. I do not wish to detain your Lordships on this personal matter; but the accusation which the noble Earl made against me was substantially this—that being questioned by the Duke of Argyll I misled the House as to the real state of the case. The noble Earl quoted my words in justification of that charge. He began by saying that my words would indicate what the nature of the Duke of Argyll's Question had been. I regret that he did not quote the actual Question of the Duke of Argyll. When a legal opinion is produced, it is usual to give the question on which the legal opinion was founded. When the *dictum* of a Judge is quoted it is a matter of ordinary practice to ask what was the precise nature of the case to which the *dictum* refers. Words taken by themselves are often misleading, instead of giving information. As I understand the charge of the noble Earl, it is that at a time when I knew that Sir Lewis Pelly had been commissioned to go to Cabul I denied that any Envoy had been sent to Cabul at all. Now, my Lords, it is necessary to read the Question of the Duke of Argyll to which I replied. What he said is spread over a speech of considerable length—I will not read many passages, but I will select some of them. They go to show that what the Duke of Argyll was asked was as to whether it was true that I had forced on the Ameer of Cabul a Resident at his Court. The Duke of Argyll said—

> "No doubt it would be very convenient to have a Resident at Cabul, if you could get a man for the place, and that he was received with cordiality; but it was notorious for a long time past that the present Ameer had set his face against having such an officer in his Court. . . . . . Rumour said that the Government of India had determined upon a change of policy, and had resolved to insist on the Ameer having a resident British Envoy at his Court."—[3 *Hansard*, ccxxxiv. 1830.]

Well, my Lords, the noble Earl said, parenthetically in the course of his remarks, that I should not attempt to explain the statement by observing that what we had deliberately attempted to do was to attempt to induce the Ameer to receive resident Envoys at other places besides Cabul. I dare say when the noble Earl made that observation, he thought it was unimportant whether the Ameer received an Envoy at Cabul or Herat. But the difference is essential. Her Majesty's Government had been impressed with the opinion that to ask the Ameer to receive an Envoy at Cabul would be not only idle, but unwise, because of the turbulent and revengeful character of the population, which would render the residence of the Envoy dangerous. Moreover, there is no doubt that a Resident at Cabul would have such powers of interfering in the internal government of Afghanistan, and of overshadowing the dignity of the Prince himself, that such a proposal would have very naturally raised objections in the mind of the Ameer—objections which it was the desire of Her Majesty's Government to avoid raising. We did not want to interfere in the internal government of Afghanistan or to overshadow the authority of the Ameer. What we wanted was to have officers on the Frontier, who might see something of what was going on within them and beyond them. I need hardly explain to the House why we should wish to know what was going on in Afghanistan. It is sufficient to say that the year before Khiva had been occupied — without going further I am sure the House will understand why we desired to know what was going on in Turkestan and in the Ameer's territories, without having any intention whatever of interfering in the internal government of Afghanistan or overshadowing the Ameer in his own Court. I dwell upon this point to show that the difference between asking for an Agent at Herat and at Cabul is immense. It was a distinction upon which the Ameer insisted all along. We have a curious account in Lord Lytton's letters in 1877, derived from officers who saw the Ameer at Umballa. A considerable number of them represented that they knew from personal knowledge that while the Ameer was willing to admit an Agent at Herat, or on his Frontiers, he would not admit one at Cabul. We were exceedingly careful to avoid making this particular demand to which the Ameer was certain to object. My first instructions to Lord Northbrook were, that he should take measures for obtaining the assent of the Ameer to the establishment of a British Envoy at Herat; but I did not suggest any similar step with regard to Cabul. Lord Lytton, when he came to propose the terms on which the negotiations should be conducted, was careful to make a similar distinction. He says, in Article 5 of the Treaty, he proposed that for the protection of the Afghan Frontier British Agents should reside at Herat, and at such other places as might be agreed upon by the contracting Powers; but further on the Treaty says, that unless and until it is otherwise agreed, a Native Agent only should reside at Cabul. With this understanding I think your Lordships will see that my reply to the Duke of Argyll was absolutely correct. I had first to inform him that I could not give him any positive knowledge. The circumstances at the time were difficult and critical in the extreme. Russia was in arms; great irritation prevailed; no one knew whether the war would not spread much further than its original area; and whatever the policy of Her Majesty's Government might be, and whatever duties it might be called upon to perform, this, at least, was our duty—not to bias in any way the policy of the country, nor to add to its difficulties and dangers by any imprudent language of our own. It was, therefore, our duty not to say much of that which I say now, and which is said in the Papers before the House. Consequently, I told the Duke of Argyll that I could not give him much positive information, but that I could give him some negative information. The negative information was this—that we had not tried to force an Envoy on the Ameer at Cabul, and that we had not suggested Sir Lewis Pelly as an Envoy at Cabul. Now, I want to know why the noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville) insinuates that I said anything contrary to the most perfect truth in the reply I made to the Duke of Argyll. The noble Earl who sits on the cross-benches (Earl Grey) talked of my having stated that there had been no change of policy as regards Afghanistan. I must charitably suppose that the noble Earl spoke without having taken the trouble to read the speech to which he referred. There is no such statement in that speech. The noble Earl remarked that I said that our relations with the Ameer had undergone no material change since last year, and that the Ameer's feelings towards the British Government were not more embittered than they had been. Now, if I had said that his feelings were not more embittered towards us than they had been when Lord Mayo met him at Umballa, there might be a considerable doubt as to the accuracy of that statement. His feelings are undoubtedly a matter of some mystery; but I have little doubt that they have gone on deteriorating progressively against us from the time when Sir John Lawrence came to the unfortunate resolution not to take what has been called the honest double-dealing policy with regard to the candidates for the Throne of Afghanistan. I have no doubt they became worse and worse. There was a slight improvement, however, during the Viceroyalty of Lord Mayo; but during the Viceroyalty of Lord Northbrook there were several circumstances which caused them to become worse and worse. There was that unfortunate arbitration at Seistan, with which the Ameer was profoundly dissatisfied; and which only added one to the list of those arbitrations which have not precisely produced that perfect good feeling which the devisers of the system hoped for. Then there was an act which reflects great credit on Lord Northbrook, who was then Viceroy, but which much displeased the Ameer. That was Lord Northbrook's interposition to save the son of the Ameer, Yakoob Khan, from suffering the worst results of one of the most atrocious acts of perfidy which even an Afghan Ruler ever committed. What I desired to express, and what was a distinct and a true answer to all the questions of the Duke of Argyll, was, that the policy which led to the Conference of Peshawur had not made any unfavourable difference in the dispositions of the Ameer—his feelings were already as hostile to us as they could well be. I can only go to the official documents. The noble Earl says—what is perfectly true—that I received the despatch of Lord Lytton about a week before I made that answer in the House. Well, what are we take as proof of the Ameer's relations towards us? I will first take the Ameer's own account. I find this in Lord Lytton's despatch—

> "So completely had the whole movement collapsed before we closed the Conference at Peshawur, that the first step taken by the Ameer, [immediately after that event, was to send messengers to the authorities and population of Candahar, informing them that the jehad project was abandoned, requesting them to do all in their power to allay the religious excitement he had till then been endeavouring to arouse, and adding that his relations with the British Government were eminently satisfactory."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 171.]

With that statement in my hands, I could not say in this House that our relations with the Ameer were unsatisfactory. Lord Lytton, in the meanwhile, said—

> "We see no reason to anticipate any act of aggression on the part of the present Ameer;"

and he added—

> "Our relations with him are still such as we commonly maintain with the Chiefs of neighbouring and friendly countries."—[*Ibid.*]

That is exactly the position which it was the ambition of Lord Lawrence, and, subsequently, of Lord Northbrook, to maintain. What was my own official estimate some three months later of the state of things? I said we had been engaged in negotiations, the object of which was not to maintain our relations with the Ameer unchanged, but to make them more friendly than they had been. He refused our advances, and when I spoke in the House I knew that those advances had been refused. My statement, therefore, was in all its parts strictly in accordance with the facts. We have now before us not the original Address, but an Amendment to it; and the noble Earl has based his Amendment on statements implying that the Prerogative of the Crown has been used to encroach on the privileges of Parliament. It is saying, in a more distinct form, what was again and again intimated by the noble Earl who opened on that side, and what has been stated by Mr. Gladstone at Greenwich. It is the charge included in that curious phrase "personal government," of which we have heard so much of late. I always believed—and every one else believed—that when this phrase was constantly reiterated it meant some return to the days of Charles I., and some overthrow of the Constitution established in 1688. But now it appears from Mr. Gladstone that he never meant that. He says the phrase is awkward perhaps, but it is one to which they are well accustomed, and that it applies, not to Her Majesty, but to Her Majesty's Ministers. Well, personal government of some kind you must have. Somebody must do the work of government. If it is not done by the responsible Ministers, it must be done by the permanent officials; or, if not done by the latter, it must be done by the Chief Clerks—and if not by the Chief Clerks by the Assistant Clerks. I suppose that what the noble Earl who has moved this Amendment really referred to is the idea that it is the duty of the Crown, before it exercises the Prerogative of making peace or war, to consult Parliament. Great efforts have been made to persuade the country that we have done something essentially un-Constitutional in what we have done in this respect. The assertion has been repeated again and again without proof, till—as such assertions get to be accepted by sheer repetition—there are some people who believe it. I think there are some people who believe that in concluding the Anglo-Turkish Convention without the knowledge of Parliament we did something without precedent. But some ingenious person in the House of Commons, to try the matter, moved for a Return of all the Treaties which were laid on the Table of the House before they were ratified, and not one could be produced. The truth is, that some of the most important and most recent engagements in our history have been concluded by the Ministers of the Crown without any reference to, or knowledge of, Parliament. I will only state two, and they will be sufficient. Few more important things have been done in our generation than the sacrifice of that right of search for which our forefathers fought. I do not say whether it was right or wrong; I only say that few more important things have been done. Yet that was done—the Declaration of Paris was accepted and signed—without any intimation to Parliament of what was going to be done; and so complete was the absence of any official form about it, that I believe that now no records can be discovered of the instructions given for signing it or of the object with which it was concluded. Again, take the Tripartite Treaty of 1856, which bound us to fight for every inch of Turkish soil if we were challenged to do so either by France or Austria. It was a Treaty most large in its engagements, and most precise in its language. That is in the same condition. No intimation was given to Parliament before it was signed, and you find no record of the motives which induced the Ministers to conclude it. In fact, you will hardly find any Treaty of an important political character which was not concluded under similar conditions as far as the ignorance of Parliament was concerned. Well, the case is the same with regard to declarations of war. I have in my hand a long list of successive declarations of war since 1815, and I am unable to discover that any considerable number of them—I doubt whether any of them except the Crimean War—was communicated to Parliament before it was undertaken. Allow me to give three or four recent precedents to the House—I mean precedents within the lifetime of Lord Palmerston, who was not a Tory, and who was a very considerable authority on Constitutional practice. The Afghan War was declared by Lord Auckland in October, 1838, with the consent and the full authority of the Home Government; and the first time it was communicated to Parliament was in the Queen's Speech on the 5th of February, 1839. Then there is the war in Syria—a very considerable and important operation. On the 15th of July, 1840, while Parliament was still sitting, the Government concluded a Treaty with the other three Powers, to the exclusion of France, without either consulting Parliament beforehand or informing them of it afterwards. The result of that Treaty was the military operations in the Levant which took place in the winter, and Parliament was not called together until January, 1841, when the whole thing was over. Take, again, the case of the Persian War—a case as nearly on all fours with the present one as can be. Persia, like Afghanistan, is an Oriental country, and about equal to it in power, and the interests that were concerned were in the same manner partly European and partly Asiatic. But the Persian War was determined on by the Government at home during the Recess of 1856-7; the assembling of Parliament was not hastened in the least degree, and Parliament was informed of the war for the first time in 1857. I think the noble Earl on the cross benches (Earl Grey) protested against it then as he does now, and there were protests of the same kind made in the other House; and what was Lord Palmerston's reply? He said that in the case of an expedition against Persia—a remote country, and one not likely to entail on us any considerable efforts—considering that in the ordinary course Parliament would speedily assemble, to call it specially together under those circumstances would only be a burlesque on our Constitutional forms.

EARL GREY was understood to say, that Lord Palmerston admitted the principle that Parliament ought to be informed as soon as possible when war was to be made; but contended that the Persian War had been one of so little importance that to summon Parliament specially at an inconvenient season on account of its occurrence would have been a burlesque.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: It is perfectly true that he said that whenever this country becomes involved with one of the great Powers of Europe or with the United States of America—not before, but when we become so involved—it is the duty of the Government to call Parliament together and ask it for the means of carrying the struggle on. But in the case of a collision with such a Power as Afghanistan—a remote country, and one which is not likely to entail upon us any considerable efforts—it would be, according to Lord Palmerston's words, only a burlesque of Constitutional forms to call Parliament together when it was commenced. Therefore, the criticism of Lord Palmerston—if he were here—would be, not that we have exaggerated the Prerogative of the Crown or disparaged the privileges of Parliament, but that in our excessive tenderness for Parliament, and to avoid the slightest appearance of treating it with disrespect, we are actually burlesquing Constitutional forms. There is another case—that of the Abyssinian War. On July 25, 1867, the then Foreign Secretary declared to Parliament that the Government had not decided on sending an expeditionary force. In the following August an expeditionary force against King Theodore was decided on; but the fact was not communicated to Parliament until the Prorogation, when there was no opportunity of debate; and the intention of going to war was never communicated to Parliament until the war was entirely over. The Expedition left Bombay in September, and the fact was not officially communicated to Parliament until the Queen's Speech of the 19th November. I am not here to deny that you will find on these occasions men of the type of the noble Earl on the cross benches (Earl Grey) who then raised objections. It is very probable that that was so; but what I say is, that in all those instances, whatever the objections were, be they small or large, they did not represent the dominant feeling of Parliament; that Parliament is in the last resort the supreme determiner of its own privileges; and that Parliament has always admitted precisely that use of the Prerogative—or rather a much more extensive use than that which we have had recourse to on the present occasion. There is only one other remark that I will venture to make. It is on a matter of a personal character, in reply to some observations which have been made on the personal characteristics of Lord Lytton. I heard with regret the observations made by the noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville). I admit that it is the Prerogative and the duty of Parliament to scrutinize and, if necessary, condemn the action of the servants of the Crown. On the other hand, every generous mind will feel that men in situations of extreme responsibility, and who have the greatest difficulties to contend with, ought not at the same time to have the painful feeling that they are being treated ungenerously. If the noble Earl had been content merely to condemn the measures which have been taken by Lord Lytton, of course the answer was ready—those measures were either before or afterwards approved by his official superiors, and on them the whole Parliamentary responsibility must fall. But when the noble Earl goes so far as to ridicule him because, as the noble Earl puts it, he made a speech in the presence of his own Envoy, and employed a shorthand writer to take it down—or, as I should rather put it, he followed the usual course after such an interview and corrected the Memorandum of what had been said during its progress—I think the noble Earl trespasses beyond the line which ought to be observed in criticising absent public servants. I can only say that on our part we cannot accept, in the slightest degree, the shadow of the censure which has proceeded from the noble Earl. We have the greatest cause to be indebted to Lord Lytton for the devotion with which he has given himself to the great task that he has undertaken, and for the high qualities that he has displayed. I do not know what Lord Lytton's precise nationality is; but he has combined the imagination of a poet with the shrewdness of a Scotchman. He has a singular combination of qualities. The remarkable eloquence which he shows in all his speeches and despatches might give you the impression that he was a man whose gifts were purely those of imagination, if you had not followed him through the details of his official career and been enabled to satisfy yourself that in industry, caution, and sound, hard discretion he has not been exceeded by any Viceroy who has preceded him.

THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK: My Lords, I rise to address your Lordships on this occasion because it appears to me that I am called upon to give evidence on two points, on both of which I am obliged to give it against Her Majesty's Government. The noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Cranbrook), in answering the speech of my noble Friend behind me, gave, as far as I could follow him, a very able account of my actions and of the motives that actuated me in dealing with the Ameer when I was Viceroy of India. It appears to me, however, with all due deference to the noble Viscount, that I am the only person who can state to your Lordships and to the country exactly what I did when I was Governor General of India. The question at issue between us is a very simple one. I have never made any charge against the noble Viscount of having endeavoured wilfully to misrepresent my conduct in this matter; but I am bound to say that the words used by the noble Viscount in his despatch of the 18th of November last, give the people of this country an entirely inaccurate impression of what really happened at the time. That inaccurate impression has not only been expressed in the daily organs of the Press, but it has also been expressed to-night by the noble Lord the Seconder of the Address. In paragraphs 8 and 9 of the noble Viscount's despatch, he says that—

> "Shere Ali, actuated by his fears on this score, sent a special Envoy to Simla in the summer of that year (1873), charged with the duty of expressing them to the Government of India."

And in paragraph 9, he says—

> "Finding that the object of the Ameer was to ascertain definitely how far he might rely on the help of the British Government if his territories were threatened by Russia, Lord Northbrook's Government was prepared to assure him that, under certain conditions, the Government of India would assist him to repel unprovoked aggression. But Her Majesty's Government at home did not share his Highness's apprehension, and the Viceroy ultimately informed the Ameer that the discussion of the question would be best postponed to a more convenient season." — [*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 262.]

No person who reads those paragraphs could come to any other conclusion than that I wished to give certain assurances to the Ameer which I was prevented from giving by the Home Government, and that I was therefore compelled to tell the Ameer that the discussion of the matter had better be postponed to a future time; and from another paragraph of the noble Viscount's despatch it has been naturally inferred that Her Majesty's present Government in 1876 gave assurances to the Ameer which Her Majesty's late Government in 1873 had refused to give him. As regards the first part of the question, I am, as I said before, the only person who can give evidence with respect to it. The fact is, that having asked to be allowed to give to the Ameer certain assurances, and having received a reply by telegraph from the Home Government in answer to my inquiry, I felt that their telegram justified me in giving the Ameer the precise assurances I desired to give him, and which I actually did give him through his Prime Minister, an authenticated copy of those assurances being forwarded to him personally. So far, therefore, from the despatch of the noble Viscount giving an accurate impression of what occurred, it gives an impression totally at variance with the facts of the case. As the noble Viscount has gone into this question at such length, and as the Duke of Argyll is unable to be in his place to-night to explain his own conduct, I asked him to allow me to make use of any private letters relating to this subject which might have passed between us; and, with his permission, I will read to the House a paragraph from a private letter I wrote to him two days after I received his telegram permitting me to give the assurance I desired to give to the Ameer, and before I had the interview with his Prime Minister. The words I used in the letter I wrote to the Duke of Argyll were these—"Your telegram of the 26th will enable me to give him sufficiently distinct assurances." This letter, therefore, entirely bears out my impression of what occurred at that time. While I entirely acquit the noble Viscount of any deliberate intention to misrepresent the matter, I cannot help thinking that it is extremely unfortunate that he did not take more pains to master the facts of the case. If he had taken common pains to do so, he would never have allowed the paragraphs in his despatch to which I have referred to stand. The noble Viscount would have found my view of the case supported by the despatch of the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury), of the 28th of February, 1876, who, in page 158 of the Papers, in referring to this question, says—

> "In the year 1873, Lord Northbrook gave to the Envoy of the Ameer the personal assurance

> that, in the event of any aggression upon the territories of His Highness which the British Government had failed to avert by negotiation, that Government would be prepared 'to assure the Ameer that they will afford him assistance in the shape of arms and money, and will also, in case of necessity, assist him with troops.'"

Viscount CRANBROOK: Go on. Read the next paragraph.

The Earl of NORTHBROOK: I will do so if the noble Viscount wishes me to do so. The despatch goes on—

> "The terms of this declaration, however, although sufficient to justify reproaches on the part of Shere Ali if, in the contingency to which it referred, he should be left unsupported by the British Government, were unfortunately too ambiguous to secure confidence or inspire gratitude on the part of His Highness. The Ameer, in fact, appears to have remained under a resentful impression that his Envoy had been trifled with, and his attitude towards the Government of India has ever since been characterized by ambiguity and reserve."

That is an argument to which I will advert immediately. At present I am dealing merely with the facts of the case; and I think that if the noble Viscount had consulted these Papers carefully he never would have introduced these paragraphs into his despatch. If anyone will read the 12th paragraph of Lord Lytton's despatch of the 10th of May, 1877, in page 162, it will be seen that the account of the noble Viscount does not accurately state the case. There is also the statement in the Conferences between the Prime Minister of the Ameer and Sir Lewis Pelly, which gives a completely accurate account of the transactions of 1873. The Prime Minister says that the assurances at his first interview were not sufficient, but that afterwards further assurances were given; and if the noble Viscount desires any further evidence, there is the language of Lord Lytton in his letter of the 15th of March, 1877, to the Prime Minister, in which the assurances I had given in 1873 were withdrawn; all notice of which has been omitted by the noble Viscount. Therefore, I say that even from the Papers themselves the noble Viscount ought to have formed a more accurate judgment of the transaction, and have avoided writing a paragraph which has led to such misapprehension on the part of the public. But that is not all. The noble Viscount has now upon his Council three distinguished statesmen who were Members of my Council in 1873, or afterwards — Sir Henry Norman, Sir Barron Ellis, and Sir William Muir—all of whom were cognizant of these transactions; and yet will it be believed that the noble Viscount has not taken the common precaution of asking them whether he was right in his facts before publishing those paragraphs, and that the first thing that they knew about his despatch was seeing it in the newspapers? If he had taken that precaution, the noble Viscount would not have found himself in the difficult position in which he is now placed. Exception has also been taken by the noble Earl behind me (Earl Granville) to the 16th paragraph of the despatch, which refers to the close of the Sir Lewis Pelly's negotiations, and I cannot look upon the explanation of the noble Viscount as to the accuracy of that paragragh as satisfactory. In the 18th paragraph, moreover, the noble Viscount describes the position of the Government after the close of the negotiations as one of "vigilant reserve." The real position was that on the 15th of March, 1877, the Viceroy had informed the Ameer that all the assurances of protection he had received from Lord Lawrence, Lord Mayo, and myself, were repudiated, and that the only engagement by which the British Government were bound was the Treaty of 1855, under which no assurance of protection was given him. I do not think anyone would draw any such inference as this from the account given in the despatch of these transactions. Giving the noble Viscount every credit for a desire not to misrepresent the facts of the case in his despatch, I must say that anyone who reads his conclusions and then carefully examines the Papers will be very much surprised. There is another point in the noble Viscount's speech to which I must allude, although it is one on which I have no personal knowledge. The noble Viscount in his despatch leaves it to be inferred that Her Majesty's present Government have given to the Ameer, or rather offered to the Ameer, the assurances which His Highness required from me and which I was not able to give him. The noble Viscount spoke in a condemnatory sense of the safeguards and cautions attached to the assurances offered to Shere Ali in 1873.

VISCOUNT CRANBROOK: I must deny having expressed the sentiment which the noble Earl imputes to me.

THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK: Then, I wish the noble Viscount would not use language which is liable to misconstruction. His words about "vague" assurances certainly seemed to imply that those assurances were not of a kind which ought to have been given at the time. Now, I wish to point out to your Lordships that the offers made to the Ameer by Her Majesty's present Government were guarded far more strictly than those of the Government of 1873. These Papers contain the draft Treaty which Sir Lewis Pelly was authorised to conclude with the Ameer. My assurances to the Ameer in 1873 were that the British Government, under certain circumstances, would afford him assistance in the shape of arms and money and also, in case of necessity, assist him with troops. The safeguards were these—that he should abstain from aggression and should unreservedly accept the advice of the British Government in regard to his external relations. Now, turning to the draft Treaty which Sir Lewis Pelly was authorized to conclude with the Ameer, which is given at page 190 of the Papers, what do I find? There is an assurance of protection, no doubt, in the second Article; but it is qualified in the third and fourth Articles in precisely the same way as the assurance of protection offered to the Ameer by the Government of 1873. The qualification is that His Highness should "refrain from all provocation of aggression on or interference with the States and territories beyond his present Frontier," and that "he should conduct his relations with Foreign States in harmony with the policy of the British Government." It appears that the Viceroy was not quite satisfied with these conditions; and on looking to the *aide mémoire* "for subsidiary secret and explanatory agreement," at page 191, you will find that it was understood, in regard to Article 2, that the Ameer should "bind himself to abstain from discussion of political, international, or State matters with any Foreign Government," communicating unreservedly to the British Government all communications on such subjects received by him. I wish to show that if there is any distinction between the terms offered to the Ameer by the Viceroy under instructions from the Home Government, and the terms which were proposed in 1873, the terms proposed by Her Majesty's present Government were more strict than those offered in 1873. I have thought it right to mention this, because there is great misapprehension on the subject. It has been said in several of the newspapers, and notably by *The Pall Mall Gazette*, that the conduct of the late Government towards Shere Ali was the whole cause of the present war. Shere Ali, said *The Pall Mall Gazette*, wanted to throw himself into the arms of England, and made a proposal which Lord Northbrook was willing to accept, but which Mr. Gladstone's Government declined; and out of that proposal has grown the Afghan War. Knowing the truth of this matter, as I do, I cannot, in common fairness and justice to the Government under which I was then serving, refrain from explaining what the real facts of the case are; and I venture to say I should have taken the same course if these circumstances had occurred when the Party opposite was in Office, and while I was serving under the Earl of Beaconsfield. I think the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury) has very much underrated the importance of the observations of the noble Earl beside me (Earl Granville) upon the debate which occurred in this House on the 15th of June last year. I do not think anything which amounts to concealing from your Lordships facts which are known by Ministers can be considered to be a "small personal question unworthy of discussion." It so happened that I took very great interest in the debate in question, and the account which the noble Marquess has given of it is not one which I feel disposed to accept. My noble Friend (the Duke of Argyll) certainly did put some Questions on particular points to the noble Marquess; but he did not confine his speech to that. If he had done so, I might have accepted the explanation now given by the noble Marquess. My noble Friend discussed the policy pursued by successive Viceroys towards Afghanistan, remarking that the views of the last three Viceroys were that we should maintain an amicable and watchful attitude towards the Ameer, without entangling ourselves in permanent engagements. There can be only one interpretation of what occurred. The

Duke of Argyll wished to receive, not only an answer to a particular Question, but a general assurance from the noble Marquess that he had not departed from the line of policy indicated. I remember hearing the noble Marquess state that affairs maintained a peaceful aspect, and that there was "no reason for any apprehension of any change of policy or disturbance in our Indian Empire." But the noble Marquess, in now quoting that passage, omitted to quote the words "in our Indian Empire." I assert on my own authority, having been personally in the House and having listened with the greatest care to what fell from the noble Marquess, that I believed and accepted those words to mean that there had been no material change in our relations with Afghanistan. That is not all, because I addressed your Lordships, and I gave the noble Marquess an opportunity, of which he might have taken advantage, of explaining the misconception under which I laboured, and of stating to your Lordships precisely the state of affairs as they existed at that time. As the matter is important, I must trouble your Lordships with the few words I used on that occasion. I said—

> "The policy we have pursued with regard to the Ameer has been to show him that we desired to assist him with our advice whenever he requires it, and not to press upon him the presence of British officers in his territories, unless he really desires that they should go there, and will give them a welcome."

I said—

> "That if that policy is deliberately adhered to now, as it has been for many years. . . . whatever suspicions may be entertained by the Ameer . . . will disappear, and that the Ameer will soon see that his suspicions have no foundation, and will look upon us . . . as his best friends, and as those to whom, in certain circumstances, he will have to apply for assistance."

I added—

> "It is with great satisfaction, therefore, that I have heard the assurance of the noble Marquess that the policy I have referred to Her Majesty's Government will continue to pursue."—[3 *Hansard*, ccxxxiv. 1843.]

I therefore stated in the presence of your Lordships the interpretation I put on the words of the noble Marquess; and I further said—

> "I am satisfied that he has given us that assurance in perfect good faith, and that we may trust him to resist any attempt to put it aside."

If it had not have been for that assurance, as I understood it, most undoubtedly I should have brought the question before your Lordships. I will not say what the effect of the debate might have been; but, at any rate, before the war had been entered into, this House and the country would have known what the policy of the Government was, and would have been able to express an opinion as to whether that policy was right or wrong, and whether we were to drift into the war in which we are now engaged. As I have said before, this is not simply a personal question. In dealing with distant countries great confidence must be placed in Her Majesty's Government, and great discretion must be used by those who differ from them. On such questions a Minister is required to be more careful than in dealing even with European questions. I have said what the assurances given were, and I have now to state what were the circumstances at the time they were given. So far from Her Majesty's Government not having desired to enter into any definitive Treaty engagement, an endeavour had been made to negotiate a Treaty with the Ameer; and so far from there having been no change in our relations with the Ameer, on the 15th of March, 1877, the assurances that had been given to the Ameer—of protection in the event of attack or of internal disturbance—by Lord Lawrence, Lord Mayo, and myself, had been withdrawn under the instructions of the British Government, any expectation of support from us had been repudiated, and he had been told that we were under no engagement except that of the Treaty of 1855, under which there was no obligation on our part except to refrain from interference, and to leave the Ameer entirely to himself. I was perfectly astounded by the condition of things revealed by the despatch addressed to the noble Marquess by the Viceroy on the 10th of May, 1877, which must have been in the hands of the noble Marquess at the time he gave the assurances in the House of Lords in June, 1877, of which I have spoken. It is with deep regret I am obliged to say this: it would not be right, the Question having been put, and the answer having been given, if I did not give my deliberate testimony that the statement then made by the noble Marquess gave me a completely incorrect impression of what the real facts of the case were. I am not going now to enter into the general policy of the war; but I must say I do not think the noble Duke behind me (the Duke of Somerset) was quite fair in his remarks about the noble Lord a late Governor General (Lord Lawrence) for having joined the Afghan Committee. If my noble Friend had done such a thing in the sense of supporting the Afghans against the British Government, no language would be too strong to be used in the circumstances. But as matters stand, I am surprised at the noble Duke's condemnation of my noble Friend. He has an opinion that the war is right. Very good; but my noble Friend thinks it is unjust and impolitic—an opinion in which I myself am very much disposed to concur with him. The noble Duke says that my noble Friend is not patriotic; but he would appear not to be patriotic, simply because he differs from the noble Duke, and expresses the earnest opinions which he holds. Few men in this country have given such proofs as my noble Friend has done of patriotism, of vigour, of honour, and of a desire at any risk to maintain the British Empire in India; and yet, because he does not happen to agree with the noble Duke, he is to be spoken of in such terms. It is repugnant to all my feelings of justice and to every sentiment of propriety that a man of such distinguished services should be so spoken of in this House. My noble Friend has a perfect right to express his opinions on the causes of this war, and to say whether he thinks it just or unjust. It is fortunate that we have men like him in the country, who know something of our former relations with Afghanistan, and who can correct statements which have been made, and despatches which have been published, by the knowledge which they possess. One thing more. With regard to the Amendment proposed by the noble Earl (Earl Grey), I hope it will not be pressed to a division. Unfortunately, this discussion has assumed a somewhat personal character. Nobody more regrets that circumstance than I do; but from that very fact, if the Amendment were to be pressed, your Lordships would be asked to vote upon a proposition which you have not yet had an opportunity of fully and completely discussing. At the same time, I must confess that I concur entirely with that part of the argument of the noble Earl which rests upon the Act of 1858. I hold that it is not right for any Administration carrying on war outside India to apply the Revenues of that country towards the expense of such war without the previous consent of Parliament. In this case there was plenty of time before the declaration of war for the Government to have summoned Parliament and explained their policy; therefore, that would have been a proper and a Constitutional course, because there can be no doubt that the Prerogative of the Crown is limited by Act of Parliament, and, although it is the Prerogative of the Crown to declare war, at the same time the clauses of the Act of 1858 prescribe the course that should be followed under the circumstances. It has been a matter of extreme regret to me to be placed to some extent in collision with the noble Marquess and the noble Viscount opposite. I have endeavoured since I returned from India to abstain from making unnecessarily any observations on Indian affairs. I can say with perfect sincerity that, both in and out of Parliament, I have endeavoured to look at Indian affairs entirely apart from Party politics; and I should not hesitate for a moment to express my opinion as strongly with regard to anything done by those on my own side of the House as with regard to the conduct of noble Lords opposite.

THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELD: Although, my Lords, I cannot support the noble Earl who moved the Amendment, I still agree with him that there are occasions when Amendments to the Address are desirable, expedient, and politic. I think I may speak with some authority on the subject, for probably I am the only Member of this House who has, in his time, moved an Amendment to the Address—with what success I care not to recollect—but, at the same time, a feeling of duty, such as that which has animated the noble Earl, actuated me, and I am quite prepared to say that, under similar circumstances, I should deem it my duty to take a similar course. What, then, was the state in which we found ourselves some 25 years ago, advocating a cause with deep and warm convictions, but one which, perhaps, was not supported by a majority of the House, to which we appealed, or the nation? The Recess had passed. We had all of us made a good many speeches—in which, probably, we had used language not much more measured than we have lately become accustomed to; many of us had written letters—though not so many, perhaps, as some individuals have done in more modern times; and, under these circumstances, being also—if I may recall the circumstance without offence—members of a society of great activity and organization — more active certainly than the Afghan Committee — having agitated the country for a considerable time by the sincere expression of our opinion, we did think that when Parliament met we were bound to take the opinion of that great Assembly on the question which we had so long described as of the highest importance and of the most urgent interest. The noble Earl (Earl Grey) has taken that step to-day; but the noble Earl (Earl Granville), in his recognized position of Leader of the Opposition in this House, has taken an entirely different course. He has declared that to-night we are not to enter into the question of policy which so deeply interests the country, and which, if we are to judge from the speeches, organization, and conduct of noble Lords opposite and their friends in the country, so deeply excites and agitates them. We are not to-night to enter into the merits of that policy, but confine ourselves to what the noble Earl who last spoke (the Earl of Northbrook) so admirably described as descending into the personalities of the question. But, although the Leader of the Opposition told us that we were not to-night to enter upon the question of policy, he still felt it consistent with his duty to denounce the war into which we have entered as an unjust and impolitic war. He has still felt it consistent with his duty to hold up to depreciation and ridicule the Viceroy of the Queen, who is at this moment incurring the greatest responsibility, and on the devotion of whose intelligence more, perhaps, depends than on that of any other individual in the country. He has even felt it consistent with his views to intimate that Her Majesty's Ministers are, at this moment, neglecting their highest duty, and that they are not supporting those gallant men whose heroic exploits have just reached us, and that we have not reinforced them as was required. This, my Lords, is a strange vein to indulge in when we are asked not to enter upon the merits of this question. If that insinuation against the Government be founded on fact, we should be unworthy of the seats we hold. Is it to be said that those soldiers, who have given so good an account of the enemy, have not been adequately supported? Is the country to be informed on the first opportunity that they are hardly equal to the exertions they have been called upon to make? Not more complimentary to the troops than to Her Majesty's Government. I cannot but feel that the country to-morrow will be greatly disappointed in reading this debate. To-morrow the country will not be considering what one ex-Minister may have written, or what a present Minister may have quoted. It may, under ordinary circumstances, be a legitimate mode of passing our time that we should compare notes on such subjects, and if any misrepresentations have been made as to the conduct or expression of individuals our utmost efforts on both sides should be given to rectify them; but is it right that hour after hour should be wasted, at a time when the country wants our opinion on one of the greatest issues ever submitted to the consideration of Parliament, in order to ascertain whether Secretary This misquoted the despatch of Governor General That? Hours have been passed in a discussion leading to such a mystification that, excepting the principal actors in the scene, I defy any human being to understand what the whole controversy is about. To whatever monstrous proportions you may exaggerate this discussion, it is nothing after all but an official squabble; while the real issue is the most important that can be presented for our consideration. See the unjust effect produced upon the House—By this singular process of debating, we are not to discuss to-night the policy to discuss which Parliament has been summoned. But though we are not to discuss it, the Leader of the Opposition has given his opinion on the great issue. He tells you we are engaged in an unjust and impolitic war. But what is this? It is mere assumption. If the war is unjust and impolitic, prove it. Bring forward your reasons and your arguments. Assail our policy, and give us the proofs on which your opinions are founded. Do this and we will meet you, and the House and the country will decide. That is the legitimate and Constitutional manner which the noble Earl (Earl Grey) has adopted in moving his Amendment. But to-night we have been for hours listening in the House of Lords whilst a number of influential men have risen and denounced as unjust and impolitic what they refrain from attacking openly and frankly. It would be vain at this hour to enter into such a discussion. The noble Earl opposite has, with consummate dexterity, prevented any expression of opinion by Parliament on this all-engrossing subject to-night. It is postponed to some day when there may be a long and adjourned debate; instead of now animating the spirit of the country, and explaining why they are called upon to make great sacrifices and encouraging that patriotic spirit which has been sneered at, but which I trust there are some in this House who appreciate. A week may yet elapse, at a time very critical to this country, before the opinion of Parliament can be taken. I cannot refrain from expressing my entire disapprobation of this course of proceeding. I admit its dexterity; but I think that there are times when Parliamentary manœuvring, a very happy quality when great interests are not at stake, may be misplaced. There are one or two points on which I should not have touched on this occasion, but for some remarks which the noble Earl called upon me to notice. He has a habit, when I do not notice every remark he makes, most amiably to remind me of it, and I must notice what he tells us about the Treaty of Berlin. The noble Earl, who has already decided, without discussion, the question of this war, expresses great doubts about the statement in the gracious Speech from the Throne, that Her Majesty has every reason to believe the Treaty of Berlin will be successfully carried into effect; and he asks us, like a counsel cross-examining a doubtful witness—" But is this the real opinion of the Ministry?" If it had not been, is it to be supposed that we should have recommended Her Majesty to use such language, and ourselves have come down to support such a Speech from the Throne? Why, my Lords, in that case our conduct would have been not only infamous, but absurd. I may, in fact, say that it would have been akin to what has been charged against my noble Friend the Secretary of State for India (Viscount Cranbrook), of garbling in a despatch an epitome of important State Papers which he knew would necessarily be made known within 48 hours of the publication of his own despatch. My Lords, the language which Her Majesty has been advised to use in the gracious Speech from the Throne has been entirely warranted by circumstances. We do look upon the Berlin Treaty as certain to be carried completely and successfully into effect. But the noble Earl says—" It is not merely the Treaty of Berlin. There are other Treaties; there is the Convention with Turkey. Why not insert a paragraph in the Queen's Speech to inform Parliament what is being done to effect the reform of the Ottoman Empire?" Why, the Treaty of Berlin, like other Treaties, provides a certain specified time during which its arrangements may be properly carried into effect, and a moiety of the period has not yet elapsed. Probably of all the arrangements connected with the Treaty of Berlin, the arrangements with respect to Turkey are the most important. But the noble Earl is under a great error in supposing that nothing has been done. Unceasing labour has been bestowed upon the subject; and nothing but the great ability of those who fortunately are in the employment of Her Majesty abroad, their perseverance, and untiring devotion to their task could have effected the considerable results already accomplished. My Lords, I look forward to the Convention respecting Turkey and Cyprus as one likely to prove most advantageous, not merely for this country, but for the world in general; I look forward with confidence to the regeneration of Asia Minor. When the noble Earl turns round and ridicules the occupation of Cyprus and the objects for which we undertook that occupation, I will tell him that it is not easy in language to describe the advantages of that position; and when the noble Earl assumes that the Island is wanting in many qualities which were announced, and that its acquisition is a blunder, I can assure him that the conditions for which we agreed to occupy that Island have been entirely fulfilled. I repeat without the slightest fear, after communication with my Colleagues who have recently visited it, that it will be, as I have formerly said, most important as "a place of arms," as affording a capacious harbour for our Navy, and unlimited convenience for the quartering of Her Majesty's Forces. It has entirely fulfilled our expectations, and I believe will soon be recognized as one of the most important and influential positions under the dominion of Her Majesty. My Lords, I regret very much that there has been a feeling among certain of your Lordships that there has been an omission in the gracious Speech from the Throne, inasmuch as there was no allusion to the prevalent distress in the country consequent on the badness of trade. That was through no inadvertence, no neglect. Noble Lords opposite will, I am sure, agree with me in one thing—that there are no persons so interested in the prosperity of the country as Her Majesty's Ministers, whoever they may be. But it is a questionable course to allude publicly to the distress of the country when it is not peculiar to the country itself; when you are not yourselves prepared with any remedial measures; and when, if you express your real opinions, you may give rise to hopes and miscalculations which afterwards may be disappointed and defeated, and which you must deplore. That is the reason that has governed us in this case. What is the real state of affairs at present? The distress in this country is great; but there are circumstances which alleviate it in the low price of provisions. Still, that distress cannot be denied; and yet it must be borne in mind that it is a commercial distress, which is shared by every other country. It has been occasioned by the same causes which occasion the distress of other countries. Her Majesty's Government are not prepared—I do not suppose any Government would be prepared—with any measures which would attempt to alleviate the extensive distress which now prevails. But if we are pressed upon the subject, it is, I trust, justifiable, though I speak with the utmost diffidence, to say that the opinion of Her Majesty's Government is that the worst part of the distress has been experienced. We believe, from all that reaches us, that there are indications, not in this country only but in other countries, of a re-action. We believe that not only in this country, but in other countries where the industry peculiarly affects our own, where the course of commerce exercises a particular influence on the industry of England, there are symptoms of amelioration and general amendment which must in time—and perhaps sooner than the country is prepared for—bring about those advantageous results which, after periods of suffering, we have before experienced. But in a Speech from the Throne addressed to Parliament assembled for a specific purpose, upon which the attention of Parliament ought to be concentrated, it did not appear to us advisable to introduce the subject, though we hope that before the year is passed we shall every day find ourselves in a better position with respect to the employment of the people, the employment of capital, and the enterprize of individuals. I will not dwell on the words of the President of the United States, though words from such an authority and such a quarter cannot be treated with too much consideration. But the enterprize of America generally precedes that of Europe, as the industry of England precedes that of the rest of Europe; and I look forward with confidence that the industry and enterprize of America will be productive of beneficial results upon this country. I should not like to sit down without thanking the noble Earl who moved the Address for the speech which he made this evening. I am sure the House listened to it with much interest. It would well have preceded a debate which, unfortunately, we are not to have. But it will be a satisfaction to my noble Friend to remember that it has been his lot, which is not the lot of all of us, to have in his time addressed both Houses, and to have succeeded in interesting both. I do not wonder at the interest which has been shown in the affairs of India by my noble Friend who seconded the Address. I believe there is no portion of Her Majesty's subjects who have profited more by our Indian Empire than the Irish; and, what is more, our Indian Empire is, perhaps, more indebted to them for the great talent and energy which they have shown in its administration than any portion of Her Majesty's subjects. Well, my Lords, in conclusion, we are told that on Monday we are to deal with this great question which now excites public attention, and that we are to come to a decision upon it. We have received intelligence to-day which no man, on whatever side he sits, can read without pride and admiration. Whatever may be the results of that brilliant victory—and I should hope that the result will be speedy and satisfactory—there can be but one opinion among us as to the admirable qualities by which that victory has been accomplished. Her Majesty's Ministers, my Lords, have another sort of encounter hanging over us. I know not what may be its result. The decision may differ from what might be calculated upon in ordinary times. Whatever that result may be individually, I am prepared to meet it, as, I am sure, are my Colleagues. Whatever the result, it will be, I hope, equal to the occasion. That the House of Lords will decide that they will maintain the Empire, and that they will not in any way sanction that policy which mistakes timidity for wisdom;—that is what I most earnestly hope, and that is what I believe the people of England expect.

Earl GRANVILLE: My Lords, may I be permitted to reply very briefly to some of the criticisms which have been made? The noble Duke has complained of my being illogical in condemning a war which I consider unjust, unnecessary, and impolitic, and yet being ready to vote the Supplies for it. He is quite right—it is illogical; but when once our soldiers are before the enemy, and the honour of the country is engaged, however illogical it may be, I will not consent to deprive our army of the necessary support, however desirous I may be that the war should be brought to a speedy termination, honourable to ourselves, and just to the foe. The noble Duke complains that a disapprobation of the war will encourage the Ameer. But Parliament has been debarred from any previous knowledge of the policy which has caused this war; and now when it has broken out, if we may not discuss this policy, lest it should encourage a semi-barbarian on the other side of the world, there cannot be much use in calling Parliament together at all. But if I am willing to kiss the rod of an old political and personal friend like the noble Duke, I am not prepared to do the same for the rod of the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury). It is much too full of buds. The noble Marquess has read me a severe lecture for indulging in personalities. I admit that there is no greater authority in either House of Parliament than the noble Marquess on the subject of personalities; but as the House has been misled on a most important measure and policy which has been maturing for two years, I think it is not mere personality to ask for some explanation of what has occurred. The noble Earl (the Earl of Beaconsfield), who is himself not wanting in authority on a question of Parliamentary manœuvring, has given me a severe lecture for the manœuvring I have done to-day. Well, I have only made a complaint which I thought I was entitled to make, and asked certain questions which have not been answered. I had consulted the convenience of the House in not beginning a skirmishing discussion on the merits of a question which must be thoroughly discussed, and on which the House will be asked to give an opinion on the early opportunity which has been promised by the noble Viscount. In conclusion, I appeal to my noble Friend on the cross benches to withdraw the Amendment, which cannot be disconnected entirely from the general subject which is to be discussed on Monday.

Earl GREY said, he would not press his Amendment to a division; but he wished the Question to be put.

Question put, Whether the said words shall be there inserted? *Resolved* in the *negative.*

Then the original Motion was *agreed to.*

Ordered that the said Address be presented to Her Majesty by the Lords with White Staves.

CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES.

The Earl of Redesdale appointed, *nemine dissentiente*, to take the Chair in all Committees of this House for this Session.

Committee for Privileges—Appointed.

Sub-Committee for the Journals—Appointed.

Appeal Committee—appointed.

House adjourned at Eleven o'clock,
till To-morrow, a quarter
past Four o'clock.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Thursday, 5th December, 1878.

The House met at half after One of the clock.

Message to attend the Lords Commissioners;—

The House went;—and having returned;—

NEW WRITS ISSUED DURING THE RECESS.

Mr. Speaker acquainted the House,—that he had issued Warrants for *New Writs, for* Truro City, *v.* Sir Frederick Martin Williams, baronet, deceased; *for* Peterborough Borough, *v.* George Hammond Whalley, esquire, deceased.

CLARE COUNTY WRIT.

Mr. Speaker also acquainted the House, that he had received from one of Her Majesty's Secretaries of State a Letter relating to the Humble Address presented to Her Majesty of the 8th of August last:—And the same was read.

NEW WRITS ISSUED.

For Maldon, *v.* George Montagu Warren Sandford, esquire, Manor of Northstead; *for* Bristol, *v.* Kirkman Daniel Hodgson, esquire, Chiltern Hundreds.

NEW MEMBERS SWORN.

Honble. William John Wentworth FitzWilliam, *for* Peterborough; Lord Colin Campbell, *for* the County of Argyll; Samuel Rathbone Edge, esquire, *for* Newcastle-under-Lyme; Arthur Tremayne, esquire, *for* Truro.

PRIVILEGES.

Ordered, That a Committee of Privileges be appointed.

OUTLAWRIES BILL.

Bill "for the more effectual preventing Clandestine Outlawries," read the first time; to be read a second time.

NOTICES OF MOTION.

AFGHANISTAN (EXPENSES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS).

Mr. E. STANHOPE: I beg to give Notice that on Monday next I shall move the following Resolution:—

> "That Her Majesty, having directed a Military expedition of Her Forces charged upon Indian Revenues to be despatched against the Ameer of Afghanistan, this House consents that the Revenues of India shall be applied to defray the expenses of the Military operations which may be carried on beyond the external frontiers of Her Majesty's Indian possessions."

Mr. FAWCETT: I believe I am in Order in giving Notice of an Amendment. I beg to give Notice that I shall oppose the Resolution.

QUESTION.

AFGHANISTAN (MILITARY OPERATIONS)—THE PEIWAR COLUMN—TELEGRAM.—QUESTION.

Mr. RITCHIE asked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether any information has been received at the India Office with reference to the report of the great victory of General Roberts?

Mr. E. STANHOPE: Sir, I am happy to be able to inform my hon. Friend and the House that we have received full confirmation from the Viceroy of India. With the permission of the House I will read the telegram from the Viceroy. It is dated the 5th of December, and is as follows:—

> "Roberts attacked Peiwar 2nd; turning movement during night of 1st successful; surprised and turned enemy, but attack of Kotal from that side found impossible. Roberts, therefore, continued turning movement, placing himself in enemy's rear, with flanking column, while General Cobbe engaged attention in front. Enemy, reinforced by four regiments from Khushi, made determined resistance, but were driven from Kotal, which was occupied at 4 p.m., 2nd. Enemy completely defeated, leaving 15 guns and large amount of ammunition in our hands; other guns abandoned, and will be secured. Loss supposed to be very heavy. Our loss—Captain Kelso, R.A., Major Anderson, 23rd Pioneers, killed; General Cobbe and Lieutenant Munro, 72nd Highlanders, wounded; about 50 men killed and wounded. Troops had

to undergo great exertions and exposure at altitude of 8,000 feet, but behaved admirably, and are in excellent spirits. Roberts continues pursuit towards Shutar-Gardan to-day; wounded sent into Kuram."

THE QUEEN'S SPEECH.

MR. SPEAKER *reported* Her Majesty's Speech, made by Her Chancellor, and read it to the House.

ADDRESS IN ANSWER TO HER MAJESTY'S MOST GRACIOUS SPEECH.

VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH: Sir, I rise with the greatest diffidence to move that an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, thanking Her Majesty for Her Most Gracious Speech. I have had the privilege of being a Member of this House but a short time, and I trust that in the few remarks I shall make I shall receive its indulgence, and that any shortcomings on my part may be attributed not to any want of confidence in the cause I advocate, but rather to the inexperience of one who is, for the first time, addressing it.

At first sight it may appear to many hon. Members a matter of great inconvenience to have been summoned to attend a meeting of Parliament at this time; but on further consideration of the questions that are before the country, and the provisions of the law by which Indian Revenues cannot be expended without the sanction of Parliament, I think there is no hon. Member who will not agree with me that Her Majesty's Government had no course open to them but to summon Parliament in this sudden and extraordinary manner.

Since we last met many things have taken place which have caused serious apprehensions that the Treaty of Berlin, which secured peace to Europe, was in danger of being disturbed. I cannot but think that one advantage gained by the meeting of Parliament to-day will be to dispel any such illusion, for there is not the slightest fear that any Power concerned in that Treaty has any intention of not observing its conditions. I trust, Sir, that the House will permit me to say that I think the country owes much to the Commissioners in Turkey, who have done so much to bring about a solution of those problems which at present are in a state of uncertainty there.

Very recently, Sir, another question, which at one time promised to be of a very troublesome character, has been brought, I am thankful to say, to a successful and satisfactory issue. The United States have paid over the sum of money which was adjudged to this country in the Fisheries dispute. I am sure no one doubted for a moment that that money would be paid; and I do hope that this amicable conclusion, of what might have been a serious difficulty, will tend to draw in still closer connection the tie of friendship which I hope, and I am sure will always, exist between the two countries.

Her Majesty's Most Gracious Speech refers chiefly to the condition of affairs on the borders of our Indian Empire. With the permission of the House I shall touch but generally on that question, as no doubt it will be amongst many others brought under its notice; but I am happy to think that I can commence at a period on which all parties are agreed. No one can deny that the statesmanlike ability of Lord Mayo, his personal qualities and his natural courtesy, created between himself and the Ameer of Afghanistan, I may say I think, a feeling of good-will —nay, even more, a feeling of friendship. When, at last, we suffered a great loss by Lord Mayo's death, he bequeathed to his successor the same state of good feeling. In the meantime, Sir, a new element had been introduced. The advances of Russia were beginning, and the Ameer applied to Lord Northbrook for assurances of protection against that advancing Power. What those assurances were it is unnecessary for me to say. At all events, Lord Northbrook was unable to comply in such a manner as to give complete satisfaction to the Ameer. The Russian advances still continued, and the Ameer became more and more estranged to England, and more willing to enter into negotiations with the advancing Power. Lord Salisbury, at last, thought that the time had come when he should be justified in giving further assurance of protection to the Ameer against foreign invasion, upon condition that our officers were allowed to be present at certain places in his territory, in order that they might thoroughly watch the movements on the Frontier. To this the Ameer declined to agree. The discussion was prolonged indefinitely; and, in the meantime, the Ameer showed a still more unfriendly feeling towards our country. Suddenly, in July of this year, we were startled by hearing that the Ameer had received a Russian Envoy at Cabul. Under these circumstances, the Indian Government felt that the time had come at which they should consider how they would act. They proposed a friendly Mission to Cabul on the part of this country. Of the circumstances which followed the House is well aware; and when, later on, they gave the Ameer—if I may so use the expression—another chance, the House is well acquainted with the manner in which that Ultimatum was treated. Under these circumstances, the Indian Government felt compelled to take those steps which are now to be brought under the consideration of Parliament. We are at the present moment engaged in a war which, I trust, will be short, successful, and decisive; and I can only express a hope, which I am sure you will all feel, that our European soldiers, as well as our Indian troops, will, as they have ever done, do their utmost to show that they are fully qualified to maintain the glory and the power of our Indian Empire.

As regards domestic legislation, I may be excused for saying that it is impossible for me to form any opinion of the work of the coming Session; but I wish I could feel sanguine that anything can be done to alleviate the distress which unfortunately prevails through the greater part of this country. In view of the bad harvests and the depression of trade, I feel that the prospects of a return of prosperity are anything but good. At the same time, hon. Gentlemen will remember that these misfortunes are not confined to our country. They extend all over Europe and America; and as, therefore, there can be no question that they are not the consequence of political causes, I think we must not despair. On former occasions we have had a similar depression of trade; and as bad harvests have been previously met by the skill and energy for which Englishmen have always been renowned, so, I trust, England will again overcome those difficulties as in former days.

I cannot conclude without expressing my most grateful thanks to the House for the kind indulgence which they have shown to me, and I shall conclude by moving—

"That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, to convey the thanks of this House for Her Majesty's Most Gracious Speech:

"Humbly to thank Her Majesty for the gracious expression of Her regret that She has found it necessary to call for our attendance at an unusual, and, as Her Majesty is pleased to say, probably at an inconvenient time:

"To express our regret that the hostility manifested towards Her Majesty's Indian Government by the Ameer of Afghanistan, and the manner in which he has repulsed Her Majesty's friendly Mission, has left Her Majesty no alternative but to make a peremptory demand for redress:

"Humbly to thank Her Majesty for informing us that, in consequence of this demand having been disregarded, Her Majesty has directed an Expedition to be sent into his Territory, and has taken the earliest opportunity of calling us together, and making to us the communication required by Law:

"To thank Her Majesty for directing that Papers on the subject shall be laid before us:

"Humbly to express the gratification with which we learn that Her Majesty receives from all Foreign Powers assurances of their friendly feelings, and that Her Majesty has every reason to believe that the arrangements for the pacification of Europe, made by the Treaty of Berlin, will be successfully carried into effect:

"To thank Her Majesty for having directed the Estimates for the ensuing year to be laid before us in due course:

"Humbly to assure Her Majesty that, after full deliberation upon the matters which have led Her Majesty to anticipate our usual time of meeting, we shall be prepared, at such date as Her Majesty may determine, to give our careful consideration to such measures for the public benefit as Her Majesty may direct to be submitted to us:

"Humbly to assure Her Majesty that our best care shall be devoted to the maintenance of the great interests of Her Empire; and that we unite with Her Majesty in praying that the blessing of the Almighty may attend our counsels."

Mr. HALL: In rising to second the Address, I shall not hesitate to allude to the great subject to which the remarks of my noble Friend the Member for Down (Viscount Castlereagh) have been mainly directed. It must be quite clear that when Parliament is summoned at this unusual and, as Her Majesty is pleased to say, somewhat inconvenient season, there must be some great topic for discussion and settlement by the House, which rightly and necessarily puts the ordinary Business of an ordinary Session entirely in the shade. Sir, that great topic is the question of our North-Western Frontier of India, and the relations of Her Majesty towards the Ameer of Afghanistan, and as being germane to that question. The House will have learned with satisfaction the assurance contained in Her Majesty's gracious Speech that Her Majesty is in friendly relations with all other foreign Powers.

It is a matter, I venture to think, not only for satisfaction, but also for profound thankfulness, that those great subjects which the Berlin Congress was called together to discuss seem to be in a fair way of being brought to a final adjustment, without any break whatever in the friendly relations between the signatory Powers; because it cannot be denied that whether we look to our North-West Frontier in India, or look at home for that revival of trade prosperity, for which so many eyes are anxiously scanning the horizon, much depends on the peaceable and loyal carrying out of the Berlin Treaty. And, Sir, I cannot use the word "trade" without venturing to express the sympathy, which I am sure the House feels, with our fellow-countrymen in Scotland, who have suffered from so severe a financial calamity, and who have borne their suffering so bravely.

Sir, the regret which has been expressed in the Speech from the Throne, that Parliament should have been called together to discuss the war in Afghanistan, is a regret which, so far as the war is concerned, will be shared by every hon. Member of the House, no matter what may be his political opinions. These Frontier Wars, so many of which have been entailed on this country by the necessities of our Indian Empire, are at all times undertakings which this country would fain avoid if she could fairly and reasonably do so: and of Afghan Wars especially, it may be said that our reminiscences certainly are not of such a character as to induce responsible Indian statesmen to rush into them lightly or without a grave sense of responsibility. Therefore it is that we have always found that the chief and most cardinal point in the policy of our Indian statesmen has been the independence and friendship of Afghanistan. But, as has been well pointed out in one of our great centres of commerce and intelligence by the Leader of this House on a recent occasion, that independence and friendship must be real; because what we desire is, that Afghanistan should be for us in Asia that which our forefathers always desired Turkey should be for us in Europe —a buffer between ourselves and the possible aggrandizing propensities of other Powers. That has been a position as favourable for the Ruler of Afghanistan as for this country. It was a position which was always cordially and frankly accepted by Dost Mahomed, and up to 1872 apparently by his less reliable son Shere Ali, with more or less sincerity. I use the word "apparently," because it is very doubtful whether Shere Ali ever forgave this country for the recognition it gave to his rival brothers in 1867. Be that as it may, and without stopping to inquire whether the result of the famous Umballa Conference in 1869 did or did not carry out Shere Ali's wishes, I think we may fairly say that up to the year 1872 the relations of Shere Ali to this country were fairly friendly. Since that date, however, there has been a great change. His friendship has given way to ill-concealed enmity, and his estimate of the comparative power of Russia and England has undergone a complete change—a change not in our favour. What the causes of the change may be, and the amount of responsibility that will have to be borne for it by previous Viceroys and the present Administration, must and will, of course, be discussed at a fitting moment. That moment is certainly not the present; but when that time comes, and strong opinions are expressed, on the one hand that a more resolute and less ambiguous policy in the past would have secured Shere Ali to our interests, and on the other hand opinions are as strongly expressed that a less resolute and a more ambiguous policy now, would have had a similar effect, I am inclined to believe that political circumstances farther North than Cabul, in the one case, had not so far matured as to render a more resolute policy absolutely necessary; and, in the other case, had done so, in so marked a manner and with such great rapidity, that a longer continuance in the rut of ambiguity would have been not only unwise but absolutely impossible; and I, therefore, venture to think that it would better become the Parliament of England frankly and fully to look this side of the question in the face with a view to our future advantage, rather than by useless endeavours to prove opponents wrong and lose our capacity for forming a sound judgment in a mist of political prejudice. At the end of the year 1872 the Seistan boundary arbitration was concluded, and that seems to have left a rankling sense of wrong in the mind of the Ameer, and it was but a few months after that the continued advance of Russia in Central Asia seemed to impress the Ameer with the possible difficulties of his position in regard to that country, and he therefore sent an Envoy to Simla to endeavour to induce Lord Northbrook to enter into an alliance specifically against Russia. I venture to think that the wisdom or unwisdom of the course then adopted depended upon the estimate reasonably to be formed—of the reality of the danger which Shere Ali apprehended. And we must not, in determining that, forget, that only six months before an agreement had been come to between Russia and this country as to the boundaries of Afghanistan, and that so frank, full, and unreserved were the assurances of Russia in this respect, that the English Government seemed to have no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that Shere Ali's reading of the political barometer had been entirely incorrect. The House will remember that when these assurances were given Lord Granville had been told that Afghanistan did not come within the political purview of Russia, that the Emperor considered an extension of territory as a weakness; while as to Cabul, it was admitted that English officers might fairly be found there, and that Russian officers ought not to be found there. But it would seem that Shere Ali was a better judge of the immediate future than either the Russian or English Governments, for within six months of the agreement, Khiva had fallen, and Shere Ali had seen the Russian Frontier and his own drawing nearer and nearer day by day. He seemed to be making up his mind to side with the strongest Power, whether that should be Russian or English; and I cannot help thinking that however favourable a Treaty might at that time have been concluded between his country and ourselves, the well-known character of the Ameer Chief would have rendered it not impossible that the Treaty would have been frankly and fully accepted by him so long as, and no longer than, it tallied with his own interests and squared with his own estimate of the relative power of Russia and England. With regard to this I may venture to quote the opinion given by Lord Lawrence in 1869—that if an invasion of India were imminent, every Afghan, from the Ameer on the Throne to the domestic slave in the household, would join it. In 1875 Lord Northbrook expressed his belief that whenever the day came for Russian influence to be supreme in the Turcoman territory, it would be necessary that more specific assurances should be given to the Ameer that we should have a British Resident at Herat; and at the close of that year Her Majesty's Government had come to the conclusion that the time had arrived. That opinion was not shared in by Lord Northbrook; but subsequent events went far to show that the real question was, not whether the time for more specific assurances had arrived, but whether, in truth, it had not for ever passed away? For what do we find? That when, in obedience to Lord Salisbury's instructions, the Mission of Sir Lewis Pelly was proposed to the Ameer, it was rejected by him, and when, after considerable pressure, the Envoy of the Ameer was sent to Peshawur, it was abundantly clear that the Treaty for which his master was said to have been looking so long no longer had any charms for him, and his whole ingenuity appeared to be directed to the frustration of the objects of the Conference. Old grievances were raked up; much time was wasted by interminable discussions as to the position of the proposed British Residents, although that point was well understood to have been previously agreed to; and, generally, it appeared that no definite conclusions were desired by the Ameer. With regard to those British Residents, I may mention that the question had been fully explained to the Ameer over and over again, and there is evidence to show that he not only understood it, but fully acknowledged the justice of our demands. For it must be quite clear that in any Treaty entered into by us for securing the integrity of Shere Ali's dominions, it would be necessary to us to secure speedy and trustworthy information of what was going on upon the Frontiers, if only to enable us to carry into effect our engagement to prevent conduct on his part provocative of Russian aggression. If we had not done this we should have been placing our responsibility at the mercy of Shere Ali's caprice. The Peshawur Conference went on until the Envoy died, and then Lord Lytton, having information of continued hostility on the part of the Ameer—who was trying to raise a jehad, or religious war, against the English — wisely seized that opportunity to close the Conference. For 12 months nothing more was done, when all British India was, as my noble Friend has said, startled by the intelligence that a Russian Mission had been received at Cabul. Then the question arose as to whether the Government could remain a pacific spectator of that great event? and it was felt that to do so would be practically to hand over the interests of Afghanistan to Russia, in the same way that Bokhara had been handed over to her. I do not know whether, as a simple matter of International Law, it might have been justifiable for Shere Ali to receive a Russian Mission, and to reject an English one; but for our Government to have permitted such conduct would have been contrary to all the dictates of common sense, and would have been an utter disregard of that *salus republicæ* which we all know is *suprema lex.* It must be quite clear that even if the British Government could have forgotten the treachery — the base treachery—of Shere Ali, and the gifts which have been so freely lavished upon him by successive Viceroys during a period of eight years — gifts comprising ammunition without end, 12 cannon, 21,000 rifles, and £250,000—for which no sort of return has ever been made, or is ever likely to be made; if they could have forgotten all that, it was absolutely impossible for them, as guardians of British honour in India, to forget the insult offered by the stoppage of a peaceful Mission. I believe there are many of our way of thinking who believe so fully in the ultimate power of our country in India, that they are apt to despise what generally goes by the name of prestige. That is a view with which I cannot sympathize. Prestige, Mr. Speaker, I once heard well described—I think the description emanated from an hon. Member of this House—prestige is credit, and credit, as we all know, is capital. Prestige, in the present case, is the estimate formed in the Native mind of the invincibility of the British power in India. It is that which in the olden times was won for you by the genius of Marquess Wellesley and the great Wellington, and, in more recent years, by Pollock, Nott, Sale, and Havelock. Let us remember how much this prestige has cost to win, and prize it as the talisman of the future. With regard to increase of territory, I ought, perhaps, to say that, in the ordinary acceptation of the word, I believe Great Britain desires no increase of territory either in India or anywhere else; but I may venture to express a hope, with regard to the future, that in any rectification of Frontier which may take place by arrangement with the Border Tribes—who are independent of Shere Ali to a great extent, be it remembered — or otherwise, that care will be taken to have the mountains on our own side. In that case our responsibility will not only be not increased, but we shall be able, at less cost and at less trouble, to guard our own, which is all that Great Britain desires to do, and with less than which I hope she will never be content.

I thank the House very much for having listened to me so patiently; and I will only venture, in conclusion, to express a hope that, when those feelings of partisan passion which on these subjects seem naturally to arise, and which although we have heard nothing of them in debate to-night may possibly be still in store for us—that when they are hushed, as one day they will be, and the calm gaze of the historian is directed to the Eastern policy of England in 1878, I trust it will be written that without European convulsion, and at the cost of only a short Frontier war, British India was secured from foreign foes, not only in the South-East, amid the fertile valleys of Asia Minor, but also on her North-Western Frontier, in that less hospitable region, which borders on the snows of the Himalayas and the great Hindu-Kush.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That, &c." [See p. 88.]

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: Sir, the first and most agreeable portion of my task to-night is to congratulate the House and my Friends the noble Lord the Member for Down (Viscount Castlereagh) and the hon. Member for the City of Oxford (Mr. Hall) for the manner in which they have moved and seconded the Address. It is unnecessary for me to say anything respecting the speech which has just been delivered. The hon. Member who has just spoken has on former occasions often taken part in our debates, and all will be prepared to admit the ability he has on those occasions manifested. With regard to the Mover of the Address, although the last Lord Castlereagh who sat in this House was a statesman with whose politics we on this side of the House could not generally agree, I am sure we shall all be disposed to welcome the appearance of the noble Lord who spoke first to-night, and I hope he will rival the distinction which has been acquired by various members of his family.

Certainly the Members who moved and seconded the Address have had before them an easier task than that which has fallen to some of their Predecessors; for Her Majesty's Government have, I must admit, succeeded in compressing the Queen's Speech within shorter limits than those which have marked former documents. Therefore, I suppose, it was not thought necessary for either the Mover or the Seconder of the Address to enter into the consideration of the great variety of those disconnected topics which have frequently somewhat embarrassed Members who had a similar duty to perform. No doubt the haste with which it has been found necessary to summon Parliament will account for some of the omissions which we may perceive in the Queen's Speech; but there are other omissions for which I do not think that hasty summons furnishes a sufficient excuse.

In the first place, I have noticed with very great surprise that there is no allusion to the Colonies in the Speech. I believe the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Colonies has attended the recent deliberations of the Cabinet, and I believe he is at present in his place, and that he knows how that has come about. I believe and understand, and we are all aware, that events of the gravest character are occurring in one of the Colonies of South Africa; that a war is actually in progress in that Colony which is occasioning much excitement and some measure of alarm there; and that it has been found necessary to send out reinforcements from the mother country. Yet Her Majesty's Government seem to think it so utterly trifling and unimportant a matter that in Her Majesty's Speech it is not even mentioned. I cannot help thinking that such neglect as this is likely to be felt very deeply by the Colonies. It is possible that no measures dealing with the matter are in contemplation by Her Majesty's Government; but a few words of sympathy and encouragement for the difficulties under which the Colony is at present labouring would have been found acceptable, and would not have been thrown away.

There are, Sir, a few lines devoted to the progress made in the re-organization of European Turkey under the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin. I do not complain that the reference is very short; but I think the House will probably expect to have from Her Majesty's Ministers some further information with regard to the matter. Since the Prorogation of Parliament we all know that one of the provisions of the Treaty has been carried into effect; but not without very prolonged resistance on the part of the Turkish people or the Government, and a very considerable loss of life and injury to the resources of Austria. We heard a few weeks ago—as has been mentioned by the hon. Member who has just sat down—that there were considerable difficulties in the plan of organizing a new Province in Eastern Roumelia. We heard, and it was supposed at that time, that obstacles had been thrown in the way by Russia. I trust, however, from the language at the end of Her Majesty's Speech, that the Government will be able to inform us that this is not the case. At the same time, I believe that these obstacles to the desired organization of the Province are very great, and arise both from the difficulty of framing a Constitution for the Province, and also from the disinclination of its inhabitants to remain under Turkish rule. I trust, Sir, that in these matters we shall have some information from Her Majesty's Government; and that they will be able to inform us that it will not be necessary to employ force upon the inhabitants of Eastern Roumelia in order to impose upon them a Government to which they are irrevocably opposed.

I think the hon. Member for Oxford felt the force of the omissions from Her Majesty's Speech when he referred to the existing depression of trade, and that he thought the matter one worthy of mention in Her Majesty's Speech. It is possible—nay, it is probable—that that depression is beyond the power of control of Her Majesty's Government; but are we to gather from the Speech that they have no legislative intentions with the view of endeavouring to improve the existing state of things? I believe it is unexampled in the history of Queen's Speeches that Parliament should be opened without a single indication from the Throne of the subject of domestic legislation during the Session. We are not without precedent in this case. A Conservative Government was in power when Parliament was hastily summoned at an earlier period of the year than the present for the consideration of a very similar subject. Parliament was summoned, in 1867, on account of the war in Abyssinia, in the middle of the month of November; but on that occasion the form of Her Majesty's gracious Speech was the usual form. The subjects of legislation were set forth at length, and the Business intended to be laid before Parliament during the Session was mentioned in the usual manner. I hope, Sir, that Her Majesty's Government will be able to inform us that the remarkable omission to which I have referred arises from the fact that the Government have not yet made up their minds as to the legislation they are about to introduce; or whether, on the other hand, they know what Bills they will bring in, but that they are of such infinitesimal importance that they could not properly require or find a place in Her Majesty's gracious Speech.

I now come, Sir, to the subject which occupies the greater portion of Her Majesty's Speech, and which was the cause of Parliament being summoned at an earlier period than usual. And here I may point out the extraordinary position in which Parliament is placed. It is now but a few months since we were rejoicing at the conclusion of a Treaty—the Treaty of Berlin — and of an arrangement which we were told had given us "peace with honour." Within those few months we find ourselves involved in a war, a war which may be—I trust it will not be, but which may be—an anxious and a prolonged war. Although it is not a formidable war, having regard to the antagonist with whom we are immediately engaged in it, yet we cannot conceal from ourselves that it is a war which may probably bring us further difficulties and complications with a more powerful Empire. Well, Sir, and what are the circumstances under which we are called together? Some time since we were told by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Home Department that a cloud had arisen on the horizon in the East. Well, Sir, that cloud we now find has been in the sight of Her Majesty's Government for the last two years, and yet this House has been in perfect ignorance of its existence; and so far as any official communication to it was concerned, so far as they had information other than that derived from the ordinary sources open to every hon. Member, might have assembled to day and heard in Her Majesty's gracious Speech for the first time that anything had disturbed the tranquillity of our relations in India. It is true that Papers have been laid before us; but with regard to those Papers I think the House has just cause to complain. Three months ago Her Majesty's Government must have been perfectly aware, from the repulse of the Mission, that, whether the matter was amicably settled or not, it should become the subject of discussion in Parliament, and that information should be laid before Parliament. A large portion of those Papers might have been published in the early part of this year; but, though it was known three months since that the Papers must necessarily be presented to Parliament, they were only placed in the hands of hon. Members on Saturday last, and a portion of them only within the last few hours; while other important Papers which bear closely upon the subject, relating to affairs in Central Asia, and which were promised in answer to a

Question put by my hon. Friend the Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke) at the conclusion of last Session, were only presented last Monday. That, in my opinion, is a very serious matter. It is one not merely affecting the convenience of hon. Members, but which may affect the character and the honour of this House. The case of the Government, I presume, is contained in the Papers which lie on the Table, and the statement of facts as they have occurred has been given in the Queen's Speech. It may reasonably be contended that it would be the proper course and absolutely necessary for any hon. Member who desired to question the policy, the expediency, or the justice of this war to make himself acquainted at the earliest possible period with the contents of those Papers, and to raise those questions upon the earliest possible opportunity—namely, upon voting the Address to the Crown; but, in my opinion, the conduct of Her Majesty's Government, to which I have referred, has rendered such a course impossible. The Papers are so voluminous, the subject to many of us is so new, it requires such careful consideration, that no hon. Member would be justified in calling the attention of the House to this great question and asking it to pronounce a final opinion on the conduct pursued by Her Majesty's Government until the House had more time than it could possibly get to examine the case of the Government as set forth in those Papers. Sir, as I have suggested, it may probably become necessary, and be the duty of some hon. Member, to call in question the policy and expediency of this war. But before I go further let me say for myself, and, I believe, for those who sit near me, that we have not the slightest intention to oppose in any way any proposition the Government may make for obtaining the necessary Supplies and means for carrying on the war. In my opinion, this war has been entered upon by Her Majesty's Government, a Government — unfortunately as I think—entrusted by Parliament with full powers to enter upon such a course—a Government—unfortunately again, as I think—which has received many proofs of the confidence of the present Parliament, and therefore, as I have stated, fully entitled and empowered to advise the Crown to exercise its Prerogative of declaring war. Under those circumstances, it appears to me that it is due to the safety and honour of our gallant Army—it is due also, I will admit, to the safety and honour of our Empire in India—that a war once entered upon, whether rightly or otherwise, should be conducted with vigour and conducted to a successful end. I may even go further, and say that I think it is now the truest mercy to the Ameer himself and to his people that the war which has been begun should not be allowed to linger, but that it should be brought to a speedy conclusion. For these reasons, Sir, I have no intention whatever to oppose any measure which Her Majesty's Government may think it necessary to bring before the House for the purpose of obtaining means to prosecute the war; and for these reasons I have also the very greatest pleasure in congratulating the House and Her Majesty's Government upon the news which has been received to-day. As this war has been entered upon, it is no doubt satisfactory that it should be prosecuted, as I have said, with vigour; and it is satisfactory, too, to know that so far as the operations have hitherto been conducted, they have been well conceived and admirably executed.

Well, Sir, having said that, I revert to what I said before, and I must acknowledge that the discussions which took place previous to the assembling of Parliament, and the perusal, as fully as I have been able to read them, of the Papers, have raised doubts, and more than doubts—they have given rise to a very strong conviction in my mind—that the conduct and policy of Her Majesty's Government which have led to the outbreak of this war are not capable of justification. I trust, Sir, that we shall not be told that, now that the war has broken out, it is mere waste of time to go back to the origin of the war; that a patriotic Parliament has but one duty to perform—namely, to ignore the past, and simply to support the Government who have undertaken the war. If it were necessary to refer to precedents, I could point to the conduct pursued by the Opposition at the close of the last and the beginning of the present century in the course of the War of Independence with the American Colonies and the Revolutionary War with France. With respect to the first case, at all events, I think there is no doubt that the Opposition took a wise and patriotic course in opposing, and continuing to oppose, the Government during that war. With regard to the other there may be more difference of opinion. But I may remind the House that in 1857, in the other House of Parliament, the late Lord Derby, and in this House Mr. Cobden, supported by the present Prime Minister, by the whole Conservative Party, by many hon. Members on both sides of the House, did not think it unpatriotic to pass a Vote of Censure upon Lord Palmerston on account of the war which was in progress at the time. But it is unnecessary to refer to precedent on the subject, for reason points to the same conclusion. Therefore, if the Papers had been placed in the hands of hon. Members at an earlier period, it would have been competent to them not only to discuss and criticise, but, if necessary, to condemn the policy and conduct of Her Majesty's Government. If this policy has culminated in a war without the knowledge of Parliament, it would be strange if that fact should absolve the House from the duty of criticizing the conduct of the Government. I think, indeed, that the very fact of war having broken out would only make the conduct of the Government more worthy of criticism. I have very little doubt that the Government themselves would not feel a complete confidence in the goodness of their case in justification of this war. The unofficial explanations repeatedly put forward by Gentlemen holding official positions—explanations put forward in anticipation of the meeting of Parliament—appear to me to be open to objection and to point to that conclusion. The publication of Lord Cranbrook's despatch of the 19th of November, in anticipation of the publication of the Papers, appears to me to point to the same conclusion, and I must confess that the publication of that despatch appears to me to be open to grave misapprehension and objection. The publication of such a document, reviewing the whole of the long series of events referred to in the long series of Papers, I think could only be justified by giving to it the strictest character of an historical narrative. Without imputing any intentional partiality to Her Majesty's Government in this matter, I think that it is very difficult for a statement of this kind, made by one of a party implicated in these transactions, and who has taken part in them, to be made a strictly historical narrative. Such a statement made in these circumstances is very apt to become, not an impartial historical narrative, but a mere statement of the case upon one side, and accordingly that is what I find to be the character of this despatch; and I contend that, therefore, that document is not calculated to enable Parliament and the country to form a calm and deliberate judgment upon what has occurred. That despatch has been allowed for some weeks to sink into the mind of the country before the statement on the other side could be put forward. No sooner, however, was that despatch put forward than we find its impartiality challenged. I am unwilling to refer to a matter that has already been dealt with at considerable length by those who possess a much fuller knowledge of the subject than I can pretend to have; but I wish not to pass it over altogether unnoticed, because I desire to give the right hon. Gentleman opposite an opportunity of giving the House some explanation with regard to it. I refer to what has taken place with respect to the 9th and 10th paragraphs of Lord Cranbrook's despatch. In those paragraphs extraordinary importance is attached to certain negotiations which took place between Lord Northbrook, the then Governor General of India, and the Envoy of the Ameer. I am not saying that any actual statement is made; but the general impression conveyed by those paragraphs has been challenged by those who were concerned in the transactions referred to. The impression conveyed is that Lord Northbrook, finding that the Ameer of Afghanistan was seriously alarmed at the Russian progress in Central Asia, desired to give to the Ameer certain more extended assurances of support and protection than had hitherto been offered to him by the British Government; and that on his telegraphing to the Home Government for permission to do so, he was told that the then Government did not share the Ameer's apprehensions, and that the result of the telegram in reply was to tie Lord Northbrook's hands and to prevent him from giving the assurances which the Ameer desired to receive, and to put the matter off until a more convenient season. That is the impression which would be conveyed to the mind of any ordinary man on reading the paragraphs of the despatch to which I have referred. What are the facts, however, as they appear in the Papers and in the narrative of Lord Northbrook? The Ameer had not sought the interview with Lord Northbrook in vain. On the contrary, Lord Northbrook had himself desired to communicate with the Ameer, in order to explain what had taken place with regard to the boundaries of Seistan and also the character of the negotiations which had taken place between the British and Russian Governments in reference to the Northern boundaries of Afghanistan. Lord Northbrook found, in the course of his conversation with the Envoy of the Ameer, that there was considerable alarm in the mind of the latter, and he gave him certain assurances which had been given by previous Governors General, and telegraphed to the Home Government for authority to give the Ameer further and more precise assurances on the point. The Government replied to him in a telegram which authorized him to give the further assurance that the British Government would pursue a certain policy with regard to Afghanistan. The result was that Lord Northbrook gave those re-assurances which he, with the advice of his Council, was prepared to give, and refused simply those conditions which were asked for by the Envoy, and which neither he nor his Council had the slightest intention of giving, or thought it was possible that any Government would give. That is a short statement of the difference on this part of the despatch. I do not impute to Lord Cranbrook any intention to convey a false impression; I merely wish to show the difficulty of making a statement of this sort thoroughly impartial. The questions which are involved in the accuracy of the remaining portions of Lord Cranbrook's despatch are of a very much graver and more important character; and on the accuracy, or the want of accuracy, of those statements it contains depends the question whether this war and the policy of Her Majesty's Government are justified or not. The hon. Member for Oxford (Mr. Hall) has stated substantially, and with great ability, the version of the story conveyed by this despatch. I need hardly go over it again; but perhaps the House will permit me to recapitulate the main points of the case put forward by Her Majesty's Government, as I understand them. When Lord Lytton went out to India as Governor General, he found that the Ameer of Afghanistan was unfriendly to us. He found that proofs of his ill-will and unfriendliness had been accumulating for some time; that he had become more and more estranged from us; and that he had been negotiating with the Government of Russia; and, in fact, he found that all the efforts which had been made, and all the sacrifices which had been incurred, by the British Government had been thrown away; and that instead of having on our North-Western Frontier, as we had hoped, the Ameer as an Ally and as an advanced guard of our Indian Empire against invasion, he was, on the contrary, no Ally at all, but a mere instrument in the hands of possible enemies of this country. That I gather is the correct statement of the representation of the Government as to matters existing between this country and Afghanistan. But the story goes on that Lord Lytton went out with instructions from Her Majesty's Government to correct this state of things. He went out to offer the Ameer an alliance under far more favourable terms than had hitherto been offered by any previous Government. But the sole condition required as preliminary to the alliance was one of eventual safety to the Ameer himself, as well as for our own protection. It was that our Agents should be permitted to reside in certain parts of Afghanistan. It is further reported that the Ameer was approached in a most conciliatory manner, and that overtures were made in a manner most calculated to insure a favourable reception. Notwithstanding this the negotiation fell through, and the Ameer declined to accede to the condition. After long consultations with Sir Lewis Pelly nothing further remained for the Government than to adopt an absolute vigilant reserve, not, as I understand it, being on bad terms with the Ameer, but simply on terms of vigilance and watchfulness, in the hope that time would enable him to see the advantage of the proposals which we made to him, and the danger he was incurring by rejecting our alliance and holding himself aloof from us. At this point the Russian Mission was despatched to Cabul, where it met with a very ostentatious reception, and Her Majesty's Government thought it necessary that a Mission from India should also be received by the Ameer; but, notwithstanding the fact, as stated, that representations to this effect were made in the most friendly spirit by the Government of India, permission to send a Mission was most positively refused by the Ameer, and when the Mission attempted to approach it was stopped in a most ostentatious manner by a hostile force. That I understand to be the history of these despatches. I admit at once the perfect accuracy of the position, that if the attitude of the Ameer has been correctly described in these Papers, it went a long way towards establishing the painful necessity for the war which has been undertaken. I say "the painful necessity," because, even if it were established, it is difficult to see what useful object we can hope to gain by having undertaken it.

I must say, however, that, on the other hand, there is a very different case set up, and it is contended that that case is supported by a greater weight of authority and of evidence than is contained within the pages of the Blue Book which has been issued by Her Majesty's Government. I, however, have no intention on this occasion to attempt to prove any allegation. I have already said that, in my opinion, the time has not come when the House can with advantage be asked seriously to discuss the bearing of these Papers. I do not wish to argue anything; but having stated what I take to be the opinion of the Government, I wish to show briefly what I understand as the nature of the case which may be set up on the other side in support of the view that Her Majesty's Government were not justified in undertaking the war in which we are now engaged with the Ameer of Cabul. Now, Sir, what is that case? It is this—The view to which I allude is based on the fact that before the departure of Lord Northbrook from India the relations of Her Majesty's Indian Government with the Ameer, though not cordial or altogether satisfactory, presented no element of danger; that the Ameer was thoroughly convinced that he had no danger to apprehend from aggressions upon our part, but that he was very seriously alarmed at possible aggressions on the part of Russia; that he had shown no symptom of rejecting our advice, but had conformed to it in his Frontier relations and in the matter of the Seistan boundary; and that, in fact, the main object of the policy of successive Viceroys from the time of Dost Mahomed had been secured, and there was no occasion to alter it. In fact, he showed that the bad terms were the result of the policy which had been adopted by Lord Canning and his successors—Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo. Lord Lytton when he arrived was determined to remedy this state of things and was prepared to offer an alliance. The requirement of a preliminary Conference was a proceeding which all the best authorities in India condemned as unwise and dangerous. It prepared the way for the proposed Treaty by a pretext as transparently unwise as it was un-English. Lord Lytton put forward a pretext, in which the Ameer saw only the fulfilment of those schemes for the partition of his country which, although made and discussed here, he was perfectly well acquainted with, and which he at once prepared to resist. He was addressed, before any interview had taken place, in letters which contained threats which were calculated to alarm him, and which did alarm him. These threats were repeated in an interview which was had between the Ameer and our Native Envoy, who conducted the negotiations with considerable skill and ability, and in the course of which the Ameer protested against the conditions sought to be imposed upon him, and appealed to the Treaties which had been concluded with him, and the assurances he had received from various Envoys, as to the position which he was to hold in relation to political matters affecting his country. At the end of this negotiation a violent letter was written by Lord Lytton for transmission to the Ameer, in which his conduct was denounced, and in which Lord Lytton repudiated the obligation contracted by the British Government towards that of Afghanistan; and, in short, cast off the alliance which had been entered into. The Conference was put an end to by the death of the Envoy; but Lord Lytton concluded the business, and did so on the basis of renouncing our obligations to the Ameer, although he was informed that another Envoy was on the road, and instructed to accept our terms.

I will now point out a singular circumstance in connection with all these events. All the accounts given of the Conferences at Peshawur are reported in one single despatch from the Government in India to the Government at home. These transactions are not, as is usually the case, related in despatches sent at short intervals, while the events were in progress. During the whole, or at least a great part, of that time—a period of 15 months—there appears to have been but this single despatch. Why was that? Is it a fact, as has been surmised, that if the despatches which passed were published they would not point to an unanimous, or nearly unanimous, opinion between the Viceroy and the Home Government; or is it a fact that the high-handed measures of Lord Lytton did not receive the cordial support and concurrence even of his own Government? I certainly think that explanations on this point ought to be received, and that is my sole reason for mentioning it at the present juncture. Then, a year after these events, it was found that a Russian Envoy had arrived at Cabul. Could the Government be surprised at that? Lord Lytton, having repudiated the relations between his Government and that of the Ameer, was it to be wondered at that the Ameer should seek the support of, or throw himself into the arms of, his next most powerful neighbour? I do not deny that Her Majesty's Government were, probably, justified in requiring that the Ameer should receive an Embassy; but it does not seem clear, on the face of the Papers, that the refusal to grant a reception was a positive one, or one couched in such terms as to justify Her Majesty's Government in proceeding by force of arms against the Ameer. It is stated in the despatches that the Ameer strongly complained of the tone of the letters addressed to himself and to his Ministers; but in spite of all these things, there appears to be good reason for believing that the Ameer was perfectly willing to receive the Mission if only it was understood that it came by his permission and was not forced upon him. Notwithstanding that, no delay was granted, and the consequence was the stoppage of the Mission.

I have now briefly stated the arguments which may be put forward on the opposite side, and I think it puts the matter in a very different light. It is, therefore, for the House to decide as to the view and the statement of facts which is most entitled to support and credence. What opinion can the House pronounce, except that the Governor General and the Government never had any serious intention in these negotiations with Shere Ali; because we heard nothing then about a "scientific Frontier" or "irresponsible frivolity"—the words of truth and justice were much more heard. Was it not, then, reasonable to infer that the account which I have just given, and which shows that the Government was in search of a scientific Frontier, indicates that the Government did not object to find a pretext for a quarrel with the Ameer? If that is not the explanation, I should like to hear what explanation can be given. If their object was to cultivate friendly relations with the Ameer, and to secure in him a friendly Ally instead of a sullen enemy, I must say they have mismanaged the negotiations as negotiations never before were mismanaged.

I know what is said on another view of this question, and I know that it is said this is not a matter which merely concerns Great Britain and a small Frontier State; that we cannot leave out the great question of the advance of Russia in Asia. I can assure the House that I am by no means indifferent to the gravity of the considerations involved in that question. No Government—no Party—in this country has been indifferent to these considerations. There is no despatch which is more remarkable than one of the earliest written by the Government of Sir John Lawrence—the greatest advocate of what is called "masterly inactivity"—in which the attention of the Government of 1867 is directed to the advance of Russia in Central Asia. In that despatch the Government of Sir John Lawrence pointed out what was the character and what the inevitable course of that advance, and they prophesied with remarkable accuracy the extent to which Russian progress would extend. There is one despatch in this Book which is still more remarkable. It is the answer given by the Government of the day—by the right hon. Gentleman opposite, who was Secretary of State for India—and the expressions are so remarkable that I shall ask the House to allow me to read them. They are the only extracts I intend to read. The extract to which I refer states that—

> "Upon this point [the question of the progress of Russia in Central Asia], Her Majesty's Government see no reason for any uneasiness or for any jealousy. The conquests which Russia has made, and apparently is still making in Central Asia, appear to them to be the natural result of the circumstances in which she finds herself placed, and to afford no ground whatever for representations indicative of suspicion or alarm on the part of this country. Friendly communications have at various times passed between the two Governments on the subject, and should an opportunity offer Her Majesty's Government will avail themselves of it for the purpose of obviating any possible danger of misunderstanding either with respect to the proceedings of Russia, or to those of England. This is all that it appears necessary or desirable to do."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, pp. 25-6.]

[An hon. MEMBER: What is the date?] I said 1867. I have pointed out that the Government was informed of the inevitable progress which would be forced upon Russia, and the extent to which Russia would be forced in a few years to extend her dominions. I am not imputing any blame to the Government of the day; but I say there is no excuse for imputing to the late Government, or to any other Government, that they were indifferent to the movements of Russia. I am perfectly willing to admit the possible danger and the certain inconvenience to our external and internal relations with India, with the power of Russia bordering on the Frontiers of India. I am perfectly willing to admit this; but it does not follow that that danger is disposed of by rushing into hasty or ill-considered measures in the way of extending our Frontiers. Certainly, the effect of an advance on our part will not be to retard, but rather to accelerate the danger which will ensue when our Frontiers are coterminous with those of another European Power. It is not an infallible remedy against an apprehended danger; and we may hasten the danger, if we take the initiative and advance to meet Russia. The policy of all former Governments has been to deal with Russia direct in this question—to hold Russia responsible for what she was doing in Asia—and not the intermediary States which are coming within her influence. That has been the policy of former Governments. It has also always been our policy to provide that, when Russia approached towards India, she should find other States well affected to us, anxious to maintain their own independence—States jealous of the danger of Russian advance. That, however, has not been the policy of the present Government; for we find that it holds, not Russia responsible for what it is doing in Asia, but it holds the unfortunate State of Afghanistan responsible for it—a country which will not be rendered jealous by the Russian advance, which will not be actuated by feelings of amity towards us, but which will be forced to fall into the arms of Russia. Before I sit down I have only to refer again to the condition of complete ignorance in which Parliament has been kept; and I think we have something more to complain of than the neglect that information has not been communicated to us. It has been withheld from us. In the Session of 1877 the attention of the Government was called by the Duke of Argyll to this subject of the North-West Frontier of India, and in reply to the Question Lord Salisbury replied as follows:—

> "Now, we have not tried to force an Envoy upon the Ameer at Cabul—we have not suggested Sir Lewis Pelly as an Envoy to Cabul. . . . . . Our relations with the Ameer of Cabul have undergone no material change since last year. I do not believe that he is worse disposed towards us than hitherto, or that his feelings are in any way more embittered towards the British Government. . . . . . If it is necessary to re-open the Conference it will be done under better auspices. . . . . . There is no ground for any of the apprehensions to which the noble Duke has referred, or for suspicions which are too absurd to be seriously entertained. . . . . . But there is no reason for any apprehension of any change of policy, or of disturbance in our Indian Empire."—[3 *Hansard*, ccxxxiv. 1835-6.]

I am not going to controvert any of these statements. I have no doubt that proof may be brought forward for the verbal accuracy of every word that has been stated; but what I want to bring before the House is the general impressions and inferences of that statement, and what it seems to sanction, judged by what has taken place at Peshawur. Who will imagine for a moment, after hearing that speech, that an interview had taken place between the Envoy of the Ameer of Afghanistan and the Representative of the British Government?

There was a similar attempt to obtain information from the noble Lord the Member for Middlesex (Lord George Hamilton). In the debate on the 9th of August, 1877, the noble Lord said—

> "He hoped that the frank exchange of opinion which had undoubtedly passed between Sir Lewis Pelly and the Ameer's Envoy had removed previous misconception, and would lead to a restoration of those friendly terms which had formerly existed."—[3 *Hansard*, ccxxxvi. 707.]

I need not refer to the further declarations of Lord Salisbury, nor to a speech made by the right hon. Gentleman opposite, giving a warm adherence to what is called the old policy, and saying he would be no party to any change in it. Again, Sir, precautions should be taken by the Government to relieve this House up to the present moment of a serious responsibility. The responsibility is not shared in the slightest degree by Parliament at present. It will be shared in a few days no doubt; but, in my opinion, that does not relieve the House in the slightest degree. On the contrary, it is still more incumbent on this House to examine the policy which has led to this. I do not intend to take up the attention of the House any further. It will, no doubt, be anxious to hear from the Ministers what information the Government has to give, and to hear such explanations which may have some influence on the judgment of the House as to the objects of the war; and I do not think any explanation on that point can avert, or ought to relieve, the responsibility of asserting a judgment which the House ought to form on the previous conduct and policy of the Government which led to the outbreak of the present war.

Mr. GLADSTONE: I purposely rise, notwithstanding the Chancellor of the Exchequer has risen, for a reason which will be obvious. I do not propose to enter at all, on the present occasion, into what I conceive to be controversial matter. My noble Friend has made the observations that he thinks necessary, and I have no wish to make any addition to those observations. He has given us a distinct intimation that, on a future occasion, a Motion will be made which will open up fully the whole question of the merits of the policy which has led to the present war, and the merits of the war itself. That being so, I feel under no obligation to touch the matter at present; but, that being so, I take it likewise to be quite clear that nothing shall be said or done in the Address which shall have the effect of committing us to any opinions expressed. I am going to point out what I think an unfortunate error, an error which I do not think anybody in the least degree to blame for, but it is an error which has probably arisen from the haste of preparation; and I know that sentences sometimes assume a form and colour, in fact, which is far from the intention of those who phrased them. It is almost habitual with us not to pay a very close attention to these Addresses when they are read, and I am very far from blaming the noble Lord and the hon. Gentlemen who have so well discharged their duties to-night; yet, at the same time, it is a matter of grave consideration for those whose minds do not happen to be in the same attitude, that we should not be called upon to express an opinion on the hostility of the Ameer's policy, and the manner in which he has repulsed Her Majesty's Mission, leaving Her Majesty no alternative but war. [*Cheers.*] I do not question that sentiment on the present occasion; but is it the meaning of the hon. Gentleman who so gallantly cheers me that I am to be called upon to vote that? That is the obvious meaning of his cheer, if it has any meaning; but, in truth, I do not believe it has any meaning. I do not think it will be necessary to postpone discussion on the Address for this reason, as doubtless Her Majesty's Government will see fit to make some verbal Amendment, which will have the desired effect. I reserve myself entirely for a future occasion, when we shall be enabled to open up the merits of the question. I am anxious to make one observation merely in the manner of question. It would be of great advantage to the House if Her Majesty's Government could on one or two points enlarge the information given us on this subject. My noble Friend has referred to points apparently omitted—one a reference to the distress in the country, and the other a reference to the war at the Cape. The point I want information upon is this—It is stated in Her Gracious Majesty's Speech from the Throne that Her Majesty contemplates with confidence the execution of the requisitions of the Treaty of

Berlin. There is one point among those requisitions with regard to which it does not appear that any progress has been made, so far as the public are informed. I mean the question relating to the Greek Frontier. I have heard various rumours of efforts made by other Powers, and of efforts made by Her Majesty's Government, in this direction. I am quite sure it is a matter on which the country feels a lively interest; and if Her Majesty's Government are in possession of, and can give the House any information on the subject, I think it will be received with thankfulness. There is another omission which I think is rather remarkable, considering that in the Speech at the close of the last Session there was a very full paragraph on what is called the Anglo-Turkish Convention, and the purposes are very distinctly described. It is singular that this matter does not re-appear in any form in the Speech which has now been delivered. I will not say that sufficient time has elapsed for the execution of reforms in Asiatic Turkey; but five months have elapsed since that Instrument was executed between the Sultan and Her Majesty: and I do think that, after all that has been said upon this subject and considering the obligations under which the Turks have been to England, some progress ought to have been made by the Porte in, at all events, initiating reform. If Her Majesty's Government can give the House any information with regard to reforms in Turkey, I am sure it will be received with great thankfulness. There is only one other subject to which I will refer. Notice has been given on the part of Her Majesty's Government that a Resolution will be moved on Monday next that the charges of this war shall be borne out of Indian funds. For my own part, I concur in what has been stated by my noble Friend. I do not think the House, in the position in which it is placed, is in a condition to refuse the Supplies necessary for carrying on the war; but the very fact of its not being in a position to exercise a judgment on that subject must be a very important element in the general discussion as to the mode in which the House came to be placed in that position. But with regard to the particular question relating to the charges of the war, we are, I submit, free to exercise a discretion upon it. In that discretion is involved a vital principle altogether apart from any desire to withhold the means necessary for defraying the engagements into which the Crown has entered. I hope, then, that accurate information as to the probable charges of this undertaking will be given, and that the explanations regarding them will be full and explicit. It will be remembered that on the occasion of the Abyssinian War, 11 years ago, we felt under very serious difficulty. What was stated by the Government in relation to that war was supposed to be the outside cost of that war, and no more at that time was said upon the subject. When, however, Parliament was dissolved and the new Parliament had met, the amount of the charge on being examined into was found to be about double that which had been stated to the House by the Government. I am sure that Her Majesty's Government will be anxious to avoid any error of this kind with respect to the present war charges. I trust that when the explanations in respect to them will be made that they will be given with as much accuracy as possible; and that it will be perfectly understood that upon all questions relating to the proposals of the Government the House shall retain an unlimited discretion.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, I will endeavour, in the observations with which it will be my duty to trouble the House at the present time, to follow the example which has been so well set by the noble Lord (the Marquess of Hartington), and not import into our discussion to-night anything that can be advanced of a controversial character before this matter is finally parted with by Parliament. I feel that the noble Lord and my right hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich, in abstaining on the present occasion from importing the premature discussion of questions which will by-and-by have to be fully considered and discussed with the debate on the Address, have exercised a wise and convenient discretion. I wish, I may add, at the outset to dispose of one or two points which may be considered of a formal character, and with respect to which we can all agree. In the first place, with reference to what has been said by both of those who have spoken from the opposite Bench as to the manner in which the Address has been moved and seconded. I am sure what has fallen from them will be in consonance with the feelings of the whole House. My noble Friend (Viscount Castlereagh), in his first essay in public speaking in this House, has, I think, broken the ice in a manner which leads us to hope that we shall often meet him in the field of debate, and that he will sustain the honoured name he bears. As to my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford (Mr. Hall), he has well maintained to-night the reputation which he had previously already established. I am, at all events, quite sure, that whoever is to blame—if, indeed, there be anybody to blame—for the incorrectness of expression which has been noticed in the Address, it cannot be either the Mover or the Seconder. The Address has been prepared in the usual manner, and there is no doubt that the thoroughly well-understood habit of this House is that it should be so drawn as not to raise any question of controversy in the moving of the Address. It is obviously for our convenience that the Address should be as positively neutral as it can be, and that we should simply confine ourselves to thanking Her Majesty for the information which She has been good enough to communicate to us. The intention with which the present Address was framed was certainly to do that and no more; but it may, no doubt, be a question among very acute critics whether the particular phraseology employed may not fairly be held to go a little further. Nobody will for a moment suppose that there was any desire to do so, and I would venture, Sir, to leave the matter in your hands. If you should be of opinion that the expressions to which exception has been taken could be improved by a slight verbal Amendment, there would, I believe, be no difficulty in getting the correction made. I suppose the Motion might be withdrawn, and renewed in a more proper form.

Now, there is another point on which I wish to say a few words. The noble Lord opposite (the Marquess of Hartington) has remarked that the Speech is one of unprecedented brevity, which is perfectly true; and he has, I think, gone so far as to say that there is no precedent for any Royal Speech at the commencement of a Session, however suddenly that Session might have begun, in which some reference was not made to measures of domestic legislation. I do not think, however, that the noble Lord is quite accurate in that observation. It is quite true that in the case to which he referred—the meeting of Parliament in 1867—domestic measures were alluded to in the Royal Speech; but there is an earlier instance when Parliament was called together, in 1854, with reference to the question of the Crimean War, in which no allusion to domestic measures was made, more specifically than on the present occasion. Her Majesty's Government, after fully considering the advice they should give Her Majesty on the subject, thought it would be more convenient that on this occasion the attention of Parliament should be directed exclusively to the subject which had caused our early and unusual meeting, and that we should reserve for our more regular meeting at the usual time of the year a statement of the Business with which we proposed that Parliament should occupy itself; and, though such a course may not be in accordance with all the precedents which have been referred to, I think it would be more convenient to the House, that when the attention of Parliament is to be directed to questions of domestic legislation, that should be done after full and careful consideration, and that all reference to measures of the kind may be well omitted on such an occasion as the present. For the same reason we have avoided referring to other subjects to which it is usual to refer in the Speech from the Throne. The question we had to consider was, shall we have the Queen's Speech directed exclusively to the subject which brought us together, or shall it be made to deal with matters of a more general character? and we decided to advise Her Majesty to direct the Speech exclusively to one point, there seeming to be no reason why we should go into other questions.

In reference to the various points on which particular questions have been raised, undoubtedly, in the first place, the position of affairs in South Africa is not free from some anxiety. At the end of last Session Parliament was informed that the war in Cape Colony was over, but that there was still cause for anxiety in other parts of South Africa. Since that time, I am sorry to say, the cause of anxiety has increased rather than diminished; and, in compliance with the request of Sir Bartle Frere and Lord Chelmsford, it has been thought advisable to re-inforce our troops in the Zulu territory. But the last advice, dated October 19, says—"There is no war, and we still hope that war may be avoided." Our object has been to send out troops to impress the Zulus with the strength of this country; we hope that there may be no actual collision, and that the relations between us may be improved. We are asked as to the position of the question of Greece. Well, with regard to that, I may say that at the present moment a rectification of the Frontier, as recommended in the Treaty of Berlin by the Six Powers, has certainly not as yet been made. But negotiations are in progress, and we hope a satisfactory settlement may be arrived at. I am not now, however, in a position to go into detail upon that question.

With respect to reforms in that interesting part of the Turkish dominions —the Island of Crete—I believe that the reforms there have been practically arranged, and that a Firman, giving satisfaction to all parties in the Island, is at this moment on the point of being issued.

As to reforms in Asia Minor, these have formed the subject of serious communications between Her Majesty's Government and the Porte, and at the present moment we may say the progress is satisfactory, though the negotiations are still going on; and I am not at this moment in a position to lay the Papers on the subject on the Table of the House. They will, however, be produced as soon as possible. I forget whether there was any other point which my right hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich mentioned particularly.

With regard to Cyprus, I hope we may before long be in a position to lay the Papers on the Table; and I wish to say with reference to Cyprus in connection with some observations which I made a month or two ago which seem to have been misunderstood—that we have had very careful estimates prepared, and that so far as those estimates go we are very much encouraged to hope that the revenue of the Island will more than cover the expenditure, exclusive of those matters which belong to the military arrangements. At present that is such a serious exception, that I am not able to go into the question; but the House may be sure it is a matter that engages our attention, and we do not think it is at all probable that Cyprus will be the burden upon us that some persons have supposed. With regard to the expenditure generally, so far as we are able to make any estimate of it, including, of course, military expenditure, the information which I have received from the spending departments encourages me to hope that at the end of the year we shall be able to show that the estimates of the year have not been exceeded. I am sorry I cannot give a thoroughly satisfactory report of some branches of the Revenue; but the course of the Revenue for the last month has been of a character more encouraging than we have recently found it to be: but I do not wish to forecast that about which I am really in the dark.

I now come to a subject which has formed the principal topic of discussion this evening; and I, in the first place, want to assure the noble Lord opposite that I greatly regret that there should have been any delay in the presentation of the Papers which have been laid on the Table of the House. I do not know that there is any blame to be attached to anyone for that delay. The selection of Papers, which are contained in a large mass of correspondence, and which had to be looked over for a series of years, has unavoidably taken up a good deal of time; and when it is necessary, as it has been on this occasion, to consult persons who are affected by the publication of the Papers, a further delay takes place. We did not, till a very recent period, anticipate that it would be necessary to call Parliament together, or to make any appeal to it on this subject. We fully believed—and I think had very good ground for believing—that the necessity which has arisen would not arise. We were fully impressed with the belief — which was also the belief of Lord Lytton—that the Mission we proposed to send to the Ameer at Cabul would be received, and that this unfortunate necessity would not occur. When it did occur, we lost no time in taking the necessary steps for advising Her Majesty to call Parliament together, and in setting about the preparation of the Papers which have been laid before Parliament. The noble Lord complains that while this preparation of Papers was going on, the Government took a step in advance by publishing separately a particular despatch of Viscount Cranbrook, summing up the case of the Government, and explaining to the country the views of the Government on the situation of affairs; and the noble Lord intimates that by so doing we were producing an unfair impression, and taking a course which we had no right to take —laying our own case before the country before there was an opportunity of the whole of the Papers being in the hands of the public at large. I can assure the noble Lord there was no intention in the publication of that despatch to endeavour unfairly to prejudice the public mind. We knew the subject was one which, to a great extent, the public were unacquainted with. We knew it was very desirable their attention should be drawn as speedily as possible to the outline of the case, which we endeavoured to present as fairly as it could be done, and which I venture to think we did present fairly. I am not disposed to admit there is a shadow of reason to impute to us anything in the nature of distortion or suppression, or any unfair dealing with the statements we made in that despatch. But there must be, in an account of transactions extending over so many years, and in which so many Governments have been concerned, and so many distinguished persons have taken an active part, and which were of themselves difficult and complicated transactions—there must be many occasions on which different views will prevail, and on which those who are interested will desire to state their case in a different way from that in which it would appear to the Government of the day. And I cannot but think that some advantages have arisen from the publication—premature, if you like to call it —of the despatch of Viscount Cranbrook, because it has given the opportunity to those who are interested in the matter to lay hold of the points to which they wish to draw attention, and to give the answers which they had thought themselves entitled and bound to give. I am told that no opportunity of an answer was given. I really think that is an extraordinary view for anyone to take who considers what has taken place, and what controversy has arisen since the publication of that despatch. If such controversy could go on when no opportunity of an answer was given, what would have gone on if an opportunity had been given I cannot conceive. After all, the despatch only anticipated the publication of all the Papers and the meeting of Parliament, by a very short period; and I must say that it gives very fair notice of the particular points on which explanation may be desired, while its result has been to assist the elucidation of the whole subject. The noble Lord goes on to make a much more serious charge. He imputes that we have introduced into that despatch a paragraph which, according to his view, misrepresented — and almost wilfully misrepresented—the conduct of our Predecessors at an important stage of these transactions. I quite agree with the noble Lord that the relations between statesmen sitting on different sides of the House, and who represent different Parties in the country, ought to be maintained upon a footing of perfect honour and confidence in respect of the representations they make of the conduct of their opponents. We may differ — and we do differ — very widely upon questions of policy; we may—and do—differ very widely upon matters of the greatest importance; and we may express our opinions — and it is well we should do so — with freedom and vigour; yet anything like an unfair representation of the conduct of an opponent is a matter which undoubtedly ought to be visited with most severe censure. But I can only say that having read and re-read the paragraph in question, and having examined and re-examined the correspondence on which that paragraph is founded, I can see no reason whatever for regretting or questioning the language of the paragraph in Lord Cranbrook's despatch. There ought to be no mistake about this despatch. Undoubtedly it was written, and it is signed by Lord Cranbrook; but it is also true that the despatch, before it was finally sent out, was submitted to the whole of the Cabinet, and that we are all responsible for the statements in that despatch — at all events, for the general character of the despatch. With regard to this paragraph 9, I think an undue amount of importance has been given to it in this respect: the noble Lord seems to imagine—as others have seemed to imagine—that our great object throughout this despatch, and especially this part of it, was to throw the blame of what has occurred on our Predecessors in 1873. Undoubtedly there is reason to doubt whether the conduct that was pursued in 1873 had the best results. Whether it was not, on the whole, open to the charge—I will not say charge, but to question—whether it was the proper policy to be adopted. But the great object that we had in writing the despatch, and in setting out this history, was not so much to throw blame on this Government or on that Government, but to show what the progress of events had been, and how matters had come into the state in which we found them when we were obliged to act a short time ago. But with respect to this particular paragraph, the substance and purport of it was that in 1873 certain communications were opened between Lord Northbrook and his Government in India and the Ameer of Afghanistan; that those communications led to an unsatisfactory result; and we attributed—undoubtedly it was a fair inference from the paragraph—that result, in a large measure at all events, to Her Majesty's Government at home. The paragraph certainly gives the impression that it was our belief that the Government at home had overruled Lord Northbrook in India. Lord Northbrook has since said that is not a true statement of the case. Of course, we know nothing of what may have been in the minds of Lord Northbrook or the Government, and we are bound to accept that statement. But allow me to say that if you read the different telegrams which passed between the Cabinet at home and the Government of India the suggestion which is contained in that paragraph is, at least, not an unnatural suggestion. I am sorry to trouble the House with extracts; but the challenge has been made, and it is on a point as to which it is desirable we should not submit to have it said that we are dealing unfairly with our opponents. I must therefore read some portion of this Correspondence. The matter begins in this way — There is a telegram from the Viceroy at Simla to the Secretary of State in London, dated June 27, 1873, and in that we read—

"We think it for interests of peace that Russia should know our relations with Afghanistan, and we say in paragraph 18: 'Although we have abstained from entering into any Treaty engagement to support the Ameer by British troops in the event of Afghanistan being attacked from without, yet the complete independence of Afghanistan is so important to the interests of British India that the Government of India could not look upon an attack upon Afghanistan with indifference. So long as the Ameer continues as he has hitherto done in accordance with our advice in his relations with his neighbours, he would naturally look for material assistance from us; and circumstances might occur under which we should consider it incumbent upon us to recommend Her Majesty's Government to render him such assistance.' I propose to inform Cabul Envoy of sense of this paragraph."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, pp. 102-3.]

What is the answer he receives to that telegram? It is one which certainly appears in the nature of throwing cold water on the proposal. It is dated July 1, from the Secretary of State in London to the Viceroy at Simla—

"I do not object to the general sense of the paragraph, which you quote as a communication to Russia from the Foreign Office, but great caution is necessary in assuring Ameer of material assistance which may raise undue and unfounded expectation. He already shows symptoms of claiming more than we may wish to give."—[*Ibid.* p. 108.]

That is rather holding back than otherwise, and to a certain extent qualifying the intention of the Viceroy. A short time afterwards, on the 24th of July, after communications had been opened with the Ameer, the Viceroy telegraphs—

"Ameer of Cabul alarmed at Russian progress, dissatisfied with general assurance, and anxious to know definitely how far he may rely on our help if invaded. I propose assuring him that if he unreservedly accepts and acts on our advice in all external relations we will help him with money, arms, and troops, if necessary, to expel unprovoked invasion. We to be the judge of the necessity."—[*Ibid.*]

To which Her Majesty's Government at home reply—

"Cabinet thinks you should inform Ameer that we do not at all share his alarm, and consider there is no cause for it: but you may assure him we shall maintain our settled policy in favour of Afghanistan, if he abides by our advice in external affairs."—[*Ibid.*]

I do not deny that those telegrams may have been perfectly well understood between the Secretary of State and the Viceroy to mean that they were entirely in accord as to what they were to do; but certainly the impression of anyone reading the Papers would be that the Ameer was dissatisfied with that indefinite understanding known by the name of "our settled policy;" that the Viceroy had been anxious to say something more definite; and that the language of the Cabinet at home had been rather to throw cold water upon that, and to suggest that the Cabinet did not at all share the alarm of the Ameer. If we turn to Lord Cranbrook's despatch, what do we find in the 9th paragraph?

> "Finding that the object of the Ameer was to ascertain definitely how far he might rely on the help of the British Government if his territories were threatened by Russia, Lord Northbrook's Government was prepared to assure him that, under certain conditions, the Government of India would assist him to repel unprovoked aggression. But Her Majesty's Government at home did not share his Highness's apprehension"—

That is perfectly true—

> "and the Viceroy ultimately informed the Ameer that the discussion of the question would be best postponed to a more convenient season."—[*Ibid.* p. 262.]

Just so. What was the effect which this communication produced upon the Ameer?

MR. GOSCHEN: You have not read what was said to the Ameer. [Mr. GLADSTONE: Hear, hear!]

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Here it is, at page 114 of the Correspondence.

> "The Envoy observed that at the previous interview His Excellency had said that if, in the event of any aggression from without, British influence were invoked and failed by negotiation to effect a satisfactory settlement, it was probable that the British Government would in that case afford the Ruler of Afghanistan material assistance in repelling an invader. His Excellency had also said that such assistance would of course be conditional on the Ameer following the advice of the British Government, and having himself abstained from aggression. Now the Ameer, in expectation of the assistance of the British Government, had up to the present time followed the advice of the Viceroy as regards abstinence from aggression, and in the event of assistance being given would continue to follow that policy."

He goes on to point out that we did not give him sufficient re-assurance. Then the Viceroy made this peculiar communication to him—

> "The Viceroy replied that the British Government did not share the Ameer's apprehensions, but that as already mentioned in the previous conversation, it would be the duty of the Ameer, in case of any actual or threatened aggression, to refer the question to the British Government, who would endeavour by negotiation and by every means in their power to settle the matter and avert hostilities. It was not intended, by insisting on such previous reference to the British Government, to restrict or interfere with the power of the Ameer as an independent Ruler to take such steps as might be necessary to repel any aggression on his territories; but such reference was a preliminary and essential condition of the British Government assisting him." [Mr. GOSCHEN: Go on.] "In such event should these endeavours of the British Government to bring about an amicable settlement prove fruitless, the British Government are prepared to assure the Ameer that they will afford him assistance in the shape of arms and money, and will also, in case of necessity aid him with troops."

The Viceroy thought the Ameer should hold this assurance to be sufficient. The Envoy then pressed that the contingency of an act of aggression on the part of Russia should be expressly mentioned in the letter. He was answered that this suggestion could not be adopted, for the British Government were not prepared to admit the possibility of such a contingency occurring. Now, let me conclude this part of the story by referring to the answer which the Ameer gives, at page 119—

> "All that has been written regarding the northern boundary I have fully understood, and I offer up my grateful thanks to the Almighty that peace and tranquillity have, praise be to God, been established in all States in perpetuity, and that doubts and disputes have on every side been removed; and that such security has been established in all countries that no aggressions will take place, nor will any Power raise discussions or disputes with another within the dominions of that Power; and that the use of inimical expressions has been discontinued in diplomatic correspondence, and that peace and tranquillity have been secured to the whole world."

Then he goes on and says, in effect—"Under all these circumstances, why was it necessary to hold all these conversations?" I have intervened so far with these quotations from the Correspondence because of the challenge of the noble Lord opposite. I do not for one moment dispute that Lord Northbrook acted entirely in accordance with his own judgment in what he said, and that it was not in consequence of a communication from the Cabinet, although a suggestion appeared to have come from the Cabinet. But it was impossible in reading these despatches not to remember that when Lord Mayo, in his former dealings with the Ameer in 1869, made certain communications to the Ameer, he was taken to task by the Secretary of State of that same Government, and he had to explain and satisfy them that he had not gone too far in what he had said, which, being of a more definite character, had been quite satisfactory, as we know, to the Ameer. I cannot help thinking that a sort of assurance might have been given by Lord Northbrook, if he had been left as free as Lord Mayo was, to say in what form assistance would be given, and to explain under what circumstances it would be given. There was just that sort of restriction which might be represented by the difference between drinking a glass of champagne fresh out of the bottle and drinking it after it had been allowed to stand for a while. I have no doubt that the effect of all the qualifications insisted upon by Lord Northbrook was to produce upon the mind of the Ameer a wholly different impression from that which would have been produced by more definite assurances. I do not find fault with the Government of that day for what they did. They were placed in great difficulty. The British Government has, throughout its dealings with Afghanistan, been placed in a position which was necessarily difficult and complicated. All I have to point out is, that the attempt to deal with Afghanistan in the way in which we have for many years attempted to deal with it has led to misunderstanding and difficulties; and I cannot doubt that many of those difficulties have been occasioned by errors of judgment, though perfectly honest and honourable. But we are going, by-and-bye, to have a more solemn and serious debate on this question, and it will be the duty of the Under Secretary of State for India, when he states the case and makes a proposal to the House, to take a more general view of our relations from time to time with Afghanistan than I have now done. But the noble Lord has brought another charge of a much more serious character against the Government. He threw out the suggestion that Her Majesty's Government and the Viceroy of India have been guilty of a deliberate intention to pick a quarrel with the Ameer. Now, that is about the most serious charge that could be made. Pick a quarrel which is to bring about a war in which, whatever may be our successes, we must suffer considerably, and in which we must, under any circumstances, inflict great suffering! To bring about a quarrel for the purpose of attaining some object which we do not like to avow is one of the most serious charges that can be made against the Government. It is with the very deepest regret we find ourselves involved in a war at all. It is with the greatest possible reluctance that we have been brought by the force of circumstances to the position in which we find ourselves; and with all our admiration for the gallantry of our troops and for the military operations which have, so far, been conducted, we yet hope that the war will be of very short duration. But with all these qualifications, it cannot but be a matter of most serious regret that we should be forced into such a position; and to say that the Government and the Viceroy have deliberately brought about that state of things, and deliberately picked a quarrel, is to make a very serious charge indeed against the Government. I utterly and entirely deny the charge of the noble Lord. I need not now go through what the case of the Government really is in this matter, because the noble Lord opposite has done it for us. In the most complete and lucid way he stated what he understood to be the case of the Government, and he stated it with the most perfect accuracy. It was, and it always has been, our desire to live upon terms of friendship and to maintain good relations with the Ameer of Afghanistan. Our great object, and the object of all successive Governments, has been but one. We have never desired to enlarge our territories or to annex fresh soil, and certainly not such a country as Afghanistan; but what we have felt it our duty to provide for as well as we could was the security of India. Let me remind the House that it is a question not of ambition, or prestige, or covetousness, or anything of that kind. We are under obligations to those hundreds of millions of subjects who are under our charge in India to procure for them such tranquillity and opportunities for the development of the country as it may be possible for us to do. Whatever difficulties there may be lying in our way, the general effect of the British rule in India, I think, has been to produce happiness among its people, and if our rule were overturned it could not fail to occasion the most serious mischief. The Government has been desirous to prevent this injury, and to maintain the confidence of the Native population in the British rule. Our power in India rests upon two bases—justice and strength, and it is absolutely impossible you can maintain security unless you are known to be strong. What is the quarter from which danger has been apprehended? It is the North-West, and it has been the object of successive Viceroys in every possible way to prevent and obviate danger from that quarter. We have endeavoured to do that for a long series of years, by keeping up, as far as possible, friendly relations with Afghanistan, and preventing others from interposing there. I do not propose to go into that question further; but I say that that is the object we have sought to attain throughout. Opinions I have formerly expressed have been referred to. Well, Sir, I hold those opinions as strongly as ever I did. I desire now, as ever, to abstain from the taking of an unnecessary step; but when we saw that a Russian Mission was received at Cabul at a time when an English Mission was refused—and refused on two grounds—one, that they could not receive any Mission at all; the other, that if they received an English they must receive a Russian Mission—it was absolutely impossible, if we were to have regard to the question of our security, for us to remain inactive. The noble Lord and the right hon. Gentleman have intimated that, perhaps, we ought to have gone to Russia; and the noble Lord assumes and implies that we did not. Well, but we did. We made inquiries at St. Petersburg as to what the Mission was. And what was the answer we received? It was, that the Mission was sent under circumstances now happily passed away. A friendly character was given to the Mission. But does the noble Lord suppose that we could stop the danger that was going on in that part of the world by communications with St. Petersburg? Does he not know that there is this real difficulty—that the Government of Russia is often ignorant of what is going on in the neighbourhood of Afghanistan and in Central Asia, or is powerless to prevent or control the proceedings of its officers. It was necessary for us to take some step to secure our proper position in Central Asia. We acted upon that principle, and we sent a Mission with every precaution that could suggest itself to us, so that it might be received in a friendly manner. It was a Mission at the head of which was an officer well known to the Ameer—a friend of the Ameer's—and whose views were of the most pacific character. It was sent with every circumstance of care and caution, that it might not interfere with the mourning then going on in the Ameer's Court. How was it met? It was met with hostile interruption upon territory which did not belong to the Ameer, for it was in a Pass which belongs to tribes more or less independent of the Ameer, but upon whom he put pressure, under threats of punishment, to refuse acquiescence to our passage, after they had assisted the Mission to come in a friendly way towards the Pass. Under these circumstances, what alternative had we? I venture to say that when the case is fully stated, and the judgment of the House is asked upon it, it will be very difficult, indeed, to show that the course taken by Her Majesty's Government was not forced upon us, or was one which we could have avoided without serious danger to British interests or the interests of the people of India. Well, Sir, something has been said as to the probable extent and limits of this war. It is impossible at this moment, when military operations are going on, to speak with confidence on such matters. Our object is clear. It is not aggrandisement; it is not annexation of large Provinces or the extension of our territory; but it is the security of our Frontier. How that security is to be obtained is a matter on which very serious attention must be bestowed. I hope and trust, from all we hear and read, that this calamitous struggle will be of short duration. I hope and trust that the arrangements which will be made may be such as to give confidence, and secure for us that Frontier which we have hitherto been unable to secure. This, at all events, I am able to say—that it is a struggle which has been forced upon us by the conviction that it was our duty to the people of England, and to the people of India more particularly, that we should not allow the dangerous state of things to which I have referred to continue; that we ought to make clear that which has hitherto been a matter of suspicion; that we should ascertain what were the feelings towards us of the Ameer; that we should take steps to vindicate our honour, which is essential as part of our strength in India; and also that we should take steps to secure that which is the great object at which we have always aimed, and still aim—namely, the security of our Indian Frontier.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE said, it was not his intention to enter into the struggle which had been going on between the two front Benches with regard to the merits of the Afghan Question in the past—struggles which would probably be resumed at an early day. He rose for the purpose of asking for the presentation to the House of information which it was absolutely necessary should be placed in the hands of hon. Members. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had spoken with an air of injured innocence as to charges which had been made by the noble Lord (the Marquess of Hartington) with respect to the Government; but the right hon. Gentleman must be aware of the tone which had been taken out-of-doors by some of his supporters, and also in the Press, as to Members of former Governments, and the charge which had been made to the effect that the present war was traceable to their policy and conduct. It was impossible that they could sit down quietly under such accusations, or not take the first possible opportunity of putting themselves right before the country. The right hon. Gentleman had stated that inquiries as to the character of the Russian Mission had been made at St. Petersburg, and that the Government had received assurances of a satisfactory nature; but the Papers showed that no satisfactory assurances had been received, and that the despatch which was sent to St. Petersburg immediately after the rising of Parliament required the withdrawal of the Mission, and was little short of an ultimatum. The despatches of the late Government and their Viceroy had been criticized; but it would be seen that the present Government held almost the same language as their Predecessors. The House was told in 1875 that if confidential Papers could be produced, it would be seen that the relations between this country and Russia were harmonious, and yet at that time all the acts now complained of had taken place, and they all remembered the speech of the noble Lord at the head of the Government, in which he said that he felt no alarm at the advance of Russia; that there was room enough in Asia for England and Russia. The noble Lord spoke on that occasion with General Kaufmann's letter in his pocket. These were matters he would not then go further into, as he had merely risen to ask for further Papers which it was absolutely necessary they should have before they could give an opinion upon this war. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had not explained the delay in the production of the Central Asian Papers, which had been promised within a few days after the 15th of August, but had been kept back to the last moment before the meeting of Parliament, although they were essential to the understanding of these questions. Was it consistent with the ordinary observances of the House that, having actually laid Papers on the Table of the House in August last, under the title of "Central Asia, No 1," there should be delivered to hon. Members on Saturday last as part of the same Papers despatches three months later in date? But several Papers of the most vital importance had not been given to hon. Members at all. Surely Lord Lytton's Proclamation of War ought to be laid on the Table. Lord Lytton had been made to say in it that the Ameer had "openly and assiduously attempted, both by words and deeds, to incite war against the British Empire in India." There was not, as far as he knew, any evidence in support of this statement; and he should certainly like to know why a document containing it was not laid before the House, in order that it might be compared with the milder allegation of the hon. Member who had seconded the Address, that there was an "ill-concealed enmity" between the Ameer of Afghanistan and the Government of the Queen. Next, then, came the four letters written by the Commissioner at Peshawur, and referred to by the Ameer. These letters also should be before them. Perhaps they might serve the Ameer's view, and if they did they ought to be known here. They had, he understood, been published in India. The Instructions upon which Sir Neville Chamberlain would have acted had he reached Cabul would be a document in which the House would find the Government policy very clearly laid down. The Government might refuse to present these Instructions to the House; and, if so, hon. Members could account for the refusal in their own way. He threw on the Government the responsibility of assenting or refusing to assent to their publication. At page 170 of the Afghan Papers, paragraph 34, there would be found an extraordinary statement alleged to be made by the Representative of the Ameer. That man was one of the ablest diplomatists in his service, yet he was represented in these Papers as saying that since his own absence from the Cabul Durbar His Highness had fallen under mischievous influences, which he himself deplored and condemned. He found nothing in the Papers to explain that statement, and he was inclined to think there was some mistake in the translation from the Persian, for he could not understand how so able and astute a man could make such an admission. If it was true, they ought to know what the mischievous influences were, and if it was not it ought to be rectified. Then at page 180 some extracts from a conversation at Simla with our British Native Agent at Cabul were given. Extracts were generally unsatisfactory; and it was almost always possible to make an extract report the very contrary of the tenour of the document or report from which it was taken. Sir Charles Wingfield, a great Indian authority, had represented Shere Ali as saying that the chief reason for his estrangement from the Indian Government was the fact of his having read in Sir Henry Rawlinson's works that the policy that was being pursued by the British Government towards Afghanistan was a policy of annexation. Was he right in believing that that part of the conversation omitted in the extracts was the part in which the Ameer's Agent said that? He came now to matters outside the Afghanistan Question. In the Speech there was a paragraph about the Treaty of Berlin. The noble Lord who moved the Address said that one result of the meeting of Parliament would be that no Power would check the carrying out of the Treaty; and the hon. Member who seconded it said, further, that on the carrying out of the Treaty of Berlin would depend the revival of trade. In that he quite agreed with the hon. Member; but he was greatly mistaken if he supposed the Treaty of Berlin was going to be carried out very soon. He had no doubt that the Russian troops would retire by the stipulated time; but it would be still a very long step indeed to the final execution of the Treaty, and they might expect a formidable insurrection in Southern Bulgaria before that result would be consummated. We had been committed to certain engagements with Turkey. Were we ready to be a party to compelling the South Bulgarians to accept a Government, even when they opposed it by revolt? He would remind the noble Lord who moved the Address that his great Predecessor in the title constantly refused to impose by force upon a people a form of Government against which they maintained any reasonable sort of objection. Lord Castlereagh, who was so unpopular in consequence of the violence of his repressive principles with regard to a portion of this country, never would have gone so far as to impose by force upon foreigners a form of Government they did not like. This led him to ask for Papers on this subject. There had been a great many Papers in connection with the carrying out of the Treaty of Berlin, and surely there were many of those Papers which might be produced without the least inconvenience, such as the German Circular to the Powers in August, and their answers, the German Circular to Turkey, the French despatches recommending Turkey to carry out the suggestions of the Congress with regard to Greece. Would the Government present the past Papers with regard to Greece, the Greek Circulars of August last and our reply, and the French Circular of the 22nd October, to which we only replied on the 21st November, after every other Power had answered it? There were Papers published during the Recess with regard to the negotiations between this country, France, and Egypt. They were complete as far as they went; but they made no mention of previous communications. It was well known, however, that the Government went out of its way to make communications to the French Government respecting Egypt; and there was one in which they said that, under no circumstances, would they take any steps for the annexation of Egypt. He did not know whether there were any more Papers on this subject. The present Government seemed inclined to give Parliament a vast mass of information on subjects which were not so material, and to keep them in the dark with regard to important matters essential to the understanding of our position. With respect to Egypt, he would make this remark. Lord Salisbury alluded in his despatch to the Correspondence between the English, French, and Austrian Governments with respect to the Tripartite Treaty; but M. Waddington went further in his reply to Lord Salisbury, and spoke about the clandestine Convention between ourselves and Turkey, and mentioned that France and Austria refused to act under the provisions of the Tripartite Treaty. That meant that they had been asked to act together with England in maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and had refused. He wanted to know when that proposal was made to France and Austria? This was of great importance, because they had been told very early in the Eastern troubles by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that the Tripartite Treaty must be looked upon as virtually dead, and it seemed to him that after that statement was made France and Austria were invited to intervene by force to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. He also wanted to know what was the present situation with regard to Merv? The Government had attached very great importance indeed to the possession of Merv by Russia; and he should like to know whether there was any information to disprove the very serious rumours which were afloat on this question? More information was also needed with regard to Cyprus, previous questions in reference to that subject having been answered in an uncandid way in that House. The very question as to jurisdiction and sovereignty, which had been pooh-poohed last Session by the Solicitor General as highly speculative, had arisen in regard to the trial of an American before a Court presided over by a Turkish cadi, and at which the assessor was an Englishman. A conviction for digging up antiquities was obtained under a Turkish statute, and the antiquities were confiscated. The point was raised whether the Court was a Turkish or an English one; the defendant maintaining that if it was an English Court he should be tried by English law, and that if it was a Turkish Court he ought to be tried by the Consul. The Consul had been appealed to, and, as the American Government did not pass over these matters quietly, there had no doubt been some communications with the Government. Information was thus needed not only with regard to the health of Cyprus—which, he feared, from the reports of to-day, was a serious question, for a diminution of the troops quartered there had been found necessary—but also with regard to the grave question of jurisdiction and future sovereignty. Parliament, unless otherwise informed, must treat as idle rumours stories as to a new secret Convention handing over Cyprus entirely to us; but it was important that in any new arrangement between England and Turkey Parliament should not leave these matters in the unsatisfactory position in which they now stood.

MR. BOURKE: I only rise to trespass on the attention of the House for two or three minutes in consequence of what has just fallen from the hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea. I am very far from complaining of any remarks of his. On my part, and on the part of the Government, I may state that we are always ready to give every Paper to the Members of this House which they ask for, provided it can be given with due regard to the public interests. It is very difficult to know what are the Papers which shall be presented to Parliament. After the Government have done all their duty in a matter, certain parts of a question, or certain other questions, may occur to hon. Members of this House, and therefore all the Papers required are not always produced at first. I can only say that all the Papers he may want with respect to the Foreign Office, if he would only give me Notice of them, I will do my best to produce to the House, and it will not be on any small or narrow ground that they will be refused. With regard to one or two remarks which were hardly worthy of the position the hon. Baronet holds in this House, and with regard to "extracts" which he thought were occasionally garbled and not produced by the Government with a very good intention——

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE: I did not allude to the present Government; I was referring to something that occurred some years ago.

MR. BOURKE: Then I have nothing more to say upon that point. I am very glad, indeed, to have elicited that expression from the hon. Baronet. There is another question upon which the hon. Baronet did say something, and upon which I am anxious to say a few words myself. I certainly did at the end of last Session use the words which he has attributed to me, and have never denied them for one moment, either in public or in private conversation, and those words were that the Central Asian Papers would be produced "in a few days." The fact of the matter is this—when I answered that Question I consulted those whom it was my duty to consult; and having satisfied myself that the Papers should be, and could be, produced within that period, I used the words "a few days" advisedly. The Vacation then began, and the preparation of those Papers did not cease, because the preparation of them was confided to one of the ablest and most industrious public servants we have, and he went on with the task. But events soon occurred which made it perfectly clear that the Papers which we intended to present, and which we thought would be sufficient at that time, would be inadequate, with regard to Central Asia. It was therefore determined that a very much larger series of Papers should be presented, and therefore an examination of the Central Asian documents for the last 13 years had to be undertaken. The Register for the last six years contains 15,000 documents; therefore, the examination of the Papers for 13 years was no light task. I, during the Recess, reminded the Office on several occasions of the promise I had given, and I also heard on several occasions of the subject from the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett). I have throughout done my best to have the Papers produced; but they were delayed, in the first instance, owing to the press of business, and, in the next place, owing to the great mass which had to be examined. All I need add is, that we were as anxious as any hon. Member could be that they should be presented, and that the statement that they would be produced "in a few days" was made by me in perfectly good faith. I hope this explanation will be sufficient for the House and for the hon. Baronet; and, at the same time, I think I may say that no great difficulty or inconvenience has been caused by the Papers not being produced. With regard to one expression used by the hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea, "that the Papers had been kept back," I must say the Papers were not kept back for one moment; but, on the contrary, we have done our best to get them forward; so, as to having any intention to keep them back, such an intention has not existed for one moment. The hon. Baronet has already made a statement with regard to the Berlin Treaty; but I may say that we have no reason to suppose that any Power in Europe has any intention of not carrying out that Treaty; and I am sure the hon. Baronet will attach importance to what has been said by M. Waddington on the subject. M. Waddington, at a dinner which was given a few weeks ago in his honour, said, with regard to the Berlin Treaty and the work which has been accomplished by the French Plenipotentiaries—

> "They have inaugurated peace; they have constantly supported the great principles on which our modern society rests. They have maintained the honour and dignity of France, and they have brought back for her from Berlin the esteem and respect of Europe. The work of the Congress has been, and is still, the object of attacks as passionate as they are unjust. The moment for judging it as a whole has not yet arrived, and can arrive only when it has been completely carried out. The Treaty of Berlin is a work of compromise and equilibrium, whereby the Powers, while taking account of accomplished facts, have sought, as far as was possible, to conciliate a host of conflicting pretensions, claims, and resistances. I regard it as an equitable and comparatively durable solution of the Eastern Question; but on one condition—that it shall be completely and loyally carried out in all its stipulations, without exception, to ensure which result the French Government will devote all its efforts. The Prefect has spoken of *apaisement*. It is a word I always hear with pleasure; but there is one I like still better—it is peace. We have at Berlin secured you peace abroad. May it soon be equally profound at home, and take root in the heart and mind of every Frenchman who loves his country. I give the health of the President of the Republic, the highest personification of French Fatherland."

That was the sentiment by which Her Majesty's Government were animated in carrying out the Treaty of Berlin, and I wish to state that they are entirely in accord with the French Government on the subject. With regard to Greece, the hon. Baronet has already been informed by my right hon. Friend that it would be impossible to present the Papers with respect to that country at this moment. The negotiations are going on, and I can say they are favourable to the sentiments of Her Majesty's Government. As to the document to which the hon. Baronet has alluded on the subject of the Tripartite Treaty, I am not sure whether it is of any great importance now whether it is shown or whether it is not that Her Majesty's Government have asked the other Powers to join in communications on the subject. It is extremely unlikely, because unnecessary; and I do not think for one moment that the idea was entertained by Her Majesty's Government of asking the other Powers. With regard to the Central Asian Papers connected with the execution of the Berlin Treaty, if the hon. Baronet will kindly give me a list of the particular Papers which he wishes to have produced, and repeat his Question on Monday, I will then be prepared to give him an answer.

MR. W. E. FORSTER took this opportunity to ask for a little more information, especially on the point which was more particularly before them—the war with Afghanistan. Before that, he must state that although his hon. Friend the Member for Chelsea asked for a great many Papers on a great many subjects, he yet gave good reasons for every question. He had been met very fairly by the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; but there was one Paper which his hon. Friend would find it extremely difficult to include in the list which he had been invited to give in, because it was not actually a despatch, but a statement of M. Waddington. He (Mr. W. E. Forster) had only one more remark to make with regard to the general question, and that was as to the state of the negotiations, or the conditions to which this country and the Government stood committed with regard to Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia. There appeared to be a feeling abroad that the English power might be used to prevent the people of Bulgaria being a united Commonwealth. Now, he would not enter into the question of the expediency of dividing Bulgaria; but he knew there was nothing that a large part of the population would look upon with more distaste than the use of the English power to put down such a union as that of the two Bulgarias. He entirely supported his hon. Friend in saying he trusted the Government were not in any way committing the country without giving information, so that the House might form a judgment as to the ground on which they did so. His hon. Friend had anticipated him in two or three questions he was going to ask with regard to Papers that had been given to the House upon this country's position in Afghanistan. In the first place, he alluded to the Proclamation of War. He supposed that would be given. [MR. E. STANHOPE: Yes, it is given to-night.] His hon. Friend had alluded to the terms of that Proclamation. He understood it went back for some time past, and supposed it referred to those acts which were alluded to in that part of Lord Lytton's despatch which appeared in page 170; but he did not think his hon. Friend quite described the full weight of the ground upon which the House might fairly ask for a little more information. At page 170 an account was given by Lord Lytton of the Peshawur Conference. In paragraph 33 of that despatch Sir Lewis Pelly is reported to have demanded from the Envoy an explanation of the reported hostility of the Ameer's conduct. The Envoy is stated to have replied that the reports which had reached us of the Ameer's utterances were much exaggerated, and he feared His Highness had fallen under influences which he must condemn. In the enclosures there were most detailed memoranda of all the interviews between Sir Lewis Pelly and the Minister of the Ameer, and yet there was no mention of this demand, or of the answer thereto. The question he (Mr. W. E. Forster) wished to ask was whether there was not some such allusion; and, if there was not, upon what Lord Lytton founded his statement in the 33rd and 34th paragraphs, that there was a demand for explanation, and that the Envoy gave it? He could not find in the detailed account either the demand or the explanation. One other Paper he should like to ask for, which was not of great importance; but he thought they should have the letter from Captain Grey, alluded to in the Memorandum by Dr. Bellew, in page 195. This letter he wanted produced; because, though he could not put his hand on the statement, he knew it was in the despatches, that one reason why the Indian Government believed the Ameer was hostile was that he thought this Minister was prejudiced against him. With respect to the letters referred to in the despatch which Lord Cranbrook called the evasive letter, perhaps they were not in England. [Mr. E. STANHOPE: Yes, they are.] Then, again, the Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan was sent to sound the Ameer as to whether he would receive Sir Neville Chamberlain, and the practice was in Indian matters for a gentleman sent on a mission to make a Report. If he did make a Report, and if it was in England, would it be produced? If it was not, would the Government telegraph for it? He could not help thinking that the Report would throw a great deal of light upon the Ameer's conduct. The only other request for additional information which he would make referred to a different matter. The policy with regard to the admission of British Residents in Afghanistan had been admitted on all sides to have been changed by Lord Salisbury, who wrote on the 22nd of January to Lord Northbrook, and again on the 19th of November, in a tone which undoubtedly denoted a great change of policy. The question he was going to ask was, whether there were any opinions given by any Members of the Indian Council in England on the matter, and whether they would be produced? He could not think that there was anything in any of these Papers which the Government would refuse to give to the House. He had only one other remark to make, and it was with reference to the question as between the present Government and the Government he had had the honour of being connected with. It might be thought unseemly that there should be bickerings between two front Benches, between the present Ministers and the late Ministers, with regard to their past conduct when the country was in a difficult position, and when they were engaged in so very important a matter; yet the Opposition could not, with a due regard to their own honour, allow charges to be made against them without making some reply. He only wished, very briefly, just to state what the country, generally speaking, understood by Lord Cranbrook's despatch. They understood, first, that Lord Northbrook and the Government did not agree as to the treatment of the Ameer; that, in consequence of that disagreement, Lord Northbrook informed the Ameer that the discussion as to his reception of a Resident had better be postponed to a more convenient season, and that the result was that no assurances were given to the Ameer. He was confident that it was the impression of the country that the Ameer wanted assurances against Russia; that Lord Northbrook was prepared to give these assurances; and that it was owing to the action of the Home Government that they were not given. Now, the facts were these—that Lord Northbrook proceeded to give certain assurances containing the word "probable," and that it was in consequence of a telegram he received from the Home Government that he missed out the word "probable," and gave to his assurances a stronger character. The question of the assurances was not postponed. On the contrary, in the Blue Book there are positive statements made by Lord Salisbury and Lord Lytton, that assurances were given against aggression. He thought they had some right to complain of the right hon. Gentleman dwelling upon the refusal of Lord Northbrook to insert in his communication to the Ameer a distinct reference to a possible aggression on the part of Russia; because they had every reason to believe that for two years, at least, thereafter the right hon. Gentleman and his Colleagues would have taken up precisely the same ground. Lord Northbrook was given to understand by the Government that the policy of their Predecessors was approved.

LORD ROBERT MONTAGU*: Sir, a reference has been made by the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down (Mr. W. E. Forster) to some "acts of hostility" supposed to have been committed by the Ameer of Afghanistan against the English nation. No such acts could have been committed prior to the conclusion of the Peshawur Conferences in the month of May of last year; for Lord Lytton and the Indian Council wrote, in their despatch of May 10—

> "We see no reason to anticipate any act of aggression on the part of the present Ameer, or on our own part any cause of interference with His Highness. Our relations with him are still such as we commonly maintain with the Chiefs of neighbouring and friendly countries."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 172.]

Sir Lewis Pelly, moreover, on March 15, 1877, summed up the conclusions of the

Conference in a Paper for the Ameer's Envoy, and said—

> "The British Government harbours no hostile designs against Afghanistan. . . . The Afghan people may rest fully assured that so long as they are not excited by their Ruler, or others, to acts of aggression upon the territories or friends of the British Government, no British soldier will ever be permitted to enter Afghanistan uninvited. . . . The Ameer . . . need be under no apprehension whatever of any hostile action on the part of the British Government." —[*Ibid.* p. 220.]

The supposed *casus belli* is simply and solely the refusal to receive, at the date named by Lord Lytton, an armed British Embassy of 1,000 strong. It is worth while to trace the causes of that refusal; for there is a patent and distinct chain of causes and effect, which brought about that refusal and the war. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has just accounted for the lateness of the production of the Papers—just a week before this time—and the short notice which was given for the assembling of Parliament—little more than a week—by saying that the Government had not at all expected a war; and that as soon as they saw that war was inevitable, they determined upon calling Parliament together. I was glad to hear that assertion; for it is as much as denying that the war was intentionally brought about, and a *casus belli* invented to serve a particular purpose. That, indeed, would be a crime too awful in its conception, and too heinous in its perpetration, for anyone calmly to contemplate. But if this be not true, then the Government may be accused of want of prescience in not foreseeing the war of which they had been warned by the Indian Council, and of blindness in not detecting a very manifest chain of causes and effect. At the time of our Afghan reverses, in 1842, a policy towards Afghanistan was inaugurated. That policy was to cultivate and maintain, by every means in our power, the goodwill and friendship of the Ameer, and, as a part of that policy, not to force upon him the location of European Envoys on his territory. That policy was perfected by Lord Canning; it was carried out by Lord Lawrence; it was endorsed and practised by Lord Mayo; and not repudiated by Lord Northbrook. During all that time, for 30 years, there has been an Indian Envoy at the Court of Cabul; but no British Envoy was forced upon the Ameer. That policy was successful. On June 7, 1875, the Indian Government wrote, in a despatch to Lord Salisbury—

> "If we have formed a correct judgment of the sentiments of the Ameer towards the British Government, the main objects of the policy which was advocated by Lord Canning . . . are secured."—[*Ibid.* p. 134.]

Lord Salisbury, however, comes to the India Office in 1874, and he soon determines to change the policy which had been maintained by so many successive Governments, and advocated by all who were acquainted with India, and which had been successful; he determined to change it, and adopt an opposite policy. He wrote a high-handed despatch, commanding a change of policy. The Indian Council replied by a dignified, but strong protest, warning him of the dangers which he was incurring. Lord Salisbury's despatch was written on January 22, 1875. The Indian protest was written on June 7th. On November 19th, Lord Salisbury sent a still more peremptory order, directing the appointment of a British Envoy. Again, Lord Northbrook and his Council remonstrated, protesting in strong and unmistakable terms—

> "We deprecate, as involving serious danger to the peace of Afghanistan and to the interests of the British Empire in India, the execution, under present circumstances, of the instructions conveyed in your Lordship's Despatch."—[*Ibid.* p. 155.]

This was met by Lord Salisbury, and overriden, by a most peremptory order to carry out the opposite policy without a moment's delay. There is then a hiatus in the Blue Book. But we know that Lord Northbrook came home before his time, and that Lord Lytton was appointed. Lord Lytton had conferences with Lord Salisbury and the Russian Ambassador, Count Schouvaloff, and went to India to carry out the new policy. There was a new Council and a new Viceroy; and they wrote home in May, 1877, that the information concerning these conferences with the Russian Ambassador "influenced their considerations," and then they proceeded to affirm many things which they had a short time before most stoutly denied, in order to vindicate or at least exculpate the change of policy. Thus was the settled and time-honoured policy of 30 years reversed, and no information is laid before the House of the grounds which "influenced" and brought about that change. We know not how or by what arguments that sudden *volte-face,* before the Russian Ambassador, was produced. It is now for the House to look at the results, not unpredicted and unwarned, and to judge of that change of policy. A policy approved and maintained by Parliament, by successive Administrations and Viceroys, has been suddenly and secretly altered, and Parliament knows not the reasons which induced the alteration. Unless the House of Commons is to be no more than a debating society, it must judge the acts of the Ministry, and hold them responsible for a change in a declared policy that Parliament had approved. The country expects the House to do this. Yet the information which alone can enable the House to arrive at this judgment, has not been laid before the House; and we are called together because the wilful change of policy has immediately resulted in a war, just as we were forewarned that it would. The fact I believe to be this—Lord Salisbury never apprehended the old policy, because of a most pernicious fallacy in his mind; and he initiated the new policy as a direct outcome of that fallacy. He could not understand the former policy, which has been termed "masterly inactivity," because he has no conception of any influence except brute force. He, for the same reason, disbelieved in the possibility of any Russian influence being exerted in Afghanistan or India, and told us to study "maps on a large scale," and see how far off India is from Russia; and he jeered at Russian power being felt in India, saying that you might just as well expect a Russian Army to march on the Cape of Good Hope. As he misjudged the former policy, so too when he found that Russian influence had become paramount at Cabul, he had no other idea of establishing English influence, except by brute force. Yet, "opinion is stronger than armies." That disbelief in anything except brute force is the grave error in Lord Salisbury's mind, which has proved fatal to our influence in the East, and has thrown Afghanistan into the arms of Russia, and given Russian policy full scope in Europe. He has, as I will presently show, been playing Russia's game, in fighting the Ameer, and causing us to assume the character of aggressors, while Russia is enabled to appear as a protector. Lord Napier, in his able Memorandum on this question (at page 225 of the Papers)—a Memorandum penned on the very day of the signature of the Schouvaloff-Salisbury capitulation—May 30—says—"We have managed the Ameer badly. . . . the Afghans look upon us as a weak and treacherous people." That is very true; and all our recent acts and words have, I will show, tended to increase that distrust in the Ameer's mind. It will be found, by the Papers, that the Ameer reiterated frequently his profound distrust of the Russians. That feeling pervades, indeed, the whole of Central Asia. Thus we read in Sir Donald McLeod's Memorandum (page 47)—

> "All the information I have been enabled to obtain on the subject leads me to believe that there exists, throughout Central Asia, in the minds of all the most influential and best informed of its populations, a wide spread feeling of distrust and dislike of the Russians, as an aggressive and unscrupulous Power, who have brought their co-religionists (Mahommedans) to ruin and humiliation, in almost all quarters where their dominion has been established."

That was written in 1868, before the events of the late war, the Berlin Treaty, and the Secret Agreement; or the same would have been also said of us. Another example of this feeling is given in the Ameer's letter of May 5, 1873 (page 110), in which he says—

> "It cannot be concealed that it is impossible for the Russians to remain always firm in their negotiations. For instance, they could not remain firm in their engagements about the Crimea even for a short period. My anxiety which I feel on account of the Russians will never be removed unless the British Government adorns the Afghan Government with great assistance in money and ammunitions of war for the troops, and unless great aid is given for the construction of strong forts throughout the Northern Afghan Border. And further, if an emergency arises from the Afghan Government to oppose the Russians, such opposition cannot take place without the co-operation of the disciplined troops of the British Government. . . . Time has approached very near, when the Russians, after taking possession of Urganj and Merve Shajehan, will make communications for exercising some influence in my kingdom."

That was the state of feeling throughout Russia. They knew the Russians to be false, faithless, and robbers of territory by fraud and force. They recognized the fact that the Russian political principle is—Destruction in order to annex. What should have been our line of conduct? We should have been careful to dissociate ourselves entirely from the Russians, and separated ourselves entirely from their proceedings. What was our line of conduct? On Gortchakoff's suggestion we did the very reverse. We set to work thoroughly to re-assure the Ameer (as we learn from page 211 and many other places). We told the Ameer that there is no danger from Russia; no precautions need be taken against Russia; Russia will never invade him, nor interfere in his territory; there is not the slightest reason to fear Russia. Lord Salisbury expatiated upon this theme in his speech about "large scale maps," and "Cape of Good Hope" re-assurance. Doubtless, that speech was read in Cabul, and the incredulous Afghans learned that we English considered that the inspection of a large map was enough to convince any sane man that the Russians could never reach Afghanistan, and that no apprehensions need be entertained of a Russian advance in Central Asia. But, at the same time, we were urging the Ameer to receive a British Envoy at Cabul, and English officers on his Northern Frontier. "I really cannot be answerable for their lives (reiterated the Ameer), my people have an ineradicable hatred to Europeans." Yet we continued to urge it vehemently. "Why then should you want to send Envoys and officers?" asked he. "Merely out of kindness; in order to protect your territory." "From whom?" "From Russian aggression." "That is but a pretext (thought he). You tell me not to fear Russian aggression, and yet you want to send Envoys and officers to protect me against Russian aggression. I suspect that you would send them to undermine my independence, so that you may make me a mere Indian Prince, or openly annex my territory." That was a very natural conclusion for him to arrive at, and that was the conclusion which he arrived at. Colonel Taylor, the British Commissioner at Umbeyla, wrote these words with regard to British officers in Afghanistan—

> "As a body, the Afghans do distrust us, and the re-appearance of fair faces in the streets of Cabul would not be popular, as they would be regarded as the forerunners of occupation."—[*Ibid.* p. 58.]

That was a very natural conclusion in regard to the real object in the urgency of British demands to send British Envoys. The occupation of Quetta strengthened that suspicion. "It would be a very good step," said the Indian Government, "provided you could get the Ameer to concur in it; but not otherwise, as it would raise his suspicions." Look at the position of Quetta on the map; at the mouth of the Bolan Pass; excellent to bar an advance of the Russians; but no one fears an advance of the Russians; we are all thoroughly re-assured on that point. The only other use of it is, as a basis from which to effect a *coup de main* on Candahar, and then on Guzni, and then on Cabul. That was the next step to sow distrust, and to make the Ameer suspect our intentions. So that, as we re-assured the Ameer against all fears concerning Russia, as Prince Gortchakoff persuaded us to do, we were, in fact, causing him to distrust our own good intentions. Not content with this, the suggestion is quietly rumoured (as we find from the despatch of the Indian Government of May 10th, 1877) that the Ameer was "assumed to be dependent" on Great Britain. We are further told (page 166)—

> "Prince Gortchakoff had not been slow to fix upon us all the responsibilities of such a position. . . . It is the British Government which the Government of Russia would endeavour to hold responsible for the conduct of the Ameer."

He had not only, then, been led, by our own words and acts, to mistrust us, and to suspect us; but he was induced to associate us in the same enterprize with the Russians, and we had so far succeeded that he was already regarded as a mere dependent of Great Britain. What was the effect on the Ameer? At the Peshawur Conferences, on May 19th, 1877, we find the Envoy saying significantly—You talk of danger? But danger is of two kinds, external and internal. Against all external danger you have re-assured me; you say there is none. There is then only a danger from within; and that is the very thing which I fear that your Envoys would cause. The mischief seemed, then, to have been already done; and it was worked by our own hands. Yet we were not content. We allowed ourselves to be inveigled into going further in our mischievous re-assurance. The Envoy at the Peshawur Conferences was a cunning man. He bethought him of a delicate test. "You wish me to accept your British Envoys, to guard me against Russia, because the advance of Russia is so rapid in Central Asia? (thought he.) I will see whether you are sincere." He therefore said to Sir Lewis Pelly (page 114)—"The Turkomans, across the Oxus, are much afraid of the Russian Army which is approaching; and they have sent to the Ameer for help against the advancing Russians; but what do you, Sir Lewis Pelly, advise?" "Oh!" said Sir Lewis, "the Turkomans are a set of robbers; do not help them; leave them to the Russians." "Oh no! (thought the Envoy), you seem very much to concur in the Russian plans of aggression; perhaps you belong to the same gang, and are a mere pal of theirs." That was a suspicion. Was it a just suspicion? Of course, it was more than a suspicion. For the Peshawur Conference was closed in February, 1877; while on January 28, 1876, the Indian Government wrote, in their despatch, concerning—

> "The assurances given to the Ameer, that a good understanding exists between England and Russia on Central Asian affairs."—[*Ibid.* p. 154.]

Then England and Russia had already come to an understanding, not only as to what should be done with Afghanistan, but also respecting all the Khanates of Central Asia! The booty was already divided beforehand! That was one way of "re-assuring" the Ameer, who had already begun to think that Afghanistan had been placed between the upper and nether millstone! Again, the Viceroy and Sir Lewis Pelly used a threat to the Envoy at Peshawur—a threat which flew like an arrow, to wound beyond its mark. On October 10, 1876 (page 183) they said—

> "Our only interest in maintaining the independence of Afghanistan is to provide for the security of our own Frontier. But the moment we cease to regard Afghanistan as a friendly and firmly allied State, what is there to prevent us from providing for the security of our Frontier by an understanding with Russia, which might have the effect of wiping Afghanistan out of the map altogether? If the Ameer does not desire to come to a speedy understanding with us, Russia does; and she desires it at his expense."

Just as I thought! said the Ameer to himself; they have been plotting together for my destruction; and if I cannot be persuaded to admit the "internal danger," they will tear me in pieces by force; better to trust to the God of Battles and of Justice, and die sword in hand. Lord Napier, in his Memorandum written on the Schouvaloff-Salisbury capitulation day, says—

> "Does not the example of Turkey, with her tributary States stirred into rebellion by emissaries from Russian societies, show the mischief which Russia might work in India?"—[*Ibid.* p. 225.]

That the Ameer had been thinking much on this subject is proved by the fact that his Envoy spread out a map, and asked Dr. Bellew (on February 7, 1877) to point to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Servia and Bulgaria, and Circassia; and asked—

> "How it was that the nations of Europe (and notably Great Britain) permitted Russia to send her soldiers to fight in the Servian ranks whilst the Russian Ambassador remained at Constantinople."—[*Ibid.* p. 202.]

Doubtless he asked, also, why we interfered to save Servia, who had been guilty of the "most outrageous and wicked war" (as the Prime Minister said on September 21, 1876), and to prevent Turkey from crushing Servia, and even from taking securities against a repetition of the offence. He perhaps asked why we had been content with telling Russia that it was a breach of Treaties and of International Law to invade Turkey; while we did not fulfil our obligations under those Treaties, and defend the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire. Dr. Bellew states that he asked about Circassia—Circassia, whose independence we had recognised—Circassia, the great bulwark that prevented the advance of Russia into Central Asia, the first fortress of India (as was well remarked by Sir Henry Rawlinson, and by others in these Afghan Papers). And we allowed Russia to take Circassia and menace India! Yet that was of little use to Russia; for the Caucasus, even although Russian, was yet impassable; and Poti, to the south, was marshy, and malarious, and with three miles of shoal water between it and the sea; and so we gave Russia the only good harbour on the coast — Batoum — and enabled her to turn the Caucasus and land her troops to menace Persia and India. So the Envoy saw how that by our perfidious advice to Turkey we had weakened her hands—the Head of all Islam—and by our treacherous acts at Berlin we had given away her fortresses and harbours, and by our secret agreements, we had partitioned her Empire. Nay more; his suspicions were confirmed when he read the Premier's speech on the 28th July—

> "One of the results of my attending the Congress of Berlin has been to prove, what I always suspected to be an absolute fact, that this horrible, devastating war, which has just terminated, would not have taken place if England had spoken with the necessary firmness."

Was not all this enough to make the Ameer say: "Russia and England seem to be pulling together; they are in the same boat; while there is this difference between them—Russia is the stronger, and England is afraid; besides England deserts her allies in the hour of need; it is better for me at once to propitiate the Russians." These were the Envoy's words, as reported by Sir Lewis Pelly (page 181)—

> "The Russians broke Treaties at pleasure, were very pushing in their policy, and feared no one. The recent political history of Europe showed that the English were unable to compel the Russians to adhere to Treaties, and were equally impotent to arrest Russian aggressions."

That, then, was the Ameer's suspicion of our real intent in forcing British Envoys upon him; and that was the estimation in which he held us. In his eyes, we seemed to be plotting with his enemy, while pretending to be his friend; we appeared to be insidiously forcing Envoys upon him, in order to break up his independence; we were afraid to fight in fulfilment of our Treaty obligations; we connived at violations of law; we approached him with character gone and honours tarnished. And that was the time which Lord Salisbury chose for making his haughty demands (page 159)—

> "Her Majesty's Government . . . must have, for their own Agents, undisputed access to its Frontier positions (of Afghanistan). . . . They must be entitled to expect becoming attention to their friendly counsels; and the Ameer must be made to understand that, subject to all——"

MR. E. STANHOPE observed that the Ameer had never seen the despatch from which the noble Lord was quoting.

LORD ROBERT MONTAGU: He may have heard of the despatch of February 28, 1876, before the Peshawur Conference at the end of the year. Such things are easily done in India. I am, however, no longer speaking of the effect on the Ameer's mind; I have passed from that to the acts of the Government——

MR. E. STANHOPE said, that the document referred to was a confidential and private despatch, containing instructions intended for the Viceroy. The Government thought it ought to be now published for the information of the House.

LORD ROBERT MONTAGU: Then, I think, Sir, that the next poetical effusion, which Lord Lytton writes, should be entitled—"The Sorrows of a Viceroy;" for it appears that he must submit to receiving despatches couched in language which no gentleman would address to his butler. Yet Sir Lewis Pelly, taking his cue from his superior, seems almost to have capped it. For, on February 15, 1877 (page 210), he told the Ameer's Envoy that the British Government would—

> "Strengthen the Frontier of British India without further reference to the Ameer. . . . The Viceroy will take such measures as he may deem wise and lawful for strengthening the Frontier of British India, and providing for the safety and repose of that Empire; and this without communication with the Ameer."

Nothing, then, can be more manifest than this chain of causes and effect; nothing more clear than that the words and acts of the Government have led straight up to war, and that those acts and words were such as to make the Ameer conclude that England was perfidious and secretly hostile to him, and that his safest course was to cement a timely friendship with Russia. This effect had been foreseen, but not by the British Government. It was foreseen that British policy would throw Afghanistan into the arms of Russia, and that the consequent war was playing the game of Russia and securing her aims. The Indian Government, in their despatch of June 7, 1875 (page 133), said—

> "If we are correct in believing that the refusal (to receive British Envoys) would not show the intentions of the Ameer to be disloyal, it would afford no sufficient justification for a change of policy which might throw Afghanistan into the arms of Russia upon the first favourable opportunity. We may also observe that the re-

fusal would weaken the hands of Her Majesty's Government in any future negotiations with Russia when questions might be raised as to the real value of British influence in Afghanistan."

Sir Richard Temple went further, and, in his Memorandum (page 69), he states the conclusions to which we had arrived—

> "If we engage ourselves in Afghanistan, Russia will find us in the hour of trial impoverished and embarrassed. If we keep out of Afghanistan, Russia will find us in the hour of trial strong, rich, and prosperous in India. If she really wishes us ill she must naturally desire that we may be so infatuated as to pursue the former course. But it is for us to avoid the course which our enemies, if we have any, would desire us to follow."

So much for the expediency of this war; and now as to its justice. Either Lord Salisbury intended war, or he did not. If he intended to force on a war (which he has done, whether intentionally or not), then the war is unjust, and a grievous crime. If he did not, then by over-riding the Indian Government, in his pride and petulance, and despising its earnest warnings, he has committed a very grave error. They closed their despatch of January 28th, 1876, with a most solemn warning on a matter "of such grave importance," and "deprecated" the demand to send British Envoys "as involving serious danger to the peace of Afghanistan." Was it just to make such a demand? It was a violation of pledges and assurances repeatedly given by the British Government to the Government of Afghanistan, as will be seen on pages 89, 94, and 95. The Indian Government themselves assert in the above-mentioned despatch that—

> "The proposal to establish British Agents in Afghanistan is, as we pointed out in our Despatch of the 7th of June, a departure from the understanding arrived at between Lord Mayo and the Ameer at the Umballa Conferences of 1869."—[*Ibid*, p. 151.]

At the end of the Conference at Peshawur last year, after the demand had been rejected, the Ameer was assured that there was no cause of quarrel or ground of hostility between England and Afghanistan, as you will see on page 172, where we have the statement to this effect deliberately written by the Indian Government; and on page 220, where there is Sir Lewis Pelly's own assurance. Yet the Conference was prematurely closed on the death of the Ameer's Envoy, although the Ameer desired to prolong it, and had despatched another Envoy with instructions to accede to the British demands. The cause of war, if any, was therefore of a later date. The Indian Government (page 247) state it to be the Ameer's refusal to receive the English Mission, which was armed, and 1,000 strong. Yet he did not refuse; he merely wished to delay it, as he was mourning for his favourite son; and also he did not wish to accede to the peremptory demand to admit it on a specified day; because he said it would "disgrace him in the eyes of his people." But he intimated that he would receive it later. Yet our pretended cause of war is his refusal to receive our Mission. Be it so. Would that be a just cause of war? Sir Neville Chamberlain evidently thought that the refusal would not be a sufficient cause of war; for he telegraphed to the Viceroy on September 21 (page 236)—"Shall I make . . . . Faiz Mahomed . . . . fire upon us?" and on being forbidden to do so, he telegraphed (page 244) that he would consider a refusal to let the Mission pass "the same as if we had been fired on." It is clear that such a refusal, even if absolute, would not give a cause of war. If an acquaintance whom I did not care to see were to call on me, and I told my servant to say—"Not at home," would he have a right to burst into my house, and enter my room and fire a revolver at me? On October 6, the Ameer wrote a letter of expostulation to the Viceroy, saying (page 252)—"I am astonished and dismayed by this letter, written threateningly to a well-intentioned friend;" then he pleads his "great trouble,"—the loss of his favourite son, and complains of the "harsh and breathless haste" in sending the Mission. This letter, Lord Lytton came to regard as "a direct challenge" (page 253). On October 30, Lord Salisbury telegraphed the Ultimatum which was to be sent to the Ameer, where the cause of war was thus stated (page 254)—"You did not hesitate to instruct your authorities on the Frontier to repel the Mission by force." Yet it was expressly stated by Major Cavagnari, Sir Neville Chamberlain, and others, that the Commander of Ali Musjid explained that, having received no orders from the Ameer, it would be his duty to oppose by force the forcible entrance of the Mission. It seems to me that there has been no cause of war; and that Lord Lytton, in order to make one, trumped up a false tale about a threat to shoot down Major Cavagnari and his suite —a tale utterly repugnant to Major Cavagnari's own account of the affair. Yet war is either the highest and most solemn judicial act, to procure reparation or to defend a right; or else it is the greatest and most heinous of crimes. One murder is bad enough; yet an unjust war is murder—murder multiplied by thousands. If the Cabinet has made an unjust war, then on them rests the guilt. But if a majority of the House endorses and adopts that action, then the fault is with them; and unless the nation protests, the nation is involved in the crime. For my part, I enter my humble and feeble protest against that which I sincerely believe to be a crime.

GENERAL SIR **GEORGE BALFOUR** believed the war to be an error financially, politically, and in a military point of view; and his main reason for this belief was that it was based on a violation of Treaty obligations in reference to the new claim for the admission of British officers as Envoys, in violation of the condition for non-interference with the affairs of Afghanistan, as entered into between Her Majesty's Government and Dost Mahomed in 1855. He also questioned very much if they had any right to occupy Quetta without the consent of the Ameer. No doubt, the Treaty with the Khan of Khelat of 1854 did give that right of occupation; but the two prior Treaties of 1839 and 1841 made the Khelat and Shawl territories subordinate to the Ruler of Afghanistan; and he hoped they would hear something from the Secretary of State which would set their minds at rest on those points. As to the Khyber Pass and the Afridis, the rights of Dost Mahomed in that direction were acknowledged by Sir John Lawrence, and he did not see how they could be disputed now. The hon. and gallant Gentleman referred to the 1868 Memorandum of Sir Henry Rawlinson which, he said, was reported to have been circulated in India, and was known to several English officers there; and he drew attention to what was common rumour—namely, that a copy of it had fallen into the hands of the Ameer, and said that it was, in all likelihood, after he pursued its contents, so hostile to him, that his conduct towards England changed. At all events, the work published by Sir Henry Rawlinson in 1874, known as *England and Russia in the East,* advocated the occupation not only of Quetta, but of Candahar and Herat, and it was very likely a translation of this part might have been made for the Ameer by the Russians. He would remind the House that the policy of non-interference with Afghanistan had been initiated by a Tory Government at the time of our disasters. When our Army was withdrawn in 1842, Lord Ellenborough, with the advice of the Duke of Wellington, by public Proclamation abandoned Afghanistan for ever. That was the resolution arrived at by the Tory Government, aided by the advice of a most experienced commander, who said that, though we might invade Afghanistan, the difficulty lay in coming back again from that country. He hoped that they would have an estimate given as to the probable cost of the war, and trusted that it would be a more accurate one than that given at the commencement of the Abyssinian War. To hold Afghanistan, he maintained they would require to keep at least 15,000 European and 35,000 Native troops, in all 50,000 European and Asiatic troops, in the country. The cost of these, with the many military charges, could not be less than £4,000,000. It would be a fatal policy to cast this enormous charge on the present embarrassed finances of India.

MR. **M'CARTHY DOWNING** said, that the Queen's Speech was one of the most meagre ever delivered in that House. It did not contain one matter connected with the affairs of England, Scotland, or Ireland. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had spoken as if it were a usual thing to omit such matters from the Queen's Speech to a Parliament specially summoned; but in 1867, when Parliament was called together in November on a question of at least as much magnitude, he found that in the Speech from the Throne there were many important questions affecting the three countries of the United Kingdom. Fenianism in Ireland was referred to, and it was stated that it was intended that there should be repressive laws with regard to it. It was also stated that Reform Bills for Scotland and Ireland would be introduced; that a Commission would be issued to settle the boundaries of existing boroughs in England; that Bills with regard to bribery and corruption at elections, to public schools and general education, and to consolidate the Acts relating to the Mercantile Marine would be brought in. Parliament was called together in 1857 in consequence of a monetary crisis of great severity, and because India was then in rebellion—a more important reason for calling Parliament together than the question of Afghanistan. Was there on that occasion no reference in the Queen's Speech to local matters of importance? On the contrary, the Speech said that the attention of Parliament would be called to the law to regulate the representation of the people in Parliament, and that there would be introduced Bills to amend the law relating to real property and to amend several branches of the Criminal Law. The Government on that occasion indicated to the House of Commons what measures would be brought in, after, of course, the period of adjournment, but no such thing was done now. The late Lord Derby in February, 1858, when Parliament met, and when, in the House of Lords, the adjournment of the House was moved at an early period of the evening, said he conceived that was a course of proceeding most unusual, and that he was quite surprised the Government had made no statement of their general policy, and of the measures which they intended to introduce into the House after the adjournment. The present Government had made no such statement either; and very likely when the House met in February they would still make no announcement of their policy. In 1847, on the 18th of November, when Parliament was called together in consequence of the state of trade, and a commercial crisis owing to the failure of several banks, and the condition of trade in America, and also because of the famine in Ireland, the Government indicated the measures which they intended to introduce. That was an occasion when they may have avoided giving to the country a statement of what their policy was. But they said in the Queen's Speech that they should introduce a Bill to regulate navigation, and that a Commission would be appointed to report on the best means of improving the health of the Metropolis. An Amendment was moved and seconded in consequence of there being no measure for the amelioration of the condition of Ireland, upon which an assurance was given by the Chief Secretary for Ireland as to Bills which the Government intended to introduce after the adjournment. Well, was the Chief Secretary for Ireland in his place to-night to tell them if the Government meant to do anything for Ireland. There had been three bad seasons—that of this year having been the worst that had occurred since 1847—and was no measure to be introduced for the amelioration of the condition of that country? Had they been promised a University Bill? Had they been told their Grand Jury Laws were to be amended? Had they been told there was to be a Land Bill? They had been told nothing of the kind. Why, there might be a Dissolution of Parliament before the right hon. Gentleman would have an opportunity in February of stating what measures he intended to introduce. The House might not meet after the adjournment until there had been a General Election; and it was very convenient for the Government not to make any declaration of their intentions either with regard to England, Scotland, or Ireland. 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The hon. and gallant Gentleman went on to say that we had no right to occupy Quetta. Now, this was a question which would, he supposed, have to be gone into hereafter; but he would say at existing boroughs in England; that Bills with regard to bribery and corruption at elections, to public schools and general education, and to consolidate the Acts relating to the Mercantile Marine would be brought in. Parliament was called together in 1857 in consequence of a monetary crisis of great severity, and because India was then in rebellion—a more important reason for calling Parliament together than the question of Afghanistan. Was there on that occasion no reference in the Queen's Speech to local matters of importance? On the contrary, the Speech said that the attention of Parliament would be called to the law to regulate the representation of the people in Parliament, and that there would be introduced Bills to amend the law relating to real property and to amend several branches of the Criminal Law. The Government on that occasion indicated to the House of Commons what measures would be brought in, after, of course, the period of adjournment, but no such thing was done now. The late Lord Derby in February, 1858, when Parliament met, and when, in the House of Lords, the adjournment of the House was moved at an early period of the evening, said he conceived that was a course of proceeding most unusual, and that he was quite surprised the Government had made no statement of their general policy, and of the measures which they intended to introduce into the House after the adjournment. The present Government had made no such statement either; and very likely when the House met in February they would still make no announcement of their policy. In 1847, on the 18th of November, when Parliament was called together in consequence of the state of trade, and a commercial crisis owing to the failure of several banks, and the condition of trade in America, and also because of the famine in Ireland, the Government indicated the measures which they intended to introduce. That was an occasion when they may have avoided giving to the country a statement of what their policy was. But they said in the Queen's Speech that they should introduce a Bill to regulate navigation, and that a Commission would be appointed to report on the best means of improving the health of the Metropolis. 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The noble Lord jumped about from one thing to another, asking for explanations and pointing out contradictions, till no one knew what Government it was of which he was speaking; and he should really not venture to follow him through the very curious account of the transactions which he had given, if he were not anxious at once to point out that some of the propositions which the noble Lord had laid down could not for a moment be sustained. It was, in his opinion, unpardonable in the noble Lord to have accused the Viceroy of India of having trumped up a false statement. The noble Lord went on to say that we had attempted to impose Resident Agents on the Ameer contrary to our express promise. Now, he (Mr. E. Stanhope) would venture to say that no such promise had ever been given; and when it was suggested that such a promise had been made by Lord Mayo, he could only reply that no mention of the subject had been made by Lord Mayo in his communications with the Ameer. If hon. Members would look at the paragraph of Lord Mayo's despatch in which the subject was mentioned, they would find that it was described as a boon desired by the Ameer himself. As to the statement of Lord Cranbrook, in the famous 9th paragraph of his despatch, of which so much complaint was made by right hon. Gentlemen opposite, he must express his surprise that they were content to rest a complete change of policy on the authority of a single telegram. Having reversed, by means of a telegram, the whole of our Indian policy as regarded the Ameer, they were satisfied to allow it to remain on the authority of that telegram, and in not one single despatch did the Duke of Argyll think fit to place on record an explanation of his views. Let him examine for a moment what the words of that telegram were. The Ameer was to be assured that we were to maintain our "settled policy" in favour of Afghanistan, if he would only consent to abide by our advice in external affairs. Well, when a settled policy was spoken of, he presumed what was meant was the policy which was settled at the time of Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo. But what happened? Lord Northbrook met the Envoy of the Ameer, and gave him further assurances of a somewhat vague character. The Envoy was then kept waiting for six weeks, and during that time there were further conversations; and when the Ameer at last asked for definite pledges against encroachment by Russia, and that it should be put in the writing from the Viceroy to the Ameer, instead of any satisfactory assurances having been given, Lord Northbrook, in a letter dated the 6th of September, informed him that, in his opinion, the question was of such importance that the discussion of it should be postponed to a "more suitable opportunity." In his despatch of January 28, 1876, Lord Northbrook had said that nothing short of full promises of protection would be satisfactory to the Ameer; and that, consequently, in the Viceroy's letter, the question had been deliberately reserved for future consideration. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone) had called attention to a paragraph in the Address to which he had some objection, and he thought it very desirable there should be some change in the wording of it. He (Mr. E. Stanhope) would ask leave of the House to propose an Amendment of certain words of the Address, which he thought would entirely meet the views of everyone. He would ask, in the third paragraph, to omit the words "to express our regret," and to substitute the words "humbly to thank Her Majesty for informing us."

Amendment proposed,

In paragraph 3, line 1, to leave out the words "To express our regret," in order to insert the words "Humbly to thank Her Majesty for informing us,"—(*Mr. Edward Stanhope,*)

—instead thereof.

Question, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question," put, and *negatived.*

Words *inserted.*

Main Question, as amended, proposed.

MR. CHILDERS said, before the debate closed, he thought some further reference should be made to the very pointed remarks by his noble Friend the Member for the Radnor Boroughs (the Marquess of Hartington) with reference to the discrepancies in the despatch, as to which remark had been made, and as to which no explanation had been given either by the Chancellor of the Exchequer or by the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down. He thought it was absolutely due to the House that some such explanation should be given before the debate closed, for there were discrepancies on which comment might be made on another occasion. It was absolutely necessary to elucidate the problem why, when a great change of policy had occurred, it had been subsequently contradicted in Parliament, as had been done by Lord Salisbury. In the last despatch it was very distinctly stated that a change in the policy towards Afghanistan was deliberately made by the Government some time ago, and steps were taken in connection with that change of policy. Lord Salisbury had made a statement in the House of Lords as to the continuance of the former policy; and yet when his noble Friend (the Marquess of Hartington) had read this despatch the Chancellor of the Exchequer made no answer to it. [The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said that arose from an oversight.] He had no idea of impugning the truth, veracity, or honour of the Foreign Secretary or any Member of the Government; but when hon. Members read in a despatch statements which they knew were not accurate, they were perfectly entitled to speak of them in language which was warranted by the despatch itself. He considered that the discrepancies he had referred to were worthy of grievous censure, and that the explanations which had been up to this point given by Members of Her Majesty's Government were not satisfactory explanations, and also that the charges made against them were well founded, and had not been disproved. The House would remember the manner in which that despatch had been published and received, and the very singular argument they had heard from the right hon. Gentleman that evening, that the very incompleteness of the despatch would be advantageous to those it impugned if it only notified certain points of attack and defence. That despatch had been published in a very unusual way in the newspapers, a week before the Papers were issued. It was a carefully arranged statement for a particular Party purpose; but the grounds on which it was based were not made public, so that the Government deliberately kept back from their opponents the defence from an attack which would have been impossible if the Papers had been issued in the usual way. When the whole question came to be discussed next week it would be seen what were the real facts, and we could then enter more fully into the matter. Notwithstanding the repudiation of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, he contended that paragraph 9 of Lord Cranbrook's despatch conveyed a most unfair inference. That paragraph, too, had been said to be not a principal part of the despatch, but only part of a long narrative; yet it was remarkable that every person in the country who spoke or wrote on the subject had immediately fixed on that 9th paragraph. He was willing to believe that the Chancellor of the Exchequer and his Colleagues were as simple as they professed to be; but they were the only Members of their Party who were so simple. Besides, the 9th paragraph of the despatch was the foundation of almost all that followed. The whole argument of the central part of that despatch was that a wrong policy had been adopted at a certain time; that to that error all the mischief the despatch described was due; and that, therefore, an opposite policy was wise. It was noteworthy that there were only two statements in the whole despatch for which the authority was given, and both of these were in the 9th paragraph. It should, therefore, have been pre-eminently accurate, as when published no one could verify the quotations. Yet what happened? The quoted telegram consisted actually of an opinion and an instruction. The opinion was quoted in the paragraph; but the course which the Viceroy was instructed to pursue was not stated. And what the Viceroy said he had done was omitted, the only part quoted being his account of what neither he nor anyone else could have done. This was the real basis of the charge of unfairness which had been brought against the Government.

He would give the House an illustration of what he meant in the shape of a narrative of a similar kind. Suppose it were proposed to give an account of the events connected with the last Administration, and suppose it were stated that the late Government at the time of the General Election deemed it desirable to disestablish the Irish Church, and suppose the narrative then went on to say—"but Her Majesty's Opposition did not share the sentiments of the Government, and the Opposition ultimately succeeded in themselves becoming the Government." That would be exactly a parallel case to this objectionable paragraph in Lord Cranbrook's despatch. All the statements contained in such an imaginary narrative as he had described were perfectly true, but it was not the whole truth, and a similar suppression stamped this despatch with the character which was now universally ascribed to it. The hon. Gentleman who had last spoken had made a most ingenious defence of the omission in paragraph 9; but he placed it upon a ground that appeared to him (Mr. Childers) untenable. He had endeavoured to draw a line between "the settled policy" of the Governments of Lord Mayo and Lord Northbrook and the assurances which Lord Northbrook wished to give in 1873. For that there was not a shadow of foundation. He could prove this by the statements of the Government itself, for the despatch was not the only account that had been given of these assurances. With regard to the assurances of material assistance offered by Lord Northbrook to the Ameer in 1873, if the House would refer to the statements to the Ameer at the Peshawur Conference, and even to Lord Lytton's despatch narrating that negotiation, it would be seen that the present Government considered that those assurances had been of the amplest character; and it was not until the last despatch of Lord Cranbrook was compiled, that it was thought essential to throw blame on the late Government. The fact was that the Ameer wanted more unconditional and absolute assurances than any Government whatever had been prepared to concede to him. In a discussion in the other House, in 1874, Lord Derby, speaking with express reference to those negotiations of 1873, declared in the most emphatic manner, on the part of the present Government, that the assurances which the Ameer was seeking to obtain, and the condition which he was seeking to attach to them, were such as it would be improper for the British Government to assent to. He could not, therefore, accept the explanation which the Chancellor of the Exchequer had given as to the accuracy and fairness of that despatch. When the right hon. Gentleman said that despatch was the act of the Government and not that of an individual Minister, it was quite unnecessary to apologise for any strong language about it, which absurdly enough had been attempted to be called a personal attack on Lord Cranbrook; but it was necessary promptly to unmask its grossly and unfairly inaccurate character, and that inaccuracy had now been conclusively shown in the course of the debate.

Mr. O'CONNOR POWER: Sir, I shall endeavour to follow the example of my hon. Friend the Member for Cork (Mr. M'Carthy Downing), and give expression to the feeling I entertain regarding this Address. My hon. Friend quoted several instances to show that the practice of submitting a Speech which contains no reference to local legislation is very unusual; and he complained that the claims put forward on behalf of the Irish people had been completely ignored. In my opinion, when we have been summoned here from different parts, we ought, at all events, to have been informed of the intentions of the Government respecting our own country, in the condition of which we are far more interested than in the successful policy of the Government in Afghanistan. Although I am opposed to the foreign policy of the present Government, I have not taken part in the Party quarrels or divisions in this House; and I do not intend to take part with the Liberal Party in any division which may be called for on foreign policy, being convinced, as I am, that, as between the two Parties, it is six of one and half-a-dozen of the other. What has this debate been this evening? Not such as to enlighten us as to the right and wrong of the war, but simply an attempt on the part of the Government to vindicate their policy, and an attempt on the part of the Opposition to show that something they did on a certain occasion is not deserving of the censure which has been cast upon it. Neither

Her Majesty's Government on the one hand nor the Opposition on the other have endeavoured to show that the policy of either of them is one that will recommend itself to liberty-loving men, or to those who profess to be actuated by Christian principles. Ireland is often regarded as an integral portion of the Empire; but my first duty as an Irish Nationalist is to assert the distinct nationality of Ireland. And why? Because, in ordinary times, Ireland is shut out from the observation of Europe, and her aspirations are judged by the caricatures given in the English Press. It is, therefore, when questions of an international character are before the House, that it becomes the duty of Irishmen to stand forward before Europe and declare that their first consideration is the nationality of their own country. The Union between Ireland and England is only a Union in name. It is not a union of hearts. It is the result of the blackest crime ever perpetrated by one nation against another—the destruction of the Irish Parliament. And the Imperialism of Lord Beaconsfield in 1878 ought to be as odious to the Irish people —certainly, it was as destructive to liberty—as the Imperialism of Pitt in 1798. It has the same object in view—English aggrandisement; it adopts the same means of reaching its object—corruption and violence; it proceeds from the same arrogant, liberty-hating Tory Party, and marches forward to the same dishonoured victory over the bodies of brave patriots fallen in defence of their native land. I have read all that has been written and spoken recently by English statesmen of both Parties on the subject of the Afghan War, and I am bound to say that a good deal of what they have said of each other is substantiated by the official Correspondence which has been placed in our hands. The accusations they have levelled at each other are well sustained in the official Papers; and as an Irishman I have the greatest pity for England, whose politicians are plunged in such violent dissensions that they seem determined to fight each other like the Kilkenny cats, until there is nothing left but their tails. We Irish are so often lectured on the sin of disunion that we would be justified in preaching a sermon on the beauty of Christianity for the benefit of Indian Viceroys and ex-Viceroys, and English Ministers and ex-Ministers; but it requires too large a stock of English hypocrisy and self-complacency to succeed in such a task. I object to the Address in answer to the Royal Speech, because it is the duty, Sir, of the Representatives of the people to demand the redress of grievances before granting Supplies. I, for one, shall exhaust all the Forms of the House in refusing the Supplies for this wicked war. In the name of my constituents I denounce it as a base and cowardly aggression on an independent State. I shall vote against the Address, because I condemn and abhor the brutal policy which has been pursued towards the Afghan nation. I shall vote against the Address, because the Government has turned a deaf ear to the cries for justice which have been repeatedly raised on behalf of the Irish people in this House. Ireland repudiates from her heart and soul this blood-stained Imperialism, which tramples on the rights of nations; and though I care not who may betray her honour, by associating her fair name with the unhallowed policy of the Government in this unholy war, I assert that her sympathies are now, as they have ever been, on the side of struggling freemen in every oppressed land.

MR. SULLIVAN said, that the curtain fell last Session upon Her Majesty's Ministers placing on the back of John Bull Asia Minor. Now they were going to place there Asia Major too. The policy of Her Majesty's Government seemed to him to be one of universal annexation and war with smaller Powers, with those who might be weak enough to be safely bullied, in order that their territories might be added to that already overgrown Empire. The state of home affairs in England and Ireland was far more serious and far more worthy of a winter Session than this Afghan business, or any of these aggressive wars of Her Majesty's Ministers. What was the condition of Ireland at that moment? In a commercial and industrial point of view her condition was eminently worthy the attention of Her Majesty's Government; yet it was at that moment, when trade was depressed, and finances paralysed, that they came forward and prevented the revival of public confidence by creating gloomy apprehensions of further financial burdens and additional wars. They must lay at the doors of Her Majesty's Government the guilt and blame of whatever financial disaster might occur in Ireland from that broken confidence which could only be restored by a policy of peace. They had fondly hoped that after the Berlin Treaty and the return of the Prime Minister from that capital, there would be an end to the torture and suspense to which they had been accustomed for the past two years, but they had been mistaken. Every interest in the country was groaning under the present condition of affairs, for they could not tell from day to day what policy would be brought forth by that Ministry of surprises. Indeed, next week might see the Government spring upon them another war, and that at a time when great numbers of the people of England—in Staffordshire and elsewhere—were suffering from absolute starvation. He should have thought there would have been some reference in the Queen's Speech to the distress from which the people were at present suffering. Grave evils were at the doors of their manufacturers, and that was the moment selected by the Government for a military promenade with a Mission that would not, perhaps, be characterized truly in our day, but which 20 years hence England would blush to name. It was an unjust and aggressive war; and no greater crime that he knew of could be charged to a public Ministry than that of making war on an uncivilized community with an unjust cause. No nation should draw the sword lightly. What were the grounds for the war? The Prime Minister said that we wanted a "scientific Frontier;" and although that had not been avowed by Ministers to-night, he would rather believe Lord Beaconsfield's statement at the Guildhall than some of the reasons which had been advanced in that House. No. That was good for the Guildhall, but it would not do for the Houses of Parliament. They spoke of an "expedition." But what was an "expedition?" It might be scientific or geographical. They euphemistically called the war an "expedition" because they were ashamed to give it its proper name. The Indian Secretary, in his final despatch, was far more anxious to convict the Opposition than to convict the Ameer of wrong. Why had these voluminous despatches been withheld and then flung upon us in a mass, while public opinion in England had been misled by inspired telegrams from India? The object clearly had been to fan the war flame. Else, why were the Government dumb while the newspapers commented on the false telegram about the alleged insult? The Ministers put into the Royal lips a version of the story of the wolf and the lamb. The object of the Viceroy had been to pick a quarrel with the Ameer: on the same pretences on which they had gone to Afghanistan they might go to the North Pole. As for the despatch which had been issued by Lord Cranbrook to hocus the people, it was a Party document manifesting much more anxiety to show that the Liberal Party were wrong than that the Ameer deserved punishment. It was of a piece with the false telegrams sent from Simla with the tacit connivance of the Government officials to arouse the war feeling in this country. It was one of those tricks of political life which were unbecoming the dignity of Cabinet Ministers. He considered the Ameer came out of this quarrel with credit, whilst it was greatly to the reproach of Her Majesty's Government. They wanted to fasten a quarrel upon him in order to put Residents in his towns. He had previously known that Residents were spies, who would undermine his power, and he got a promise from an English Viceroy that no Residents should be put in his territory, and now that promise was sought to be evaded. Russia gave them an undertaking and now she was violating it. Let them settle with Russia; but she was strong and the Ameer was weak. Was that a policy worthy of Great Britain, when they wished to make the Indians pay for their "scientific Frontier?" Just as they struck the Ameer rather than Russia, because he was weak and Russia was strong, so they taxed the Indians rather than the English, because the former were unrepresented in Parliament, and had no one to take their part. They were plunging India into bankruptcy; but for a country which had felt the march of Great Britain's wonderful civilization his voice at least should be raised, and his vote given to whoever in that House made a struggle against that unjust war, and against the imposition of additional taxation on people who were not represented; and he believed he might say that the voice and vote and the best will of Ireland would be given with a protest against a public wrong, and to defend those who could not speak for themselves.

MAJOR NOLAN said, he regretted that no answer had been given by the Government to the remarks which had been made as to the omission of any reference to Ireland. He regretted that there were not more Irish Members present; but he hoped that they would be there before the end of the Session to protest against the total omission of Irish affairs from the Queen's Speech. It might be said that England and Scotland were also omitted; but he objected to the total omission of home affairs. He might be told that the whole interests of the country were entirely with the war; but he thought there were many grievances in Ireland—the Land Question, for instance—which most of them would say ought to be settled before any foreign war was considered. When they saw the tremendous slap in the face the Ministry were giving Russia by that war, they could not say in what they were involved for, or that the war in Afghanistan would not be followed by war with Russia. Then, again, there was not a word in the Queen's Speech about the Irish University, and he was afraid the Government would not do anything on the Land Question. If the Ministry would give something moderate in that direction, they would be satisfied. He would allow that the Government had done some good last year; if they would give them the University, it would be something more. The absence of any reference to Irish affairs left the Members in a most painful position in facing their constituents. In face of a war, he considered that a country which elected its Members freely had a very great superiority over the country which could not elect its Members freely. There was a vast number of persons in England who were not represented; but, as a matter of fact, England could elect its Members more freely than Ireland. At present the householders in Ireland were not represented in that House; and he did think it most unfair that they should be pledged to a war, and plunged into it without having some vote in the matter. He thought that they ought to have some declaration by the Government to a franchise equal in Ireland as in England before they were committed to a war. He was sorry there was not a large number of Irish Members present; but he thought that the expression of the regret of the Members who were there would, perhaps, be the means of bringing over a good many more, so that if no satisfactory statement was forthcoming from the Government they might try their strength.

SIR JOHN LUBBOCK thought the hon. Member for Mayo (Mr. O'Connor Power) very inconsistent, for while condemning the course of Her Majesty's Government, he announced his intention of not voting against them. This was not a matter simply between Her Majesty's Government and the Opposition. These were questions in which they were all deeply interested; and he could not understand how hon. Members could use expressions which touched the very verge of the usage of Parliament, and then declare that they were not going to vote. He had also referred to South Africa; but the fact was that this country had spent its money and its blood there, because it honestly believed it was necessary to protect the lives and property of Englishmen. It might be an error of judgment; but he thoroughly believed that there was nothing to be ashamed of in our conduct there. We were, in fact, making heavy sacrifices, believing that we were doing our duty. The hon. and learned Member for Louth (Mr. Sullivan) had condemned our previous dealings with the Ameer, and he (Sir John Lubbock) was previously of somewhat the same opinion himself; but he was bound to say that upon reading the Papers he had altered his views. In 1855 the Ameer made a stringent Treaty with us, and yet after receiving a friendly Mission from Russia, when we wished to send one, he refused to accept it; and again, after he had had ample time to consider the matter he treated all communications with contempt. In this and other matters it seemed to him that we had just cause of complaint, and he (Sir John Lubbock) thought that the Ameer brought this war upon himself. Whether the war was politic was quite another question, upon which he should probably quite agree with the hon. Member. He could not keep from expressing his astonishment when last Session Her Majesty's Government came down with large Supplementary Estimates and proposed, not to meet them manfully by extra taxation at the moment, but to distribute the payment over a period of years. But at that very moment they knew that this Afghan War was looming in the immediate future. ["No, no!"] Hon. Members said "No;" but he did not think that anybody could read those Papers without coming to the conclusion that Her Majesty's Government had determined at the time that the Ameer should receive an Envoy, and that the Ameer had also made up his mind that he would not do so. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer had brought in a Bill to establish a new Sinking Fund; but he did not act up to his own principles, and borrowed money with one hand while he was repaying it with the other. After making every allowance, he thought this state of affairs most unsatisfactory; and he could not help feeling that it was much to be regretted that Her Majesty's Government should have rushed into this war, and that they should have departed from the old policy of the Indian Government.

Mr. O'CLERY said, he also had to complain of there being no reference to Ireland in the Speech, and considered Imperial England held towards Ireland a somewhat similar position to that held by Imperial Rome towards the subject-provinces in the old days. He must say, however, that there had been times when England did not treat her in that way, and those were periods when England was entering into a great war, and when English resources were strained to the uttermost to maintain her position. At that time Ireland was loyal to the core, and gave 100,000 volunteers. The result was that when the war was at an end they had a great English Minister—Pitt—deliberately striking them down. While the blood of Ireland was shed on every field to maintain English splendour, how did they find Ireland treated during the famine? With supreme indifference. There was a time in the Crimean War in which the English Government were obliged to consider Ireland; and in regard to that war there was no higher praise given by English officers to anyone than that they gave to the Irish soldiers. They had always been told during a war that it was not the time to make applications; but he would be false to his own position if he said that the Irish people felt any interest in the struggle now being entered upon. The English enjoyed the blessings of a free Government, and there was not an Englishman who did not feel that he was defended by the Government; but an Irishman had not the same feelings. Irish people might regret the loss of life, and the Irish were compelled by the force of English laws to take part in what was undoubtedly an unjust war; but, beyond that, they could not take any further interest in this struggle. This Session, which had been called to discuss the fate of Afghanistan, would be better used for discussing the questions relating to Ireland. They thought they were entering upon a very little war; but they could not disguise from themselves that it might turn into a very large one. They thought they were only waging war with Afghanistan; but it might be possible that our real enemy—Russia—would not act towards Afghanistan the same part that England acted towards Turkey. Therefore, it was the first duty of every English patriot to see that the claims put forward by Irish Representatives should receive the measure of respect to which they were entitled, and by so doing Englishmen would be doing a higher duty than by providing for war with Afghanistan.

Mr. ASSHETON CROSS said, the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down (Mr. O'Clery) had used, perhaps inadvertently, an expression which he thought ought not to go uncorrected. The hon. Gentleman had spoken of Russia as an enemy of this country. He must point out that the Queen's Speech assured them that Her Majesty was now in friendly relations with all the great Powers of Europe—Russia included, of course. He had heard other expressions from hon. Members on that side of the House as to the injustice, and almost the cruelty, of this war, which unfortunately existed in Afghanistan; but as it had been generally understood that the debate on the justice or injustice of the war was to take place, not on that night, but on an early opportunity, he hoped hon. Gentlemen would withhold those strong epithets until the question had been fully debated. The hon. Member for Cork (Mr. M'Carthy Downing) had complained that there was no reference to Ireland in the Queen's Speech.

If legislation for England or Scotland had been mentioned in the Speech, while no notice was given to Ireland, then the latter country might have thought itself neglected. But at the beginning of an Autumn Session, called for a specific purpose, he thought it sufficient in the Queen's Speech only to state generally that measures would be laid before Parliament in the ensuing Session. There was the precedent of 1854, in the case of the Crimean War, for the course which had been followed in the present instance, and he thought in the matter of precedents they were pretty evenly balanced. When Irish Members spoke of that as a grievance, he hoped they would remember that the last measure which the Government had passed for Ireland was one of peace, goodwill, and, he believed, of justice. That being the last message of the Government to Ireland, he hoped that they would acknowledge, and do the Government the justice of believing, that they might have other measures to introduce for that country equally beneficial. A general statement would be made to Parliament, immediately after it re-assembled, of the measures which the Government intended to bring forward; and when their list of measures was produced the Irish Members might rely upon it that their country would not be overlooked.

MR. O'CLERY explained that his use of the expression had been misunderstood. What he meant to infer was that it was against Russia that they had to defend themselves in the East, rather than Afghanistan.

Main Question put, and *agreed to.*

Committee *appointed,* "to draw up an Address to be presented to Her Majesty upon the said Resolution:"—Viscount CASTLEREAGH, Mr. HALL, Mr. CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER, Mr. Secretary CROSS, Mr. Secretary STANLEY, Mr. WILLIAM HENRY SMITH, Viscount SANDON, Sir HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON, Mr. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Mr. EDWARD STANHOPE, Mr. BOURKE, Sir WILLIAM HART DYKE, and Mr. WINN, or any Three of them:—To withdraw immediately: —Queen's Speech *referred.*

House adjourned at half after Twelve o'clock.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Friday, 6*th December,* 1878.

LORD CHANCELLOR — The Lord President acquainted the House that Her Majesty had been pleased to create Hugh MacCalmont Lord Cairns, Lord Chancellor of Great Britain, a Viscount and Earl of the United Kingdom, by the style and title of Viscount Garmoyle in the County of Antrim, and Earl Cairns; and his Lordship, having retired to robe, was introduced in the usual manner.

AFGHANISTAN—THE WAR.

NOTICE OF AMENDMENT.

THE EARL OF CORK: My Lords, I beg to give Notice, on behalf of my noble Friend (Viscount Halifax), that on Monday next he will move the following Amendment to the Motion to be proposed by the noble Viscount the Secretary of State for India:—

> "That, while this House whilst ready to consent to providing the means necessary for bringing the war in which we are unhappily engaged to a safe and honourable conclusion, regrets the conduct pursued by the Government which has unnecessarily engaged this country in the contest."

THE DUKE OF RICHMOND AND GORDON: May I ask my noble Friend whether the words he has just read are intended as an addition to, or a substitution of, the Motion of my noble Friend the Secretary of State?

THE EARL OF CORK: A substitution.

AFRICA—CAPE FRONTIER MOUNTED POLICE.

MOTION FOR AN ADDRESS.

LORD HOUGHTON said, that complaints had reached this country from some young men of good family who, thinking that they were about to join a body of a civilian character, had enlisted in the Cape Frontier Mounted Police, but subsequently found that they were transferred to a military corps. He would therefore move for any Correspondence between the Government and the civil or military Authorities at the Cape of Good Hope respecting the change of the body of Cape Frontier Mounted Police into Cape Mounted Rifles.

Moved, That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for any correspondence between the Government and the civil or military Authorities at the Cape of Good Hope respecting the change of the body of Cape Frontier Mounted Police into Cape Mounted Rifles.—(*The Lord Houghton.*)

EARL CADOGAN said, that complaints of a similar nature to those stated by the noble Lord had reached the Colonial Office. The first of those complaints reached them on the 6th of November, and was followed by others. On the 14th, and again on the 21st of that month, despatches were addressed to Sir Bartle Frere requesting explanation of the matter. It was impossible for the Government to receive an answer before the middle or end of January, and therefore he hoped the noble Lord would not press his Motion for Papers on the present occasion, and he should be ready to give him an undertaking that as soon as the required answer and explanation had been received the Papers should be produced.

Motion (by Leave of the House) *withdrawn.*

House adjourned at a quarter past Five o'clock, to Monday next, a quarter before Five o'clock.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Friday, 6th December, 1878.

MINUTES.]—PUBLIC BILLS—*Resolutions in Committee—Ordered—First Reading*—Permissive Prohibitory Liquor* [6]; Burial Law Amendment [10]; Money Laws (Ireland)* [12]; Consecration of Churchyards Act (1867) Amendment [13]; Licensing Boards (Scotland)* [15]; Clerical Disabilities* [18]; Spirits in Bond* [19]; Joint Stock Banks (Accounts) [23]; Interments in Churchyards [24]; Licensing Laws Amendment [25]; Intoxicating Liquors (Ireland) [32]; Church of Scotland [39]; Burials* [42]

Ordered—First Reading—Married Women's Property (Scotland)* [1]; Medical Act (1858) Amendment* [2]; Hypothec Abolition (Scotland)* [3]; Convention (Ireland) Act Repeal* [4]; Volunteer Corps (Ireland)* [5]; Elective County Boards (Ireland)* [7]; Waste Lands Reclamation (Ireland)* [8]; Municipal Corporations (Property Qualification Abolition)* [9]; Hours of Polling (Boroughs)* [11]; Rating of Towns (Ireland)* [14]; Valuation of Lands (Scotland) Amendment* [16]; Colonial Marriages* [17]; Sale of Intoxicating Liquors on Sunday* [20]; Employers and Workmen Act, 1875 (Extension to Seamen)* [21]; Disqualification by Medical Relief* [22]; Landlord and Tenant (Ireland)* [26]; Relief of Insane Poor* [27]; Cruelty to Animals* [28]; Voters Registration (Ireland)* [29]; Marriage with a Deceased Wife's Sister* [30]; Artizans' Dwellings Act (1868) Extension* [31]; Public Health Act (1875) Amendment* [33]; Contagious Diseases Acts Repeal* [34]; Poor Law Guardians (Election by Ballot) (Ireland)* [35]; Duration of Parliament* [36]; Ulster Tenant Right* [37]; Inhabited House Duty and Income Tax* [38]; County Courts* [40]; Landlord and Tenant (Ireland) Act (1870) Amendment* [41]; Libel Law Amendment* [43]; Poor Law Amendment Act (1876) Amendment* [44]; Bills of Sale (Ireland)* [45]; County Infirmaries (Ireland)* [46]; Habitual Drunkards* [47]; Racecourses (Metropolis)* [48].

NOTICES OF MOTION.

AFGHANISTAN—AMENDMENTS ON THE ADDRESS.

MR. WHITBREAD: I beg to give Notice that it is my intention to call attention to the Papers on Afghanistan, and to move—

> "That this House disapproves the conduct of Her Majesty's Government which has resulted in the War with Afghanistan."

With regard to the day on which I can bring that forward, I am, of course, very much in the hands of the Government. Having given Notice of a Motion which directly challenges the conduct of Her Majesty's Government, I am, of course, anxious to bring it forward at the earliest opportunity; and I presume that Her Majesty's Government—and, indeed, both sides of the House—would desire, as is usual, that not a day should be lost in bringing it forward. I therefore ask the right hon. Gentleman what day he will give me for the Motion?

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Undoubtedly, Sir, under ordinary circumstances it would be the desire of the Government to give the very earliest day for a Motion that is in the nature of a Vote of Censure upon the Government, a Motion brought forward by an hon. Member of the standing of the hon. Member for Bedford, and with, as I have some reason to suppose, the general approval of the leading Members of the Party sitting opposite to me; but I would remind the House and the hon. Gentleman that on this occasion Parliament has been called together for the special purpose of discharging a Constitutional and statutory obligation entered into by the Government; and that in order to fulfil that obligation it will be necessary for us immediately to submit to Parliament a Vote giving the required consent of both Houses of Parliament to the course which is proposed to be taken. That being so, it would be impossible for us to set aside proceeding with the Motion of which Notice has been given by my hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for India. It was, of course, open to the hon. Member for Bedford or for his Friends to have brought forward a Motion such as that of which he has now given Notice yesterday upon the Address; or it would be open for him to bring forward his Motion as an Amendment to the proposal of my hon. Friend to which I have just referred. It is not for me, of course, to say what would be the most convenient or proper course for the hon. Member to take; but all I can say is, that if the question of the hon. Gentleman points to our giving up Monday and putting off the Resolution which we have already given Notice of, in order to enable his Resolution to be brought forward, I think it would be impossible for us to comply.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN: I beg to give Notice that on the Resolution of the hon. Member for Bedford I will move the following addition:—

> "And this House regrets that, in the present instance, the consent of the Nation, through its representatives, was not obtained before War was declared; and that the Government withheld from publication, until after the Declaration of War, the Papers which would have enabled a correct opinion to be formed as to its justice and necessity."

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: I desire to make an appeal to the Government to re-consider the decision which has just been announced by the Chancellor of the Exchequer; but I am under the impression that it would be irregular for any discussion to take place at this stage of the proceedings. It would possibly be more in Order if I were to postpone any appeal I have to make until after the Notices of Motions and Questions have been put.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: We shall have to move that the House, at its rising, do adjourn till Monday.

SIR HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON: It becomes my duty now to move that the House, at its rising, do adjourn till Monday.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the House, at its rising, do adjourn till Monday next."—(*Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson.*)

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: I intended, if I had been enabled, to have made an appeal to the Government, before the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced the determination of the Government, to take into consideration the request made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bedford. My hon. Friend has given Notice of a Resolution which is undoubtedly a Resolution of Censure—or, at all events, of Want of Confidence in the Government. From the observations that I made yesterday I think it will be easily understood that I and those who act with me are prepared to support that Motion. Well, Sir, under these circumstances, I wish, as I have said, to appeal to the Government to re-consider their intention of moving on Monday the Resolution of which they have given Notice, and to give precedence to that of my hon. Friend. It occurs to me that that would be the most convenient course for two reasons. In the first place, as, I think, the Chancellor of the Exchequer has admitted, the Government would, under ordinary circumstances, be anxious to give the earliest possible opportunity for a vote involving the question of the confidence of the House in the Government. But, in the next place, there are peculiar circumstances which seem to me to render this course even more desirable. What will take place on Monday? On Monday the Under Secretary of State for India will make a statement which will not be confined to the financial question, but will open the whole case of the Government in reference to the proceedings in Afghanistan. The hon. Member will be followed by my hon. Friend the Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett), who has given Notice of a Resolution which raises the question whether the cost of the war shall be borne by the Revenues of this country or by those of India. Now, the course taken by my hon. Friend precludes the possibility, even if it had been otherwise desirable, of my hon. Friend the Member for Bedford moving his Resolution as an Amendment to the Resolution which will be moved by the Under Secretary of State. But I have ascertained that my hon. Friend the Member for Hackney is not disposed, even if that were thought desirable, to give way in order that my hon. Friend the Member for Bedford's Resolution might come on. I cannot complain of the decision at which my hon. Friend the Member for Hackney has arrived, because I believe it will be the only opportunity which he will have in his power of raising the very important question which he wishes to submit to the House. What will be the result? We shall have had a general statement of the policy of the Government from the Government Bench; we shall then be invited by the hon Member for Hackney to consider a most important but still a subsidiary point; and the debate which is commenced and conducted under these circumstances cannot possibly be a very satisfactory one. We shall have on one side speeches made directed to the whole policy of the Government; and, on the other hand, we shall have speeches made directed to that subsidiary point raised by the hon. Member. Now, it strikes me it would be far more logical and convenient if we should decide, in the first instance, on the issue raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Bedford as to the policy, or want of policy, of the proceedings which have led to war. Having disposed of that question, we could then consider on a subsequent occasion the issue raised by the hon. Member for Hackney as to the source from which the cost should be defrayed. That certainly seems to me to be by far the most convenient course; and I cannot help thinking that if the Government will consider it they will agree with that view, and they may possibly be disposed to allow precedence to my hon. Friend the Member for Bedford.

Mr. GLADSTONE: I rise to point out that the Parliamentary case does not appear to me to rest exactly as it was described by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Chancellor of the Exchequer stated that it was in the option of Gentlemen on this side of the House to raise the general question on the Address to Her Majesty, and that, having voluntarily foregone that opportunity, there still remained to them the question of an Amendment to the Motion of my hon. Friend opposite, who represents the Indian Department. But I think, Sir, it escaped the recollection of my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer that we have not yet done with the Address to Her Majesty, and that it is in the option of any person either to move an Amendment on the Report of the Address, or, if it is thought fit, to move the postponement of the consideration of the Address until Monday, when it would of necessity be taken as the first Business, and when, therefore, the Opposition in this House would be enabled to give effect to their view, which I understand to be, as expressed by my hon. Friend the Member for Bedford and my noble Friend, that the general question of the conduct of the Government, and of their policy, ought to be discussed and disposed of before we come to consider the subaltern and collateral, although a most important, question, which is wholly distinct from that general question. I frankly own I do not know why Her Majesty's Government object to the proposal that has been made by my noble Friend. I cannot conceive what disadvantage they are to undergo if they should think fit to give way to it. I would also point out that the two questions not only are not the same in subject-matter, but are not the same in any degree as regards the opinions that hon. Gentlemen might be disposed to entertain. It is perfectly possible that there may be those on this side of the House who object to the policy of Her Majesty's Government, but, notwithstanding, who might be disposed to support the Motion of my hon. Friend opposite on the part of the Government; and, *vice versâ*, it is perfectly possible that there may be those on that side of the House, or elsewhere, who may be prepared to give a strong support to the policy of Her Majesty's Government, and yet who may think that, under all the circumstances of the case, it is not desirable that the cost of these hostilities should be imposed upon the burdened finances of India. I would entreat Her Majesty's Government to consider that point, which appears to me to be undeniable. In truth, as I view the matter—although I can understand it arises without the slightest intention to perplex the Business of the House—the proposal of the Government that we should take the discussion on the Motion and Amendment now before the House would come to nothing more nor less than this—that, first of all, we should be compelled to debate together, and in hotch-potch, so to speak, two questions which are both of very great importance, even if not of equal importance, and which are perfectly distinct from one another; and then that, having so discussed these two questions together, we should go to a division, in which it would be absolutely impossible for anyone to know whether he was voting on the one side or the other. Now, Sir, that is a state of things in which it cannot be acceptable or desirable to Her Majesty's Government that the Business of the House should stand. I apprehend no one is desirous to interfere with the progress of the Report of the Address to-night. If we are driven to the alternative between making an attempt to discuss the policy of the Government upon the Report of the Address, where the discussion would undoubtedly be legitimate and in place, and discussing upon another occasion when it would not be legitimate nor in place, and where it would only throw the Business of the House into confusion, I know not what position my noble Friend might take; but I see nothing but inconvenience to the proceedings of the House in consequence. Then, also, I think Her Majesty's Government may do well to recollect that they are not now, as at the end of the Session, masters of all the days of the week. If it is insisted that the debate on Monday shall be the debate on the Motion of my hon. Friend opposite, and also that that Motion shall be the only occasion given us for considering the Amendment of my hon. Friend the Member for Bedford, the consequence will be that the debate will spread over several nights, and my hon. Friend the Member for Bedford would, I apprehend, decline to move his Motion as an Amendment. But suppose my hon. Friend the Member for Bedford, declining to move his Motion as an Amendment, should think proper to avail himself of his privilege to bring forward his Motion on Tuesday, what, then, will be the position of the House? That we shall begin on Monday the debate on the question of Indian finance with a considerable admixture of the other subject; that my hon. Friend, I apprehend, will not give way on Tuesday; and his debate will then commence and be continued during Tuesday night. But then the Government will retort upon my hon. Friend the disadvantage which it has been in his power to inflict upon them, and on Thursday we should resume the debate, and so go on on the Motion about Indian finance. I hope I have not appeared to put this question in a hostile point of view; I have only argued it in the interests of the general convenience, and I hope the suggestion of my noble Friend will be entertained.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: I must confess, after listening to the speech which has just been delivered, I feel very much like the picture that was exhibited to us in a comic periodical the other day, of "John Bull in a Fog." After the number of suggestions made by my right hon. Friend as to the different modes in which those who oppose Her Majesty's Government may attack us, I feel the situation is perfectly bewildering. I should have thought that there was but one possible mode in which the Motion could be brought forward, and that that mode depended upon the formal decision of the Government; but after hearing the wealth of suggestions made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich, and considering how many arrangements might be made by Gentlemen opposite—who have only got to arrange amongst themselves in which particular way they would like it discussed—I do not think the case is strengthened by the speech which has been made to us. But what I wish to point out is this—we have taken the unusual course of advising Her Majesty to summon Parliament at this inconvenient season for a particular object, to fulfil the statutory obligation which is laid upon us to obtain the consent of both Houses of Parliament to the application of the Indian Revenues to certain military operations. I wish to point out, in passing, that that is a very different thing from saying we are asking Parliament now to agree to charge the whole of the expenses on the Indian Revenue. That is a point which has been raised in this Motion. I only point out that by the way; but at this time we are making an appeal to Parliament, asking it for the authority required by the Act. The proper time for making that proposal is the very first day of Business that we can command, and it it is proposed to make that proposal on Monday next. Well, we are told, whether that proposal should or should not be assented to, it is desired to challenge the whole policy with regard to the war itself. But that might have been challenged on the Address, and it may still be challenged on the Report of the Address; or it might be challenged by some arrangement between the different Members of the Opposition—which obviously suggests itself, but which we are told cannot take place; or, lastly, it might be arranged, after a decision had been taken upon the questions which will be raised by the Amendment and Motion, a substantive Motion should be brought forward by the hon. Member for Bedford, which would raise the general policy as to the war. But I think the proper and most convenient course is that which the Government proposes to pursue, and that is that we should be allowed to take the opportunity which would naturally be afforded us, on moving for the statutory consent of this House to the application of the Revenues of India to those purposes, of stating our case. Our object is to explain our case, and to let such discussion arise as may be thought desirable. I really think that we are taking the most convenient course, not only for ourselves, but for the House generally. We have to consider the convenience of the House generally, especially upon such an occasion as this; and I am, therefore, very sorry that it is not in my power to comply with the request of the noble Lord and the hon. Gentleman opposite.

Sir WILLIAM HARCOURT said, there was one point on which he wished clearly to understand the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Opposition had been, he would not say taunted, but it had been pointed out that they might have taken the course of moving this Amendment on the Address. Now, his noble Friend the Leader of the Opposition stated on the previous night the reasons which had induced him not to take that course, expecting, no doubt, at the time, that the Government would have made no difficulty with reference to a day for this Motion. ["Oh, oh!"] His noble Friend might have been wrong—and it would now appear he was wrong—at all events, he entertained that expectation. But his right hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich had pointed out that the House had not yet done with the Address. The Report of the Address was still in the hands of the House; and he did not know whether the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for India was prepared to state the case of the Government that night, and if not, the best course to take would be the one suggested by his right hon. Friend, and that was that upon the Report of the Address, to move that it be postponed till Monday. They should then place the Government and the Opposition really in the position which the Government considered the latter ought to have taken up in the first instance. Therefore, he should like to know what the Chancellor of the Exchequer thought of this—that when the Report of the Address was moved that evening a proposal for an adjournment till Monday should be agreed to, and then the Government, on the Report, would state their case, and the hon. Member for Bedford would move his Amendment. He did not see that any time would be lost. The hon. Member for Bedford's Motion would then be an Amendment on the Report, and he should like to know whether the Government would assent to this.

Mr. WHITBREAD thought the Chancellor of the Exchequer had not quite understood the position. ["Oh!" "Order!"] That was his opinion, and he begged leave to state it. The position of affairs was this: The Opposition desired to challenge the conduct of the Government in two particulars—those raised by the Motion of his hon. Friend the Member for Hackney, and by his (Mr. Whitbread's) own Motion—but the Chancellor of the Exchequer proposed that the Government should state the whole of the Government case on Monday; and then, after that, that the House should go into a discussion on the particular point raised by the Motion of his hon. Friend the Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett). Did the Chancellor of the Exchequer really think that the case of the Government could be dealt with in its entirety, having stated that the discussion would be confined to the Motion of his hon. Friend the Member for Hackney?

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: I did not make that suggestion. I said the case of the Government would be stated on Monday, and it would be for those who opposed the Government to take what course they deemed necessary.

MR. WHITBREAD reminded the House that his hon. Friend the Member for Hackney, who had already given Notice to raise a particular issue, had declined to give way. He did not complain of his hon. Friend for taking that course, as the point he wished to raise was an important one; but the effect of it would be that they should have the general statement made by the Under Secretary of State for India, they should then have the particular issue raised by his hon. Friend the Member for Hackney, and, afterwards, a great many Gentlemen would reply on the whole case, while others would state their opinions of the Amendment, so that they should have a desultory debate, not dealing satisfactorily either with the particular point raised by his hon. Friend the Member for Hackney, nor brought to a point where the decision of the House would be taken on the whole question. The course proposed by the Government would lead to a long and desultory debate; and when the Opposition came afterwards to raise the questions involved in his Motion, complaints would be made from the Ministerial Benches of their going over the ground again, and prolonging the Sitting at this inconvenient time of the year. It was not in his power to press the Chancellor of the Exchequer further. In the course of his experience of that House—which was not a short one — he had generally found the Government anxious to provide every facility for bringing forward Motions which challenged their policy. Often last Session and the Session before they used this sort of language—" Why don't you bring your opinions to the test of a vote? It you disapprove the conduct of Her Majesty's Government, why don't you bring a Vote of Censure?" Well, he wanted to propose a Vote of Censure. But the way in which the Government proposed to deal with that matter was by postponing it. He had expressed his desire to enter the lists with the Government on the earliest possible occasion; but, of course, it was not in his power to compel the Government to accept that challenge sooner than they liked.

MR. BERESFORD HOPE said, that he was totally unable to understand the complaint of the hon. Member for Bedford, that the Government was unwilling to meet a direct challenge. As the question presented itself to him, the complaint of the Government was that the Opposition had hesitated and declined to make a direct challenge. There had certainly been plenty of time for all the Leaders, for all who wished to be Leaders, and for all who thought themselves Leaders of the Opposition to have arranged their plans of operation. Those various classes of Leaders might have assembled together; they might have squabbled together, and then made up their differences, and agreed upon some Amendment with which they could have appeared as the great united Party they were well known to be. It would have been both natural and easy for them to have arranged an Amendment to the Address, which in a crisis like this was the ancient and well-known course of procedure. But they were totally unprepared, and their bewilderment did not even stop here; they seemed totally to have forgotten that there was a Report on the Address. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich, in his character of the good angel who sat watching aloft, the super-Leader or post-Leader of his Party—which he was it was difficult to know, for he always appeared after the Leader to supply the casual deficiencies in the Leader's speech—stepped forward to refresh their memories, and his suggestion that there was a Report on the Address seemed a sudden revelation to Gentlemen opposite. But the hon. Member for Bedford was much too experienced a Member to have forgotten that there was a Report; and why he did not give Notice of his Amendment last night was the one thing which he had not explained. His solicitation amounted to a confession that the Liberal Party had out-generalled themselves in taking up a defenceless position, and had to fall back upon an appeal to the Chancellor of the Exchequer to take the command of their forces and lead them out of their own difficulty.

Mr. RYLANDS said, he thought there was one point in the present situation that ought not to be lost sight of by the House. It had been customary—and he believed the Government considered it a very convenient custom—that the Address in answer to the Speech from the Throne should be assented to unanimously. But there were exceptions; and he took it for granted that the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition (the Marquess of Hartington) was actuated by a desire to meet the convenience of the House by not moving an Amendment on the Address. In taking that course the noble Lord had disappointed the expectations of some of those who followed his Leadership, and who would have been glad if the question had been raised at the earliest possible moment, as an Amendment on the Address. He could also say that the noble Lord had disappointed a large number of earnest members of his own Party throughout the country, who were watching the proceedings of that House with the greatest anxiety, and they were most desirous that the first opportunity should be embraced for entering a protest against a war which they believed to be one of the most infamous ever waged. He, and those who thought with him, would, at all events, have the courage of their convictions. The hon. Member for Cambridge University (Mr. B. Hope) taunted the Liberal Party with its divisions; but they were quite prepared, out of regard for the convenience of the House, and out of respect to the noble Lord who led their Party, to keep back for a time their protest, but how were they met? in such a way that he hoped that the *dilettante* mode of dealing with Addresses to the Throne would be done away with. He understood the Chancellor of the Exchequer to say that while the noble Lord had not, out of courtesy, brought forward the question on the Address to the Throne the Government would cheerfully give every opportunity for its full discussion. They had found out by a mere accident that the terms of the Address were most unusual, and if it had not been altered it would have committed the whole House to an approval of the origin of the war. If that Address had not been altered they would have challenged the opinion of the House. It was subsequently altered, for the express purpose of preventing the necessity for an Amendment. This was only on a piece with the conduct of the Government, who had been acting in the same manner for several months past, leading the House on by assurances in which they were afterwards disappointed. They had treated the House of Commons —or, at all events, the Liberal Party— with contempt; they had kept back information from the House—["No, no!"] —the only opportunity they would have of raising the important Constitutional question would be on such a Motion as that of his hon. Friend the Member for Bedford, which the Government refused to give an opportunity of discussing. They hoped to have an opportunity for discussing, not only the war, but many questions relating to the war; and if the Government did not give the House an opportunity for discussing the Vote of Censure—from which they shrank—they would use all the Forms of the House which were in their possession with the view of discussing this Resolution of the hon. Gentleman on conditions which should ensure a fair and full discussion. Even now, he hoped the Government would give his hon. Friend Monday night for his Motion.

Mr. NEWDEGATE perfectly understood the position of the Opposition, and in the circumstances of this war, the contingencies of which were so wide, it was to the credit of the Opposition that they should have been unwilling even to appear to refuse the means of carrying it on. He rejoiced that Her Majesty's Government had convened Parliament in deference to what he had always understood to be the requirements of the law with respect to the employment of Indian troops out of India. But now that Parliament was assembled, Her Majesty's Government had declined to afford an opportunity to the hon. Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread) to discuss a censure of their policy. ["No, no!"] That he understood to be the reply of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He had replied to the hon. Member for Bedford, the noble Lord the Member for Radnor, and to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich, that there were opportunities at the command of the Opposition and at the general command of the House, and they must avail themselves of some of these. That was an answer which the Chancellor of the Exchequer had a perfect right to make; but inferences would be drawn from it which might not be agreeable. The answer might be given from a sense of duty; but, if so, the duty devolved upon the Opposition to avail itself of the privileges they possessed as Members of the House. He trusted that what had occurred would render Her Majesty's Opposition and the great body of the House careful how they parted with their privileges.

MR. GOSCHEN: The Government have not yet favoured us with their opinion as to the course which it has been indicated from this side must be necessary—namely, that unless the Government can make a satisfactory arrangement for the discussion of the Motion of the hon. Member for Bedford, the discussion on the Report on the Address ought to be adjourned, so that on that Report my hon. Friend the Member for Bedford may move his Amendment. I am sure the Government do not wish this discussion to close without giving us their views on that point; and I wish to know in what spirit the Government desire these debates on this most important issue to be conducted? The hon. Member for Cambridge University (Mr. B. Hope) indicated his views of the Opposition; but I trust the public will not be misled by pleasantries of that sort. The point of the case is this—that the Opposition desire a clear and unmistakable opportunity of debating the policy of Her Majesty's Government. The Government proposal is to this effect—that the discussion of the Vote of Censure is to be mixed up in an inextricable manner with another proposal which is only subsidiary. They charge us now with an omission in not moving an Amendment on the Address. [The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: Not "charge."] Not to the same extent in this House, perhaps; but in "another place" the charge was made in the most direct manner. To that charge we reply that the inexplicable delay in the issue of the Papers placed before us rendered it impossible to come to an adequate conclusion on the great issues involved in time to take that course. Hon. Members could not make up their minds without knowing the facts disclosed in that most important volume containing the Asian Papers. If they had known how the Government acted with Russia, and what weak remonstrances they made as to the advances in Central Asia, while they were making demonstrations against Afghanistan, it might have been possible to debate the subject without perusing the Papers. But, on this side at least, we feel there is an immense responsibility involved in the case; and we did not think it possible to debate it in the manner in which the country desired until those Papers had been thoroughly mastered. That is a fair and proper statement of the matter. The noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition placed that argument before the House, and it was not challenged by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I wish now to know whether hon. Members opposite and the Government do not desire that my noble Friend should continue to act in that loyal, patriotic, and Constitutional manner in which he discharged his duties to his Party and the country; or I should like to know whether they wish this side to have recourse to what they would be the first to call factious opposition the moment it was adopted, and if they, on their part, intend to disregard traditionary forms? The traditionary form is, that on Notice of a Vote of Censure the Government immediately postpone all other Business in order to take the opinion of the House upon that issue. In the first place, by delaying the Papers they have put us in a position that a debate upon the Address would have been too early and inadequate, and now they wish to reduce us to the position that the debate must be put off and be unsatisfactory. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer says "we must state our case." So far it is clear. What is to follow? The hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett) will propose a Motion on a subsidiary point, and a general discussion will take place upon it. It is perfectly clear that in that case the issues themselves which it is desired to raise cannot be satisfactorily discussed; and the country will know, if you refuse to give us this adequate discussion upon your conduct, that you are attempting to confuse our challenge with other issues. I wish to know the opinion of the Government with regard to the adjournment of the Report on the Address.

Mr. ASSHETON CROSS: We all regret that in debates on such a serious question as we are going to be engaged in next week, proceedings should be begun by any heated arguments, on one side or the other, entirely on side issues. I understood from the noble Lord last night that nothing was further from his desire than that it should be the case; and when we are accused of having placed matters in an awkward position before the House, we are entitled to deny that that awkwardness originated with us. How did this matter come before us? Both Houses were called together for one special purpose. Of course, an Address had to be moved to the Crown. The natural course on such a question as this is not unknown to the noble Lord, for it was successfully applied in his case in former years, and he is therefore perfectly aware of it. It was to challenge the policy of the Government in an Amendment on the Address. The noble Lord declined to do that; and I think I am not wrong in saying that he declined to do it because he did not wish to do anything in the way of stopping Supplies absolutely necessary for the war.

The Marquess of HARTINGTON: The right hon. Gentleman is somewhat under a misapprehension. What I said was that, in my opinion, an Amendment to the Address might have been a proper—perhaps the most proper—way of meeting the question; but that the conduct of the Government in keeping back the Papers until almost immediately before the meeting of Parliament rendered the adoption of that course impossible.

Mr. ASSHETON CROSS: And, at the same time, the noble Lord said he did not want there to be a semblance of opposing Supplies. If the course now suggested were followed, that would practically be the result. It was, however, open to those who challenged the policy of the Government to move an Amendment to the Address, which, in my opinion, would have been the most proper way of proceeding; or to have given Notice of moving an Amendment on the Report, or on the Motion which my hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for India proposes to submit to the House on Monday next. If the hon. Member for Bedford had announced it to be his intention to bring forward his Amendment on that Motion, I feel sure the hon. Member for Hackney would not have disputed his right to do so. The hon. Member for Bedford, however, has not chosen to take advantage of any of the three opportunities which were open to him. My purpose in rising was to make a suggestion that will, it seems to me, remove the difficulty, if hon. Members opposite will agree amongst themselves. Suppose the Report on the Address is taken to-day, and that on Monday the Under Secretary of State for India lays the case of the Government open on the withdrawal of the hon. Member for Hackney, no one will be injured. It is convenient that the course in both Houses should be the same. The Under Secretary of State could then be followed by the hon. Member for Bedford, and then we should go into the whole question, and it would be thoroughly discussed. If the hon. Gentleman succeeded in carrying his Amendment, the hon. Member for Hackney would, I have no doubt, be satisfied with the result; but if, on the other hand, the Amendment were to be defeated, then the Question put would be that "the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question," and the Amendment of the hon. Member for Hackney, being a simple negative of the Resolution proposed by the Government, he would be afforded an ample opportunity of discussing the question which he desires to raise in the fullest manner. That, in my opinion, would be the simplest and best course to adopt.

Mr. FAWCETT said, he would consult the convenience of the House in reference to his Amendment; but his Amendment was a very important one, and was totally distinct from the question raised by the hon. Member for Bedford. He had reason to believe that on both sides of the House there existed considerable difference of opinion as to the manner in which the financial burdens should be apportioned. If the war was Imperial rather than Indian in its scope and its results, it would be monstrously unjust to make the people of India pay for it; if, on the other hand, it was of the contrary character, its expense should be defrayed by India. That was, in short, the point raised by his Motion, which, as the hon. Member for Bedford would see, had no relation to his own Resolution. In the few remarks he would have to make he should avoid any consideration of the purposes of the war, beyond what was necessary to show that the charge should not be borne by the people of India. The Home Secretary had suggested a course which he must be well aware would place him (Mr. Fawcett) in a position of such absurdity as to his opportunity that he could not agree to it. There would be a debate of four nights, one of the greatest debates which had taken place for a quarter of a century, and the suggestion of the Home Secretary would lead to his rising at 3 o'clock in the morning when the division on the Vote of Censure took place to propose his Amendment. He would not further discuss that impracticable suggestion; but would only add that, in common with many hon. Members on that side of the House, he would have preferred the more direct and simple course of bringing forward the Motion of the hon. Member for Bedford on the Address. As, however, that had not been done, it seemed to him that the best remaining plan would be to bring it forward on the Report.

MR. A. MILLS confessed that he had been so much struck by the remarks of the hon. Member for Hackney, as to the necessity for keeping the discussion on the merits of the war distinct from considerations of finance, that he could not but agree with him in hoping that the Motion of the hon. Member for Bedford would be brought forward as an Amendment to the Report. He regretted that the traditional usage had not been followed; but it was necessary, at any rate, to preserve the distinction between the Motions of the hon. Members for Hackney and Bedford.

MR. RATHBONE remarked that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had thought it convenient that the plan he suggested should be adopted. He wished, however, to know to whom it was convenient, and for what reason? All the Opposition wanted was to have the question clearly and definitively debated, in the belief that the Government had a bad case; and, that being so, he could understand that it would be very convenient for them so to cloud and trouble the waters of the discussion that the country would not be able to judge between the two parties. That was a convenience they had no intention of affording.

MR. CHILDERS said, that it would probably now be admitted on all sides that his noble Friend had been right in not proposing any Amendment to the Address on account of the short time they had had for perusing 500 pages of Blue Book; but when it had been remarked that a different course had been taken by him on another occasion, he would remind the House that that was after the General Election of 1859, when the Reform question had been discussed for months. At the present moment they were at great disadvantage, because the usual methods for discussing the policy of a war had been deliberately taken out of their hands. Take the nearest analogous case — that of the summoning of Parliament on account of the Abyssinian War. On that occasion not one, but several distinct opportunities were afforded for discussing the whole question. After the Address had been adopted the entire case of the Government was stated, on the Motion for Supply, by the Leader of the House. That was followed by a Ways and Means debate, and then by a Motion as to the charge on the Revenues of India. Some objected, in the debate in Supply, both to the action of the then Government and to that of their Predecessors; but that debate had been concluded before the specific question of the charge on India for the expenses of the war had been discussed. In the present case, however, the question was simply the lesser and more specific one raised by the difference of opinion as to what share of the military burden should be borne by India. It would seem that the Government were disposed to take advantage of the fact that no Amendment had been moved to the Address, in order to preclude the Opposition from a general debate before the comparatively less important—though still very important—subject raised by the Under Secretary of State came before the House on Monday. The Home Secretary had suggested that when his Colleague came to move a Resolution relating to the payment of the expenses of the war by India, an Amendment might be moved by the hon. Member for Bedford; and that after this matter was disposed of the hon. Member for Hackney might satisfy himself by merely voting a negative to the original Motion. But why should the hon Member for

Hackney so satisfy himself? He might wish to qualify that opposition by language and a Resolution very different from a bare negative. He (Mr. Childers) did not think there was any precedent for such a proposal. It had been suggested that this question should be now raised on the Report. But this could not be done to-day, for it was not possible to propose an Amendment without Notice, and no Notice could have been given until to-day. The House would agree that the first available day ought to be taken; and he thought they had better adjourn the Report of the Address that night, and take it on Monday. They could then thresh out the whole question of the war on the important Motion of the hon. Member for Bedford. It would be time to consider the Motion of the hon. Member for Hackney after this subject had been discussed.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said that, having already spoken, he had no right to say anything further except by the indulgence of the House. He thought that the convenience of the House would be consulted by accepting the proposal that had just been made. The Government had, of course, no desire in any way to preclude discussion; but he thought the proposal made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department would have given the hon. Member for Hackney every advantage that he could have obtained by any other course. Whatever course was taken, he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) understood there would be a general discussion of the whole merits of the war in the first instance, and then a subsequent discussion would be raised by the hon. Member for Hackney as to how it was to be charged. According to the proposal made by his right hon. Friend, they would take the Motion of the hon. Member for Bedford first, and then take another night for the other. Nobody would ever have supposed they could take up the Motion of the hon. Member for Hackney at 3 o'clock in the morning. If it had come up at such an hour, it would have been allowed to stand over until the following day. The Government had no desire to force the matter forward upon the House. They would agree to the adjournment of the discussion on the Report of the Address till Monday. Before sitting down, however, he must take notice of the observation of the right hon. Member for the City of London (Mr. Goschen), that the Government had intentionally kept back the Papers. That was a remark that ought not to have been made. The Government had endeavoured until the last moment to bring about an amicable settlement. It was not until the Ameer declined to send an answer to the Ultimatum that warlike measures were found necessary; and then the Government took immediate steps to prepare the Papers and lay them on the Table of the House. He assumed that if the discussion on the Report and the Motion of the hon. Member for Bedford were resumed on Monday the House would be prepared to continue it *de die in diem.*

MR. WHITBREAD assented.

Motion *agreed to.*

House, at rising, to adjourn till Monday next.

QUESTIONS.

AFGHANISTAN — RUSSIA AND THE AMEER—GENERAL KAUFFMANN.

QUESTION.

MR. A. MILLS asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether any official information has been received by the Government concerning the alleged presentation of an address by General Kauffmann on behalf of the Emperor of Russia, to the Ameer of Afghanistan?

MR. BOURKE: No information has been received on the subject.

AFGHANISTAN—REPULSE OF THE MISSION.—QUESTION.

LORD ROBERT MONTAGU asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, What is the authority for Lord Lytton's statement in the telegram of September 26th, 1878 (not contained among the facts which were given in his three previous messages), viz.:—

> "Officer commanding fort said . . . but for personal friendship he would, in obedience to the Ameer's orders, have shot down Cavagnari and his suite;"

why neither the account given by the Indian Government on the same day (p. 239), nor that of October 3rd (p. 247), mention such a grave occurrence; if he could explain why Major Cavagnari, in his report of the affair, says—

> "Faiz Muhammed Khan, from first to last, has behaved in a most courteous manner, and very favourably impressed both Colonel Jenkins and myself;"

and, why Sir Neville Chamberlain, in writing his demand on September 22nd, (p. 259) to the Commander of Ali Musjid, said—

> "You declared that you had received no instructions to permit the British Mission to pass, and stated that you would certainly oppose it by force if it advanced?"

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, if my noble Friend will turn to the next page to that which he has quoted from the Blue Book I think he will find an answer to his Question. At page 249 he will find a Report from Major Cavagnari to Sir Neville Chamberlain, and the 11th paragraph contains a full account of what took place. It is there stated by Major Cavagnari that Faiz Muhammed Khan came down to meet them, and stated that he was not allowed to proceed, and then he makes this observation—

> "That if he had not been friendly disposed he would not have consented to the present interview or have restrained his levies from firing on my party."

At page 251, in the Report from Colonel Jenkins, who was present on the same occasion, there is the following passage:—

> "Major Cavagnari then asked whether, under these circumstances, the Sirdar would oppose the passage of the Mission; and the Sirdar said that he would certainly do so. He further said 'You may take it as a kindness, and because I remember friendship, that I do not fire upon you for what you have done already.'"

These are the grounds upon which the Indian Government spoke of the armed opposition by which they were encountered, and I think that is an answer to the Question. The noble Lord asks me, whether I can explain how it was that Major Cavagnari, in his report of the affair, said that—

> "From first to last Faiz Muhammed Khan behaved in the most courteous manner, and very favourably impressed Colonel Jenkins and myself."

No doubt Faiz Muhammed Khan had a very disagreeable duty imposed upon him in resisting the English Mission, and I presume that he discharged that disagreeable duty with courtesy, and like a gentleman, as no doubt he is. It is stated that he favourably impressed both Major Cavagnari and Colonel Jenkins. His restraining his levies from firing would favourably impress them.

LORD ROBERT MONTAGU: I would ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, If he does not think such an interpretation of the words quoted is inconsistent with those other words quoted by Sir Neville Chamberlain; and whether the real meaning of them is not this—"You see how perfectly friendly I am to you. You see I still maintain my ancient friendship." ["Order!"]

MR. SPEAKER remarked that the noble Lord was not entitled to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer for an expression of opinion on this point.

LORD ROBERT MONTAGU: Then I will ask whether this is not the meaning of the words—"As a proof of my great friendship for you, I have restrained my levies from firing on you."

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: That was not the impression that was made on the minds of our two emissaries. Colonel Jenkins, in his Report to Sir Neville Chamberlain, says that had it not been for the great courtesy and care exercised by Major Cavagnari a collision would probably have taken place. No doubt there was considerable danger; and if Major Cavagnari had not, with considerable dexterity and tact, changed the subject, it is extremely likely that serious consequences would have ensued.

THE EASTERN QUESTION—THE TREATY OF BERLIN—ARTICLE 24.

QUESTION.

MR. W. CARTWRIGHT asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether any Communications have been addressed to, or any Correspondence exchanged between Her Majesty's Government and France or any other signatory Power of the Berlin Treaty in respect of some proposed action in the sense of Article 24 of that Treaty, with the view of facilitating the rectification of the frontier between Greece and Turkey, as suggested in Protocol 13 of the Berlin Congress; and, if there has been any such Communication or Correspondence, whether Her

Majesty's Government intend to lay it before Parliament.

Mr. BOURKE: The subject mentioned in the Question is still under negotiation, and when these negotiations are finished the Papers will be submitted to Parliament.

AFGHANISTAN—RUSSIAN POLICY.

QUESTION.

Lord ROBERT MONTAGU asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, with regard to the following statement made by Lord Lytton and Sir Lewis Pelly on 10th October, 1876 (p. 183) :—

> "Our only interest in maintaining the independence of Afghanistan is to provide for the security of our frontier. But the moment we cease to regard Afghanistan as a friendly and firmly allied State, what is there to prevent us from providing for the security of our frontier by an understanding with Russia, which might have the effect of wiping Afghanistan out of the map altogether? If the Ameer does not desire to come to a speedy understanding with us, Russia does; and she desires it at his expense;"

to what negotiation or proposal did the Viceroy allude; and, whether, as Afghanistan is now not a friendly State, any understanding has been come to between England and Russia on the subject?

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER, in reply, said, that as he read the passage referred to by the noble Lord, and as it was understood by his noble Friend the Secretary of State for India, it simply conveyed the general impression which the Viceroy had derived from the conversation with the Russian Minister as to the action of Russia. There was no ground for interpreting it as referring to any formal proposals by Russia on the subject.

THE BOARD OF WORKS (IRELAND).

QUESTION.

Major NOLAN asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland, If the Government intend to take steps towards the re-organization of the Board of Works in Ireland?

Mr. J. LOWTHER: The Board of Works is under the control of the Treasury, and my hon. Friend the Secretary of that Department informs me that steps are being taken with a view to a re-organization of the Board. I, however, have no personal knowledge of the matter, which is not in my Department.

Mr. Cartwright

Major NOLAN: I cannot say that I am satisfied with the answer which is given me by the right hon. Gentleman. Therefore, I give Notice that I shall repeat the Question to the Secretary to the Treasury, and shall also ask him if the Government intend to make any announcement on the subject before the adjournment of the House for the Christmas Recess.

PURCHASE OF LAND (IRELAND)—OCCUPYING TENANTS.

QUESTION.

Mr. SHAW LEFEVRE asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Whether it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to introduce a measure for the purpose of giving greater facilities for occupying tenants of land in Ireland to become owners of their holdings by purchase in pursuance of the evidence and Report of the Committee of last Session on this subject?

Mr. J. LOWTHER: The Report of the Select Committee referred to and the Evidence are now engaging the attention of the Government, and it would be premature for me to state now what the decision of the Government may be. In due time it will be communicated to the House.

Mr. SHAW LEFEVRE: I shall call attention to the subject again, and move a Resolution, when the House meets after the Recess, in case the course proposed by the Government should prove unsatisfactory.

INDIAN DESPATCHES—OPINIONS OF THE COUNCIL OF INDIA.—QUESTION.

Mr. W. E. FORSTER asked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether any opinions were given by any Members of the Council of India with respect to the Despatches from the Secretary of State for India to the Governor General of India, dated 22nd January and 19th November, 1875; and, if so, whether the Government will give the House their opinions; whether he can give the House Captain Grey's Letter to Noor Mahemed Shah, referred to in Dr. Bellew's Memorandum, dated Peshawur, 28th January 1877; whether there is any record of Sir Lewis Pelly's demand from the Cabul Envoy for an explanation of the reported hostility of the Ameer's language and conduct while engaged in friendly and pacific negotiation with the British Government, referred to in paragraph 33 of Lord Lytton's Despatch of 10th May 1877, and of the Envoy's reply to this demand, referred to in paragraph 34 of the same Despatch; and, if there be such record, whether it can be produced; and, whether the Native Agent, Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan, made any report of his Mission to Cabul on his return to Simla in October 1878; and, whether, if so, such report can be produced?

MR. E. STANHOPE: The letters of Captain Grey and also the letters which passed between Sir Lewis Pelly and the Envoy shall be included in the forthcoming Papers. The only official account which we have received at the India Office of the Report of our Native Agent is a very short telegraphic Report; but my noble Friend is in communication with the Viceroy on the subject. With respect to Lord Salisbury's despatches to the Governor General of India, dated the 22nd January and 19th November, 1875, no opinions by any Members of the Council are recorded in the proceedings. They were approved by the Secret Committee of the Council. [MR. FAWCETT: The Political Committee of the Council?] I prefer to call it by the name of the Political and Secret Committee. While under discussion notes were written by three of the Members for the consideration of their Colleagues and the Secretary of State. These notes were of a strictly confidential character, and it has never been the practice to communicate their contents, or, in fact, to make their existence known. If such notes were to be published, a Secret Committee would be useless, and I am afraid we cannot, therefore, undertake to produce them. The letter of the Native Agent will be produced with the rest of the Papers.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT said, that with reference to the Report of the Native Agent's Mission to Cabul there were three letters written by Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan, but only abstracts or extracts were given of the contents in the Blue Book. As the letters were written letters, he presumed they might be given as well as the telegraphic extracts.

MR. W. E. FORSTER: Do I understand that we shall receive these Papers as early as possible on Monday?

MR. E. STANHOPE; They will be ready early to-morrow.

THE AFGHAN PAPERS.—QUESTIONS.

GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOUR asked the Under Secretary of State for India, If the Papers referred to at page 70 of the Afghan Papers will be laid before the House?

MR. E. STANHOPE: The Papers referred to by the hon. and gallant Member consist of voluminous Minutes relating mainly to the affairs of Quetta and Beloochistan, and should be produced together with the Papers relating to the subject. That is the reason why they have not been included among the present series.

GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOUR: Can I see them before the debate?

MR. E. STANHOPE: No, Sir.

GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOUR: I thought so. ["Order!"]

MR. E. STANHOPE: It is not usual to show Papers to any individual Member which have been refused to the House generally.

AFGHANISTAN (EXPENSES OF MILITARY OCCUPATION.)—QUESTIONS.

MR. FAWCETT asked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether the consent of the Council of the Secretary of State for India has been obtained to any of the expenditure hitherto incurred in connection with the Military Expedition against the Ameer of Afghanistan; and, if so, when this consent was obtained and whether it was unanimous; and, whether any opinions have been recorded by the Council as to the justice of throwing these charges upon the Revenue of India; and, if so, whether there will be any objection to lay the record of these opinions before Parliament?

MR. E. STANHOPE: On Tuesday last a proposal came before the Council of the Secretary of State for increasing the Native Army in India. It was agreed to by a unanimous vote of the Council. Since that time certain opinions and reasons have, I understand, been prepared, but have not yet been recorded in the proceedings of the Council. When they are so recorded, if the hon. Member likes to move for them, there will be no objection to their production.

Mr. FAWCETT: I will move for them; but the Under Secretary of State has not answered my Question. It was, Whether the consent of the Council has been obtained to the expenditure which has been incurred in Afghanistan; and, if so, on what day?

Mr. GOSCHEN: I would ask a further Question, and that is, whether the Council of India has been consulted on any single point connected with the outbreak of this war before Tuesday last?

Mr. E. STANHOPE: Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will be good enough to give Notice of that Question. With regard to the Question of the hon. Member for Hackney, as I understand it, the object was to know whether certain dissents of the Members of the Council had been made, and whether we knew of them. I have already told him that when such dissents are entered upon the records, if the hon. Member moves for them, they will be presented to Parliament.

Mr. FAWCETT: I am extremely sorry to trouble the Under Secretary of State for India, but my Question is divided into two parts. The Under Secretary has answered the latter part of the Question; but the first part is absolutely distinct, and refers to the expenditure "hitherto incurred." What I want to know is, whether the consent of the Council of the Secretary of State for India has been obtained to any of the expenditure hitherto incurred in connection with the military expedition against the Ameer of Afghanistan; and, if so, when that consent was obtained, and whether it was unanimous?

Mr. E. STANHOPE: I have to say that the consent of the Council has not been necessary in any case that has hitherto occurred. The only occasion in which any reference to past expenditure has come before the Council was on Tuesday last.

Mr. FAWCETT: Then I will ask—and repeat the Question on Monday, if necessary—if the consent of the Council of the Secretary of State for India has not been obtained to the expenditure which has hitherto been incurred—considering it is distinctly provided by the 41st section of the Government of India Act that no expenditure of the Revenues of India, whether in India or elsewhere, can be allowed, except by the consent of a majority of the Council of the Secretary of State for India—by whose authority this expenditure has been incurred?

Mr. E. STANHOPE: I think the House will at once see that that is an argumentative Question. At the same time, I may say that I do not at all agree with this reading of the statute; and I shall at the proper time be prepared to argue the matter at much greater length than I could devote to it now.

General Sir GEORGE BALFOUR asked, if it was the intention of the Government to lay Papers on the Table connected with the assumption of the Ameer of Afghanistan in respect to Quetta?

PARLIAMENT—COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC BUSINESS.—QUESTIONS.

Mr. NEWDEGATE wished to know, whether the Chancellor of the Exchequer intended to submit to the House the Resolutions which had been agreed to by the Committee on Public Business last Session? No. 3 of those Resolutions was to the effect that no hon. Member should move for the second reading of a Bill which he might introduce a day later than one month from the date of the first reading. There were 51 Notices of Bills.

Mr. MITCHELL HENRY wished to know, whether the hon. Member was not making use of the indulgence of the House in a very unusual way?

Mr. SPEAKER said, he understood the hon. Member for North Warwickshire did not intend to raise any discussion. At the same time, he must point out to him that he could only put any Question by the indulgence of the House.

Mr. NEWDEGATE thought it would have been competent to him to have raised the question on the first Bill; but that would be invidious, and therefore he had preferred to take his present course. There were 34 Wednesdays between now and the end of July.

Mr. SPEAKER: The hon. Member is now going into matter which he is not entitled to go into.

Mr. NEWDEGATE would not trespass on the House. There were 51 Notices; and he asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he would move the second and third Resolutions which he carried in the Committee on Public Business last Session?

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said, he was afraid that he could not give a very full answer to the Question. Undoubtedly the Resolution was adopted by the Committee to which the hon. Gentleman referred; but he was not at the present moment able to say whether he would make proposals to that effect in the House. He would not do so, at any rate, in the present short Session.

CRIMINAL LAW—THE MURDER IN KENT.—QUESTION.

MR. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN wished to ask the Home Secretary a Question of which he had given him private Notice. It was, Whether the Government were in possession of information more detailed than that which had appeared in the newspapers in reference to the terrible murder in Kent; and also whether, considering the circumstances of the case, the Government had any intention of offering a reward for the discovery of the murderer?

MR. ASSHETON CROSS, in reply, said, he had no information at all on the subject, but he expected to be in possession of some to-morrow. If it should appear desirable to offer a reward, he should do so; but, as his right hon. Friend knew, rewards were not offered by the Home Office until a verdict had been returned by the Coroner's Jury.

THE ADDRESS IN ANSWER TO THE QUEEN'S SPEECH.

Report of Address *brought up*, and read.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the said Address be now read a second time."

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Debate be adjourned till Monday next."—(*Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer.*)

Motion *agreed to.*

MOTIONS.

BURIAL LAW AMENDMENT BILL.

LEAVE. FIRST READING.

Considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

MR. BALFOUR *moved*—

> "That the Chairman be directed to move the House, that leave be given to bring in a Bill to amend the Burial Laws."

MR. BERESFORD HOPE took that opportunity of giving Notice that, on the second reading of the Bill, and at any subsequent stage, he would give it every opposition in his power, as he believed it to be a measure eminently calculated to add infinite confusion to a question infinitely confounded already.

Motion *agreed to.*

Resolution *reported:* — Bill *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. BALFOUR, Lord FRANCIS HERVEY, and Mr. WAIT.

Bill *presented,* and read the first time. [Bill 10.]

CONSECRATION OF CHURCHYARDS ACT (1867) AMENDMENT BILL.

LEAVE. FIRST READING.

Considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

MR. MONK *moved*—

> "That the Chairman be directed to move the House, that leave be given to bring in a Bill to amend 'The Consecration of Churchyards Act, 1867.'"

MR. DILLWYN said, he thought it better to oppose the Bill—the object of which was to allow clergymen to set apart a portion of the graveyard for the interment of Dissenters—on the first reading, as it would save the time of the House, if the Bill was one which the House was likely to reject. He had long considered that the practice of introducing Private Bills as a matter of course should be put an end to. The Public Business of the House had become so enormous that something should be done to relieve the pressure; and he would commence by opposing this particular Bill, which, if introduced, would help to crowd the Orders of the House without a probability of its being carried.

Mr. NEWDEGATE did not dispute the right to oppose the introduction of a Bill; but there was this difficulty in pursuing that course—that it was impossible for the House to know upon what it was voting. He had suggested to the Committee upon Public Business that a copy of the Bill should be deposited in the Public Bill Office three days before the Motion for introduction must be made, but the Committee did not adopt the suggestion. There were 51 Notices for introduction of Bills already on the Paper, and there would be only 31 Wednesdays down to the end of July, so that there would be something like two Bills for every Wednesday. Some private Members' Bills might, no doubt, be down for Tuesdays; but one effect of this would be that unless Government should consent to give exceptional privileges in favour of a Bill, that scarcely anybody wanted, most important measures might be strangled. Looking forward to the time when the Chancellor of the Exchequer would submit the Resolution to the House, he was not prepared to oppose the first reading of this Bill. He advocated the printing of Bills before they were read a first time.

Mr. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN deprecated the premature discussion of Resolutions, some of them adopted only by a majority of the Select Committee on Public Business last year. He had put on the Notice Paper a Question, asking the Government what course they intended to take with regard to the Resolutions of that Committee? Without seeing the Bill, he was not prepared to oppose the first reading, although he should probably resist its further progress. For the present they had better adhere to the old Rule, under which all that was implied by a first reading was that the subject was one which it was fitting the House should consider.

Mr. BERESFORD HOPE said, he must protest against the hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate) stealing a march on the other Members of the Public Business Committee by quoting from its Report at such length recommendations which were, after all, very likely to come to nothing. It was taking an undue advantage of those other Members who were just as able to do the same, but who refrained from such an irregularity. At the same time, he hoped that the hon. Member for Swansea (Mr. Dillwyn) would not persevere with his Motion. He was himself not averse from considering how the custom of dealing with proposed legislation at that stage might, with due precautions, be revived. After all, it had not been so long obsolete; for he had himself in the last Parliament, not so many Sessions back, defeated Mr. Auberon Herbert on a Motion for leave to bring in a Bill. But he did not think it quite fair on the part of the hon. Member for Swansea arbitrarily to select one out of many Bills, and, without Notice, attempt to strangle it.

Mr. OSBORNE MORGAN remarked, that if this Bill was the same as that brought in last year, it was about the worst measure ever introduced, and he should give it his most strenuous opposition. The hon. Member (Mr. Monk) was greatly mistaken if he thought it would satisfy the claims of Nonconformists. He hoped his hon. Friend (Mr. Dillwyn) would be satisfied with calling attention to the subject, and would not divide against the introduction of the Bill.

Mr. MONK thought his hon. Friend might have given Notice of his intended opposition to the Bill, as he knew perfectly well that it had been read a second time in the last Session; and that, although it was then opposed, the opposition had not been carried to a division, the feeling of the House being almost unanimous in its favour. He should, however, be perfectly ready to meet his hon. Friend at the proper time.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: I think it would be most undesirable at the present moment, and on a single question of this kind, to make a change in our practical system of proceeding. I think it open to very great doubt whether it might not be wise for the House to return to a practice which is perfectly legal, but has become almost obsolete—namely, to object to Bills on their first reading. It is a practice on which there is a great deal to be said; but it should be practised under the full understanding that the House had considered the proposal. I do not certainly think that on this occasion it would be proper to put it in practice without further investigation.

Sir CHARLES W. DILKE said, there were occasions on which it was distinctly desirable that Bills should be opposed on their first reading, and he would give Notice that he would oppose the Licensing Bill that night, but he appealed to his hon. Friend (Mr. Dillwyn) not to oppose this particular Bill.

MR. ASSHETON supported the Bill.

MR. DILLWYN explained that his object had been to curtail the Business of the House by relieving the overcrowded state of the Order Book. He would give way to the appeal made to him, and not press his opposition to the introduction of the Bill.

Motion *agreed to.*

Resolution *reported:* — Bill *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. MONK, Mr. GRANTHAM, and Mr. FORSYTH.

Bill *presented,* and read the first time. [Bill 13.]

INTERMENTS IN CHURCHYARDS BILL.

LEAVE. FIRST READING.

Considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

MR. RITCHIE *moved*—

"That the Chairman be directed to move the House, that leave be given to bring in a Bill to enable Incumbents of parishes or ecclesiastical districts, or Ministers in charge of the same, to permit Interments in Churchyards with a religious service other than that of the Church of England, or without any religious service."

MR. DILLWYN said, that he had an objection to this Bill; but in deference to the feeling of the House he would not oppose its introduction, though he hoped that a different course would next year be taken in regard to the introduction of Bills.

Motion *agreed to.*

Resolution *reported:* — Bill *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. RITCHIE, Mr. GORST, Mr. WOODD, and Mr. SAMPSON LLOYD.

Bill *presented,* and read the first time. [Bill 24.]

LICENSING LAWS AMENDMENT BILL.

LEAVE. FIRST READING.

Considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

MR. STAVELEY HILL *moved*—

"That the Chairman be directed to move the House, that leave be given to bring in a Bill to amend the Licensing Laws."

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE said, that his objection to this Motion was that it ought to be made later. Last Session the Government recommended the hon. Member to wait for the Report of the Lords' Committee; he did not do so, however, but endeavoured to press the Bill. The Lords' Committee had not yet reported, and the Government would give no encouragement for carrying Bills of this kind until the Lords' Committee had reported.

MR. MUNDELLA hoped that the same privilege would be extended to the hon. and learned Member as had been afforded to every other hon. Member, and that the Bill would be allowed to be introduced and read a first time. All the magistrates in the country were in favour of it. It related to the important subject of grocers' licences, and it was very desirable that the subject should be discussed.

MR. STAVELEY HILL hoped the House would allow the measure to be discussed by giving leave for its introduction.

SIR WILFRID LAWSON pointed out that there were six drink Bills on the Paper, and that four had been allowed to be introduced *sub silentio;* and it would be rather hard upon the hon. and learned Member not to allow this Bill to be brought in at once, as the Lords' Committee might sit for ever.

SIR HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON said, he did not think it fair that this measure should be singled out from a number of others for opposition. Until it was so decided by some Resolution of the House, it would not be well to subject Bills of this sort to opposition on the Motion for Leave to introduce them. The Bill would not be taken for second reading until after the Lords' Committee had reported, if that Report were made in sufficient time, and when it came on again the Government would state what they proposed to do.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN (for Sir CHARLES W. DILKE) said, that no division was intended to be taken at this stage. He submitted, however, that the question was one of very great importance, and required the urgent attention of the House.

Motion *agreed to.*

Resolution *reported:* — Bill *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. STAVELEY HILL, Mr. MUNDELLA, and Mr. RODWELL.

Bill *presented,* and read the first time. [Bill 25.]

CHURCH OF SCOTLAND BILL.

LEAVE. FIRST READING.

Considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

SIR ALEXANDER GORDON *moved*—

"That the Chairman be directed to move the House, that leave be given to bring in a Bill to make further provisions in regard to the Church of Scotland; to facilitate the re-union therewith of other Presbyterian Churches in Scotland; and for other purposes relating thereto."

MR. M'LAREN wished to ask the Speaker, whether it was competent to a private Member to introduce a Bill which affected the Church of Scotland?

MR. SPEAKER said, there was no objection to the introduction of the Bill; but it could not be passed through the subsequent stages if it touched the interests of the Crown without the consent of the Crown being first given.

Motion *agreed to.*

Resolution *reported:* — Bill *ordered* to be brought in by Sir ALEXANDER GORDON, and Mr. MACKINTOSH.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 39.]

MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY (SCOTLAND) BILL.

On Motion of Mr. ANDERSON, Bill to amend the Law regarding the Property of Married Women in Scotland, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. ANDERSON, Sir ROBERT ANSTRUTHER, Mr. ORR EWING, Mr. M'LAREN, and Mr. LYON PLAYFAIR.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 1.]

MEDICAL ACT (1858) AMENDMENT BILL.

On Motion of Dr. LUSH, Bill to amend "The Medical Act, 1858," *ordered* to be brought in by Dr. LUSH, Sir TREVOR LAWRENCE, and Sir JOSEPH M'KENNA.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 2.]

HYPOTHEC ABOLITION (SCOTLAND) BILL.

On Motion of Mr. VANS AGNEW, Bill to abolish the Landlord's right of Hypothec for Rent of Land in Scotland, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. VANS AGNEW, Mr. BAILLIE HAMILTON, Sir GEORGE DOUGLAS, and Colonel ALEXANDER.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 3.]

CONVENTION (IRELAND) ACT REPEAL BILL.

On Motion of Sir JOSEPH M'KENNA, Bill to repeal "The Convention (Ireland) Act," *ordered* to be brought in by Sir JOSEPH M'KENNA, Mr. P. J. SMYTH, and Mr. DOWNING.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 4.]

VOLUNTEER CORPS (IRELAND) BILL.

On Motion of Mr. O'CLERY, Bill to authorise the enrolment of Volunteer Corps in Ireland, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. O'CLERY, Major NOLAN, Lord FRANCIS CONYNGHAM, and Major O'BEIRNE.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 5.]

PERMISSIVE PROHIBITORY LIQUOR BILL.

Considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

Resolved, That the Chairman be directed to move the House, that leave be given to bring in a Bill to enable Owners and Occupiers of Property in certain districts to prevent the common sale of Intoxicating Liquors within such districts.

Resolution *reported:* — Bill *ordered* to be brought in by Sir WILFRID LAWSON, Sir THOMAS BAZLEY, Mr. RICHARD, Dr. CAMERON, Mr. DALWAY, Mr. DOWNING, and Mr. CHARLES LEWIS.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 6.]

ELECTIVE COUNTY BOARDS (IRELAND) BILL.

On Motion of Major NOLAN, Bill to establish Elective County Boards in Ireland, *ordered* to be brought in by Major NOLAN, Mr. O'CLERY, Mr. FAY, and Mr. O'SULLIVAN.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 7.]

WASTE LANDS RECLAMATION (IRELAND) BILL.

On Motion of Mr. COLLINS, Bill for the Reclamation of Waste Lands in Ireland, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. COLLINS, Mr. MACCARTHY, Mr. DOWNING, and Major NOLAN.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 8.]

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (PROPERTY QUALIFICATION ABOLITION) BILL.

On Motion of Mr. MUNDELLA, Bill to abolish the Property Qualification for Members of Municipal Corporations and Local Governing Bodies, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. MUNDELLA, Mr. CHAMBERLAIN, Mr. BURT, and Mr. SULLIVAN.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 9.]

HOURS OF POLLING (BOROUGHS) BILL.

On Motion of Mr. CHAMBERLAIN, Bill to extend the Hours of Polling at Elections in Boroughs other than metropolitan, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. CHAMBERLAIN, Sir CHARLES W. DILKE, Dr. CAMERON, Major NOLAN, Mr. MUNDELLA, Mr. RATHBONE, and Mr. HENRY SAMUELSON.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 11.]

MONEY LAWS (IRELAND) BILL.

Considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

Resolved, That the Chairman be directed to move the House, that leave be given to bring in a Bill to amend the Money Laws of Ireland.

Resolution *reported :* — Bill *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. DELAHUNTY and Mr. RICHARD POWER.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 12.]

RATING OF TOWNS (IRELAND) BILL.

On Motion of Mr. O'SHAUGHNESSY, Bill to alter the Law with regard to the Rating of Towns in Ireland, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. O'SHAUGHNESSY, Mr. BUTT, and Sir JOSEPH M'KENNA.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 14.]

LICENSING BOARDS (SCOTLAND) BILL.

Considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

Resolved, That the Chairman be directed to move the House, that leave be given to bring in a Bill to enable Ratepayers in Scotland to elect Licensing Boards.

Resolution *reported :* — Bill *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. FORTESCUE HARRISON, Sir GEORGE BALFOUR, and Dr. CAMERON.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 15.]

VALUATION OF LANDS (SCOTLAND) AMENDMENT BILL.

On Motion of Sir WINDHAM ANSTRUTHER, Bill to amend the Act relating to the Valuation of Lands and Heritages in Scotland, *ordered* to be brought in by Sir WINDHAM ANSTRUTHER, Mr. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN, and Sir GRAHAM MONTGOMERY.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 16.]

COLONIAL MARRIAGES BILL.

On Motion of Mr. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN, Bill to amend the Law with respect to certain Colonial Marriages, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN and Sir THOMAS CHAMBERS.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 17.]

CLERICAL DISABILITIES BILL.

Considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

Resolved, That the Chairman be directed to move the House, that leave be given to bring in a Bill to extend the provisions of "The Clerical Disabilities Removal Act, 1870."

Resolution *reported :* — Bill *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. GOLDNEY, Mr. HIBBERT, and Sir WINDHAM ANSTRUTHER.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 18.]

SPIRITS IN BOND BILL.

Considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

Resolved, That the Chairman be directed to move the House, that leave be given to bring in a Bill for the improvement of the quality of Spirits in Bond.

Resolution *reported :* — Bill *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. O'SULLIVAN, Major NOLAN, Mr. BLENNERHASSETT, Captain PIM, and Mr. STACPOOLE.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 19.]

SALE OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS ON SUNDAY BILL.

On Motion of Mr. STEVENSON, Bill to prohibit the Sale of Intoxicating Liquors on Sunday, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. STEVENSON, Mr. CHARLES WILSON, Mr. BIRLEY, Mr. OSBORNE MORGAN, Mr. WILLIAM M'ARTHUR, and Mr. JAMES.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 20.]

EMPLOYERS AND WORKMEN ACT, 1875 (EXTENSION TO SEAMEN) BILL.

On Motion of Mr. BURT, Bill to extend the provisions of "The Employers and Workmen Act, 1875," to seamen whilst they are in British waters, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. BURT, Mr. JOSEPH COWEN, Mr. MUNDELLA, Mr. GOURLEY, and Mr. GORST.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 21.]

DISQUALIFICATION BY MEDICAL RELIEF BILL.

On Motion of Mr. RATHBONE, Bill to remove disqualification by Medical Relief for Infectious or Contagious Disease, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. RATHBONE, Sir JOHN KENNAWAY, Sir CHARLES W. DILKE, and Mr. RITCHIE.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 22.]

JOINT STOCK BANKS (ACCOUNTS) BILL.

Considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

Resolved, That the Chairman be directed to move the House, that leave be given to bring in a Bill to provide for the compulsory audit of the Accounts of Joint Stock Banks, and for the annual publication by them of Statements of Accounts according to a prescribed form.

Resolution *reported*:—Bill *ordered* to be brought in by Dr. CAMERON, Mr. STEVENSON, Mr. BENJAMIN WHITWORTH, Mr. PENNINGTON, and Mr. JAMES STEWART.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 23.]

LANDLORD AND TENANT (IRELAND) BILL.

On Motion of Mr. HERBERT, Bill to provide for the equitable settlement of Rent in certain cases of difference between Landlords and Tenants in Ireland; and to make better provision as to Notices to Quit; and for other purposes relating thereto, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. HERBERT, Mr. KING-HARMAN, and Mr. DEASE.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 26.]

RELIEF OF INSANE POOR BILL.

On Motion of Mr. RODWELL, Bill to make better provision for the maintenance, reception, and relief of the Insane, Imbecile, or Infirm Poor chargeable in Unions and Parishes in England other than in the Metropolis, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. RODWELL, Sir BALDWIN LEIGHTON, and Mr. BRISTOWE.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 27.]

CRUELTY TO ANIMALS BILL.

On Motion of Mr. HOLT, Bill to amend the Law relating to Cruelty to Animals, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. HOLT, Mr. ASHLEY, Mr. HARDCASTLE, Sir CHARLES LEGARD, and Mr. CHARLES WILSON.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 28.]

VOTERS REGISTRATION (IRELAND) BILL.

On Motion of Mr. MELDON, Bill to assimilate the Law relating to the Registration of Parliamentary Voters in England and in Ireland, and to amend the Law relating to the Registration of Voters in Ireland, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. MELDON, Mr. BUTT, and Mr. MITCHELL HENRY.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 29.]

MARRIAGE WITH A DECEASED WIFE'S SISTER BILL.

On Motion of Sir THOMAS CHAMBERS, Bill to render lawful Marriage with a Deceased Wife's Sister, *ordered* to be brought in by Sir THOMAS CHAMBERS, Mr. MORLEY, and Dr. CAMERON.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 30.]

ARTIZANS' DWELLINGS ACT (1868) EXTENSION BILL.

On Motion of Mr. TORRENS, Bill to extend the powers of the Artizans' Dwellings Act of 1868 by provisions for compensation and rebuilding, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. TORRENS, Sir THOMAS CHAMBERS, and Mr. GOLDNEY.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 31.]

INTOXICATING LIQUORS (IRELAND) BILL.

Considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

Resolved, That the Chairman be directed to move the House, that leave be given to bring in a Bill to provide for the earlier closing on Saturday evenings of public houses in Ireland; and for other amendments of the Laws relating to the sale of Intoxicating Liquors in that country.

Resolution *reported*:—Bill *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. SULLIVAN, Mr. DEASE, Mr. MELDON, and Mr. WHITWORTH.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 32.]

PUBLIC HEALTH ACT (1875) AMENDMENT BILL.

On Motion of Mr. ALEXANDER BROWN, Bill to amend "The Public Health Act, 1875," *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. ALEXANDER BROWN, Mr. WHITWELL, and Mr. RYDER.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 33.]

CONTAGIOUS DISEASES ACTS REPEAL BILL.

On Motion of Sir HARCOURT JOHNSTONE, Bill to Repeal the Contagious Diseases Acts, *ordered* to be brought in by Sir HARCOURT JOHNSTONE, Mr. STANSFELD, Mr. WHITBREAD, and Mr. MUNDELLA.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 34.]

POOR LAW GUARDIANS (ELECTION BY BALLOT) (IRELAND) BILL.

On Motion of Mr. ERRINGTON, Bill to provide for the Election of Poor Law Guardians in Ireland by Ballot, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. ERRINGTON, Mr. BLENNERHASSETT, and Mr. O'REILLY.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 35.]

DURATION OF PARLIAMENT BILL.

On Motion of Mr. JOHN HOLMS, Bill to shorten the Duration of Parliaments, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. JOHN HOLMS, Mr. JOSEPH COWEN, Dr. CAMERON, Mr. COLLINS, and Mr. HENRY SAMUELSON.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 36.]

ULSTER TENANT RIGHT BILL.

On Motion of Mr. MACARTNEY, Bill to secure more effectually the Tenant Right Custom in the province of Ulster, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. MACARTNEY, Mr. CHARLES LEWIS, and Mr. WILLIAM WILSON.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 37.]

INHABITED HOUSE DUTY AND INCOME TAX BILL.

On Motion of Mr. HUBBARD, Bill to amend the administration of the Inhabited House Duty and Income Tax, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. HUBBARD and Mr. SAMPSON LLOYD.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 38.]

COUNTY COURTS BILL.

On Motion of Mr. NORWOOD, Bill to extend the jurisdiction of the County Courts, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. NORWOOD, Sir J. EARDLEY WILMOT, and Mr. ROWLEY HILL.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 40.]

LANDLORD AND TENANT (IRELAND) ACT (1870) AMENDMENT BILL.

On Motion of Mr. DANIEL TAYLOR, Bill to amend "The Landlord and Tenant (Ireland) Act, 1870," *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. DANIEL TAYLOR, Mr. THOMAS DICKSON, and Mr. BENJAMIN WHITWORTH.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 41.]

BURIALS BILL.

Considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

Resolved, That the Chairman be directed to move the House, that leave be given to bring in a Bill to amend the Burial Laws.

Resolution *reported* :— Bill *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. OSBORNE MORGAN, Mr. LEFEVRE, Mr. WILLIAM M'ARTHUR, and Mr. RICHARD.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 42.]

LIBEL LAW AMENDMENT BILL.

On Motion of Mr. HUTCHINSON, Bill to amend the Law of Libel, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. HUTCHINSON, Dr. CAMERON, Mr. JOSEPH COWEN, Mr. PULESTON, Mr. MORLEY, Mr. WADDY, Mr. EDWARD JENKINS, Mr. GOURLEY, and Mr. SULLIVAN.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 43.]

POOR LAW AMENDMENT ACT (1876) AMENDMENT BILL.

On Motion of Mr. MELLOR, Bill to amend "The Poor Law Amendment Act, 1876," *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. MELLOR, Mr. MEREWETHER, Sir CHARLES FORSTER, Mr. MUNDELLA, Mr. Serjeant SIMON, Mr. HIBBERT, and Mr. TORRENS.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 44.]

BILLS OF SALE (IRELAND) BILL.

On Motion of Mr. MELDON, Bill to amend the Law relating to Bills of Sale in Ireland, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. MELDON and Mr. O'SHAUGHNESSY.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 45.]

COUNTY INFIRMARIES (IRELAND) BILL.

On Motion of Mr. MELDON, Bill to amend the Law relating to the Management of County Infirmaries in Ireland, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. MELDON, Mr. SHAW, Mr. ERRINGTON, and Mr. ARTHUR MOORE.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 46.]

HABITUAL DRUNKARDS BILL.

On Motion of Dr. CAMERON, Bill to facilitate the control and cure of Habitual Drunkards, *ordered* to be brought in by Dr. CAMERON, Mr. CLARE READ, Mr. ASHLEY, Sir HENRY JACKSON, Mr. EDWARD JENKINS, Mr. WILLIAM HOLMS, and Mr. O'SHAUGHNESSY.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 47.]

RACECOURSES (METROPOLIS) BILL.

On Motion of Mr. ANDERSON, Bill for the Licensing of Metropolitan Suburban Racecourses, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. ANDERSON, Sir THOMAS CHAMBERS, and Sir JAMES LAWRENCE.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 48.]

House adjourned at a quarter before Eight o'clock, till Monday next.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Monday, 9th December, 1878.

THE LORD WINDSOR—Sat first in Parliament.

ROLL OF THE LORDS.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR acquainted the House that the Clerk of the Parliaments had prepared and laid it on the Table: The same was ordered to be *printed*. (No. 1.)

QUEEN'S SPEECH—HER MAJESTY'S ANSWER TO THE ADDRESS.

THE LORD STEWARD (The Earl BEAUCHAMP) *reported* Her Majesty's Answer to the Address as follows:—

MY LORDS,

I THANK you sincerely for your loyal and dutiful Address.

You may rely on my hearty desire to co-operate with you in all measures calculated to increase the security of all parts of My Empire.

AFGHANISTAN (EXPENSES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS).—RESOLUTION.

VISCOUNT CRANBROOK: My Lords, I very much regret that it should have fallen to my lot, as Minister for India, to be the person whose duty it is to bring before the House of Lords the question of war in that part of Her Majesty's Dominions. I occupied for some years the office of Minister for War; but I am happy to say that while filling that office it was my good fortune to be a Minister of Peace, though during the whole of that time the Department with which I was connected was occupied in making preparations for war, in case war should be necessary; and I believe that the best way of preventing war is to put a bold face on the matter—to say what you mean and do what you have said. My Lords, the Motion I have to make is in these terms—

> "That Her Majesty having directed a military expedition of Her forces charged upon Indian revenues to be despatched against the Ameer of Afghanistan, this House consents that the revenues of India shall be applied to defray the expenses of the military operations which may be carried on beyond the external frontiers of Her Majesty's Indian Possessions."

My Lords, in 1858 a short Act (the Government of India Act) was passed, with the view of putting a check, to a certain extent, on the powers of the Indian Government, but in a different way from the way suggested by the noble Earl (Earl Grey), who moved the Amendment to the Address. The noble Earl assumed that it was essential when the subject of war was under discussion that the Cabinet should be entirely precluded from going to war until a preliminary notification of its intention to do so had been given to Parliament. I am not now going to argue whether or not in other kinds of war there is or should be such a principle; but I do say that by the Act of 1858 Parliament sanctioned the principle that Her Majesty's Government may make war in India without any previous notification to Parliament. Nay—that Act provides that the Government may do so if within three months after they have done so should Parliament be sitting, or within one month after the next assembling of Parliament, should Parliament not be sitting at the time, the Government announces the fact to both Houses. That is provided by one clause. Another clause provides for the obtaining of that consent of Parliament to the application of the Revenues of India which my Motion asks this House to accede to. Now, my Lords, in reading a statute the proper rule to be observed is to read it as a whole; and I think that, taking the former clause, under which if Parliament should not be sitting the Government is not bound to acquaint it with the declaration of war for three months after it meets—and the Government might wait a number of months without advising the Queen to call it together—I think, taking that clause in conjunction with Clause 55, it is clearly contemplated that power is given to the Home Government to declare war without previous communication of its intention to Parliament, and it follows, of necessity, that the application to Parliament in respect of funds must be made subsequently. The declaration of war cannot precede the communication, for, otherwise, such notice would be given of our intention as might preclude the war from being efficaciously undertaken. The fact is, then, as stated the other night by my noble Friend (the Marquess of Salisbury), we are taking Parliament into our confidence with greater rapidity than is required by the Act of Parliament. We called Parliament together as soon as there was a certainty of the war. Up to the 20th of November there was not that certainty; we were up to that date unaware of what would be the reply of the Ameer to our Ultimatum; but when the circumstances occurred with which your Lordships are familiar, and there was no longer any uncertainty that our Frontier must be passed, we resolved to call Parliament together. You cannot, however, in such a case wait and stay your hand until you have had the opportunity of consulting with Parliament. And I think I may now say that the acting with such promptitude as the Government did, tended materially to the success of the operations which have already been executed.

Now, my Lords, as to the question of the use of the Indian Revenue, I do not know that much need be said. If the House consents to the Revenues of India being applied to defray the expense of these operations, it will not follow from such consent that Parliament would be prevented from contributing to the cost of those operations; but I am bound to say, after looking very carefully into the financial condition of India and the circumstances of this war, I believe it will not be necessary—at least in the initial steps—to call on the Revenues of England. I am in possession of facts which, I think, will convince your Lordships that, without unduly pressing on the Revenues of India, there will be no necessity to call on the English Revenue —at least, during the present financial year. It was announced by my hon. Friend (Mr. Stanhope), in "another place," that, including the £1,500,000 of new taxation for famine insurance, the surplus of Indian Revenue was estimated to amount to £2,156,000. The Revenue has actually exceeded the Estimate. In opium alone the increase is £1,245,000. But some of the charges have been increased, reducing the estimated surplus to £1,800,000. Looking into the different calculations made on the subject, the supposition of the Indian Government is that during the present financial year the cost of the military operations will not exceed £1,100,000 or £1,200,000. Take it at £1,250,000, and there would remain then a substantial surplus of about £550,000 after the payment of the charges for the Expedition. If it should be necessary, in answer to any remarks on the subject, I will go into this question again; but for the present I shall pass from it, as the Amendment of the noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Halifax) is not addressed to this particular branch, but to the general question. I shall pass, then, at once to political matters.

My Lords, for at least half-a-century great interest has been felt in Afghanistan by those who have devoted any attention to Indian affairs. It has been considered as one of the entrances to India from the North-West; its relations towards Great Britain have always throughout that period been regarded as very important to the Imperial interests of England — it has been considered that without proper relations between British India and Afghanistan our Frontier could not be regarded as secure. This has never been a question of Party politics. The opinion to which I have just referred has not been that of any one Government or another; but an opinion expressed by all statesmen of every Party. Everyone will admit that statesmen of all Parties have agreed in the necessity of a strong Afghanistan on friendly terms with this country. And so long as we could trust the Rulers of Afghanistan, and so long as they were true to us, we were content. We desired nothing else and nothing more. I do not think I should wisely occupy the time of your Lordships by going back to the time of Dost Mahomed; but, in fact, Afghan policy was very much affected by what took place in the war with that Ruler. I may make one remark in reference to occurrences in Afghanistan which at the time of those occurrences painfully affected the mind of this country, and of which unpleasant memories still remain. I may say that the sufferings sustained by our troops in the war to which I am referring did not happen because this country was too weak to maintain her rights and unable to vindicate her position in Afghanistan by the sword; but we were unfortunate. We were unfortunate in our political negotiators; we were unfortunate in our generals. The commonest precautions were neglected; and from those miserable complications and neglect, and not from any want of valour in the field, resulted those disasters which we all regret. But, my Lords, those occurrences did not permanently affect our relations with Dost Mahomed. Being our pensioner, and being well affected towards us, when he returned to Afghanistan he was not influenced by any hostile feelings towards England; but circumstances obliged him to maintain an appearance of "sullen reserve." He had to consider not only himself, but his country; and he felt obliged to maintain that attitude until he saw that his people had forgotten what they had suffered in the war. He then became a firm Ally of the British Government. He felt our power, our position, and resources, and he had learnt that what we promised we would assuredly undertake, and in 1855 he entered into that Treaty which is so well known to your Lordships. As showing how implicit was his trust in the British Government, it is remarkable that while he by that Treaty bound himself to regard "our friends as his friends and our enemies as his enemies," there is no reciprocal declaration from us that we will regard his enemies as our enemies and his friends as our friends.

And here, with respect to the Papers in which this Treaty has been printed, I wish, in answer to charges which have been made as to these Papers, to say that no such Papers were promised or asked for last Session. In reply to a Question put in the other House, the Papers relating to Central Asia were promised by the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, but these Indian Papers never were promised; but as soon as we saw that the complications between this country and Afghanistan were likely to become serious, and it was clear that official information would be required, we saw that those Papers would be important, and I gave directions that they should be prepared with all possible speed. I am satisfied that effect was given to those directions. I will add that though there remain unprinted some Papers which some persons may wish to see, nothing whatever has been kept back; and I believe there are in the Papers on your Lordships' Table everything necessary not only for explaining the question, but for enabling anybody who has been concerned fully to explain his own conduct, should he think it necessary to do so.

My Lords, the next Treaty to which it is necessary to allude is that of 1857. It was essentially a temporary measure, and I need not treat it further than to observe that in connection with it there again arises proof that when we are at war with any of our Western neighbours the importance of Afghanistan comes into peculiar prominence. We were at war with Persia when that Treaty was made, and it became necessary to secure Dost Mahomed as our Ally—and that was done. When Dost Mahomed died in 1863, and Shere Ali as his successor ascended the Throne, he notified his accession to the Viceroy of that day. But during six months Shere Ali waited in vain for an acknowledgment of that announcement. I am not blaming anyone for that. In consequence of the illness of Lord Elgin there may have been delay—in consequence of the death of Lord Elgin there may have been still further delay; but, as a matter of fact, six months elapsed after Shere Ali announced his accession before he received any communication from the Indian Government. I think we must admit that that circumstance was, at least, unfortunate. It must have rankled in the mind of a man of the Ameer's peculiar temperament, and the feeling to which it gave rise was perhaps intensified by events which followed. Struggles and complications followed. There were wars between Shere Ali and members of his family at the time, and one succeeded another in different parts of the country. At that time the noble Lord opposite (Lord Lawrence) was at the head of British affairs in India; he pursued a policy of recognizing *de facto* Governments of Afghanistan, and not only of Afghanistan as a whole, but of parts of Afghanistan. The noble Lord, though one of those who maintained the necessity, in the Imperial interests, of a strong and friendly Afghanistan, signalized his Viceroyalty by recognizing *de facto* Governments in the several parts of that country. So matters went on until 1868. When Shere Ali, though partially unsuccessful, retained a pre-eminence at Herat, the noble Lord recognized him as the *de facto* Ruler of Herat; while he, at the same time, recognized as *de facto* Ruler of Cabul and Candahar Ameer Mahomed Ufzul Khan, his brother, to whom he wrote a letter congratulating him on his successes over Shere Ali. It was not until the latter was again on the Throne of Cabul, and seemed to be permanently seated there, that the noble Lord wrote to him offering him that assistance which would have been so useful to him when he was struggling for that Throne. As I have said, a strong and friendly Afghanistan had been the object of all British Governments; but I ask your Lordships whether it is a likely plan of conciliating the Ruler of a strong and friendly Government to acknowledge the persons who succeed in establishing themselves in different parts of his dominions immediately upon receipt of their letters, but not to acknowledge the Ruler himself until he had been six months firmly seated upon his Throne, and no longer needed our assistance? So thought Shere Ali; but he was prudent in his generation. He accepted the acknowledgment of the Viceroy. Why? Because the first thing which he, or any person who aspired to the rule of Afghanistan, wished to obtain was the acknowledgment and recognition of the British Government.

That recognition gave the title of the Ruler of Afghanistan a validity which he could not otherwise obtain for it. That was the position of the Ameer just before the noble Lord left India; and Shere Ali, though he felt sore, and was much vexed at what had been done in respect of his brother, proposed to meet the noble Lord and to enter into a Treaty with him. But the noble Lord refused to enter into any Treaty engagement with him. He would give him what he had so much recommended for many years—"present assistance," for the purpose of consolidating and strengthening his Throne. Shere Ali was engaged in trying to establish his dynasty, and wished that our Government should recognize the successor of his choice. The noble Lord conveyed to him that so long as he was content to maintain friendly relations with Her Majesty's Government so long might he rely on our assistance and friendship. No doubt that was valuable; but it was not what the Ameer wanted; he desired to secure the succession of his family, but not to enter upon the general question of foreign relations. But the noble Lord was succeeded by my noble Friend Lord Mayo; and let me for a moment turn to something which occurred, and which has reference to that policy which has been before alluded to. There was at this time no question of Party feeling or Party politics; but there was a very general impression among all at the time to which I have now come that it would be very undesirable to enter into any Treaty binding ourselves in any way to the Ameer in the future, and that policy was supported by many who held very different views on other public questions. But in 1867 there was a paper written by Sir Henry Rawlinson treating of Russian advances in Central Asia, and which everyone will admit to be a paper of great ability, and almost prophetic in its character. In that paper the writer called attention to the measures which, in his judgment, were necessary for maintaining for England a dominant position in Afghanistan. The proposition that England should have such a position has, I think, remained unchallenged, although it has been made the subject of much writing, and the paper to which I allude has been reviewed in a great many other papers. One says—"We must use diplomatic measures;" another says—"We must use conciliatory measures;" but all look forward to a state of things when we must forbid any further advance, if it should be attempted; and not a few were prepared, to use the words of the noble Lord near me (Lord Lawrence), if a certain line is passed, we must be prepared for war with Russia in all parts of the world. But when Lord Mayo arrived in India questions with regard to the Ameer's foreign relations did not arise. The question uppermost in the mind of the Ameer was that of his dynasty. This appears from despatches sent home by Lord Mayo, and by the despatch of the Duke of Argyll, in which fault was at first found with what Lord Mayo had done. But that was not the case outside the Conference which took place between the Ameer and Lord Mayo. You find by the Papers that outside the Conference conversations passed on various subjects, and at that time the Ameer would have raised no difficulty to the residence of British officers in certain parts of Afghanistan, excepting Cabul. These things are, I repeat, to be gathered from what took place outside the Conference. In the latter the Ameer was concerned about his dynasty. The noble Lord who preceded Lord Mayo had urged the Home Government of that day, in strong language, to lay down a course of action, and to get rid of these questions which were constantly arising. My Lords, I look in vain among the Papers for any instructions to Lord Mayo on those points. The noble Lord (Lord Lawrence), who had taken his seat in this House, spoke on the 19th of April, 1869. He and the Duke of Argyll, the Secretary of State for India, addressed the House on that occasion, and the noble Duke said—

> "I think it would be an extremely dangerous thing to govern by telegraph, or even to reply in Parliament upon telegraphs; but I have every reason to believe that Lord Mayo has consistently pursued the same policy of non-intervention and of the avoidance of entangling engagements, which was pursued by my noble Friend the late Governor General of India (Lord Lawrence). So far as my own instructions to Lord Mayo are concerned, they certainly have been to avoid all entangling engagements for the future with Afghanistan, and to maintain the British Government and the Government of India perfectly free in regard to that and other conterminous States."—[3 *Hansard*, cxcv. 1087.]

Then Lord Lawrence, in reference to the Ameer's proposal to enter into a

Treaty as his father had done, and to maintain friendly relations, said—

> "I thereupon wrote to the Ameer and told him what were my views—that I was willing to help him still further in a moderate way; that I could not bind myself by any Treaty which would involve obligations on the part of Her Majesty's Government to assist him."—[*Ibid.* 1094.]

Those distinct statements show that the policy of the noble Duke and the noble Lord was one of distrust and isolation, of independence of Afghanistan in respect of any entangling engagements. Lord Mayo had instructions not to enter into any entangling engagements for the future; but Lord Mayo obtained, by his frank and genial intercourse and character, an extraordinary influence with the Ameer. He wrote in the most friendly manner to the Ameer:—and it is a remarkable thing that though through the whole period of his administration Lord Mayo gave but one rather vague promise in writing, Shere Ali appeared to regard the simple promise of Lord Mayo as stronger than the more solemn engagements of the Government offered to him at a subsequent time—indeed, he evidently considers that what has been subsequently done tended to vitiate and weaken Lord Mayo's promises. Evidently the Ameer believed in Lord Mayo's sincerity; and, no doubt, a man like my noble Friend was such a one as would have impressed one with the erratic, but still, to some extent, chivalric mind of Shere Ali. Lord Mayo wrote him a letter asking him to be reconciled to his son; and that letter was received without displeasure—a circumstance which, I think, was owing to its tone and the manner in which it was worded. With the lamented death of Lord Mayo a great change occurred. My Lords, I cannot but think that in the not taking advantage of what might then have been done a great opportunity was lost. During the period that had elapsed great progress had been effected by the colossal power which is overshadowing Asia. Advances were made by that Power to the Ruler of Afghanistan, and he was impressed with those occurrences more than were those who ruled British India. He saw his neighbours disappearing one after the other, and he concluded that the time had arrived when he must put his own house in order, and prepare for any emergencies that might arise. The letter written by the Ameer in 1873 opened the way to a complete understanding. Now, it appears that in 1873 the noble Earl (the Earl of Northbrook) requested Shere Ali to receive a British Envoy at Cabul. That was a very important step. The Ameer did not refuse to receive the Envoy; but he desired that they should first come to an understanding as to the objects of the Mission and the questions to be discussed, and he proposed to send an Envoy to Simla to hold a Conference with the Viceroy. This was accepted; and on the 12th of July, 1873, the noble Earl (the Earl of Northbrook) held his first Conference with the Cabul Envoy, Syud Noor Mahomed Shah. The Ameer then wanted much; but in his view he got nothing, and, in my opinion, a great opportunity was then lost. In alluding to what then occurred I will do so without personal references. I am quite content to take those occurrences as they stand on the Papers, or even to take them as the noble Earl himself wishes them to be accepted. When, the other night, I entered into a consideration of them, as recorded, I did so in vindication of myself from attacks which, I venture to think, went somewhat further than they ought to have done; but I submit that we have had enough of personal squabbles—the events with which we are engaged are too great to allow any place for personalities. Well, then, as it appears on the Papers, I say that in 1873, when Shere Ali pointed out the danger which had arisen from Russian advances, the time had come for a change in our policy towards Afghanistan; the time had come when we were bound to say that we would protect the Ameer, and protect him for the safety and security of the Empire. What had occurred? From his rocky heights he watched the irresistible tide advancing, submerging Kingdom after Kingdom and filling every valley, and approaching his own dominion. He asked you to aid him to set up a sea-wall to keep out the enemy, and you gave him—what? You first of all gave him incredulity, and then promises of assistance so vague, so ambiguous, so obscure, that Syud Noor Mahomed said, in 1877, that neither in writing nor in speech did Lord Northbrook inform him what help he might hope to obtain. But the time had come when Mrs. Partington, with her diplomatic mop, could no longer keep out the tide, and when verbal promises here and there were ineffectual. There was the inevitable pressure. The waters were getting higher every year. Shere Ali saw what India did not see—that the danger which was approaching was inevitable, and that the time had come when we ought to have stretched out our hands and helped him. He wanted you to say you would not only help him under certain contingencies, but that an unprovoked aggressor on his dominions should be your enemy. But you would not say it. He asked you practically that you should engage yourselves to resist unprovoked aggression by Russia. You declined. Syud Noor Mahomed Shah said that whatever specific assurances Russia might give, the people of Afghanistan could place no confidence in them, and would never rest satisfied unless they were assured of the aid of the British Government. The Ameer said—

> "My anxiety which I feel on account of the Russians will never be removed unless the British Government adorns the Afghan Government with great assistance in money and ammunitions of war for the troops, and unless great aid is given for the construction of strong forts throughout the northern Afghan border. And, further, if an emergency arises for the Afghan Government to oppose the Russians, such opposition cannot take place without the co-operation of the disciplined troops of the British Government."

Again, he said—

> "Should the British Government intentionally overlook this matter with a view to temporizing for a few days, it is their own affair, but I will represent my circumstances in a clear form in detail without time-serving hesitation."—[*Afghanistan*, No 1, pp. 110-111.]

My Lords, the Ameer represented his views through an influential Minister at great length to the noble Earl (the Earl of Northbrook) at their interviews; but he only got the same indefinite promise, and he took it for what it was worth. It did not conciliate Shere Ali, who considered it weaker than the promises of Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo. He considered that they did not in any degree tend to secure to him the assistance he wanted. Whoever may be to blame for it—and I do not now say that anyone was to blame for it—from that time the Ameer distrusted England, and began to look somewhere else. We have several proofs of the change in his mind. Take that letter, in which he ironically speaks of his delight at the arrival of that time when there is no danger of the peace being broken, and therefore no necessity for precautions against such an occurrence. We have it on the authority of the noble Earl himself that the Ameer took no notice of the request made of him in respect to British officers, though he was quite ready to accede to that proposal in 1873. He did not let Mr. Forsyth pass through the country, and he did not communicate to the Viceroy his choice of a successor till that choice had been made. As the noble Earl admitted, his language was unsatisfactory, his letters not civil. In 1874, when he had imprisoned his son, against whom even in his latest letter he has expressed such inveterate hostility, he complained of the conduct of this country in interfering between him and his son. His complaint is not so much, however, of the interference, but of the manner in which it was effected. I admit that for the Ameer to have promised his son a safe conduct, and then to have seized him and cast him into prison, was a dastardly and a wicked thing; but what the noble Earl did was not that which Lord Mayo did in reference to the Ameer's son—address him in a private letter. The noble Earl directed our Native Vakeel to go to Shere Ali and read the message to him in his presence. Pride and haughtiness are characteristics of Shere Ali; and one can imagine that to such an Eastern Ruler there could not have been a more disagreeable thing than to have a lecture read to him on that subject, and that, too, without any previous inquiry as to whether anything had occurred to change the circumstances under which a guarantee of safe conduct had been given to his son. That the affair has rankled in his breast is clear from the last communication of his which has just reached this country. We do not know with accuracy, since the time that written message was sent to the Ameer, how many friendly letters have passed between Russian generals and Shere Ali. Some of what passed since then we may know; but I believe we do not know all. After these events, negotiations began to be conducted on a different footing; and whereas we knew everything before that time, we begun to know very little after. There is another thing on which the Ameer has laid great stress—the fact that a present and complimentary message was sent direct to the Chief of Wakhan by the noble Earl without having been sent through him as Suzerain over that Khan. Well, in 1874 the present Government came into office; and, my Lords, about the policy of the present Government there is no concealment in these Papers. They fully and freely state the truth, and there is no question about what that policy is. In 1875, after a year's experience, my noble Friend (the Marquess of Salisbury) complains of the scantiness of information on what was passing in Afghanistan in the hands of the Indian Government; and no one can read the Native Envoy's news letters without arriving at the same conclusion as my noble Friend. In January, 1875, after a year's reading of these precious Papers, which did give us all that we could get about Afghanistan, my noble Friend, dissatisfied with the imperfect ideas which could be formed on such materials, wrote to the Viceroy that it was desirable we should have a resident British officer, not, my Lords, at Cabul, but at Herat, who should furnish us with fuller information, especially of what was passing near the Frontier. I should have thought that nothing could be more advantageous to the Ameer as well as to ourselves. The time had come when Europeans were acquiring power and influence in those parts, and it was essential that the movements of Europeans should be watched by Europeans. The duty of watching them is one which Asiatics are incapable of performing. It is essential that the duty should be performed by civilized Europeans. I shall read on this subject the opinion of one who is capable of forming a judgment on the point. Sir Bartle Frere says—

> "I judge them only from the abstracts of their correspondence, which are, I conclude, weeded of much extraneous and trifling matter before they are printed and sent home; but even in the shape in which these abstracts reach us, I find a vast portion of durbar gossip in proportion to the important items of intelligence, &c. I find no scale of proportion by which to estimate the relative value and probability of the important and unimportant, the undoubted, the doubtful, and the mere hearsay; . . . still less do I find any discriminating description of persons such as may assist the Viceroy and his advisers in judging of men and events. A man in the Ameer's position knows well that he can trust almost any English officer who comes to him as a representative of the English Government."

Well, the noble Earl as Viceroy, in the exercise of his discretion, did not think the time had arrived when the demand for the admission into Afghanistan of such officers should be made. The question was one of time, of degree, of how long we ought to wait, for he said that if the Russians were at Merv the time would have come. The noble Earl thought that the Russians had not approached near enough to cause any danger. If they had been at Merv—that is, within 12 marches of Herat—I have no doubt that the noble Earl would have thought it a good thing to have a British officer there—in time, perhaps, to receive them. Herat is called the key of India. Without going so far as to adopt that phrase, it is a place which must exercise a considerable influence in Central Asian affairs. But the noble Earl apparently wished to follow his own way, and the time passed. My Lords, there is such a thing in politics as "Too late." British officers might have been received into Afghanistan before the Conference in 1873—after the Conference it was "too late." My Lords, I am astonished at the way this matter is argued out-of-doors. I hope that here, at least, it will not be argued as it has been argued elsewhere. I hope it will not be argued as if we were dealing with the state of things which existed 10 years ago—as if within the last 10 years nothing had taken place—as if the world had stood still. Events are crowding upon each other in Europe and Asia; and to speak of the policy of 1868 as the policy of 1878 would be what, if it were not for those who do argue so, I should describe as childish. Again, the noble Earl was appealed to by my noble Friend, but he did not think the time had come; which shows me, begging the noble Earl's pardon, that he had not realized the state of Afghanistan, and the condition which surrounded it.

Well, the noble Earl (the Earl of Northbrook) left in 1876, and the present Viceroy (Lord Lytton) succeeded him. The Instructions with which he set out are contained in these Papers. I venture to say this for him, since so many accusations on the point have been made — that the steps taken by Lord Lytton have been taken in strict accordance with the Instructions given to him. The Government accept the responsibility of those Instructions. They do not desire to throw on Lord Lytton the burden of sins that do not belong to him. The Government are here to answer for themselves; and they say that the policy which he was instructed to carry out was a just, right, and true policy for the interests of Afghanistan, the interests of India, and the interests of the Empire; and when Lord Lytton was thwarted in carrying it out, it was not from any fault on his part. It was, I regret to believe, because the opportunity had passed. It was "too late." My Lords, it was a most unfortunate thing that it was too late; because I must say for myself—and I know I can say it for my Colleagues and for the noble Viceroy—that anything more repugnant to our feelings than to be obliged to coerce Afghanistan, instead of being able to enter into intimate and friendly relations with her, cannot be imagined. I cannot help saying that he would be a madman who, if he were able to keep a united and friendly Afghanistan in union with him, would do anything to break up the strength and force which that state of things would place at his disposal. That was not our intention, nor is there a sign of it to be found in the Papers—and when our policy was rejected by the Ameer, hew as told that we regretted that rejection. Well, in May, 1876, Lord Lytton applied to the Ameer to receive a Mission for the purpose of consultation—a friendly Mission to announce Lord Lytton's accession to the Viceroyalty, and to announce that Her Majesty had assumed the title of Empress of India; and, further, to invite the Ameer to attend the great celebration on the 1st of January on that subject. A fitter subject for such a friendly Mission cannot possibly be conceived. It was opportune, too, as it would have given Lord Lytton the means of ascertaining what was going on in Afghanistan; what the feelings of the Ameer really were towards us; and of communicating to him what our feelings were towards him, and of assuring him in friendly Conference that some better understanding could be arrived at. The Mission was rejected. Why was it rejected? There had been nothing in the conduct of Lord Lytton to cause the Ameer apprehension. He had taken no step to weaken the friendly feeling which had before existed between the Ameer and the Indian Government. No preliminaries to the reception of that Mission were demanded. Some have said that our occupation of Quetta displeased the Ameer, but it had not taken place; and as to Khelat generally there was only what had been done — and rightly done — by the noble Earl (the Earl of Northbrook), with a view to get Beloochistan into something like good order. The Ameer now tells us, in his letter of the 19th November, that it is customary to receive friendly Missions as a matter of course. Yet he rejected this one, and why? Because there was rankling in his mind all that had taken place in 1873, and to which I have referred, and he said so. He was written to again by the Commissioner at Peshawur as to the folly of such a course, and he then suggested that he should send to the Viceroy our own Native Envoy in order that he should state what was the real condition of things in Cabul. My Lords, I cannot conceive anything more conciliatory than Lord Lytton's reception of that message—of which it might be said that it was not very complimentary that the Ameer, who had refused to receive our Mission, should suggest that he should send our own Envoy to confer with the Viceroy. But Lord Lytton did not object; he concurred in the suggestion in the most conciliatory manner. My Lords, the noble Earl the other night complained of the language of Lord Lytton; but that language was used to his own confidential officer—it was spoken in confidence, and was only an expression of his own feelings. Well, our Native Envoy came down. He was one of those capable gentlemen who were relied on for information; but it was found very difficult to squeeze information out of him. It could only be obtained by degrees. It was manifest, however, from more than one piece of evidence, that nothing had been sent by him from Cabul but what the Ameer wished; that the Native Envoys were obliged to show what they were about to send; that they were under duress—in point of fact, one of these Agents says, in effect, that he spoke with the voice of the Ameer, and not with his own. But, at any rate, the grievances alleged by the Vakeel sent from Cabul were all prior to the arrival of Lord Lytton in India. Finally, it was agreed that the Prime Minister of the Ameer should come and confer with the Indian Government, and he came; but nothing could be more unfortunate than the state of mind in which that unfortunate man approached the carrying out of his mission. He trembled at the probable result to himself. This, however, he said not to the Viceroy, but to an intimate friend of his, Dr. Bellew—"The Ameer now has a deep-rooted mistrust of the good faith and sincerity of the British Government, and he has many reasons for this mistrust. The Ameer himself has written of his aversion and apprehension." He, therefore, anticipated that there was very little chance of any satisfactory conclusion being arrived at. Accordingly the Conference brought about no satisfactory conclusion, and it came to an end through the death of the Envoy. An attack has been made upon Lord Lytton for closing it, when he knew that another Envoy was coming. His action was approved of by my noble Friend (the Marquess of Salisbury) on the grounds on which it took place. In the first place, the Ameer's Minister had never expressed his assent to that which Lord Lytton laid down as the essential condition to the very beginning of the Conference; and Sir Lewis Pelly said to the Envoy—

> "The acceptance of the principle that British Officers may reside in Afghanistan is absolutely necessary as a preliminary to the commencement of negotiations."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 196.]

It was, indeed, supposed to have been accepted when the Envoy was deputed to meet Sir Lewis Pelly. But throughout those long debates and discussions he continually evaded giving any promise on the subject. Although he did not actually say it, he used language that what was required was not possible; that everything was against it; and that he would be in danger of his life if he agreed to it. Therefore, my Lords, the very basis of the negotiation was at an end; for after the death of the Minister his colleague, the Mir Akhor, admitted that he had no instructions and no power to go on with it. I say, without hesitation, that it would have involved the dignity of this country; it would have involved the dignity of the Government of India, if the Viceroy had not at once put an end to that Mission.

But you will remember, my Lords, that it was still open to the Ameer to make any proposal he thought fit, and my noble Friend near me referred to that fact. Writing to the Viceroy, in reference to the Peshawur Conference, he said—

> "In the event, therefore, of the Ameer, within a reasonable time, spontaneously manifesting a desire to come to a friendly understanding with your Excellency on the basis of the terms lately offered to, but declined by, him, his advances should not be rejected."—[*Ibid.* p. 224.]

And added words to the effect that if he will not approach us, if he rejects our approaches, then he must be responsible for that which he will bring down upon his own head. My Lords, I say that the transaction on the part of Lord Lytton is defensible from beginning to end. It was straightforward. There was no concealment about it—no device to conceal his intention. He told the Ameer what he would do and what he would not do. He said —"I must be supported by Political Officers of my own on the Afghan Frontier, who will tell me what is going on.' That there might be no mistake Lord Lytton told the Ameer the terms on which he was prepared to assist him —to acknowledge his dynasty, to be the friend of his friends and the enemy of his enemies. The noble Earl (the Earl of Northbrook) has said that his terms were as large as those in which Lord Lytton made a part of his promises as to assistance in case of attack. But a Treaty does not consist of one clause, but of many which went far beyond the noble Earl's suggestion; but anyone who would indicate to an Afghan Ruler that he would be responsible for his foreign policy without having a voice in that policy would undertake a grave responsibility; and therefore Lord Lytton took means to provide that that policy should be in harmony with his own. The consequence would otherwise have been that you would have pledged your honour to a Potentate who did not understand the limits and conditions imposed upon him, and the time would come when he would be in distress, and you could not, without in his eyes forfeiture of your honour, fail to assist him; for by dallying about promises which he considered you had made, he might well have cause to conclude that you did not mean to comply with them. So things remained at the close of the Conference, and for a certain period there was no intercourse between Lord Lytton and the Ameer. There was no hostility on our part. Lord Lytton merely said to the Ameer—"What is offered you is as much to your advantage as ours; we press nothing on you; you are left to yourself." Now, my Lords, what happened? The Ameer did not remain by himself. He began more frequently to hold communication with Russia. He began to send, himself, I think, emissaries. Moreover, during the period of the negotiations he was actually attempting to incite the tribes against us—that is to say, he was actually engaged in hostile operations against us. Well, we pardoned him. "We will leave him," we said, "till he is in a better frame of mind." But, instead of getting into a better frame of mind, what did he do? He waited till a time when hostilities appeared probable between this country and Russia, and then he, who had made it an excuse for not receiving a Mission from us, that he should be compelled, in such case, to receive a Russian Mission, received a Russian Envoy with ostentatious pomp and ceremony. The Duke of Argyll, in his published letter, says he had reason to believe the Ameer had received the Russian Mission with reluctance. I am bound to say we have received no official information to that effect. Private letters which I have seen, and Russian newspapers, tend to show, on the contrary, that the Russian General was treated with actually embarrassing ceremony—more like a King than an Envoy. He was received with Royal salutes and attended by what was really an army, and everything was done by Shere Ali to show the general that he was most welcome. It has been set forth in the Russian papers, as from correspondents who were present, that his reception was of a magnificent character. So far, therefore, from this Russian Mission being forced on the Ameer, the Russian Envoy was accepted and entertained to the best of the Ameer's ability. Well, my Lords, I do not hesitate to say that if the Indian Government had said that that conduct on the part of the Ameer was a distinct declaration of hostility against us, she would have been perfectly justified. The Ameer had all along been aware of Russia's pledge not to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and that Afghanistan was without the scope and sphere of Russian influence. Yet, knowing this, he refused our Mission without any reason, except, perhaps, this—in order that a Russian Mission might come. The noble Duke in his letter says he is one of those who would never allow Afghanistan to be subordinate to Russia. No; there may be room for Russia and England in Central Asia; but I say distinctly there is not room for England and Russia in Afghanistan. The noble Earl (Earl Grey) who, when a Russian Mission is actually at Cabul, can anticipate the lapse of 50 or 100 years before the question of danger to India can arise is, indeed, a consistent disciple of masterly inactivity. Were we to blind ourselves to facts, as he does, we might hear when it was "too late" the warning cry—"The Philistines be upon you;" and although we might, in our giant struggles, then bring ruin upon others, we should also bring it certainly upon ourselves. The Russian Mission having been received at Cabul, the Viceroy sent a message to the Ameer demanding the admission of a friendly Mission, coupling with it a letter of condolence couched in the most proper terms on the death of his Highness's son and heir, Abdoollah Jan. My Lords, there is in the East no greater insult than to delay an answer to a letter of condolence. But it was long before that letter was answered; and to the Native mind in India the delay was an insult of a character which would in itself have justified hostilities. ["Oh, oh!"] I say in the Native mind of India. I do not mean to say it would have justified hostilities from the European point of view, nor was it so regarded by us. Anybody who has been connected with India, even so short a time as I have been, knows how differently from ourselves the Eastern mind views transactions of this kind. Well, my Lords, we demanded the admission of a friendly Mission; we insisted upon it; and we have been told that this was an outrage to the Ameer. It so happens, however, that this is not the first time Viceroys have insisted upon demands on the Ameer. The noble Earl himself on one occasion—the Mission to the Chief of Wakhan—thought proper to insist upon the admission of his Envoy through Afghanistan. A great deal has been said in this country about the "independence" of Afghanistan; but the word on English lips as applied to Afghanistan is absurd and misleading. Afghanistan has constantly been asking our protection. The noble Earl himself has admitted that it is impossible to interpret neutrality in a strict sense in relation to Afghanistan. And how did he view the question of "insistence" when it arose? He writes—

> "When we had reason to suppose that Shere Ali intended to demur to our reasonable request, that our Envoy should pass through Afghanistan with a communication from us to the Meer of Wakhan, we insisted upon compliance with our wishes. We should adopt the same course again under similar circumstances."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 135.]

To "insist" means, if necessary, to resort to force of arms, and this is what the noble Earl who has been held up as the advocate of masterly inactivity was on the occasion referred to prepared, I presume, to do in the event of a passage being denied to the British Envoy through the Ameer's dominions. The step we have taken is, therefore, not so very different from that which the noble Earl opposite — that great advocate of masterly inactivity—was himself prepared to take in similar circumstances. We asked for the admission of a friendly Mission. It was refused, and refused by force of arms and with threats. Sir Neville Chamberlain, of all men, was the least disposed to interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan. "No man"—to use his own words—"was more desirous than I to preserve peace and secure friendly relations." Yet what does he add? That it was plainly the Ameer's intention to drive them into a corner, and that they had either to obey all his behests or to stand upon their own rights. Nothing could have been more distinctly humiliating to the dignity of the British Crown and nation. "But for the tact displayed by Major Cavagnari at one period of the interview," writes Sir Neville Chamberlain, "even the lives of the British officers and of their small escort would have been endangered," and "the Mission failed because of the Ameer's indifference to any indignity imposed by him on the British Government, while he himself would not tolerate anything which could be strained to bear even the appearance of a slight to his kingly privileges."

My Lords, we now come to the time when everyone in India thought an actual declaration of war necessary. On the other hand, Her Majesty's Government at home, though they thought it would be justifiable, felt so keenly the importance of the occasion that they resolved to make one last attempt to bring the Ameer to a proper frame of mind and show him where his true interests lay. The Ultimatum was accordingly sent. Having arrived at this point it was no longer for us to talk of unknown and unascertained friendly relations. It was absolutely essential that we should inform the Ameer of the minimum we should insist upon. That minimum was, first an apology for the repulse of the Mission. The noble Lord opposite (Lord Lawrence), in one of his letters to the newspapers, said that no doubt Shere Ali would have made us an apology if we had consented to withdraw the Mission. But, my Lords, that would not have been an apology by him, but by us. We required an apology from the Ameer for having stopped by force of arms a friendly Mission. The Mission was not accompanied by an armed force. So careful, indeed, was Lord Lytton to avoid the appearance of a movement of troops when proposing the Mission, that he even held back the change of reliefs. The Mission was escorted by a force of little over 200 men, which was not so many as the Ameer had himself brought to the Conference at Umballa. Such a body of men could not have threatened the integrity or independence of Afghanistan; it was no more than sufficient as a protection for our Envoy. Accompanying the Mission were Native gentlemen, to show the Ameer that India practically was represented by us, and that it was not merely a British Mission, but that we came with the assent of those in whom we take so deep an interest in India. And, my Lords, let me here say, by the way, if any one imputes unfriendliness to the Native Princes of India, let him look at what these Princes have offered us. They have offered to be at our side in the campaign; and shame ought to cause a blush to rise to the cheek of any man who imputes disloyalty to them at such a time and on such an occasion. Why should the Afghan Representative, who was a soldier, and bound to have obeyed orders, have said that but for his friendship for Major Cavagnari, he would have fired on the Mission? Why should he have had such orders? Your Lordships may suppose that the Mission was at the time in Afghanistan, but that is an absolute delusion—Ali Musjid does not belong to the Ameer—it belongs to the Kyberee tribes, the Afredees and others; and therefore the Mission had not entered the Ameer's territory when this hostile action was threatened against us. The Mission, as it was directed, immediately withdrew, and the Viceroy was informed of its withdrawal. When we are spoken of as making an unnecessary war, it must be remembered that there was something more involved than our own honour as affected by the affront we had received; we had pledged our word to the Kyberee tribes that if they gave us a safe conduct to Ali Musjid we would hold ourselves responsible for their safety; and it appears that the house of a Chief had already been burnt. The Kyberees called upon us to fulfil our pledges, and even if they had not, it was our duty to take such steps that they should not be placed in danger. Therefore, when you talk of the non necessity for war, we say that it became necessary on account of our obligations to them, as I think it was also necessary on account of the affront which had been offered to ourselves. The Ultimatum is sent, and the 20th of November is fixed upon as the date before which the Ameer's reply must be received. The term allowed left eight or nine clear days to the Ameer to prepare his reply before despatching his messenger. No reply came by the 21st, and, of course, the troops had by that time advanced to the Frontier to fulfil the duties imposed upon them. How they have fulfilled them has been admirably described by the noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville) on a former occasion; but I should ill discharge my duty as Secretary of State for India if I did not add my tribute to that which has been already paid by saying that praise is well merited by those who have achieved such great results with such small loss of life and with such moderate means. We might have sent large armies and have been involved in extravagant expenditure; but the officers made only such demands as they thought necessary for the purpose. India has had all our resources placed at her disposal; but she has been content with what she had; and Indian soldiers have added another laurel to the Crown which Indian soldiers have so well supported.

My Lords, since these events a long letter has come from the Ameer; something has been said by anonymous slanderers that the Government were in possession of this letter before Parliament met on Thursday last. My Lords, that is an absolute fabrication. It is stated, and reasoned upon, as if it were an ascertained and known fact; and I think it is only my duty to give that absolute denial. The Government had received notice that a letter had been addressed to Major Cavagnari, and was waiting for him—that the messenger was waiting for him to give it to him; and, as it will be remembered, we had announced in the Papers that we had heard of it, and therefore there was not the least concealment on our part. The telegraphic summary was received on the Thursday night; it was deciphered by about 1 o'clock on Friday morning; and it was delivered to me early that morning with an intimation that the full text would follow rapidly afterwards. Therefore, we determined—and I think justifiably—that we would wait for the full text before publishing anything, and the full text arrived yesterday. It was a very long business to decipher it; I did not receive it until about 3 o'clock in the afternoon; and I lost no time in making arrangements for its being in your Lordships' hands and in the newspapers this morning. I think this is a complete answer to the fictions circulated in order to discredit the Government.

My Lords, that letter is no answer to the Ultimatum. If it had come on the 20th of November, according to the instructions which my Colleagues and I had given to the Viceroy the troops must have advanced. It is an evasive reply; it makes no apology; it does not give any undertaking with respect to the Kyberees; it says nothing with regard to admitting a permanent Mission; it is in character such a letter as would not be sent by one friendly authority to another. We read these things too much with European eyes; but this must be read by Eastern eyes, because it is only in that way we can discern the real meaning which underlies these apparently friendly expressions. We have arrived at this point; and I say the time has gone by for "masterly inactivity." The time has gone by for verbal engagements; the time has come for distinct, definite, perfect understandings, whether it be with those West of Afghanistan, or with Afghanistan itself. I wish—as everyone would—to speak with respect of one of the great countries which forms part of the concert of the nations of Europe; I would not say anything that would be offensive or disrespectful to that country or its Government. It has been driven on by events I dare say, and by necessity, to effect larger seizures of Asiatic territory than it originally contemplated; and with its advances it has continued to give us assurances, solemn pledges reiterated again and again, and not even denied now; and it has admitted that this particular Russian Mission was sent to Cabul because of the apprehension of war between us. Be it so; it proves this—that the weak point in our armour was considered to be Afghanistan; it proves that they thought if they could turn our watch-dog, the Ameer, into a bloodhound against us, it would be a great advantage to them—and, therefore, my Lords, I say that if you have a faithless porter at your door you must dispose of him, and take the charge of your door from him. We are driven to this step.

My Lords, it is no light matter that will make any man carry the country into a war; but, my Lords, our honour, our safety, and our interests alike impelled us to this course. We have been driven to it step by step; and the day has come when there can be no paltering with our duty. I admit that within these Eastern nations you may be compelled from time to time to make further advances than those that were originally contemplated. Be it so, but let us now enter into some conditions about which there can be no mistake; let us say distinctly that in Afghanistan we must be paramount and supreme; that in Afghanistan, holding the doors of India, we must either have a friendly porter or we must take the keys ourselves. The objects of this war, then, are those of justice and security. It is a just war, because we are not bound to wait attacks until an enemy shall come upon us in force at his own time; when we see what is coming upon us we have the right to make preparations and act so as to avert it. Such is our course, my Lords; and I am sorry that an Amendment should be moved on this occasion by my noble Friend. He has on all occasions said that he has endeavoured to avoid giving a Party aspect to Indian questions, and when India becomes a Parliamentary question in that sense the day of our Empire will be drawing rapidly to a close. You must have a despotic Government in India; you must make the Executive Government responsible for India. I am far from saying that Parliament shall not exercise its right to speak of what we have done; I am not complaining of it. I only say I deeply regret that in the midst of a war it should be thought that any occasion had arisen for it. I ask you—our opponents—what you would have done if you had known that a Russian Mission had been received with honour at Cabul? Would you have asked the Ameer to let you send a friendly Mission to explain what the relations between him and you ought to be; or would you have submitted, with the retiring modesty which a noble Lord exhibited on a former occasion, when he wished the banner of England to retire behind the Indus? That is not the way in which India was won, or the way in which India is to be held. My Lords, India was looking on. The people saw us at the gates of Afghanistan demanding admittance; they saw us repulsed; what would be, what was, the effect on the Indian mind and Indian feelings? That is a matter of some importance to us who have to govern the country. They thought that we were hesitating too long, and that we were afraid; that there was something behind Afghanistan we durst not meet. This was in their minds, and if we had retired they would have been justified in supposing that such fears were entertained. We call upon you, as we call upon the country, to support us in the policy we have adopted for the honour, safety, and welfare of Her Majesty and Her Dominions. The noble Viscount concluded by moving his Resolution.

Moved to resolve, That Her Majesty having directed a military expedition of Her forces charged upon Indian revenues to be despatched against the Ameer of Afghanistan, this House consents that the revenues of India shall be applied to defray the expenses of the military operations which may be carried on beyond the external frontiers of Her Majesty's Indian Possessions.—(*The Viscount Cranbrook.*)

VISCOUNT HALIFAX*: I am anxious, at the outset of the observations which I shall address to your Lordships, to express my satisfaction that the debate of Thursday last will have cleared off all questions of a personal or Party character, and I am glad to hear from my noble Friend who has just sat down his wish to avoid anything of the kind. He has only done me justice in saying that I have always disclaimed the introduction of any Party views into Indian questions; and although he is inclined to attribute a Party view to the proceeding of this evening, I can assure him that I have been influenced by no such feeling. The question of the Frontier policy of India is one of such importance, and the recent change in that policy may lead to such serious consequences, that it is above all Party considerations. I agree with my noble Friend that it is of the greatest importance to us that a strong friendly Government should be established in Afghanistan, and that we should have a paramount influence at Cabul; but there is a serious difference between us as to the course of conduct on our part by which that result can best be attained. My noble Friend commenced his review of past transactions from the Afghan War of 1839, which I well remember, as well as himself. It originated in an apprehension of the danger to our Indian Empire which might result from the possible consequences of the presence of two Russian officers at Cabul. We undertook to set up a Ruler there on whose friendship we could depend. It was a great mistake, for which we paid dearly in the greatest disaster which ever befell our arms in India. The only permanent result of the war was an intense hatred of the British name, and jealousy and fear of the British power in the mind of every inhabitant of Afghanistan. From that time forward the object of every Viceroy of India, up to the time of the present Viceroy, and supported by every Indian Minister, has been to endeavour to remove all such feeling from the minds of the Afghans, to conciliate their Rulers, and to make them our firm and steadfast friends; and the result has been that for 35 years peace and a fairly good understanding have been preserved. Soon after the time, however, when the noble Lord now Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs assumed charge of the India Office, directions were given to my noble Friend (Lord Northbrook), then Viceroy of India, to raise what has always been a burning question in Afghanistan, and to press on the Ameer of Cabul the residence of British officers in that country. My noble Friend remonstrated, and during his Viceroyalty nothing was done. In 1876, however, Lord Lytton proceeded to India to carry out a new Frontier policy. It would be easy to show that this was so, if it were needful; but we have a statement to that effect in words of his own in a despatch of March, 1877, which will be found in the Khelat Papers. Lord Lytton says in that despatch—

> "The present Viceroy, having had the advantage before leaving England of personal communication with your Lordship on the general subject of our Frontier relations, was strongly impressed by the importance of endeavouring to deal with them simultaneously, as indivisible parts of a single Imperial question, mainly dependent for its solution on the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government."

The Frontier policy of the Indian Government was no longer, it seems, to be a policy for the interests of India, but was to depend on the general foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government. This new line of policy was initiated by Lord Lytton, and it has resulted in war. The old line of policy gave us 35 years of peace; 30 months of the new has plunged us into war. Surely, my Lords, such a change of policy and such results are well worthy of the consideration of Parliament; and I may be justified in bringing them to your Lordships' attention without being supposed to be actuated by Party motives. We are now at war. Why are we at war? I will take in succession our alleged causes of complaint against the Ameer, none of which—indeed, not all of which together—seem to me to afford any sufficient justification of our invasion of his territory. I have said, my Lords, that the question of the residence of British officers in Afghanistan has been a burning question with the Afghans, not with the Ruler only, but with the Chiefs and the people, for years. My noble Friend has alluded to the Treaty of 1857, concluded between Dost Mahomed and my noble Friend, then Sir John Lawrence. At that time Dost Mahomed had agreed to receive a British officer even at Cabul; but on going back to his camp and meeting his Chiefs, they were so violently opposed to it that he was compelled to retract his consent, and my noble Friend was satisfied with his reasons. But, with the consent of the Ameer and his Chiefs, British officers were allowed to reside temporarily at other places. Amongst others, the present Sir Herbert Lumsden resided for a time at Candahar. Now, he went there with the full consent of the Afghan Rulers; he went there to dispense money provided by us for the pay of the Afghan troops — and how were the British officers treated? In a Minute of Sir John Lawrence's, some time afterwards, he says—

> "Our officers were all this time in a most precarious position—scarcely for a day were their lives safe. Under plea of taking care of them, from their first arrival they were surrounded by spies, and could not move a stone's throw from their house without an escort, who watched and denounced any man who might speak to them. At last matters got so bad that they were glad to leave Candahar. General Lumsden, who was at the head of this Mission, more than once assured me, after his return, that he had better means of gaining information on Afghan and Central Asian affairs at Peshawur."

If such was the position of British officers when residing with the full consent of the Afghans, what would it be if they were forced on an unwilling people? We learn, too, that the objection is not that of the Ameer alone, but is as fully entertained by his Chiefs and people; and that it is unjust now to hold Shere Ali as solely responsible for refusing assent to the residence of British officers in Afghanistan. At the time of the Umballa Conference with Lord Mayo the question was again discussed, and Lord Mayo again acquiesced in the objections stated by Shere Ali. So the matter remained till the receipt by Lord Northbrook of Lord Salisbury's despatches in 1875, to press the question on the Ameer. On the receipt of those directions Lord Northbrook assembled the Frontier officers, who from their knowledge of the dispositions and feelings of the Afghans had the best means of forming an opinion. They unanimously agreed that it would be most unwise to press the question on the Ameer. Lord Northbrook brought the question before his Council, and with their unanimous concurrence remonstrated against Lord Salisbury's directions. There are two paragraphs of this despatch which state so clearly the objections to the course enjoined by Lord Salisbury, that I will take the liberty of reading them to your Lordships. Lord Northbrook says—

> "It is in the highest degree improbable that the Ameer will yield a hearty consent to the location of British Officers in Afghanistan which the Mission is intended to accomplish; and to place our Officers on the Ameer's Frontier without his hearty consent would, in our opinion, be a most impolitic and dangerous movement. Setting aside the consideration of the personal risk to which under such circumstances the Agents would be exposed and the serious political consequences that would ensue from their being insulted or attacked, their position would be entirely useless. They would be dependent for their information on untrustworthy sources. They would be surrounded by spies under the pretext of guarding them or administering to their wants. Persons approaching or visiting them would be watched and removed; and though nothing might be done ostensibly which could be complained of as an actual breach of friendship, the Agents would be checked on every hand, and would soon find their position both humiliating and useless. Such was the experience of Major Todd at Herat in 1839 when his supplies of money failed. Such was the experience of Colonel Lumsden when he went to Candahar in 1857 as the dispenser of a magnificent subsidy. A condition of things like this could not exist for any length of time without leading to altered relations and possibly even in the long run to a rupture with Afghanistan, and thereby defeating the object which Her Majesty's Government have in view."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 155.]

This was the last act of Lord Northbrook's Government; and so the matter rested. Up to that time an uniform course had been pursued of not pressing the residence of British officers in Afghanistan. Not that it was not a measure desirable in itself, but that it would be useless without the consent of the Ameer, and ought not to be pressed upon an unwilling Afghan Government. My noble Friend opposite has taken great pains to prove that the alienation of the Ameer is owing to various steps taken by Lord Northbrook. I venture to think that there is no sufficient reason for such an opinion; and in confirmation of this view I will read an extract from a letter of Sir Henry Norman's, which has just appeared in the public papers. Sir Henry Norman is an Indian officer with a great knowledge of Indian affairs, both military and political. He served in the Mutiny and on the Frontier, and he closed his career in India as Member of the Governor General's Council, and is now a Member of the Council of India. He says—

> "My opinion was, and is, that up to the time of Lord Northbrook's departure the Ameer had no feeling of hostility to us, though he was somewhat out of temper, and was disquieted by writings which more or less pointed at measures distasteful to him. Any real resentment he may have subsequently shown is entirely due, according to my belief, to measures taken from April, 1876, to the present time."

Such, my Lords, was the state of matters at the close of what I venture to call the conciliatory policy. Lord Lytton took a different tone, and we are now witnessing the results. On his arrival he despatched a Native officer to Cabul to propose to Shere Ali to receive a Mission at Cabul, which the Ameer declined; and after some correspondence and communications which the noble Lord opposite has partly stated, and to which it is unnecessary to refer further, the Native Agent of the Indian Government who resides at Cabul, met the Viceroy at Simla, to communicate to him the views of the Ameer and to receive those of the Viceroy, in order that they might be communicated to the Ameer. This meeting took place in October, 1876. I must say, my Lords, that the tone adopted towards the Ameer was such as must have been intolerable to a Ruler who considered himself entitled to be treated as an independent Prince. The assent of the Ameer to the residence of British officers in Afghanistan was declared to be a preliminary *sine quâ non* to any further negotiations; and I now quote the Viceroy's own words to the Agent, as reported in the official account. The Viceroy regretted the view which the Ameer took of his own position, and went on to say—

> "The moment we cease to regard Afghanistan as a friendly and firmly allied State, what is there to prevent us from providing for the security of our Frontier by an understanding with Russia, which might have the effect of wiping Afghanistan out of the map altogether? If the Ameer does not desire to come to a speedy understanding with us, Russia does; and she desires it at his expense."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 183.]

And a little further that—

> "If the Ameer became our enemy we could break him as a reed."—[*Ibid.*]

There are other expressions still more insulting which were quoted by my noble Friend (Earl Granville) on Thursday night, but which I will not repeat. This was on the 10th of October. My noble Friend opposite (Viscount Cranbrook) talks of this as a sort of confidential conversation between the Viceroy and the Agent. It was nothing of the sort. At a subsequent interview three days later, on the 13th of October, the Viceroy said to the Agent that—

> "He had treated the Vakeel confidentially, and had stated, without reserve, all that he had in his mind. He had no doubt that the Vakeel would convey this faithfully to the Ameer."—[*Ibid.* p. 185.]

We do not, of course, know how much of this conversation the Agent did really communicate to the Ameer; but, at all events, he sent his Minister, Syud Noor Mahomed, to meet Sir Lewis Pelly at Peshawur. At this Conference it was again declared that the Ameer's consent to the residence of British officers in Afghanistan was a preliminary *sine quâ non* to all further proceeding. It seems as if at one time the Ameer was not indisposed to give a reluctant assent, yielding to necessity and pleading his helplessness, but the old hereditary Afghan feeling was too strong, and it is touching to read the appeals of the Envoy. One of our officers at Peshawur was a Dr. Bellew, who had been associated with Syud Noor Mahomed in the Seistan arbitration, and was his personal friend. He was a medical man also, and it would appear that the Syud was almost on his death-bed. He appealed to Dr. Bellew as his friend on the 28th of January, 1877, in the following terms:—

> "He (the Ameer) is now convinced that to allow British officers to reside in his country will be to relinquish his own authority, and the lasting disgrace thus brought on the Afghan people will be attached to his name, and he would sooner perish than submit to this."—[*Ibid.* p. 195.]

Again, on the 7th of February, he said to Dr. Bellew—

> "'You must not impose upon us a burden which we cannot bear, and if you overload us the responsibility rests with you.'" — [*Ibid.* p. 202.]

Dr. Bellew interposed here, and asked

the Cabul Envoy what the burden was which he alluded to?

> "He at once replied, 'The residence of British officers on the Frontier of Afghanistan.'"—[*Ibid.*]

And on the 12th of February, at an interview with Sir Lewis Pelly, he said—

> "In the first place, the people of Afghanistan have a dread of this proposal, and it is firmly fixed in their minds, and deeply rooted in their hearts, that, if Englishmen or other Europeans once set foot in their country, it will sooner or later pass out of their hands."—[*Ibid.* p. 208.]

It was all in vain; there was no relaxation on the part of the Indian Government, and it was ultimately declared that all promises and assurances of support and assistance were withdrawn; that the Treaty of 1855, of the adequacy of which the Ameer had frequently complained, was the only engagement between India and Afghanistan; and, further, that the Viceroy would take steps for the rectification of the North-West Frontier without reference to the Ameer. The Cabul Envoy died at Peshawur; and though Lord Lytton knew that his successor was on his way, and that it was reported that the Ameer was prepared to concede everything, he directed Sir Lewis Pelly to close the Conference and to leave Peshawur. An insulting letter was written by Sir Lewis Pelly—which I believe may be taken as being, in fact, from the Viceroy to the Ameer, in which occurs a most extraordinary passage, which I can only understand as a piece of bitter irony. Your Lordships will remember how the residence of British officers had been pressed; and I think your Lordships will be as much surprised as I was at reading the following sentence in that letter:—

> "The proposal of this arrangement was regarded by the British Government as a great concession; and that the British Government will most assuredly not allow its officers to undertake duties on behalf of Afghanistan involving a residence in any part of that country, unless their presence there is specially invited and cordially welcomed by the Ruler of it, whoever he may be, and their personal safety and comfort solemnly guaranteed by the same authority."—[*Ibid.* p. 216.]

So ended the Conference at Peshawur. The Native Agent who represented the Government of India was subsequently recalled from Cabul, and all the accustomed and ordinary means of diplomatic intercourse with the Ameer were closed. I come now to the rectification of the North-West Frontier referred to in the later communications to the Ameer. It is not explained in the Papers; but it received an explanation in the speech at the Mansion House of the noble Lord at the head of Her Majesty's Government. He stated that it was requisite to obtain a scientific Frontier, and that the unsatisfactory character of the existing Frontier had been a source of anxiety to former Viceroys. I am sure that the noble Lord would not make such a statement unless he believed that he had good authority for it; but I confess that I am at a loss to imagine what such authority can be. Our present Frontier is what was the Frontier of the Sikh Kingdom under Runjeet Sing; and when in the time of Lord Dalhousie we annexed the Sikh dominions, the Sikh Frontier against Afghanistan became ours. This, of course, was the case under Lord Dalhousie. Now, I was in constant and confidential communication with Lord Dalhousie, with his successor, Lord Canning, with Lord Elgin, and with my noble Friend near me (Lord Lawrence), four successive Viceroys, and from none of them did I ever hear a word upon the subject. I have never heard that any anxiety was expressed by Lord Mayo, and my noble Friend (Lord Northbrook) has never expressed any. Unless, therefore, the noble Lord opposite has some authority for his statement of which I, at least, have never heard, I must be permitted to believe that no such anxiety has been felt or expressed by any Viceroy since our Frontier has been what it is. I come now to the military authority in favour of advancing our North-West Frontier. The only one given in these Afghanistan Papers is the opinion of Lord Napier of Magdala. It was not his original opinion. He had recorded an opinion in the opposite sense. But, my Lords, on looking carefully at this opinion now given, it seems to refer almost entirely to the Frontier of Scinde and the occupation of Quetta; and I am inclined to think that his previous recorded opinion referred to the same question, when a proposal from Bombay on this matter was submitted to the Government of India, but not concurred in by them. But in 1867 this whole question was formally brought before the Government of India, in the time of

Lord Lawrence, and Minutes against any extension of the Frontier were recorded by himself, Sir Henry Norman, Sir Henry Durand, Sir George Yule, and Sir William Mansfield, then Commander-in-Chief in India, three of them being experienced military men. In addition to these authorities we have recently seen the opinions against any extension of the Frontier entertained by Sir Herbert Edwardes, whose military talent and intimate knowledge of the Frontier no one can doubt; of General Sir John Adye, a Queen's officer of high character, and who himself served on the Frontier in the Umbeylah campaign; and I find, somewhat to my surprise, that Sir Henry Green, one of the foremost advocates of the extension of the Frontier of Scinde, is opposed to the extension of that portion of the Frontier which borders on Afghanistan. With this preponderance of military opinion, so far as we have the means of knowing, against any extension of the North-Western Frontier, it seems now, however, that, regardless of the rights of the Ameer, we are prepared to take possession of part of his territory. It appears to me that any annexation of territory in Europe which has been condemned by universal public opinion—that of the Frontier of the Rhine, the taking possession of Sleswick, or any other such proceeding—may be equally justified. But, indeed, the case is worse against us in this proceeding in India; for by the Treaty of 1855, which we acknowledge still to be in force, we are bound to respect the territories of the Ameer. We have repeatedly given the assurance that we wanted nothing from Afghanistan; even in the last proceedings we declared that we should take nothing over which the Ameer had jurisdiction; and if, in spite of all these engagements and assurances, we commit such an act of unjustifiable and unprincipled spoliation, what becomes of our character for good faith, on which our position in India so essentially depends? My noble Friend opposite, indeed, asserts that Ali Musjid is not in Afghan territory. Whose officer commanded, whose troops garrisoned Ali Musjid? Shere Ali's. And when occupied, as my noble Friend said, by the Khyberees, it has been only at times, and then under the authority of the Ameer of Cabul. Who occupy the northern side of the Pass? The Momunds; and when a British officer was murdered by some of them a few years ago, to whom did we apply for redress?—to Shere Ali. Surely that is recognizing his jurisdiction. Whose troops are we fighting in the Koorum Valley? Those of Shere Ali. The inhabitants of that valley are undoubtedly subjects of the Ameer. The intermediate tribes — Afreedees and others — do not pay much obedience even to their own Chiefs; but their allegiance is due, such as it is, to the Chiefs of Cabul, whose dominions, till the conquest of the Sikhs, extended to the Indus and beyond it. I cannot suppose for a moment that the Afghans, or indeed any persons in India, will consider our annexation of territory beyond our North-West Frontier as anything but an encroachment on Afghanistan. I will now advert to the complaint made of the presence of Russian Agents, and of the reception of a Russian Mission at Cabul. In former years it has been the custom for letters to be exchanged between the Russian officers in Turkestan and the Ameer. It was constantly done in Lord Mayo's time, and Lord Northbrook's. Sometimes the Indian Government was consulted as to what answers should be sent from Cabul, sometimes they were not; but no objection was ever entertained to this Correspondence, and on one occasion, if I remember rightly, Lord Mayo expressed his approbation of it. It would seem, however, as if, latterly, the arrival of persons claiming to be Russian Agents had been more frequent, and their presence at Cabul more constant than heretofore. We must, however, be cautious in placing too much confidence in these reports. Not only the Russian Government, but the officers in Turkestan have denied having sent such Agents; and in such an atmosphere of intrigue and deceit as surrounds an Eastern Court it is impossible to be sure of the truth, which, indeed, we shall probably never know. The Ameer's Envoy stated at Peshawur that at that time their presence had been a source of embarrassment to the Ameer. In 1878, however, a formal Mission was undoubtedly sent from Turkestan to Cabul; and perhaps we might have had reason to complain that this was a breach of the engagements of Russia, and of her assurance that she considered Afghanistan as beyond the sphere of her influence. But had we not given Russia some justification for her course? I will only allude to what appeared in an Indian newspaper, supposed often to represent the views of the Government there, in which it was said that

> "It was now no longer a secret that if war had broken out between England and Russia we should not have remained on the defensive in India."

At any rate, it is undeniable that we brought Indian troops to the Mediterranean, with the view of taking part in the struggle with Russia if war, as at one time seemed not improbable, had broken out. Was it unnatural that the Russians should take measures with a view to finding employment for the Indian troops at home? The Mission did not leave Turkestan till there had been ample time for orders to be transmitted by telegram from St. Petersburg for its departure after the arrival of the Indian troops in Egypt. The Indian troops arrived, I think, before the middle of April, and the Mission did not leave Samarcand till the 10th of June. Explanations have been asked for from the Russian Government, which has stated that the Mission was despatched under circumstances which happily no longer exist, and it appears by the Central Asian Papers that Lord Salisbury is satisfied with their explanations. But this cause of complaint, whatever it may be as to the Russians, does not apply to the Ameer. He had not entered into any such engagements. And how did we stand with him at the time when their Mission was received? I have already stated that long before this we had withdrawn our promises of support, broken off all intercourse with the Ameer, and withdrawn our Agent from Cabul. There was, besides, another circumstance which we know weighed heavily on his mind—the occupation of Quetta. In 1875, Sir Henry Rawlinson, a Member of the Indian Council, had written a Memorandum on Afghan and Russian affairs, in which he advocated the occupation of Herat and Candahar—leaving him in undivided authority only over Cabul and the Northern and Eastern portions of Afghanistan, and the first step to this occupation was to be the taking possession of Quetta. Lord Salisbury thought it necessary to

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state, in one of his despatches to Lord Lytton, that English newspapers and books on Indian affairs were rapidly translated and forwarded for the information of the Ameer, and it is well known that the Ameer had seen the translation of Sir Henry Rawlinson's book. Now, was it not most natural that the Ameer should consider this occupation of Quetta as the practical commencement of the scheme which would deprive him of about one-third of the best part of his dominions? Lord Northbrook had refused to occupy Quetta. One of the earliest steps, however, of Lord Lytton, coming out fresh from England, and who might, therefore, fairly be supposed to be imbued with the notions of the India Office in England, was to direct the occupation of Quetta; and in November, 1876, an Engineer officer was employed in laying out sites for barracks and public buildings, and it was actually occupied by troops before the meeting with Sir Lewis Pelly at Peshawur. Is it very surprising that after the language held, and the conduct of the Indian Government to him at the close of Sir Lewis Pelly's Conference, and with the threatening of this apparent danger to his territories, which was paraded and magnified by the Indian Press, that the Ameer should not have turned a deaf ear to the Russian Envoy? Is there no excuse for a man whom we had so treated? I do not propose to say a word further as to the justice or fairness of our conduct, or of the war. I am anxious only to deal with considerations affecting India; and I ask, would it not have been more politic and wiser on our part to have endeavoured, even then, to re-establish friendly relations with the Ameer than to throw him into the arms of Russia? If Russia is so hostile and so formidable to us in Asia; if it is necessary to take such precautions to guard against the danger of her action against us; can there be greater insanity on our part than to alienate the Power which would be our best Ally against her? What could Russia, for her own interest, wish more than that we should engage ourselves in hostilities with the Afghans, and waste our strength and resources in a struggle from which military honour would be the only gain? How truly applicable to such conduct on our part is the line of the Latin poet—

"Hoc Ithacus velit et magno mercentur
Atridæ."

Sir Neville Chamberlain's Mission, as to the reception of which at Cabul no answer had been received, was, as might have been expected, stopped at the mouth of the Pass, but without any insult, as was stated by the noble Lord who moved the Address. An Ultimatum in no very courteous terms was sent to the Ameer, and before any answer was received, with what I should term precipitate haste our troops entered Afghanistan. Conciliation has ceased. Coercion has begun. Where will it end? We have had military success, as was sure to be the case. I have never entertained the least doubt of our being able to go where we chose—to drive Shere Ali from Cabul, to occupy Candahar and Herat; but, my Lords, when we have obtained the military success, wherever and whenever we may stop, our real difficulty begins. I approach with some hesitation what may be called a military question, and so in part it is; but it is also a political and a financial question. Our present Frontier in the plain being deemed insufficient, we are to go into the hills, and amongst them to occupy some line as a "scientific" Frontier. Now, my Lords, I can understand if we were dealing with a single line of mountains—such as the Pyrenees or the Balkans—that by occupying the Passes in such a chain we might obtain what military men would call a scientific Frontier. But there is no such single range beyond our present Frontier. The country is described by a most competent military authority as a vast tract of mountains of the most rugged and desolate character, sometimes attaining the height of 10,000 feet, running down in successive ridges from the great mass of the Hindoo Koosh, intersected by narrow valleys and defiles, with difficult Passes between them, and across which it is impossible to lay down a clear and definite line of Frontier. To whatever line we choose to advance, we must occupy and govern the country behind it. If our posts and the escorts which bring up their supplies—all of which must come from the rear—are weak, they will be liable to be cut off. If they are strong, the expense will be very considerable. If our posts are in the valleys in order to command the water and such roads as are there, they will be overlooked from the surrounding heights, and if on the hill sides, the supply of water may be deficient and the communications will be difficult. All this was experienced in the operations at the Umbeylah Pass in 1863; and, indeed, the experience of that operation is a warning against engaging in this mountain warfare. It was at that time desirable to punish a band of plunderers known as the Sitana fanatics, who had established themselves at no great distance from our border. A force was despatched for this purpose, and in order to reach them it had to pass through some territory belonging to the Bonairs. We had no hostility to them, and they were told so; but, nevertheless, they, and the neighbouring tribes, rose in force as soon as we had entered their district, and held us in check for a considerable time in the Pass. At last, fortunately for us, they assembled in force in the valley, and we attacked and defeated them. So little real hostility was there, that they actually aided us in the object of our expedition; but so inveterate was their feeling against the foot of the foreigner on their soil that, as we retired, they destroyed the traces of the route by which we had advanced. If such was the feeling against us for our temporary presence, what will it be if we advance for the purpose of permanent occupation? The country surrounding the Khyber Pass is inhabited by the Afreedees and other tribes, numbering about 100,000 men, of the fiercest, most intractable, and semi-barbarous of the Afghans. They live in a constant state of feud. Robbery and murder are of daily occurrence. How will you punish such crimes, which you cannot permit in the districts which you govern? The guilty persons will escape into the next valley, will be aided by its inhabitants, and there will be frequent incursions of these people, who are admirably fitted for mountain warfare, and being bigoted Mahomedans will be animated by an intense fanatical hatred of the infidel foreigner who seeks to reduce them to obedience, to law and order. You will be compelled to advance from valley to valley, much in the same way as I understand is now going on in the hills on your North-East Frontier against tribes much less formidable than the Afghans. Now, my Lords, assuming that, even in spite of our annexation of part of his territory, friendly relations have been established at first with the Ameer, such proceedings as these will render it impossible for him to maintain relations of friendship, or to avoid supporting the tribes whom you attack. The national feeling of his people and their religious fanaticism will force him to do so. You will be brought into collision at Cabul. What may be the result cannot be predicted; but whatever it may be, anarchy, a puppet Ruler supported by us, or actual annexation, will equally involve us in further difficulty, and we shall be again compelled to go forward. I do not see that amongst all the advocates of advancing our Frontier anyone has even suggested where we can stop; and depend upon it that if we once commence advancing into Afghanistan, instead of taking the first ridge, we shall never stop till we have taken the last, which looks down upon the plains of Balkh and the Oxus. But this is an occupation of Afghanistan, the folly of which Sir Charles Napier said only equalled that of attempting to conquer it. Against whom do we require a scientific Frontier? Not against the Afghans; against them our present Frontier has sufficed for the last 28 years. Bands of plunderers are the only persons who have crossed in hostile form. It is not against Afghans, but against Russians that a scientific Frontier can be needed. But nobody expects the Russians to advance for the purpose of assailing India by Cabul and the Khyber. Look to Sir Henry Rawlinson's book, who certainly understands the subject. He tells you that it is upon Herat that they must advance, and I believe that all military men agree in this opinion. In order to meet their possible advance, he proposes to erect a great fortress at Herat, a second at Candahar, with a line of forts and fortified posts at Quetta and elsewhere, in order to maintain the communications along a line of 800 miles, from the Indus to Herat. In this view he is corroborated by a great military authority, General Hamley. If on military grounds this be necessary, then here arises the important question of finance. Herat will have to be defended, not against Persian or Afghan attacks, but against the forces and military skill of the Russians. It must, so near the Frontier, be made a second Metz. I do not presume to say what the first cost of constructing such a fortress, of that at Candahar and of those at the other posts, will be, but it cannot be less than £3,000,000 or £4,000,000. As regards the permanent defence of the country, an estimate was made in the time of Sir John Lawrence's Government. The minimum number of men required was put at 30,000, of whom one-third were to be Europeans, and the annual cost was taken at between £3,000,000 and £4,000,000. But it was supposed that the necessary force would in all probability be, not 30,000 but 50,000 men, and no allowance was made for keeping down a hostile population, or for the Civil Government of the country. Whatever the whole force required for all these purposes may be it must be in addition to what there is now in India, where there is not a man too much. It would be a low estimate to put the annual sum required for all this at less than from £4,000,000 to £5,000,000. Now, my Lords, little or nothing is to be obtained in Afghanistan. It is a country which, as Dost Mahomed expressed it, produces only men and stones. The whole expense must be defrayed from other sources. It is impossible to impose such a charge upon the Revenues of India. In spite of the favourable account which my noble Friend opposite gave of the amount of the opium duty this year, the Revenue of India, one year with another, barely covers the expenditure. Some of the Revenue is precarious. The expense of the Civil Administration is steadily and inevitably increasing, and nobody has suggested how much additional taxation can be imposed on India. If such expense is to be incurred it must fall upon the taxpayers of this country; and that is a prospect which may well make the boldest statesman pause. Her Majesty's Government may ask me what I would do. Fortunately, as I think, the winter months render a pause in our military operations inevitable. I would endeavour during this interval to revert to the policy of conciliation. We have done much of which the Ameer has, I think, good reason to complain; but Dost Mahomed had more, when we had deposed and driven him into exile. Nevertheless, Sir Herbert Edwardes and Sir John Lawrence so far conciliated him that he became our fast friend; and during our worst necessity during the

Mutiny, in spite of the urgency of his Chiefs, he allowed no Afghan to cross the Frontier to our detriment. Call such policy by what name you please—backward policy, or masterly inactivity—it has succeeded in preserving peace and a good understanding with the Afghans. We ought to abandon all notion of permanent occupation beyond our present Frontier; we ought to satisfy the Afghans that we covet no portion of their territory. We ought, if communications are opened—as I hope they may be—endeavour to conciliate them. We should be patient, forgiving, and generous, and require nothing but what is absolutely necessary for the honour of the country. We have, in truth, no cause of quarrel with the Afghans but what we have made ourselves. There is no difficulty as to our Frontier. It is not so on their Northern Frontier, where they are almost coterminous with the Russians, or with States under Russian influence. Bokhara and Balkh are in near proximity; and looking to what has been the progress of Russian advance, it is more than probable that ere long some cause of difficulty or cause of quarrel will occur on this Frontier, and on the occurrence of which the Afghans will naturally look to us for assistance. That is the relative position in which we ought to stand with Afghanistan, not offending their national feelings; respecting their independence; always ready to afford them friendly aid. Such a state of things I hope and trust may be established; and with the Afghans our friends, though we may not have a scientific Frontier, nevertheless, with a friendly and warlike population holding an almost inaccessible country, and the British power behind them, we shall have an unassailable bulwark to our Indian Empire. The noble Viscount concluded by moving the Amendment of which he had given Notice.

Amendment *moved*,

To leave out from the word ("House") to the end of the motion for the purpose of inserting ("whilst ready to consent to providing the means necessary for bringing the war in which we are unhappily engaged to a safe and honourable conclusion, regrets the conduct pursued by the Government which has unnecessarily engaged this country in the contest.")—(*The Viscount Halifax.*)

LORD LAWRENCE *: My Lords, the noble Earl who moved the Address to Her Majesty on the evening of the 5th (the Earl of Ravensworth) took occasion to quote a sentence from one of my letters, written some years ago when I was Governor General, to the effect that if the Russians got possession of Afghanistan it would be the cause of much trouble to us in India. I quite admit that this quotation may be correct, for in a despatch of the 3rd of September, 1867, I expressed the same view. I considered then that we should do all in our power to avert such a condition of things, and I urged on Her Majesty's Government that some understanding should be at once come to with Russia on this matter. I think, now, if Russia will not enter into satisfactory arrangements with us about Afghanistan, or, having made them, allow her officers in Central Asia to violate them, that ulterior measures should be taken in England to protect India. But, though I entertain these views, I hold — and firmly hold—that it would be an unwise policy for us to go beyond our present boundary on the North-West Frontier of India, and thus to anticipate the attacks of Russia. The policy which England for the last few years has adopted towards Russia is of a very doubtful character. We distrust her—we are continually questioning her as to her intentions and movements — and then profess ourselves satisfied with her explanations. For instance, in the Correspondence recently published regarding affairs in Central Asia, we accept all she says as to the circumstances which have led her to make the recent diversion in Afghanistan; and while we do this, and resume friendly relations with her, we wage war with the Afghans because they received a Russian Mission; and further are about to rectify our Frontiers in the hope of strengthening ourselves against Russian advances. This is not a very magnanimous policy, and I doubt it adding to either our strength or prestige in India. I will not say very much about the policy which we have pursued towards Afghanistan since the war of 1842, except that, after punishing its people for their treachery, our endeavour has uniformly been to make amends to them for our first invasion of their country. The noble Earl taxed me in severe terms—which, however, I view with indifference—on account of my successive recognitions in 1864 of Shere

Ali and his brothers. I confess that I did this; and cannot help thinking that if the noble Earl had been in my place, and had possessed a knowledge of Afghanistan, in all probability he would have acted as I did. For many years the state of things in Cabul had been one of constant change and struggles for the Throne, one Chief ousting another, as their respective parties gained supremacy. Ameer Dost Mahomed was himself a usurper of the Throne he sat on; and we at one time drove him from it in favour of a *de jure* King, and afterwards re-instated him, to the general satisfaction of the Chiefs and people. On his death, Ameer Shere Ali, his son, who had previously been appointed heir-apparent, succeeded his father, and would probably have retained possession of the Kingdom if he had only acted prudently; he, however, was not the rightful heir, either by Mahomedan law or by custom of the country, and his brothers were among his bitterest enemies. Sirdar Afzul Khan raised the standard of revolt in Balkh; Sirdar Azim Khan intrigued in Cabul; and a third brother attacked him from Candahar; it was, in fact, an internecine struggle between the members of one family. Why, then, should we interfere to uphold Shere Ali against his elder brothers? On what principle were we to pronounce that Shere Ali was the *de jure* Ruler of Cabul? Had we maintained his cause, and upheld him on the Throne, we might have found that we were helping a man whom neither the Chiefs nor people of the country desired to rule over them. I affirm, then, that the policy then pursued of dealing only with the *de facto* Ruler of the day was the right one. When, however, Shere Ali had subdued his enemies and recovered his power, and was willing to renew friendly relations with us, I judged that the time had come when we could with safety afford him aid; and my opinion was fully concurred in by the Secretary of State for India, Sir Stafford Northcote. I promised the Ameer, therefore, a considerable sum of money—part of which was given him at once, and the remainder in Lord Mayo's time; I also presented him with a number of arms, to which Lord Mayo added, including in his gift 12 guns. The interview with the Ameer which I had arranged previous to my departure from India was carried out by Lord Mayo in right Royal fashion. But it is an entire mistake to suppose that the Ameer consented at the Umballa interview to receive British officers either in Cabul or in other parts of his country, or that we desired that he should do so. The evidence of Mr. Seton-Karr, who was Foreign Secretary of the Government of India in 1869, is conclusive on this point. I was very glad to find among my papers a letter of his, written on the 5th of April, 1869, in which, with the approval of Lord Mayo, he gave me information on this point, which confirms fully his recent statement. What the Ameer really wanted was a Treaty of Reciprocity, whereby the friends and enemies of the one country should be deemed the friends and enemies of the other, and that this Treaty should be made with him and his own family. Lord Mayo refused both of these requests; but gave him strong assurances that in case of foreign invasion, if we were satisfied that the Ameer had not acted aggressively beyond his Frontier, he might rest assured of help in time of need. Lord Mayo likewise pledged himself that we would never send British officers to reside in his country—a point which we shall see was of the utmost significance to the Afghans. Shere Ali returned to Afghanistan expressing himself on every occasion as highly pleased with his reception at Umballa. In 1872 Lord Northbrook became Viceroy of India, and shortly afterwards Ameer Shere Ali sent his Minister, Syud Nur Mahomed Khan, to pay his respects and make certain representations to him. These consisted in the Ameer's desire for a reciprocal Treaty (as in Lord Mayo's time), and for the formal recognition of his son, Abdoolla Jan, as heir-apparent. Lord Northbrook, of course, did not accede to these requests, but gave him similar promises to those of Lord Mayo; the only addition to them being that troops were more specifically mentioned than before. This subject has excited especial interest, because it has been supposed that the Secretary of State for India, the Duke of Argyll, had not responded to the Viceroy on this point; but it is clear that this was not the case, for the Viceroy acted on his construction of the Secretary of State's telegram, which he understood as giving him the sanction for which he had asked. It may be said that from the time of Lord Ellenborough, in 1843, down to April, 1876, a period of 33 years (when Lord Northbrook returned to England), an uniform policy of peace and conciliation had been acted on with regard to Afghanistan. When any unreasonable demands were made they were firmly and quietly refused; on the other hand, if we wished to introduce changes which the Afghans objected to, our wishes were never pressed on them: and this policy was approved of by the Home Government. It is worthy of note that the two points, one of a personal Treaty with the Ameer of the day and his heirs, and the other of a reciprocal Treaty, have been, from 1855 to the time Lord Northbrook left India, subjects of the greatest interest to the different Ameers of Cabul. Sirdar Hyder Ali, in 1855, desired that the Treaty should be made with his father, Dost Mahomed, and himself as heir-apparent individually, and not as Rulers of Afghanistan; we did not comply with this, or the other request; explaining that our Treaties were simply to be made with the Rulers of Cabul, as such; and that in the matter of reciprocity, we could only give full assurance of help in time of need, did we approve of the Ameer's conduct. In one instance, to which I will now allude, the Home Government did not agree with Lord Northbrook. In 1875 the British Government desired to make a material change in the policy hitherto adopted towards the Rulers of Cabul. They desired the Viceroy to press upon Ameer Shere Ali the reception of a Mission at Cabul as a temporary measure, with the view of urging him to agree to British officers being placed at different parts of his dominion, such as Balkh, Herat, and Candahar, and eventually, if possible, at Cabul. This change of policy was more than once pressed on the Viceroy—who, however, firmly resisted. He stated in one of his despatches that all the officers of standing and experience in the Punjab, and elsewhere, were of his opinion, and that no dissentient voice had been raised in his Council. When, however, Lord Northbrook gave up the Viceroyalty, instructions still more definite to the same purport were again issued; and several letters appear to have been sent to the Ameer which produced great irritation on his mind. It is known that three of the Governor General's Council — Sir William Muir, Sir Henry Norman, and Sir Arthur Hobhouse — strongly deprecated both the new Instructions and the way in which they were carried out; but, on the retirement from the Council of these gentlemen, no obstacle then remained to the pressure of this measure on the Ameer. Shere Ali was next asked to attend the Durbar on the 1st of January, 1877; but the invitation was declined—which is not surprising if it be borne in mind that he was an independent Ruler, and that his presence at the Durbar might have been construed as an admission of dependence; moreover, he could be ill-spared from his duties in his own country. Later on, the Ameer was requested by the Viceroy to receive Sir Lewis Pelly at Cabul for a short time, to explain the views and wishes of his Excellency; he declined this also, but, after some hesitation, agreed to send down his confidential Minister, Syud Nur Mahomed, to meet Sir Lewis Pelly at Peshawur. The Syud was labouring under a severe form of disease, and came by slow stages from Cabul. On his arrival at Peshawur he was courteously received by Sir Lewis Pelly and Dr. Bellew. His first interview with the latter officer was of a very pathetic character. The Syud deplored the nature of the Viceroy's wishes, and concluded by saying — "Matters have now come to a crisis, and the situation is a grave one. This is a last opportunity for a settlement, and God only knows the future." Sir Lewis Pelly had received instructions to insist on the principle that British officers might be placed in Afghanistan, except, in the first instance, at Cabul; indeed, this condition was to be the basis of the Conference, and without its acceptance no other point was even to be discussed. The Syud entreated, again and again, that the matter might be postponed until later in the proceedings; but Sir Lewis Pelly was inexorable, and the Conference consisted of a consideration of this single subject. The Syud, among other questions, was asked why the Ameer had refused a temporary Mission, and what were the misapprehensions which had led him to such a step? He evaded an answer as long as he could; but at last alluded to the settlement of the Seistan boundary, Lord Northbrook's intervention on behalf of Yakoob Khan, and other minor points. But it is evident from a perusal of the proceedings that the Envoy was on the defensive, and had no real desire to prefer any other complaint than the one under discussion—namely, the reception of British officers in Afghanistan, in which, the Syud said, the Ameer, the Chiefs, and the people were all of one mind, and were all in the highest degree alarmed at the idea of its being forced on them. Every other consideration appears to have been merged in this one anxiety, and to the last moment of the last day of the Conference the Syud refused to admit that the Ameer would ever accept such a measure. The Conference was obliged to end on account of Syud Nur Mahomed's illness; but a letter was sent him by Sir Lewis Pelly (under the Viceroy's directions) still demanding an answer on this point. But no answer was ever sent, for the Syud died without giving any consent to this cardinal condition. On the news of the Envoy's death the Viceroy directed that the Conference should be terminated, though it appeared that the Ameer was about to send down a second Envoy, who was authorized to submit to all the conditions demanded by the Viceroy, including the reception of the officers. The Native Agent who had represented the British Government at Cabul, and had accompanied the Envoy to Peshawur, was not allowed to return to Afghanistan, and the Viceroy sent no one to take his place; and so it came to pass that all diplomatic communications with the Ameer ceased, and the Government of India received no reliable information, but had to depend on the news picked up in the bazaars of Peshawur and elsewhere. But to return briefly to the Conference, the proceedings of which ought to be read, in order to realize fully the genuine feeling of alarm and apprehension that was expressed by the Syud in deprecating the sending of officers into his country. And another circumstance worthy of note is, that in these discussions the Envoy expressed himself as thoroughly satisfied with the manner in which Afghanistan had been treated in the days of Lord Northbrook, Lord Mayo, and myself. He seems to have looked back to the time when we governed India as one of assurance and security to the Ameer of Cabul. I would observe here, that the unsuccessful result of the Mission to Candahar in 1857 was one of the reasons which led me to conclude that the time had not arrived for the Afghan Government to be required to accept our policy in this matter. Ameer Dost Mahomed had absolutely objected to receive British officers at Cabul; and though when relieved from this anxiety he had with seeming willingness agreed to their residence for a time at Candahar, yet they were not received with the consideration that ought to have been shown them. The officers chosen were Colonel H. Lumsden (Sir H. Lumsden), Lieutenant P. Lumsden (now Adjutant-General), and Dr. H. W. Bellew; none better, in every way, were to be found on the Frontier. I cannot trace in the Correspondence communications of any kind between the Ameer and Viceroy from March, 1877, to July, 1878. We may, therefore, reasonably conclude that it was during this period that the Ameer turned to Russia for help, and that those communications took place with her which led to negotiations with the Turkestan authorities, and finally to the Mission to Cabul. In July, 1878, the Ameer was called upon by the Viceroy to receive Sir Neville Chamberlain's Mission, and before an answer could arrive its advance guard was sent on to Ali Musjid, where it met with the rebuff which is one of the reasons of the present war. Telegrams of an exciting nature, describing the conduct of the Ameer's officer at Ali Musjid as violent and insulting, were sent to England, and are still officially uncontradicted. They contributed much to the anger of the people of England against the Ameer. On referring to the Afghan Correspondence two different versions of the mode in which the Mir Akhor received our Mission on the 21st of September will be found. Major Cavagnari, the head of the party, says distinctly, that though told he would be resisted by force if he proceeded, he was treated courteously from first to last. Colonel Jenkins states, however, that the Mir Akhor said that but for former friendship he would have fired on the party. As Major Cavagnari was the principal officer, we are justified in taking his account in preference to that of Colonel Jenkins. But be this as it may, the difference is not of much importance; for if the Mir Akhor believed that our

Mission was about to force its way through the Pass, it was only natural that he should intimate that he was prepared to resist. Bearing in mind the rough character of the Afghans, the action of this officer at its worst was no more than a rebuff, which, for want of common prudence, our people had brought on themselves. We now come to the Ameer's answer to the Viceroy's letters, which constitutes the *gravamen* of the charge against him. It is very difficult in the absence of a copy of the exact expressions used by the Ameer in the original Persian to estimate fairly the importance to be placed on its contents; and this difficulty is increased, as we have neither of the four letters of the harshness of which the Ameer complains. However, taking the translation as it stands in the Correspondence, I declare as my deliberate opinion that the words therein used do not amount to an insult. The Ameer was clearly angry, and under great apprehensions when he wrote. His answer is evasive, and to a certain extent, perhaps, defiant; but as little so as could be expected consistently with a resolution to resist receiving the Mission. He also complains of discourteous and inconsiderate treatment on the part of the British Government; and it would be well for us not to forget the provocations which in many instances he had received from us, if we wish to judge justly in this matter. The so-called affront from the Ameer was certainly not one that deserved to be wiped out in blood. I see in the Correspondence in August of this year that the Governor General telegraphed that "the safety of India depended" on our establishing a preponderating influence in Afghanistan, and to that end would insist on the reception of British officers into that country; and, this condition being accepted by the Secretary of State for India, we have been plunged into the present war. It is my firm and unbiassed opinion that the war now raging in Afghanistan is a most unjust one, and that its political consequences will be exceedingly damaging to us. We have already been victorious in the fight; but in the minds of most educated Natives in India the war will be considered—and considered rightly—as an oppressive and high-handed proceeding. It is vain for us to say that the war is with the Ameer and not with his people; they will be one in their desire to resist our aggression. All the good results of the policy of more than 30 years have been cast to the winds, and the suspicions and enmity of the Afghan nation have been revived with four-fold intensity. Thus have we played the game of Russia; for rest assured that, if the day should ever come when Afghan influence would be of any value, it will to a certainty be thrown in the balance against us, and we shall have nothing to blame for such results except our own folly and injustice. Now as to our present action. In my opinion, the war ought to be brought to as speedy a conclusion as can with honour be done—the victorious party in a conquest has never any real difficulty in treating with the vanquished. I would exact nothing from the Afghans. I would take no territory from them on any pretext whatever. I would arrange that bygones should be bygones. I would place no British officer in their territory. If they were willing to make a friendly and reasonable Treaty with us I would meet their wishes (still, of course, adhering to the old principles of refusing to bind ourselves absolutely to defend and protect them). I would give them the strongest assurances, provided we were satisfied with their conduct, of help in case of foreign invasion. I would agree, on the same conditions, to give them periodical grants of money—not as a regular subsidy; for by keeping the power of giving or withholding in our own hands our hold over them becomes stronger. The Ameer is very poor; his revenues are small, and the legitimate expenses of maintaining his Government are very considerable. He has never had sufficient means at his command to pay his troops, whose allowances are scanty and always some months in arrear. I have said that I would take no territory from the Afghans; neither would I extend our North-West Frontier over what are called the independent Border Tribes; in every respect we are much better without them than with them. If we annex any of them—more especially those of the Pathan race—we shall sooner or later be forced to subjugate them, disarm them, and keep them down. This would necessitate a considerable addition to our Native Army, and, for political reasons, to our European force also; the consequent increase of expenditure would be a great drain on our resources. We might with advantage give some of these tribes moderate retaining fees, and employ more of them than at present as levies on the border; we might establish posts of small size in suitable positions in the Khyber Pass, to be held by them. Should a day of invasion ever come, we shall have ample time to make such preparations with them as circumstances may suggest, and having respected their independence, and treated them kindly but firmly, we should have some reason for calculating on their assistance. They would, with a few English and Native officers to look after them (not to drill them), make good guerilla troops wherewith to annoy the flanks and rear of an invading enemy. With the consent of these tribes, field-works might then be constructed within the mountains, our own forces would be ready in the plains and valleys east of the Passes, and would be near their true base, the sea-coast of Scinde, and would be able to concentrate rapidly at any point by means of our lateral communications. We could keep a considerable portion of our European troops in the adjacent hills in the rear, or in the most healthy parts of the plains, until they were wanted; and then, when the enemy appeared, we should be able to array against him an army, European and Native, fresh and well-found, which would prove irresistible. Now, as regards the present Motion. Of course, in the first instance, the Revenues of India must defray the expenditure; but England alone ought to bear all the costs of the war, as a matter of justice. Unless this be done the general feeling in India will be one of indignation and despair—particularly if additional taxation is laid on an already burdened people. If we borrow the money we shall add indefinitely to the financial difficulties of India, and when troublous times come shall be proportionately overweighted. One word, before I sit down, as to another point. What is the cause of the mystery and secrecy with which everything of importance to India is carried on, both by the Government there and by the Secretary of State for India in England? In 1877 the Duke of Argyll and other noble Lords endeavoured, in this House, to find out if there was any important change in the policy towards Afghanistan. An answer in the negative was given to all our inquiries. We now know, as we then surmised, that the policy which has since brought on the war was being vigorously pursued. The Correspondence also recently published is not compiled in an impartial spirit, for there are many omissions which, were they filled up, would show strong reasons against the course pursued by the Government; for instance, not a word is said of three dissentient opinions in the Governor General's Council to the present policy. Those omissions have led to much of the public anxiety, and ought to be at once remedied. Again, the mode in which affairs are at present conducted in the India Office requires immediate reform. Criticisms which Councillors desire to make are not allowed to appear —it is always too soon or too late. If they are eventually published, the time has passed in which they might have done good. Whilst maintaining the authority of the Secretary of State, the Councillors should have perfect freedom to make known their opinions; and the people of England would then have some chance of benefiting by their knowledge and experience, and of seeing for themselves in some degree how matters were going on in India. The noble Viscount the Secretary of State for India, in order to disparage the weight of my opinion on the present war, has alluded to a proposal made by me in the Mutiny, to give up the Peshawur Valley and retire across the Indus; and no doubt the noble Earl, in moving the Address to Her Majesty's Speech, on the 5th instant, had the same object in view when he made a similar allusion. I have hitherto been unwilling to refer to what actually occurred in 1857, because to do so satisfactorily would have necessitated my bringing to light the state of things which induced me to entertain this idea. I will only point out now that the proposal was prospective and conditional, subject to a state of things which might have occurred, and which was likely to occur. If ever openly and fairly challenged, I shall be prepared to show grounds for the line on which I then intended to act. Sir Herbert Edwardes concluded, by mistake, that I had decided to abandon Peshawur at once; but this was not the case; I, in the first instance, only wished that preparations should be made, by the withdrawal of the English women and children to a place of security—cis-Indus; so that, should the necessity arise which I had anticipated, our soldiers might be free and untrammelled. In 1858, after all danger from the effects of the Mutiny had passed from the Punjab, I discussed this question with Sir Herbert Edwardes and Sir Neville Chamberlain, when the latter officer expressed an opinion that, under the circumstances in which I had proposed to act, he thought I had resolved advisedly; that had the force before Delhi been compelled to give up the siege and fall back, we could not have continued to hold Peshawur. My views may not have been correct, and Sir Herbert Edwardes's may have been the right judgment; but while he only knew how we stood at Peshawur, I was behind the scenes and knew also the state of things at Delhi. Sir Neville Chamberlain had this advantage also; for he had barely left Peshawur a month or six weeks when I made the suggestion now under consideration to Sir Herbert Edwardes—and he was subsequently Adjutant General of the troops before Delhi. Whatever may be the views of impartial men on this subject, on knowing all the circumstances which in 1857 beset our position in the North-West of India, it was solely the desire of economising our English troops, and thus to enable them to be used in the most effective way in stemming the tide of misfortune which surrounded us, that led me to advocate the abandonment of Peshawur; and as for those who use the resolution I then formed with the object of damaging my reputation, I can only regard their conduct with feelings strongly akin to contempt.

THE EARL OF DERBY: I do not intend to follow the noble Lord (Lord Lawrence), who has so extensive and so practical a knowledge of the question of Afghanistan in all its phases, nor the noble Viscount who moved the Amendment, nor the Secretary of State for India, in the able and exhaustive accounts which, from their respective points of view, they have given of the question now before us. I rise not very willingly, and I shall not trouble your Lordships long; but having been concerned in some of the earlier stages of these transactions, and standing in the unfortunate position of finding myself unable, on the one hand, to support the Resolution of the Government, and, on the other hand, unable to agree with a large part of the arguments adduced by a majority of those who oppose it—believing, as I do, that the policy of the Government in 1876 was sound and defensible, but that the proceedings in 1878 are not such as this House ought to support—standing in that isolated and unfortunate position, I do not feel it consistent with my duty to give a silent and unexplained vote. The Secretary of State for India commenced by taking credit, on behalf of the Government of which he is a Member, for having called Parliament together at the earliest convenient date. He had a perfect right to do so; and that, probably, is the only part of these transactions on which the opinion of your Lordships will be unanimous. I think, however, it is impossible not to feel that there is something unreal and unsatisfactory in the state of things with which we have to deal. We are discussing—and we know we are discussing—an issue over which we have no real or practical influence. When a war is begun, to withhold Supplies which are necessary to carry it on, and thereby to expose a British Army in the field to disaster and defeat, is a course outside the limits of what is allowable or possible. We are, therefore, placed in this position—we are bound to support in action a policy which in opinion we may wholly disapprove. The other evening the noble Duke who sits on the Opposition benches (the Duke of Somerset) made a sarcastic comment on the speech of a noble Earl then sitting below him (Earl Granville), because that noble Earl, while disapproving the general policy of the war, yet expressed a hope that nothing would be left undone to press it to a conclusion. Well, that is the sort of language which a great many others of us are holding. It is an inconsistency if you will; but an inconsistency which is forced upon us by the peculiar position in which Parliament is placed. And, my Lords, it is not only to the case of a war that this practical helplessness of Parliament extends. Take the case of a concluded Treaty. If the Government has pledged the faith of the nation to this, that, or the other — no matter how imprudently—we are asked, how is it possible for us to repudiate an obligation undertaken in the face of Europe? My Lords, let me say, in passing, that any remarks I may make on this subject are not meant by way of censure upon the Government. They have acted simply in accordance with many precedents. I do not contend that the Government have exceeded Constitutional limits, nor do I even affirm that they have strained them; but I do hold that a country professing to be self-governed, and which supposes at least that it manages its own affairs, is in a very peculiar position when twice in the same year Parliament—once in July and again in December—is called upon to consider decisions of national importance—decisions which may affect the future of the country for many years—those decisions having been taken on the responsibility of the Executive Government without a possibility of any Parliamentary opinion—or, indeed, any opinion at all—being previously expressed upon them—thus rendering all criticism merely retrospective and historical in its character. Most of us believe that before long the nation is to be consulted as to the policy it will sanction. When that time arrives there will be a question to be asked and answered—a question quite apart from Party politics—Can a country be said to be really self-governed which may at any moment find itself engaged in a European or an Asiatic war — not necessarily a defensive war—or which may be committed to some engagement, inevitably involving war in the future; the decision in each case having been taken without anyone knowing anything of it outside the small number of persons who constitute the Cabinet of the day? I do not think it is any answer to say—"You have Ministerial responsibility." What does Ministerial responsibility mean? We all know it means that if a majority of the electors disapprove what has been done, the Government is changed, and the power will pass from one set of men to another. But that result is not a remedy. It does not get us out of the quarrel in which we have been involved, nor does it disengage us from the obligations which we may have hastily and rashly incurred. This question, my Lords, is one upon which I will say no more, but which I think you will find become more and more prominent. My Lords, there has been a great deal of controversy, and much has been said and written by members of the two political Parties, as to which Administration must bear the responsibility of having originally alienated the Ameer from us. My Lords, I have examined the Papers; I have read most of what has been written on this subject: and the only conclusion to which I can come is, that it would be utterly impossible, and that even if it were possible it would be utterly useless, to try to single out any one special and exclusive cause for that feeling of jealousy and distrust on his part with which we have undoubtedly to deal. I believe the mischief may be traced back in its origin to a cause for which no one now living is responsible—to the first Afghan War. Everybody now admits that war to have been a folly, and there are a good many who think it a crime. To us it is now mere matter of history—it has almost faded from our memories. But we cannot expect that it shall have equally passed from the recollection of those who suffered from it. The Afghan Rulers and the Afghan people probably know very little of any change of opinion which may have taken place here. What they do know is this—that in the memory of living men their country was invaded by a British Army without cause or provocation; that it was occupied for a considerable time; and that when at last evacuated, its evacuation was accompanied by severities not usual in English war. It seems to me, therefore, that if we were in the position of the Afghan Chief, or of those about him, we should be disposed to look with considerable suspicion and distrust on the proceedings of neighbours who had these antecedents. It may be argued, no doubt, that in 1855 the quarrel was made up and a Treaty signed between the Indian and the Afghan Governments, which was in force up to the late declaration of war. But on looking at that Treaty the other day, it struck me—as it struck the noble Earl who moved the Address the other night—that it was not altogether a satisfactory Treaty to one of the parties concerned. The Treaty consists of three Articles. The first is a declaration of perpetual peace and friendship. The second is a declaration that we will respect the Ameer's territories, and not interfere therein. The third gives the same pledge on behalf of the Ameer, with the important addition that he agrees to be the friend of our friends and the enemy of our enemies. That amounted to an alliance offensive and defensive with us on the part of the Ameer, while we on our part incurred no corresponding obligation. I know that a few years later it was modified, as the Secretary of State for India said, for a temporary purpose; but this Treaty at least helps to explain why the present Ameer, who succeeded to those obligations, should have assumed towards us that very peculiar tone which is observable in his correspondence — the tone, not exactly of a friend, nor exactly of an enemy, but of a man who feels himself ill-used and has a grievance. I will not go through the history of our past relations with the Ameer. As far as I can judge, the root of the misunderstanding between us and him appears to have been this—that while we offered him occasional help in money and arms and promised him a certain support in his difficulties, the kind of support which he has asked us for, and at various times has endeavoured to obtain, was such as with our ideas of responsibility it would have been impossible for any English Ministry to give. He wanted a pledge that his dynasty should be supported by us against all rivals. The Secretary of State for India (Viscount Cranbrook), in referring to that subject to-night, seemed to treat that claim of the Ameer as not altogether unreasonable, and to contend that he had some cause of complaint against us, because we only recognised him as *de facto* Ruler of a part of his country, and also recognized another Prince who held certain other districts. My answer is, that the Ameer appears to have required from us that which would necessarily have involved our continual interference in the domestic affairs of Afghanistan, and possibly the employment of British troops to put down insurrection against him. The granting of his request would have led to the exercise of constant control over his acts; because if we were to be bound to give him support, we must have taken care that he did not abuse his power. No concession of that sort could, therefore, reasonably have been made. No doubt other questions had their influence—such as the Seistan arbitration and some minor matters—which it is not worth while to mention; but I think that to which I have adverted was the principal grievance of the Ameer, and the one which raised the strongest feeling of resentment in his mind. Well, in 1873 came the Russian advance on Khiva. The Ameer was naturally alarmed, and a long series of communications passed between him and the Indian Government. What I understand the Ameer to have then wanted from us was an unconditional guarantee of protection from external attack, he making no stipulation in return. The British Government was willing to give him assurances of protection if he was attacked without provocation, such protection to be conditional on his placing himself in our hands. The difference between what was asked for and what was promised appears to have mainly, if not entirely, turned on the conditions upon which the protection should be afforded; and I am bound to say, from a study of these Papers, that I do not draw the conclusion that there is a very marked difference in the attitude of the Ameer to the British Government, before and after these transactions. He is represented to have been jealous, suspicious, and mistrustful after what took place in 1873; but it appears to me that he was jealous, suspicious, and mistrustful before that date, and that there is no apparent change in that respect. Well, in 1874 the present Government came into Office. I am not careful to argue the question of how far, and how soon, they diverged from the policy of their Predecessors. I do not think the divergence was very marked in the first year, because I myself had, early in that year, to state the views of the Cabinet on the subject; and I did so after consultation with the then Secretary of State for India. What I said is on record; and I do not see in it any marked difference from the recorded opinions of the India Office in the preceding year. No doubt, later on, steps of a different kind were taken. But is it necessary to assume, as a matter of course, that either the policy that prevailed before 1873, or the policy that prevailed after that date, must necessarily have been erroneous because they may have differed? My Lords, I do not take that view. I say that you must allow for the lapse of time and for the change of circumstances. You must admit that the establishment and consolidation of Russian power in Central Asia introduce a new element into the question. It may have been wise and right—I believe it was—to have taken precautions after that event, which before its occurrence would have been premature, and possibly mischievous. What were the steps then taken? One of them—the occupation of Quetta—was recommended by various considerations of local security; it violated no right of the Afghan Government; and we had a Treaty right to take it, although it may, no doubt, have tended—and I am afraid it did tend—to increase the irritation and the jealousy of the Ameer. That was no sufficient reason for not taking it; but the feeling is intelligible, and I think its existence, and the cause of it, ought to have been borne in mind when we dealt with him as we have done in the last few months. Then came the attempt to place Agents at Herat and Candahar. My Lords, whatever the result may have been, I am bound to say that in that attempt, so long as nothing more was done to press it than the making of friendly representations, I see nothing that, in principle, was open to objection. It was, and is, eminently desirable that we should know what is passing in Afghanistan. The geographical position of that country, the conditional protection which we had promised, and which, whether we had promised it or not, we could not help giving, in case of foreign attack;—the very fact of the suspicion and distrust with which we were met, were all reasons to make it desirable to render our relations with the Ameer more close and intimate. I think, therefore, the Government was quite right in making the attempt. But, obviously, it was one which had to be made cautiously and temperately. Every Asiatic Prince knows how an English Resident, once stationed in his dominions, is apt to acquire influence, and sooner or later to become his virtual master. Moreover, an Agent who is imposed by force on a Prince who is unwilling to receive him is in a position essentially and thoroughly false. He may be treated with all the outward marks of courtesy and respect, and yet he may be allowed to see and know little of what goes on, and without a word said or a thing done on which a quarrel can be fixed, he may be shown, in a hundred ways, that he is neither wanted nor trusted. I hold, therefore, two things to be proved. First of all, that in the circumstances of 1874 it was desirable to establish English Agents in Afghanistan if it could be done by friendly means; and, next, that if it were done by other than friendly pressure—by force, or by pressure equivalent to force—it would fail in the very object which we had in view. In 1876 I held office, and, though not personally cognizant of the details of Indian Frontier diplomacy—for other matters pressed heavily at that date—I, of course, accept fully the responsibility for what was done. I do not think that the Instructions then given to the Indian Government conflict with anything that I have put before your Lordships, or tended to bring about the war in which we are now engaged. The negotiations which were attempted failed and the result was reported home, and the Secretary of State commented on them in due course. The despatch appears in the Blue Book. The substance of it is, that the negotiations showed that the Ameer now knew clearly what we wanted, and might be left to reflect for a time on the knowledge he had acquired, and that it was not desirable to put pressure on him in a hostile sense. The despatch of October 4, 1877, says—

> "The independence of Afghanistan is a matter of importance to the British Government, and, as an essential part of arrangements for its protection, Her Majesty's Government would still be glad to station Agents upon whom they could rely at Herat and Candahar. In the event, therefore, of the Ameer, within a reasonable time, spontaneously manifesting a desire to come to a friendly understanding with your Excellency on the basis of the terms lately offered to, but declined by him, his advances should not be rejected. If, on the other hand, he continues to maintain an attitude of isolation and scarcely veiled hostility, the British Government stands unpledged to any obligations, and, in any contingencies which may arise in Afghanistan, will be at liberty to adopt such measures for the protection and permanent tranquillity of the North-West Frontier of Her Majesty's Indian dominions as the circumstances of the moment may render expedient, without regard to the wishes of the Ameer Shere Ali or the interests of his dynasty."
> —[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 224.]

No doubt, the last sentence is open to various constructions; but, taking the despatch as a whole, I think there is nothing in it to which anyone can reasonably object. It appears to be a fair view of the situation temperately stated; and I believe that if subsequent despatches had been conceived in a similar spirit we should not now find ourselves in our present position. What was the situation, then, at the end of 1877? We were on terms of coldness and estrangement from the Ameer, but not of actual hostility. He distrusted us. He was afraid of us. He thought he had reason to complain of some things we had done and of other things we had not done; but, my Lords, there is nothing to show that he loved Russia any better than he loved us. It was not in the nature of the case that he should. Considering what had happened in Khiva and Bokhara, it is simply impossible to believe that he really wished well to the Russian cause, or desired the success of the Russian armies. Well, then, at last, when a Russian Mission went to Cabul, why did he receive it? Surely the answer is plain—he did not dare to do anything else. We must remember that he was the head of a feeble State, scarcely master of his own dominions; that he was constantly liable to be held responsible for the actions of tribes over whom he had little control—that he felt himself placed between two aggressive military Empires—for we have been aggressive in India. He was not upon friendly terms with us; he knew that he had offended us; and he probably thought that if he offended Russia as well, he would have made two enemies instead of one. And so—very unwisely as the result has shown, quite unjustifiably considering the agreement by which he had bound himself to us, but still in circumstances, of very strong pressure and very great temptation—he took this unfortunate step of receiving the Russian Envoy. Well, my Lords, what, in the circumstances, ought we to have done? I do not contend for a moment that we ought to have allowed the attitude taken by the Ameer to be permanently maintained; but to hold him primarily responsible for what had passed I think was a very harsh mode of dealing with him. No doubt, he had broken his agreement with us. But had no one else broken an agreement with us? Had Russia held to the undertaking she had given? Has not Russia pledged herself, again and again, not to interfere in Afghanistan? And what was the language we held to her? It was courteous; it was friendly. It was a remonstrance, no doubt; but a remonstrance framed in the most amicable terms, expressing a hope that the Mission to Cabul would be at once withdrawn, but making no grievance of its having been sent. I am not here, my Lords, to find fault with either the substance or the style of that document. I think the Government were right in holding the language they did. But we all know that the question which has arisen is the result of the strained relations which existed between the two Governments during the present year. In this country military men freely speculated upon the possibility of our attacking the Asiatic possessions of Russia from India; and I have no doubt Russians speculated equally on the possibility of at least disturbing our Indian Empire by an expedition sent from the North. If such a war had broken out the combatants must have passed through the dominions of the Ameer. The Mission was, therefore, a preparation for war; it was a counter-move to our despatch of Indian troops to Malta. But when the questions which arose were settled at Berlin, the object of the Mission to Cabul ceased; and, in the circumstances, I think the Government were quite justified in simply requesting its withdrawal, and not making a grievance of its having been sent. But what I cannot understand is, why the two parties concerned in this transaction are to be dealt with in so entirely opposite a spirit. Surely, if an offence had been committed against us, Russia was the greater offender of the two; and if reasons of prudence and policy, against which I have not a word to say—which, on the contrary, I altogether uphold—made us determine to condone the offence on the part of Russia, I ask whether simple justice ought not to have led us to deal in a like manner with the party who was immeasurably the less guilty of the two? But we turn round upon the Ameer, saying—"You are in our power; whatever Russia may have done, we cannot reach her—but we can deal with you, and you must pay the penalty for both." Well, my Lords, on the Russian part of the question I shall not say another word—the answer of the Russian Government is vague enough—but when we are told by them that their Mission was of a "provisional" nature, and was one of simple courtesy, I presume we are to read the word "provisional" as "merely temporary," and that we may take it, if not as a pledge, at least as an intimation, that in a very short time the Mission will be removed. But look, my Lords, at the position of the Ameer. I do not myself think that there is any great advantage in forcing a Resident upon a Prince unwilling to receive him, however desirable it may be that he should receive him even in his own interest. But if we thought otherwise, look how entirely the matter was in our own hands. We had a claim upon him such as we never had before. We could now say—"You have received a Mission from Russia; in justice and fairness you cannot do less for us." Suppose, my Lords, that we had held that language and given him time to consider it. The Ameer is no fool. He may be irritable and suspicious; but no one who reads the letters of his which are interspersed in the Correspondence will say that he is not a capable and able man. He knows quite well that he cannot fight the British Empire by himself; and if he had received a warning couched in proper terms, is it likely he would have resisted? Probably he would, in the first instance, have consulted his Russian friends. He would have gone to them and said—"A demand has been made upon me. I am threatened with war if I refuse compliance. Do you mean to stand by me or not?" We know perfectly well the answer they must have given — certainly they did not intend to fight for the Ameer, and they must have told him so. Then, disappointed in the hope of foreign help, which he undoubtedly entertained, and knowing perfectly well his own weakness —knowing, too, that by his own act he had placed himself in a false position—is it credible that he would have resisted? Would he not, on the contrary, have embraced the opportunity for effecting a reconciliation, if freely and frankly offered? Of course, I may be told that the Russian Agent would have given advice in the contrary sense to what the Ameer supposed, and so have encouraged him to persevere. I do not believe it; and I will tell your Lordships why. It cannot be imagined that Russia would have promised to stand by the Ameer, and then when the occasion arose have deserted him. Nothing could be more disastrous to the influence of Russia than such a course. And, therefore, I say that she would not have given such advice. She would not have urged the Ameer to resist if she did not mean to support him. She would, on the contrary, have advised him to give way, making the best terms he could. But instead of friendly overtures being sent, what happened? The Viceroy telegraphed on the 2nd of August that "the present situation required immediate correction;" that he proposes to insist on the reception of a British Mission; that the Ameer would probably welcome it—if he believed that after all that had passed, it says more for his poetical imagination, of which we heard the other night, than for the shrewdness with which he has also been credited—and he adds, what is more likely, that the Ameer was well aware that we were in a position to enforce our demands. The Government, in reply, approve of his insisting on the reception; but they appear to have left all details to the Viceroy. And here comes the extraordinary part of the transaction. Anybody would expect, if merely as a matter of form and courtesy, that when this question of receiving a British Mission had been for years in dispute, even if it was meant ultimately, and in case of need, to enforce the demand, at least that notice would have been given of the intention sufficient to admit of correspondence on the subject; so that the Ameer, while yielding, in reality, to pressure, should at least seem to exercise his option as the Sovereign of a free State. But the Viceroy gives him no such notice. He appears bent, not merely on forcing the Mission on the Ameer, but on making all India see that he did so force it. He does not leave him the semblance of an option. He selects his Envoy—a very distinguished officer — surrounds him with an escort of 250 men, makes the fact public to all the world, and sends him to the Frontier to demand admission at once. What is, then, the situation of the Ameer? If he admits him, he makes it plain to his own people that he is yielding to coercion. If he refuses, it is war. Surely it might have occurred to the Viceroy that a high-spirited Chief—the head of a warlike race—could not afford to be humiliated, and might prefer to die fighting. If the object were to pick a quarrel—which I do not impute—then, and only then, the measures taken were well suited for their purpose. We have heard it said in this House by the Secretary of State, and it has been said out-of-doors—and I think the worst enemies and severest critics of the British Empire in India have never said anything so disparaging—that we could not afford to give a little time for reflection and re-consideration to a Prince who had put himself in the wrong. We, the rulers of the great Empire of India, could not afford to give an Afghan Potentate a little time for consideration, lest the people of India should jump to the conclusion that we were actuated by fear of his military power! I do not contend that this is a war undertaken on our part wholly without provocation. I do not for a moment deny that the Ameer has deprived himself, by his own acts, of the sympathy which we might otherwise have entertained for a Prince in his position. But it is a war which, if there had been any real wish at Simla to avoid it, might have been avoided. You might have had your Mission received at Cabul, and you might have had "peace with honour." But in that case there would have been no chance of what is believed in some quarters to be so desirable—the rectification of an inconvenient Frontier. I hope that that question is not at the bottom of a good deal of these transactions. It is a very old saying—and one which applies to Governments as well as individuals—that when they adopt confiscation as a means of punishment they are very apt to end by punishing as a means of confiscation. But even from the point of view of an advanced or rectified Frontier, I doubt the expediency of this war. It will be very easy for us to overrun and conquer Afghanistan; but what is to come next? To make the Ameer refrain from intriguing with Russia or putting himself under Russian influence is a perfectly fair and reasonable object; but are we likely to secure the confidence and friendship of the Ameer by a march upon Cabul? Probably, if we could ascertain the real feeling of the Ameer we should find it to be one of very impartial dislike, both of the Russians and of us. Now, if we are to establish ourselves at Jellalabad, as has been suggested, while the Russians are hundreds of miles away, it needs no great acuteness to see that we, being nearer, shall be the more cordially detested of the two. That is on the supposition that it is intended to leave the Ameer his independence, together with the greater part of his territory. The net result of the war in that case would be that we should be a little more feared and a good deal more disliked than hitherto. If, on the other hand, Afghanistan is to be subdued as well as overrun—and recollect it is not always in your power to stop the war at the precise moment you please, because despair does not reason, and men often fight on when there is no hope of ultimate success—the undertaking will be one of a very serious character. There is not a more difficult country in the world than Afghanistan. It is a complicated mass of mountain ranges, inhabited by warlike tribes constantly at feud with one another, but always ready to unite against a foreign enemy. They do not care for or value peace. They are quite willing to tolerate anarchy, but they will not endure servitude. That we can hold Afghanistan I do not doubt; but the question is, whether we should not hold it at an expenditure of money which, if otherwise applied, would secure to us the goodwill of every Afghan Chief for many years to come? I have only one word to add on the financial aspect of the question. I must confess I heard with some surprise the statement of the Secretary of State for India as to the cost of the campaign. Of course, I speak with respect, and with every wish to accept as conclusive the estimate formed by those most competent to give it; but I remember—and the Secretary of State for India must remember—our last experience of a little war. The cost of the Abyssinian War, it was hoped, would be £2,000,000 or £3,000,000; but it turned out to be not much less than £9,000,000. I hope the same will not be the case now; but if the anticipations of the Government with regard to the present campaign are realized, it will be the cheapest campaign ever undertaken. In connection with this subject I must say I look with some alarm on the present and prospective condition of the finances of India. In my opinion, the danger to our Empire comes from that quarter much more than from any foreign intrigue or threat of invasion. Look at the state of things in that respect. You have there a population of 200,000,000 of people, all except a very few of whom are practically trying the experiment on how little food it is possible to keep body and soul together. The great bulk of the people consume nothing but necessaries, and it is on these necessaries that new taxation must fall, because there is nothing else to tax. The Revenue is far from having the elasticity which belongs to our home Revenue in normal times. You have a standing increase of Debt—I do not say from year to year, but from 10 years to 10 years; you have had an enormous increase of expenditure during the 20 years that have elapsed since the East India Company was done away with; you have a people on whom you do not know how to lay fresh burdens to any considerable extent. And, my Lords, this is not all. The Secretary of State for India referred with peculiar satisfaction to the flourishing condition of one part of the Revenue—that derived from opium. Now, that is exactly the most precarious of the whole. Once let the Chinese people take to growing their own opium, or let the Chinese Government make an earnest attempt to put down its importation — public opinion certainly would not allow us to make a second opium war — and by the cessation of that one branch of Revenue there would be at once £6,000,000 or £7,000,000 struck off the Indian Revenue—a loss which could not be replaced, and which would lead not merely to embarrassment, but to insolvency. My Lords, I do not ask you to accept the, it may be rather despondent, views I hold on that point. I only ask you to remember that the financial position of India is grave. If we are to encounter danger, I believe there is less to be apprehended from beyond our Frontier than from the discontent which would ensue upon a greatly enhanced taxation. The burden is already heavy; and what would happen should any unfortunate combination of circumstances require it to be increased? But that is a matter I only touch in passing. On the question before us I have come to the conclusion which I have endeavoured to express. I see nothing to condemn in the policy of 1876—on the contrary, I should have been ready to defend it were defence from me necessary. But with the Russian Mission matters took a new turn. I repeat it; I do not contend that there has been no provocation; but I cannot but believe that the Viceroy and his advisers have precipitated a war which, by a little more patience and forbearance, might have been avoided. And if I am to express my opinion upon the matter in a word I would say that, in my judgment, this war on which we have entered is unnecessary, and that, being unnecessary, it cannot be either wise or just.

THE DUKE OF SOMERSET said, he could not agree with the noble Earl who had just spoken (the Earl of Derby) that their vote could not possibly have any effect on the policy of the Government, for the Amendment must be viewed in connection with a Motion which was made in the other House, and he could not look upon the two as anything but an attempt to displace the Ministry. He had been in Parliament, in one House or the other, for 40 years, and he had known many attacks made by the Opposition on existing Governments; but he did not remember one occasion on which the usual arrangements for the consultation of the Party had led to the proposing of such a Resolution as this Amendment. The noble Lord who moved the Amendment did not care to call his Party together; but it seemed that a few noble Lords must have met in a closet and settled on the Amendment. For what did the Resolution imply? It spoke of bringing the war in which we were engaged to "a safe and honourable conclusion;" and what he complained of was that the opponents of the Government went with one voice to the country and came to this House with another. They excited the country by saying that the war was contrary to all the precepts of morality and all the principles of religion; and yet they came to this House and talked of bringing it to "a safe and honourable conclusion." Of course, the Government wish for nothing else but to bring it to a safe and honourable conclusion; they did not want the assistance of the Opposition to do that. As to the question on which so much discussion had been raised—Who caused the war? the Opposition referred to the taking of Quetta and to the domineering style of Lord Lytton to the

Ameer, as having been the causes of the war. But that morning they had seen the Ameer's own opinions, and it was that some of our Viceroys had entered into a family quarrel, and had given him some advice and lectured him about his conduct towards his son, Yakoob Khan, who was heir-apparent and a very promising youth. He had murdered with his own hand one or two people, including the Commander-in-Chief, and he was the terror of the country. The Ameer had induced him to visit Cabul, and then, in true Afghan style, took hold of his promising relation, and kept him prisoner at Cabul; and then his followers became indignant, and made a great disturbance in the country. Complaint had been made of the manner in which he condemned the conduct of the noble Lord (Lord Lawrence) in reference to the agitation in this country. He did not wish to have used a discourteous word, for he appreciated the great services of that noble Lord; and, looking at the report of his speech next day, he could not find that he had used a word which should have given offence. He praised the noble Lord for his former conduct in reference to his administration of Indian affairs; but he regretted the course his noble Friend had taken in reference to the affairs of Afghanistan. He felt that he had as much right to express condemnation as to express approbation. Then they were told that the present Government had caused all this disturbance in the minds of the Ameer and his people. The Afghan Papers did not justify that assertion. Those Papers showed that in 1875, in 1873, and before that, the Ameer was only looking to see where he could make the best bargain. He said he must be supported on one side or the other; he wanted to be supported by us or by Russia; he was determined to get some support, for he could not stand alone; and, in the meantime, Russia had advanced to Khiva. What was the good of saying that the Government had departed from the policy of former Viceroys? Circumstances had altered, and we must adapt our policy to those altered circumstances. It was clear enough from the Papers that, when we brought the Indian troops to Malta, Russia regarded that as a menace, and moved towards Cabul and Merv as a counter menace; and that had opened the eyes of the country to the dangers by which we were threatened. The question was how that danger was to be met? He was aware, from having heard the Frontier question discussed 40 years ago, that it was one surrounded with enormous difficulties. We must have a safe Frontier. It was of no use saying it would cost a great deal of money. No doubt it would; but was not India worth it? Could India be constantly threatened? We had a duty to its people, and that duty was to protect them. These wide dominions were obtained very often by stratagem and violence; we had to compensate the people of India for former wrong; and the best way was to give them tranquillity and peace. We had done that to a great extent, and he believed we had governed the country to its great advantage. We relieved them in their famines; we continually prevented war within their borders; and we had a further duty, which was to protect them against war from without their border. For these reasons he could not support the Amendment, which did no credit to the noble Lord who had moved it.

THE EARL OF CARNARVON: I shall only detain the House a few minutes. The question on which we have to vote divides itself into two parts, one being the financial, the other the general policy which has resulted in this war. Of finance I will say no more than to express my hearty concurrence in every word that fell from my noble Friend on the cross-benches (the Earl of Derby). The general policy is the real question on which the vote will be taken; and I do not disguise from myself that this vote takes the form of a condemnation of the policy pursued by the Government of which I have been a Member. I hope your Lordships will believe that I am extremely reluctant to join in a vote condemning the policy of those with whom only a year ago I acted as a Colleague, and that I would most gladly, if it were possible, avoid the necessity; but it is not possible. At the same time, as it seems to me, under the circumstances, to be unnecessary and painful to discuss in full the details which lead to such a conclusion, I hope I shall not be misunderstood if I venture for once to give the conclusions at which I have arrived without stating the reasons by which I am quite ready to justify them. They are conclusions which have been arrived at as the result of much thought. I cannot, then, in the first place, reconcile this war with any notions or ideas of justice. Adopting the distinction between the policy pursued before 1876 and afterwards, I think the policy which led to the war was erroneous, and that the policy which is the object of that war is unsound, dangerous, and delusive. I believe the expense will be very much larger than the present estimate. I doubt very much what is said about the rectification of Frontier, when I find military authorities differing so largely about it. I hate the word rectification; it seems to me to savour of some of the worst traditions of the worst periods of the French Empire—it is a word borrowed from an evil school; it is a word which has been too often used to conceal wrong and robbery, and that system of stratagem and violence which, to my astonishment, my noble Friend opposite (the Duke of Somerset) just now seemed to eulogize, and against which I, for one, must with my whole strength protest. If wrong and robbery had been the foundation of our Indian Empire, I should look back with shame instead of pride upon those who founded it. To sum up, then, my principal objections to the policy which has been pursued—first, I think the morality and character of the country has been lowered by the recent transactions; and next, with regard to India, for the policy which has so long been adopted by successive Governors General, and which has already borne no insignificant fruit, you have substituted one which is sown with the seeds of hatred, distrust, and future foreign difficulties. It has taken the lifetime of a generation to efface from the Native mind the recollections of the former Afghan War—these transactions will inevitably revive them. And what is the policy you have substituted? I admit it is a showy, an ambitious, and, to many people, an attractive policy; but I believe it has neither substance nor reality, and sooner or later—probably soon rather than late—it must issue in disappointment and failure. It is at variance with the promises originally given to the Ameer; it is at variance with the patient, and conciliatory, and consistent policy which Lord Mayo pursued; and the only compensating merit I can discover in it is that it is an open—I think a cynical exhibition of power, which for a time may have, if successful, an effect on the wavering dispositions and doubtful allegiance of Native Governments. But even this is very uncertain. I have but one word more to say. I can, if I rightly caught his meaning, accept the view of my noble Friend the noble Earl who sits on the cross-benches (the Earl of Derby) with regard to Ministerial responsibility. I, like him, was a Member of the Government at the time these despatches were written, and I would be the last to shirk my fair share of responsibility. But I will say this—that, assuming every one of the despatches to be sound, right, and reasonable, I can see nothing in the Correspondence, as far as I remember, which constitutes a just and legitimate cause of war. Certainly, when the Ameer was urged to establish a British Agency in Afghanistan, the Government never contemplated that that demand was to be enforced at the point of the sword. In that lies the whole difference—between representing, and even urging upon the Ameer what was desirable, and in forcing it at the point of the bayonet. Such being the case, though I can honestly and unfeignedly say that I never gave a vote with more reluctance, I shall vote for the Amendment of the noble Viscount. It is very likely I shall be in a minority—perhaps a small minority; but to anyone who knows the history of this country that is not a very serious trial. There is nothing in it which need dismay any man. It is far more important, when one feels the honour and morality of the country at stake—whether the numbers be few or many—irrespective of Party discipline, that we should be content to record our opinion, in the face of an adverse Parliament, it may be also of an adverse Party—I am not prepared as yet to say in the face of an adverse country.

LORD NAPIER AND ETTRICK said, he was very glad to hear the account which had been given by the noble Viscount the Secretary of State for India (Viscount Cranbrook) with reference to the surplus of £2,500,000 on the present Indian financial year. The estimated expenditure of the war was about £1,200,000, so that there would still remain a substantial surplus. He thought, however, after a period of so much distress in India, that surplus ought to have been devoted to those works of national improvement of which that country stood so much in need. After the admirable spirit which India had recently displayed, the Government ought to have shown more generosity than charging the whole expenditure of the war on the Indian Exchequer. He hoped the Government would reconsider this matter. What India desired was to co-operate with England; certainly, the whole burden should not be thrown on India. He approved very much of the able and logical speech of the noble Earl who spoke from the cross-bench (Earl Grey). He contended that although Afghanistan had given some provocation, the main quarrel lay with Russia, and it was to Russia we should address our principal remonstrance. He also said, if the Ameer of Afghanistan had given us a certain amount of provocation, we had acted with undue precipitation, and that if we had given him more time for reflection the quarrel might have been pacifically adjusted. No doubt we had some reason for complaint against Russia—especially at an earlier period in the transaction; but, considering the relations that then existed between England and Russia, and the strong probability of a war between the two countries, he could not say that the sending by Russia of a Mission to Cabul could be found much fault with. Russia did only what we should have done in similar circumstances. Besides, from the first Russia cut off almost all grounds of expostulation or remonstrance on our part, for on the 2nd of July the Russian Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs denied absolutely that any Mission had been sent by his Government to Cabul, or that there was any intention on the part of the Russian Government or of the Governor of Turkestan to send a Mission. The Russian Government could, therefore, always say that the Mission had been sent by the Governor of Turkestan without their knowledge. Further, the Mission was now represented to be simply one of courtesy and compliment. In these circumstances, it was not possible to address any serious remonstrances to the Russian Government. What did our Government do on a similar occasion? In 1840 the Government of Egypt, instigated by France, placed the dominions of the Sultan in serious jeopardy. Lord Palmerston, with the greatest secrecy, formed a coalition of the European Powers against France; but did he lead them against France? Not at all. He brought them to bear against Egypt, and by a judicious employment of their forces they expelled the Egyptian army from Syria, and destroyed the policy of France by which Egypt had been set in motion. The refusal to receive a British Resident at Cabul, or the reception of a Russian Mission there, were not the grounds of this war. The grounds were that when a Russian Mission had been received at Cabul with distinguished honour, the Ameer, though repeatedly requested, obstinately refused to receive a similar Mission from us with the same honour. That refusal practically amounted to an act of menace and hostility to Her Majesty's Government. It was always difficult in this country to justify a war not of defence but of policy; but a war might be justified on grounds of policy, and this was such a war. If we had shrunk from action on this occasion we might in a year or two have been placed in a position where we should have to incur far greater expense and suffering. But though the Government had just cause of war, he held that the circumstances were such that, having shown ourselves to be perfectly in earnest and absolutely powerful for the objects we had in view, we ought to take the first opportunity of granting favourable terms to the Ameer. And now a word as to the general question of policy. He found that the successive Governors General aimed at the same policy, though differing as to the means by which that policy was to be executed. The policy on which they were agreed was the maintenance in Afghanistan of a strong and independent Government, having aims consistent with our policy. But one party said that was to be secured by a general system of negotiations and assurances to the effect that the Ameer was to be assisted with money and arms, and, in cases of extreme necessity, with troops. By others it was argued that these assurances ought to be put into the form of a definite Treaty. The advocates of the general system of assurances admitted that, in certain circumstances, it would be desirable to sign a Treaty. The only advantage he had ever heard alleged in favour of general assurances as compared with Treaties was, that under the former system we avoided the danger of entangling ourselves in distinct and onerous obligations with Afghanistan which it might at some future period be inconvenient to fulfil. He maintained, however, that this advantage was a great deal more apparent than real; for under the system of assurances the Representatives of Her Majesty in India had made arrangements defining the boundaries of Afghanistan and engaging to defend those boundaries, in certain circumstances, by force of arms. Could it be said that after doing this the Government had remained really free, and had incurred no serious or binding obligations? On the contrary, he ventured to say that even if no Treaty should ever be signed, this country was bound, in honour, and in equity by the obligations it had successively undertaken; and that the only liberty it had retained for itself under this system was to violate its engagements and to retire from its obligations with disgrace. In his opinion we had, under this system of assurances, practically incurred the obligation of preserving, in certain circumstances, the integrity of Afghanistan, and of interfering in the internal affairs of that State. We had said that we wanted a strong and an united Afghanistan in which we should have exclusive authority, and in which the influence of Russia should have no exercise. How could this object be attained if we suffered the present State of Afghanistan, which we had created and defined, to go to pieces? The policy pursued by his noble Friend (Lord Lawrence), the Viceroy who preceded Lord Mayo, by Lord Mayo himself, and by Lord Northbrook, virtually established obligations towards Afghanistan from which this country could not escape. The Russians were a great people, with the consciousness of a great past and a greater future, and their Sovereign was by nature in the highest degree humane, liberal, and sincere. But the Russian Government was moved forward on the back of national sympathies and national aspirations. With a Government and a country so constituted we had every reason to maintain relations of amity and alliance. But in order to realize that result it was necessary that our Government should employ judicious means and expedients; and the best means and expedients which they could employ were an absolute plainness and a perfect frankness, so that there might exist no doubt or uncertainty as to our relations with the various States with which we were brought into contact. With regard to Central Asia, the experience of the past proved that that effect could not be produced by vague and indefinite assurances and declarations, but only by formal Treaty and guarantee. Another reason why it was requisite to make a binding Treaty with Afghanistan was that such a course would impart an element of permanency and consistency to the policy of this country. There was a danger, incidental to our Parliamentary Constitution, of a fluctuating or uncertain character attaching to our foreign relations, and, therefore, it was extremely desirable to fix the nature of those foreign relations by formal Treaties. Such a Treaty, in reference to Afghanistan especially, would have a tranquillizing effect upon India. In alluding to a certain Memorandum dictated by Lord Lytton, Earl Granville had characterized the Viceroy's language as very imprudent. If that language had really been intended to be communicated to the Ameer, that reproach might have been directed against it with some reason. But it was not distinctly proved in the Correspondence before their Lordships that the Viceroy's language was meant to be communicated to the Ameer. It was merely used in confidence by Lord Lytton to a British Agent, who was only to convey the general sense of it to the Ameer; and there was no reason why the Native Agent should communicate to the Ameer any particular illustration or expression then employed by his Excellency. Another reproach had been cast upon the Viceroy by Earl Granville. The Viceroy was stated to have said that in certain contingencies we could efface Afghanistan from the map of the world and partition it between two great Powers; and it was complained by the noble Earl that no evidence that any intimation to that effect had ever been conveyed to Russia appeared in the Papers on their Lordships' Table. But the fact that the Russian and the English Governments had formally created the theory that an independent Afghanistan should be maintained between the two countries was believed, although the theory was not universally accepted. But if their Lordships would read the conversation which took place between Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg and the Russian Foreign Secretary on the 23rd of June, 1875, and a second held in the following month, they would find the matter alluded to as to which reference, it was said, was made by the Viceroy, and that the idea of a partition of Afghanistan existed, at all events, in some Russian minds. With reference to the defence of our Indian Empire, it could, no doubt, be defended from our present Frontier; but, on the whole, the policy of Her Majesty's Government would furnish a Frontier which was accredited by the highest authorities and had been recommended by the great Emperor Akbar 300 years ago.

THE EARL OF ABERDEEN said, that the question had been argued, on the part of the Government, as though the policy they had adopted was the only one they could have pursued. But he could not agree in that position. As to the charge of want of patriotism, which had been preferred against the opponents of the Government on this question, it would fall very lightly upon those who felt they were acting in this matter from honest conviction. A severance of Party ties was a matter which no one of ordinary sensitiveness could view with indifference; and it was also very natural that one should be inclined to abstain from any hostile act towards the Administration with a war on their hands. But the present question was not one on which they could be guided by inclination. It involved great political principles; and he was convinced their Lordships would feel it incumbent to vote upon it according to their convictions, without respect to considerations of political convenience. It might appear that some apology was required from one who, without any special qualification, took part in the present debate; but he trusted that the importance of the question would absolve him from the charge of temerity. Some of the distinguished Members of their Lordships' House had been the Colleagues of a Minister whose words were listened to with attention, and whose name he had the honour of bearing; and he could not but think that if that Minister had lived to the present day he would not have failed to endorse the views now expressed by his former Colleagues and supporters.

THE EARL OF AIRLIE maintained that the merits of the policy pursued by the late Viceroy of India and his Predecessors had not been sufficiently appreciated by the present Government, and that the arguments of the noble Earl (the Earl of Northbrook) in the debate of Thursday evening had not been refuted. The noble Viscount the Secretary of State for India, who opened the debate, had sought to cast the responsibility of the present state of affairs upon the late Government; and he had said that the assistance proffered to the Ameer by the late Viceroy was hedged about by so many conditions as to make the promise amount to little or nothing. But if their Lordships would look at the Correspondence before Parliament they would see that the offers of the present Viceroy (Lord Lytton) were equally hedged about by conditions and limitations. Looking at what had transpired in the Conferences with the Ameer, it must be admitted that we had placed him in a very false position. We had told him first that if he would not come into our views, Russia would come to an arrangement with us; then we had entered into prolonged negotiations with him; and, finally, we had broken them off. No wonder the Ameer had felt that he was in a corner; that we were not serious in our professions to him; and that it was his interest to come to an understanding with Russia in order to protect himself. It really seemed as if our object had been to get him into a corner. We had gone a very strange way about promoting that which was said to have been "at all times the object of our policy," the statement of which was in curious contrast with the results our action had produced.

EARL GREY moved the adjournment of the debate.

THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELD said, he saw no objection to the adjournment of the debate; but he thought it would be for the convenience of their Lordships to meet to-morrow at 4 o'clock, instead of the usual hour.

Motion *agreed to.*

Further debate adjourned till *To-morrow.*

House adjourned at a quarter before
Twelve o'clock, till To-morrow,
Four o'clock.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Monday, 9*th December*, 1878.

MINUTES.]—New Writs Issued—*For* Londonderry County, *v.* Richard Smyth, esquire, deceased; *for* Borough of New Ross, *v.* John Dunbar, esquire, deceased.

Public Bills — *Resolution in Committee — Ordered—First Reading*—Copyright * [53].

Ordered — First Reading — Borough Franchise (Ireland) * [49]; Tenants' Improvements in Towns (Ireland) * [50]; Landlord and Tenant (Ireland) (No. 2) * [51]; Ancient Monuments * [52].

QUESTIONS.

THE COINAGE — WITHDRAWAL OF WORN SILVER COIN.

QUESTION.

Mr. MONK asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether he is aware of the serious extent to which the silver coin of the Realm is defaced by wear and tear, and of the inconvenience arising therefrom to large employers and their workmen; and, whether the Government will take steps to withdraw such worn coin from circulation?

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: Sir, the Bank of England undertakes to receive in London and at its branches worn and defaced silver coin which may be brought to it, and, if required, exchange it for new coin. No banker, therefore, need re-issue worn coin, and large amounts are withdrawn from circulation every year at the expense of the State. The average annual amount withdrawn in the United Kingdom during the five years ending 1877-8 was nearly £200,000; but during the present financial year, owing to the contraction of trade, the amount presented for withdrawal will be little short of £500,000. To meet the excessive charge which will thus be imposed on the Mint a Supplementary Vote of £30,000 was taken last Session. The particulars will be found in the Report of the Master of the Mint.

TURKEY—REPORT OF THE RHODOPE COMMISSION.—QUESTION.

Lord ELCHO asked, Whether Her Majesty's Government entertain any doubt as to the trustworthiness of the Rhodope Report; and, whether they have taken, or are about to take, any steps to carry into effect the objects for which the Rhodope European Commission was appointed?

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: Sir, perhaps, as the Question of the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Serjeant Simon) on this subject was addressed to me, and it was at my request he postponed it, I may be allowed to answer my noble Friend. It is not quite correct to speak of "the Rhodope Report." No single united Report has been made by the members of that Commission. Four members have addressed separate and identic Reports to their own Ambassadors; and in these circumstances it would not be possible to take any political action upon it without serious consideration. With regard, however, to the recommendations contained in the Report as to the sufferings which undoubtedly have been brought to light, it is difficult to see how any adequate relief can be provided, either by private charity or by the funds of the Turkish Government. Her Majesty's Government are considering whether they can make any proposal on this subject.

Lord ELCHO: May I point out that my Question referred also to the trustworthiness of the Report, and that I should like to know whether any doubt is entertained on the subject?

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: Sir, my noble Friend will see that is a Question very difficult to answer one way or the other. The Report which has been addressed to Her Majesty's Government by Her Majesty's Ambassador is one of considerable importance, and it undoubtedly discloses a serious state of suffering, for which it would be really desirable that some remedy could be found; but I can hardly answer the noble Lord's Question.

Lord ELCHO gave Notice that he should repeat the Question.

Mr. Serjeant SIMON said, in consequence of the Answer which had just been given, he begged to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether, in the circumstance that the Report was not a united Report of the Commission, it was in contemplation to take steps to verify the Report of our Commissioners, or whether the Report would be allowed to drop?

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: I think it would be better that that Question should be put after due Notice has been given.

MR. SERJEANT SIMON gave Notice that he should put the Question to-morrow.

SOUTH AFRICA—THE CAPE COLONY—THE MOUNTED POLICE.

QUESTION.

MR. GORST (for Lord RANDOLPH CHURCHILL) asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether it is true that persons who had contracted to serve the Cape Government in a civil capacity in the "Mounted Police" have been by a Colonial Law compelled, without the option of discharge, to serve in a military capacity in a force called "The Mounted Rifles;" whether those who respectfully refused to submit to this arrangement were not tried by court martial and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and hard labour, which involves their working on the roads of the Colony with common convicts; and, whether Her Majesty's Government propose to take any action in the matter?

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH, in reply, said, he was unable to state whether the reports referred to were or were not correct. Complaints had been made to the Colonial Office in November, and they had been referred to Sir Bartle Frere to report, and that Report, of course, had not yet been received. He feared it would be some time before all the facts of the case were in his possession.

MR. GORST gave Notice, on behalf of the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock, that he would repeat the Question at a future period.

THE EASTERN QUESTION — THE TREATY OF BERLIN—DESPATCHES—CYPRUS—JURISDICTION OF COURTS OF LAW.—QUESTION.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether there can be laid before Parliament the following Despatches as to the execution of the Treaty of Berlin, namely, the German Despatches of August last and the Answers of the British Government, and the French Despatches of 22nd August and 27th September; and, whether there is any objection to produce any Correspondence as to the power of the Courts in Cyprus to try the subjects of Foreign Powers for offences against Turkish Law, or as to the Cesnola case?

MR. BOURKE: Sir, the French despatches of the 22nd of August and 27th of September are to be found at pages 300 and 302 of the French Yellow Book published in November last. The first is a Circular addressed by M. Waddington to the French Representatives abroad. The second is a despatch addressed by M. Waddington to the French Ambassador at Constantinople. Neither of these Papers has been communicated to Lord Salisbury. There was no Correspondence with the German Government in August. A communication was made to Her Majesty's Government in September, but it was strictly confidential. No Correspondence has taken place with any foreign Power on the subject of jurisdiction in Cyprus.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE asked, whether the proceedings of the Cesnola case had been brought to the knowledge of the Government by the Governor of Cyprus?

MR. BOURKE: I am not in a position to answer that Question without Notice. I do not recollect that they have.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE: I will put a further Question to-morrow on the subject.

AFGHANISTAN—THE RUSSIAN MISSION AT CABUL.—QUESTION.

SIR HENRY HAVELOCK asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether Her Majesty's Government have any information as to the Russian Mission sent by General Kauffmann having yet left Cabul, or whether it is still there; and, in the latter case, whether any communication has taken place between the Governments of England and Russia later than the Despatch from Lord Salisbury of the 19th August 1878, No. 158, given at page 149 of the Papers, Central Asia, No. 1, as to the probable date of the withdrawal of this Mission after its purpose, stated to be one of "simple courtesy," shall have been accomplished; and, if any such Correspondence has taken place, whether he will object to add it to the Papers already published, and to lay it upon the Table of the House?

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, we have no means of obtaining complete information of what takes place at Cabul. But since the Russian Ambassador came back to this country my noble Friend the Secretary of State has seen him, and he has been informed by him that the Russian Envoy has left Afghanistan, and we know from other sources that he has returned to Europe.

INLAND REVENUE — THE CUSTOMS DEPARTMENT—RE-ORGANIZATION.

QUESTION.

MR. J. HOLMS asked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, Whether the Commissioners of Customs have submitted to the Treasury a scheme for the re-organisation of their Department, in accordance with the recommendations made in 1874 by the Playfair Inquiry Commission; and, if so, whether he can promise an early settlement of the question?

SIR HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON, in reply, said, that a scheme for the reorganization of the Customs Department had been submitted to the Treasury. That scheme was now under consideration; and, as far as he was informed, there would be no unnecessary delay in settling the question, but the details were numerous.

PARLIAMENT—COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC BUSINESS.—QUESTION.

MR. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether it is his intention to make any propositions to the House, founded upon the recommendations of the Select Committee which sat last Session, to consider the best means of facilitating the despatch of Public Business?

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, in reply, said, the Government were not prepared to make any proposal during the present short Session with reference to the subject alluded to in the right hon. Gentleman's Question; but when the House re-assembled it would be one of the measures they would have to bring under its consideration. At present he could not make any positive announcement on the subject.

THE WINDWARD ISLANDS—COOLIES IN GRENADA.—QUESTION.

MR. ERRINGTON asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether it is true, that during the month of September last Mr. Kerr, the Lieutenant Governor of Grenada, was obliged to remove from various estates in that island more than 100 indentured Coolies in consequence of their being in a dying state from want of food and general ill-usage; whether some of those removed have since died; whether Mr. Denham, the protector of immigrants, has been by direction of the Governor prosecuted for manslaughter; if so, with what result; whether the 400 Coolies now in Grenada on the estates of the persons who ill-treated the others are to be left there; and, whether, as Coolie immigration can hardly be done away with entirely, he will take steps in order that such abuses shall not recur?

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: Sir, it is true that Mr. Kerr felt called upon to remove to hospital more than 100 Coolies from the estates in Grenada on which they had been located. On some estates complaints were made of insufficient food and medical attendance. Proceedings have been taken against the managers. The manager of one estate has been convicted of neglecting to supply the Coolies allotted to him with sufficient food and has been fined £50, and the Coolies from that estate have been allotted to an estate belonging to another person in a healthy locality. On other estates on which no complaints were made the Coolies were found to be in an unsatisfactory state of health, owing partly perhaps to the exceptionally unhealthy season, and partly to the unsatisfactory accommodation provided for them. Since the removal one or two of the Coolies have died; but the rest are doing well. They will not, however, be allowed to go back to the estates unless satisfactory accommodation has been first provided for them. Measures have been taken for more thorough inspection of estates and for more regular medical attendance, and I have reason to believe that the proprietors of estates are exerting themselves to remedy the state of things complained of. On the occasion of the removal one man who was left behind by the captain of the ship which was sent to remove them died. Proceedings were taken against Mr. Denham in the matter, but he was exonerated from blame. There appears, however, to have been a failure of justice as regards the really culpable parties, which is being inquired into.

MR. W. E. FORSTER asked, whether the 400 Coolies now in Grenada, on the estates of the persons who ill-treated the others, were to be left there; and whether Papers in connection with the subject would be produced?

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH said, he thought he had already answered the Question. The Coolies had been removed, though not to the number of 400. The owners and managers of those estates on which they resided had been prosecuted and one had been fined; and the Coolies would not be allowed to return until proper accommodation for them had been provided.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA—THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON—THE FISHERY AWARD.—QUESTION.

MR. GOURLEY asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, If he has received from the United States Government the amount awarded by a majority of the Halifax Commissioners, under Clause 18 of the Treaty of Washington; if so, how he intends disposing of the amount; whether it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to re-consider the circumstances under which the Award was obtained with a view to the reduction of the amount; and, if he is prepared to state how far the fishermen of Newfoundland exceeded their rights in interfering with United States fishermen when fishing and drying their nets on a Sunday?

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, in reply, said, that the amount of the Halifax Award—namely, $5,500,000—was paid by the Government of the United States to Her Majesty's Government on the 21st of November last, and was now being disposed of between Newfoundland and the Dominion of Canada. It would be seen, by the Papers published in *The London Gazette*, and since presented to Parliament, that Her Majesty's Government had no intention of re-opening the question as to the amount of the Award. The question how far the fishermen of Newfoundland exceeded their rights in interfering with United States fishermen was at present under the consideration of the Government.

MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACT, 1870—LEGISLATION.

QUESTION.

MR. P. A. TAYLOR asked Mr. Attorney General, Whether his attention has been called to a decision lately given at the Manchester Police Court to the effect that a married woman judicially separated from her husband, and to whom a protection order had been granted, had nevertheless no legal redress against her husband who had taken away her property; and, whether, if such be the state of the Law, he will propose the necessary amendment of "The Married Women's Property Act, 1870?"

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir JOHN HOLKER), in reply, said, before the Question of the hon. Member appeared on the Paper his attention was not called to the subject. Since Notice of the Question was given he had endeavoured, but without success, to ascertain the nature of the decision. If the hon. Member would furnish him with further particulars, he would be happy to state whether, in his opinion, any amendment of the law was necessary.

ARTIZANS AND LABOURERS DWELLINGS ACT, 1875—INQUIRY AS TO OPERATION.—QUESTION.

SIR UGHTRED KAY-SHUTTLEWORTH asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, respecting his statement on July 12th last that the time had come when inquiry should be specially made in reference to the towns in England where an official Report under "The Artizans and Labourers Dwellings Act, 1875," has been made and no action taken upon it, Whether he has taken any steps in such inquiry, and, if so, with what result; and, whether he will lay the Correspondence before Parliament?

Mr. ASSHETON CROSS, in reply, said, he had corresponded with the Local Government Board on the subject referred to; and if the hon. Baronet would move for that Correspondence, there would be no objection to its being laid on the Table.

THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT, 1858.—AFGHANISTAN (EXPENSES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS.)

QUESTION.

Mr. FAWCETT asked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether, in view of the provision contained in the 41st section of the Government of India Act of 1858, which runs as follows:—

> "That the expenditure of the Revenues of India, both in India and elsewhere, shall be subject to the control of the Secretary of State in Council, and no grant or appropriation of any part of such Revenues, or of any other property coming into the possession of the Secretary of State in Council by virtue of this Act, shall be made without the concurrence of a majority of votes at a meeting of the Council;"

if he will inform the House by what authority the expenditure hitherto incurred in connection with the military expedition against the Ameer of Afghanistan has been sanctioned?

Mr. E. STANHOPE: Sir, the expenditure was incurred on the authority of the Secretary of State for India. The matter was fully considered in 1869, and the Duke of Argyll, speaking in the House of Lords on behalf of his Government, said—

> "It is the opinion of all whom I have consulted, including the Law Officers of the Crown, that under the present Statute it is unquestionably in the power of the Secretary of State for India to order in India any service which may be required. Payment for this service is made in India, and the disallowance of that payment is not competent to the Council, without the sanction of the Secretary of State."—[3 *Hansard*, cxcv. 1074.]

Mr. FAWCETT: As I feel that the question is one of very great importance, and as I believe the money has been spent not only in India, but beyond the Frontier of India—["Order!"]—I am only desirous of having an opportunity of calling attention to the subject; and I will on an early occasion move a Resolution to the effect that, in the opinion of this House, the Secretary of State, by sanctioning the expenditure which he had done, has infringed the spirit and the letter of the Government of India Act.

AFGHANISTAN—REPLY OF AMEER TO ULTIMATUM.—QUESTION.

Sir CHARLES W. DILKE asked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether a letter from the Ameer Shere Ali has been received by Major Cavagnari; and, if so, whether its contents are known to Her Majesty's Government?

Mr. E. STANHOPE: Sir, the following telegram will, I think, explain all the circumstances as to the receipt of the Ameer's answer:—

> "From Viceroy, Dec. 5, 1878.
>
> "Cavagnari reports arrival at Dakka on 30th November of a subordinate officer of Ameer's, with letter in reply to ultimatum. Messenger had reached Basawal 22nd, and there heard of Ali Musjid defeat and returned to Cabul. Letter is dated 19th, but is believed to have been re-written at Cabul after news of Ali Musjid. Summary of contents follow in cipher."

We do not know when its contents became known to the Indian Government; but the summary was received in England on the night of December 5, and was not seen by any Member of the Cabinet until Friday, December 6. The statement in *The Daily News*, to the contrary effect, is a simple fabrication. The summary of contents was not published, because the full text was expected. That arrived yesterday, and was at once published in every quarter.

CRIMINAL LAW—CASE OF JOHN NOLAN.—QUESTION.

Mr. MITCHELL HENRY wished to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department the Question of which he had given him private Notice, What course he proposes to pursue in reference to the case of John Nolan, a lad of 18 years of age, who died in the House of Correction, and whose death the Coroner's Jury found to be accelerated by the repeated and excessive punishment of bread and water diet, which was ordered by the Governor and sanctioned by the Surgeon; and, whether he will be good enough to procure a Copy of the Depositions and lay them on the Table of the House, together with any Correspondence that has taken place between Sir

W. H. Wyatt, the Chairman of the Visiting Justices of Middlesex, and himself, on the working of the new Prisons Act, or any other of the metropolitan or city magistrates on the same subject?

MR. ASSHETON CROSS, in reply, said, the hon. Gentleman's Question was a painful matter, and one which affected the character of two officers of the very highest standing, one of them being a medical gentleman who had been in two prisons during a large number of years. He found the circumstances were very bad indeed; and he had therefore written to the President of the College of Physicians to ask him to name some gentleman who would assist him by going with another officer to make the strictest inquiry on the subject. The President had most handsomely stated he would be glad to undertake the inquiries himself. He (Mr. Assheton Cross) had accordingly ordered Dr. Guy, who was on the Commission for Public Prisons, and the President of the Royal College of Physicians, and any other gentleman they should agree on, to make the very strictest inquiry. Until, therefore, he received their Report, he did not think it would be right to press the subject any further. He had, however, already taken action in the matter, by ordering that the recommendation of the Jury should be carried out as to having one physician attached to each prison, instead of one for the two, as had been the case for a great number of years. He was ready to produce the Papers if the hon. Member for Galway would confer with him as to the form in which they should be laid on the Table.

AFGHANISTAN—THE FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE.—QUESTION.

MR. W. E. FORSTER asked the Under Secretary of State for India, When the further Afghan Papers would be in the possession of Members, especially the Proclamation of War, which he had hoped would be issued by itself, and must have been in the hands of the Government for some days?

MR. E. STANHOPE, in reply, said, that some Papers had already been issued in a few cases, and were in possession of several Members of the House.

ORDER OF THE DAY.

THE ADDRESS IN ANSWER TO THE QUEEN'S SPEECH.

ADDRESS REPORTED. AMENDMENT (MR. WHITBREAD).

Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Question [6th December], "That the said Address be now read a second time."

Question again proposed.

Debate *resumed.*

MR. WHITBREAD, in rising to move the Amendment of which he had given Notice, said: Sir, it was not my desire to have moved the Motion of which I gave Notice upon this occasion. I should much have preferred if it had stood as a Resolution by itself. I had no desire to break in upon the practice—I think a very good one—which has prevailed in recent years of allowing the Address to pass without any Amendment being proposed. I was anxious, for another reason, to have moved my Resolution independently; because I did not desire that hon. Members opposite should suppose that my Motion was moved as an Amendment to any Vote for Supplies for our Army now engaged in Afghanistan. What I wish to obtain is the decision of the House upon the subject, as disclosed in the Papers which have been laid upon the Table. My Motion refers to the past conduct of Her Majesty's Government; and I do not wish that it should be mixed up with questions of the present or of the future. I am well aware of the vast interests which are touched by those who speak of the affairs of our Indian Empire; but I do not believe that any harm can arise from arguments directed solely to considerations of strict and impartial justice. I do not wish to be led away into saying anything upon the various questions that surround the one which I wish to bring under the notice of the House. I do not intend to say more than a single word upon the war which is now going on, and that is, as I have already said in another place, that it seems to me to be unnecessary and unjust. But, although I should not advise the stoppage of Supplies, I think that in the moment of success we might do that which we could not do if we were to suffer a reverse; and I maintain that directly we have obtained a substantial success, we should be justified in doing our best to terminate the war. I would further express a hope that any demands which may be made by the Indian Government upon Shere Ali should be as little humiliating as possible; and I cannot help thinking that the course of the debates will show that, at all events, such grave errors have been committed that it is our strict and bounden duty to come down somewhat in the conditions which some might deem it necessary to impose, and from the arrogant position we have assumed. Now, in the first place, I must ask the House to consider what has been the policy of previous Governments in relation to this question. The first extract in the Papers which have been laid before us to which I would ask the attention of the House will be found in page 44 of the Afghanistan Papers. It is an extract from a despatch of the 4th of January, 1869, from the Government of Lord Lawrence to the India Office at home. They set forth in paragraph 5 the policy which they recommend. They say—

> "We venture to sum up the policy which is recommended or supported, in various languages and by various arguments in our Minutes, somewhat as follows:—We object to any active interference in the affairs of Afghanistan by the deputation of a high British officer with or without a contingent, or by the forcible or amicable occupation of any post or tract in that country beyond our own Frontier, inasmuch as we think such a measure would, under present circumstances, engender irritation, defiance, and hatred in the minds of the Afghans, without in the least strengthening our power either for attack or defence. We think it impolitic and unwise to decrease any of the difficulties which would be entailed on Russia, if that Power seriously thought of invading India, as we should certainly decrease them if we left our own Frontier, and met her half way in a difficult country, and, possibly, in the midst of a hostile or exasperated population. We foresee no limits to the expenditure which such a move might require, and we protest against the necessity of having to impose additional taxation on the people of India, who are unwilling, as it is, to bear such pressure for measures which they can both understand and appreciate. And we think that the objects which we have at heart, in common with all interested in India, may be attained by an attitude of readiness and firmness on our Frontier, and by giving all our care and expending all our resources for the attainment of practical and sound ends over which we can exercise an effective and immediate control."

That was the policy which was pronounced by Lord Lawrence's Government, and it was the policy which was followed in the time of Lord Mayo and Lord Northbrook — what they desired to see was a strong, just, and merciful Government established in Afghanistan, which should be an independent State, and friendly to the English Government. I should like, in the next place, to read an extract from a private letter of Lord Mayo, which was written not long after the Umballa Durbar, which showed that Lord Mayo's views were the same as those enunciated in the despatch of Lord Lawrence's Government. The extract is taken from Hunter's *Life of Lord Mayo*, and it appears in page 271 of that work. It is as follows:—

> "Surround India with strong, friendly, and independent States, who will have more interest in keeping well with us than with any other Power, and we are safe. The Central Asia question is only a bugbear if prudence be observed, and will have no reality for many years to come."

In another letter he said—

> "Our influence has been considerably strengthened both in our own territories and also in the States of Central Asia by the Umballa meeting, and if we can only persuade people that our policy is non-intervention and peace, that England is at this moment the only non-aggressive Power in Asia, we should stand on a pinnacle of power that we have never enjoyed before."

That was Lord Mayo's opinion, as expressed in a private letter. At page 93 of the Afghanistan Papers will be found paragraph 4 of the despatch of the Government of India to the Duke of Argyll, dated the 1st of July, 1869, which is as follows:—

> "We entirely agree with the principles laid down in Your Grace's despatch, *i. e.*, 'that it is for the interest of our Indian Empire that there should be a strong and settled government in Afghanistan, such as may promote commerce with us and protect the people of the country from the evils of civil war; that the discretion of the Indian Government should be kept absolutely free as to the occasions on which such assistance should be given or withheld;' that further, we should abstain from exercising 'any interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan,' and give no pledge which would lead the Ameer to believe that we should ever countenance or support a notoriously cruel and oppressive Government."

It will be remembered that, shortly after Lord Mayo became Viceroy, at the wish of Shere Ali a Conference was held at Umballa, the result of which was stated in the despatch from which I have just read. No doubt when Shere Ali met Lord Mayo he asked for more than the British Government could give him; for years before the Conference Shere Ali had been engaged in a tedious civil war, and had great difficulty in seating himself firmly on the Throne. He desired, therefore, not only pecuniary assistance from the British Government, but also dynastic pledges, which would secure for the heir of his choice the succession to the Throne, and guarantee his country against the evils of civil war. Lord Mayo received him nobly; and all who remembered and deplored the noble Lord, will recollect that he was well calculated to make an impression on such a Ruler as Shere Ali. Lord Mayo thus summed up the practical results of the Conference in the despatch dated the 1st of July, 1869, which will be found in page 94 of the Papers—

> "While we distinctly intimated to the Ameer that, under no circumstances, should a British soldier ever cross his Frontier to assist him in coercing his rebellious subjects; that no European officers would be placed as Residents in his cities; that no fixed subsidy or money allowance would be given for any named period; that no promise of assistance in other ways would be made; that no Treaty would be entered into, obliging us under *every* circumstance to recognize him and his descendants Rulers of Afghanistan, yet that we were prepared by the most open and absolute present recognition, ... to give all the moral support in our power, and that in addition we were willing to assist him with money, arms, ammunition, Native artificers, and in other ways, whenever we deemed it possible or desirable to do so."

Having read that paragraph once or twice, I was a little astonished the other evening at hearing my hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for India (Mr. E. Stanhope) assert that no promise whatever had ever been given to the Ameer that he should not be required to receive British officers in his country, and that the point was never mentioned between him and the Ameer. According to *The Times,* my hon. Friend ventured to say that no such promise had ever been given; and that he could only reply that Lord Mayo made no mention of such a communication in his despatch home, and had never mentioned it to the Ameer. It is difficult to reconcile that statement with the paragraph which I have just read.

MR. E. STANHOPE: I did not say exactly what I am reported to have said. What I did say was, that in the conversation which took place between the Ameer and Lord Mayo the latter never mentioned the subject of a Resident Agent.

MR. WHITBREAD: The hon. Member has mistaken my point, which was, not whether the subject was ever mentioned between the individual Viceroy and the individual Ameer, but whether such a promise had ever been given. The gist of the hon. Member's argument was that no attempt was made to impose a Resident Agent upon the Ruler of Afghanistan contrary to a promise that had been given, and he said that no such promise was ever given. But the subject was thus summed up in the very next page of Lord Mayo's despatch—

> "The position of affairs at the close of the Conferences may, in the Viceroy's words, confidentially addressed to Your Grace, be summed up as follows:—Firstly, what the Ameer is not to have—no Treaty, no fixed subsidy, no European troops, officers, or Residents, no dynastic pledges. Secondly, what he is to have—warm countenance and support, discouragement of his rivals, such material assistance as we may consider absolutely necessary for his immediate wants, constant and friendly communication through our Commissioner at Peshawur, and our Native Agents in Afghanistan; he, on his part, undertaking to do all he can to maintain peace on our Frontier, and to comply with all our wishes on matters connected with trade."

After reading that extract, the hon. Member cannot contend that no promise was ever made to the Ameer that he should not be required to receive European officers as Residents. Very possibly the subject was never mentioned between the Ameer and the Viceroy; but that was only because it was an unmentionable topic. Dost Mahomed, the father of the present Ruler of Afghanistan had said if we desired to remain friends with the Afghans we ought not to force them to receive European officers as Residents. However, the fact is that at the time of the Umballa Conference the subject was broached to the Ameer; and if Lord Mayo did not do so himself it was on account of Shere Ali's known hostility to the project. I will not weary the House by recounting the various occasions on which the policy of non-intervention has been approved in this and in the other House of Parliament. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer has twice expressed his approval of the policy of non-intervention—on the 9th of July, 1869, and on the 22nd of April, 1873. I also recollect a very strong statement of Lord Derby in the same direction—to the effect that the Protectorate of Afghanistan must necessarily follow, if we forced the Ameer against his will to receive our officer as a Resident. It is desirable, at this point, to call the attention of the House to what was our understanding with Russia; and if hon. Members will turn to the Papers they will find the understanding set forth at page 104 of the Papers. In the 6th paragraph of the despatch from Lord Northbrook to the Duke of Argyll, dated the 30th of June, 1873, it is said—

> "In the latter part of the year 1869 the presence of Mr. Douglas Forsyth at St. Petersburg afforded an opportunity for a more full discussion of the proposals which were under the consideration of the two Governments. The subject of the influence which should be exercised by Russia and Great Britain respectively, over the States on their Frontiers was frankly entered into, and it was agreed that beyond the limit of the Provinces which the Ameer of Afghanistan then held he should not attempt to exercise any interference or influence, that the good offices of England should be exerted to restrain him from all thought of aggression, and that, similarly, Russia should exercise all her influence to restrain Bokhara from transgressing the limits of Afghan territory."

And then, at the end of paragraph 7, Prince Gortchakoff is reported to have

> "stated that he saw no objection to English officers visiting Cabul, though he agreed with the Earl of Mayo that Russian Agents should not do so."

I think that that is an important admission on the part of the Russian Representative. At the bottom of the page we shall see the further declaration of Prince Gortchakoff. It is said that

> "Prince Gortchakoff, on the conclusion of these communications, requested Sir Andrew Buchanan to tell Lord Clarendon that 'as both Governments are free from all *arrières-penseés*, ambitious views, or unfriendly feelings towards each other, the more fully and frankly all questions connected with Central Asia are discussed between them the more effectually will the 'mists' be blown away which, through the misrepresentations of over-zealous subordinate Agents, may, at any time, hang over them.'"

Moreover, the result of the communication that had passed was thus summarized by Prince Gortchakoff in a despatch to Count Brunnow on the 1st of November, 1871—

> (*a*.) "That the territory in the actual possession at the present moment of Shere Ali Khan should be considered to constitute the limits of Afghanistan.
>
> (*b*.) "That beyond these limits the Ameer should make no attempt to exercise any influence or interference, and that the English Government should do all in their power to restrain him from any attempts at aggression.
>
> (*c*.) "That for their part the Imperial Government should use all their influence to prevent any attack by the Ameer of Bokhara upon Afghan territory.
>
> "These principles had been unreservedly accepted both by the Cabinet of London and the Governor General of India." — [*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 105.]

That was the position of affairs between Russia and England as relating to Afghanistan at the time of which I am speaking; and, as will be seen on referring to page 116, Shere Ali was made fully acquainted with it. I would here note that, as will be found upon the following page (page 106), it was about this time that General Kaufmann

> "assured the Ameer of Afghanistan that he had given no encouragement to Abdool Rahman Khan, the nephew of the Ameer, who was residing as a refugee in Russian territory and was supposed to entertained designs upon the tranquillity of Afghanistan."

This Abdool Rahman Khan is the man who, of all others, could be most formidable to the Ameer—much more so even than Yakoob, his son. He was the son of Shere Ali's elder brother, who carried on a civil war against him for so many years, and very nearly prevented him from gaining the Throne. Abdool was still anxious to stir up trouble on the border, and would have done so if General Kaufmann had not dissuaded him. General Kaufmann told him that living within the Turkoman country as a refugee he was not to abuse the hospitality he was receiving by making any attack upon Afghanistan, saying that Russia had no quarrel either with the Ameer of Afghanistan or with the British Government. At that time it does not appear that Russia was doing anything in her relations with Afghanistan of which this country could complain. I assert that somewhat boldly; because I wish it to be clearly understood that it was the case that up to that time there was nothing of which we had cause to or did complain. This is a fact which I wish to be distinctly understood. In the year 1873 Lord Northbrook had occasion to make the Ameer acquainted with the decision arrived at, both with regard to the boundary of Afghanistan and that of Seistan. The latter, which was the boundary between Afghanistan and Persia, gave considerable offence to Shere Ali, and Lord Northbrook, wishing to explain the matter to him, proposed to send a British officer to Cabul for the purpose. Here I beg the House to observe the course of action taken by Shere Ali. He declined to receive a British officer, and proposed instead that his own Minister should wait upon the Viceroy. Lord Northbrook accepted that proposal; and I mention this point, because it is one constantly recurring in reference to proposals on our part to send European officers to Cabul, which proposals have been just as constantly refused. It is well to bear this in mind, in order that we may the better understand the question when we come to deal with that part of it which relates to the refusal of the Ameer to receive the last Mission. When the Afghan Envoy, Noor Mahomed Shah, came to Simla he opened up, besides the two questions of the boundaries, a great many other questions. He again asked for an unconditional Treaty, his master having complained always that the only Treaty between Afghanistan and England—that of 1855—was a one-sided Treaty, in that it bound the Ruler of Afghanistan to a great many things and bound England to very little. He therefore wanted an unconditional guarantee against external attack; but when asked whether the Ameer would receive European Residents, the Envoy replied that, in the interest of both countries, he could not recommend that the point should be pushed, and that branch of the question was dropped. Lord Northbrook, after referring home, felt justified in giving to the Ameer assurances which went rather beyond those of Lord Mayo; but he got no unconditional guarantee. The result was, that the Envoy went away not quite so well pleased as did Shere Ali from the Durbar at Umballa. He had got assurances that went even further; but I believe the explanation of it is this—that Shere Ali put rather too hopeful a construction upon the promises made to him by Lord Mayo. Though I admit that those promises were very carefully worded, I cannot help thinking that part of the subsequent disappointment of the Ameer results from this. There is a rather curious little reference to this in the Papers, where it is stated, at page 201, that Sir Lewis Pelly thought, in reading over the agreement come to after the Umballa Conference, he detected in the Persian version words which seemed to convey that the English Government would visit with "severe punishment," instead of with "severe displeasure," any attempt on the part of his rivals to disturb his position as Ruler of Cabul, or to stir up civil war in the Kingdom. The reason why no more definite agreement was come to between Lord Northbrook and Noor Mahomed Shah was that, though the Viceroy was prepared there and then to give him something more definite, the Envoy declared that he had no power to treat further. Now, we come to the first part of the story, as it relates to the present Government. On the 22nd of January, 1875, Lord Salisbury instructed the Government of India to address the Ameer, with a view to getting his sanction to a Resident Agent in Afghanistan. This Instruction is conveyed in a despatch, which commences by stating that Her Majesty's Government have followed with anxious attention the progress of events in Central Asia and on the Frontiers of Persia and Afghanistan, and then proceeds as follows:—

> "I have therefore to instruct you to take measures, with as much expedition as the circumstances of the case permit, for procuring the assent of the Ameer to the establishment of a British Agency at Herat. When this is accomplished it may be desirable to take a similar step with regard to Candahar. I do not suggest any similar step with respect to Cabul, as I am sensible of the difficulties which are interposed by the fanatic violence of the people."

The next paragraph is a very interesting one. It says—

> "The Ameer has more than once in former years expressed his readiness to permit the presence of an Agent at Herat, and it is therefore not possible that, if his intentions are still loyal, he will make any serious difficulty now."—[*Ibid.* p. 129.]

This, I think, was the beginning of the mistaken policy. I have no doubt Lord Salisbury believed that the Ameer had really consented to receive these Agents;

and upon that point I should like to call the attention of the House to one or two other extracts from the Papers which are before us, because it really seems to me to have been the beginning of the mischief—this belief that the Ameer would consent to receive the Envoys. The evidences upon which Lord Salisbury founded that belief are two notes of private conversations which Captain Grey, who acted as Persian interpreter, had with Noor Mahomed Shah at Umballa, and which will be found in page 173 of the Papers. In the despatch which Lord Northbrook wrote home in reference to this one of Lord Salisbury, he expressed an opinion that it was very doubtful, though perhaps possible, that the Ameer had made this concession, or agreed to accept the Residents, in a private conversation with Captain Grey; and he added, that if such an assent was given, it was given in a private conversation, of which there was no official record; and that, therefore, it would be impossible upon such a foundation to press upon the Ameer the reception of these Agents. Captain Grey's note of the conversation which, as I have said, is to be found on page 173 of the Papers, is very curious. It is contained in an "Extract from Memorandum of Conversations between Captain Grey and Noor Mahomed Shah, dated 31st March, and 1st April, 1869;" and in the first conversation it is recorded that the Ameer

> "is open to any proposition for securing his northern border, while doubtful of any Russian power for aggression for some years to come, still thinks precautions should be taken; would construct forts on his own part or under our superintendence and admit European garrisons if ever desired; would gladly see an Agent or Engineer superintendent there (in Balkh), Herat, or anywhere but actually in Cabul, which might lead to the supposition of his being a puppet."

But on the very next day Captain Grey had another conversation with this same Noor Mahomed Shah, and it is recorded that—

> "The Secretary asked him if the Ameer would sanction Native Agents in Afghanistan either as visitors or as permanent residents, supposing the British Government wished it; the Minister replied that he did not wish to commit himself, and asked, rather anxiously, whether European Agents were intended, observing at the same time that it was of no use to send any but Mahomedans, Hindoos were of no good at all."

That is the evidence, as far as Captain Grey is concerned; and the question is of some importance, because it is referred to again in the Instructions given to Sir Lewis Pelly in reference to the Conference at Peshawur. I have yet to learn that the assent to the Resident Agents was given, or given in such a form that it could possibly be used against the Ameer at all; and I want to draw the attention of the House to a short statement which has been made by Mr. Seton-Karr, who was Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in 1869, at the time of the Umballa Durbar. Mr. Seton-Karr has not authorized me, personally, to make use of his statement; but he entrusted it to a friend, with full power to use it as he thought most fitting. Mr. Seton-Karr states that

> "he was the bearer of every confidential communication between Lord Mayo and the Ameer, and was present at every interview between them. He gave Lord Lawrence an account of what occurred in a letter dated the 5th of April, 1869, which he has authorized Lord Lawrence to use. In that letter there is the following paragraph:—'He, Shere Ali, is told that we don't want British officers as Residents at Cabul or anywhere else, and he says they would do him harm in the eyes of his people.'"

I can hardly believe, therefore, that there was a real assent to the reception of these officers as Residents. If there was, it was given in very private conversations with Captain Grey, and on condition of dynastic pledges and an almost unconditional Treaty, without which nothing would have been done. After a delay of some months, Lord Northbrook's Government in India replied to the despatch of Lord Salisbury. In that reply it was set forth that, in the opinion of Lord Northbrook, Lord Salisbury very much underrated the value of the Native Agents the Government already had in Afghanistan; he denied that any real information which it was necessary for them to possess had ever been kept back by these Agents; he asked what piece of information which they ought to have known could be pointed to which had not been received from these Agents; and he went on to express the opinion entertained by everyone around him that the value of British Residents in Afghanistan would be positively *nil*, unless the Ameer and his people cordially welcomed them. There is not wanting some evidence of this. There are the cases, both recent, of Major Todd at Herat, and Major Lumsden at Candahar, both of whom were as much imprisoned as they would have been if shut up in a gaol, with regard to the information they could get or transmit to their Government. They were watched on all sides; and no one was allowed to have access to them, except those who could tell the story which it was desired should be known. There is, in short, no more difficult position than that of a British officer residing in the midst of a hostile population, determined that he should neither obtain, nor transmit any information which could be of value. The fact of the matter is that, as things at present stand, more could be learnt of Afghanistan affairs by an official residing at Peshawur, than by similar functionaries living in Herat or Candahar. With regard to the larger question—whether the Ameer would willingly receive these Residents—Lord Northbrook took considerable pains to ascertain the views of all those who were entitled to speak on the subject, and for that purpose he addressed a communication to the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, in order to obtain his views, and those of such officials as might be considered competent to advise on the following points:—

> "First, whether the Ameer of Afghanistan would willingly consent to the appointment of British officers as Residents at Herat and Candahar, or at either place; second, whether the presence of such Residents at either place would be advantageous to the British Government; third, whether the Lieutenant Governor was satisfied with the sufficiency and accuracy of the intelligence received from the British Agent at Cabul, and if not, whether his Honour could suggest any way of procuring fuller and more accurate intelligence."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 130.]

The answers received to these questions were practically unanimous. The opinion of the Punjab Government, set forth at page 132 of the Papers, is in these words—

> "If the concurrence of all those who may be supposed to have the means of forming a correct judgment of the sentiments of the Ameer is of any value, we must be prepared to find him most unwilling to receive a British Agent at Herat. On this the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, Sir Richard Pollock, Major-General Reynell Taylor, Colonel Munro, and Captain Cavagnari are all agreed, and their views are confirmed—1. By those of Nawab Foujdar Khan and Nawab Gholam Hassan Khan, who have successively served as British Agent at Cabul, and who have means of knowing the present sentiments of the Ameer. 2. By the opinion of Noor Mahomed Shah, the Cabul Envoy, who, when at Simla in 1873, advised the Foreign Secretary that a specific request should not be preferred to the Ameer for British officers to be stationed within the Afghan dominions. 3. By the recent acts of the Ameer in objecting to permit Sir D. T. Forsyth to traverse Balkh on his return journey from Yarkund and in discouraging Colonel Baker from returning to India from Teheran *viâ* Cabul."

There was a remarkable agreement among all these officers on the subject; and it seems to me to have been a very strong step for the Government at home to re-open this question, and to insist upon sending these Resident Agents into the territories of the Ameer against his will. Lord Salisbury, believing that the Ameer had previously consented, remarked that if he was still loyal it was not possible that he should refuse now to receive them. On this the Indian Government very properly remarked that it did not necessarily follow that because the Ameer declined to receive these Residents he had become disloyal. There were strong grounds for his refusal; because there cannot be a doubt that there was a very strong party—if not an unanimous people—in Afghanistan opposed to the reception of these Residents. I, for one, doubt very much whether the Ameer could have maintained his rule if he had permitted these Agents to reside in his dominions. What did his people believe on the subject? You will find, from every page of this Book, their belief to have been that if once they allowed these British Residents to come in their independence was gone. You may cast all sorts of hard words against these people of Afghanistan. They have been called barbarous, and I daresay they are; they have been described as treacherous, and I daresay the description is accurate; they may be called an uncivilized race, who will not admit strangers within their country if they can help it; but, at all events, they are independent, and love their independence. Neither Lord Salisbury nor Lord Lytton seem to have realized the feeling entertained by the whole people of Afghanistan upon this subject of the British Resident. They said — If we once admit him, he will be writing all sorts of reports about us to his Government, and then they will come and interfere with us and take our country from us; at any rate, it is not possible that we should maintain our independence in the management of our own internal affairs if we once admit him. Before I leave this despatch, there is one more paragraph which I wish to mention, and that is the one in which Sir Richard Pollock expresses his

> "conviction that no unfavourable change whatever had occurred in the disposition of His Highness, and that he leaned as much as ever on the British Government." — [*Ibid.* p. 134.]

Lord Northbrook, in the same despatch, reminded Lord Salisbury of the promise given at the Umballa Conference on the question of the Resident British Agents, and begged to be allowed to continue the conciliatory policy followed by so many Viceroys. It was not long, however, before the Home Government returned to the charge; and on the 19th of November, 1875, Lord Salisbury wrote a despatch to the Indian Government, in which he urged them to find—or, as he said, "if need be, to create"—an opportunity for sending a Mission to secure the assent of the Ameer to the British Residents in his dominions. Lord Northbrook's Government did not take so long to reply this time; and I am glad to say that they adhered firmly to the policy which they had already announced as their wish to follow. They asked for a re-consideration of the whole question; expressed a doubt whether Lord Salisbury had weighed all the reasons advanced in their former communications; and repeated some of them. With respect to the proposal for finding or creating an occasion for sending a Mission to the Ameer with the object indicated, they very properly pointed out that if it were thought necessary to send such a Mission at all, the most advisable course would be—

> "To state frankly and fully to the Ameer the real purpose of the Mission, and to invite him to enter cordially into those closer relations with the British Government which the Mission is to endeavour to establish. The Ameer and his advisers are shrewd enough to understand that only matters of grave political importance could induce us to send a special Mission to His Highness' Court. If the Mission were ostensibly directed to objects of minor political importance, the Ameer and his officials would be incredulous. He might then decline to discuss the weightier questions brought forward by our Envoy, and in all probability his confidence in us would be shaken, especially as the proposal to establish British Agents in Afghanistan is, as we pointed out in our despatch of the 7th of June, a departure from the understanding arrived at between Lord Mayo and the Ameer at the Umballa Conferences of 1869." — [*Ibid.* p. 151.]

Then they asked over again that they might not be driven to depart from the policy which was pursued by Lord Lawrence and by Lord Canning and Lord Mayo; and they pointed out that if these British Agents were sent into Afghanistan without the cordial consent of the Ameer, they would run a risk of having insults offered to them for which it would be difficult to hold the Ameer responsible. The despatch also pointed out over again, with considerable detail, the reasons which guided them in asking a further consideration for this matter in their former despatch. It was hardly possible, therefore, that the Viceroy and his Government could have more manfully or sturdily maintained their policy; and I am glad that they did so. Only conceive the way in which this attempt to force British Residents upon Afghanistan was to be carried out! Of what nature were the men with whom they had to deal? Fancy an Englishman, or even a man endowed with all the shrewdness of a Scotchman, endeavouring to create an opportunity, and putting forward some flimsy pretext to suspicious Asiatics, thoroughly awake to what was going on, and then imagining that they would not see through it! Lord Lytton succeeded Lord Northbrook as Viceroy; and we are told in one of his despatches that he went out to India well prepared to deal with this question, after previous communication with the Government at home and with the Russian Ambassador. I do not at all complain of his communicating with the Russian Ambassador before leaving London. It was natural that the Viceroy who was going out should take every opportunity of learning the views of the Russian Ambassador; but there is a very ugly interpretation to be put on some things that occurred afterwards in connection with this proceeding. Lord Lytton went out with powers to give more definite declarations of support to the Ameer, and to obtain more definite arrangements on the subject of Resident Agents in

Afghanistan. These powers appeared partly to be contained in the Instructions drawn out for him by the Secretary of State. These Instructions state that—

> "Her Majesty's Government are, therefore, prepared to sanction and support any more definite declaration which may, in your judgment, secure to their unaltered policy the advantages of which it has been hitherto deprived by an apparent doubt of its sincerity. But they must reserve to themselves entire freedom of judgment as to the character of circumstances involving the obligation of material support to the Ameer, and it must be distinctly understood that only in some clear case of unprovoked aggression would such an obligation arise."

And further—

> "The Ameer must be made to understand that, subject to all fair allowance for the condition of the country, and the character of the population, territories ultimately dependent upon British power for their defence must not be closed to those of the Queen's officers or subjects who may be duly authorized to enter them."—[*Ibid.* p. 159.]

That communication when made to the Ameer would naturally strengthen him in his notion, that when once he had admitted British Agents there would be an end of his independence. Lord Lytton wrote, on the 5th May, 1876, his first letter to the Ameer. It will be found at page 174 of the Blue Book. It was nominally from the Commissioner at Peshawur to the Ameer; but, of course, it was written under the instigation and the directions of the Viceroy. He says to Shere Ali, that as soon as he heard of the arrival of the Viceroy in India

> "I lost no time in waiting on him; and in the course of a lengthened interview with which I was honoured by his Excellency, the present Viceroy inquired very cordially after your Highness's health and welfare, and those of his Highness Abdoollah Jan; intimating his intention of deputing to your Highness, as soon as the necessary arrangements can be made, his friend, Sir Lewis Pelly, who has accompanied his Excellency from England, and who will return so soon as his interviews with your Highness are completed. Sir Lewis Pelly will be accompanied by Dr. Bellew and Major St. John for the purpose of delivering to your Highness in person a khureeta, informing your Highness of his Excellency's accession to office, and formally announcing to your Highness the addition which Her Majesty the Queen has been pleased to make to Her Sovereign titles in respect to Her Empire of India."

That was the opportunity, or the pretext, which the Viceroy found or created, or rather, which I suppose was created for him at home. The Ameer looked at the last few lines of that letter—for that is the pith of it—and soon saw through it. The letter, after assuring the Ameer of the friendly feelings by which the Viceroy's intention was prompted, went on to say that

> "Sir Lewis Pelly, who is honoured by the new Viceroy with his Excellency's fullest confidence, will be able to discuss with your Highness matters of common interest to the two Governments."

I do not complain of the tone of that letter; but there you have the pretext of announcing his own accession to office and the assumption of the title of Empress; and then comes the pith of the letter, which, as in many other cases, is contained in the last line, and of course Shere Ali, being pretty wideawake to what was on foot, was not deceived by it. The Ameer replied on the 22nd of May. His reply will be found at page 175 of the Blue Book. He says—

> "In the particular of the coming of the Sahibs for the purpose of certain (some) matters of the two Governments is this—that the Agent of this friend formerly personally held political parleys at the Station of Simla on these subjects. These having been considered sufficient, and efficient, were entered in two letters . . . . and need not be repeated now."

And he goes on to say—

> "At this time, if there be any new parleys for the purpose of refreshing and benefiting the God-given State of Afghanistan entertained in the thoughts, then let it be hinted, so that a confidential Agent of this friend, arriving in that place and being presented with the things concealed in the generous heart of the English Government, should reveal them to the suppliant at the Divine Throne, in order that the *matters* weighed by a minute and exact investigation may be committed to the pen of affectionate writing."

I think it is clear from that, that Shere Ali saw through the pretexts of announcing the arrival of the Viceroy and the addition of Empress to the Queen's titles. He saw that we wanted him to do something in reference to British Agents, or something else, and he first wished to know what it was. This answer appears to have angered the Viceroy; and, as will be found at page 175, the Native Agent at the Court of Cabul wrote a letter, which was, to a certain extent, explanatory of the Ameer's reply. The Native Agent says the

Ameer was afraid that the real meaning of the thing was, that he was to be ordered to receive British Residents; and he observes that, as to the coming of the Sahibs, in his view of the state of affairs it is not advisable, remarking, that the point chiefly to be regarded is, that even if for the purpose of securing the good-will of the British Government the Ameer should consent to receive a British Agent, and to make the necessary arrangements for his safety, then this grave difficulty would arise—that what was done could not be concealed from the Russian authorities, who were on his northern borders, who were extremely fearless, and who would want to have Agents in his country too. Now that may, perhaps, have been an excuse; but, at all events, it shows that there was no more desire to receive Russian Agents than British on the part of the Ameer. I quote this, because it is held that the great desire of Shere Ali was to receive Russian Agents, and not English; but I do not think that proposition can be maintained. The second letter of the Viceroy, dated 8th July, 1876, and which will be found at page 176 of the Papers, gives the first indication of the new — that is, the threatening—policy which has landed us in our present situation. In the last paragraph it says—

> "I am to repeat that, in proposing to send a friendly Mission to your Highness, the Viceroy has been actuated by a cordial desire, which it rests with your Highness to reciprocate, for the continuance, on closer terms than heretofore, of amicable relations between the two Governments in view of common interests, more particularly affecting Afghanistan and the personal welfare of your Highness and your dynasty. It will, for this reason, cause the Viceroy sincere regret, if your Highness, by hastily rejecting the hand of friendship now frankly held out to you, should render nugatory the friendly intentions of his Excellency, and oblige him to regard Afghanistan as a State which has voluntarily isolated itself from the alliance and support of the British Government."

Here was the first distinct threat of the withdrawal of all support from the Ameer if he did not accede to the Viceroy's proposals. That threat was conveyed in language which was certainly direct. It is here important to bear in mind one fact connected with the Russian Agent at Cabul, and that is this—that we never find that anything was done by a Russian Agent at Cabul which could be complained of by our Government prior to the receipt by the Ameer of this threatening letter. Let the House turn to the Central Asian Papers, and at page 79 they will find proof of what I have just said. At the foot of that page, in a telegram dated September 16, 1876, sent from Simla by the Viceroy to Lord Salisbury, it is stated that the Indian Government would send home by the next mail a despatch expressing a decided opinion on the necessity of Her Majesty's Government remonstrating with Russia on the subject of the Correspondence that had passed with the Ameer, through the hands of Russian Agents, two of whom were then in Cabul. On page 83 of the "Correspondence respecting Central Asia" you will find the written despatch, and also certain enclosures. The point with regard to the enclosures is this—that the earliest intelligence received by us of anything done by the Russian Agent or Agents, of which we could complain, is to be found in the Cabul Diary from the 4th to the 14th of August, 1876. This is the first mention of anything in connection with a Russian Agent at Cabul of which we had cause to complain. Now, if you turn to page 76 of the same Papers you will find that, by the Cabul Diary of the 1st of June, 1876, the Ameer had been in receipt on the previous day of Russian communications. It is recorded that on the receipt of the letters the Ameer summoned the British Agent, and showed him the letter of the Governor of Samarcand to the Naib. Its purport is that the Russian Government, with regard to Afghanistan, aims at nothing but friendship; that Mirza Abdul Karim has left with a Murrasila from the Russian Governor General to the Ameer; and that the Naib should appoint an Agent to escort him to Cabul. I quote this in order to show that up to this time, June, 1876, we had never complained, or had reason to complain, of anything done by the Russian Agent at Cabul, and that the Ameer always acted with openness in sending the communications to us. In order to show that that and previous communications were not regarded with anything like distrust, I would point out to the House that at page 79—Paper No. 70—it is recorded that on the 6th of September, 1876, Lord Derby transmitted to Lord Augustus Loftus, for his information, and without remark or complaint of any kind, a copy of a despatch, inclosing these Cabul Diaries of 30th May to 1st June. That, to my mind, shows conclusively that up to the time at which we began to threaten the Ameer he acted with perfect openness. Afterwards, there may, perhaps, have been something to say on the other side. The Viceroy, after sending his second letter to Shere Ali by the Commissioner at Peshawur, also sent certain Instructions, by the same hand and on the same day, to the Native Agent at Cabul, with the last paragraph only of which will I trouble the House, in the following words:—

> "If the Ameer . . . . still declines to receive the Viceroy's Envoy, the responsibility of the result will rest entirely on the Government of Afghanistan, which will thereby have isolated itself from the alliance of that Power which is most disposed, and best able, to befriend it."—[*Ibid.* p. 177.]

This threat having been sent to the Ameer, he sent, on the 3rd of September, 1876, a reply, not altogether unfriendly in character. After suggesting that he disliked the idea of a Mission, the Ameer proceeded—

> "I have come to this conclusion, that if an Envoy of the British Government, and a selected trusted Representative of this Government, should meet on the Frontier to explain mutually the views and wishes of their respective Governments, it would be a very advantageous arrangement; or, should that course not approve itself to the British authorities, then, that the British Agent at Cabul, who has long been intimately acquainted with all my wishes, should be summoned to his own Government, and expound the whole state of affairs, and, having fully understood the desires and projects of the British Government, should return back to me, and explain them all to me in private, after which I should be the better able to decide what course it is incumbent on me to adopt in the interests of my country."—[*Ibid.* p. 179.]

Lord Lytton assented to the proposal; and on the 7th of October, 1876, Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, the British Native Agent at Cabul, had a conversation with Sir Lewis Pelly at Simla. He stated the Ameer's grievances about the Seistan boundary, about Mahomed Yakoob Khan, and our desire for the appointment of political Agents, and he used the following remarkable phrase:—"that the Ameer regards the Agents from Russia as sources of embarrassment," but hardly knew how to get rid of them. This certainly did not look as if the Ameer had made up his mind to side with the Russians. Upon the question of Yakoob Khan, there can be no doubt that the Ameer was very sore on account of Lord Northbrook's interference; but the facts were really these:—This son was the man to whom the Ameer mainly owed his position. He had fought for his father, and helped him materially to ascend the Throne. They quarrelled, and it was owing to the good offices of Lord Mayo that they were reconciled. After this, Yakoob Khan, being anxious to see the Ameer, came under a safe conduct from Herat to Cabul, when he was immediately cast into prison. Lord Northbrook very properly represented to the Ameer that the assistance rendered to him by England, from the time of Lord Lawrence downwards, had been given to him upon the one ground that England desired to see a strong, just, and merciful Government established in Afghanistan. Now, was it possible that we, who had spent so much money, taken so much pains, and bound ourselves to such obligations to the Ameer, would allow him, without a word of remonstrance, to commit this atrocious act upon his son, who had come to him under a safe conduct? Lord Salisbury frankly said that this was a just and proper course to take. But the Ameer looked upon it as a violation of our pledge not to interfere with his internal government. After having seen Sir Lewis Pelly, the Native Agent had an interview with the Viceroy, which is recorded on page 183 of the Afghan Papers; and I think there is more in this one little conversation derogatory to British honour, and calculated to work permanent harm, than in any other Paper that has ever come under my notice. The Viceroy said he was going to open his mind frankly to the Native Agent, who came to him under the somewhat peculiar circumstances and with the Mission which I have described in the words I quoted just now from the letter addressed by Shere Ali on the 3rd September, 1876, to the Commissioner of Peshawur. Lord Lytton, in the course of the conversation, made use of the following words:—

> "The Ameer had apparently come to the conclusion that, having nothing to hope from us, and, at the same time, nothing to fear, he may safely stand aloof from the British Go-

> vernment; confident that, in the event of external attack, we shall be obliged to help him, for the protection of our own interests, even if we are under no contract obligation to do so. This was a very natural conclusion; but, unfortunately for the Ameer, there was a fatal flaw in its premises. It is true that, if the Ameer proves himself our friend and loyal ally, not our interests only, but our honour, will oblige us to defend his territories and support his Throne. But the moment we have cause to doubt his sincerity, or question the practical benefit of his alliance, our interests will be all the other way, and may greatly augment the dangers with which he is already threatened, both at home and abroad. As regards the former, the British Government can only assist those who value its assistance; and the assistance which the Ameer seems at present disinclined to seek or deserve may, at any moment, be very welcome to one or other of those rivals, from whom he will never be free till he has our assured support. As regards the latter, our only interest in maintaining the independence of Afghanistan is to provide for the security of our own Frontier. But the moment we cease to regard Afghanistan as a friendly and firmly allied State, what is there to prevent us from providing for the security of our Frontier by an understanding with Russia, which might have the effect of wiping Afghanistan out of the map altogether? If the Ameer does not desire to come to a speedy understanding with us, Russia does; and she desires it at his expense."

Here was the Viceroy speaking in the name of the Sovereign of England, in the course of a conversation described as private—but which was no more private, in fact, than is this debate—and suggesting to the Ruler of Afghanistan that as there were rival pretenders to his Throne, he (in other words, England) would offer his help to one of those rivals, unless the Ameer accepted his terms. Is it possible to draw any other conclusion from these documents, and will anyone say that such a conclusion is worthy of the policy of England? Is it the kind of diplomacy that you in this House approve for our Representative to turn round upon the Ameer, whose friendship we had always professed to desire, and to say to him—"If you do not admit our political Residents into your country we will turn to one of your rivals, from whom you are never safe once our support is withdrawn from you?" I cannot conceive any statement more derogatory to the dignity of England, solemnly made by the man who was professing to speak in the name of his Sovereign. Of this I am sure—that if he was speaking in the name of his Sovereign, he was not speaking either the sense or the judgment of the English people. I think it will be fitting that before these debates close the Government should give the country some unqualified assurance on this subject. Well, with regard to the second paragraph of this statement which he made, what about this understanding with Russia? How far has it gone? Is there another secret Treaty? Is it possible that the farce could go further? Here we have Viceroy after Viceroy protesting to this man,—the Ameer—that we desired to have an independent State between us and the Russians whom we saw coming on in Central Asia; that that was the great object of our wishes; and that for that purpose we were prepared to give him money and troops, and, in fact, anything he wanted; and yet, at the same time, we were intriguing over his head, and had even gone so far as actually to ascertain that Russia was ready and willing to enter into an agreement for the division of his country? This half-educated and half-civilized Prince was accused of intriguing with Russia; but whatever might be his intention, he must have found that the British Government had been in advance of him. It appears to me to be hardly probable that this matter can stop exactly where it stands. This House is entitled to know how far the Government have gone with Russia in this matter. We are entitled to know whether there is anything more with respect to it than is recorded in this Blue Book. It is due to us that we should be informed how far the plan—if I may so call it—of the division of Afghanistan has gone. Has it as yet taken the stage of a written proposal, and are the lines drawn on the map? I think we ought to know clearly from the Government exactly what the position is in which we stand with regard to Russia upon this point. But that is not all. The Viceroy goes on to threaten the Ameer through his Agent. He tells him that our relations with the Ameer "cannot remain as they are; but that they must become either worse or better." He then re-affirms the necessity that exists for the British Government to watch the Afghan Frontier, and speaks of an arrangement to which he says it is expedient the Ameer should accede for the reception of British Residents and a special Mission. I am not going to trouble the House with the poetical allusion to the "earthen pipkin and the iron pots;" but I should like to have some information with regard to a statement which it seems to me is more deserving of condemnation than any other I have read. In the last few lines of page 183 it will be seen that the Viceroy went on to observe that

> "British policy does not permit of the alteration of definite Treaty engagements. The Ameer has hitherto had only verbal understandings with us. The letter given him by Lord Mayo was not in the nature of a Treaty engagement, and was, no doubt, vague and general in its terms."

Now, I may, I think, say, with the concurrence of the House, that this is language which is calculated to shake the confidence not only of the Ameer, but of every Prince in India. Here we have this diplomatist drawing a sharp line between written Treaty engagements and the word of Her Majesty's Representative. ["Oh, oh!"] Is that an unfair interpretation? [*Cries of* "Yes!"] I will read the paragraph over again—The Viceroy went on to observe that "British policy does not permit of the alteration of definite Treaty engagements"—that is to say, of the Treaty of 1855, which has always been looked upon as a one-sided Treaty, and the only clause in which, in reality, is that which binds us to respect the territory of the Ameer. The Viceroy goes on to say that the Ameer has hitherto had only verbal understandings with us; and what conclusions, I would ask, could the Ameer draw from all this, except that British policy did permit the alteration of verbal understandings? [The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: Read to the end.] I will; because there are, in my opinion, three things mentioned in this paragraph to which it is desirable that the attention of the House should be distinctly drawn. We have, first of all, the reference to Treaties; then to letters written by our Representatives; and then to verbal negotiations. The end of the paragraph is—

> "The letter given him by Lord Mayo was not in the nature of a Treaty engagement, and was, no doubt, vague and general in its terms."

[The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: Hear, hear!] Well, the letter was no doubt, "vague and general in its terms." I do not know what construction my right hon. Friend is going to put upon it; but to my mind it appears that we have here a plain distinction drawn by the Viceroy between the obligations which are imposed by written Treaties, and the obligations entailed upon us by the verbal promises of our Viceroy. Can there be any other rational construction, I would ask, placed upon the words which I have quoted to the House? And what more dangerous question, I should like to know, could be raised throughout India than that which those words suggest? What have the Native Princes of India to depend upon in most cases? Not on written engagements, but upon verbal assurances given to them by the Viceroy; and if you cast the slightest doubt upon the fact that the promise of one Viceroy is binding upon his successors, you are aiming one of the heaviest blows which you could possibly deal at the confidence which is reposed in our Government in India. My right hon. Friend, at all events, is awake to the gravity of the point; and I shall be glad if, in the course of this debate, he would give us some explanation on the subject. The Viceroy seems to have been very much enamoured of this singular sentence with regard to the obligations of Treaties; because you will find, if you turn to page 216, that there is a reference to the point, and that there was a distinct idea in his mind that the obligation imposed upon us by a Treaty was one thing, and that by verbal assurances another. I am now about to quote from a letter of Sir Lewis Pelly addressed, during the Peshawur Conferences, to the Minister of the Ameer, Syud Noor Mahomed Shah. Sir Lewis Pelly says—

> "Your Excellency's contention is that the British Government is already bound, by its existing engagements with the Ameer, to support and defend His Highness against any foreign or domestic enemy; and that consequently the Ameer has nothing to gain by a Treaty of Alliance which, so far as the British Government is concerned, would be a mere re-statement of the obligations it has already contracted on his behalf, whilst, so far as His Highness is concerned, it would impose upon him obligations altogether new. This is, I think, a fair summary of your Excellency's argument: and the argument would be perfectly sound if its premises were true. But, unfortunately for the Ameer, they are fundamentally erroneous. The only obligations ever contracted on behalf of each other by the British Government and the

> Barakzai Rulers of Afghanistan are embodied in two Treaties, of which the first was signed in 1855 and the second in 1857."

Now, are there, I would ask, no other obligations except those contracted by these Treaties? Have hon. Members not seen how Shere Ali clung to what he called the writings which were given to him by Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo? They were his charters. He repeated, over and over again, that there was no need of any Treaty. He was, he said, satisfied with the assurances which he had received, and wanted nothing more. He had the writings of Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, and they were, as he himself expressed it, "efficient and sufficient." I can hardly conceive that the Ameer could have put any other construction upon the language which was used by the Viceroy than that which I have put upon it. It seems to me to be the reasonable construction. Well, the Envoy was told to convey an account of what had taken place faithfully to the Ameer, certain conditions being attached to the opening of negotiations—namely, the location of British officers on the Afghan Frontier, and the maintenance of an attitude of friendship and confidence on the part of the Ameer. The second condition there was no difficulty in acceding to; but the residence of British Officers in his territory evidently was a great stumbling block throughout these communications. On this point of the introduction of British Agents on the Frontier there is a very remarkable statement, and it is the first time we hear anything definite with regard to the re-arrangement of Frontier. The Viceroy in the account of his second interview, on the 13th of October, 1876, with the Native Agent, Atta Mahomed Khan, says—

> "Should the Ameer not consider the advantages worth the concession required by him, viz., British Agency on the Frontier, and a really friendly attitude on the part of the Ameer himself, it would then be needless for him to depute his Minister to meet the Viceroy's Envoy, and the Viceroy would be free to adopt his own course in his re-arrangement of Frontier relations, without regard to Afghan interests." [*Ibid.* p. 185.]

This is the first occasion on which we have the question of the re-arrangement of Frontier introduced. We have next a letter from the Viceroy to the Ameer, dated Simla, October 11th, 1876, which conveyed to His Highness an invitation to attend the Proclamation of Her Majesty as "Empress of India" at Delhi. Now, I am not sure that the Viceroy did a wise thing in inviting the Ameer to grace his triumph at this grand Delhi Proclamation; because he would be sure to meet on that occasion a great many Native Princes whose internal affairs had been very considerably interfered with by different British Residents in India. I do not like, I may add, to dwell in detail on this point of the reception of British Agents on the Frontier. Hon. Members will find in the Papers letters dated November 23, December 5, 7, 11, 18, and 21, which depict the attitude of the Ameer at the time. They are to be found at pages 192, 193, and 194. In the first of these letters, which is written by Atta Mahomed Khan, and which is dated Cabul, November 23, it is stated that—

> "The general result of their observations was that the Government of Afghanistan was not in a position to receive British officers within its Frontier."—[*Ibid.* p. 192.]

The letters then went on to show that there were signs of yielding in the Ameer; and in the last of the series, which was dated December 21, the writer says, after a lengthened interview with the Ameer, His Highness observed—

> "God willing, for ever, the friendship existing between our Government and the British Government will remain more firm than before, and this true friendship will never be disturbed. Whatever objections or pleas have been hitherto made as to the residence of British officers on the border are owing to the savage conduct of the people of Afghanistan, and even now we agree to their residence on the border owing to helplessness."—[*Ibid.* p. 194.]

The meaning of that is, that he had been driven to this concession; that pressure had been put upon him; in other words, that he had been bullied; and that he could not resist any longer giving his consent to the residence of British officers within his territory. Then he sends an Envoy to meet Sir Lewis Pelly at Peshawur, and the first interview of this Envoy is with Dr. Bellew. You will find an account of it at page 195. Dr. Bellew, in a Memorandum, dated January 28, 1877, of his visit to the Envoy, records the following observations made by the latter:—

> "The Ameer now has a deep-rooted mistrust of the good faith and sincerity of the British

Government, and he has many reasons for this mistrust."

Dr. Bellew's reply to that observation was to the effect that he had always thought

> "The disposition of the British Government towards that of the Ameer was of a most friendly character, and that he felt sure, from all that he could see as a private individual, that its most earnest desire was to see the Ameer's Government strong and prosperous, and consolidated on a firm basis."

The answer of the Envoy was—

> "That is what you say. But the promises of your Government are of one sort and their acts of another. Now listen to me. I tell you what I know. It is twenty-two years since the Government of the Ameer made a Treaty with John Lawrence Sahib, and it has not from that time to this diverged from it. At that time the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan refused to consent to the residence of British officers in his country, because he knew the lawless character of his people, and how they had killed Englishmen in the streets of Cabul at the time of Shah Shuja's overthrow. Well, his explanation was accepted and friendship continued, and then after a time the Ameer (Shere Ali Khan) came down and met Lord Mayo. Again the question of British officers was advanced, and on the same grounds objected to. After this you came with Pollock Sahib to Seistan. You will recollect that on one occasion he spoke in praise of Yakoob Khan, and I immediately warned him that if he desired to secure the Ameer's confidence he would never mention the name of Yakoob Khan again. Well, when I returned from Teheran I met Lord Northbrook, and discussed various matters at Simla, where the question of British officers coming to Afghanistan was again mooted. Now, why all this pressing to send British officers to Afghanistan when you declare that you have no wish to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan? It has roused the suspicion of the Ameer."—[*Ibid.* p. 195.]

Now, the more I read these Papers, the more it seems to me that there had not been so much intrigue with other Powers as a deeply-rooted feeling in the hearts of the people of Afghanistan against the introduction of British Residents into their country. They evidently felt that their independence would be gone the moment they gave way on that point. Dr. Bellew paid the Cabul Envoy a second visit, which is referred to at page 202, and there, again, the Envoy uses words which I cannot help thinking are spoken from the man's own heart. In his interviews with Dr. Bellew he appears to have spoken perfectly freely; and that, I believe, is the impression which has been conveyed to the minds of many of those who knew him in India. He says here, at page 202—

> "God grant that the issue be favourable (well). But you must not impose upon us a burden which we cannot bear, and if you overload us the responsibility rests with you."

Dr. Bellew adds—

> "I interposed here, and asked the Cabul Envoy what the burden was which he alluded to. He at once replied — The residence of British officers on the frontiers of Afghanistan."

He told Dr. Bellew at the first interview that the allusion to his assent to the admission of British Agents to reside in Afghanistan "was as much as an order for his death." There is a ring of truth about this story that the people of Afghanistan were violently—fanatically, if you will—opposed to this step. That the opposition was a true one I think we can, after reading these Papers, hardly entertain a doubt; and, moreover, it was an opposition which, it seems to me, the Ameer hardly dare face. In the Report of the Conference at Peshawur between Sir Lewis Pelly and the Ameer's Agent on February 15, 1877, Sir Lewis Pelly says—

> "But, in the most friendly manner, I beg the Envoy to understand that, if the Ameer reject all we offer and all we ask, and no basis of negotiation is left, the Viceroy, while observing the terms of the Treaty of 1855, will decline to support the Ameer and his dynasty in any troubles, internal or external, and their unknown consequences, and will continue to strengthen the Frontier of British India without further reference to the Ameer."—[*Ibid.* p. 210.]

Now here I would ask, how was the Viceroy going at once to strengthen the Frontier and maintain intact the Treaty of 1855? That is a matter which appears to me to require explanation. Then the Cabul Envoy says that he does not understand what "strengthening the Frontier" meant; and Sir Lewis Pelly replied—

> "The Viceroy will take such measures as he may deem wise and lawful for strengthening the Frontier of British India and providing for the safety and repose of that Empire; and this without communication with the Ameer."

Then the Cabul Envoy asks—

> "Does this mean, within the territories of the Ameer of Afghanistan, or otherwise?"

Sir Lewis Pelly replied—

> "That the object of the present Conference is not to interfere with Afghanistan."—[*Ibid.*]

Now was that, I would ask, a satisfactory answer? Now this Pelly Conference, as it is called at Peshawur, was brought to a close at the time of the death of Noor Mahomed Shah, the Ameer's Envoy. The death of the Envoy occurred on the 26th of March, and on the 30th of March the Conference was, by order of the Viceroy, brought to a close, although another Envoy was present at Peshawur at the time. If you want to see the reason for the closing of the Conference you must turn to pages 170 and 171—to the despatch of the Viceroy, dated the 10th of May, 1877. The Viceroy there tells us that—

> "The Afghan Envoy, who had long been suffering from a mortal disease, expired shortly after his receipt of this communication. His surviving colleague, the Mir Akhor, declared that he had no authority to answer any question from the British Government; and Sir Lewis Pelly was consequently instructed to close the Conference on the ground that there was no basis for negotiation. Apparently the Ameer, whose object was still to gain time, was much surprised and embarrassed by this step. At the moment when Sir Lewis Pelly was closing the Conference, His Highness was sending to the Mir Akhor instructions to prolong it by every means in his power; a fresh Envoy was already on the way from Cabul to Peshawur; and it was reported that this Envoy had authority to accept eventually all the conditions of the British Government. The Viceroy was aware of these facts when he instructed our Envoy to close the Conference."

Now, it is a little difficult to understand why the Conference was closed when that which the Viceroy had taken so much trouble to gain appeared to be at last within his grasp. Was not it the obvious solution of the difficulty, that by that time it was deemed expedient that there should be an extension of our North-Western Frontier? The Viceroy tells us that it was evident it was not desirable to go further with the Conference when he found that Shere Ali was not friendly in his disposition towards us, and was obviously not cordial about the receipt of these British Residents. But had he at any time, I would ask, found the Ameer cordial with respect to the reception of those Residents? Had he not been warned, over and over again, by every officer whom he came across in India, that the Ameer was strongly opposed to such a step? He, nevertheless, presses on the subject; and when at last he knew that the Envoy of the Ameer was about to accept all his terms, he closes the Conference. He found by that time that the mere location of British officers in the Ameer's territory would not be sufficient, and that he wanted an extension of Frontier. It is impossible to account otherwise for his closing the Conference after so long a delay when he was on the point of having the very terms acceded to for which he had been asking throughout. Well, a great break occurs at this stage of the proceedings. The matter was reported to the Government at home in a despatch dated 10th of May, 1877, from Simla, and you will find towards the close of that despatch, at page 172, the following remarkable passage:—

> "The further course of Cabul politics we cannot foresee, and do not attempt to predict. But we await its natural development with increased confidence in the complete freedom and paramount strength of our own position. In the meanwhile we see no reason to anticipate any act of aggression on the part of the present Ameer, or on our own part any cause for interference with His Highness. Our relations with him are still such as we commonly maintain with the Chiefs of neighbouring and friendly countries. But whilst, on the one hand, they are now relieved from all liabilities, real or imputed, on behalf of his personal fortunes or those of his dynasty, on the other hand, they have been placed by our recent arrangements with Khelat (and others which will be separately reported to your Lordship) in a position much less dependent than heretofore upon the personal disposition, or uncontrolled conduct, of so uncertain a neighbour."

Now, this step was taken of closing the Conference, and it was reported home in the despatch from which I have been quoting, and which is dated the 10th of May, 1877; but it appears, I confess, to my mind, somewhat curious that this despatch is the first official record of these transactions we have following the despatch of the 28th of January, 1876; or, in other words, for a period of a year and a-quarter. That was a very long time for the Viceroy to be left without counsel and support from the Government at home. It seems to me that a Viceroy inaugurating a thoroughly new policy, which had been opposed by his Predecessors, should have sought advice from home during that period. But Lord Lytton does not appear to have done that. Is it possible that a despatch on the subject was delayed? because had such a despatch been written there were members of the Viceroy's own Government who would have been found to protest against it. I hold in my hand a letter which has been addressed to the Editor of *The Daily News* by Sir Henry Norman. It is too long to read; but I may inform the House that Sir Henry Norman states that if he and his Colleagues had been consulted they would certainly have protested against this policy. I will read only one sentence from the letter. Speaking of how odd it would appear if he cordially concurred in adopting a policy which he had a few weeks previously deprecated, Sir Henry Norman says—

> "I did no such thing, nor did Sir William Muir or Sir Arthur Hobhouse, who, with myself, were members of the Viceroy's Council during all the discussions preceding Sir Lewis Pelly's Mission; ou the contrary, we objected to the policy, and to measures in connection with it."

We can understand that it would have been inconvenient to write home under the circumstances. I wish also to point out that as it was possible to carry out this policy only by deliberately concealing it from Parliament, it was so concealed. During the spring of 1877 a good many persons began to hear from India reports of these Conferences which alarmed them; but the matter was allowed to rest for a time. There were, however, later on, debates on the subject, both in the House of Lords and the House of Commons. One of the most important was that which took place in the House of Lords on the 15th of June, 1877, and it was a debate, I may observe, which threw the whole of us off our guard in reference to this question. That debate was opened by the Duke of Argyll, who, in the course of his speech, remarked that—

> "Rumour said that the Government of India had determined upon a complete change of policy, and had resolved to insist on the Ameer receiving a Resident British Envoy at his Court. It had been said, too, that a particular officer had been appointed."—[3 *Hansard,* ccxxxiv. 1832.]

Well, what was the reply of the Marquess of Salisbury?

> "We have not tried to force an Envoy upon the Ameer at Cabul—we have not suggested Sir Lewis Pelly as an Envoy at Cabul. . . . . Our relations with the Ameer of Cabul have undergone no material change since last year. I do not believe that he is worse disposed towards us than hitherto, or that his feelings are in any way more embittered towards the British Government."—[*Ibid.* 1835.]

Well, Lord Lawrence spoke after the noble Marquess in the debate, and he was followed by Lord Northbrook, who said—

> "I heard what fell from the noble Marquess to-night . . . . with the greatest possible satisfaction, because I feel it would be no light matter to change a policy which has been pursued deliberately by successive Governments in this country, and which has received the cordial support and approval of men like Lord Canning, my noble Friend who has just addressed your Lordships, and Lord Mayo."—[*Ibid.* 1842.]

I have seen that some explanation has since been given of the answer of Lord Salisbury on that occasion, and it is to the effect that we had not meant to send a British Resident to Cabul. Now, for my own part, I am disposed to doubt whether even the literal correctness of that explanation can be maintained; for it will, I think, be found from one of the Viceroy's letters to the Ameer, that he proposed to send Sir Lewis Pelly to him at Cabul or elsewhere. But be that as it may, I contend that the speech of Lord Salisbury was one which was calculated to throw us off the scent, particularly in that sentence which says that our relations with the Ameer have undergone no material change since last year. And now I wish, in dealing with that point, to make this remark. There is, to my mind, nothing more important than that our Questions and Answers to each other should be not only literally true—as I assume the Answer to which I have just referred to be—but that they should be frank. Right hon. and hon. Gentlemen who sit on the front Benches opposite have far more interest in this than independent Members. If we cannot rely absolutely on the information which we receive in Question and Answer in Parliament, it would be impossible to conduct the business of the country without resorting to practices which would be distasteful to every Englishman. If, where it may be done, an Answer were to be given which, while it may be literally true, might serve to throw us off the scent, then it would become necessary for us to frame our Questions in the form of the clauses of a criminal indictment, and that would be to degrade the business of Parliament. I, for one, trust that we shall always be able to maintain the practice which has hitherto prevailed; and that when we receive an Answer to any Question which we may put, it shall be one which, as heretofore, we may accept with implicit reliance on its honesty and straightforwardness. If that practice should be departed from, and a new mode of putting and answering Questions should be adopted in its stead, nothing, to my mind, could tend more to bring our proceedings into disrepute. But to return to Shere Ali and his fortunes, we find that the Government thought that the Ameer might well be left to reflect upon the situation in which he was placed. On the 30th of March the Viceroy closed the Conference at Peshawur, and thus shut the door between his Government and the Ruler of Cabul. And when was this course taken? That Government, which is always talking about *prestige*, closed the door of communication between them and the capital of Afghanistan, and withdrew from it their Native Envoy, at a time when grave events were happening in Europe, and when England seemed to be madly bidding the rest of Europe to stand aside in order that she might step in as the champion of Mussulman rule, and alone settle the question with Russia. This was the time chosen to take away our Native Agent from Shere Ali's Court, leaving no one to point out to him that neither in Europe, nor in Asia, were you afraid of the great White Czar. And this we are told is diplomacy. The Ameer was left alone to his reflections: did they ever consider for a moment what those reflections were likely to be? Might he not have reasoned with himself thus—"This new Viceroy is angry with me. He has broken up the Conference. No Viceroy has ever before treated me with insult and the hard language this one has done. I used to get fair words from Lord Lawrence, and Lord Mayo, and Lord Northbrook; but this last Viceroy casts some doubts on the promises which I received from them. He has gone so far as to tell me that he has been in communication with the Russians for dividing my Kingdom and blotting me out altogether; had I not better talk to the Russians? That General Kaufmann always appears very civil to me. He says nothing about Resident Agents. He makes friendly inquiries after me, and he has got under his control that nephew of mine, who is a most dangerous conspirator against my Throne." Was there any improbability in supposing that Shere Ali would have reasoned with himself in that way? The Viceroy had shut the door against himself, but had left it open to Russia, and that at a moment when we were threatening Russia by bringing over troops from India to the Mediterranean. The Government, I may add, never found anything to complain of between Shere Ali and the Russians until after they had written threatening and insulting letters to the Ameer. After that there were, I admit, some intrigues. But be that as it may, the Government approved the course which had been taken by the Viceroy; and I would now quote a passage which will be found at page 223, and which is almost the last extract with which I shall trouble the House. The passage occurs in a despatch dated 4th October, 1877, from Lord Salisbury to the Governor General of India. He says—

> "Upon this point the history of the events reported in the letter under reply is unhappily conclusive, and demonstrates but too plainly how erroneous was the opinion expressed so recently as the year 1875 by Sir Richard Pollock, the Commissioner of Peshawur, that 'no unfavourable change had occurred in the disposition of the Ameer.' Shere Ali's confidential Envoy stated explicitly that his master had 'now a deep-rooted mistrust of the good faith and sincerity of the British Government.'"

Here we have a specimen of putting two paragraphs together in such a way as to create a very misleading impression. You will find, at page 195, that in the interview which he had with Dr. Bellew, the Afghan Envoy stated that—

> "The Ameer has now a deep-rooted mistrust of the good faith and sincerity of the British Government."

But why? Because of the Indian Government pressing upon him the question of the residence of British officers on his Frontier; and this sentence, taken from the report of a conversation on the 28th January, 1877, is quoted as a proof that the opinion expressed by Sir Richard Pollock in 1855 as to the disposition of the Ameer was plainly erroneous. [*Cries of* "Read on!"] If I have omitted anything material, there are other hon. Gentlemen who are capable of supplying the omission. Now, on the 14th of August, 1878, the Viceroy writes to the Ameer that a British Envoy will visit him "immediately at Cabul." He gives him no time to consider his position. Then, on the

21st August, the Mission was postponed; and when at last it proceeded, in the course of the next month, our Envoy was, as we all know, refused admission. But why was it sent on that particular day, when it seemed probable that, if time were allowed, it would not be rejected? Because it had been prepared with a certain amount of pomp and circumstance, and was designed to invite the attention of the Native nobles who had been asked to accompany it to a sort of triumphal entry into Afghanistan against the wishes of its Ruler and its people. The policy of parade had been carried so far that we could not afford that the Mission should be postponed or recalled. What was the account given in the telegram of the circumstances attending the meeting of Major Cavagnari with the Commandant of Ali Musjid? I think the Government are under a heavy responsibility in that matter. The account was, that the Commandant of the fort threatened Major Cavagnari, saying that, save for his personal friendship, he would shoot him on the spot. Remember how every newspaper was led into the belief that our Envoy had been insulted. The Government are quick enough to contradict everything that tells against them and their policy; but in this case this false telegram—false, that is, in the sense of giving an absolutely untrue impression of the facts—was allowed to do its work. I repeat, the Government are under a very grave responsibility for letting the war fever be lashed up in such a manner. They had pressed the Mission on, and I do not say that it could not possibly have been right to do so, even against the wishes of the Ruler of Afghanistan; but that could only have been so if the circumstances of the case were urgent, and if there was no other course open. But were the circumstances of the case urgent? Certainly not. The Papers which were delivered to us relating to Central Asia throw much light on that point; and it must be patent to all who have read them that our real cause of complaint was against Russia. It was Russia who had violated her agreement with us, in sending an Envoy to Afghanistan; and you must remember that it was the Russian Mission that was the immediate cause of the British one. Lord Cranbrook seems to have seen it in this light, for on the 8th August, 1878, he writes to Lord Salisbury—

> "It is the Russian Cabinet alone which is responsible for the acts of its Agent; and it is the Russian Governor General of Turkestan, rather than the Ameer Shere Ali, who, with or without authority, is at this moment pursuing a policy of which the effect must be to seriously agitate the minds of Her Majesty's subjects throughout India. In view of the gravity of the situation the Secretary of State for India may safely leave to Lord Salisbury, who has a full knowledge of the question, the adoption of such language at St. Petersburg as he may think best calculated to bring about a result such as the engagements of Russia entitle us to expect."—[*Central Asia,* No. 1 (1878), p. 143.]

These sentences have the right ring about them. We shall see how they were acted upon. In the meantime, it appears that on the 14th August M. de Giers, in conversation with Mr. Plunkett, used these words—

> "Everything has been stopped. The political as well as the military precautions which we thought ourselves justified in taking against you — everything has been stopped."—[*Ibid.* p. 148.]

This conversation was known at the Foreign Office on the 19th August, and it was not until that day that Lord Salisbury takes any action upon Lord Cranbrook's letter of the 8th. The demand he makes of the Russian Government is conveyed in the following words, addressed to Mr. Plunkett:—

> "I must therefore request you to mention these reports to Prince Gortchakoff, and to enquire whether there is any foundation for them. You will not conceal from His Highness that proceedings of the kind referred to would cause uneasiness in India and dissatisfaction in this country, and should it prove that there is any truth in the statement that a Russian Mission has proceeded to Cabul, you will express the hope of Her Majesty's Government that it may be at once withdrawn, as being inconsistent with the assurances so frequently received from His Highness."—[*Ibid.* p. 150.]

Mr. Plunkett, receiving this on the 26th of August, and being unable to find M. de Giers at the Russian Foreign Office, writes to him according to his instructions. But it is not until the 6th September that he calls to inquire

> "why he had not yet received any answer to the request of Her Majesty's Government that the Russian Mission should be withdrawn from Cabul."—[*Ibid.* p. 162.]

On the 13th September Mr. Plunkett writes to Lord Salisbury, enclosing M.

de Giers's reply, which had just reached him from Livadia. M. de Giers says—

> "The dispositions of the Imperial Government in regard to the Central Asian Question . . . . have necessarily been affected by the political condition in which we were placed by the attitude of England during the recent crisis in the East. But, under the present circumstances, those dispositions are the same as formerly, and are not of a nature to give rise to any distrust on the part of the English Government."

He adds, that

> "the Mission . . . . is of a provisional nature, and one of simple courtesy." —*Ibid.* p. 164.]

By a letter addressed to the India Office, on September 20th, we learn that

> "Lord Salisbury infers from M. de Giers's note that his Excellency acknowledges that all the former assurances of the Russian Government in regard to Afghanistan have now recovered their validity."—[*Ibid.* p. 165.]

I will here observe this—that M. de Giers does not promise to withdraw the Mission to Cabul, nor does he say the previous Russian assurances have recovered their validity, which is the construction of Lord Salisbury. It is altogether a very vague statement; and its right answer would have been to acknowledge with courtesy his letter, say that we were glad to learn that the dispositions of Russia were the same as formerly, but that we should be glad also to know by what date the Russian Mission would be withdrawn, and whether we might count upon the former Russian assurances having recovered their validity. The truth is, that whilst ready enough to go to war with the Ameer, the Government was not pressing Russia with the persistency with which she ought to have been pressed on this subject. Some time ago it used to be the fashion for hon. Gentlemen opposite to complain of Lord Derby because his utterances to the Russian Government were too gentle and tender. Well, if Lord Derby's utterances were gentle, Lord Salisbury's are lamb-like. But, after all, let the House bear in mind the date. It is a fact that on the 13th September Mr. Plunkett was in possession of M. de Giers's reply, which Lord Salisbury professes to look upon as satisfactory, and it was not till the 21st of September that we pressed on our Mission into the Khyber Pass. If the Russian assurances were to be relied upon, why was the Government in such a hurry to press the Ameer? It seems to me that we have actually gone to war with the Ameer—that we took the step that we knew would lead to war a week after our officer was in receipt of Russian assurances that the very cause of the war was going to be removed by the Russian Government. I admit that Mr. Plunkett's despatch containing M. de Giers's assurances were not received in England till the 18th of September; but why did they not send a telegram? What is the use of the telegraph? It is not given you merely to send showy telegrams, in order to raise a war fever; it was given you that you might take steps to stop a war. The case is this—we have had cause for complaint against Russia, and we have fastened it upon the Ameer; we have gone to war with the Ameer on account of that Russian Mission; and the upshot of the war will probably be this, as far as I understand it—that we shall annex the territory of the independent tribes lying between us and Afghanistan. This is an odd example of vicarious punishment. There is, too, an ascending scale of punishment—to the Russians, remonstrances of the most gentle order; to the Ameer, war; to the independent tribes, annexation. And it is curious, also, that the punishment falls exactly in the inverse ratio of the ability of the different parties to resist. I have detained the House very far beyond what I had anticipated; but these Papers are interesting, and the story, I think, cannot be told without copious reference to them. We have seen the Government land us in this war; a war, as I think, unjust and unnecessary at the outset. I cannot come to the conclusion that anything else has been in their minds since the Pelly Conference was closed but this advance and rectification of the Frontier; and I am driven reluctantly to the belief that they took the opportunity of the Ameer's unwise and improper conduct—for unwise and improper, I think, his conduct was—to make that advance. And now, when you have made that advance, I should like to know what particular end you expect to gain from it? That is a question I am not going to enter into at large. It may very likely form the subject of another debate. But the charges that I bring against them are that they have adopted a new policy in India; that they have adopted that policy against the advice of all previous Viceroys, and against the advice of every officer of experience who has served in the Punjab, and who is entitled to form an opinion upon it; that they have acted upon that policy, and attempted to carry it out by threats, and by language unworthy of the British Government, calculated to defeat the very end they have had in view, and to shake confidence in us throughout India; that they concealed this policy from Parliament and the country; and that it was only by concealing this policy that it could be carried out, for if we had had the story before us, there is such a consensus of opinion among those who have served long in India that I would have defied them to do so; further, that having a cause of complaint against the strong, they fixed the quarrel on the weak; and that, by their conduct, they have brought us to a war in which already gallant men's lives have been lost, and homes made desolate, to atone for the blunders and errors of their Administration. Now, these are grave charges. I have brought them on the foundation of the Papers that have been laid before us; and unless the Government can clear themselves completely of these charges, I am justified in asking the House to assent to the Motion which I now make.

Amendment proposed,

To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "this House disapproves the conduct of Her Majesty's Government which has resulted in the War with Afghanistan,"—(*Mr. Whitbread,*)

—instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

MR. E. STANHOPE said, that the speech to which they had just been listening had, as they would naturally have expected, been couched in moderate terms—more moderate, indeed, than those in which the hon. Member had recently addressed his constituents at Bedford. He would endeavour to follow his example, and to avoid, so far as possible, what he might call the "personalities" of the question. He must ask the indulgence of the House if he had to follow the hon. Gentleman's speech at some length. As he understood the charges brought by the hon. Member against the present Government, they were these—that the irritation of the Ameer's mind had been caused entirely by the Government, and mainly, as the hon. Member evidently thought, because they had tried to induce him to accept British Residents. And then he went further, and maintained that the Government, having been desirous of late to annex additional territory in India, had taken advantage of a certain misconduct on the part of the unfortunate Ameer, in order to achieve that annexation. These were the grave charges that had been brought, to which he desired to offer a complete and entire opposition. But as they ranged over a long course of years, it would be necessary for him to present the House, in his reply, with a consecutive narrative of the relations of this country with Afghanistan, in the course of which he would endeavour to meet the various points of the hon. Member. When the Ameer, after various vicissitudes of fortune, succeeded at length in getting under his authority the greater part of Afghanistan, he was desirous of entering upon friendly relations with the Indian Government. Lord Lawrence aided him with money and arms, and if he had remained in India he would probably have arranged a meeting with the Ameer. That intention had been carried out by Lord Mayo, who met him and discussed certain subjects with him very fully and frankly; and though he (Mr. E. Stanhope) was ready to admit that the representations made by Lord Mayo in the letter written at the close of the Conference had been misunderstood and misrepresented by the Ameer, yet, at the same time, there could be no question that, whether from the nature of the assurances or from Lord Mayo's own personal influence and judicious conduct, the Ameer left that Conference a satisfied and a happy man. It had been said that Lord Mayo gave the Ameer a promise that we would never press a British Resident upon him. He (Mr. E. Stanhope) had, on a former occasion, said in that House—and he was ready to say it again—that as between Lord Mayo and the Ameer the subject was never mentioned. But it was mentioned by Lord Mayo's authority in the conversations between his Agents and the Agents of the Ameer. And what happened was this—It was abundantly clear from the despatch which the hon. Member opposite did not desire to read the end of, that the Ameer did wish us to establish Resident Engineer Agents within his dominions for the purpose of affording him advice. It was a boon which he asked us to grant him. It was included among the boons which he had asked from Lord Mayo at the time that he had begged for assistance in money and arms, and it was one of the boons which Lord Mayo thought that we ought not to grant at the then stage of our relations with him. The then state of things was summed up by the Duke of Argyll in 1869, when he said—

> "I have every reason to believe that Lord Mayo has consistently pursued the same policy of non-intervention and of the avoidance of entangling engagements, which was pursued by my noble Friend the late Governor General of India (Lord Lawrence). So far as my own instructions to Lord Mayo are concerned, they certainly have been to avoid all entangling engagements for the future with Afghanistan, and to maintain the British Government and the Government of India perfectly free in regard to that and other conterminous States."—[3 *Hansard*, cxcv. 1087.]

After this interview the first difficulty that arose was with reference to the Seistan boundary in 1872. The Ameer did not understand the nature of an arbitration, and the decision undoubtedly rankled in his mind for some time. But the terms of it, although, perhaps, very different from what the Ameer had expected, had been faithfully kept by him. But in 1873 a new element was introduced into the matter. Lord Northbrook, as it would appear, suggested that an Envoy should be sent to the Ameer to explain the Seistan decision to him. And what was the reply of the Ameer? He said that he should like to send an Envoy to us; but that if we preferred to send to him, he was willing to receive him. That was the spirit in which he received the overtures of Lord Northbrook. It was eventually agreed that he should send an Envoy to us, and then it appeared that the advances of Russia in Central Asia had greatly alarmed the Ameer. It was true that the Duke of Argyll seemed to think that the Ameer only pretended to be afraid of the results of those advances; but he (Mr. E. Stanhope) thought that from the Papers themselves there undoubtedly was substantial ground for the fears which the Ameer had then expressed. It seems perfectly clear that the Ameer was alarmed by the Russian advance in Central Asia, and that he sought our protection against its consequences. Upon that point he accepted the statement of Lord Northbrook's despatch to the Home Government on the advance of Russia, although, as Lord Northbrook stated, it was drawn more in accordance with Mr. Gladstone's speech on Mr. Eastwick's Motion than as expressing the views of the custodians of India. Lord Northbrook was of opinion that it was necessary and desirable that some more definite assurances should be given to the Ameer on this point, and he stated that the Cabinet at home gave their consent to his giving them. Upon that point he fully accepted the assurance of right hon. Gentlemen opposite. Lord Northbrook, however, gave those further assurances wrapped up in such a perfect mist of conditions that it was not surprising that the Envoy described those assurances as obscure, and asked for something a little more definite. The Envoy asked that the assurances should be put into writing, to be sent by Lord Northbrook to the Ameer, and that in that writing it should be stated distinctly that we intended to protect him against Russia. And what was the reply of Lord Northbrook? He would ask the House to remember what was the one assurance which had been given to the Ameer in 1869 by Lord Mayo—an assurance in writing which was peculiarly prized by him, and which it was evident from the beginning to the end of these Papers he had stuck to with the greatest tenacity. Well, Lord Northbrook sent a letter to the Ameer, and annexed to it certain conversations—he only called them conversations, not assurances—which had been held with the Envoy, and a Memorandum which the Envoy was instructed to show him, adding, with reference to affording him protection—

> "But the question in my opinion is one of such importance that the discussion of it should be postponed until a more convenient opportunity."

And the Memorandum also contained those words and no more. Lord Northbrook stated in his despatch that he had added those words because the Envoy had not authority to enter into the subject; but there was nothing in the

Papers to show that the Envoy had not the necessary authority. Then in 1874 occurred the arrest of Yakoob Khan. He had no particular reason for disputing the proposition of the hon. Member, that the conduct of the Ameer in imprisoning Yakoob Khan was such that the Government could not justify it. There was one point of view of the matter, however, from which, doubtless, the Ameer might look at it. The Ameer stated that he had put his son in prison for two reasons — first, for rebelling against his authority; and, secondly, for engaging in intrigues with Persia to undermine his authority. Therefore, the Ameer himself might well conceive that he had ample justification for the course which he had pursued with regard to his son; and he quoted against us the language of Lord Mayo's letter, in which he said he (the Viceroy) should regard with the severest displeasure any rivals who might attempt to dispute the Throne with him. Our interferences on behalf of Yakoob Khan had rankled in the Ameer's breast for years, and it was the only grievance to which he had referred in his last letter. There was a good deal of evidence as to his state of mind in reference to us at this period of our relations. Lord Northbrook's Government told us that his language after the return of the Envoy from Simla in 1873 was "anything but satisfactory;" he had refused to let peaceful expeditions, sent under Colonel Baker and Mr. Forsyth, pass through his territory; he hesitated about accepting our gift of arms; and he had refused to accept the present in money we had offered him. In the meantime, it was abundantly clear that his relations with Russia had altered, and that he now no longer addressed them in merely courteous language, but as soliciting their favour. And what did he do towards England? In the earlier stages he said he was quite prepared to confer with Her Majesty's Government on the subject of his relations with Russia; and he sent on the letters which he had received from the Russian Governor General, in order that the Indian Government of the Queen might suggest replies. But if the House carefully studied the Papers in consecutive order, it would find that after a time his friendly communication was altogether dropped; and the only account which Her Majesty's Government received of any letters having passed between the Ameer and the Russian Governor General was the simple statement of the fact by our Agent.

MR. GOSCHEN asked the hon. Member to state the date at which this form of communication was dropped?

MR. E. STANHOPE said, that if the right hon. Gentleman would carefully examine the documents, he would find it very difficult to fix any very definite date for this event; but he would find the whole of it taking place within the years 1873-4-5; and when they came to 1876, the House would find the Agent representing—before Lord Lytton had said one word directly or indirectly either to the Ameer or to anyone connected with him—the estrangement and the annoyance of the Ameer. This was stated in various ways and by different persons; but there could be no doubt of the fact that the estrangement and alienation came about before Lord Lytton had had any communication with the Ameer, and was the result of action taken by former Rulers of India. The Viceroy, in a despatch dated May 10, 1877, wrote—

> "In short, the information gradually extracted from our Cabul Agent convinced us that the system on which we had hitherto conducted our relations with Shere Ali had practically resulted, not only in the alienation of His Highness from the Power which had unconditionally subsidized and openly protected him; but also in the increased closeness and confidental character of his relations with the only other Power that can ever cause serious danger to our Empire in India."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 168.]

This was the state of things with which his noble Friend (Lord Salisbury) had to deal; and in referring to the action of his noble Friend, he wished it to be clearly understood that up to the present time he had dealt entirely with events which happened before Lord Lytton went to India, and before the Ameer had any knowledge whatever of what Lord Salisbury had done in his capacity of Secretary of State. Up to the time of which he had been speaking, all Lord Salisbury's actions had been included in confidential communications between himself and the Government of India; and he now came to speak of the time at which the Government of India communicated what they had to say to the Ameer. It was clearly admitted by Lord Northbrook that the circumstances of the time, and the steady advance of Russia, might at length force the Government of India to give to the Ameer assurances utterly different from, and far more definite than, those they had hitherto given; and though he explained in a despatch in 1875 that he regarded the interference of Russia with Afghanistan as neither probable nor near, yet, at the same time, he intimated that if that advance took place it might be desirable not only to give more definite assurances, but actually to enter into a Treaty with the Ameer for protecting him against foreign aggression, adding that the appointment of a Resident at Herat would be a necessary consequence of any such engagement as that to which he referred, and of the advance of the Russian Frontier. Lord Salisbury's reply to this was, that if the Government were to wait for an indefinite period, as hinted by Lord Northbrook, the time for useful action might have passed, and that our influence with the Ameer, which was already on the wane, might have altogether disappeared. So that the only difference between Lord Salisbury and the Viceroy was as to the opportuneness of the time for the course which was suggested; and the consequences of the delay which resulted rested, to a very large extent, on Lord Northbrook, who for more than a year disregarded the instructions which he received from home. Which of the two was right? Events had shown that the contingency which Lord Northbrook described as neither near nor probable had happened within three years; that the time had passed for the representations which might have been made to the Ameer to be made with any chance of success; and that Lord Salisbury showed himself to be gifted with foresight which was entirely wanting in Lord Northbrook. Acting upon the conclusions at which he had arrived, Lord Salisbury instructed Lord Lytton, on his arrival in India, to propose a friendly Mission to the Ruler of Cabul. A great deal had been said upon the pretext on which the proposal of that Mission was based; but it seemed to be forgotten that the Ameer's own Minister had suggested to Lord Northbrook that it being necessary first to familiarize the Afghan people with the very idea of a Mission and of communication with the people of India, it would be unwise at the outset to set fully forth all the objects which it was hoped to attain by means of the Mission. The Envoy was to be instructed to offer to the Ameer certain definite assurances in the event of his asking for them; but the Ameer positively refused to receive the Mission on the 22nd of May, 1876—a date which was important, because at that time neither the occupation of Quetta nor the proposal of a Resident Envoy at Cabul had been made, and these were the events which in some quarters were said to have led to all or a great part of the difficulty that had arisen. After the refusal further negotiations were commenced; and the Ameer agreed that Her Majesty's Government should withdraw their Native Envoy from Cabul in order to confer with him at Simla as to the views of the Ameer. This was done, and the grievances, supposed or real, of the Ameer were set out at great length in the conversations which were recorded in the Afghan Papers. It transpired that his special grievances were—our decision as to the Seistan boundary, our interference in the case of Yakoob Khan, and certain steps we had taken with regard to Wakhan. It was then shown to the Ameer that Lord Lytton was most anxious to discuss these or any other grievances, and, if possible, to remove any misunderstanding that might have arisen. After this, further conversations took place between Lord Lytton and our Agent at Cabul, and he wished to protest against the language in which these conversations were described. It was certainly true that if there had been any desire on the part of the Government to withhold facts, they would have been amply justified in keeping back the records of these conversations, for the reason that they were just as strictly confidential communications as were those which passed between a client and his legal adviser, whom he wished to put in possession of certain facts, but not in the precise language which he would use when addressing the Court. Thus Lord Lytton impressed upon the Envoy the importance of the Ameer being induced to do something in order to strengthen himself in his external relations. It might be that some incidental expression might have been used which was not quite so judicious as could be wished; but the House would make every allowance for the circumstances in which that Conference was held; and they must remember that such confidential communications were never before given in any such form as that in which they now had them. In one of these it was curious to observe what a number of fallacies the hon. Member had discovered. He had tried, indeed, to make out of it that between this country and Russia there was a secret Treaty for the partition of Afghanistan. He thought he should waste time if he offered any observations on that subject. The evidence brought forward was so utterly meagre and unsupported by any facts, that he did not think it was worthy of any further consideration. But what was a much more serious matter was this—that the hon. Gentleman endeavoured also to draw the conclusion that the Government of this country was prepared to fulfil its written engagements, but that it would not keep its verbal engagements. Now, that was an utterly and entirely unfair and misleading interpretation to put on Lord Lytton's words. The distinction Lord Lytton drew as between verbal and written assurances was the distinction which was always drawn by the Ameer; and it was pointed out—as it always had been pointed out—that what the Ameer wanted was written and not verbal assurances. He said so in 1869, and he got them; and he said so in 1873, and he did not get them; and the Ameer had always relied on that little scrap of writing from Lord Mayo as something to be prized, because it was to the Oriental mind a thing he could understand. It was not a mere verbal undertaking, surrounded by conditions and all sorts of suggestions which were to the Oriental mind utterly and entirely a puzzle. Then followed the series of communications between Sir Lewis Pelly and the Agent of the Ameer. There was only one condition, and that was the condition of Lord Lytton that there should be Resident Agents on the Frontier of Afghanistan. The hon. Member quoted a great deal against this proposal, and he must therefore ask the permission of the House to allow him to interpose at this point of his narrative what were the real facts on that subject. In 1857, the question of Resident Envoys was not only raised, but it was accepted for a definite purpose by the Ameer, and was incorporated in the Treaty. Under that Treaty they were entitled to appoint Resident Agents for a certain purpose, not, indeed, at Cabul, but in other places. Again, in 1859 the question was mooted, and there could be no question whatever that the Ameer assented in principle to that condition. They had heard quoted the authority of Mr. Seton-Karr. This was the gentleman who, having been confidentially employed, thought fit, before any of these documents were given to the world, to give to the public his version of the transactions. Now, he was told Mr. Seton-Karr was a gentleman who did not speak the languages principally used on the occasion, and his evidence was not so powerful as that of other gentlemen concerned in the matter. He was not going to give his own evidence against that of Mr. Seton-Karr; he was going to ask the House to allow him to quote a much greater authority than his own. He was going to rest satisfied with the statement of Lord Northbrook's Government. When the hon. Gentleman approached that period he ceased to read anything from the Papers. He gave them a general idea of what he thought; but if he had read one passage they would have had Lord Northbrook's Government's definite views. He referred the House to the following paragraph in the despatch of Lord Northbrook's Government in 1875:—

> "On the whole, however, we think that either the Ameer himself or his Minister, Noor Mahomed Shah, did in confidential communications with Captain Grey express a readiness to accept at some future time not far distant the presence of British Agents at places in Afghanistan, excepting Cabul itself. But our impression is that the intimation was intended to be contingent either upon the receipt of far more substantial assistance than was promised the Ameer at the Umballa Conferences, or upon the conclusion of a Dynastic Treaty, that is, upon obtaining the recognition, in a Treaty with the British Government, of his son Abdoolla Jan as his successor. Such a formal recognition His Highness was anxious to secure, but Lord Mayo, for obvious reasons, declined to entertain the proposal."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, pp. 131-2.]

Now that was clear and distinct. [Mr. CHILDERS: Read the next paragraph.] He did not want to do anything unfair, he had not the next paragraph, and he did not know what it was, but he thought it had nothing to do with it. Passing on from 1869, it was clear the subject of Envoys was again discussed in 1873. Under Lord Northbrook's express instructions the Foreign Minister discussed the matter with the Agent of the Ameer, and then he suggested the appointment of Resident Agents in Afghanistan. Entire concurrence was expressed by the Agent in principle; but in order to familiarize the people it was thought desirable, in the first instance, only to depute an Agent to examine the Frontiers of the country, and not to reside there until the people of the country understood the matter. The position of affairs, then, was this—that the principle had been assented to more than once by the Government of Afghanistan; that Lord Northbrook had himself suggested it as an indispensable condition for making a complete and definite Treaty with the Ameer; and that the Agent of the Ameer came to Peshawur in 1877 on the express condition, which had been fully explained to him, that it was understood he assented to the condition of the acceptance of Resident Agents. From the first the great object the Ameer had in view was apparent. The Agent went over all the old grievances, and he showed no disposition whatever to come to a definite point. There was great delay; and all this time it was well known that the Ameer was hostile—so hostile that he had endeavoured to incite the neighbouring tribes to enter into a religious war. The conversations were drawn out to such a length that they seemed to be almost interminable. [An hon. MEMBER: There is no evidence of that.] Was the hon. Member who said there was no evidence prepared to disbelieve the distinct statement, not of Lord Lytton, but of the Government of India? Well, that being so, from the spirit in which the Ameer had acted, and in which he had instructed his Agents to continue the negotiations, it did not appear to the Government that there was any great hope of the negotiations ending satisfactorily. However, the Government were prepared to continue the negotiations. Now, the hon. Gentleman who had just spoken had made a great deal of what took place at the time, and he had endeavoured to show that the Government were desirous of snatching an opportunity of ending those negotiations. Well, he (Mr. E. Stanhope) durst say they were, for it seemed to him they would lead to no satisfactory results. But the inference which the hon. Gentleman drew from the despatch of Lord Lytton's Government was not, he believed, such as the House would be disposed to draw. That Government had stated that the Ameer still desired to gain time; that he was sending another Envoy; and that it was reported that he was prepared to accept our conditions. Probably, it was a report spread about by the Ameer himself to gain time, because he did not desire to commit himself finally either to Russia or to England. Then it was said—"Why did not Lord Lytton send home an account of those negotiations?" In the first place, the Government of India waited till those negotiations were concluded, and then sent home a despatch of great length and importance with the least possible delay. He thought it was unjust to the Viceroy of India to say that he delayed, for an unworthy motive, to send home a despatch because he desired to prevent a division of opinion in his Council from becoming known. If such imputations were to be made, he wished to know why did not the Duke of Argyll send a despatch to India and tell the Indian Government distinctly in 1873 what his policy was with reference to Afghanistan? He sent a telegram which it was impossible for any ordinary human being to understand. The hon. Member alluded to a letter written by Sir Henry Norman, in which he said that he had no opportunity of representing his dissent from the opinions of Lord Lytton, because of the delay in this despatch. That was a misleading statement. He (Mr. E. Stanhope) had an opportunity that very day of conversing with a gentleman who held a very responsible position not long ago in the Council of India, and he told him it was a well-established rule that dissent could not be entered before anything was discussed; but that when the thing was thoroughly discussed it was open to any Member of the Council to make an entry of his dissent in the Minutes, and to call upon the Governor General to send the Minutes home. Sir Henry Norman neglected that opportunity. The next point to which he thought the hon. Member attached considerable importance was a statement of his noble Friend (Lord Salisbury) soon after the conclusion of the Conferences. Well, Lord Salisbury had given a full explanation of that in the other House of Parliament. To that explanation it was almost impossible for him (Mr. E. Stanhope) to add. If the House was not prepared to accept the assurances which his noble Friend gave as perfectly sincere there was really nothing more to say. But he did know that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) and the hon. Member for Bedford, in the speeches which they had made in the country, had misquoted the language of Lord Salisbury. It might have been accidental; but it was rather curious that the language should have been misquoted in the same way in both speeches.

MR. WHITBREAD said, he held *Hansard* in his hand, and handed it to the reporter.

MR. CHILDERS said, he wrote down the statement precisely, and read it word for word.

MR. E. STANHOPE said, they must be very much obliged to him for affording them an opportunity of making these explanations. They were unfortunate in being reported by *The Daily News*.

MR. CHILDERS believed the report in *The Times* was *verbatim*. The report in *The Daily News* was a very short one.

MR. E. STANHOPE said, nobody who read the speech of Lord Salisbury could doubt for a moment that the circumstances were exactly those which he stated. He explained that then he spoke under circumstances which prevented any full statement—and he answered a definite question put by the Duke of Argyll, and the proof that he was understood in what he stated was to be found in the subsequent speech of Lord Northbrook, who said that he understood Lord Salisbury's speech to apply only to an Envoy at Cabul. To resume; the Conference being broken up, the Government considered it desirable to review the position in which we stood towards the Ameer. It was explained to him most fully that we desired and sought no quarrel with the people of Afghanistan. Our object was that they should enjoy their independence, their peace, and their prosperity. We had no wish to interfere with their domestic concerns; and while we carefully guarded ourselves from being supposed to accept the interpretation which the Ameer had put upon certain assurances of Lord Mayo's, we told him that we would not withdraw from the obligations we had previously entered into. We did not disguise from him that we should have preferred a policy of hearty co-operation for the protection of our common interests; but if he would not have it, then we were prepared to revert to our former relations, only hoping that the day would come when he would see matters in the same light as we did, and be prepared to welcome proposals made to him in absolute good faith. So matters continued till an event happened which changed the whole aspect of affairs. We learned in July last that a Russian Mission had arrived at Cabul, and had been welcomed by the Ameer, after having rejected our Mission. Considering the events which were happening in Europe, and the attitude of the Ameer, this appeared to the Government of India to constitute a grave political declaration, and to necessitate a re-consideration of our whole position. He (Mr. E. Stanhope) supposed that our only motive for caring about the affairs of Afghanistan had been the interest of India. We are placed in that country in a position unexampled in the history of the world, as trustees for its many millions of inhabitants, and responsible for their contentment and prosperity. The Government of India had always held that the maintenance of Afghanistan as an independent, strong, and friendly Power was desirable, not only as a barrier against the encroachments of any foreign Power, but as a security to our Frontier. Not that we had, or have, any expectation of invasion, still less any fear of it. But it had long ago been pointed out that the influence of a Russian Mission at Cabul would be perceptible throughout the length and breadth of India. As long ago as 1847 Lord Palmerston thus expressed to Lord John Russell his views with reference to Afghanistan—

> "A Russian force in occupation of Afghanistan might not be able to march to Calcutta, but it might convert Afghanistan into the advanced post of Russia, instead of that advanced post being in Persia; and whatever Hardinge may say of the security of the rest of our Frontier, you would find in such a case a very restless spirit displayed by the Burmese, by the Nepaulese, and by all the incorporated States scattered about the surface of our Indian Possessions. These things would lead to great expense, require great efforts, and might create considerable damage. The best method of preventing

these embarrassments seems to be to take up such a position, not *in posse*, but *in esse*, as would make it plain to everybody that we could not be taken by surprise."

Well, the Government of India, entertaining the same opinion, felt that while Afghanistan was under British influence, our Frontier—in itself a purely accidental one—was comparatively secure; but that if she were to become a mere tool of a foreign Power, a formidable element of disturbance and intrigue would be introduced upon our Frontier, while within that Frontier the disturbing effect (to say the least of it) would be enormous. It would, he was sure, very much surprise the House if he were to tell it how numerous were the disturbances which had constantly been occurring upon our Frontier. There had been during the last 28 years no less than 19 expeditions, in which 68,000 men had been engaged, and no less than 60 or 70 affairs of minor importance. And what, he should like to know, would have been the condition of our Frontier, if those who dwelt upon the other side of the mountains had always been hostile to us instead of friendly? We should have been driven from a permanent state of peace establishment into one of constant preparation for war. And what was the course which was, under the circumstances, taken by the Government of India? It might have been, under some circumstances, judicious to have treated the conduct of Shere Ali as a merely unfriendly act, and we might have remained inactive, or the suggestion of Lord Lawrence might have been adopted, and we might have retired from our present position to the line of the Indus. That was a matter which, however, he did not think he need argue for a moment, for everybody must be aware what would be the effect which would be produced in India by any such abandonment of our position as Lord Lawrence proposed. The point was one, he might add, which he was quite content to leave as it had been placed by the Duke of Argyll, in saying we could not allow Afghanistan to pass entirely under the influence of a foreign Power. Or we might have insisted that the course taken by the Ameer amounted to an act of open hostility to us; but a much more moderate view was taken by the Government of India. They said—

"It appeared quite possible, however, that the significance of this event might have been over-rated or misconstrued in India, or that the Ameer himself might be induced, by timely diplomatic representations, to realize the gravity of his action, and to appreciate its inevitable effect upon his relations with our Government. But the only hope of clearing up any such misunderstandings, or of bringing our legitimate influence to bear upon the Ameer, lay in the renewal of direct personal intercourse with him through a British Envoy."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 239.]

That being so, the Government of India proposed to send a friendly Mission to the Ameer; and they pointed out that they did not at the time anticipate that there would have been any serious difficulty on the part of the Ameer in accepting that Mission. They hoped that he would, on the contrary, really have welcomed it; and that to make the attempt was, at all events, not only desirable, but absolutely necessary. And what were the steps which were actually taken? Were they unfriendly? Sir Neville Chamberlain was appointed to conduct the Mission, and he was given an escort of no unreasonable strength, and one by far smaller than that which the Ameer himself had brought with him into India upon a former occasion. If a smaller one, indeed, had been sent, it would have been regarded by the people of India as derogatory to our prestige. We had, besides, sent, in deference to the Ameer, Gholam Hussein Khan, who had already acted as Agent in Cabul, to announce the Mission. But it would appear that, from first to last, the sole object of the Ameer was delay. Our Agent was allowed to make only short marches. Four letters had been sent to the officers of the Ameer, of which a great deal had been said—they had been sent to clear the way, as it were, for our Agent, and in order that there might be no mistake as to his responsibility. That being so, Gholam Hussein Khan arrived in Cabul on the 10th of October. He had an interview with the Ameer, and from that time several letters had been received giving an account of the state of feeling of the Ameer. Among those letters, which had been, as far as they were in the possession of the Government, set forth in the Blue Book, there was one to which he thought it desirable attention should be drawn, because it explained the great point in all these communications—that most of them had been written under the influence of the Ameer. That letter explained previous letters, and was from Gholam Hussein Khan to Munshi Muhammad Bakhtyar Khan, and it was as follows:—

> "The facts are these: Whatever I write is what I hear from the Wazir or from the Ameer, and some sentences are from myself. Considering that the post is in the hands of the Ameer, and that nobody is allowed to communicate with me, you may imagine what sort of an account I can give. The temper of the Ameer is hasty (or touchy), and he gives little or no attention to the letters from the British Government. The reason of his not inviting the English Mission is the intention to delay. Three Russian officers have gone back and two are still in Cabul. I suspect that the coming of the English Mission is impossible so long as the Russians are here (or until the Russians have gone back). If the British Government is content to delay for its own purposes, then conciliatory letters may prove useful, but in the event of delay being considered injurious, then my stay here is of no profit, and I should be recalled in some suitable manner."—[*Ibid.* p. 247.]

That being, as we were informed by Gholam Khan, the state of things, what did Lord Lytton do? Did he show himself as anxious to precipitate matters as some seemed to suppose? No; he telegraphed to Major Cavagnari that he was to take great care not to proceed in his arrangements with the Frontier Tribes in such a manner as to offend the Ameer, before the opportunity had been afforded of seeing whether he would accept our Mission. The delay, however, continued to go on, and time passed to such an extent that the Government of India felt they could wait no longer. Major Cavagnari accordingly proceeded and had an interview with the Agents of Shere Ali at Ali Musjid; and, with regard to that interview, he was glad to find the hon. Member opposite had not that evening spoken as he had done at Bedford, because at Bedford he spoke of the telegram which was sent by the Viceroy, giving an account of it, as a lying telegram.

MR. WHITBREAD: The word "lying" is one which never ought to be used in public speaking, and I am sorry it should have been. What I intended to convey was that the telegram, whoever it came from, gave a false impression of what had occurred.

MR. E. STANHOPE: The telegram was from the Viceroy, and such a word as "lying" applied to it was, in his opinion, deserving of serious reprobation, and the hon. Member had certainly used it.

MR. WHITBREAD denied that he had applied such language to the Governor General. He had copied the telegram from a newspaper, not knowing who was the author of it, and what he wished to state—and what he was prepared to state in that House or anywhere else—was that the telegram, in giving an abbreviated account of what had taken place, had conveyed a false impression of the scene at Ali Musjid.

MR. E. STANHOPE was sorry the hon. Gentleman had not corrected the report of his speech which appeared in the papers, and would only add upon that point, that any imputation on the character of the Governor General of India, who had such important negotiations to conduct, appeared to him to be extremely undesirable as well as unfair. They had great difficulty in presenting the telegrams in such a way as to do justice to the Viceroy, and afford an impartial statement of the facts. To say, then, that what he asserted was utterly untrue, was very hard on the Viceroy. That being the case, he was prepared to justify the telegram. Having read the Reports of Colonel Jenkins and Major Cavagnari, he was convinced that what the Viceroy had said was the whole truth. He would not quote the Report, which had been often quoted; but he really had thought that the House would believe the truth of the Viceroy's statement as to what passed at that interview. That interview was also remarkable for another thing—the tact shown by Major Cavagnari. At any moment an incautious word from him might have precipitated a conflict; and obviously, if Lord Lytton had intended that result, he would never have instructed him to preserve a cautious demeanour towards the subjects of Shere Ali. After the refusal of the Commandant of Ali Musjid to admit our Mission, the Viceroy, so far from precipitating a collision, telegraphs home that he would endeavour to avoid it, and, if possible, to obtain a pacific solution. And after that, he instructed his Envoy to address a final Ultimatum to Shere Ali, and to offer time for consideration. This forbearance was carried so far as to cause a delay of two months before the insult was resented, and of postponing military operations to the very last day possible before the commencement of the winter. He wished to ask hon. Members opposite, at what point of the negotiations was it that, in their opinion, the Government had gone wrong? He would like to know precisely what they would have done in like circumstances? How would they have treated the Prince who had tried to stir up the Border Tribes against us, and who, in order to embarrass us at a time when, to say the least of it, our relations with another foreign country were strained, had received an Envoy from that country whose intentions were avowedly hostile to us, while our counter-Mission was rejected in the face of all India, and at a point outside his own territory to which he had advanced his forces? In view of all those facts, the Government of India had felt that a crisis had arrived in our relations with Afghanistan; that if such conduct were tolerated, a feeling might get abroad that we were losing our strength; and that that paramount influence in Afghanistan which ought to be ours was not only going, but absolutely gone. The Indian Government had felt that Afghanistan under a foreign Power might prove a constant menace to our safety in the East, and they had accordingly represented to the Government at home the absolute and urgent necessity of taking some steps to secure our position. There could be no pretence for saying that Lord Lytton desired war—of all people in the world he was one of the least likely to desire it; and if there was one thing for which he would be remembered gratefully, it would be for the re-establishment of our Indian finances on a sound basis. Was it likely, then, that he should desire to overthrow that satisfactory basis, and to risk his whole reputation and undertake the anxieties of war? The Government at home had entered upon the war with no light heart—though sometimes they had been accused of desiring war—but that had been at a time when they had achieved peace. In truth, they desired no war, and no annexation of Afghanistan; yet, when dangers and trials were pressing, and when they felt that to take some notice of them was necessary and unavoidable, if they had failed to do so they would have been untrue to their trust. In that spirit, they were quite ready to submit their conduct to the judgment of Parliament, and were not afraid of the verdict.

Mr. TREVELYAN: Sir, in my opinion, the two speeches we have listened to this evening are not likely to diminish the wonder that has been expressed in several quarters at the contrast between the eager warmth with which this matter has been discussed out-of-doors, six weeks ago, and the calm and dispassionate manner in which it has been debated within this House. But the circumstances have greatly altered; for six weeks ago the question of war and peace was still open, and those who regarded war as a great calamity would have been something less than Englishmen if they had not discussed the subject with animation. The Government, however, have now taken upon themselves the responsibility of declaring war. Overt acts of war have been committed; and it has become the duty of Parliament to say conscientiously whether they think what has been done should have been done or left alone. We are bound to do that, unless we are ready to sink to the rank of an Assembly which only meets to register the foregone conclusions of the Government. A theory has been propounded by several leading papers, that when war has once been declared the House of Commons has nothing to do but to hold its tongue and vote the money. But I cannot endorse it; for the simple reason that it goes to maintain that the most important of all resolutions which the Executive can take—if only it be taken without first consulting Parliament—is *ipso facto* removed from the cognizance of Parliament. I do not propose to touch on any of the matters which have been treated so exhaustively by my hon. Friend the Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread), except in so far as that is rendered necessary by some of the observations of the last speaker. It is especially necessary to refer to certain remarks of his with regard to Lord Northbrook; because Lord Cranbrook's despatch identifies Lord Northbrook's reputation with that of the Government which I had the honour to support. Lord Cranbrook, in the ninth paragraph of his despatch, has attempted to throw upon Lord Northbrook the consequences of the fatal step that was taken in 1876, and which has involved us in the war with the Ameer; and the Under Secretary of State for India evidently regards

—and justly so—Lord Northbrook as the recalcitrant agent of the present Government. The hon. Gentleman said—"Events showed that representations which were addressed to the Ameer in 1876 ought to have been addressed to him in 1875, and would have been addressed to him but for Lord Northbrook." Sir, I should rather say that events have proved the truth of Lord Northbrook's prediction, and that the consequences which Lord Northbrook said were certain to arise, if a certain fatal step was taken in 1875, have actually resulted now that that step was taken in 1876. Lord Northbrook prophesied that if British Residents were pressed on the Ameer he would refuse to receive them. He has refused. He prophesied that the refusal would impair the influence of the British Government in India. It has done so to such a degree that we are going into a great war to restore that influence. He prophesied that the Ameer would be thrown into the arms of Russia; and he has been thrown so completely into the arms of Russia that no one knows if he will be got out of them. The hon. Gentleman, towards the close of his speech, asked the cardinal question on which the issue of this debate must turn, and that is—at what specific point of those negotiations the conduct of the late Government would have diverged from that of Her Majesty's Ministers? Although I am not in the secrets of the late Government, I will not hesitate to name the exact point of separation, and that is just halfway through the Blue Book, at page 128, at the time when Lord Salisbury wrote a letter raising again the question of the British Agents in the territories of the Ameer, and insisting that his policy with regard to that matter should be carried through. Lord Northbrook, however, clearly shows that his policy with regard to Afghanistan had been to show the Ameer that we desired to assist him with our advice whenever he required it, and not to press upon him the presence of a British officer within his territories. While I thank the Government for the fulness of the Blue Book—and feel bound to compliment the editor upon the skill with which he has arranged the several documents—I have yet to complain that there is one hiatus in the Papers which will have to be explained in a manner which will bring more conviction to the House than has been produced hitherto—the absence of the Minute of General Norman, Sir Arthur Hobhouse, and Sir William Muir. Had that been given, it would have let some light in upon what is the difference between the old and new policy of the Indian Government. Taking the Papers as a whole, however, such well-digested information, tracing the whole course of events, has never been laid before Parliament to my knowledge, and they give those who study them an opportunity of so tracing them. We have often heard of the high pitch to which the art of writing well is carried among our Anglo-Indian officials; but this collection of Papers proves that at the India Office there exists not only the art of writing well, but a still higher and rarer literary quality—the art of arrangement. This Book contains not merely the materials of history. It is history itself. Almost without a word of comment, the story is left to tell itself; and the only exception brings into strong relief the merit of the performance; for I cannot but think that the author himself would be glad if he had ended the Book at page 260. Lord Cranbrook ought to have been sufficiently confident in the excellence of his own production to have sent it into the world without the tail which he has put to it; and the unfortunate—and to those whose political and administrative reputations are concerned the very unfortunate—brevity and condensation of paragraph 9 contrasts most unfavourably with the full and detailed exposition of the rival policies of Lord Lawrence and Lord Lytton, of the late Cabinet and the present one. As to the merits of those policies we differ, and differ widely; but as to their intention, it is difficult to see how there can be any difference of opinion whatsoever. The old policy consisted in full reliance upon a well-disciplined and well-appointed army, stationed within our own borders; in keeping our troops in hand in a country where there was, or soon would be, complete means of lateral communication all along our Frontier, and where that Frontier would not be cut transversely by great ranges of mountains—as high as the mountains of the Bernese Oberland—which would hinder, instead of furthering, that facility of concentration which is the soul of modern, and indeed of all, warfare. Another supposed—and, as I think, very material—advantage of the old policy was that our Frontier lay in a plain; and the inhabitants of a plain when once conquered are conquered for ever; while there are few instances in history in which the inhabitants of mountains have been finally and thoroughly subdued and assimilated. Situated, to a great extent, in a fertile country, in the midst of their supplies, and in the very heart of the best recruiting ground in India, our Army had nothing to do, except to look after the people who were in front of them, and no reason to trouble themselves about the people among whom they lived, or, still worse, the people who were behind them. And while this policy was, according to the very distinguished military men who held it, the most effective policy from a military point of view, it had, in the eyes of the soldier-statesmen who governed India, and who, while they were soldiers, were not ashamed of being statesmen, this immense recommendation—that it was an economical policy. That was the opinion not of holiday soldiers, or penny-wise and pound-foolish economists. The Minute of 1869 embodying that opinion was signed by the statesman who saved the Punjab, and the General who had been Chief of the Staff of the Army which recovered India. Men who had been in such a position at such a crisis knew very well that a military danger, far more serious than any external military danger, would be the internal discontent that would infallibly result from increased and increasing taxation. Such men as these —such a man as Colonel Reynell-Taylor, the Commissioner of Umballah, who in three desperate campaigns has fought throughout the length and breadth of the country which he now wisely governs—hold the same view; as General Norman, who, in the course of 10 years, was 25 times thanked in general orders and despatches for services in the field—held the view that the old system of Frontier defence was the most effective for military purposes; and that the system which was most effective for military reasons was—as in the long run must always be the case—the most truly economical. To put against opinions like these you have, indeed, great names; but I must beg to remind the House that this is a matter on which we want something more than great names—we want exact calculations. General Norman, and Colonel Taylor, and Sir John Lawrence, are arguing in favour of a system which they know by experience; which they have worked, and, to a great extent, have founded; a system which was in force for many years; a system which was in force from the moment when the Government of Lord Ellenborough evacuated Afghanistan to the moment when the Government of Lord Lytton occupied Quetta. But the new policy is a thing of the future. The military and still more financial arrangements connected with it are matters of hypothesis and conjecture; and I am bound to say that the imaginations and ideas of some of its warmest supporters are—like the garrisons which they propose to plant a couple of hundred miles from our present Frontier—not in the plain, but in the clouds. What are the data on which we are relying, as against the minute, the well-founded, the familiar, and household knowledge of the old school of Punjaubee administrators? Here is a specimen of what—in default of any estimates proceeding from official and authentic sources—is put forward as a guide to the public opinion of the country. General Shakspear, of the Artillery—a very hard-fighting officer, though his distinguished services were done elsewhere than in India, and who appears to be at least as courageous with his pen as with his sword—writes to *The Times* from the scientific club to say that, whereas our present Frontier would take 100,000 men to defend it, a scientific Frontier would require only 5,000 men. Now, here we have a scientific soldier writing about a scientific Frontier from a scientific club, who tells us that, if the Russians attempted to invade us—for that, of course, is the contingency under which we should require 100,000 men to hold our present Frontier—we could keep them back with 5,000 men. Sir, I cannot imagine how anyone—soldier or civilian—can believe that, by placing behind our backs a range of mountains 100 miles broad, 13,000 to 17,000 feet high, and swarming with turbulent and faithless mountaineers, we could at once repel Russia, and keep up our numerous, lengthy, and perilous lines of communication with smaller forces than we have at present. It is at least an open question among scientific military men that a line on the summit of a range of mountains—or, still more, on the reverse of a range of mountains—is the very worst and most dangerous line to defend. You have not only to protect your main Passes—and for every one of those main Passes, if Russia came, 5,000 men would be barely sufficient garrison—you have to watch and block every mule track, and even foot track, by which Infantry could pass in order to take your garrisons in the rear. Look at the experience of Turkey. By far the greatest and most unmitigated misfortune of Turkey in the late war was the defeat which befel her at a time when events, political and military, were hurrying so fast that very little was heard of it in London—the battle which, I think, is called the battle of Kesnova. The Turks held the Shipka Pass and the neighbourhood in immense force, and with a most powerful artillery. They were attacked in front by the main Russian Army. They beat the Russians handsomely. They were on the very point of ruining their army, when Skobeleff pushed his Infantry across paths by which he could not drag a single field-piece. He took the victorious army in the rear. He had it at a hopeless disadvantage. Without a gun to help him, two-and-forty pieces of Artillery fell into his hands in a couple of hours. And when once they were beaten, the whole Turkish Army, being on the mountains—instead of being on their own side of the mountains—were captured, if I recollect right, to the number of 28,000 men. Now, brave as the Turks are—heaven knows that I do not wish to argue too closely from them to our own valiant battalions; but everybody who has studied military history knows that, in order to fight his best, the British soldier must, like other soldiers, be placed in a position which accords with the well-established principles of the art of war. I am stating the case insufficiently. I am conceding half of what is urged on the other side, when I say that if we push our line across the mountains, for every soldier who, owing to our improved positions, we could spare from the front, we should be forced to tell off two to guard our communications. Austria requires 60,000 men permanently to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina—countries in which, taking them together, two-thirds of the population are favourable to her—and if we chose to place behind our Frontier a district much like Bosnia and Herzegovina, with mountains thrice as high, and with a population not a man of which we can trust, to believe that we should in the end get off more cheaply than Austria, is, in my opinion, to labour under nothing short of infatuation. And, what is more, that is the opinion of Her Majesty's Government. If the object of this war—the wisdom of which we condemn and you justify—is to provide India with a Frontier which can be defended more economically, what is the meaning of the announcement made in this House last Friday by the Under Secretary of State for India? What is the meaning of his declaration that the Indian Government, with the unanimous consent of the Indian Council, had determined to increase the Native Army? And *The Times* newspaper—which throughout the whole of this business has shown a minute acquaintance with the military intentions of the Government that is more than prophetic—*The Times* newspaper, which two full months before war was declared, before ever the Chamberlain Mission had started from Peshawur, before nine out of ten Englishmen knew that such a Mission was to be sent, told us the exact number of troops which would be required in case Afghanistan was invaded, and entered into details so minute that it pointed out the destination of every half-squadron and half-battery—*The Times* newspaper now informs us that the Indian Government intends to increase every Native Infantry battalion by 200 men, and to add a proportionate complement of European officers. Under the old policy we contrived to guard India with 500 bayonets in a battalion; and since we have been informed by the Prime Minister—on the most solemn and important occasion on which, except from his place in Parliament, a Prime Minister can speak—that we have gone to war to extend our Frontier; and since, by the confession of the Ministry, the first result of our extension of Frontier, as I can well believe, will be to add 40 per cent to the strength of our Infantry—apart from justice, apart from international morality, on grounds of British, or, as it is now called, Imperial expediency—I emphatically put in my protest against such a war. I should very much like to know whether

Lord Beaconsfield, before he made his declaration at the Guildhall—which committed the country to a permanent military occupation of the North-Western Highlands—had considered in detail the practical objections which the Indian authorities made to such an occupation in the year 1869, and had satisfied himself of the practical arguments by which those objections should be refuted? Let hon. Gentlemen turn to pages 56 and 57 of the Afghan Papers—I have not risen to take up their time by reading lengthy extracts, and still less shall I presume to translate into my own feeble and insufficient language the phrases in which the ablest and most distinguished of our Punjab officials have put their opinions and their experience on record; but I beg hon. Gentlemen to read that part of Colonel Reynell-Taylor's despatch which refers to the inconvenience—a word which, in the Indian language, means the peril—of permanently stationing Native troops on the other side of the mountains, and still more among the mountains themselves. It has been my great good fortune — a good fortune which I wish had been shared by some very prominent statesmen—to have had just enough connection with India to make me more than distrustful—to make me absolutely sceptical as to my own power of forming any sound opinion of Indian subjects as the result of my own observation. But I do know just enough of India—or, rather, of Anglo-India—to have some means of judging the relative value of the opinions of others; and I am certain that when Colonel Reynell-Taylor states, and gives the grounds for his statement, that the permanent occupation of the new Frontier will put a strain—and a very serious strain—on the discipline and the *morale* of our Native Army, he has said something which will require a more weighty answer than a few clever sentences in a debating speech in the House of Commons. I look in vain in these Papers for a confutation of these, as I think, convincing—and, if convincing, most alarming—arguments. At this moment, on both sides of the House, we are under the deep impression produced upon our judgments and imaginations by successes, which prove that the quality of British soldiership has not deteriorated, and the average quality of British military leadership has largely and unmistakably improved. At this moment our Native troops, who have taken part in those successes, are under the influence of the just pride and exultation which spreads itself like a second patriotism through a successful army; but when two or three—or, if you like, 20 or 30—years have gone by; when the novelty has worn off, and the cold, the discomfort, the exile, the entire breaking up of that family and domestic life which, to the Native soldier, constitutes a necessity of military service, have done their work, then the discontent of the 25,000 Sikhs and Poorbeah Sepoys, who will be quartered in the Passes, will add a very serious feature to our Indian difficulties. But it will be said you may quarter the European troops in the Passes, and keep the Natives in the plains. That may be said in the House of Commons; but it will not be regarded as a practical solution of the question in India. With 200,000 men in arms under the command of the independent Princes of India; with Scindiah adopting the Prussian system to arm his entire male population; with our own Native Army 120,000 strong; our 40,000 or 50,000 British linesmen, and our 10,000 British Artillerymen are not a man too many to enable the Englishmen resident in Hindostan to sleep quiet in their beds. When the first flush of victory and confidence is over, I will venture to say that the least acceptable proposition which could be made to the Anglo-Indian community would be to denude Cawnpore, Meerut, and Allahabad, in order to send 12,000 or 15,000 British bayonets to the other side of the Suleiman mountains. These were the considerations, I cannot doubt, which weighed with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, when, in August, 1877, he made his declaration against advancing our present Frontier. So strong was the right hon. Gentleman's opinion in favour of the view which I have been advocating, that he declared himself opposed to the military occupation of Quetta. Considerations—political and diplomatic—have since, I suppose, modified the right hon. Gentleman's judgment; but on the military question—and I have not attempted to deal with any other—I boldly quote him as an authority in favour of my view. It is a thousand pities that we did not leave it for Russia, if she wants to invade us, to entangle herself in a preliminary conflict with the Ameer, and hamper and handicap herself with the bitter animosity of that most resentful nation—the effect of whose patient but watchful hostility we ourselves, a generation ago, learned by memorable experience. I could wish no worse fortune for our worst enemy than to have turned himself—as we have contrived to turn ourselves—into the enemy of the Afghan race. An hon. Friend of mine opposite—who, I think, has not been in India—the other day, when speaking to his constituents, described the Ameer as the puppet of Russia. With much greater justice, the hon. Gentleman the Member for the Eastern Division of the West Riding (Mr. C. Beckett-Denison)—who has been in India for a long time and to some purpose — spoke of the Ameer as a Potentate who was anxious to rub the noses of England and Russia together. But, unfortunately, we needs must step in and remind Shere Ali that there was a Power far more formidable than Russia, and far nearer to his doors, who demanded of him much greater sacrifices, and was determined to inflict on him a more intolerable humiliation. I candidly admit that the negotiations with Lord Northbrook in 1873 left the Ameer sullen. I am very much inclined to think that they found him sullen; but Shere Ali, whatever else he may be, is no fool; and some much stronger motive than sullenness is required to induce a Ruler to defy a Power which could at any time occupy his capital on six weeks' notice, and that motive was terror—terror, mixed with indignation, at the persistent determination to force upon him British Residents; the invitation—for so he would read it—to accept the fate of so many other Native Rulers who had admitted British political officers within their Frontiers—to run the usual round of semi-independence, total dependence, and then final subjugation and extinction. He knew his people better than we know them. He knew that when Afghans saw the white faces lording it in their streets they could not be trusted to keep their fingers off the foreigner. He knew—if we have forgotten it—how often, among a people less hot-blooded and vindictive than his, the downfall of a Native dynasty has begun with an attack upon the British Residency. And in this frame of mind he heard that Quetta—which stands at the back gate of his country, as Peshawur stands at the front gate—was occupied by a military force; and he heard it, as we well know, with much the same feelings as George III. heard that Napoleon was encamped with 100,000 men on the cliffs off Dover. And, finally, his Envoy was invited to a Conference at Peshawur, to which our Envoy came with the draft of a Treaty in his pocket, which as hon. Gentlemen will see, if they turn to pages 190, 191, was expressly, carefully, and most effectually drawn for the purpose of turning him into a subsidised dependent. If we wished to hurt his feelings; if we wished to pick a quarrel with him; if we wished to thrust him—whether he willed it or not—into the capacious arms of Russia, I cannot even conceive what other course we should have taken. But the details of the process by which this unhappy Ruler was forcibly alienated from British influence, which by the end of this week will be familiar to the country, I leave in more capable hands. My endeavour to-night was not to enlarge upon the justice or injustice of our conduct—though my vote in the division will be affected by that consideration—but to show, apart from right or wrong, that we are doing not well, but ill for our own interests by going to war in quest of a scientific Frontier.

MR. MARTEN said, it must be assumed that the Government was following the advice of military men of experience, and he pointed out that the testimony of an experienced commander like Lord Napier of Magdala was in favour of the Frontier which was now sought for North-Western India. In that noble Lord's opinion the assertion that we were secure in India if we remained within our mountain boundary was at variance with all history. A mountain chain that could be pierced in many places was no security if you hid behind it. How much Austria lost in not defending the Bohemian mountains; and what might have been the position of the Turks had they properly secured the passage of the Balkans? The principal charge the Mover of the Amendment had made against the Government was that they had inaugurated a new policy with regard to our Indian Possessions, and that that policy was a policy of preserving ourselves against the aggressions of Russia. But he (Mr. Marten) distinctly repudiated that charge; for he contended that they had, on the contrary, endeavoured to pursue the same policy, making allowance for the changes which were found necessary under the altered circumstances. As he understood the policy of the Indian Government and of England with regard to Afghanistan, it was that we desired Afghanistan should be independent, strong, and, above all, that it should be friendly to us; and if these three conditions were fulfilled, our position on the North-Western Frontier would be safely protected. The real ground of complaint put forward by the Ameer, according to his Envoy, was the interference of the Viceroy with regard to his son. How could it then, in fairness, be said that we had given him umbrage by asking that he should enter with us into an offensive and defensive Treaty, which was, he contended, a proposal for a complete alliance justified by the advances of Russia, and for the due effect of which it was necessary that we should have the means of having Resident Agents? Reviewing the Papers at considerable length, the conclusion he arrived at was, that had we, at an earlier period, adopted a wise and friendly policy we might still have been on friendly terms with the Ameer, who had at one time avowed his willingness to be the enemy of our enemies. That friendly disposition had, for some reasons not clearly explained, been disturbed. He (Mr. Marten) was very strongly impressed with the belief that both the Indian Government and the Government of this country, before the accession to power of the present Ministry, had not been sufficiently alive to the active progress made by Russia in Central Asia. The House was asked to express its disapproval of the general policy of the present Government; but from what had been already said in the debate, and the references that had been made to the Papers in the hands of hon. Members, the present war, he maintained, had been forced upon the Government by circumstances arising out of the policy of their Predecessors; and if they had pursued a timid or procrastinating policy they would have lost a great opportunity, in his opinion, of strengthening our Indian Frontier. The purchase of the Suez Canal shares; the assumption of the title of Empress of India by Her Majesty; the visit of the Prince of Wales to that country; were, he believed, all portions of a policy which had been pursued by the Government with great skill and perseverance, and which was calculated to uphold our great and glorious Empire.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: I understood the hon. and learned Member opposite (Mr. Marten) to say that the policy which the Government have recently pursued in India is not a new one, but is only the policy of their Predecessors, with some slight rectification. I think, in the face of the Papers, he will find it difficult to establish such a statement as that; and I think it entirely inconsistent with all that fell from the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for India. I listened with great attention to the very able statement he made tonight. It was a clear and consistent statement; but I thought it a little incomplete. It made clear the position which the Government occupied as to Afghanistan; but it left me a little in doubt as to the position which the Government think they occupy in regard to Russia. I understand, from the account given in the speech of the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Stanhope), that the hostility—and the evidently increasing hostility—of the Ameer towards this country was an all-sufficient justification for the policy pursued. He told us that this hostility was in a measure due to the action we had taken with regard to his son, Yakoob Khan; to our refusal to complete with him a defensive and offensive alliance; that it was owing to the unfortunate action of previous Viceroys; that it was due to a variety of circumstances; but there was one thing which had not the slightest effect on the good will of the Ameer towards us, and that was the attempt to force upon him the residence of British officers in his territory. This statement was made on the authority of Captain Grey, who reported that Mahomed Shah had declared the Ameer would not object to receive European Agents in other places than Cabul. But the hon. Gentleman omitted to quote the statement which followed the one he read, and which is from the Governor General in Council, in which he says, in reference to this statement, that, looking at all the circumstances of the case, and the absence of all official record of a conversation of a private and confidential nature, he was not justified in founding an opinion that the Ameer was willing to receive a European Agent at Herat. Proofs are not wanting that both the Ameer and his father, Dost Mahomed, persistently, and on all occasions, objected to such a Mission. And what stronger proof could be afforded of this than the fact that he refused an alliance with his powerful neighbour and £100,000, rather than accept such a condition? What are the proofs the hon. Gentleman has given us of the unfriendliness of the Ameer? First, he tells us of the attempt to get up a "Jehad" against the British Government. But I believe that if there is any truth in what appears to be only a rumour—for though he tells us this upon the authority of the Governor General, it must be recollected that the Viceroy does not report from his own knowledge, but from Native and other sources—but suppose there is anything in this report that a religious war was attempted to be got up, it was directed against both Russians and English. The second proof of hostility is the refusal of the Ameer to accept the Mission. That refusal is a proof of his dislike at having the Mission thrust upon him, and not of his unfriendliness towards us. From the general argument, it appears the Government have thought these reasons sufficient to change the policy of their Predecessors; but what I wish to point out is that no intimation of this change was given to the House. When the hon. Gentleman the Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread) gave Notice of his Resolution I gave Notice of an addition thereto, in the shape of a censure upon the Government for not having, previous to declaring war, taken Parliament into its confidence, and for having withheld Papers so long and on inadequate pretexts. This was not in any sense hostile to the Motion of the hon. Member. Indeed, I hoped to have his support. I find, however, that, owing to a change in the order of the debate, which has transformed the Resolution into an Amendment, I am not able to propose my Resolution. Therefore, I withdraw it. But I do this the more willingly because I clearly understood from the speech of the hon. Member for Bedford that he proposed to include in his reasons for condemning the conduct of the Government, the grounds I purposed to set out in my addition. As it is, even if the failure to consult Parliament was not in itself the cause of war, and even if it cannot be shown that war might have been prevented if the House had had the previous opportunity of discussion, yet there is a great difference between consulting Parliament now, when the country is irretrievably committed to war, and of consulting Parliament before the war commenced. There may have been times of national peril and emergency, when it was impossible to take the opinion of Parliament before it became necessary to declare war; and there have been many and more frequent cases in which Parliament has been kept so fully informed of all the circumstances leading up to war that they were fully prepared for its declaration, and might even be said to have consented by implication. But in this instance we have been kept in absolute ignorance of what was going on, and not merely so, but we have been misled by statements and assurances that, if true to the letter, had the effect of throwing us off the scent. I do not attempt to deny that what has been done may be in strict accordance with Constitutional precedent. But I want the House to see that the use of this precedent, in the present instance, practically reduces the House of Commons to impotence, so far as influence over our foreign relations is concerned. Whatever might be the intention of the Government, practically, the effect of it is to deprive the nation of all control over foreign affairs. Some hon. Members have invented a convenient theory by which opposition is silenced in the presence of foreign complications. If we attempt discussion before war breaks out, we are hampering the Government in negotiations and endangering peace. If we wait until war is upon us, then it is said that, in an unpatriotic way, we are dividing the country in the presence of the enemy; while if we postpone discussion until the war is over, until arrangements are made, then we are told we are guilty of futile fault-finding and unnecessary retrospection. The thing, in fact, comes to this—that it is not the business of the House of Commons or the people to express an opinion on foreign affairs—this should be left to the responsible Advisers of the Crown—the House of Commons confining its functions only to paying the bill. I want to ask them to consider to what their practice will eventually lead. They mistake the temper of the people of this country—they reckon without their host —who think the people will consent to a system so fatal to the future destinies of the country. You may bring Parliamentary government into contempt; but the only result will be that public opinion will find expression in less satisfactory ways. You may diminish the influence of Parliament; but you increase that of public agitation. You may choke up the channel between the people and the Ministers of the Crown; but the stream will still flow on, and find a less safe and less convenient course. If, on general grounds, it behoves Parliament jealously to guard its just authority, in the present case we have special reasons for deprecating the treatment we have received. There has been a great change in the policy which has governed India for the past 40 years, and which has been advocated by leading Members of the present Government; and during the time that this change has been in progress, we have had frequent assurances from the Ministry that there was not the slightest intention of changing it. I do not taunt the Government with the fact that their utterances now are inconsistent with their previously expressed opinions. Circumstances may have changed, or, what is more probable, their view of the circumstances have changed. But I do complain that they have allowed us to believe no change was in contemplation. The Papers produced, and the speech we have heard to-night, show the extent and nature of this change, and the degree to which the old policy of masterly inactivity with regard to India has been abandoned, for what I call a policy of "masterful activity." Lord Cranbrook has drawn up the case for the Government in paragraph 10, and tells us how when he came into office circumstances demanded a policy of timely precaution —an admirable phrase; one of those phrases for which we are indebted to the present Government, meaning more than it appears to mean. I confess I do not understand how it is possible to reconcile speeches made in former debates by Members of the Government with the evidence we find in these Papers. The speech which my hon. Friend (Mr. Trevelyan) has already quoted from the Chancellor of the Exchequer I hope the latter will explain with satisfaction to us, who require no assurances of his good faith, but who are compelled to say that we have been misled by it. On August 9, 1877, the Chancellor of the Exchequer said—

> "I have always demurred to the idea which has been put forward by some, that the best way to meet danger is to advance beyond our Frontier, and have always held that the true lines we ought to lay down for ourselves are these—to strengthen ourselves within our Frontier, and to do so by a combination of measures, moral and material."

And, again—

> "The main lines of our policy are unchanged, and I believe the country will be satisfied with and will wish them to continue."—[3 *Hansard*, ccxxxvi. 718-22.]

Yes, Sir; but would the country have been satisfied if they had known that at the very moment when these words were uttered our policy had been changed—that a policy of "timely precaution" was in full progress—and that an English Viceroy had actually been instructed by his Government to find a pretext—or, if he could not find one, to create one—to cover demands which they dared not openly avow? The other night the Chancellor of the Exchequer spoke with some indignation of a statement made by the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition, to the effect that the war was being waged on false pretexts; but he did not appear to me to appreciate the exact nature of the accusation which I understood the noble Lord to bring, and which, in any case, I now venture to repeat. We do not accuse the Government of going to war on a pretext which to them appears insufficient; we do not accuse them of such grotesque wickedness; but we do say that the pretext held out to us is not the real one. We do not make this charge on our own authority; we make it on the authority of the friends and supporters of the Government. I find the semi-official newspaper, *The Pioneer of India*, of the 21st August, speaks of the Mission to Cabul as follows:—

> "It is a measure for which the way has been carefully prepared by the policy of the Indian Government during the last two or three years, and it should begin the establishment of our relations with the most important State on our Northern Frontier on a satisfactory basis. Everything that Lord Lytton has done in connection with the North-Western Frontier has been directed towards undoing the blunders of

> the past. The work has been one of time, because the way had to be picked carefully. There has been a powerful, though wrong-headed, opposition at home to circumvent."

Now, how can this be reconciled with the assurance of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that at this time there was no change in the main lines of our policy with Afghanistan? I do not know whether it is a strictly Parliamentary practice "to circumvent" an Opposition, which I understand to mean "to take in." But it is not alone the wrong-headed opposition which suffer, but so also do the Parliament and people, from being kept in the dark. We have been told that the Russian Mission at Cabul, which took place after the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, is sufficient to account for a change in the policy of the Government; but I can point out that pressure upon the Ameer began years before this Russian Mission was thought of; and, in any case, the Russian Mission was certainly not a just cause of war against the Ameer of Afghanistan. The reception of the Russian Mission by the Ameer was, I believe, very unwilling on his part. I believe it to have been unwilling for one reason—that he delayed it for more than a month before he allowed it to enter his territory. But I say the reception of that Mission would be a very natural act, a mere act of self-preservation, after the warnings and threats which he had received from the Viceroy. He had been told by the Viceroy that very probably Russia and England would combine to wipe him out of the map; and I think it very natural that he should take the first friendly offer he received from one of the two Powers. Then we have the fact of the withdrawal of Sir Lewis Pelly's Mission, just at the moment when news came that the Ameer was prepared to assent, although unwillingly, to the demands which were made upon him. When you couple that with the peremptory manner in which the Mission of Sir Neville Chamberlain was carried through, and the violent language of the Viceroy about the earthen pipkin and the two iron pots, it certainly seems to me as though, on the part of the Indian Government at all events, there was a foregone determination to go to war, and to find in the Cabul Mission, or in something else, an excuse for a policy which was to end in a rectification of territory and a scientific Frontier. If the reception of an English Mission was the sole object of the Government, that might have been obtained on two or three occasions; but if a rectification of territory was what was wanted, then we can easily understand that such a policy as was pursued was a very sure and certain way of effecting the desired object. I desire to ask hon. Members whether, assuming that British interests would be served by such an alteration of Frontier as is now contemplated, whether we are to hold that British interests are altogether independent of considerations of right and justice? Does anybody suppose that we should have dared to avow or carry out such a policy in a European country? And is it sufficient to call a man a barbarian in order to discharge oneself of all obligations to treat him with common fairness and consideration? Are we to go on piling up one pretext after another; to act as judges in our own cause; and in this way to justify our policy of injustice and aggrandisement? Only carry this a little further, and it would be a justification of any invasion of national freedom and national independence. Only admit that a country has to follow the law of self-preservation without reference to others, and it is evidently a justification for an attack—say of France upon Belgium, or Germany upon Holland, or the absorption of Canada by the United States—and this deliberate attempt to substitute might for right in dealing with Indian Princes, and the law of force for the law of nations, is certain, in my opinion, to have a most disastrous effect upon the true foundations of our Indian Empire. The Duke of Wellington, writing a letter to Major Malcolm, said—

> "I would sacrifice Gwalior, or every Frontier of India, ten times over in order to save our credit for scrupulous good faith."

Recently a celebrated historian, who gave utterance to a similar sentiment, was very severely taken to task; but I do not suppose anyone would venture to doubt the patriotism of the Duke of Wellington. But what are we doing? What of this scrupulous good faith? What of our prestige in India? These we are willing to throw away in pursuit of the hazy phantom of a "scientific Frontier." What is a scientific Frontier? The Government have not vouchsafed to us at present any definition of what they understand by it. I do not suppose they would find it easy to get any two great military authorities to agree upon the exact boundary which should give us security; and if they did agree, who is there that does not know that agreement would have no finality about it? If you begin a policy of this kind it has no end. Each successive stage brings us one step nearer to the inevitable time when we shall find ourselves face to face with Russia, and any further rectification of Frontier will be only possible at the expense of a European war. It is a curious thing that whenever we have had the misfortune to be governed by Ministers who affect a spirited foreign policy, the country at once becomes a prey to apprehension and panic. At one time it is Spain which is the object of this unworthy fear; then France; and now it is Russia. We hear a great deal of a "great" England and of our Imperial destiny; and this great England, with enormous resources in men and money, is betrayed into an unworthy and undignified apprehension, which, I say, should never enter into its mind as long as it does not meddle with what does not concern it. Those take the truest estimate of Imperial greatness and power who believe that "when a strong man armed keepeth his house his goods are in peace," and none can make him afraid. Those, on the contrary, take a mean, unworthy view who are always going fussily about, going to war with some one, for fear that some one should anticipate them by going to war with them. I have only one point more to which I wish to call attention. I object strongly not only to the policy of the Government, and to the way in which it has been carried out, but also to the time at which it has been adopted. The right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary lately rebuked an hon. Gentleman for speaking of Russia as an enemy of this country, and said the Queen was on friendly relations with all the European Powers. At the time of Sir Neville Chamberlain's Mission there was no emergency—we were in full enjoyment of peace with honour—at that time there was a slight revival in trade, which had been depressed so long. Now that revival is absolutely checked, and the nation's industries are prostrate—trade is worse than I ever knew it before. I can speak with authority of my own district. Birmingham is fortunately situated in having so many industries carried on there that it does not suffer so much as other towns in times of bad trade, for if one trade is slack, the chances are that another trade will be busy. But, at the present time, I know no trade which is making any satisfactory return for the capital engaged in it; and I know of a great many which are being worked at a loss. In the district of Staffordshire things are still worse. The coal and iron industries are almost destroyed. Of 150 blast furnaces in South Staffordshire, less than 40 are at work; and there is not a month in which one or more are not added to the unemployed. I happen to be President of the Board of Arbitration which settles the wages of the ironworkers for the whole of the central district of England; and I have had, unfortunately, to my great regret, to award three successive reductions of wages, until they have touched the lowest point which has been known for 25 years, and there is not the slightest sign of seeing improvement. And yet this was the time—when there was no emergency, when there was no reason for haste—when the Indian Government chose, and which the Home Government approved, for taking steps which so greatly add to the prevailing distress and stagnation. I suppose it may be said that in criticizing and condemning the policy of Her Majesty's Government we are acting the part of a factious Opposition. Her Majesty's Government seem to think that the functions of a Constitutional Opposition is to shut its eyes and open its mouth, and take all the Government pleases to send them. But it was not always so. It was not in this sense that the Leaders of the Conservative Party used to understand the duties of an Opposition. In 1857, at the time of the China War—which, in my opinion, was as unjust and as immoral as the present war—Mr. Disraeli opposed the Government of the day, and supported a Vote of Censure upon them, which was carried; and afterwards, when Parliament was dissolved and Lord Palmerston appealed to the country, Mr. Disraeli, in an address to the electors of Buckinghamshire, wrote some words which are very apposite to the present occasion. He said of Lord Palmerston—

> "With no domestic policy, he is obliged to divert the attention of the people from the consideration of their own affairs to the distraction of foreign politics. His external system is turbulent and aggressive that his rule at home may be tranquil and unassailed. Hence arise excessive expenditure, heavy taxation, and the stoppage of all social improvement. The general policy which I should enforce at this juncture may be contained in these words—'Honourable peace, reduced taxation, and social improvement.'"

Sir, we appeal from Lord Beaconsfield in 1878 to Mr. Disraeli in 1857. For my own part, I would not wish wiser words or better words in which to appeal to my constituents when the time comes—as I sincerely hope it may come very soon—when the nation will be called upon to decide between the two sides of the House. If its decision should be against us, we shall bow to it with what resignation we may; but until we know it to be given at the polling-booth I, for one, will not believe the nation will sanction a policy the military necessity for which is doubted and denied, and which, regarded from any ordinary standpoint of morality, is unjust in its objects, and dishonourable in the means by which it is sought to be obtained.

MR. RIDLEY considered the most satisfactory chapter in the Blue Book was that which recorded the success of Lord Mayo in gaining over Shere Ali as the real friend of this country. There were two policies to be pursued with respect to Afghanistan as a Frontier State; one was to have treated him as an independent Sovereign—in which case neither we nor Russia had any business to have a Resident at his Court—and the other was to say we would defend him against the assaults of foreign foes, provided his foreign policy met our views—and in that case we must have a British Resident upon whom we could depend to give us authentic information of what was going on in his Kingdom. As long as Russia did not interfere with Afghanistan we were content to stand aloof; but as soon as she sent a Mission to Cabul, and the new factor of Russian aggression came into consideration, it was necessary to provide in some more determined manner for the safety of the Empire under our control. Lord Mayo was satisfied that the Russians meant to be friendly, and that the fears of Shere Ali might be set aside; and Lord Northbrook assured him he was safe under the assurances of Russia, but Shere Ali himself knew better. Before the ink was dry on the Treaty of Umballa we found that General Kaufmann was opening communications with the Ameer; and as Lord Northbrook chose to rely upon Russian assurances we had thrown the Ameer into the arms of that Government. These assurances reminded him of the Acts of Parliament which were passed at the time that the English were conquering India. England acted in a similar manner last century, when, in spite of the written law at home, we conquered India. But for that disobedience of the law, we should have been without half the Deccan and half of Hindostan at this moment. Therefore, without considering the question of right, they could not close their eyes to the fact that the Russians had never ceased advancing in Central Asia since 1847, and the Ameer had a better chance of observing that advance than we had. Shere Ali, from his own Kingdom, could serve the Russians if he chose. He was on the spot, while we had to depend upon despatches at at least 1,000 miles from what would be the scene of action. It was, to his mind, clear from the first that the Russians meant more than they said when they wrote letters to the Ameer expressing hopes that he would be friendly to the Russian nation, and telling him that by good behaviour he might in time merit the favour of their good master the Czar. After these letters had been treated by Lord Northbrook in the way he had described, the relations between India and the Ameer entered upon a new phase; because in consequence of a disturbance which had arisen in reference to the boundaries of Afghanistan, it was considered necessary that there should be an interview between Lord Northbrook and the Ameer. This was after Shere Ali had received letters from Russia which had caused him apprehensions as to which he had received assurances. At that negotiation Shere Ali asked more than any Government of England could grant; and he was also told that, as there was no possibility of his being invaded by Russia, the question of guaranteeing him against the consequences of such an invasion could not be considered. From that point commenced the ultimate enmity of the Ameer, who began to think that he had better turn his eyes to what he thought might prove the strongest nation; and it also became clear that Russia meant more than courtesy in sending her first messengers, for she increased their number and the frequency of their visits, and showed a disposition to take steps which might favour her advance, either in Central Asia or in Hindostan. He thought the despatch quoted by the hon. Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread) would not serve his purpose; because it was based upon the supposition that Russia was not to interfere with Afghanistan. This was at the basis of their negotiations; and he therefore failed to see the force of the arguments used by those who had the direction of the Government of India at the period in question. If the Russians were not in Afghanistan, England need not be there; but the contrary state of facts applied with equal force; and he warned the country that it behoved it to take care of itself in this matter, if Russia was to be allowed to occupy a position from which she could pour her troops down through the Passes into India. He did not think the country could look with equanimity on such a state of things. Such a course reminded one of no parallel in history except it be that of that King who, while the battle was going on which decided the fate of his Sovereignty, retired to a little place apart, and meditated upon the fortune of the shepherd who had nothing to do with Kingdoms. He did not think they would be content to say—" Here on this mole-hill I will sit me down; to whom God will, be victory." That was not the course which would recommend itself to the country. Their fathers won the Empire of India with the sword and the bayonet, and India had, at all events, received some benefits. The ryot might be poor; but he knew now that what he sowed would be his to reap. He knew also that in India everyone was equal before the law; and he (Mr. Ridley) could not believe there were not some ties beyond those of military occupation which bound together the Indian Government and its subject-population. Such was the Empire they had received from their fathers, and it was their duty to see that it passed from their hands untarnished and the extent of its territory undiminished; and not only that, but that it passed to their descendants protected, in the first place, from the hands of a foreign invader; and, in the second place, by developing mutual interests and strengthening ties, increase the happiness, contentment, and freedom of the country.

Mr. W. E. FORSTER congratulated the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down (Mr. Ridley) upon the ability he had exhibited in his first speech to the House. He must be allowed to say, however, that he thought it would have been a speech which would have been more appropriate in support of the Government had they acted in a determined manner towards Russia instead of against the Ameer of Afghanistan. The real question of importance that they had before them was this—whether the war with Afghanistan was necessary or not, whether it was provoked, and whether the Government could have avoided that war? There could be no more important question than that, and it seemed to him that it transcended all other questions before the House. As to the charges made against the late Government, he would be content to let them rest; and especially with reference to that 9th paragraph in the despatch to which so much reference had been made, he was quite content to leave that charge and its reply to the judgment of the country. He had not intended to say much upon one other question; but it was of so much importance that he must make some allusion to it. He referred to the question whether the statements made by the noble Viscount the Secretary of State for India were consistent with the facts in his possession? The Under Secretary of State for India passed very lightly over the speech made by Lord Salisbury in 1877; but it was of some importance that they should briefly consider it. In that speech Lord Salisbury said—" Our relations with the Ameer of Cabul have undergone no material change since last year." With what had since transpired that statement seemed to him wonderful. That speech was made in June, 1877, and on March 30 the Conference at Peshawur had been closed, and negotiations with the Ameer had been broken off, the Native Agent must have been withdrawn, and, in fact, that policy of not insisting upon the reception of Resident Agents—a policy supported by Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, and a change from which was resisted by Lord Northbrook and disapproved by half of Lord Lytton's own Council—a disapproval they heard nothing of until quite recently—that policy had been changed, and changed for months, and the result of that change was to break off negotiations with the Ameer; and yet Lord Salisbury stated there was no material change in our relations with the Ameer. Lord Salisbury also stated there was no reason for "any apprehension of any change of policy in our Indian Empire." This was one of those statements which were literally true, but which were, he might say, naturally misinterpreted. There was no apprehension of change of policy, because the change had been already made for months. They had, however, a complaint to make far more important than any charge against the late Government, or any charge of inconsistency in the statements of Members of the present Government, and that complaint was, that a change in policy was made which resulted in war, and which most men experienced in Indian affairs thought must, and all knew might, result in war, and yet Parliament was allowed to separate without any consultation being held with regard to this change. He quite admitted that there would be a danger in depriving the Executive of the power of declaring war; it was an ancient and a proper Prerogative; but, like many another Prerogative, it depended on its being exercised in the spirit of the Constitution. He did not for a moment say that under no emergency could a fresh line of policy be adopted without Parliament being consulted; but what he did say was that when there was not an emergency a fresh line of policy ought not to be adopted without some intimation to Parliament, as had been the case in the present instance. But now let him go to the main question, which was one of the most important that could come before the House or the country, and that was—were we engaged in a war in which we ought to be engaged? He would not go over the story told by his hon. Friend the Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread). He would not go back to the condition of affairs before Lord Lytton went out to India; though, at a fit time, he would be quite prepared to defend the acts of Lord Northbrook, Lord Lawrence, and Lord Mayo. They all three carried out the same policy. The House at that hour—a quarter to 12 o'clock—would not wish to hear extracts; but would it allow him to refer to a letter that had appeared from Sir Henry Norman? Sir Henry Norman, who distinguished himself at Delhi, had been Indian Military Secretary. He was on Lord Mayo's Council, and was on Lord Northbrook's Council, and remained for some time on Lord Lytton's Council. On his return home, the present Government showed their confidence in him by placing him on the Indian Council. Sir Henry Norman, in that letter, said—

> "My opinion was, and is, that up to the time of Lord Northbrook's departure the Ameer had no feeling of hostility to us, though he was somewhat out of temper, and was disquieted by writings which more or less pointed at measures distasteful to him. Any real resentment he may have subsequently shown is entirely due, according to my belief, to measures taken from April, 1876, to the present time."

The writings to which he alluded were, he supposed, those of Sir Henry Rawlinson, whose book, published in 1875, recommending the annexation of a great part of Afghanistan, was doubtless in the Ameer's possession, and had much to do with his suspicion of the intentions and real desires of England. But the Ameer had not declared war against us. The question was, why we had declared war against him; what grievance we had against him; not what grievance he had against us. He was suspicious and angry about the course we adopted with reference to his son; but there was no reason to suppose he would commit any acts of hostility. Lord Lytton went out—he was not blaming Lord Lytton—under positive orders from Lord Salisbury to insist on the reception of permanent Agents, and then came the first overt act in our change of policy towards the Ameer—the letter dated July, 1876, insisting on the reception of such Agents. What was the next step? By arrangement with the Ameer our Native Agent at Cabul came to Simla in order to know what were the desire and objects of the Viceroy, so that he might convey information with regard to them back to the Ameer. Then came that remarkable conversation which the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State had passed over lightly—in his opinion, somewhat too lightly. The Under Secretary of State for India (Mr. E. Stanhope) had stated that this conversation was confidential; but did hon. Gentlemen opposite suppose that the two statements — first of all, that if the Ameer did not do what was required of him rivals might be encouraged; or, secondly, that the Russians might wipe him out of the map—were not intended to be communicated by the Vakeel to the Ameer; and, if so, was it not to be expected that from the moment he received them he would be frightened, angry, and suspicious? Well, as a matter of fact, he did become very much frightened, and at last sent word that he was helpless; that he greatly objected to have English Agents sent to reside on his territory, but that if it was insisted on, he would send one of his Ministers to meet our Envoy; and after considering all the difficulties of his position, the Ameer said they might arrange that British officers might be brought to live on the Border. Here, therefore, was a great concession made by the Ameer; but the Ameer's Minister died, and the Conference was broken up. The hon. Gentleman's explanation of the reason why Lord Lytton closed that Conference he must confess he could not understand; nor could he make the account of it given by Lord Lytton himself consistent with the statement of Viscount Cranbrook. Lord Lytton had certainly said in his despatch that the Ameer had been inciting the Border Tribes against him, and preaching a *jehad;* but, so far as he (Mr. W. E. Forster) had been able to see from the Papers, no proof whatever of that statement was furnished. But, be that as it might, the Conference was broken up, the Native Agent was withdrawn, and nothing more was heard of any proceedings for a period of 14 months. And what, he would ask, was the position of the Ameer during that time? We had withdrawn our promise to protect him, and there was a positive statement in the despatch of Lord Salisbury to the effect that we had done so, for he said—

> "Any illusions, therefore, which Shere Ali may have entertained upon this point have been effectually dissipated. He has further learned that the British Government will not undertake the formal responsibility of assisting him to defend his country from the attacks of external foes, or of supporting his dynasty against sedition, unless British officers are allowed to reside on the Frontier for the purpose of acquiring information for communication to their Government.—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 224.]

There was a curious letter at page 247, in which it is stated—

> "I suspect that the coming of the English Mission is impossible so long as the Russians are here (or until the Russians have gone back)."

That brought out a remarkable coincidence of dates. That letter was written on the 19th of September—the very same day on which Lord Salisbury received a reply from St. Petersburg that the Russian Mission was a mere Mission of courtesy. He really saw no ground for proceeding to hostile measures with the Ameer. The threatening messages which had been sent to him were still rankling in his memory; and how could they, at a time when he was suspecting that he was the pipkin, as he was told, between the "two iron pots," expect him to refuse permission to the Russian Envoy to enter his territory? He hoped the House would consider—he was sure the country would, when they read the whole of these statements—that the Government were not justified in this war upon the Ameer. No doubt he was a barbarian, but he had his own feelings about independence; and the Government ought to have considered much more deliberately whether they should force their Envoys upon him. He might be told this was not a mere question of justice or injustice; that it lay much deeper; that this was a necessary war—necessary to the safety of India—and that they must not be led away by sentimental considerations of justice. Well, but what would be said if, instead of being a necessary and a wise war, it was an unnecessary and an unwise war? Suppose that, instead of securing the safety of India, it positively endangered it? Many people certainly entertained this opinion, and among them were some who knew much more about the matter than he did, or, for that part of it, than the majority of hon. Members knew. They were going to war with Afghanistan in order to guard India against Russia. But how? Was that object to be effected by conquering and annexing Afghanistan, and by extending our Frontier over that mountainous country until we met Russia at a disadvantage?

["No!"] Some people had advocated that; he did not know whether the Government had done so. Well, then, should we leave Afghanistan independent? But in what a position would she be, and with what disposition towards us? This was not our first Afghan War; we had had another; and there was not one now that he could find to justify it. In this case, too, we should leave memories behind in a hostile Afghanistan, though we said our great object was to guard against Russia by having a friendly Afghanistan. There was a report that the Ameer had fled out of the country. If that were true, whom were we to put in his place? Was it another Shah Soojah? Then it was said we wanted to rectify our Frontier. Well, he would not enter into that question; but this he would say—that for every one competent military expert who said that the new Frontier was scientific there were two who said it was unscientific. One word about the only statement which the Government had vouchsafed as to their grounds for going to war before war was declared. The Government said in the most authoritative manner, through the lips of the Prime Minister, that they were bound to go to war, not because they had been provoked and were obliged in honour to do so, but because they wanted a rectification of Frontier. That confession of Lord Beaconsfield was, perhaps, the most cynical statement which ever fell from a Prime Minister. It was made on the 9th of November, when the Government had not yet got an answer to the Ultimatum sent to the Ameer. It was possible that the Ameer would have accepted the Ultimatum. There was not a single word in the Ultimatum about a rectification of Frontier; and yet the Prime Minister said we were making an arrangement for rectifying our Frontier. He blushed to hear it; and the only excuse he could find for the statement was that we were taking the Frontier, not from the Ameer, but from independent tribes. If so, why go to war with the Ameer? He was one of those who, whenever an important question arose, asked himself, when he opposed the Government—"What should I do if I were not in Opposition?" He, and those who acted with him, could not tell Gentlemen opposite the exact course they would take; but it might fairly be asked what would be the direction of their policy? He thought the enormous majority of those, both in and out of the House, who supported this Amendment would, first of all, say they would have "peace with honour." That, however, was not very easy since the Government had chosen to plunge us into war. He believed the Opposition might go further and say — "We would take—and you ought to take—the very first opportunity of coming to honourable terms with the Ameer." Having shown the enormous superiority of our strength, we ought to try to convince him that we returned to our old and disregarded our new policy. What was this old policy—the policy of Lord Lawrence, Lord Mayo, and Lord Northbrook? It was to try to convince the Ameer first, that it was neither our wish nor our interest to annex his territory, or to conquer him, or to take from him his independence; and, secondly, that it was our interest, and would be our intention, to secure him from any unprovoked attack by Russia. That was the assurance which Lord Northbrook gave to the Ameer; an assurance qualified by the necessary condition that the aggression was not to be provoked by the Ameer himself. That was our old policy, and it formed a strong contrast to the new one, which was to protect the Ameer against Russia, but only on the condition that he submitted to terms which he believed would destroy his independence. We might return to that old policy, though it would not be easy to do so, because the Government had made the Ameer suspicious and caused his people to share his suspicion. Having endeavoured to answer a question which might be asked of the Opposition, he desired in turn to put a question to Her Majesty's Government. He thought the country ought to know more about our relations with Russia in this matter. It ought to know something more about the understanding referred to by Lord Lytton, when he sent word to the Ameer—

> "If the Ameer does not desire to come to a speedy understanding with us; Russia does, and she desires it at his expense."—[*Ibid.* p. 183.]

He thought they had a right to ask whether there was an attempt at such an understanding with Russia now; and he would therefore repeat the question put by his hon. Friend the Member for Bedford—"Is there any probability of our having another secret Treaty with Russia?" If there were no secret understanding with Russia, he should like to know what was the meaning of Lord Lytton's statement, which certainly was not made without authority? They ought to know why, and upon what ground, Lord Lytton ventured to send such a message to the Ameer. Still more important was it to know how the matter stood now. It seemed to him almost impossible to believe that our relations with Russia in this business rested as stated in the documents which had been presented to Parliament. On the 8th of August, 1878, the Indian Secretary told the Foreign Secretary—

> "It is the Russian Cabinet alone which is responsible for the acts of its Agent; and it is the Russian Governor General of Turkestan, rather than the Ameer Shere Ali, who, with or without authority, is at this moment pursuing a policy of which the effect must be to seriously agitate the minds of Her Majesty's subjects throughout India."—[*Central Asia*, No. 1 (1878), p. 143.]

What did the Government do upon that? Lord Salisbury sent on the 19th to our Embassy at St. Petersburg a request that the Mission to Cabul might be at once withdrawn. On the 18th of September he received an answer that the Mission was of a conditional nature and one of simple courtesy. Yet war was declared against the Ameer afterwards; and in the Papers presented to Parliament one of the chief grounds for the declaration of war was alleged to be the formal reception of this Mission. Therefore, he repeated his question—"Have the Government accepted this explanation of Russia as satisfactory; and, if so, why did they make this reception of an Envoy one of their chief grounds of complaint against the Ameer?"

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Debate be now adjourned."—(*Lord John Manners.*)

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON said, he presumed there would be no difference of opinion as to the necessity for the adjournment of the debate, or as to the desirability of continuing it on the next day (Tuesday). He presumed that the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer would appeal to those hon. Gentlemen who had

Notices on the Paper to give way. There was, however, one point which it was desirable to decide, and as to which some understanding ought to be come to that night. A very general opinion had been expressed by very many hon. Members that as there was very little Business on the Paper for Wednesday the debate should be continued on that day. If that were the wish of the majority of the House, there were two ways in which the object in view might be accomplished. They might either meet at the usual hour, or the Standing Orders might be suspended, and the debate continued at the ordinary hour in the evening. It was very desirable that some understanding should be arrived at; and he was sure that in this matter it would be the wish of the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, as it was of himself and his Friends, to consult the convenience of the House.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE said, as his name was on the back of the Bill which was down for Wednesday, and as his hon. Friend who had charge of it was not present, perhaps, before the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer rose, he might be allowed to say a few words. This measure affected a large number of voters, especially in the large towns, like London, and it dealt with an entirely novel question, which had never before been discussed in that House. The matter had, however, been under the consideration of several Revising Courts, and it had engaged the attention of a great many local bodies in London and elsewhere. Therefore, it could not be assumed that the Business on the Paper for Wednesday was purely formal. There were also obvious objections to continuing the debate on the Wednesday. If it were commenced at the usual hour, 12 o'clock, he feared there would be a very small attendance. On ordinary Wednesdays hon. Members came down at some time in the day, because there was the certainty, at some time or other, of a division. But there would not be this attraction to bring them down next Wednesday; and there might be, therefore, the greatest difficulty in making a House. If, on the other hand, they were to meet in the evening, that would be very unusual. There was no absolute pressure of time which rendered this step necessary; while it was also open to the objection that many hon. Members had already made arrangements which would keep them away during the greater portion of the evening.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said, this was really one of those questions which must be decided entirely by reference to the convenience of the House. No doubt it was desirable, as much as possible, to shorten the time for which hon. Members were to be detained in London at this season; and as there were a great many speeches to be made it would be an advantage if they could go on with the debate on the Wednesday. At the same time, he felt very strongly the force of the two objections which had been urged by the hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke). He and the Government, and he was sure he might say the noble Lord opposite, were only anxious to fall in with what was the general feeling of the House. It appeared to him that the most convenient course, if anything were to be done in the way of altering their course of procedure, would be to take the debate in the morning, and not to attempt to meet in the evening. In the first place, five nights of consecutive debate was very hard work; and, secondly, a good many arrangements had probably already been made for the evening. On the other hand, Wednesday morning might be very well spent in the discussion. If a Sitting were proposed in the evening, it would be necessary for him to give Notice that evening that he would move the suspension of the Standing Orders. It would not, however, he believed be necessary to give Notice that evening of any formal Motion that the debate be taken on Wednesday morning. Unless he heard any decided expression of opinion that they should sit in the evening, he thought it would probably be better that he should not give that formal Notice, but that the debate should be continued on the Wednesday morning, if it were thought on the next (Tuesday) evening, after consideration, that it was desirable to do so.

MR. RYLANDS said, he entirely concurred in the views expressed by the hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke) against the Morning Sitting on Wednesday. It was quite certain that they would have a very small attendance; and, in his opinion, the debate would be very inferior indeed. If they were to continue the debate at all on the Wednesday, his own feeling would be in favour of an Evening Sitting. It would, however, be very hard work to have five nights' debate in succession; and, therefore, he was decidedly in favour of not interfering at all with the Wednesday arrangements. They certainly could not interfere with them without creating very great difficulty and inconvenience; and the course proposed was certainly most unusual and unprecedented. He did not suppose there ever was such a proposal made before; and he certainly did not remember a previous instance where the Wednesday was taken for a purpose of this kind. He, therefore, hoped that the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, if he did not feel very strongly on this matter, would not fall in with the suggestion.

MR. DILLWYN would remind the House that it would be very difficult to ascertain the feeling of hon. Members generally on the subject at that moment, for the great majority of them had gone home immediately after the Motion for the Adjournment. For his part, he was very strongly opposed to still further trenching on the privileges of private Members, who were continually being cut down bit by bit. If they consented to this alteration on the present occasion, it would be erected into a precedent to be followed at other times, and thus private Members would be deprived of the one day which still remained to them on which to bring on their Bills.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON entirely agreed in the course suggested by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Since he conferred with his right hon. Friend earlier in the evening, he had ascertained, so far as he had been able to discover what were the feelings of Members, that it would not be in accordance with the wishes of the majority in the House that the debate should be continued on Wednesday evening. It would, therefore, be unnecessary to give formal Notice that night of a Motion to suspend the Standing Orders. This discussion would call the attention of hon. Members to the subject; and no doubt by the next day the Chancellor of the Exchequer would have been able to ascertain what was the general feeling of the House as to the continuance of the debate.

Motion *agreed to.*

Debate *adjourned* till *To-morrow.*

MOTIONS.

TENANTS' IMPROVEMENTS IN TOWNS (IRELAND) BILL.

LEAVE. FIRST READING.

MAJOR NOLAN, in moving for leave to bring in a Bill for the security of Tenants' Improvements in towns in Ireland, said, there was another Bill of very nearly the same nature introduced by his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Cork (Mr. M'Carthy Downing), and he would wish to explain that the two Bills were not quite the same. Though his own Bill might be very useful, it would also be very necessary that the Bill of his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Cork should be introduced. His Bill was one which would remedy a very crying defect in the legislation of Ireland at the present moment. In 1870 the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich brought in a Bill to protect the improvements of tenants in Ireland, and it not only protected their improvements, but also gave to a large number of tenants in Ireland the right to a certain compensation for disturbance. The Bill which he (Major Nolan) wished leave to introduce would not in any way interfere with or extend the disturbance clauses of the Land Bill of 1870 to tenants in towns; but the object of the Bill would only be to allow those tenants the right to compensation for such *bonâ fide* improvements as they had actually made. That was to say, that if under the Bill which he proposed the tenant was disturbed, he should not be in any way worse off with regard to his improvements than if he resided in the country. As, however, he saw the House was somewhat impatient, he would merely ask leave to introduce his Bill.

Motion *agreed to.*

Bill for the security of Tenants' Improvements in towns in Ireland, *ordered* to be brought in by Major NOLAN, Mr. PATRICK MARTIN, and Mr. O'SULLIVAN.

Bill *presented,* and read the first time. [Bill 50.]

ANCIENT MONUMENTS BILL.

LEAVE. FIRST READING.

SIR JOHN LUBBOCK, in moving for leave to bring in a Bill to provide for the better protection of Ancient Monuments, said, that the Bill was now introduced as passed by the Select Committee which sat last Session; but that he had accepted some verbal Amendments which the Chairman of Committees had been so good as to suggest. The object of these Amendments was to give even greater security to the owners of property, and they had been most willingly accepted by those interested in the Bill, whose great object was to preserve these interesting monuments, but who had every wish to respect existing rights. He hoped the Amendments might satisfy some, at any rate, of those who had hitherto felt it their duty to oppose the Bill.

Motion *agreed to.*

Bill to provide for the better protection of Ancient Monuments, *ordered* to be brought in by Sir JOHN LUBBOCK, Mr. BERESFORD HOPE, Mr. OSBORNE MORGAN, and Sir RICHARD WALLACE.

Bill *presented,* and read the first time. [Bill 50.]

BOROUGH FRANCHISE (IRELAND) BILL.

On Motion of Mr. BLENNERHASSETT, Bill to assimilate the Borough Franchise of Ireland to that of England, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. BLENNERHASSETT, Major O'GORMAN, Sir JOSEPH M'KENNA, and Mr. RICHARD POWER.

Bill *presented,* and read the first time. [Bill 49.]

LANDLORD AND TENANT (IRELAND) (NO. 2) BILL.

On Motion of Mr. DOWNING, Bill to amend the Law of Landlord and Tenant in Ireland, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. DOWNING, Mr. BUTT, and Mr. SHAW.

Bill *presented,* and read the first time. [Bill 51.]

COPYRIGHT BILL.

Considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

Resolved, That the Chairman be directed to move the House, that leave be given to bring in a Bill to codify and amend the Law of Copyright.

Resolution *reported:* — Bill *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. EDWARD JENKINS, Mr. HERSCHELL, Mr. DILLWYN, and Mr. FORSYTH.

Bill *presented,* and read the first time. [Bill 53.]

PRINTING.

Select Committee *appointed*, "to assist Mr. Speaker in all matters which relate to the Printing executed by Order of this House, and for the purpose of selecting and arranging for Printing, Returns and Papers presented in pursuance of Motions made by Members of this House:"—Mr. SPENCER WALPOLE, The O'CONOR DON, Mr. STANSFELD, Mr. SCLATER-BOOTH, Mr. DODSON, Mr. MASSEY, Mr. WHITBREAD, Mr. MITCHELL HENRY, Mr. M'LAREN, Mr. WILLIAM HENRY SMITH, Mr. ROWLAND WINN, and Sir HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON:—Three to be the quorum.

House adjourned at a quarter before One o'clock.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Tuesday, 10*th December*, 1878.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY FOR INJURIES TO THEIR SERVANTS—LEGISLATION.

QUESTION.

EARL DE LA WARR asked, Whether it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government to introduce a Bill this Session on the subject of the liability of employers for injuries received by their servants; and, if so, whether it was likely to be brought in at an early day?

EARL BEAUCHAMP, in reply, said, he was not surprised at the Question of the noble Lord; because he stated, in answer to a similar Question last Session, that the Attorney General had promised to bring in a measure on the subject this year. He was unable to state the provisions of the Bill, or the time at which it would be introduced.

TURKEY—CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE SLAVE TRADE.

QUESTION.

THE EARL OF SHAFTESBURY wished to put a Question to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of which he had given him private Notice. Could the noble Marquess inform him whether there was any hope of the establishment of a Convention with the Ottoman Porte for the suppression of the Slave Trade in the Red Sea and elsewhere?

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY, in reply, said, that for some time negotiations had been going on, and he had no reason to despair of coming to an agreement on the subject with the Porte. In fact, the only objection he had heard on the part of the Porte was rather one as to the means than as to the end. The Turkish Government appeared to prefer an exchange of notes to a Convention; but he believed there was no difference between them as to the substantive nature of what was proposed.

CENTRAL ASIA—MERV AND BOKHARA.

QUESTION.

THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWN asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, If he can confirm the statements made in Nos. 129. and 132. of the "Central Asia Correspondence (No. 1)," with reference to the submission or annexation of Merv to Persia; whether Merv is now generally recognized as Persian territory; and whether he can give any further information on the subject; also to ask whether the whole of the territory known as Bokhara has been formally incorporated in the Russian Empire?

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: The noble Earl asks me if I can confirm certain statements made in certain Papers of the Central Asia Correspondence. All I can answer is that the noble Earl himself possesses in the Papers all the information we have on the subject; and therefore I am not in a position either to confirm or contradict any of the statements. Merv, I may say, however, is not generally recognized as Persian territory; and I do not believe that submission or annexation to Persia is recognized by the inhabitants of Merv itself. No doubt the noble Earl will be able to gather further information on the point in the course of the debates. In reference to Bokhara, I am happy to say that it has not been "formally incorporated in the Russian Empire."

AFGHANISTAN (EXPENSES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS).—RESOLUTION.

Order of the Day for resuming the debate on the Amendment to the Viscount Cranbrook's Motion, read.

Debate *resumed*.

EARL GREY: My Lords, after the long debate that has already taken place, I will not abuse your Lordships' patience by attempting to enter into a full discussion of the subject before us; I will only ask for your attention to some rather desultory observations on two or three of the most important points which have not, I think, received all the consideration they require. In the first place, I would remark that I was surprised to find so little said last night by the noble Viscount the Secretary of State for India (Viscount Cranbrook) as to the justice of the war. The noble Viscount cannot be ignorant that its justice has been denied by no small number of persons of some authority; we had, therefore, I think, a right to expect that in stating the case of Her Majesty's Government he would have brought forward some arguments to show that the war is a just one, according to those rules as to what is right or wrong between nations which are generally recognized. According to these rules, as laid down by all the greatest writers, it is held that no nation ought to declare war against another unless it be either to obtain redress for some great wrong, for which it has asked and been refused reparation, or else for self-defence. It is true that a war may be one of self-defence, though no actual hostilities have been committed against the nation which begins it; if there is good evidence that hostilities are meditated, in such cases nations may, in self-defence, anticipate an intended attack. But to justify war on this ground, the danger which it is meant to avert must be a certain and a serious one. Last night the noble Viscount did not tell us that any such danger existed; all he said was that for some time the Ameer has exhibited a feeling of enmity and ill-will against us. This may be true; but it is no ground for war. It often happens that accidental circumstances create for a time a very bitter feeling in one nation against another; such a feeling has more than once existed between this and other countries. Great ill-will has occasionally been shown against England by France, and by the United States; but it has never been supposed that we ought to make this a ground for going to war with the people that entertain such a feeling, if no actual wrong is done to us; and between nations, as between individuals, temporary irritation generally passes away, if nothing is done to carry it into action. Now, the noble Viscount did not allege that anything had been done by the Ameer of which we had any right to complain, except that he had declined to receive British officers in his dominions. The noble Viscount argued at some length to show how reasonable it was that we should ask to have British officers on the Afghan Frontier to give us accurate information of what was done there if we were to protect the Ameer against attack. I quite agree with the noble Viscount—we should have been very imprudent to promise to the Afghans protection against attacks unless we were allowed the proper means of assuring ourselves that they had not provoked these attacks. The refusal to admit British officers gave us a perfect right to say to the Ameer—"If you will not receive them you must not reckon on our protection;" but I cannot understand what right we had to say—"You shall accept our protection and assent to the conditions on which alone we can give it, and because you refuse we will make war upon you." I cannot understand how we are entitled to act thus towards an independent Prince. As the noble Viscount has not informed us upon what grounds he holds a war thus entered into to be just, according to the rules I have quoted as laid down by the best writers, I am unable to answer arguments of which I cannot guess the nature, and I can only say that, in my judgment, the war is an unjust one, and therefore a national crime. I pass from this topic, and I have next to call your attention to the fact that neither in the noble Viscount's speech, nor in any that has yet been made, has the slightest explanation been given as to the advantages Her Majesty's Ministers hope to gain by the war. We have heard a great deal as to its being necessary for the safety of India to prevent the extension of Russian influence in Asia, and especially in Afghanistan; but not a word has been said to prove that the extension of Russia would be a source of danger to our Indian Empire, or to show how that danger is to be averted by the war. I suppose that the danger which is apprehended is an attack on our Indian Dominions either by a Russian Army or by an Asiatic Army assisted and directed by Russians. But if this is the danger against which we are seeking to take precautions, I would remind you that the noble Earl at the head of the Government has told us that the base of operations from which Russia would have to move to the attack of India is so distant, and the line of communication so exceedingly difficult, that he has no apprehension that any Russian Army which would cause us any danger could be brought to the valley of the Indus. To fear invasion from the Afghans is equally absurd — the whole Afghan population is not supposed to exceed 3,000,000 or 4,000,000; and though the men are brave, and capable of making excellent soldiers under proper direction, they are altogether destitute of military science and discipline; and the ease with which they have just been defeated by a comparatively small British force when defending very strong positions in their own hills shows how idle it is to suppose that any force they could raise could attempt an offensive war against the British Army defending our Frontier. Nor could the union of two such weak enemies when combined together have any chance of success in attacking us. I think, therefore, the idea of an invasion of India by a Russian or a united Russian and Asiatic Army may be dismissed from the minds of rational men. In the fears which have been expressed on this subject I can see nothing but a revival of an old panic terror, which many years ago led this country into one of the greatest mistakes it ever committed, and brought upon it a great disaster. Forty years ago much alarm was excited by accounts which reached this country of the doings of Russian Agents in Persia and Afghanistan; and the Government of that day, in order to counteract the projects imputed to Russia, adopted measures which led to the first Afghan War. I had then the honour of being a Member of Lord Melbourne's Cabinet, and I earnestly endeavoured to convince my Colleagues that the policy they were entering upon was wrong. I then thought that the fear of Russia, on which it was founded, was a great delusion, and that in striving to guard against an imaginary danger we were incurring a real and a serious one. I now think the same of the similar policy of the present Government. Since this question has attracted so much consideration, I have referred to a correspondence I had in October, 1838, with Lord John Russell, who was then the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons, and I find that I argued then, as I argue now, that we had really nothing to fear from Russia, and that if we had, the best course we could take for the security of India was carefully to avoid, as much as possible, any meddling in the shifting politics and intrigues of the semi-barbarous States of Asia, to enter into no Treaties with them, not to disturb ourselves about what might go on among them, or to excite fears among our Indian subjects by showing that we were ourselves afraid, but to pursue the even tenor of our way, striving by good, and especially by economical, government, by measures for improving the means of communication, for extending education among the people, and raising them in the scale of civilization, to increase the welfare and the resources of the inhabitants of India, trusting that we should thus most surely increase our power there, and be enabled to bid defiance to every attack. These, my Lords, were my views in 1838; and if I am asked how it happened that I continued in the Government when the Afghan War was undertaken, I answer, that I was young in those days; that I was associated in the Cabinet with men older than myself, and of far greater experience and ability; that the Chief of that Cabinet (Lord Melbourne) was a man on whose judgment I had very great reliance, and whose continuance in the post he then held I considered of much importance with reference to our domestic interests; and it seemed, therefore, to me that I should have been guilty of presumption if I had left the Government because I could not bring round my Colleagues to an opinion in which I found that I stood alone. Accordingly, though my opinion was not shaken, but confirmed, by discussion, I continued in the Government; and, of course, as I did so, I accepted my full share of the responsibility for what was done, and it was my duty not to show, by word or sign, that I disapproved of it. But now, my Lords, that these things have become matters of history, as my noble Friend on the cross Benches (the Earl of Derby) said last night, there can be no objection to my mentioning what took place 40 years ago; and I am anxious to do so, in order to show to your Lordships that I am not now supporting an opinion lightly or hastily adopted, but, on the contrary, one formed after much reflection 40 years ago, and from which I have never since seen occasion to depart. I have also thought it advisable to refer to the discussions which preceded the first Afghan War, because the result of what was then decided affords a significant warning as to what may happen now. But let me proceed with the argument I was pursuing. Supposing it to be proved that I am wrong in believing that it would be wise to trust for the safety of India to the effects of good and of economical government, and of measures calculated to increase the welfare of the people, and, therefore, their contentment and attachment to their Rulers, and that prudence really requires that we should endeavour to check the extension of the influence of Russia in Asia—suppose this to be admitted, I should still maintain that the policy of Her Majesty's Government has been wrong, and that the course they have been pursuing is calculated not to check, but to increase the influence in Asia of Russia, and to diminish our own. This, my Lords, is the proposition which I shall endeavour to establish. We have been told that it is the interest of England that Afghanistan should be strong, should be independent, and should be friendly. I accept the statement as correct; and then I ask you, whether we have made Afghanistan stronger by having already destroyed a great part of her military force? When I say we have destroyed a great part of her force, I am not referring only to the number of the Afghan troops who [have been killed or wounded, but to the far larger number who have been dispersed and disorganized, to our having captured many of her guns and dismantled her forts. We have already done much to break the military power of the Afghan State; and if the war goes on we shall, no doubt, do much more. Instead, therefore, of making Afghanistan strong—as we want her to be—we are making her weak. Will that make her independent? When she has been weakened, and her own military force has been broken, she must necessarily become dependent on some other Power, and, owing to the course we have taken, that Power can only be Russia. Lastly, you say you want to make Afghanistan friendly to us, and what have you done for that purpose? You found that the one thing which was, perhaps, of all others the most distasteful to the Afghans was the notion of having a British Mission established in their country. Successive Rulers of the country, its Chiefs, and its people, were all united in their strong objection to allowing an English Envoy to reside among them. And, with their passionate love of independence, they were quite right in this objection. I do not believe that it would be possible for an Envoy of the Indian Government to reside in Afghanistan without his being led to interfere in its internal affairs in a manner which would gradually bring that country under the control of the Indian Government. You must remember that civil war is almost a chronic disorder in Afghanistan, and especially when the death of its Ruler leaves the succession to be fought for by the many competitors who always come forward to contend for it; when civil war is not actually raging intrigues and feuds go on among the different Chiefs and parties, and in their disputes a British Envoy must find it hardly possible to avoid interfering, while his doing so would lead little by little to the power he represents being brought into play and assuming the control of the Government. It may be true that this would be greatly for the advantage of the Afghans; that they would gain greatly by being placed under such a system of administration as our Government would be capable of introducing; and that it would be much better for them than living under such a barbarous Government as they now do; but surely we have already enough upon our hands without undertaking the task of accomplishing by force the internal reformation of Afghanistan. And, certainly, it is not what the Afghans want. It was said by one of themselves that they could endure anarchy, civil war, rapine, and bloodshed, but they could not endure a master; and seeing that the residence of a British Envoy among them is the first step to their being brought under the yoke of a foreign master, they are passionately opposed to it. I submit that when this is their feeling, and when they have more than once been promised that they should not be asked to receive a British Envoy against their will, it was not wise to turn round on our former declarations, to insist on sending them an Envoy, and to make war upon them when they refused to receive him. Surely this is not the way to make Afghanistan friendly to us. We know the effects of the former war; we know for how many years the enmity and hatred it engendered against England survived in the minds of the Afghans. The present war is likely to excite those feelings in a still higher degree, for we have not now even as much pretence for it as we had before, when we professed to invade the country as the Allies of the rightful heir to the Crown, and for the purpose of restoring to him the power of which he had been, as we contended, wrongfully deprived. I think I have shown to your Lordships that it is difficult to understand how this war can tend to make Afghanistan strong, independent, and friendly as Her Majesty's Ministers tell us they desire it to be; but I should like to go a little further, and ask them distinctly to explain what are the advantages they hope to obtain, and what is the state of things they seek to establish by the success of our arms? Do they mean to annex Afghanistan to the British Dominions, or, what comes to the same thing, to set up a puppet King to reign over it, under the advice of an English Resident, and maintained on the Throne by the military power of England? If so, the experience of France in Algeria may give some notion of the enormous difficulties of the task you will have to undertake, though the difficulties the French had to contend with in Algeria were less arduous than those you will have to face in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is described to us as one of the most rugged and impracticable countries in the world. It consists mainly of ranges of high and rocky mountains divided by narrow defiles, with some good land in the valleys, but scarcely able, on the whole, to produce enough food to maintain its inhabitants, who are brave, fierce, barbarians, utterly averse to the restraints of a settled Government. It is a country from which it is simply impossible to draw a revenue of any consequence towards paying the expense of governing it; while it is so unfavourable for the operations of regular troops, that the cost and difficulty of governing it against the will of the people would be enormous. Whatever little revenue it might be possible to levy would have to be collected with the aid of military force, which would also be required every time that an act of violence or disobedience to the law had to be punished; so that considering the warlike habits of the people I am informed that, in the opinion of men well qualified to form a judgment on the subject, 30,000 men, of whom one-half must be British soldiers, is considered to be the smallest number that would be required for the maintenance of order. Have you considered what the cost and inconvenience of this would be? If not, you ought to do so before you undertake so ungrateful and so unprofitable a task, which, in the end, you will probably be compelled to abandon. I do not mean to say that the Afghans will be able to drive you out of their country by force; no, but the troops you could maintain there would be so harassed and worn down by the continual hard work imposed upon them, the difficulties of governing the country would be so great, that in the end you would find it practically impossible to persevere in the attempt. Well, then, if, foreseeing the probability of this result, you determine not to take possession of Afghanistan, what other course will you take when you have brought the war to a successful close? Will you depose the Ameer? If so, who is to be put into his place? Is there any Prince you can raise to power who has sufficient weight and authority to hold it without your continual support? If not, to appoint a new Ameer, only able to govern by British bayonets, would be but a different and more inconvenient mode of taking possession of the country. Perhaps you contemplate—indeed, I see no other course that would be open to you—leaving the Ameer in possession of the greater part of his territory, only requiring him to give up to you so much of it as you may want for what is called the "rectification of your Frontier," and to agree to such a Treaty as you may dictate to him. If this should be your plan, I suppose the Treaty the Ameer would be called upon to sign would bind him to be your friend; to receive a British Envoy and as many officers as you may consider to be necessary to watch what is going on in his country; to send away the Russian Mission, and to enter into no further communication with the Russian authorities; and, lastly, to surrender the territory you wish to get for the purpose of making a scientific Frontier. These would be the probable provisions of a Treaty imposed on the Ameer at the end of a successful war; and I want to know what you would gain by them? You can hardly suppose that by compelling the Ameer to sign a Treaty declaring himself your friend, you will make him become a friend? Is this in human nature? and, above all, in Eastern human nature? It is certain that you will have made him, on the contrary, a bitter enemy, looking out for the first occasion of using to your detriment whatever power you may leave to him. But then you will have expelled the Russian Agents from Afghanistan! Do you really suppose that by causing the recognized and official Agents of the Russian Government to be sent away from Cabul, you will have thrown the slightest difficulty in the way of its communicating with the Ameer? There will be no want of channels through which more frequent communications than ever will be carried on between the Russian Government of Turkestan and the Ameer, who will greedily listen to every suggestion offered to him as to the means of annoying and injuring England. Nor do I think that you will gain much by acquiring the right of sending a British Envoy, with officers to assist him, to Afghanistan. Your Lordships have been told that this is necessary, because without it you cannot get the information your interests require as to what is going on in that country. But will you get that information? My noble Friend near me (Lord Lawrence) gave us last night a striking description of the position in which British officers found themselves when sent some years ago to Herat and Candahar with the unwilling consent of Dost Mahomed. They were treated as spies and enemies; they could hardly move a step without a guard to protect them; and they were cut off from all means of observation or of gaining information, because anyone who ventured to communicate with them became a marked man, and was in danger of his life; and this not from the Government, but from the population, for the population and the Chiefs were even more averse to the residence of British Agents among them than the late or the present Ameer. My noble Friend says that he was told by Major Todd that he could, from passing merchants and others, get better information at Peshawur, where no one was afraid to speak to him freely, as to what was going on at Herat than he could obtain at Herat itself when he was staying there as an Agent of the Indian Government. There remains the advantage of the scientific Frontier you are to obtain by taking territory from the Ameer. Now, my Lords, we know that military authorities are divided on the question whether our Frontier would or would not be made stronger by being advanced; and I find that those who recommend its being advanced have been very careful not to define the exact line of the Frontier they would substitute for that which we have. Perhaps this may be because they have not found it possible to find any new line of Frontier which would not be open to all the same objections as our present one. After reading what has been urged on both sides, it certainly appears to me that the arguments of those who consider our present Frontier better than any we could obtain by pushing it forward are much the strongest on the principles of common sense. But assume—and I am willing for the purposes of argument to assume—that, as a mere question of military science, our Frontier might be made stronger by being advanced, still you must remember that this is not all that you have to consider; you must also take into account the effect on your moral power of your ending the war by taking territory from the Ameer. Your Lordships are aware that when the assumption of the Government of India by Her Majesty in place of the East India Company was proclaimed, it was solemnly declared that Her Majesty desired no extension of the territory which thus came under her direct authority, and would strictly respect the rights of the Princes of India and of the States adjoining her Dominions to the territory they then held. Her Majesty's declaration was received with the greatest satisfaction, and with confidence by those whom it affected. Will that satisfaction and confidence continue to be felt? The Indian Princes know that both Dost Mahomed and his successor had been more than once assured by Viceroys of India that they should not be pressed to receive British

Envoys contrary to their own wishes. They have now seen that the Ameer has been pressed in the harshest manner to receive a British Envoy, and that his refusal to do so has been made the pretext of the war waged against him. If they now see that the war is ended by depriving him of a part of his territory, may they not think that to gain this territory was our object from the beginning, and that for this purpose we picked a quarrel with the Ameer? Is not this the more likely to be the light in which they will view the subject, when even before the war began it was publicly stated, by no less an authority than the Prime Minister of England, that one of its objects—I am not sure he did not say its main object—was to obtain a scientific Frontier. Will not the confidence hitherto felt in the promises and declarations of the British Government be thus shaken; and will not this cause a loss of moral power, for which the improvement of our Frontier will be, indeed, a sorry compensation? I must now return for a few moments to another point on which I have already slightly touched. I said, my Lords, that I do not apprehend any evil to the British Empire in India from the extension of Russian dominion in Central Asia. I am quite aware how largely that dominion has been extended in the last few years. I listen with the same incredulity as most of your Lordships to those disclaimers of having any ambitious schemes of conquest and aggrandizement which we are in the habit of hearing from Russian statesmen on behalf of their master, and to their assertions that his only motive in all his enterprizes is pure and unselfish philanthropy. I attach no value to these fine speeches; and certainly I am no admirer of the rule of Russia in the countries subject to her. The cruel oppression of Poland by her has been notorious; but not only in Poland, and other conquered Provinces, but in her own original dominions the Government of Russia seems to me to be one of the worst that exists in any civilized country, and the least favourable to the welfare and advancement of those who live under it. Still, when I consider what is the condition of Central Asia, the scenes of rapine and bloodshed continually going on there, while civil wars, and wars with each other, habitually lay waste the petty States into which this vast region is divided, and that this state of things has prevailed for centuries, without the smallest symptom appearing that any improvement is likely to take place while these wild tribes are left to themselves, I cannot but think that it would be well for the world if they could be brought even under so harsh a rule as that of Russia, and could be made to submit to order and discipline by her stern compulsion. Nor do I entertain the slightest objection to her undertaking this task. I know that not years, but generations, must go by before she can create in these countries a Power formidable to us; and looking to the bad use—as I think it—which she makes of her resources and of her military power in Europe and in Western Asia, I am far from regretting that she should find employment for a part of these resources and of this power in a region where she may possibly do some good, and can certainly do no harm. On Russian authority we learn that the dominions Russia has already acquired in Asia cost her not less than £1,000,000 sterling annually beyond all the revenue they can be made to yield, and that the demand upon her Army for troops, barely sufficient to keep this territory in subjection, is inconveniently heavy. As she increases her possessions in this quarter, these burdens will also increase; and I do not see how we could wish for anything more likely to keep her out of mischief elsewhere than that she should continue her career of conquest in Central Asia. I deeply regret that Her Majesty's Ministers, instead of wasting so much needless jealousy on the conduct of Russia in Central Asia, had not more carefully watched and resisted her proceedings in other quarters where they were really dangerous, and should have become her accomplices in perpetrating one of the worst acts of spoliation of modern times, by taking a strip of territory, to which she had not the shadow of a claim, from Roumania. This iniquitous proceeding was injurious not only to Roumania, but to Europe, by bringing Russia again to the banks of the Danube, from which it had been one of the most useful results of the Crimean War to drive her back. Instead of showing their jealousy of Russia by adopting a new and hazardous policy on our Indian Frontier, Her Majesty's

Ministers would have done better if they had acted on this feeling when there was real occasion for it, and refused to be her accomplices in the nefarious act I have referred to. I believe that by the policy they adopted towards Afghanistan they have seriously diminished their means of hereafter counteracting the designs of Russia in Europe. The step taken by the Government in bringing Indian troops to Malta was disapproved by many friends of mine, but I did not agree in their opinion. Though the advantages it ought to have secured for us were afterwards recklessly thrown away, I believe that at the time it was taken it was a wise and politic step on the part of Her Majesty's Ministers thus to show that when the interests of the great British Empire were menaced India, as an important part of that Empire, would help to defend them. But I fear that for a long time to come we have deprived ourselves of this most valuable resource by plunging into war with Afghanistan to guard against an imaginary danger. By rendering that country hostile, and thus creating a new demand upon the services of the Indian Army, you have made it difficult for that Army to spare any force to assist you elsewhere. Instead of this, I believe that your policy has made it necessary to send more English troops to India. Now that you have sent a considerable force beyond the Passes, I think that, in order to maintain your communications and provide for the security of India, you ought to lose no time in increasing your European force there. Though I feel that I have already trespassed too long on your time, there is one more point on which I must say a few words before I sit down. The Amendment moved by my noble Friend expresses the willingness of the House to concur in granting the money necessary for bringing the war to a safe and honourable conclusion. I am ready to vote for this Resolution; but I think it right to explain that in doing so I do not mean to assent to any grant for further offensive operations against the Afghans. Believing the war to be an unjust war, I cannot join in any Vote for affording the means of carrying it further. My noble Friend (Earl Granville), whose absence from indisposition I much regret, said the other night that it might be illogical to profess to consider the war unjust, and at the same time to be ready to grant money to carry on the war; but in spite of its being illogical this was what he intended to do, and that for the sake of our gallant soldiers he was ready to grant whatever Supplies were necessary for their welfare and for carrying on the war with vigour. No man will more gladly than myself assent to whatever may be proposed in order to secure the safety and welfare of our gallant soldiers who have so greatly distinguished themselves in the operations that have already taken place; but it would be quite a different thing to give our sanction to Votes intended to afford the means of carrying on the war with vigour—that is to say, of engaging in further offensive operations against the Afghans. This, my Lords, if we consider the war to be unjust, would, in my opinion, be something much worse than illogical; and, for my part, I will not vote for giving a single shilling for such a purpose. I regard the war as unjust; and I therefore consider that in waging it a national crime is committed, and that we shall everyone of us be responsible before God if we consent, as Members of this House, to abet and encourage it. I must add that my vote for the Amendment of my noble Friend is meant to be one of decided opposition to the Resolution moved by the noble Viscount, declaring the assent of this House to the use of the Indian Revenue for the payment of the expenses of the war. This, I think, would be most unjust to the people of India. My noble Friend on the cross Benches (the Earl of Derby) has explained his reasons for regarding the present state of the Indian finances as unsatisfactory. I entirely concur in this opinion. I believe the people of India to be already over-taxed and to require relief. We know what heavy burdens have been thrown on the Indian Treasury by successive famines; we know, too, that various public works which are urgently wanted, and some of which would greatly assist in averting future famines, have been postponed, owing to the difficulty of finding money to carry them on. In such a state of things it seems to me that to employ the Revenues of India in carrying on an unrighteous war not to the advantage, but probably to the detriment, of India, would be most unjust. The people of India have not been, and could not be, consulted on the subject; they are not responsible for what has been done. It is the people of England who are responsible; for they, through their Representatives, have given Her Majesty's Ministers the power to take the measures which have had the result which we see. The cost of the war ought, therefore, to fall on this country and not on India; and on that ground I must vote against the Resolution of the noble Viscount.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, before making some observations upon the very interesting speech to which your Lordships have just listened, I owe it to the respect which I feel for my noble Friend the late Secretary of State who spoke last night on the cross benches (the Earl of Derby) to refer to one subject on which he touched, and on which I think some misunderstanding prevails out of doors. My noble Friend referred to what is called the Constitutional question of the right of the Executive to recommend to the Sovereign a commencement of war without a previous appeal to Parliament. I heard from my noble Friend what I expected to hear—a free and full admission that in any step which the Government have taken they have only acted within the limits of their Constitutional power. But my noble Friend proceeded to say that a time might come when there would be a disposition in the country to consider whether, as a people governing themselves, some alteration in the present rule might not be desirable, and some principle established by which a previous appeal to Parliament should be insisted upon. Upon that question itself, which is only a question of theory and of future consideration, I should not think it right to delay your Lordships with more than a few sentences; but I think it as well, since the subject has been mentioned, to point out to your Lordships that there are connected with it considerations very much wider and larger than those to which my noble Friend referred. My Lords, if it is to be a rule of the Constitution that an appeal should be made to Parliament before war is declared, it must be distinctly understood that that is a rule to be applied to all wars and in all circumstances; because you cannot leave it to the Government to decide that the rule shall be applied in some cases and not in others. Now, my Lords, let it be remembered that so far as the Executive Government are concerned there could not possibly be a rule more conducive to their ease and comfort. Nothing could be more agreeable to them than to shift the responsibility of war from their own shoulders to the shoulders of Parliament. I speak, I am sure, for many of those who have held office of State under the Crown. If it has been their fate to recommend to the Sovereign a commencement of war, I think they will agree with me that nothing more serious, no duty more irksome, could well be imagined. My next observation is this. If you appeal to Parliament, you must lay before Parliament all the secret information which the Government possesses. We have not in this country any Secret Committees, such as are possessed by other countries, to which information can be communicated which cannot be made public to everybody. And I would ask your Lordships to consider how it would be possible in Parliament, as it exists in this country, to have a discussion upon the subject of a war with all the secret information which the Government possesses. You must adopt one of two courses. You must either give Parliament an imperfect knowledge of the case, or you must reveal to Parliament information which might utterly frustrate the object you might have in view in making the war. And the matter does not end there. The existing rule of the Constitution of this country in this matter is not, as some people imagine, an ancient remnant of Prerogative right adhered to and preserved for the purpose of increasing the power of the Sovereign and of the Executive Government. It is a rule which was maintained at the very best period of the Constitution, and maintained advisedly and deliberately, and I believe there is no rule which is better for Parliament itself. Parliament at present has this very great advantage—as soon as war is commenced and Parliament is appealed to to support it, Parliament is able to take a wide and general view of the object and purpose of the war, and also of its probable results. If Parliament is dissatisfied, it has nothing to do but to come to those votes which would lead to the appointment of another Executive, and that other Executive would have the advantage, not indeed of being able to stop the war, but of preventing its being carried on in the spirit of the policy in which it was originally undertaken. Supposing, however, Parliament to be the authority which had commenced the war, it could not recede from what it had undertaken, and the war would have to be carried on, whatever changes might occur, to the bitter end. There is another consideration to be borne in mind. If it is to be proposed that the power of commencing war should emanate from Parliament, I would remind your Lordships that a very small part of the object which my noble Friend appears to have in view would be accomplished. You cannot stop at the commencement of a war; you must go further back. In the conduct of foreign affairs there is scarcely an interview with an Ambassador — there is no part of the policy of the Government pursued from day to day — which may not in some circumstances and in some contingencies lead to war; and if you say that war must not be undertaken without the consent of Parliament, you must not only have a Secret Committee to judge of the war, but you must have a foreign department of Parliament conducting the foreign affairs of the Government. It is quite impossible that you should take the commencement of the war as a matter separate from the whole conduct of foreign affairs. I pass now from that subject to the more immediate object of the present Motion of the noble Viscount. My Lords, I know that this Motion has been freely called out-of-doors a Party Motion. I am not going to give it any such name. I have no right to speculate upon the motives of those who originated it or of those who support it; and I desire in any observations I have to make not to refer in any shape or form to any question of Party. My Lords, I have in my time paid some attention to the conduct of Indian affairs; and I must say there is nothing which has ever filled me with a deeper feeling of respect than the position in the Government of India of those who are the Ministers of India in this country and of those who are the Viceroy's of India abroad. I believe there is not one of those distinguished persons I have known who has not endeavoured to conduct the Government of India for the benefit of India, and for no purpose or object of Party. The Ministers of India at home and abroad have a most difficult part to fill. They are in a position of almost perfect isolation; they have to undertake a work of great difficulty, of great responsibility, and of great importance, requiring great detail of information upon subjects as to which information is difficult to acquire. If all goes smoothly, they get no thanks; if anything goes wrong, they are held accountable. My Lords, I believe nothing could be more disastrous than to make questions relating to the government of India the subject of Party warfare in this country. Looking at the Government of India as I do, I feel that those engaged in it are entitled to every consideration and respect in this House; and I think if it had been my fate to be Viceroy of that great Empire I should have looked with some degree of indulgence and sympathy upon my successors. I will simply look at the policy that has been pursued in India for the purpose of ascertaining the history of that policy We are accustomed to speak of Afghanistan; but I am not sure that we at home can realize exactly the position of that country with reference to our Indian Possessions. Let me give your Lordships an illustration of what appears to me to be the position of Afghanistan. I will ask your Lordships to suppose that the northern part of Scotland was not incorporated with England, and that it was held by an independent race very much less civilized than we are—a race independent and warlike, and as numerous as the population of Afghanistan; and I would ask your Lordships further to suppose that to the north of Scotland there was an extension of land representing somewhat the features of Central Asia, in which there was a Power of great influence, of great strength, and of great energy, and one which had shown a tendency to move southwards. Let me ask your Lordships further to suppose that between this country and Scotland there was a belt of mountains something like that to the south of Afghanistan—a belt of mountains with three or four Passes, impassable except at those Passes, and the Passes were in the hands of the people of Scotland. If that were so, and if, further than that, we began by having with the Sovereign ruling in Scotland a Treaty of friendship, and if we found afterwards that that Treaty of friendship was acted upon in this way—the subjects of this country were not allowed to pass into Scotland, and we were utterly unacquainted with what was going on inside Scotland, and we had reason to believe that was going on which might result in injury to this country—then I ask you this question: Would we here in this House—and I speak to those on one side as much as to those on the other—gravely and calmly discuss a point of diplomatic etiquette? Would not, rather, both sides of the House be urging the Government of the country to take those steps which were absolutely necessary to make secure the position of this country in regard to this northern neighbour? Let me ask what has been the policy with reference to Afghanistan in India during the last 10 years? I heard with great interest the noble Earl who spoke just now state what his opinion had been for the last 40 years of the advances which had been made in Central Asia by a great Northern Power. We all know the consistency of the noble Earl; and I have not a doubt that he has maintained, without hesitation and without alteration, the views which he says he maintained in the Cabinet of 1839—that the steps which the Cabinet took at that time to improve, as they thought it necessary, our position in India were taken against his wishes. My noble Friend says how he would deal with the advances of Russia: he would take no notice of them. That is the policy which he says ought to have been pursued in 1839; and that is the policy which he thinks ought to have been pursued ever since. I turn from that policy—the policy of the ostrich—and I look to the policy which has been laid down by the highest authorities in India. You have it stated in moderate compass, and yet one which makes the statement too large for me to refer to in words. Let me remind you of what occurred in 1868. A very interesting Paper was drawn up by Sir Henry Rawlinson, admitted to be one of the best judges of the subject who could be found. That Paper considered the question which my noble Friend has referred to; it considered at great length the position of India with regard to Afghanistan, and it pointed out four dangers, differing in degree. The first was that to which the noble Earl has referred—the possibility of an invasion of India by a Northern Power through Afghanistan. You may say that is not very likely and it would be a very difficult task—an invasion of the country against the will of the Ruler of Afghanistan. The second danger was an invasion of India in which the Northern Power and Afghanistan would assist each other. The third danger was action by Afghanistan itself upon our Frontier and upon the northern part of our Indian Possessions. The fourth danger was a progress of a Northern Power into Afghanistan, gaining influence and settling itself there, making Afghanistan a centre of intrigue and a harbour for discontented persons, to the injury of our Indian Possessions. These are the dangers which are described and explained at great length by Sir Henry Rawlinson. You will find they were submitted to the Government of India of that day, when the noble Lord at the Table (Lord Lawrence) was Governor General. Did he or the other eminent persons to whom the Paper was submitted take the view of the noble Earl, that all this was mere chimera—that Sir Henry Rawlinson was the victim of a scare, and that the best policy was to take no notice of what Russia was doing? Nothing of the kind. I find the Memoranda which were written upon the essay of Sir Henry Rawlinson, beginning with the despatch of the Governor General in Council, and including the Minutes which are enclosed in that despatch from some of the best authorities —the Lumsdens, Sir D. F. M'Leod, and Colonel Taylor—all of them differing as to the degree of danger and as to what should be done to meet the danger; but all these eminent and experienced persons admitted that the danger pointed out by Sir Henry Rawlinson to a greater or less degree did exist. But it is in these Papers we find a definition of the policy which has been advocated as the policy of the noble Lord at the Table. I am not entering into this with the least desire to cast the slightest reflection upon any person concerned; no doubt they all stated what they conscientiously believed to be the course we ought to pursue. I will refer to one sentence in which Sir Henry Rawlinson stated what his opinion was of the course that ought to be adopted in the Government of India. Having described what he conceived to be the danger of the situation, he thus continues—

> "Another opportunity now presents itself. The fortunes of Shere Ali Khan are again in the ascendant. He is already in possession of Herat, Candahar, and Ghizni, and is expected, either in person, or as represented by his son, Mahomed Yakoob Khan, to be soon installed at Cabul. He should be secured in our interests without further delay. Provided that he is unentangled with Russia, the restoration of his father's subsidy and the moral support of the British Indian Government would probably be sufficient to place him above all opposition and to secure his fidelity. If he has been already tampered with, his expectations, of course, will be higher. It may, indeed, be necessary to furnish him with arms and officers, or even to place an auxiliary contingent at his disposal; but whatever the price it must be paid, of such paramount importance it is to obtain at the present time a dominant position at Cabul, and to close that avenue of approach against Russia."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 38.]

That was the opinion of Sir Henry Rawlinson; what was the opinion of the noble Lord, then Sir John Lawrence? I will take along with the policy of Sir John Lawrence that of one of his great supporters, Sir Richard Temple; they both stated their opinions, and this was that of Sir John Lawrence, writing as Governor General in Council—

> "The following are the only fresh measures which we could bring ourselves to recommend:—We think that endeavours might be made to come to some clear understanding with the Court of St. Petersburg as to its projects and designs in Central Asia, and that it might be given to understand, in firm but courteous language, that it cannot be permitted to interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan, or in those of any State which lies contiguous to our Frontier."—[*Ibid.* p. 45.]

Now, my Lords, divesting this language of what is mere courtesy, it means simply this—that those who are conducting at home diplomatic relations with St. Petersburg should tell Russia distinctly that any interference with the affairs of Afghanistan or any State contiguous to our Frontier would not be permitted—would be a *casus belli*. That is the meaning of words of this kind. This view was repeated in a separate Memorandum, in which the words used were—

> "We might also endeavour to come to some mutual arrangements, and to an understanding with Russia; and, failing that, we might give that Power to understand that an advance towards India, beyond a certain point, would entail on her war, in all parts of the world, with England."—[*Ibid.* p. 61.]

That was the policy advocated at that time. Is that the policy of the noble Lord now? If I caught correctly what fell from the noble Lord last night, he said—

> "I think, now, if Russia will not enter into satisfactory arrangements with us about Afghanistan, or, having made them, allows her officers in Central Asia to violate them, that ulterior measures should be taken in England to protect India."

That is the policy—to take ulterior measures in England to protect India. What Sir Richard Temple says is—

> "Without, therefore, at all objecting to what Russia is doing in Bokhara, we have a right to ask, for our own interest and safety, that she abstain from all interference in Afghanistan (including Herat) and Yarkand. As our relations with Russia are at present friendly, we might, I submit, make diplomatic representations to her on the subject. . . If after that she persisted in interfering within the prohibited limits, it could only be with a view of injuring us, and our Government would know how to take the steps which alone could properly be taken under such circumstances. In that case Russia would have to look to her own safety in various parts of the world."—[*Ibid.* p. 67.]

That is the policy of the noble Earl who spoke last. That is a clear and decided policy; it is the world at war, and India supine and quiescent: make diplomatic representations at home in England; tell Russia, in firm and courteous language, you will not allow her to interfere with Afghanistan; do nothing in India towards Afghanistan; make no Treaty with Afghanistan in India; make no offer of alliance to Afghanistan in India; leave all that to take care of itself; but let the Government at home, in its diplomatic intercourse with Russia, tell Russia we shall go to war with her in every part of the world. Call this a policy of inactivity! I call it a policy of desperate and dangerous activity. But it is at the wrong time and place. It is an activity after the evil is done. It is an activity of reprisals, not of prevention. You have a great country, in the fate of which you have the highest interest; you have the greatest interest that it should be friendly to you; that it should not be alienated from you—that it should not be corrupted by those beyond it; but in place of doing anything to secure firmly its friendship, instead of taking steps to prevent its being corrupted and alienated, you leave it open to corruption and alienation, and make your whole policy to rest upon threats to those outside that they are not to interfere with it. Was there ever a policy which was so little consistent with what our knowledge of human nature is? And I ask your Lordships how is it to be supposed that a policy of that kind is to be called a policy of inactivity? But let us see how this policy works when tried, for it has been tried, and the moment it was tried it broke down. In 1873 the attention of the then Viceroy (Lord Northbrook) was called to the advances of Russia. He wrote a despatch to the Secretary of State at home, and this is what he said. Your Lordships will remember that before the despatch arrived a particular paragraph of it was sent home by telegraph to be communicated by the India Office to the Foreign Office that it might be laid before Russia. This is the paragraph—

> "We think it for interests of peace that Russia should know our relations with Afghanistan, and we say in paragraph 18:—'Although we have abstained from entering into any Treaty engagement to support the Ameer by British troops in the event of Afghanistan being attacked from without, yet the complete independence of Afghanistan is so important to the interests of British India that the Government of India could not look upon an attack upon Afghanistan with indifference.'"

The Viceroy was not going so far as Sir Richard Temple—he only said very mildly, but intelligibly, that the British Government would not look on any attack on the independence of Afghanistan with indifference.

> "So long as the Ameer continues as he has hitherto done in accordance with our advice in his relations with his neighbours, he would naturally look for material assistance from us; and circumstances might occur under which we should consider it incumbent upon us to recommend Her Majesty's Government to render him such assistance. I propose to inform Cabul Envoy of sense of this paragraph."—[*Ibid.* 102-3.]

What happened? It was sent home to the Duke of Argyll. He thought it a very proper thing to send it to the Foreign Office to be communicated to Russia; but what did the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs say? I am sorry the noble Earl who was then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is not in his place; but I mention the fact not to cast any blame upon him, but in order to show how this policy worked when it was tried. What did the noble Earl do? The noble Earl replies to the Under Secretary—

> "I am to request that you will state to the Duke of Argyll that Lord Granville would not think it desirable to communicate to the Russian Government, as suggested by the Indian Government, a copy of the former despatch, and so convey to it indirectly an intimation that any aggression by it on Afghanistan would be resisted by Great Britain with force of arms."—[*Central Asia*, No. 1 (1878), p. 206.]

So that when the moment came for that to be done which Sir John Lawrence said ought to be done—the moment it was proposed by the Indian Government to inform the Foreign Office, that the Foreign Office might inform Russia, that any aggression on Afghanistan would not be viewed with indifference—the Foreign Office declined to do it. Why? Because it would be conveying to Russia indirectly an intimation that any aggression on the Ameer of Afghanistan would be resisted by Great Britain by force of arms. The communication was not made, and thus the great policy upon which the Indian Government had rested up to that time utterly broke down. The noble Earl the other night, who was formerly Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Earl Granville), said — "You ask me what my policy would be with regard to Afghanistan. I will tell you: I would follow the course pursued and advised by those three Viceroys — Sir John Lawrence, Lord Mayo, and Lord Northbrook;" but when in the Foreign Office he did not follow that policy. I want your Lordships to consider what effect this policy produced upon the person principally concerned—upon the Ameer of Afghanistan. The noble Earl who spoke last night from the cross-Benches said it would be quite useless and impracticable to inquire what it was that had affected the temper and disposition of the Ameer of Afghanistan. In the view of my noble Friend it would be quite useless, because he approved the policy of the Government up to the end of the year 1876, and had nothing to complain of in it; therefore it was immaterial to consider what was the effect produced on Shere Ali up to that time. But when he said it was impracticable, I cannot quite agree with him. Generally speaking, it is most unprofitable work to take the opinion of bystanders as to what is passing in men's minds; but as regards the Ameer, we have a singular official history on that subject. If you look at these Papers, you will find what I can only call a series of pictures given by Shere Ali himself in his letters, as to how he became affected in regard to his foreign relations from year to year. I doubt whether the records of diplomacy contain anything more graphic. I think they may be termed "The Progress of Diplomacy," because they give the very beginning of the end—the first communication of Russia sent to Shere Ali, and the subsequent communications from us, which produced such an impression on his mind. Your Lordships will recollect what took place in 1869 with Lord Mayo. At that time the Ameer was thinking very little about foreign affairs. I do not observe that the name of any external Power was mentioned, or that anything as to his external relations was referred to; but what he was very anxious about were the internal concerns of his country. He had hardly taken his seat upon the Throne; he was exposed to very great dangers and intrigues on every side; and what he did want was that Lord Mayo would give him an assurance to maintain his family on the Throne, and to assist him if he should be disturbed by internecine causes. Your Lordships know what took place. Lord Mayo did not give him all he wished—he did not enter into the engagement which the Ameer would have liked; but he satisfied him as to the friendship of the British Government, and used this expression—that they would view with displeasure any attempt made inside Afghanistan to disturb him on his Throne. The Ameer went away so far pleased, having had an assurance given him which he had never had up to that time. That was his position at the beginning of this history. What is the next step? A somewhat singular and a very important one in the Ameer's career. He had received the first letter from Russia, and he was in a flutter of excitement on the subject. Your Lordships will find it in the Central Asia Papers at page 108. It is a communication from the Ameer. He expressed his anxiety to know why Russia should write to a State with which she was already in friendly relation. He thought she must have some sinister design. He says there was reason of apprehension, for already Bokhara had submitted to Russia. He forwarded the letter to the Indian Government; and in a most humble and respectful way he besought the Indian Government to tell him what answer he should return. Major Pollock, at Peshawur, on the 26th of May, 1870, says—

> "With the above came a forwarding letter from His Highness the Ameer to my address, and one from the Cabul Agent, to the effect that the Ameer was much troubled at the receipt of the letters from the Russian authorities at Tashkend, for the following reasons:—1st. What reasons can the Russians have for writing letters in a friendly strain to a State which has already friendly relations with the British Government? . . . There is room for apprehension, for the King of Bokhara has already submitted himself to, or become a dependent of, Russia, and it would not be surprising to find Russian officials establishing themselves on the actual border of Afghanistan. If (which God forbid) they should so establish themselves on the actual border and harbour our enemies, what hope is there of the borders of Turkestan, Balkh, and Herat remaining on a satisfactory footing without full ('kamil') arrangements being made, and it is impossible that such complete measure can be carried out for the protection of these borders without the help and assistance of the British Government, with which the Afghan Kingdom is allied."

Nothing could show more precisely the state of mind in which the Ameer was in 1869. What is the next picture in this series of transformations? Your Lordships will find it at page 197, in a letter to our Envoy at Cabul. He said—

> "His Highness in private said that he gathered from this murrasila that it was the wish of the Russian authorities to establish a regular and frequent correspondence with the Cabul Government. What demands careful thought in their inconsiderate language is, that notwithstanding that the Russian Government must have thoroughly apprehended and been convinced that the weal or woe of the Afghan State is entirely bound up in and associated with that of the British Government, still when writing about boundaries they make use of this unguarded expression, which may indicate God knows what intentions in their minds, viz., 'for as much as the slightest alteration in intention leads to displeasure between parties, it destroys entirely the harmony which may exist between them.' Further, when the Governor of Turkestan writes in his letter that the instructions of his Sovereign are to avoid all interference with or annoyance to his neighbours, it is a cause of astonishment that the Russian interpretation of harmony with neighbours is a strange one, for in but a few years they have extended their possessions from the foot of the Throne of Russia to the borders of Bokhara, and now style the Afghan State 'their neigh-

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bours,' oblivious of the fact that Bokhara and Khiva intervene. If (which may God forfend) the country of Bokhara and Khiva becomes theirs, and their Frontier is extended without the intervention of any buffer ('pardah') to the limits of Afghanistan, which may indeed be truly styled the Frontier of Hindustan, God only knows what line of policy or demeanour they will adopt towards Afghanistan, and what troubles may be in store for the Afghan and English Governments."

That was the letter in 1872. Nothing could be more friendly, nothing could show more complete reliance on the British Government than this letter of His Highness then, as in former cases, requesting the Viceroy to tell him what answer to make. There were one or two more letters in the same strain. Well, my Lords, what was the answer? What did the Indian Government tell the Ameer? I find the Indian Government replying as follows:—

> "Should His Highness the Ameer allude to these letters, and manifest the apprehensions which his courtiers entertain, the Agent should be instructed to state that the Viceroy and Governor General in Council sees in them no ground whatever for apprehension, but rather additional reason for believing that the Russian authorities desire to maintain none of the relations but those of amity with the Government of Afghanistan."—[*Ibid.* p. 202.]

That was the only consolation the Indian Government gave him in his distress. He was very much alarmed at the Russians coming across the Frontier; but the Indian Government cheered him up by telling him that those communications which alarmed him were only a proof of the friendship of the Russian Government. That brings us to the next scene, in 1873. Your Lordships have, I believe, heard a good deal about this already, and I shall refer to it very briefly. We have the impression on the Ameer's mind as to the danger he was in, owing to the movements of Russia, in what his Agent communicated to us. His Agent said—

> "Time has approached very near when the Russians, after taking possession of Urganj and Merve Shajehan, will make communications for exercising some influence in my kingdom. It is as clear as daylight that as soon as the Russians will take possession of Merve Shajehan, the Turkomans will necessarily take refuge in Badghees in Herat, and if they do not desist from their misbehaviour, viz., from causing injury to the Russians from time to time, the Russians will undoubtedly send messages to the Afghan Government that either the Turkomans should be prevented from aggression, or permission should be given to them (the Russians) to punish these hostile tribes. Under these circumstances, such difficulty will present itself to me that even the British Government with regard to the interests of the Afghan and English Governments being identical, will have to adopt very serious measures for its removal."

And he adds—

> "The British Government should take my views and reflections into most careful consideration, and be kind enough to sympathize with Afghanistan, otherwise I have not at all received any peace of mind whereon I can place perfect reliance and remain quiet or free from anxiety. Should the British Government intentionally overlook this matter with a view to temporizing for a few days, it is their own affair, but I will represent my circumstances in a clear form in detail without time-serving hesitation."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 111.]

Nothing could be more clear than the meaning of the Ameer when he gave us this intimation. He said, in effect—"It is your affair as well as mine. If you adopt a time-serving policy I cannot help it. I have warned you; I have delivered my own soul." I own, my Lords, I was very much surprised the other day at a statement which I saw from the noble Duke, whose absence we must all regret, (the Duke of Argyll). The noble Duke said that in 1873 the Ameer either was or pretended to be very much afraid of the Russian advance, and that he held out the bait which was thought to be most tempting to catch the Indian Government. I do not know how that is. I have read the whole of these Papers—there is a deal more in the same strain—and I must say I have never seen expressions which conveyed to my mind more clearly the convictions of a man really and thoroughly alarmed. But if it was the view of the Secretary of State at that time that the Ameer was only pretending to be alarmed and was holding out a bait to catch the Indian Government, I can very well understand the course which was taken with regard to the alarm of the Ameer. I will say a little more of the documents which passed in 1873. I am going to refer to them not for the purpose of casting a shadow of blame on any person connected with the events of that year, but because it is absolutely necessary that your Lordships should see what was done in 1873 in order to judge of the policy of 1876, because the policy pursued in 1876 was a policy to remedy that which had been overlooked or, at all events, not done in 1873. I will take the telegram which was sent home by the Viceroy in 1873 to the Secretary of State. I was very much surprised, I own, as to the controversy which has arisen upon the construction of that telegram. I shall adopt myself implicitly the construction which the noble Lord (Lord Northbrook) tells us the Government of the day put upon it, and that he put upon it. But, while adopting that construction, I must tell your Lordships the construction which I put upon it. The Viceroy had informed the Government at home of those apprehensions of the Ameer, and had proposed to give the Ameer some assurances of assistance. This is what the telegram of the 26th of July says in reply—

> "Cabinet thinks you should inform Ameer that we do not at all share his alarm, and consider there is no cause for it: but you may assure him we shall maintain our settled policy in favour of Afghanistan, if he abides by our advice in external affairs."—[*Ibid.* 108.]

Now, my Lords, I have been accustomed all my life to study the meaning of documents, and I will tell you frankly what I think this document means. The Ameer told the Viceroy that he was very much alarmed at the advance of the Russians, and he asked for some new assurances in the circumstances of his new position. He never suggested to the Viceroy that the Indian Government was going to fall short of anything that had been promised by previous Viceroys—by Lord Lawrence or Lord Mayo; he never suggested it for a moment. He never suggested that the Indian Government was going to recede from any engagement made with him; but what he did suggest was that the changed state of affairs required that something new should be done—that some engagement must be entered into, some promise made to him, which had never been made before; that the policy pursued by Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo was all very well in its way and well suited for the time when it was adopted, but that the time had arrived when he must have something more definite, something more tangible, than the engagements previously given by the Indian Government. That was what the Ameer meant; but the meaning of the telegram from home was that we did not share the alarm of the Ameer, and that we meant to pursue the policy we had pursued all this time. What happened? Communications were made to the Ameer, and how were they taken? The first complete communication to the Ameer was in the shape of a despatch from the Governor General, which your Lordships will find at page 116. It said—

> "The result of the communications between the British and the Russian Governments has been, in my opinion, materially to strengthen the position of Afghanistan, and to remove apprehension of dangers from without. . . . . I have had some conversation with your Envoy on the subject of the policy which the British Government would pursue in the event of an attack upon your Highness' territories. A copy of the record of these conversations is attached to this letter. But the question is in my opinion one of such importance that the discussion of it should be postponed to a more suitable opportunity. I do not entertain any apprehensions of danger to your Highness' territories from without, and I therefore do not consider that it is necessary that your Highness should at present incur any large expenditure with a view to such a contingency. My hope is that having received the foregoing assurances, your Highness will now be enabled to devote your undisturbed attention to the consolidation and improvement of your internal government. The British Government desires to see your Highness' country powerful and independent. It is my determination to maintain the policy which has been adopted towards your Highness by my predecessors, Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, and I repeat to your Highness the assurance given you at the Umballa Durbar, that the British Government will endeavour from time to time, by such means as circumstances may require, to strengthen the Government of your Highness, to enable you to exercise with equity and with justice your rightful rule, and to transmit to your descendants all the dignities and honours of which you are the lawful possessor."

How did the Ameer understand this, because that is the next evidence we have on the subject? If I had been the Ameer I should have said to myself the substance of all this is that nothing is to be done. I asked for a new engagement, and I am told to wait till a more convenient time. The Ameer wrote back after a short interval to the Governor General. I will not read the letter, since your Lordships have seen it. What the Ameer says is, in substance, this, and I may remark that the tone of the letter is such as was never adopted in a communication to a Viceroy of India before. To say that the tone of the letter is not courteous is saying much too little. Apart, however, from the discourteous tone, the Ameer, in substance, says—"I come to you for relief and for engagements suited to the position in which I find myself. You are going to retire from what Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo proposed; but I come to suggest that you must do something more than was promised by either of them, and you tell me that you are going to resume their policy. If so, what is the use of your going through the ceremony of having these long interviews?" Your Lordships have heard the Ameer's opinion about the letter he had previously received from General Kaufmann. Well, his answer to the next letter he received from General Kaufmann was this—and your Lordships will be amused at the change of tone. I do not think the reply of the Ameer, dated the 16th of November, 1873, was submitted to the Indian Government. It was written on his own inspiration, and here it is. He says to the Russian Governor General at Tashkend—

> "I received your kind and friendly letter dated the 1st August, 1873, on 22nd idem, and was extremely gratified with its contents. The cause of the delay of a few months in the dispatch of a reply to it is evident, viz., first you went to St. Petersburg, and afterwards you were occupied in the Kharism expedition. I hope you have now returned in health and comfort to Tashkend, and I have, therefore, considered it advisable to take the opportunity of sending a reply to your murrasilla. I am much gratified with the contents of your letter explaining that His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia is anxious for the peace and welfare of neighbouring States, and that you have considered it one of your most pleasing duties to report to His Majesty that you have had every reason to be satisfied with me, and that I have upheld the friendship existing between us. It is as evident as daylight that at present His Majesty is a great and powerful Monarch, and it is, therefore, becoming that neighbouring States should enjoy tranquillity and convenience. This policy will tend to confirm the friendship existing between His Majesty and these States."—[*Central Asia*, No. 1 (1878), p. 8.]

Did ever such a change in the same number of months come over a Correspondence between two Potentates? Compare this with the letter sent to our Viceroy only a few months before and see what a difference there is. Yet I am told that the mind of the Ameer continued the same, and that up to the time of the late Viceroy's arrival in India there was no change on his part. My Lords, it was done at the end of the year 1873. It was finished then, and there was no change afterwards. So much for the letters; but I must call in two witnesses to speak on this subject. First, there is the late Governor General. What does Lord Northbrook say as to the feeling of the Ameer in the year 1873. His Lordship says—

> "His language after the return of his Envoy, Noor Mahomed Shah, from Simla in 1873 was certainly far from satisfactory; but we are disposed to attribute it either to his impression that we were so anxious for his support that by assuming an attitude of dissatisfaction he might obtain further assistance from us; or to his disappointment that we did not give him the distinct pledge he asked that the British Government would protect him under all circumstances against external attack, coupled perhaps with his discontent at the result of the Seistan arbitration."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 134.]

I am not here dwelling on the question as to whether it was right or wrong to refuse to give the pledge which the Ameer asked for. I am now dealing merely with the question of fact. Is it a fact that the mind of the Ameer was changed at this time? Lord Northbrook, at all events, makes no doubt about it. Next, I will take the evidence of our Native Resident at Cabul. Writing in January, 1875, but speaking of the previous year, he says—

> "Considering then the external and internal state of Afghanistan, I am firmly convinced that now is the time for the interference of the British Government with a view to the peace of that country and the tranquillity of Hindoostan. The following are a few of the reasons why the Government of India should interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan:—For a long time the British Government has been anxious to establish amicable relations with the Ruler of Cabul, but without success."

And then he goes on—

> "The possible inclination of the Ameer towards another party (Russia?) owing to the silence and apparent apathy of the British Government."—[*Ibid.* p. 146.]

That is what our Resident at Cabul at the time of the late Viceroy reports to him as his opinion of the feeling of the Ameer. Now, what evidence have we on the other side? The noble Viscount who moved the Amendment told us last night that Sir Henry Norman, who was on the Council of Lord Northbrook and that of Lord Lytton, had addressed to the newspapers a letter, in which he said that up to the time of the departure of Lord Northbrook the Ameer had no feeling of hostility to us, and that all his hostility was due to the measures taken in 1876, and since that time. The noble Viscount dwelt very much on that letter as a proof that it was the conduct of the present Government which has caused the hostility of the Ameer. My Lords, I wish to speak with great respect of Sir Henry Norman. I have heard some persons say that that letter was one which ought not to have been written to the newspapers; but I do not express an opinion on that point. I do not know what the habits of Indian Councillors are; but they appear to me not to be very reticent, and they seem to use considerable freedom in their communications to the newspapers. However, I do not say anything about this letter, except to express my opinion that if it had been kept back for 24 hours it would never have been published at all. Strange to say, when it was published in the newspapers, it appeared side by side with another letter from the Ameer himself. Side by side with Sir Henry Norman's letter, saying that the whole of the hostility of the Ameer had been occasioned by the events since 1876, there appeared a letter from the Ameer stating just the reverse. Unfortunately, therefore, the noble Viscount's witness is discredited by the person principally concerned. The Ameer says the hostility occurred at the time when the late Viceroy interfered with him on the subject of the treatment of his son. I must say that the late Viceroy was in a very unfortunate position in regard to that subject, for I observe that General Kaufmann wrote on the same subject to the Ameer. General Kaufmann told the Ameer that he had acted quite right towards his son, and that the first thing necessary was that parental rights should be enforced. The late Viceroy, writing in a different strain, told the Ameer that he was quite wrong. In these circumstances, I am not surprised at the Ameer preferring the advice of General Kaufmann to that of the late Viceroy. At all events, I think we may remove from this discussion the testimony of Sir Henry Norman. Let me now say a word or two about these occurrences in 1873. I repeat that I blame no person whatever, for it is very easy to be wise after the event—to go back and say what ought to have been done five or six years ago. I do not propose to adopt that course. But I appeal with confidence to your Lordships on both sides of the House, whether if you had to do over again what was done in 1873, you would not then have promised to give the Ameer the assistance he asked for? I cannot entertain a doubt that, by an overwhelming majority, you would have said it would have been a happy thing if we had taken that opportunity, as Sir Henry Rawlinson advised, of obtaining the friendship of the Ameer by conceding all that he asked for. Well now, my Lords, the transactions of 1873 were the justification for the conduct of the Government in 1876. I refer to the Mission of Sir Lewis Pelly. I am not going into the details of the history of that Mission; but I have heard it said that that Mission was an attempt to force upon the Ameer British Residents in Afghanistan. I entirely deny that statement. There is no foundation for it. The whole of that Mission—the whole of the proposals made by Sir Lewis Pelly, and the proposals made before Sir Lewis Pelly met the Ameer's Envoy—proceeded on the avowed and the distinct condition that there was to be no force whatever applied to the Ameer, and that he was to understand it was not a question of forcing anything upon him. I was surprised to hear the noble Earl speak of this as an attempt to force. What were the facts? They were that the Envoy who was sent to Cabul was supplied with an *aide mémoire* to show to the Ameer and to the Durbar at Cabul what the advantages were which we were prepared to give in return for the concession of having British Agents resident in Afghanistan. He was told that the Government were ready to make with him, in the form I have described, engagements of a character such as before he had asked for; but that if he wished for those engagements, there must be a consideration on the other side; that that consideration must be the presence of British Residents, not in Cabul, but on the Frontiers of his territories; and that this was absolutely necessary in order that we should carry out the engagements which we were about to make. Well, what happened at Cabul? Your Lordships have the narrative of the meeting which took place, and of the Durbar held before the Envoy was sent to meet Sir Lewis Pelly. The Durbar distinctly understood that the condition which was to be the *sine quâ non* of the negotiations was the admission of British Residents. They met again, and at last they agreed to accept that condition;

and it was on that footing that the Envoy came to meet Sir Lewis Pelly. What happened afterwards? Let me remind your Lordships, in the first place, as to the question of these British Agents, that the policy of having British Agents in Afghanistan has never been disputed. It has been admitted by the late Governor General, as well as insisted on by the present Viceroy. Let me remind you of what was said on this in the time of the late Governor General. Writing in Council he said—

> "We agree with Her Majesty's Government that, having regard to the present aspect of affairs in Turkestan, it would be desirable that a British officer should be stationed at Herat. The appointment, it is true, would be attended with some risks, and the usefulness of the measure would depend on the discretion of the Agent who might be selected. But if an officer of experience and sound judgment were chosen who possessed the full confidence of the Ameer and the Afghan officials, we should anticipate great advantage from the arrangement.—[*Ibid.* p. 133.]

And your Lordships will remember that in 1873 the late Viceroy himself proposed that a British officer should go into Afghanistan and survey the whole of the boundaries of that country. Was there any reason to suppose that the Ameer would not be prepared to receive British Residents as a concession in return for advantages which were to be given to him? Here, again, I have got the concurrence of the late Viceroy and his Council. Their testimony on the subject is quite explicit. I do not agree with what fell from the noble Earl who spoke last, that any engagement on this subject had been given to the Ameer either by Lord Mayo or by anyone else on behalf of the Indian Government. I believe the correct statement on this point is the one given in the despatch of the Governor General in June, 1875; and I am quite satisfied with the conclusion which the Governor General and his Council then came to as to the intentions of the Ameer. He says—

> "On the whole, however, we think that either the Ameer himself or his Minister, Noor Mahomed Shah, did in confidential communications with Captain Grey express a readiness to accept at some future time not far distant the presence of British Agents at places in Afghanistan, excepting Cabul itself. But our impression is that the intimation was intended to be contingent either upon the receipt of far more substantial assistance than was promised the Ameer at the Umballa Conferences, or upon the conclusion of a Dynastic Treaty, that is, upon obtaining the recognition, in a Treaty with the British Government, of his son Abdoolla Jan as his successor."—[*Ibid.* p. 131-2.]

THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK: Read the next paragraph.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am anxious not to omit anything which in fairness ought to be read.

THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK: The next paragraph is not in my hands; but it simply states that the impression was that this was not information which could be so relied upon as to found on it any representation to the Ameer.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I do not see the alteration which that makes in these matters. I am anxious to state the thing as favourably to the noble Earl as I can. As I understand the view of the noble Earl, it is this—They state that the Ameer required some terms to be offered to him as a condition to his receiving British Agents. That is exactly the conclusion which I have given. If you had proposed to the Ameer to put Agents in Afghanistan without giving him something in return, he would never have consented; but he was quite prepared, when the subject was last mooted to him, for the consideration of the advantages which were to be given to him, to consent to the admission of British Agents. And I wish to remind your Lordships that it is a complete misapprehension to say that the Ameer had manifested an absolute objection to receive British Agents in his territories. Nothing of the kind. I take the evidence which the Governor General and his Council have given as to that. They say it is a question of bargain, and that was exactly how Sir Lewis Pelly was ordered to deal with it. He was ordered to make a bargain; he was armed with the power of offering the Ameer very great advantages and benefits, and was directed to ask in return, as a matter on which the Ameer was to be a free and a consenting party, the admission of British officers into Afghanistan. That bargain was not accepted. What occurred at the Conference? It has been said that the object of Sir Lewis Pelly was to pick a quarrel at the Conference with the Ameer and his Envoy. I have read with some care the narrative of what took place at the Conference; and I am bound to say that anything more unlike an attempt to pick a quarrel than Sir Lewis

Pelly's conduct I never read. Anything more careful, more elaborate than his explanations, more patient than his attention to all the complaints of the Envoy I never read. The Conference went on from day to day and from week to week. The whims and the caprice of the Envoy were indulged; he was allowed to speak day after day without interruption. Sir Lewis Pelly presented the advantages which he had to offer in the most attractive form; everything which patience, temper, and long experience could enable a man to do to make a Conference successful was done by Sir Lewis Pelly. But what was the conduct of the Envoy? In the first place, when he arrived, although our resident Agent told us that the Durbar at Cabul had agreed to the terms that were to be offered with regard to British Agents, the Envoy professed himself to be entirely without power to assent to such an arrangement. What was his argument? It was this—"You offer to me certain advantages, certain assistance, certain promises, and a certain Treaty with the Ameer, but you are bound to do this already. My interpretation of the Treaties which already exist between Afghanistan and Great Britain already binds you to do all that you now propose to do." Nothing could be more absurd than that statement. That was really the climax of Oriental ingenuity. What did the Envoy do? He said—"You point out to me in great detail the position of Afghanistan and the advantages which it will derive by being protected by Great Britain from any aggression of Russia: but I must remind you of what you told me three years ago. Then you read to me extracts from your despatches with Russia, and read to me assurances by which Russia promised not to meddle with Afghanistan, and that it was not within the sphere of her influence. Then now," says the Envoy—"I cannot think that all these assurances could be given between two such religious Governments like those of Russia and Great Britain, and by excellent and religious Envoys, and Secretaries of State, and after all there is the slightest reason to fear Russia's interfering with Afghanistan. He turned against us the despatches of 1873, which assured him that there was no danger to his dominions, and in that way the Conference continued until the Envoy died. But what was happening at Cabul all this time? Your Lordships will find it in the Central Asia Papers. Russian messengers were going to and from Cabul, and seldom was there a day when one was not present there, holding conferences and consultations with the Ameer. The Ameer was collecting troops on his Frontier; he was communicating with the Akhoond of Swat, the Patriarch of the Mahomedans, for the purpose of raising a religious war; while all the time the Envoy was wasting time, getting adjournments of the Conference for a week or a month, and insisting that he had no authority to give that which was a *sine quâ non* of a settlement. I should like to know, in these circumstances, what other course the Governor General ought to have pursued than the one he took when the Envoy died? It is said the Viceroy states that another Envoy was coming to agree to all our proposals. If the Viceroy had shut the door against any fresh overtures which the Ameer wished to make, I could have understood the suggestion that there was a precipitation and a want of indulgence towards the Ameer, although I do not think there would be any justification for saying that he wanted to pick a quarrel with him. The Mir Akhor, the only person on the spot, said he had no authority. The proceedings at Cabul being such as I have described, the Viceroy directed, as he was bound to do, the Conference to be closed; but it was intimated that the door would be kept open for the Ameer—as was actually done for more than a year—in order that he might come forward and accept those terms which he had in writing, and which he perfectly well knew would be agreed to by the Indian Government. Well, my Lords, that is the case with respect to the Conference with Sir Lewis Pelly; and up to this point my noble Friend (the Earl of Derby) said he agreed with the policy of the Government, that he was quite satisfied with the way in which the Conference was closed, and the despatches had stated the position of affairs at the end of the Conference. What my noble Friend objected to, he said, was what occurred afterwards. Now, my Lords, what occurred afterwards? More than a year elapsed. The Ameer kept himself back; he made no overture; he showed no disposition to accede to what we proposed; and then he received an Embassy which was sent to him on the part of the Russian Government. My noble Friend said he received that Embassy under compulsion. So far as the evidence in these Books is concerned, there is not the slightest evidence, that we can find, that there was any compulsion before the reception of that Embassy; and, so far as we have information which is not in these Books, all the public information goes the other way, and leads us to suppose that there was no compulsion whatsoever, but that the Embassy was received without anything like duress or pressure on the part of Russia. Well, my Lords, the noble Earl who spoke to-night asked what right or authority had we to require that our Envoy should be received? My Lords, I have seen that asserted elsewhere; and the case of Afghanistan has been likened to the case of some European Power with which we might have no relation by way of Treaty, but which we might require to receive an Embassy, and it is said that such a State might refuse to receive it. I shall not, my Lords, stop to inquire whether that would be so, because our relations with Afghanistan were of an entirely different nature. We had a Treaty—a Treaty of friendship—with Afghanistan; and it was absolutely necessary, in order to discharge our obligations under it, that we should have a right, in the ordinary way, to information as to what occurred in that country. But, in addition to that, Afghanistan is a country which had professed for years to lean upon us, and the Treaty was entirely connected with ourselves. Well, my Lords, when it was proposed that Afghanistan should be made a neutral zone, the Indian Government and the Russian Government declined it, on the ground that our relations with Afghanistan were not such as to enable us to look as neutrals upon that country, or to enable us to be bound by a Treaty forming Afghanistan into a neutral zone. And if your Lordships look at the Central Asia Papers you will see that the opinion of Russia and the opinion of Afghanistan also was this—that we had the power by Treaty to force upon Afghanistan a certain line of conduct with respect to the tribes and people of the country. Therefore, my Lords, in that state of things, it is idle to talk of the question of our right to send an Envoy to Afghanistan as if it was a question of sending an Envoy to the King of Dahomey, or to any country with which we have no Treaty relations whatever. We had, therefore, a perfect right to send an Envoy, and the only thing which led us to forbear from doing so was this—that the Ameer told us that if the Envoy of one Christian Power was received, the Envoy of another Christian Power would be received also. But the moment the Envoy of Russia was received and our Envoy was rejected, that excuse fell to the ground. My noble Friend (the Earl of Derby) said—"You ought to have taken this course with the Ameer—you ought to have allowed him very much more time. You ought not to have called upon him for an answer to your request at the time you did; and if you had given a greater lapse of time what would have happened would have been this," and, speaking with an appearance of almost absolute authority, my noble Friend told us what would then have occurred. Well, in the first place, I must remind your Lordships that the concession of a longer period would have meant the concession of the whole winter. It would have been the giving up of all the time necessary for purposes which might have to be accomplished. But what my noble Friend said was this—"If you had given a longer time, I can tell you what would have happened. The Ameer would have gone to Russia; he would have said to Russia, 'I have received your Embassy, and now I am called upon to receive a British Envoy, and I want to know whether if I resist you will see me through it, and fight for me?'" Then, says my noble Friend, it is perfectly certain that Russia would have said she would do nothing of the kind; that she would not fight; that he might make the best terms he could; and I think I heard my noble Friend say—but I am not quite sure of that—that Russia would have mediated. But, my Lords, what would be the state of things then? We should have given up the whole winter to Afghanistan on the chance of Afghanistan going to Russia and Russia saying she would not stir, and advising the Ameer to make terms with us, and, perhaps, offering to mediate. Well, I should like to know what would have been the result of that policy, which would have left the Ameer the master of the situation during the whole winter upon the chance that Russia might have come forward to mediate between England and Afghanistan—between England, the protector, and Afghanistan, the protected country. Yet my noble Friend would have had us leave the Ameer master of the situation, trusting to the chapter of accidents which might happen in the course of the winter. But might not the Ameer also have said that he now saw exactly what this great Power was going to do? That if he allowed the time given him to pass, possibly it would do him no harm; that he would trust to the lapse of the winter months, set us at defiance, and treat us as he had treated us hitherto. What, my Lords, would have been the result? My noble Friend says—"Well, but you have made war upon Afghanistan; but was there no one else? Is Afghanistan the only country which has done you wrong?" And my noble Friend admits that we have good reason to complain of what has been done and intended by Afghanistan; but he asks, Have you not cause of complaint against Russia also? I do not know whether my noble Friend meant to represent as his policy that he would have had us engage in a war with Russia. I rather think that what my noble Friend intended to convey was this—that inasmuch as he could show logically that if we went to war with Afghanistan we should go to war with Russia, therefore we should go to war with neither. That seemed to be the drift of my noble Friend's argument. Well, I can give my noble Friend two short answers, each of which is, I think, conclusive. If it had been the case that we should have gone to war with Afghanistan because the Ameer received a Russian Envoy, then I quite understand the argument that in that case we should have gone to war with Russia also for having sent an Envoy. But, my Lords, the mistake made by my noble Friend is, that we have gone to war with Afghanistan for having received a Russian Envoy. We have never said it; we have never thought it. What we have gone to war with Afghanistan for was for not receiving our own Envoy. That is the first answer. Here, my Lords, is the other. We requested Russia to withdraw her Envoy, and the Envoy has returned. We asked Afghanistan to receive our Envoy, and she refused. And yet the argument is, that because we have gone to war with the second, we ought to have gone to war with the first. Why, my Lords, it seems to me the most absurd thing in the world to say that we should go to war with Russia because the Ameer had refused to do that which we naturally and necessarily required him to do. Now, my Lords, I own I cannot help regretting the Amendment which has been moved by the noble Viscount. I said at the beginning that I was anxious not to treat this as a Party question; and I hope I have not said a word which would make anyone think that I desired to represent the conduct of any Party in these transactions in a Party spirit. But, my Lords, I know how this Motion will be looked at out-of-doors. It is very seldom the House of Lords has a Motion brought before it on a question of Supplies. The jurisdiction of this House as regards Supplies, as your Lordships all know, is very peculiar and very limited. I never heard of any case in which this House could interfere by an Amendment on a Motion of Supply until the Act of 1858 for the government of India was passed. Parliament, in passing that Act, provided that the House of Lords should have a power in regard to Supplies that it never before possessed; it provided that the Revenues of India for particular purposes—purposes of external war—should not be applied without the consent of both Houses of Parliament. The consequence is, that the House of Lords, as it appears to me, has upon this question a jurisdiction co-ordinate with that of the House of Commons. Well, it is a very singular thing that upon what I think is the second occasion at most on which that power has come before your Lordships to be exercised, a Motion should be made which would have the effect, if carried, of stopping the Supplies. The noble Earl is much too candid—much too straightforward—to put any disguise upon a matter of this kind. There is no doubt that, as the noble Earl says, it would have the effect, if carried, of annihilating the means of providing for the troops in India out of the Indian Revenues; and as this House has no jurisdiction over any other Revenues the very liberal offer made in the Preamble of the noble Viscount's Amendment must be taken for what it is worth.

This, then, is a Motion calling upon your Lordships who have power over the Revenues of India to stop the payment out of those Revenues of the troops now engaged in Afghanistan. My Lords, what object is to be gained by this Amendment? The noble Viscount (Viscount Halifax) says, in his Motion, that his object is to bring the war to an honourable conclusion. For my part, I cannot, for the life of me, see how the war, which, in the opinion of the noble Earl who spoke last (Earl Grey), is unjust, impolitic, and even criminal, can be brought to an "honourable conclusion." It can be brought to a conclusion, of course, like everything else; but how it can, under the circumstances, be brought to an "honourable conclusion," I confess, is more than I can understand. The noble Viscount, for his part, gave us a great deal of information with regard to Afghanistan of a not very encouraging kind. He said he knew Afghanistan very well, and that it was a terrible country. If our troops went into the valleys they would be surrounded by tribes from the hills; and if they went upon the hills they would not be able to get water from the valleys. If we sent small bodies of troops into the country they would be cut to pieces; and if we sent large bodies of troops the expense would be intolerable. If they went to Candahar they would be in great danger; and if they did not go to Candahar they would be in greater danger still. The noble Viscount fills the air with these sinister prophecies, and proposes to bring the war to an honourable conclusion by stopping the Supplies. Well, my Lords, I regret the course that has been taken by the noble Viscount. I believe it will be misunderstood in this country and still more in India. Our troops are engaged in a war which I am satisfied the great majority of the people of this country—and I believe the majority would be much greater were the question thoroughly understood—consider to be a war which could not have been avoided for the honour, for the dignity, and for the safety of our Indian Empire. That I take to be the feeling of this country; in India, I believe, there is no difference of opinion whatever; and in the face of that a Motion is proposed of the character I have described, a Motion which will be regarded here—and which I am certain will be regarded in India—as made for Party purposes. In considering a Motion of this kind, whatever may be the result of it, we are bound, in theory at least, to assume that, if carried, it may lead to the embarrassment or removal of the present Government. That, my Lords, is a very small matter. I am satisfied that if one Government in this country is removed, another will be found, without difficulty, to take its place. But if you endanger, or imperil, our Indian Empire, we can only lose it once. We have heard of the saying, "Perish India!" I do not stop to inquire by whom it was used or when; but, my Lords, I would say this—I care not what becomes of this or any other Government; I say, "Perish Governments;" but I implore your Lordships, in the vote which you are about to give on this question, to do nothing which will impair, or shake, or endanger the stability of our Indian Empire.

LORD SELBORNE said, he could not help being struck by the remarkable contrast presented by the speech of his noble and learned Friend (the Lord Chancellor) and that made by the Secretary of State for India (Viscount Cranbrook) at the opening of the debate. The Secretary of State for India treated the question before the House as being in no respect a financial one, and passed at once to a general defence of the Government policy. His noble and learned Friend, on the contrary, seemed to regard the financial aspect of the question as of vital importance, and assumed the effect of the Amendment before the House, if carried, to be a stoppage of the Supplies for the troops now engaged in Afghanistan. He (Lord Selborne) ventured to say that no such consequence was involved in the Amendment. The supporters of the Amendment thought it their duty to express their opinion on the policy of the Government which led to the war; but that duty being discharged, they would not only be ready, but, on the face of the Amendment, they professed to be ready to vote all the necessary Supplies for the conduct of the war. If any particular Member of their Lordships' House was of opinion that no portion of the Revenues of India ought to be applied to the war, he could have no objection to vote for the Amendment, because after its adoption he would be perfectly free to abide by his opinion. If, on the other hand, the majority of those who adopted the Amendment should be of opinion it was right to provide Supplies for the war out of Indian Revenues, there would be nothing to prevent their agreeing to such a step. He did not see that there was any inconsistency whatever in the views of those who thought the war unjust and impolitic, and who, nevertheless, professed a desire to bring it to an honourable conclusion. What they wished to avoid was anything which could disgrace or discredit the British arms, or endanger the safety of our gallant troops, who were now acting under orders as to the justice of which they could have no responsibility and no concern. At the same time, it would be necessary to put an end to the war as quickly as possible, due regard being had to the conditions he had specified. It was, therefore, mere rhetoric to speak of there being any inconsistency at all in the matter. His noble and learned Friend had said that in some quarter the cry had been raised of "Perish India!" He was not aware that such language had ever been employed. What he believed really did happen was that a distinguished historian, speaking at a public meeting in a manner, perhaps, not sufficiently guarded to obviate perverse misconstruction, said, in effect, that it would be better that their dominion in India should perish than that they should be disgraced by doing what was unjust and wrong. He did not, of course, mean that India should perish; but merely to express, in as strong language as he could, his abhorrence of what was unjust and wrong. When a man used the proverb "*Fiat justitia ruat cœlum,*" he did not mean that he wished the heavens to fall, but only that he wished justice to be done. No doubt his noble and learned Friend was thoroughly persuaded of the soundness of his own arguments and the justice of his own conclusions; but what could be the advantage of winding up with a suggestion that those who were in favour of this Amendment, or anybody in the House or out of it, wished India to perish, or was not fully convinced that the safety of India would be best promoted by that course which was most just, most honourable, and most wise, in dealing either with the Ameer or anyone else? His noble and learned Friend had said, that this was not a case for Party warfare: and had added that some sympathy should be shown to successors in office. He wished heartily that these questions had not been treated by anybody, or at any time, in a sense which would admit of the suggestion of Party warfare, or of there being any question between successors and predecessors in office; but was it not the despatch of the Secretary of State for India that raised questions between successors and predecessors in office, and showed, perhaps, less sympathy and indulgence than even the noble Lord would recommend not towards successors, but towards predecessors? Was not the able speech of the Secretary of State, of which he had no other complaint to make, almost from the beginning to the end an impeachment of the policy of his predecessors in office and of former Governors General more than anything else? The moment that despatch was written, no other course was open to the Government. It was not possible for them to vindicate their own policy except by accusing their predecessors of want of foresight and error of judgment, and by saying that the war was the result of the policy pursued by their predecessors. If a comparison of policy with policy had been imported into this discussion, it had been so imported because the present Government had presented its policy in contrast with that which preceded it, with the object of showing that the former policy was wrong. Another preliminary point touched upon by his noble and learned Friend was what was called the Constitutional question. There was no doubt whatever that the conduct of the Government in calling Parliament together was strictly within the Constitution; but what had been said, truly and wisely, by the noble Earl on the cross Benches (the Earl of Derby) was this—that it was of essential importance in these great matters not to strain the Constitution. The strength of the Constitution lay in keeping habitually within it when dealing with vital interests of the State. They could not revoke important public engagements by which the whole future of the country might be affected and all its resources might be pledged by afterwards turning out Ministers; they could not undo a war and restore a state of peace by passing a Vote of Censure upon those whose policy led to the war; and therefore it was essential that those who would act wisely, and really in the spirit of the Constitution, in those affairs which were necessarily intrusted to the Sovereign, should carry Parliament with them, as far as possible, in the preliminary policy as well as in the final one, and take Parliament into their counsel, so that it should have a substantial voice and judgment in these great matters, not only when it was too late, but before it was too late. Surely no stronger illustrations of the advantages of that doctrine could be adduced than those that were mentioned by the noble Earl (Earl Grey). An arrangement was sprung upon the country by surprise—which it might have disapproved if it had known of it before it was actually made—by which we were pledged, under all circumstances, to defend Turkey against foreign enemies, if Turkey would shape its domestic policy according to our views. What could be a stronger illustration of the danger of straining those powers of the Crown, than that such enormous engagements should be irrevocably contracted without Parliament being consulted before it was too late? So with regard to a war of this sort. It was not, as the noble and learned Earl had put it, that Parliament must always be consulted before going to war at all, and that secret information must be disclosed, but that Parliament must be consulted whenever and as soon as it is practicable. There might be occasions when it would be impossible, and when Parliament would not expect it to be done. No doubt great powers were given to the head of the State in order to provide for emergencies; but when a course of policy was definitely foreseen, and Parliament could be consulted without detriment to the interests of the country, then surely it ought to be taken into council as soon as possible. And the complaint was that this had not been done. For three years—during 1876-7-8—the Government had pursued a course which had led to war, and they paraded their policy as different from that of their predecessors, and on that account claimed credit for it. Yet so far from letting Parliament know the change which was going on, when they were pressed to take Parliament into their council, they unfortunately gave answers which everybody but themselves understood to represent the exact contrary of the facts. This was not acting in the spirit of the Constitution, and this was the only sense in which that question was raised. When the noble and learned Earl was instituting a comparison between Afghanistan and Scotland, he should have been glad to know whether the large map theory or the small map theory would have illustrated that argument best; but at the end of that course of instruction he failed to get any light from the comparison, and thought, on the whole, that it was a somewhat round-about process to go to the geography of Scotland for the purpose of understanding that of Afghanistan. The noble and learned Earl was loud in his praise of the foresight of Sir Henry Rawlinson, 10 years ago: but the predictions in the paper of Sir Henry Rawlinson had not been entirely verified. No railways had been constructed between the Caspian and the Sea of Aral, nor had steam navigation been established on the Oxus, so that the anticipated changes on which most of Sir Henry Rawlinson's alarm was founded had not been carried out. The opinions and actions of Lord Lawrence and his advisers were not correctly represented by saying that they did nothing but recommend England to make arrangements with Russia. Both Lord Lawrence and Lord Northbrook had done all that was wise and necessary for safety, not with reference only to communications with Russia, but also with reference to our relations towards Afghanistan: thinking, for the best possible reasons, that it would be inexpedient to do other things, the effect of which might have been to involve us in danger instead of improving our position; there was no ground whatever for the representation, that either of them recommended activity of reprisals and not of precaution. Was it fair to represent the Indian Government of that day as saying that nothing should be done in Afghanistan but merely to threaten Russia? He read the Papers very differently. His noble and learned Friend, adverting to what fell from the noble Earl (Earl Granville), the other evening, had said that noble Earl was now ready to follow a policy which he had declined to follow in 1873. What was the ground for that assertion? Simply this—that the Indian Government had suggested the communication to Russia of a particular despatch, urging that she should not interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan; which despatch his noble Friend (Earl Granville) then thought it inexpedient to send —and why? Because other communications had then recently passed between Russia and this country resulting in an arrangement upon that very subject; and if that Indian despatch had been sent, it might reasonably have given offence to Russia, as implying that we doubted her sincerity. But what had that to do with the Afghan policy,—to which his noble Friend and the Government of which he was a Member then as much as now adhered? It was true, Lord Northbrook did not give the Ameer the unconditional assurance of support at home and abroad which he wanted. His noble and learned Friend asked if we had to do over again now what was done in 1873, was there a man in their Lordships' House who would not give the Ameer the assurance he then asked for? He (Lord Selborne) did not believe there was a man in that House, not even excepting the noble and learned Earl himself, who would do it. He could not conceive any circumstances under which this country could possibly be justified in giving an unconditional guarantee against all enemies at home and abroad to the Ameer, and this was all that Lord Northbrook had refused to do. The present Government never offered to do anything of the kind, and would not have been justified in doing so if they had. If the late Government was to blame for not being alarmed about Russia in 1873, what were they to say of the Government of 1876, who, in the month of May, by the mouth of the Prime Minister, on two successive occasions, thus stated the condition of mind in which they then were, and wished all the world in and out of India to know it? In March, 1876, Mr. Disraeli, in the House of Commons, on one day said—

> "I am not of that school who view the advances of Russia in Asia with those deep misgivings that some do. I think that Asia is large enough for the destinies of both Russia and England."—[3 *Hansard*, ccxxviii. 500.]

And on the 5th of May he repeated those views, and added these words—

> "So far from looking forward with alarm to the development of the power of Russia in Central Asia, I see no reason why she should not conquer Tartary any more than why England should not have conquered India. I only wish that the people of Tartary may gain as much advantage by being conquered by Russia as the people of India from being conquered by this country."—[3 *Hansard*, ccxxix. 139.]

No doubt the Cabul Envoy, on the 12th of February, 1877, referred to certain things which happened in Lord Northbrook's time, as instances of what the Ameer considered objectionable interference with the internal affairs of Afghanistan; the intercession for Yakoob Khan, and the presents sent to a dependent Chief; and he objected also to the Seistan arbitration; but the attempt of Lord Lytton to impose on the Ameer the necessity of receiving British officers as Residents in his Kingdom was at the same time stated by the same Envoy to be in his view a much more serious interference, and greatly more objectionable than anything else. It was the same Envoy who stated, that while Lord Northbrook remained in India nothing had occurred to disturb the friendship which subsisted between the Indian Government and the Ameer. It was said that something had passed at the time of the Umballa Conference which justified the Indian Government in its new demands, and that the Ameer had been at that time willing to receive British Residents. There was, however, a difference in the testimony of the best informed persons as to what had occurred at that time. Mr. Seton-Karr, who was then the Indian Foreign Secretary, had stated, in an official letter written at that very time, that the Ameer was told we did not want British officers as residents at Cabul or anywhere else in his dominions, as he said they would do him harm in the eyes of his people. And at page 94 of the Papers would be found this passage from a despatch of Lord Mayo—

> "The policy that we had endeavoured to establish may be termed an intermediate one, that is to say . . . . we distinctly intimated to the Ameer that, under no circumstances, should a British soldier ever cross his frontier to assist him in coercing his rebellious subjects; that no European officers would be placed as Residents in his cities."

He did not know what might be Lord Mayo's reasons for giving that assurance; but Lord Mayo said it was a distinct intimation to the Ameer. The only conclusion which could safely be acted upon, under these circumstances, was that drawn in a passage of Lord Northbrook's despatch, which unfortunately the noble and learned Earl had not quoted, but which would be found at page 132, paragraph 20. It was as follows:—

> "Looking to all the circumstances of the case, the absence of any formal record of the alleged admission, its entirely private and confidential nature, and the uncertainty as to its scope and intention, we consider that we should not be justified in founding any representation to the Ameer regarding the Mission of a British Agent to Herat upon the assumption that he had, when at Umballa, expressed his willingness to agree to such an arrangement."

Nevertheless, Her Majesty's Government had thought fit to act upon the contrary view. Supposing it was advisable to attempt to get these Agents at Herat and Candahar, he did not think that would dispense with the necessity of obtaining information from Cabul, for which we should still have to depend upon Native Agents: and the importance of the object could hardly be sufficient to justify a new departure in policy for the sake of it. If, however, it was as important as the Government considered it to be, what was the course which a wise politician would have taken to accomplish the object he had in view? He would have put the bait before the fish first that he might swallow the hook. Instead of that the Ameer was ordered to swallow the hook first, as a condition which must precede his getting the bait afterwards. Instead of saying—"We want to have British Residents in your territory," a wise politician would say—"We wish to make a Treaty upon the most beneficial terms to you. Of course, we must have reasonable safeguards, but they can be discussed afterwards." Then, if the advantages offered proved attractive to the Ameer, when we came afterwards to settle the conditions, we might insert one about Residents, and unless the objections to Residents were, from the nature of the case, really insuperable and likely to throw his dominions into confusion, the Ameer would most likely have agreed to that condition. But to say at the commencement of the discussion—"We will not negotiate with you at all, unless you assent to this condition"—why, if we intended to invite failure we could not possibly have taken a better course. It had precisely the effect predicted by Lord Northbrook and his advisers—it ended in the loss of all the influence we had previously gained. His noble and learned Friend protested against the use of language which imputed to the Government an attempt to force British Residents on the Ameer. But force could be applied, morally as well as physically; and, if moral force could be employed by saying, in the most direct and unceremonious way, that the stronger intended to impose his own terms upon the weaker, that was the course which had been taken in the present case. To be sure that language was not held to the Ameer; it was to the Native British Envoy; but it was Lord Lytton's object, and his direction to the Envoy, that at least its general tenour should be communicated to the Ameer. Even deducting all the strongest phrases, about iron pots and pipkins, as meant to be translated into something more civil, the effect would still be menacing and would come to this—"If you don't do all we want, you will lose our protection, and your dominions will be effaced either by us, or by Russia with our consent, from the map of Asia." And after all, when Sir Lewis Pelly's Mission had taken place, when the Ameer's Envoy was dead, and his successor was expected with instructions to concede all that was asked, the Government of India suddenly changed their front, and broke up the Conference; saying, that in the actual situation of affairs they thought it would be no longer useful to prolong the controversy. If Russia could have dictated a policy, surely that was the very policy she would have dictated. It was telling the Ameer, in point of fact—"You must make your own arrangements with Russia, if you wish to be safe." Because the Ameer would not grant that which Lord Mayo said they would never ask, he was treated as a criminal. A more utterly suicidal and destructive policy, if the object were to strengthen our influence in Afghanistan, he could not possibly conceive. Well, when we had said and done all this, we nevertheless ended by giving to the Ameer a distinct pledge, approved by Her Majesty's Government at home. On the 15th March, 1877, Sir Lewis Pelly assured Syud Noor that the British Government had no sort or kind of quarrel with the people of Afghanistan, and closed the Conference by this declaration—

> "Meanwhile, the Afghan people may rest fully assured that so long as they are not excited by their Ruler, or others, to acts of aggression upon the territories or friends of the British Government no British soldier will ever be permitted to enter Afghanistan uninvited." [*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 220.]

He wanted to know how had that promise been kept; what acts of aggression on the territory of friends of the British Government had been committed by the Ameer when the present war was declared and when British soldiers entered Afghanistan? Sir Lewis Pelly went on to say—

> "The Ameer, therefore, so long as he remains faithful to those Treaty stipulations which your Excellency has involved on behalf of His Highness, and which the British Government fully recognizes as still valid, and therefore binding upon the two contracting parties, need be under no apprehension whatever of any hostile action on the part of the British Government."—[*Ibid.*]

Had the Ameer broken those Treaty stipulations? He found no stipulations in the Treaty that the Ameer should receive our Envoys at any time we might please to choose, with or without escort, or that he should hold no communication with Russia. On the contrary, he had for several years with our knowledge been communicating with Russia. What were our engagements? We engaged to respect the territory of Afghanistan, "now in His Highness' possession," and therefore not to send British soldiers uninvited into Afghanistan to rectify our Frontier, nor to force by menace British Residents into the Ameer's cities. His noble and learned Friend had said there was nothing in the Papers to show that the Ameer was unwilling to receive a Russian Envoy. That statement was, however, not correct, as appeared from the following telegram from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State, dated July 30, 1878—

> "British Native Medical Officer lent some time ago to Ameer returned on leave to Peshawur, the 21st instant, reporting that Kaufmann, with troops, had reached Karki, and was personally proceeding to see Ameer. Afghan officials at the Oxus tried to stop him, pending Ameer's orders; but he declined to obey them. Ameer thereupon sent orders forbidding opposition to Russian officers. Native Doctor heard Ameer tell his Minister in durbar, 7th July, that Kaufmann, or officer of equal rank from Tashkend, had crossed Oxus on road to Cabul, refusing to be stopped."—[*Ibid.* p. 227.]

Lord Selborne

This expression "refusing to be stopped" was repeated in a telegram from Major Cavagnari, and in a subsequent letter from the Ameer himself. All the evidence in the Papers, whether more or less, was to the effect that the Russians would not be stopped when the local officers objected to their proceeding. He could not but express his profound dissatisfaction both at the conduct of the Indian Government in September, 1878, and at the justification which had been offered for that conduct. It had been said that the Ameer repeatedly, steadfastly, and obstinately refused to receive our Mission. He ventured to say there was no ground for that statement. On the contrary, the Ameer offered to receive our Mission, provided that he were allowed a short and reasonable time, and that it was not pressed upon him in a manner derogatory to his independence. Sir Neville Chamberlain sent a letter on the 18th of September, asking—

> "Am I authorised to endeavour to detach the tribes permanently from the Ameer's control? . . . . It should be clearly understood that our doing this will be viewed by the Ameer as an act of hostility."—[*Ibid.* 242.]

The authority so asked for was given, and the course so suggested was taken, before the Ameer had given any answer to our requests. The Ameer was willing to consent to receive the Mission, provided a short and reasonable delay was allowed, and that it was not forced on him in a menacing and offensive manner. That delay was refused, and what was the excuse for the refusal? That if it had been granted, it might have been necessary to postpone military operations until the end of the year, although we had not declared war against the Ameer, or intimated our intention of doing so. He would very much rather, as an Englishman, have given the Ameer the time he asked for, and then have acted as might have been just if he did not keep his word and receive the Mission, even although we might have been put to some military disadvantages in consequence. Some previous Governments of this country had been charged with "meddling and muddling." If he were at all disposed to use such epithets, he thought, looking at every single step which had been taken in that matter, that the policy which had been pursued in it might be called one of bullying and blundering. If our object was to strengthen the influence of this country and obtain ascendency in Afghanistan, he was wholly unable to conceive what possible course of policy more calculated to defeat that object could have been followed than that which had been adopted. At every step errors had been committed that were entirely unnecessary, and this war, in consequence, was completely unjustifiable. He could only repeat the question of the noble and learned Earl on the Woolsack, and ask—Was there ever a policy so little consistent with our knowledge of human nature? He would not enter into the remoter political considerations as to what might be the consequences of this war. He was no great admirer of the peculiarities of Russian government, nor would he by any means be prepared to justify all the acts of Russian policy in Asia, or in Europe. Nevertheless, he had always held it to be the wise and true policy of this country, for the sake of the peace and benefit of all European nations, and for the safety and welfare of our Indian Possessions, to endeavour to be upon as good and friendly terms with Russia as Russia would permit us to be. It seemed, however, as if the whole policy of the Government had, unfortunately, tended in the opposite direction. Even while they assisted in the negotiation of peace they continued to brandish the sword at a great Power with whom it was our interest, as far as possible, to live in amity; and when they were, by their own confession, not in a position to make what had happened in Afghanistan a cause of quarrel with that great Power, they yet took measures against Afghanistan without adequate justification, which, though they might not provoke any immediate manifestation of the hostility of Russia, still must be felt by that country to be hostile in principle and spirit to her as well as to Afghanistan. He did not pretend to say what the consequences might be; but he said we were engaged in a war which, in his humble opinion, both might and ought to have been avoided, and of which he could neither see the necessity nor the justice. He must, therefore, support the Amendment of his noble Friend.

LORD HOUGHTON said, that the noble Earl who began that debate (Earl Grey), with the great candour which was, perhaps, the most remarkable part of his character, had told them that, notwithstanding that he had many years ago held a different opinion from that of his Colleagues as to the manner in which Afghanistan ought to be regarded by the Indian Government, he had not thought it his duty to leave the Government which prosecuted the war with that country to an end. He drew from that confession of the noble Earl the deduction that the present question was one on which both sides of the House ought to show much indulgence towards each other. He did not believe that any personal discussion of that matter could be advantageous or useful. If Indian Governors General and Secretaries of State were to go on criticizing each other, or imputing to their predecessors errors not only of judgment but of morality, it would be impossible to secure the services of independent or honourable men, or to govern our great Dependency with anything like the unity of purpose and the security with which it had been governed for more than 100 years. He was old enough to remember the time of Lord Auckland, and the war to which the opener of the debate had alluded. The former war in Afghanistan was prosecuted for the same purpose as the present one; but there was this difference between the two—that the former war was a case of suspicion, and the present war was a case of certainty, as against Russia. The different temper in which the former war was dealt with by Parliament, as compared with the present occasion, was illustrated by the fact that Lord Auckland was not made the object of serious political animadversion in either House, but was considered to have acted to the best of his judgment, even although the issue was so disastrous. He could not vote for the Amendment now before their Lordships. The words of the Amendment were that the war was unnecessary; and, therefore, everyone who voted for it would, in effect, say that Her Majesty's Government were spending the blood and the money of the country in a war which might well be avoided, and for which they themselves could offer no complete vindication. The noble Earl who spoke first that night (Earl Grey) laid down very distinctly the lines within which the advancing morality of the world now confined the right to go to war. He (Lord Houghton) would go further, and say that the first and the growing impression of the civilized world, notwithstanding the enormous standing armies which now existed—notwithstanding the great wars which had of late years occurred—was this—that no war was justifiable that was not a war of self-defence. It was solely because he believed this war to be one of self-defence that he could not support the Amendment. If the Ameer was to be made the centre of the picture—if Afghanistan was a separate country, the relations of which with India were such as those of Scinde—both sides of the House would be very apathetic with respect to such a State. Hours had been spent in speeches as to the character of the Ameer, and as to whether this or that message ought to have been sent to him at a particular time; but what had such matters to do with the real question before their Lordships' House? He was very much of the opinion of Lord Napier of Magdala, who had said in a Memorandum of May 30, 1878—

> "We have unfortunately managed Shere Ali badly. Perhaps it might not have been possible, with our scruples, and his want of them, to have managed him advantageously; but it must be admitted that we have not given him the reasons to unite himself with us that he naturally expected."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 225.]

He would not go into the question of our relations with Afghanistan; but he would ask, why had they been entered into? Would they have been, had there been nothing behind the Ameer? If the Ameer was an independent Sovereign the case would have been different; but there was no pretence for regarding him as an independent Sovereign. All the arguments, therefore, as to International Law and the personal treatment of the Ameer were of very small relative importance. Afghanistan lay between the great, consolidated Empire of India, and the great, growing, progressive, and aggressive Empire of Russia; and although the comparison of Lord Lytton, that it was like an earthen pipkin between two iron pots, had much better have never been made, it described exactly the Ameer's position. So long ago as 1870—as appeared by the Papers on the Table of their Lordships' House—a Russian official, writing in that capacity to the Ameer, said that, though they were distant neighbours, they should live in harmony, and assured him that Russia would not interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and gave as one reason that that country was under the protection of England, with which Power Russia was on the most friendly relations. Russia, therefore, knew long ago the relations which existed between England and Afghanistan; and when hostile feelings grew up between Russia and England, necessarily and naturally those feelings extended to Afghanistan. He would only say of the conduct of Russia in those matters that she acted towards us under the influence of the uncertain faith with which she had been in the habit of dealing with Oriental nations; and nothing had more alienated from her the confidence of the English people than her action in Afghanistan. He (Lord Houghton) viewed our present military expedition as directed to prevent Afghanistan from getting beyond the range of English authority, and possibly getting into the range of Russian authority. The story of Khiva must have produced the impression on the mind of the Ameer that Russia was not only a great, but an unscrupulous Power, and he felt that he must have the present certainty of protection from England, or that his only alternative was to place himself under the protection of Russia; and this consideration, doubtless, led him to adopt the course which he had taken. The present was, as he had said, a war on the part of England of self-defence. Much adverse criticism had been bestowed on the Prime Minister's desire for a "scientific Frontier;" but if by this was meant a Frontier that could be easily defended, he saw no great harm in it. Indeed, a scientific Frontier in that sense would be practically useful and right. As to the two opinions held by military authorities, he would not feel justified in giving a vote which implied that he thought one side was right and the other side entirely wrong. He was informed, however, that a new idea held among the strategists of India was that of a delimited Frontier which should not include any large portion of Afghanistan, nor make us responsible for the administration of any large portion of it. It seemed that a Frontier might be devised which should secure us absolutely against any future conduct of the kind now resented, even though the Ameer admitted Russian influence and intrigue into his country. He could only say that if by a very limited annexation of Afghan territory a Frontier could be obtained which would render India practically safe from invasion on the North-West, it would be very desirable to have it. The Government might, in fact, incur serious blame if they failed to rectify an indefensible Frontier when a legitimate occasion for doing so arose. Another reason why he could not vote for the Amendment was that the effect of a difference of opinion among us with regard to the war could not fail to be unfortunate at the present moment; because, declaringas it did the war to be unnecessary, it would cause great pain to our gallant soldiers, who were now shedding their blood for us in Afghanistan.

THE MARQUESS OF BATH said, that it was perfectly consistent to be prepared to give every support to our troops in the field, and to conclude the war without injury to our dominions in India, yet, at the same time, to condemn the policy that had led to the war, and the means by which that policy had been carried out. He would not trouble their Lordships with the question of Prerogative. It seemed to him that whatever might have been the use of the Prerogative, and whether or not the Government was justified in declaring war without the consent of Parliament, what Parliament had to complain of was this —not that they had declared war without its previous consent, but that they had for some years studiously concealed from Parliament the change of policy that had led to the war. If the case of the Ameer was as good as it had been made out by the Secretary of State and by the noble and learned Earl on the Woolsack, it was rather unfortunate that the Government should have gone to war with him. The Ameer knew that England was bound to defend him against aggression from the North; and therefore he did not care about obtaining a formal guarantee of our protection, except with regard to possible disturbance within his own dominions, which was properly refused him both by the late and the present Administrations. As to the increasing power of Russia in Central Asia, it was a pity the Secretary of State for India (Viscount Cranbrook) had not sat in that House long enough to have heard his Predecessor (the Marquess of Salisbury) ridicule the idea of Russia's advance involving any danger to us, though it might occupy some future generation of statesmen. Certain subjects of a personal nature could not be disposed of by calling them personal matters, for they affected the credit of Ministers and of the country. The Question asked in the House last June by the Duke of Argyll was clear and distinct, and so was the reply of the noble Marquess. That reply was received by the House and the country as an assurance that there was no change in the policy of the Government and no danger of any disturbance in our Indian Empire, and as such an assurance it was acknowledged by the noble Earl (the Earl of Northbrook); but when they looked at the Papers on the Table they saw that when the noble Marquess made that statement the Government were trying to press an Envoy upon the Ameer at Herat, and that our relations were getting worse every day, and that the feeling of the Ameer against England was becoming more embittered. But suppose it were possible, as the noble Marquess contended, to accept the construction he had placed upon his words, what did it come to? A Minister of the Crown in that House conveyed to the minds of those who heard him erroneous impressions with regard to the policy he was pursuing; and, knowing that those erroneous impressions were received as true, considered he was justified, because it was possible to put another construction upon his language—at variance with those impressions, and not at variance with the truth. Nothing would be so fatal to a man's character in private life as the suspicion that there might be a second and undiscerned sense in the meaning of his words; and any statesman would lose consideration with the public when it was known that an occult meaning must be looked for in his words—different from the meaning they conveyed, from the meaning those who heard them believed them intended to convey. The country had been kept in the dark on this question, and had been misled. The Indian Press had been encouraged to write in favour of warlike measures, and to give to steps ordered from home the appearance of an Indian origin. The incidents connected with the repulse of the Mission had been misrepresented before the true account was received; the whining reply of the Ameer had been characterized as insulting to an extent not borne out by the text; Minutes had been published by the Government to support their policy, and others opposed to it kept back; and all to involve us in a war in which certain victory would bring little credit, and could only add embarrassments to an overburdened Indian Exchequer. He attributed the sufferings which had been caused to the people to the policy adopted by Her Majesty's Government to secure "Peace with honour"—honour for themselves; for the country—peace, without repose or prosperity; the costs, the troubles of war, without its glories.

THE EARL OF JERSEY felt he owed no apology to noble Lords for the course he was about to pursue. Some noble Lords who usually sat on that (the Ministerial) side of the House had declared their intention to vote against Her Majesty's Government; while on the other side some who, he might say, were unconnected with official Opposition had declared their intention of voting for the Government. He thought the course which he intended to take was consistent alike with the interests of Party and the honour of his country. The noble Marquess had just sung a terrible dirge on lesser England; but he could not believe that the Ministers would in any way be affected by that expression of opinion. They had heard what the real opinion and intention of the Government was, and he, for one, was prepared to support that opinion. As for the remarks of the noble Marquess he would leave the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to explain himself, and he had no doubt he would do so in a manner satisfactory to the House and the country. The noble Earl who commenced the debate that evening (Earl Grey) told them that the war was illegitimate, unnatural, and criminal. These were certainly strong expressions; but the noble Earl had failed to make out that Her Majesty's Ministers had pursued an illegitimate course in calling Parliament together, or an unnatural course in looking after our interests in India, or a criminal course in supporting by the Army of England the honour and interests of the Empire. The noble Earl had stated that it would be impossible for an English Envoy to live in Afghanistan; but he did not seem to think that a Russian Envoy would be in danger at Cabul. The speech of the noble Lord the Secretary of State for India would find many an echo out-of-doors. He laid down the basis of a clear and intelligible policy—a policy to which, on more than one occasion, Russian Ministers had given their adherence—that Afghanistan should be beyond the sphere of Russian action. But the acts of Russia did not always tally with her words. Her policy was, no doubt, a very subtle one—she sent friendly letters to the Ameer containing accounts of the success of the Russian arms, and even a Russian Governor General was able to tell the Ameer that he could not refuse to receive a Mission, because it was sent by the Emperor of Russia. The late Viceroy of India said we had no right to take umbrage because the Ameer had chosen Russia as an Ally; but it was the unanimous opinion of statesmen and generals that England could not allow Russian influence to be predominant in Afghanistan. It was said the Ameer was independent; he was not so in the ordinary meaning of the term. He was obliged to us for money and arms, and he came to us to answer his letters. This was more like pupilage than independence. It was said we should have allowed the Ameer more time for deliberation; but when a great danger was to be averted it was right that timely precautions should be taken. Russian promises had been accepted by them as men of honour long enough, but they now knew what those promises were worth; and when the Ameer took for his Ally the enemy of this country it was time to take action. If there was a time when it became necessary to avert an open danger by war, there was surely a time when it was necessary to avert an insidious and lurking danger by taking proper precautions. He could not help thinking that Russian policy towards India had been based on deception and aggression. Were the Government to allow Russian intrigue to increase at Cabul? While we were negotiating with the Ameer, Russian influence would be growing. Russia knew how to wage an unofficial war; and the time might come when the Afghan troops might be thrown into Her Majesty's territory, officered by others than Afghans. While we were negotiating Russia would have been preparing for war, and Her Majesty's Government would have been held responsible for their own inaction. Fortunately, they decided to take action in time. Her Majesty's Government decided that if responsibility was to be incurred they would incur it; that they would not hesitate to act; and that before the serpent was hatched they would break the egg. If Her Majesty's Government had not hesitated to incur responsibility, he trusted their Lordships' House would to-night share that responsibility. But Her Majesty's Government had incurred something else. They had been made the butt of the speeches of every rampant orator and every disappointed statesman. Upon their heads had been showered abuse of every kind, because they preferred their duty to their country to following the vain crotchets of irresponsible men. It was only a short time ago that he read the speech of a Member of Parliament who likened Her Majesty's Government to pick-pockets. Fortunately, they were indifferent to charges of that kind, and, instead of answering them, preferred to be consistent in their duty. He trusted they would continue to do so; that they would remain firm in the policy they were now pursuing; and that when the heat of Party passion had passed away — when the clouds which now hung over the plains of Roumelia, as well as the mountains of Afghanistan, had been dispelled by the resolute attitude of Her Majesty's Government—the people of this country would not forget the debt which they owed to them; and that of them it might be said, as had been said of other statesmen—

"Not once or twice, in our fair island story,
The path of duty was the way to glory."

THE MARQUESS OF RIPON said, that when those who did not approve the policy of the Government contended that Parliament should have been consulted before war was declared they were told that such a doctrine was altogether un-Constitutional, and tended to interfere with the Prerogative of the Crown. On the other hand, when war had been declared, they were told by his noble Friend opposite (the Earl of Jersey) that if they challenged the policy of the Government they were forgetting what was due to the gallant services of our Army. These two objections destroyed each other. There was one thing, however, which was satisfactory in this debate, and that was that it was now admittted on all hands that the policy pursued by Her Majesty's present Government differed widely from that which had been pursued up to the time they entered office. They had been told by the noble Duke (the Duke of Somerset) that changed circumstances required a changed policy, and by the noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Cranbrook) that it was foolish to think that the policy pursued towards Afghanistan in 1878 should be the same as that of 1868. But then we were reminded, in justification of this altered policy, of the course of events in Central Asia, and of the progress and designs of Russia. He was not insensible to that progress, or trustful of those designs; though he was not one of those who were accustomed to attribute to the Government of Russia and its agents supernatural abilities and supernatural wickedness. But one of the main reasons why he should vote for the Amendment of the noble Viscount was that he was convinced that in this case, as in that of South-Eastern Europe during the last year or two, Her Majesty's Government had, unintentionally, no doubt, but steadily and very successfully, played the game of Russia. He would undertake to establish that assertion in a few moments out of the Papers which had been laid on the Table of the House. There was an old saying—"Forewarned is forearmed;" but Her Majesty's Government had continued to pursue the policy against which they had been warned. His noble Friend (the Earl of Northbrook) had told Her Majesty's Government that if they were to insist upon the policy of the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury) the effect would be "to throw Afghanistan into the arms of Russia at the first opportunity." That policy had been insisted on, and it had thrown Afghanistan into the arms of Russia at the first opportunity. Not only did the noble Marquess, in 1875, require that the Ameer should be called upon to receive British officers at Herat and Candahar, but he also urged the Viceroy to find some occasion for sending a Mission to Cabul and to press that Mission very earnestly upon the Ameer. That the noble Marquess did, notwithstanding the opinions of the most competent officers in India and of his noble Friend who was then Viceroy. Therefore, he had a right to say that Her Majesty's Government had adopted a course which was effectually playing into Russian hands. It had been amply shown, too, in the course of the debate, that the means by which it had been sought to obtain the object in view were even more ill-advised than the object itself. The first letter to the Ameer asking him to receive a Mission was dated on the 5th of May, which was, by a remarkable coincidence, the very day upon which the noble Earl (the Earl of Beaconsfield) told the House of Commons that he had no fear of Russian advance in Central Asia. Perhaps sufficient attention had not been paid to that first demand for the reception of a Mission. He had the pleasure of knowing Sir Lewis Pelly personally, and was aware that he was a gentleman of great intelligence, and a zealous public servant, who might be employed to great advantage in many situations. Still, he thought the choice of Sir Lewis Pelly was in this case singularly unfortunate, because he was the principal disciple of General John Jacob, who was, if not the inventor, at all events the chief supporter of what was called the "forward school" of Indian policy, whilst the fact of his being the author of a work entitled *The Views and Opinions of General Jacob*, in which the taking of Quettah was advocated, with a view to an advance on Candahar, would render him most unacceptable to the Ameer. It was a remarkable circumstance that until the demand for Sir Lewis Pelly's Mission was made there was no Russian Agent permanently residing at Cabul. After the Conference at Peshawur the Ameer was left to his own devices, and yet some noble Lords were astonished at his turning to Russia. For his own part, he thought it extremely unfortunate that the Ameer should have turned to Russia; but, really, Her Majesty's Government gave him the best possible reason for doing so. Again, with respect to the steps taken after the reception of the Russian Mission at Cabul, it seemed to him (the Marquess of Ripon) that they were in many respects specially calculated to defeat the object which the Viceroy had in view. The moment Lord Lytton heard of the death of the Ameer's favourite son, Abdoollah Jan, he ought to have paused. He must have known, surely, that the grief of Shere Ali was such, when he lost his former son, that, although a civil war was raging in his dominions and he had all but lost his Throne, he shut himself up for many weeks in Candahar and refused to be seen. The noble Lord, then, might have imagined what would be his grief on the death of his favourite son; but, notwithstanding, the demand was sent, and the acceptance of the Mission forced upon him even before the 40 days, the formal time of mourning, had expired. No wonder that the Ameer felt great irritation. The noble Viscount opposite told them last night that the letter of condolence sent to the Ameer on the death of his favourite son was not answered in a reasonable time, and that this was considered a grave insult by Orientals; but what would be thought here in the West if a man professing to be the friend of another who had sustained such a bereavement should, at the same time that he sent a letter of condolence to his friend, also write to him about a most disagreeable matter of business? Such a proceeding would naturally be resented by the receiver of the communication. There was, indeed, one explanation of these proceedings which was sometimes put forward by supporters of the Government, and which had been hinted at that night, by which it was said that they had all along desired to take advantage—to use a phrase of the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury)—of any circumstances which might enable them to obtain that rectification of Frontier, which was their real object in Afghanistan. He did not say that the Government had pursued that course. The language used by the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Beaconsfield) at the Guildhall gave only too much colour to the theory; but he did not find it in the despatch of the noble Viscount, and he would not charge any

English Minister with conduct so utterly unjustifiable. He would now ask their Lordships to consider what was the character of the contest in which they were engaged. Sir Henry Rawlinson, a supporter of the policy of the Government—if, indeed, he were not its author—in his recent article in *The Nineteenth Century*, said—

> "War with Afghanistan is to be deprecated beyond all other wars, because, however it may end, it will leave behind it a heavy legacy of debt and the hatred of people who ought to be our friends."

Such, then, was the war in which Her Majesty's Government had involved the country. For what ends was it being pursued? In the course of this discussion they had had two speeches from Members of the Government, and two alone. What had been the cause of this unusual silence he could not say; but before the debate came to a close the Government ought to give the House some inkling at least of the objects and purposes with which they were prosecuting that contest. At the present moment they knew nothing about them. The noble Viscount (Viscount Cranbrook) had told them the previous day that we must be paramount and supreme in Afghanistan. Upon these words a very wide construction could be placed; and he thought the Government were bound to tell Parliament, from whom they were asking Supplies, whether the war was merely to be waged to punish the Ameer for the insult he was said to have offered us, to obtain satisfaction for that insult, and to carry out the objects stated in the last paragraph of the last despatch of the noble Viscount (Viscount Cranbrook), or whether it was intended to procure a rectification of Frontier — of which there was no mention in that despatch, although it had been mentioned in the Prime Minister's speech. If the last was their real object, what was the extent of the spoliation which was concealed behind the dark word "rectification?" Was it to be the rectification recommended by Sir Henry Rawlinson, which was the military occupation of Western Afghanistan; or what we were told in the newspapers was the policy of the Government of India—to occupy the triangle of Jellalabad, Cabul, and Candahar; or was it to be a more limited rectification, starting from Jellalabad and passing down the mountains to the South-West, which would have the effect of transferring to our rule some of the wildest and most savage tribes on the face of the earth? To these questions the House had a right to demand an answer. Their Lordships were told that if they were not prepared to refuse the Supplies they ought not to pass censure on the Government; but in the case of the war with China—which he had believed to be unnecessary and unjust, just as he believed the present war to be so, and against which he, in common with Members of the existing Government, had voted — no such doctrine as that had been recognized. It would be unjust, he fully admitted, that the Government should be severely condemned if, in the course of a series of long and complicated transactions, they had made some mistakes of detail. But, in the present case, the root of the evil lay in the policy itself, which the Government had adopted. They had deliberately rejected the principles that for nearly 40 years—from the time of Lord Ellenborough, the Duke of Wellington, and Sir Robert Peel, down to that of the present Administration—had governed our conduct towards Afghanistan, and which had been acted upon without exception by every Ministry at home and every Governor General in India; they had embarked on their novel policy in spite of the warnings of the men best qualified to speak; and the result had been to fulfil to the letter the predictions of those whose counsels they had rejected. Their Representative in India—the Viceroy—for whose conduct they were fully responsible, had pursued the policy thus entered upon in a manner which would have wrecked a better cause; he deliberately closed the Conference at Peshawur when he knew that if he waited for a few hours all his demands would be conceded; and he had thrown the Ameer into the arms of Russia, as his noble Friend (the Earl of Northbrook) had foretold; and then, when at length he was brought face to face with the inevitable consequences of the course which he had pursued, he so conceived and executed his attempts to extricate himself as to render their failure certain. It was against such a policy, begun so rashly, carried on so unwisely, concealed so studiously from Parliament, marked on more than one occasion by a dark stain of injustice, and ending in the establishment of a Russian Mission at Cabul, and in war with a people with whom it was our interest to be friendly, that he protested that night; and he should vote for the Amendment in order to clear himself from all complicity with proceedings which he believed in his conscience to be so deeply injurious to the reputation and to the interests of the country.

VISCOUNT MIDLETON considered that the conclusions at which the noble Marquess who had just spoken (the Marquess of Ripon) had arrived were strangely at variance with the facts of the case. What were those facts? The basis of our relations with Afghanistan was admitted to be the Convention entered into by the Government of India and the late Ameer Dost Mahomed. Upon his death, eight years afterwards, there occurred one of those struggles which seemed to be the normal condition of Afghanistan after the demise of one of its Rulers. It was not until the year 1868 that any formal acknowledgment of the present Ameer on the part of our Government was made, and since that time he had many grievances to bring forward against us, the head and front of which—and this occurred during the holding of his office by the noble Earl the late Viceroy (the Earl of Northbrook)—had reference to our preference for his eldest son, whom he desired to put aside in favour of his son by a favourite wife, and this grievance he mentioned with some bitterness in his recent reply to the Ultimatum sent to him by the present Viceroy. It had been asserted that there was no change in the bearing of the Ameer towards us. Such an assertion could not be maintained. His bearing had greatly changed since the days of Lord Mayo; and he had no doubt that had that noble Lord lived the personal influence he exercised over the present Ameer would have saved us from the trouble in which we now found ourselves. About the time of the War of Succession Lord Russell took note of the progress of Russia in Central Asia, and he received from the Government of that country assurances that their objects were purely commercial and pacific. In 1867 similar assurances were received from Russia, and they were repeated to Mr. (now Sir) Douglas Forsyth in St. Petersburg by the Russian Chancellor, who, in 1873, wrote to the same effect, stating distinctly that "we consider Afghanistan altogether beyond the sphere of Russian operations." Their Lordships were aware how those promises were kept. In 1873 the noble Earl the late Viceroy pointed out in one of his despatches that the advance of Russia in Central Asia could not but be regarded with anxiety in Afghanistan. The change in the Ameer's conduct towards us in 1873 was, he believed, entirely owing to his distrust of the confiding simplicity of the Government of that day. The conduct of Russia in seeking to ingratiate herself with the Ameer, in breach of her solemn assurances, was a matter into which he would not enter further than to say that it seemed to him fully to justify the desire of the present Government to obtain the admission of English officers to Cabul and other places in the Ameer's dominions. He did not see why Afghanistan should be treated differently from the Native States in India in which we had established Residents. When Tippoo Sahib declined to receive our Envoy we marched troops into his dominions, with what result they all knew. The course taken by the Government in the present instance was very similar to that pursued towards Tippoo Sahib, and he anticipated for it an equally auspicious termination. If the case for the reception of our officers in Afghanistan was strong before, it was doubly strong when it transpired that a Russian Embassy had been received with every mark of favour at Cabul, while our Native Agent was only allowed to transmit to us such information as the Ameer or his officers thought convenient. With regard to the question of the Frontier, he would only remind their Lordships that the defenders of India, when they encountered their invaders in the plains, had invariably been worsted; and that the same lesson was taught by the collapse of the Turkish resistance in the late war as soon as the Russians managed to cross the Balkans. A scientific or strategical Frontier was therefore a matter of vital importance to India; and whatever the opinions entertained in reference to it 10 or 12 years ago, no one could maintain that we ought to be guided by them in the altered circumstances of the present day. Her Majesty's Government could not have done more than they had done, and they ought to have done no less; their measures had been dictated by prudence and common sense; and an adverse vote at this crisis would cripple the energies, if it would not paralyze the arm, of England.

THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK: My Lords, in addressing some remarks to your Lordships this evening, I wish to commence by expressing the gratification which I have felt at the gallantry which has been shown by Her Majesty's Forces in the field in Afghanistan. I wish also to express my confidence in the officers in command of those Forces—Sir Samuel Browne and General Roberts — who have conducted successful operations in the field, and General Stewart and General Biddulph, who have had no such opportunity yet, but who, I am sure, will justify their reputation when they have that opportunity. Having been personally acquainted with those officers, I believe that better selections could not have been made. The spirit which Her Majesty's British and Native Forces have evinced on this occasion cannot be surpassed; and I may be permitted to say that the general efficiency of the Army is, in my opinion, mainly due to the administration of my noble and gallant Friend Lord Napier of Magdala, who was for many years Commander-in-Chief in India, and of my gallant Friend Major-General Sir Henry Norman, who for a long period was Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, and afterwards the military Member of the Council of the Viceroy. The general arrangements for the campaign, so far as we know them, reflect great credit upon the Commander-in-Chief in India, Sir Frederick Haines, who will, I am sure, satisfactorily discharge his responsible duties; and particularly upon the Quartermaster General's Department of the Indian Army. I must further express my satisfaction —not surprise—at the expressions of loyalty received by the Viceroy from the Native Princes of India, some of them my personal friends. The Maharajah of Gwalior and others have offered their personal services and those of their troops. Having so recently filled the office of Viceroy in India I cannot pass these offers by without expressing my gratification.

I will now say a few words on the main question of the Address. Your Lordships are asked to assent to the application of the Revenues of India to defray the expenses of the war in Afghanistan. My Lords, I entirely agree with my noble Friend who recently filled the office of Governor of the Presidency of Madras (Lord Napier and Ettrick) in regretting the course Her Majesty's Government have taken. It would have been right, just, and generous to have decided at once that no portion of the expense should fall upon the Revenues of India. I consider the war to be the direct consequence of the state of affairs in Europe, and not to have arisen from anything immediately connected with our Indian Empire. For that reason, if for no other, India should not be called upon to bear the cost. Moreover, India has suffered recently from two severe famines; the people are impoverished; and the state of the finances is far from satisfactory. True, the noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Cranbrook) told us that the Indian Government expect a surplus of £1,250,000 above the Estimates this year; but this is exactly what I anticipated in the discussion of last year. The reason of this surplus is the extra taxation unnecessarily imposed upon the people of India for the purpose of raising what is called a Famine Fund. The new taxes, which press upon the poorer classes, and which I believe to be unpopular and impolitic, ought to be taken off as soon as the condition of the finances will allow of it.

I entirely agree with what has fallen from the noble and learned Earl on the Woolsack, that it would be a subject for regret if Indian questions came to be regarded as Party questions. I have never considered them to be so; and it was a gratification to me to hear the complaint of the noble Duke (the Duke of Somerset), that there had been no great meeting of the Liberal Party called together upon this question. As regards the speech of the noble Viscount who introduced this subject (Viscount Cranbrook), I have nothing personal to complain of. He is right in saying that there has been no reticence on the part of the Government in producing Papers, and he has a perfect right to criticize my public conduct. I am the last person to complain of any such criticisms. What I am now about to say is the result of my actual experience in India. The noble and learned Earl on the Woolsack has given an account of the objects of the British Government, during the last 10 years, in dealing with Central Asia and Afghanistan. During that period there have been two Administrations—five years under Mr. Gladstone, and five years under the noble Earl opposite. I was Viceroy in India during two years under Mr. Gladstone's Administration, and two years under that of the noble Earl; and as far as I know—and so far as my dealing with these affairs enables me to form an opinion—I have not been able to find out any difference whatever in the objects which the British Government desired to secure with regard to the progress of Russia in Central Asia, or to our dealings with Afghanistan; bearing in mind, of course, that the general line of policy must be modified by the progress of events. Having filled the high office of Viceroy in India, I think it is absolutely necessary, to avoid any misconception in discussing the policy of the British Government towards Russia in regard to Central Asia, for me to say that the Government of India, while I had any connection with it, has not been actuated by the fear of any attack upon India by Russia. We never believed that such an attack was possible; and we were of opinion that if anything of the kind were possible the strength of the British Empire in India and in this country was amply sufficient to render such an attack futile, and disastrous only to those who might make the attempt. The Governments of England and of India have never looked upon the progress of Russia in Central Asia with the eyes of that school of which Sir Henry Rawlinson, who has been quoted by the noble and learned Earl on the Woolsack, is the most able exponent. In 1869 the Government of India said—

> "We by no means share in the exaggerated apprehensions expressed in many quarters as to the danger to British rule in India which may arise from an extension of Russian influence in those countries lying to the South and East of her enormous possessions in Asia.
>
> "We believe that the influence of a civilised European power over wild and savage tribes cannot be otherwise than beneficial.
>
> "We would therefore heartily assist in establishing a frank and clear understanding with Russia as to the relative position of British and Russian interests in Asia." — [*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 103.]

In accordance with these principles, they suggested that, as it was for the interests of both countries that a wide border of independent States should exist between the British and Russian Frontiers, it would be desirable that Russia should be invited to adopt the same policy with regard to the independent States which come under her legitimate influence, as the Government of India had pursued with regard to Afghanistan and the independent States within their influence. Her Majesty's Government entered into negotiations with Russia for this purpose. Russia accepted, in 1873, the boundary of Afghanistan suggested by the Government of India in the time of Lord Mayo; and it was arranged that Russia should, to the best of her ability, prevent the Native States on her side from creating any disturbance in Afghanistan; while, on the other hand, we engaged to exercise our influence to prevent the Ameer of Cabul from transgressing the boundaries of his dominions. These negotiations took place under the Administration of Mr. Gladstone; and again, under the Administration of the noble Earl opposite, similar negotiations took place in 1875. The Government of India entirely concurred with the views expressed by the Home Government in those negotiations; and one of the last despatches I sent home when I was Viceroy expressed the concurrence of the Government of India in the arrangements made by the noble Earl now sitting on the cross benches (the Earl of Derby). It is but fair to the Russian Government to add that, during the time that I was in India, they loyally carried out the engagements into which they had entered.

The noble and learned Earl on the Woolsack, and the noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Cranbrook), have accused the late Government of having pursued a timid policy, and alluded to a paragraph in a despatch of the 30th of June, 1873, in which the Government of India, when I was Viceroy, suggested that Her Majesty's Government should make a plain declaration to the Russian

Government that the British Government would defend Afghanistan in the event of unprovoked attack; and they have said that this was not done. The Government of India always urged upon Her Majesty's Government—perhaps in terms a little stronger than the Foreign Secretary of the day may have liked—the expediency of speaking in the plainest language to the Russian Government both of the independence of Afghanistan and of the inconvenience which might arise from the further progress of Russia in the direction of India. I do not want to pit the policy of one Government of Her Majesty against another; but as that policy has been indiscriminately attacked by one Member of the present Cabinet, I am afraid I cannot depend upon other Members of the Cabinet to defend it. However, in the Central Asia Papers lately laid before Parliament, there is a despatch written by the noble Earl on the cross benches (the Earl of Derby) to Lord Augustus Loftus in June, 1877, in which the noble Earl quotes a despatch from Earl Granville, dated January, 1874, and says—

> "His Lordship thought it right to state candidly and at once to the Russian Government that the independence of Afghanistan was regarded by Her Majesty's Government as a matter of great importance to the welfare and security of British India, and to the tranquillity of Asia."—[*Central Asia*, No. 1 (1878) p. 111.]

The Government of India, in 1874, were much concerned about some probable movements of the Russians in the direction of Merv, not on account of any apprehension of danger to British India, but because such an advance might lead to difficulties between Russia and Afghanistan; and at the time when the late Government resigned that question was particularly prominent. The Government of India wrote pressingly to the Home Government to speak frankly to Russia—to tell her of the inconvenience that might arise from that advance, and to do what was possible to prevent it. The noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) wrote in the strongest terms to the Russian Government, and said that the advance of the Russian arms in the direction of Merv would impose on Her Majesty's Government the necessity of making a corresponding advance, in order to allay apprehensions and to remove misconception from the minds of the people of those countries. On reading those words, and the words used by Earl Granville in 1874, I felt that the intention of the Government of India had been fully carried out by Her Majesty's Government. It seems to me, therefore, that the inference drawn by the noble and learned Earl on the Woolsack and the noble Viscount opposite as to the conduct of Mr. Gladstone's Government, and of their own Government, is entirely unfounded. Both Governments, notwithstanding the objections of the noble and learned Earl, actually used much the same language to Russia as the Government of India—rightly, as I believe—had suggested. With respect to the opinions of Her Majesty's present Government on the position of Russia in Central Asia, it is hardly necessary to do more than to refer to the speech of the Prime Minister in the House of Commons in May, 1876, when he said he was

> "Not of that school who view the advances of Russia in Asia with those deep misgivings that some do."—[3 *Hansard*, ccxxviii. 500.]

He said that Asia was large enough for the destinies of both Russia and England

> "At no time," he added, "has there been a better understanding between the Courts of St. James and St. Petersburg than at the present moment; and there is this good understanding because our policy is a clear and a frank policy."—[3 *Hansard*, ccxxix. 139.]

I think that those were wise words. They seem, from the Papers laid before Parliament, to have given great satisfaction in Russia, and they show that the policy of both Governments towards Russia was up to that time one and the same.

So much for our policy with regard to Russia. With regard to Afghanistan and other neighbouring States, the policy of the Indian Government was thus expressed by Lord Mayo before he died—

> "The cardinal points of the foreign policy which the Government of India should steadily pursue may be briefly described as follows. . . . We should establish with our Frontier States of Khelat, Afghanistan, Nipal, and Burmah, intimate relations of friendship; we should make them feel that though we are all-powerful, we have no wish to encroach on their authority; but, on the contrary, that our earnest desire is to support their power and maintain their nationality; and that if severe necessity arise we might assist them with money, arms, and, per-

haps, in certain eventualities, with men. We could thus create in those States outworks of our Empire, and assuring them that the days of annexation are passed, make them practically feel that they have everything to gain and nothing to lose by endeavouring to deserve our favour and support."

The noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Cranbrook) seemed the other night to have some difficulty in describing what our "settled policy" towards Afghanistan was. If the noble Viscount had been longer in the India Office he would have found out that the policy was clear and decided. I do not want to add anything myself to the explanation I have read, and I have read it because the policy ought to stand clearly before your Lordships. When Lord Mayo was in India the first application he made of that policy was in dealing with Afghanistan, in consequence of the arrangements made by his predecessor, Lord Lawrence, for the support of Shere Ali, and that a meeting should take place between him and the Viceroy. I am not going over again the history of the Umballa Conference. Although Lord Mayo, when he met Shere Ali, could not comply with all his wishes, the result of the Conferences which then took place was by no means unsatisfactory. I wish to add my testimony to the testimony of those noble Lords who have said in this House that the personal influence and the generous confidence inspired by Lord Mayo were of substantial public advantage in dealing with the Native Princes of India, and almost, if not quite, disarmed the suspicions of one who was the most suspicious of a suspicious race. My Lords, Shere Ali was not less suspicious when, in 1873, I had to enter into some negotiations with him. I will not trouble your Lordships with any long account of them, they have been so much before the House; all that I shall say is that upon that occasion, having received authority from Her Majesty's Government, I gave Shere Ali assurances in respect to assistance from the British Government, under certain circumstances, very much in the terms I read just now when describing the general policy to be pursued towards States which adjoin British India. There were in the speeches of the noble Viscount and of the noble and learned Earl on the Woolsack certain statements with regard to those negotiations which I cannot accept. Of course, I know that the assurances which I gave to Shere Ali did not come up to the expectations he entertained. At the same time, when the noble Viscount brings forward the Prime Minister of Shere Ali, who conducted the negotiations in 1873, as evidence to show that the assurances which I then gave were vague, I cannot accept the extract read by the noble Viscount as conveying a correct account of the views of the Prime Minister. The noble Viscount read an extract from the Conference between the Prime Minister and Sir Lewis Pelly on the 8th of February, 1877, and which will be found at page 204 of the Afghanistan Papers. It is true that the Prime Minister then said that the nature of the assistance to be given to Shere Ali was left obscure, both in my writings and sayings; but this remark applied only to my first interview with the Prime Minister; and if the noble Viscount had taken the trouble to read the Report of the next Conference, on the 10th of February, given in the very next page of the Papers, he would have found that the Prime Minister proceeded to relate how he had afterwards discussed the subject completely with the Foreign Secretary, and how at a subsequent interview with me "all the subjects were thoroughly discussed, and so nothing was left unconsidered." The Prime Minister, who, I must say, gave a very accurate account of the transactions of 1873, throughout the Conferences with Sir Lewis Pelly, in 1877, so far from complaining that the assurances given by me in 1873 were vague and undefined, was actually trying to meet the complaint put into his mouth by Sir Lewis Pelly that they were vague and inconclusive, and that, therefore, it would be necessary to make a new Treaty with the Ameer.

There were, no doubt, some causes which led the Ameer to be dissatisfied with the Government of India. In the first place, both he and the Persian Government were dissatisfied with the arbitration which the British Government had undertaken, and which was ably and impartially carried out by Sir Frederick Goldsmid, to settle the boundary of the two countries in Seistan. Then Shere Ali was offended at the advice I gave him to keep faith with his son, Yakoob Khan. I need not defend my conduct in having done this, for no noble Lord has taken exception to it.

The noble Viscount (Viscount Cranbrook), having been so short a time in office, cannot be expected to know much about these details; but he entirely misapprehended the facts of the case when he charged me with having sent the message to the Ameer by a "common messenger." My Lords, I sent it by the ordinary channel of communication with the Ameer—the Native Agent of the British Government who was resident at his Court. That was, in fact, the only channel of communication I could have employed; and it was precisely the same channel that was used by Lord Lytton to conduct the recent negotiations with the Ameer. The noble and learned Earl on the Woolsack—and I cannot say that I am surprised at any error into which he may have fallen, for the subject is very complicated and difficult—has said that there was a great contrast between my letter to Shere Ali with regard to his son Yakoob, and that written to him by General Kaufmann, the Russian Governor General of Turkestan, in the year 1875.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR: It was in the year before.

THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK: I certainly understood the noble and learned Earl to say 1875; but the letter was written by General Kaufmann before I went to India. In fact, it was written in 1871, when Lord Mayo was Viceroy, and related to different events. I feel that I need not dwell long upon the other ground of complaint which the Ameer had against the Government of India—namely, the sending a Native gentleman to carry a present to the Ruler of Wakhan, who had been civil to some British officers who had visited his neighbourhood. There was some misapprehension about this affair which I explained to the Ameer; but I insisted upon his permitting the messenger to proceed, as I thought his objections were unreasonable. The noble Viscount has commented upon this transaction as if I had been disposed to go to war with Afghanistan upon the matter; but your Lordships will readily understand that there were other ways of dealing with the Ameer if he had refused; and, in fact, he did what I wished. As regards all these sources of complaint on the part of the Ameer, I apprehend that no noble Lord would wish the Government of India to do everything which the Ruler of Afghanistan wanted him to do—that would have been a course entirely undignified and quite improper. I hold that the Ameer had no reasonable ground of complaint; and I think I did what was quite right and reasonable towards him. Let us look, however, at the general result of this policy, which I have said was the policy of two Governments in India and at home during the time that I was Viceroy, and also in the time of Lord Mayo. There was no difference whatever in the policy of the two Governments. Both wanted to give reasonable assurances of protection to the Ameer, and both desired to keep on good terms with him. The result was fairly satisfactory. We wished that the Ameer should keep peace with his neighbours, and that he should follow our advice in his foreign affairs. He wanted to make an attack on Bokhara, but he abstained from doing so upon our advice. He next quarrelled with the Persians about Seistan; nevertheless, in consequence of our advice, he accepted our arbitration on that subject, and, as far as I know, he loyally kept his word. I advised him to give no assistance to the Turkomans; he acted upon my advice; and, moreover, at my request he tried to induce them to give up to the Russian Government some Russian subjects who had been captured and made slaves, in order to prevent a quarrel between Russia and the Turkomans, which might have brought the Russians to Merv. Then, as to his domestic affairs, I am not aware that the Ameer had any serious quarrel with me about them, with the exception, perhaps, of my advice to him about Yakoob Khan. He asked me, in 1874, to do what I could with the Persian Government to induce them to give a civil answer to his letter, announcing the nomination of Abdoolla Jan as his heir. That did not look like the act of a man who was hostile to the British Government and wished to quarrel with it. The most important thing he did just before I left India was to bring entirely within his control the country bordering on the Turkoman Frontier, not very far from the boundary which was laid down between England and Russia as that which was not to be transgressed. He communicated with us. We wrote home to the Government asking them to inform the Russian Government; and I believe the noble Earl on the cross benches (the Earl of Derby) communicated with Russia. All this shows that what was contemplated by the Governments of Mr. Gladstone and of the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Beaconsfield)—namely, to remain on good terms with the Ruler of Afghanistan and to keep him a reasonable and sensible being who should not quarrel with his neighbours—was maintained up to the time when I left India. I do not like to quote my own despatches; but the account I gave in them of the state of mind of the Ameer was very much like that which I have now given to your Lordships. I believe now—not on my own authority, but on that of everybody who knew anything about it—that the Ameer was then loyal, in the sense that he had not the slightest inclination to turn to Russia for support. On the other hand, he was a little "touchy" on certain things. On two occasions the Government of India wrote to the Secretary of State when I was Viceroy that if he would treat him with patience, and not press upon him certain things unnecessarily which were distasteful to him, there was no doubt that he would remain our good friend. We felt that he was an Asiatic, and must be treated with patience as such by his European neighbours.

I know the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury) entertains a different opinion from that which I hold, in common with everyone with whom I have conversed who has filled a responsible position in India, upon the disposition of Shere Ali. The noble Marquess, of course, has a perfect right to his own opinion; but he ought not to cast a slur on a distinguished servant of the Government of India, which is entirely undeserved. In a despatch of October 4, 1877, the noble Marquess, referring to the state of mind of the Ameer, when I left India in 1876, said—

> "This (the course of events) demonstrates but too plainly how erroneous was the opinion expressed so recently as the year 1875 by Sir Richard Pollock, the Commissioner of Peshawur, that 'no unfavourable change had occurred in the disposition of the Ameer.' Shere Ali's confidential Envoy stated explicitly that his master had 'now a deep-rooted mistrust of the good faith and sincerity of the British Government.'"—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 223.]

Sir Richard Pollock tells me that he was unable to correct this statement himself, because he has very properly felt it to be his duty, in consequence of the confidential position he so recently occupied at Peshawur, to consider his lips sealed, and to take no part, directly or indirectly, in the discussions that have taken place about the Afghan War. My Lords, the opinion given by Sir Richard Pollock was quoted by the noble Marquess from the despatch of the Government of India of the 7th of June, 1875, and it was given, not in 1875, but in the beginning of 1874, and therefore before the incidents about Yakoob Khan and the despatch of a messenger to Wakhan had occurred. But, besides, your Lordships will see in a moment how unfair the statement of the noble Marquess is with respect to Sir Richard Pollock. It is perfectly true that Shere Ali's Prime Minister said to Dr. Bellew in a private conversation on the 28th of January, 1877, which will be found at page 195 of the Afghanistan Papers, that

> "the Ameer now has a deep-rooted mistrust of the good faith and sincerity of the British Government, and he has many reasons for this mistrust;"

but it appears from that conversation that the main reason for that mistrust was the endeavour to force British officers upon him. No doubt the Prime Minister alluded to other matters; but this was, all through the Conferences, the principal ground of his complaints. And, therefore—I am sure, perfectly unintentionally—the noble Marquess was in error in attributing a mistake to Sir Richard Pollock. I regret that the noble Marquess should have thrown any doubts upon Syud Noor Mahomed's character by saying that his statements were obviously insincere. It is true that his history is like a chapter from the *Arabian Nights*. He travelled once with a string of horses from one end of India to the other, and eventually rose to be the trusted Minister of the Ameer, and served his master ably and loyally. A further statement was made by the Prime Minister, as will be seen by the Papers, when he was lying ill. Dr. Bellew went to see him, and the statement he then made was very pathetic. He said to the doctor—"This is a very serious business. It is the last time the Ameer will treat with the British Government. You must not impose upon us a burden which we cannot bear; and if you overload us the responsibility rests with you." The doctor asked him what burden he referred to, and he replied—"The residence of British officers on the Frontiers of Afghanistan." This, my Lords, is enough to show that the state of the Ameer's mind, as represented by his Prime Minister, arose mainly from the endeavour to force Resident British officers upon him, directed by the noble Marquess himself in 1876, contrary to the opinion of Sir Richard Pollock, and to that of every officer who had a knowledge of Afghanistan.

I said that when I left India the Ameer was loyal to the British Government. Whether he was inclined to turn towards Russia, however, is the main point. After the negotiations of 1873, it was said by the noble Viscount (Viscount Cranbrook) that the Ameer at once turned to Russia. What proof is there for that statement? I was surprised to hear the opinion of our Native Agent at Cabul quoted in support of it, and at the manner in which the noble Viscount spoke of the reports of the Native Agent. The noble Viscount said it was easy to see that his reports were all rubbish. Our Native Agent was a Mohammedan gentleman of high character and standing, who did good service in the Mutiny, and received a handsome reward from Lord Lytton for his services at Cabul. Englishmen are not the only people who can do anything. Many Natives can and do render good service to the British Government. In October, 1876, our Native Agent went to Simla, and said that Shere Ali did not suspect us of conspiring with Russia to his prejudice; nor that the British coveted any portion of his territory: the Ameer was well aware, he said, that Russia, sooner or later, would attack Afghanistan. The Agents of Russia, he added, were regarded by the Ameer as a source of embarrassment. That statement was made at a formal interview; and in a private interview with Captain Grey he said—"That the Ameer was desirous of securing a *pied à terre* in British territory whither to send his family and property when he cleared for action with Russia." Is it possible, in the face of such testimony, to say that at that time he was unfriendly to England and friendly to Russia? The noble and learned Earl on the Woolsack—who, by the way, in commenting upon the letters of Shere Ali, although he is doubtless accustomed, as he said, to interpret English documents, strangely misinterpreted the ordinary terms of compliment employed in the East—after giving an account of the negotiations of 1873, turned round and asked whether any of your Lordships would have refused to grant what was then asked by Shere Ali and refused by me? I have again to come between one Member of the present Administration and another, and to say that in his remarks addressed to me the noble and learned Earl was, at the same time, condemning his own Government. I had the honour of serving as Viceroy for two years under the Administration of the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Beaconsfield). What happened in 1874? There was a debate in your Lordships' House in which the subject of the negotiations of 1873 was thoroughly discussed; and what was then the opinion of the present Government? The opinion of the Government, as expressed in that debate, was that it was quite impossible to give Shere Ali what he wanted—namely, an unconditional guarantee of protection. But is that all? I served as Viceroy for two years after that; and did I receive any instructions to give Shere Ali the unconditional guarantee he wanted? Not one single despatch; not one single expression; not one single hint to that effect. "Here," said the noble Viscount (Viscount Cranbrook) "is what ought to have been done—the guarantee ought to have been given;" and the noble Earl says that this was the thing that drove the Ameer into the arms of Russia. But look at the two despatches in which the noble Marquess opposite instructed me, in 1875, to obtain the admission of British Residents into Afghanistan. Is there a single word about giving any additional assurances to the Ameer? Not a word; no suggestion whatever was made that any greater assurances of support should be given to him than I had given in 1873. So much so, that I was obliged to remind the noble Marquess that if Shere Ali entertained the proposal he would be certain to ask for some return. Therefore, I say that the charges brought against me by noble Lords opposite are really charges against the Government of which they themselves are Members. There can, in fact, be no distinction drawn in this matter between the present and the late Government. I do not accuse the Government of doing anything wrong in the matter; for I do not believe any Government would do such a thing as to give Shere Ali an unconditional guarantee of protection—arms, ammunition, troops, whatever he liked—without asking for anything in return. This is what he asked; and this is what is now said by the noble and learned Earl on the Woolsack that I ought to have given him.

I have shown that during these eight years there had been no change of policy. The objects of the Governments in India and at home were the same; we all wanted the friendship of Afghanistan; our difference was as to the means of securing it. In 1875 I received a despatch from the noble Marquess, pointing out the desirability of our having a British Resident at Herat. I should have liked to have had on that Frontier a British officer. I was not against the measure. Do not suppose I had the least desire to oppose it; but I thought it well to consult the officers of the Government who knew most about the matter. I was on the point of proceeding to Delhi. When I arrived there I consulted the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, and all the most experienced officers of the Frontier. I also summoned two Native gentlemen of high character, who had been the Agents of the Government of India at Cabul, and who knew the Ameer well. One of them was the Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan. I did not hold a formal Conference; but I saw all these officers privately—one at a time—and asked them how that request would be likely to be entertained by Shere Ali, and what would be the best way of making it? They said that the admission of British Residents into Afghanistan was the one thing which the Ameer disliked more than another, and which was most likely to get us into trouble with him; and I made them write down their opinions, that I might send them home. After that I had all the Papers on the subject looked out and examined, to see if there was any information which would warrant us in assuming that Shere Ali would receive a British Agent at Herat. The noble Marquess was under that impression. He wrote to the Government of India that—

> "The Ameer has more than once in former years expressed his readiness to permit the presence of an Agent at Herat, and it is therefore not possible that, if his intentions are still loyal, he will make any serious difficulty now."—[*Ibid.* p. 129.]

I was under the impression myself that, at some time, he might have said something to that effect. We found that Lord Mayo, at Umballa, had distinctly told the Ameer that he would not be asked to receive British officers in Afghanistan; but we thought that he might have said something, in private conversations, to the effect that he might accept them elsewhere than at Cabul. We wrote this to the Secretary of State, adding that what might have passed then could not fairly be used in any negotiations with the Ameer. But since we examined into this matter in 1875, it has been set at rest by the evidence of Mr. Seton-Karr, who was Foreign Secretary to Lord Mayo at Umballa, and was, therefore, completely acquainted with all that took place. Mr. Seton-Karr came to me, of his own accord, the other day, and said—"I want to tell you that it is quite a mistake to suppose that anything of the kind was ever said by the Ameer." Not only is Mr. Seton-Karr's recollection clear on the point that Shere Ali never expressed his willingness to receive British officers in Afghanistan, but he gave an account of what occurred in a letter to Lord Lawrence, written on the 5th of April, 1869, immediately after the Conferences at Umballa, which he has authorized me to use, and which contains the following passage:—

> "He (Shere Ali) is told that we do not want British officers as Residents at Cabul or anywhere else, and he says they would do him harm in the eyes of his people."

Lord Mayo's official account of what took place has been strangely misinterpreted. It has even been said that the Mission of British officers to Afghanistan was a boon which he denied to Shere Ali. This, however, is an error, which is refuted by a private letter written on the 3rd of June, 1869, by Lord Mayo to the Duke of Argyll, in which Lord Mayo, summing up the Umballa Conferences, wrote—

> "The only pledges given were that we would not interfere in his affairs; that we would support his independence; that we would not force European officers as Residents upon him against his wish."

In June, 1875, the Government of India gave their opinion that it was not wise to force British Residents on the Ameer. We thought it might lead to trouble; and, as servants of the Government, we thought it our duty to point that out. There was no hurry about the matter; and having been told, by everyone whose opinion was of any value, that the course proposed was likely to alienate the Ameer, we stated our opinion to the Government; but the Government, notwithstanding the unanimous opinion of the Viceroy and his Council, replied that the course they had suggested must be followed. Again, the Government of India, in January, 1876, pointed out the evil effects which, in their opinion, would follow from carrying out the Instructions of the noble Marquess, in the hope that the matter might still be re-considered by Her Majesty's Government.

In February, 1876, however, Lord Lytton, before leaving England, received distinct and positive Instructions, both written and verbal, to insist that Shere Ali should receive British Residents in Afghanistan. My Lords, I do not wish to say a word against the proceedings of Lord Lytton; I know the difficulties and responsibilities of a Viceroy, and Lord Lytton seems to me to have carried out the Instructions which he received. The responsibility rests not upon him, but upon Her Majesty's Government. And here it is necessary to remember that there was no change of circumstances which made it necessary then to alter our relations with Afghanistan; for, as I have already shown to your Lordships, the Prime Minister declared, in May, 1876, in the House of Commons, that the relations between Great Britain and Russia had never been more satisfactory.

The first step that was taken in India was to request Shere Ali to receive Sir Lewis Pelly at Cabul. On his declining to do so he was warned in July, 1876, that if he persisted he would isolate himself from the alliance and support of the British Government. My Lords, I consider that that was the turning-point of the negotiations with the Ameer; and we know that three Members of the Viceroy's Council—Sir Henry Norman, Sir Arthur Hobhouse, and Sir William Muir—dissented from the course which was then followed. As some exception has been taken to their conduct in making their dissent known, I must explain to your Lordships that the Government of India is not a government by a Viceroy, but by a Viceroy in Council; that ordinary matters are determined by the majority; and it is only in regard to matters essentially concerning the interests of India that the Viceroy has the power by law to overrule the majority. By statutory rules, framed by the Viceroy in Council under the Government of India Act, Members of Council have a right to express their dissent from any act done by the Government of India. These three Members of Council expressed their dissent at the time. The Viceroy requested them to postpone the formal record of their dissent until a despatch was sent home reporting the proceedings; but, for some reason or other, no despatch was sent home for a great length of time—indeed, until May, 1877, when all three had left India. I do not blame Lord Lytton for detaining the despatch, for I do not know his reasons; and I must add that I do not think it was done for the purpose of preventing the dissents from being recorded: Lord Lytton is an exceedingly able writer, and need not be afraid of answering any objection that might be raised by Members of his Council. But whatever the reason may have been, it is totally contrary to the practice that the course of important affairs should not be frequently reported to the Home Government. As those Members of Council were debarred from the usual opportunity of recording their dissent from the course taken in July, 1876, I have no hesitation in expressing my opinion that when the despatch of the Government of India of the 10th of May, 1877, was made public, they were fully justified in also making public their dissent. If they had not done so, it must have been supposed that they were consenting parties to the policy described in the despatch as having been pursued by the Government of India when they were Members of that Government, and responsible for its action.

To return to the negotiations with Shere Ali. The next important step followed in October, 1876, when the Ameer was plainly told that if he did not receive British officers in his territories he would lose all the protection he had hitherto obtained from England.

At one time it was thought he would not give way; but "owing to helplessness" he said he must agree to the demands of the British Government. He said, in substance, let my Envoy meet Sir Lewis Pelly, explain my difficulties, and if, after this, the Viceroy will not give way I must.

My Lords, I should like to dwell somewhat upon the Conferences at Peshawur, but time forbids it. I have no fault to find with the manner in which Sir Lewis Pelly carried out the instructions which he had received; he certainly carried them out with great determination. He began by telling the Prime Minister that the Viceroy desired to remove some misapprehensions in the mind of the Ameer. The Prime Minister replied that the Ameer had none; and when he was told that these misapprehensions had arisen out of the Conference with Lord Mayo at Umballa, and the communications with Lord Northbrook in 1873, the Envoy said that the Ameer went away from Umballa perfectly satisfied, and that the communications with Lord Northbrook in 1873 were satisfactory also. What weighed most in the Ameer's mind, he said, was the policy of the present Viceroy, which was different from that of previous Viceroys, in forcing the Ameer to receive British officers as Residents in Afghanistan, contrary to the Treaty of 1857 with Dost Mahomed, and to all the "agreements," "writings," and "assurances" he had received from Lord Lawrence, Lord Mayo, and myself. The Conference concluded by Sir Lewis Pelly, at the Prime Minister's request, submitting his objections for the consideration of the Viceroy. Sir Lewis Pelly was then instructed to demand a distinct and prompt answer, whether or no the Ameer refused to receive British officers in any part of Afghanistan? On this point, however, no answer was ever given, in consequence of the death of the Prime Minister. It is a very extraordinary thing that no explanation has been given, why this demand was not pressed further; for it was clear that the object of the British Government was to have British Residents in Afghanistan, and there is reason to believe that, under great pressure, and under great apprehensions, the Ameer would have given way. Indeed, it appears, from the despatch of the Government of India of the 18th of May, 1877, that Lord Lytton knew that another Envoy was on his way from Cabul, who was reported to have "authority to accept eventually all the conditions of the British Government." Sir Lewis Pelly was nevertheless instructed, on the 30th of March, to close the Conference at once.

Something has been said of the conduct of the Ameer at that time as justifying the close of the negotiations. It seems that he had been raising the cry of "jehad," or of a religious war, and using hostile language towards the British Government. My Lords, I am not going to defend this suspicious Ameer, for I think he behaved very foolishly throughout these transactions. But it is only fair to look at the circumstances under which he was then placed. The occupation of Quetta occurred in October, 1876, just at the time when the Ameer was most frightened at the menacing language of the British Government. Preparations were made about the same time at Rawul Pindee to assemble a force; a bridge was thrown across the Indus; and I believe that arrangements were actually made to send a column up to the Kurram Valley, which is on the direct route to Cabul. Besides this, the Viceroy had recently seen the Maharajah of Cashmere, and encouraged him to advance against some territory on the north-east of Afghanistan, over which Shere Ali claimed sovereignty. Nothing is said about all this in the Papers laid before Parliament; but there is no doubt about the facts. They have been stated in Parliament without contradiction. The truth seems to me to be that the poor Ameer could not form any other conclusion than that the British Government were on the point of attacking him, and he turned to every side to see what defence he could make. He found, however, that the people around him did not wish to quarrel with the British Government; and we are told by the Government of India that the whole movement had "completely collapsed" before the close of the Peshawur Conference.

The Conference was closed in March, 1877. When the Viceroy closed the Conference he took away from the Ameer every assurance that he had received of protection and support from Lord Lawrence, Lord Mayo, and myself, either for himself or for his dynasty.

He withdrew our Native Agent from Cabul, and therefore deprived the Ameer of the means of communicating with the British Government; and perhaps the noble Marquess opposite will explain what door was then left open to the Ameer. Neither the noble Viscount (Viscount Cranbrook) nor the noble and learned Earl on the Woolsack have alluded to the real result of the Peshawur Conferences; and the noble Viscount described the position of affairs most inadequately in his despatch of the 28th of November, by saying that we had assumed towards the Ameer a position of "vigilant reserve." My Lords, these were the circumstances of the case. I think the course pursued was not wise. When the Government found that the Ameer was not willing to receive British Residents in Afghanistan, they need not have altogether broken off from him, or have led him to feel that he had nothing to expect from the British Government. If a different course had been taken, and time had been given him, his feelings were such that he would, I believe, in the end, have accepted their terms, however hard he might have thought them to be.

Then came a time of real difficulty, when it was necessary that closer relations should be maintained with Afghanistan. That necessity arose on account of the political condition of Europe, England and Russia having been gradually brought to the verge of war. It would then have been right to have strengthened our relations with the Ameer; but in what position had Her Majesty's Government then placed this country with reference to Afghanistan? By pushing forward demands which were not necessary, contrary to all Indian advice, when there existed no crisis whatever, they had so alienated the Ameer that it would have been almost humiliating then to have made any advances towards him. The Secretary of State (Viscount Cranbrook) used an expression in regard to the state of things in 1873 which is far more applicable to the policy of 1876—namely, that "it was too late." The policy of Her Majesty's Government made it "too late" to make a friend of the Ameer when it was really wanted. It may be said that I ought not to content myself with offering criticisms on the conduct of the Government, but should indicate what I think ought to have been done. I say that if the Ameer had not been frightened about the reception of British Residents in Afghanistan, the moment there was the probability of a war between Russia and England the Viceroy ought to have communicated with him, arranged for a meeting, and offered to enter into an agreement with him similar to that entered into with his father in 1857. I am satisfied that he would have readily accepted such an offer. The policy of the Government, however, prevented that being done; and this, I believe, was one of the main causes of the war.

Then came the last stage of these transactions. The Ameer was alienated from us; he had no hope of support from us; he had no Native Agent of ours at his Court. It was arranged at Simla, in 1873, that if he were asked to receive a Russian Mission he should at once consult the Government of India; but this was impossible, as our Native Agent had been withdrawn. The Ameer had been told that we did not care either about him or his dynasty. When, therefore, the Russian Mission was pressed upon him, as he could look for no protection from us, he had no alternative but to accept it, and it seems that he did so unwillingly. When this was first known, it appears to me that the Government of India rightly intimated to Her Majesty's Government, in their telegram of the 30th of July, that the matter was one which ought to be settled between the British and Russian Governments, and not between the British Government and Afghanistan. When England and Russia were on the verge of war, it is true that neither country could fairly be held to be bound by the arrangements of 1873 or 1875 in regard to Central Asia. But before the Russian Mission reached Cabul the Treaty of Berlin had been signed; and I agree with the noble Earl on the cross benches (the Earl of Derby), that the Government should have dealt with Russia and not with Afghanistan. I believe, moreover, that they might have come to a peaceful and satisfactory understanding with Russia, and have avoided the present war. Russia was asked, no doubt, to withdraw the Mission from Cabul; but I am surprised at the satisfaction expressed by the noble and learned Earl on the Woolsack at the answer received to that demand. In fact, having received no satisfactory answer from Russia, Her Majesty's Government went to war with Afghanistan. I will not dwell on the circumstances connected with the dispatch of Sir Neville Chamberlain's Mission, because from the beginning I can only regard it as a declaration of war.

My Lords, I have trespassed so long upon your indulgence that I shall say no more excepting that I believe this war was unnecessary, and that with the exercise of a little common prudence on the part of Her Majesty's Government it might have been avoided. No advantage, I am convinced, can result from it, either to England or to India; and, holding these views, I feel myself reluctantly obliged to vote for the Amendment proposed by my noble Friend behind me.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, at this hour of the evening I certainly shall not delay your Lordships long by following in detail the able but very minute speech of the noble Earl who has just sat down. But before I touch on one or two of the more important points raised in this debate, I must refer to some observations which he addressed to me in reference to Sir Richard Pollock. If the noble Earl misconstrued the meaning of that despatch I am sorry for it, for Sir Richard Pollock is a very distinguished officer; but, if anyone will read my despatch at a more reasonable hour of the day, I think he will say that the construction which the noble Earl has put upon it is entirely unwarranted, and that the proofs I sought for the assertions I made were derived from the general report of the facts addressed to me by Lord Lytton. The noble Marquess below the Gangway (the Marquess of Bath) has addressed some reproaches to me. He was in some difficulty naturally to find a reason for the vote he is about to give; and he gave as his reason that I had used some language last year which he was pleased to say was not accurate. My Lords, I prefer resignedly abandoning my character in the eyes of the noble Marquess to keeping your Lordships out of bed: therefore, I shall not go into the matter, which I dealt with sufficiently on a previous occasion. I will merely say that the Duke of Argyll asked me certain Questions, which I thought it proper and expedient should be answered. He asked me whether certain troops were assembled to force a Resident upon the Ameer; he spoke of a bridge of boats erected on the Indus to facilitate operations; he wished to know whether there was any departure from a policy which had been adopted by many Indian statesmen, and whether any attempt was being made to force on the Ameer a Resident at the Court of Cabul—"Resident at the Court of a Native Prince" being an expression whose significance is well understood in India. To that Question I gave a negative answer. He asked me for positive information. I told him I could not give positive information; and because, under these circumstances, noble Lords opposite appear to have misunderstood what I intended to say, the noble Marquess and others are pleased to accuse me of disingenuousness. I imagined everyone in this House knew there were many subjects on which the mouth of a Minister of the Crown is sealed, and they cannot always explain fully what their policy is. If I had explained fully what our policy then was I must have explained the reasons on which it was founded; I must have depicted the Ameer as he had been depicted to me—as a faithless, treacherous, intriguing man, whose loyalty we had vainly attempted to secure. The noble Marquess has forgotten that anything said here by a Minister of the Crown is said not merely to this House of Lords and the English people, but to the whole world—to the Czar of Russia, to the Shah of Persia, and to the Ameer of Afghanistan; and if you insist that no answer shall be given except such as contains a complete revelation of the policy of the Government, the only inference I draw is, that in the future no answer at all can be given to Questions of that kind. Now, my Lords, turning to the main matter we have in hand. I thought at one period of the debate that we were getting rid of the study of that interesting question how the Ameer came to be angry. Seeing that he has refused, when asked in perfectly friendly language, to receive a friendly Embassy, places a force outside his own territory, and drives back that Embassy by a threat of rifle shots, it does not, in these circumstances, seem to me to be a matter of much practical importance what the particular cause of the ill-temper or disloyalty was that induced this man to commit an act which was undoubtedly an act of war. If we are to investigate the question, let us compare for a moment the theories that are offered on the other side to account for the change of the Ameer's policy. The theory advanced the other evening was this —that the Ameer was imbued with great loyalty to the British Government, and firmly determined to resist Russia; that he had been deeply impressed by all the civil speeches which successive Viceroys had addressed to him; and that up to the date of the 8th of July, 1876, that feeling of loyalty was unbroken, and the determination in favour of England and against Russia was unchanged. Of a sudden a change came over the spirit of his dream; he altered his whole policy at once, and a Russian Envoy—as we read, for the first time—was received at Cabul. And what was the cause of this wonderful change? Why, that we had proposed to send him, at any time he pleased, and in any part of his dominions he chose to select, a friendly Ambassador. If our ally was really so constituted as that such a cause as that could produce a change in his deepest feelings of affection and long-tried loyalty, I cannot think he could be an ally about whose temper we need trouble ourselves much. We have heard there is something peculiarly terrible and unknown in the idea of a Resident being sent to Afghanistan. But, my Lords, the State with which the Ameer is best acquainted is that of Persia, which adjoins his own territory, and he knows that Envoys are sent to Persia, and continue to reside there, and that no diminution is thereby occasioned to the Shah's independence or sovereignty. I believe that the idea that the Ameer has any real aversion to the location of Residents on his Frontier is an imaginary one. That he pretended to have it, I quite admit; but as the noble Duke (the Duke of Somerset) said the other evening, when you want to know why a man is angry, you had better ask himself; and the Ameer told us on two occasions what was the cause of his anger. One cause was the very impartial conduct of Sir John Lawrence when he was struggling for his life. Sir John Lawrence had a profound conviction that it was not the duty of the British Government to interfere with the claimants for the Afghan Throne; but he desired to obtain influence over the combatants for the Afghan Throne; and so, instead of leaving them alone according to each changing vicissitude of war, he recognized each candidate as he turned uppermost—always telling him, at the same time, that he had recognized the last who gained a victory, and that he would recognize the next with equal zeal. He went so far on one occasion, not being certain which was likely to be uppermost, as to send an Envoy armed with instructions to offer his facile congratulations to either. We have been told that the Ameer sees English books and newspapers—perhaps he is versed in English literature; if so, I can readily suppose that he must have looked upon Sir John Lawrence as an Oriental Vicar of Bray. What evidence is there as to what his feelings on that occasion were? Here is a record of what passed at the Conference at Umballa. His Excellency urged the Ameer to state the precise mode in which he could help him; but he replied in general terms;—but at last he broke out with great violence that the primary recognition of his rival had been the main cause of his estrangement. But then at the Conference of Umballa Lord Mayo was able to exercise an influence over him by his noble presence and genial mind. What was the next cause of his change of mind? I will accept no other testimony than that of the Ameer himself. If you look in this Blue Book at the speeches to which the noble Marquess has alluded, you will see that the circumstance upon which he dwelt more than any other was the interference of the Government of India between himself and his eldest son. That was the result of Lord Northbrook's intercession. That Lord Northbrook was perfectly justified in the course he took I do not dispute. It was perfectly impossible for any Indian Viceroy to stand by and see such gross cruelty and perfidy perpetrated without interfering. But you must remember that the great danger of the Ameer's race and of his own reign had been civil dissension, and that the one thing he had most to fear was that some member of his family should be set up by his people against him. He saw clearly the Power which loudly expressed its determination not to interfere in his civil affairs coming forward in a crisis of civil dissension to interfere against himself. It seems, therefore, on the Ameer's own showing, we may clearly conclude that what offended him on the part of the British Government was not the offer to send Sir Lewis Pelly at any place or at any time on a friendly Mission into Afghanistan—it was, in the first instance, the conduct observed to him when struggling for his Throne; and, in the second place, our apparent design to renew the civil war by encouraging his eldest son in rebellion against him. Therefore, what your Lordships have to decide is, whether we were justified in the course we took in calling upon the Ameer to allow British officers to be placed at Herat and Candahar? I was very much struck by the noble Earl (the Earl of Northbrook) reiterating again and again that there was no change of policy. If there was no change of policy, why propose to censure us? Of course, there was a change of policy. When we came into Office we found there was practically no information from Afghanistan. The noble Earl asked us to ascertain what was going on on the North-Western Frontier,—which ought to have been ascertained in Asia—and to interfere in Europe in matters which ought to have been settled on the spot. The Ameer had expressed his willingness to receive Residents at any place except Cabul. It is true that the noble Earl entirely denied that fact; but I can hardly take it that he looked at the evidence on which my statement is founded. The circumstance was stated by persons who were more likely than any others to have heard what was the fact. The noble Lord (Lord Lawrence), who spoke the other night, dismissed one of the Residents, Captain Grey, on the ground that he was "an interpreter." But surely an interpreter who necessarily hears all that is said and translated is precisely the man who knows what is going on. Then there was the friend of the Ameer, Dr. Bellew, and Colonel Burne, the Private Secretary of Lord Mayo, and these men distinctly aver that the Ameer was ready to receive Residents on his Frontier. After that, what is the use of quoting a letter written by Mr. Seton-Karr on the subject? On such a point negative testimony is of no value. There can be no doubt, if evidence is worth anything, that the Ameer was ready at that time to allow Residents to come upon his Frontier. Now, it seems to me that much of the misunderstanding upon this point, and much of the difference of opinion, arise from the fact that the real danger and difficulties we have to encounter in Afghanistan have never been rightly appreciated by Lord Lawrence and Lord Northbrook. The noble Lords have spoken in this debate about military invasion, and they have shown the difficulties that would stand in its way. In what they say I entirely concur. I accept the language used by my noble Friend behind me some weeks back when he said that a military invasion of India was almost impracticable. But it is not so much a military invasion of India that we have to fear; it is a diplomatic invasion of Afghanistan that we have to fear. The noble Earl (Earl Grey) who opened the debate to-night was apparently willing that Afghanistan should become, if necessary, a happy Russian hunting-ground. He was perfectly willing that it should be entirely occupied by Russians, and he had no fear of any results which might follow. My Lords, we are not in secret executive Session—as the Senate of the United States would be in under similar circumstances—and I cannot enter fully and freely into the dangers which Russians established in Afghanistan, and with Afghanistan as their base, working in India as they worked in Bulgaria and in Bosnia, would bring about. In dealing with the Russian Government, you have undoubtedly to make considerable allowances. That Government is not organized as other Governments are. You constantly meet with this phenomenon — that what is done by the Generals or the Ambassadors at one place is not known to the Government at St. Petersburg or by the Generals or Ambassadors at other places. At the very time when General Kaufmann was negotiating with the Ameer, Prince Gortchakoff was denying that anything of the kind was going on. At the very time that the last Mission of which we complained was crossing the Oxus, M. de Giers was saying to Lord Augustus Loftus at St. Petersburg that no Mission was being sent. I know it is the fashion to attribute all these discrepancies simply to dishonesty. I say—and I do so with absolute sincerity—that I do not believe that this is the true explanation; and, if for no other reason—besides the regard I should naturally pay to the honourable character of those concerned—I should say that, if they were inclined to deceit, they would not venture on such clumsy deceit. The truth is that Russia—a vast Empire in which the whole of the cares of the State are thrown on the central Government—is administered practically at the will of one man alone, who, like other men, is subject to interruptions of health, to distractions of business, and who probably finds it difficult to struggle against the work which he has to do; so that that unity of policy which in other countries, where there is a Cabinet of Ministers who meet together and govern in unison, is easily attained, in Russia is difficult to arrive at. The Departments appear to act separately. The Foreign Office does not know what the War Department is doing, and one section of the Foreign Office is not always in communication with another section. I make these observations in order to clear myself from using any language which from all of us would be unfitting—and which would, perhaps, from me be particularly unfitting—in derogation of the sincerity of the Russian Government. But still you have the fact that, whether by orders or without orders, Russian Commanders and Diplomatists go forth into any country which borders on any Russian territory and devote themselves to the task of organizing it in Russian interest; they command its armies, they erect its forts, they guide its diplomacy, they shape its councils; and this unauthorized diplomatic invasion is the danger that we had to fear in Afghanistan. Now, it was of no use talking about plunging the whole world in war, as Lord Lawrence said, to cure such an evil as that; it was no use sending home suggestions about remonstrances, as the Government of Lord Northbrook did. Remonstrances at St. Petersburg are of no avail to stop a danger such as that. The only thing would be to have British Agents on the spot to watch and counteract those influences. That was the only remedy that could be applied; and that was the reason why, immediately we saw the state of things which led to the gradual *rapprochement* of Russia and Afghanistan in consequence of the proceedings of 1873, we selected this particular measure of placing British Residents on the Frontier of Afghanistan, because they could have watched, reported, and counteracted the intrigues which really threatened our supremacy in that country. What was going on all this time? The neighbourhood of Russia—the moral as well as the physical neighbourhood—was increasing. The negotiations were getting more frequent and more warm. The subordinate tone of the Ameer was getting more subordinate; the tone of General Kaufmann was getting more patronizing and more imperious. And all this time we had only a glimmer of the events taking place. There was, as it were, a thick curtain stretched across the Frontiers of Afghanistan, behind which all these intrigues were going on. I have heard something of the Native Agent, and the noble Earl (the Earl of Northbrook) was very indignant because we expressed dissatisfaction at the intelligence furnished by the Native Agent. Why Major Cavagnari and Mr. Thornton, men of the highest experience, admit that the reports sent by the Native Agent were meagre and incomplete; and nothing was put into those reports that had not been previously seen by the Ameer. This was what happened in Cabul to the reports of the Agent we were exclusively trusting. The noble Earl perpetually reminds my noble Friend (Viscount Cranbrook) that he has been only a year in office, and seems to defend himself simply by appealing to the opinions which he himself expressed. He says we have adopted something which is disapproved by everybody who knows anything about India, and that it was strange presumption of us to go against it. Well, if that is the case, every measure to which he and his Government were opposed is approved by Lord Lytton and his Government—and one Government of India is generally as good as another; and I will not allow that the present Government is in any way inferior in experience or talent to that over which the noble Earl presided. Therefore, if the authority is good in the one case it is good in the other. I have shown you that in the evidence of Captain Grey and with respect to the Native Agent, the noble Earl has misunderstood the evidence of the Blue Book. I will only touch on two more points, as the hour is late. The noble Earl says we broke off negotiations suddenly, and left the Ameer no door by which to approach the British Government. The negotiations were broken off, not in anger, but through the death of the Envoy sent. Lord Lytton thought it a good occasion for putting an end to them, because he understood that the Ameer was negotiating with the Frontier Tribes to attack us at the very time negotiations were going on. Those negotiations, let it be borne in mind, were founded on large terms of support offered by us. Was it possible to go on making these offers to the man you knew was arming his subjects against you? But that the door was closed to him is absolutely incorrect. During the whole time, whatever means the Ameer had of communicating with the British Government he still retained to its full extent. It was still open to him to have sent an Envoy of his own. There was nothing to make it either humiliating or difficult for him to do so. Well, then I am told we ought to have gone to war with Russia. Why on earth ought we to have gone to war with Russia? The burden of Mr. Gladstone's speech at Greenwich was that we had not for this and for that gone to war with Russia. Why on earth should we go to war with Russia? Our complaint of the Ameer was that he had not received our Embassy. His excuse for not receiving our Embassy was, first, that the Russians would make it a ground for coming themselves; and, secondly, that Christians could not live safely at Cabul. The Mission of Russia tore into fragments both those excuses. It was obvious that he did not fear the Russians coming, and that Christians could live safely at Cabul. From that moment his excuses disappear. And now by his own showing, without any reason—out of pure hostility and disloyalty, because he was conspiring with others, because he did not wish light to be cast on his proceedings — he refused to receive our Envoy into his territory. It is natural for every man who has done mischief to object to light being thrown on what he has been doing. The excuses raised by the Ameer remind me of the conditions which spiritualist Professors lay down with regard to their claims—namely, that darkness is absolutely essential to the success of their operations. If I were speaking at an earlier period of the night I should have much liked to dissipate some more of the stranger misconceptions of the noble Earl. Now I will not detain your Lordships. I will merely urge your Lordships before you give your vote to consider the gravity of the vote you are about to give. You are endowed by Parliament with the power of refusing or giving Supplies. You have therefore, on this question at all events, the power of deciding whether a Ministry should stand or fall. A Ministry itself is a small thing—it matters little what men sit on this bench—but in this case we represent a cause, and we carry a standard. If this matter is taken out of our hands it must be placed in the hands of others, and you know what policy they will pursue. It must be placed in the hands of those who have found India a burden; of those who contemplate the superiority of America over this country with acquiescence and complacency; in the hands of those who even now advise us to take back our army and allow the Ameer to gain in diplomacy the victory which he has been unable to gain in arms; who would permit the Ameer again to draw down the deep veil that has hitherto concealed his proceedings, and prevented us from penetrating his designs—and who would allow him to pursue beyond the border his intrigues and disloyal designs.

Viscount CARDWELL, who was very imperfectly heard, was understood to express his surprise that the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury) should have contented himself with so slight a reference to the speech of his noble Friend behind him, the late Viceroy of India (the Earl of Northbrook), which had so entirely disposed of the whole history of the question at issue; and that he should have thought it worthy of him to pass by the speech of the noble Marquess behind him (the Marquess of Bath) without any attempt at an answer upon the merits. Late as the hour was, he should have thought that such a speech would have been considered to demand an answer—and could not be attempted to be got rid of merely by a sneer. As regarded the letter of the late Secretary of State (the Duke of Argyll), in which he so clearly negatived the assertion that the Ameer had expressed to Lord Mayo his readiness to receive British Residents in his cities, he presumed the noble Marquess could not have correctly heard it. He would, therefore, read it to him again, and commend it to his more careful consideration hereafter. The noble Marquess asked if there had been no change in the policy since the present Government came into Office, why had this Motion been made? The answer was a very simple one. The noble Marquess must have perceived, from the interest with which the House had followed every word that had fallen from his noble Friend the late Viceroy, as compared with the reception they had given to the reply, how complete the statement of his noble Friend had been. The policy, perhaps, had not been changed—for this Government, like all its Predecessors, professed to desire a strong and a friendly Afghanistan, but the mode of carrying the policy into effect had been entirely changed. Every preceding Viceroy, and every experienced Indian officer, had avoided the demand for British Residents in the territory of the Ameer as being the red rag to the bull; but the present Administration had made it the *sine quâ non*, and had brought about the present war. At that late hour, he would not weaken by repeating the speech of his noble Friend; who had stated with clearness and force the policy which, as Viceroy, he had carried into effect with skill and power. The speech of the noble Marquess was no answer to the statement of his noble Friend; and he was quite satisfied to leave the matter as he had stated it for the judgment of the House.

THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELD: My Lords, the hour is late, but I hope your Lordships will think me justified in detaining you for a few moments. My noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack sketched to us, as it were in allegory, a picture that may give to your Lordships an idea of that North-Western boundary that has been the subject of discussion these two nights. My Lords, I think it is advisable that at this moment some general conception of this scheme should be again put before you. I would picture it, not in allegory, but such as it really exists. That boundary, that North-Western boundary of our Indian Empire, is a branch of a chain of mountains the highest in the world — higher even than the Andes — yet no portion of this Frontier is in possession of the inhabitants of the Indian Empire or the Indian Government, and through its Passes invading armies may make their raids, or wild and turbulent tribes ravage the fertile plains which are entrusted to your Government in that part of the world. Well, then, my Lords, I ventured to say that the inconvenience of such a boundary—the injury which frequently follows such a boundary—were felt by the Government of India, and had been more than once the subject of their consideration. The noble Viscount who moves this Amendment (Viscount Halifax) expressed upon that subject some incredulity with respect to my observations. He told us that he had much acquaintance with the Governors of India, and that he could not recall any Viceroy who had experienced a feeling or conviction of that kind. Well, now, my Lords, let us look for a moment to the facts of the case. We have been in possession of this boundary for, I believe, 28 years. During that period we have been obliged to fit out 19 considerable expeditions to control its inhabitants, have undertaken between 50 and 60 guerilla enterprizes, and have employed upon these expeditions between 50,000 and 60,000 of Her Majesty's troops. All I can say is, that if none of the Viceroys of India who are the acquaintances of the noble Lord have felt the inconvenience, or if they have been insensible to the injury of such a boundary, they were not fit to be Viceroys. But I cannot believe that that is the case. My information would lead me to a very different result. The Government of India is not merely the business of Viceroys, but of statesmen—of sometimes eminent statesmen—and sometimes military leaders of world-wide renown. And it was the information which I derived from one of the most eminent individuals of that character and class that authorized me to make that observation which I made. That eminent personage was for a considerable time a Member of the Indian Administration. He was not prejudiced in favour of the views adopted by Her Majesty's Government. For a considerable period, notwithstanding his sense of the inconvenience and the injury of this boundary, he was one of those who opposed any change, because he believed it was better to incur that inconvenience and injury than to embark on the difficult and responsible office of making a fresh boundary and disturbing arrangements in which political considerations were involved. Remembering the possibility of some Power equal to our own attacking us in that part of the world, but remembering also that some 10 years ago that Power was 2,000 miles distant from our boundaries, a man might consistently uphold the arrangement that then existed, and might, by force of circumstances and the lapse of time, be now a sincere supporter of the policy which Her Majesty's Government now recommends. That, for instance, is the case of Lord Napier of Magdala. It was only recently—on the 8th of November—that I received a telegram from him in which he says—"A careful study of our Frontier convinces me that a rectification of our Frontier is necessary." Those are the words of one of great experience and of consummate ability and judgment, who for a long time was opposed to that which he now finds is absolutely necessary. He does not shrink from the use of the word "rectification," although definitions of that word have been given by many noble Lords opposite which are not to be found in any dictionary. The noble Earl who resumed the debate to-night (Earl Grey) spoke of "rectification" of the Frontier as though it were another phrase for spoliation and annexation. ["Hear!"] I expected those cheers, and wished to receive them. Another noble Earl who spoke in the debate yesterday (the Earl of Carnarvon)—I wrote down his words, because, unfortunately, on a previous occasion he seemed to accuse me of misquoting him—said, "I hate the word 'rectification.' It seems to me to savour of the worst traditions of the French Empire—a word to conceal wrong and robbery." A noble Marquess (the Marquess of Ripon), who recently addressed us, described it as a dark word, and he seemed to tremble as he uttered it. For my own part, I cannot agree in any of these definitions. "Rectification" of Frontier, is a correct diplomatic term which is accepted by the highest authorities and which has a precise and a definite meaning. The "rectification" of Frontiers, instead of being a word of the French Empire, has been long adopted, and your Lordships will be surprised to find that the peace of the world very much depends upon Treaties for the rectification of Frontiers. If all the Treaties for the rectification of Frontiers were destroyed as instruments of the terrible kind described by noble Lords opposite and by the noble Earl on the cross Benches (the Earl of Carnarvon), the peace of the world would be endangered, and might be destroyed. Well, my Lords, after that observation the other night, I took a note of some Treaties for the rectification of Frontiers, and I took them on conditions which I am sure your Lordships will all agree are fair. First of all, they are modern—I would not produce old instances. Secondly, they are not only modern Treaties, but Treaties none of which were entered into or negotiated after a war. Therefore, they are not the consequences of force or fraud. Now, I find that from 1856 to 1868—quite in our own time—there were five Treaties between France and Spain for the rectification of Frontiers; and I have no hesitation myself in saying that if those Treaties had not taken place, there would have been war between France and Spain, and that the existence of those Treaties prevented war. Between France and Switzerland there was a Treaty for the rectification of Frontiers in December, 1862—a Treaty of some celebrity—one which was certainly not a dark instrument. It was a Treaty which certainly has contributed to the maintenance of peace. There is a Treaty between Great Britain and France for the rectification of Frontiers—your Lordships may be surprised to find a Treaty for the rectification of Frontiers between an island and a continent; but it had reference to their possessions in the East Indies. That is a modern Treaty. There is a Treaty for the rectification of Frontiers between Italy and Switzerland, and one between Portugal and the Transvaal. The Transvaal is a place of which I believe the noble Earl on the cross Benches has some knowledge. To make it complete, there is a Treaty for the rectification of Frontiers between Great Britain and an Oriental Kingdom—like Afghanistan—the Kingdom of Siam. Now, I believe the number of those Treaties I have mentioned — some dozen — might be doubled or even trebled if it were necessary.

EARL GREY: Did these Treaties involve any of the States parties to them in a diminution of territory?

THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELD: The observation of the noble Earl deserves remark. A rectification of Frontiers does not necessarily involve a diminution of territory. Many such Treaties are carried out by means of equivalents. I make no application of those Treaties to the case of Afghanistan. I have not touched upon that point yet. The noble Earl is impetuous. It has been said that I stated on a recent occasion the object of the war to be a rectification of Frontier—the substitution of a scientific for a hap-hazard Frontier. Now, in the first place, I never said that was the object of the war. I treated it as a possible consequence of the war, which is a very different thing. Our first application to the Ameer was, in fact, virtually founded upon the principle of rectifying our Frontier without any disturbance of territory whatever. What was our difficulty with regard to Afghanistan? We could gain no information as to what was going on beyond the mountain range—which was, in fact, rather a prison than a Frontier—or what might be preparing in the numerous valleys of Afghanistan. What we wanted, therefore, was eyes to see and ears to hear; and we should have attained our object had the Ameer made to us those concessions which are commonly granted by all civilized States, and which even some Oriental States do not deny us—namely, to have a Minister at his capital—a demand which we did not press—and men like our Consuls General at some of his chief towns. With that we should have been satisfied. It would virtually have been a rectification of our Frontier; because we should have got rid of those obstacles that rendered it utterly impossible for us to conduct public affairs with any knowledge of the circumstances with which we had to deal as regarded Afghanistan. Therefore, the noble Earl is precipitate in concluding that because I am in favour of a rectification of Frontier, and wished to see a scientific instead of an hap-hazard one, that necessarily any change would occur. I only wish to observe that abstractedly there is no absolute necessity for change, because you may rectify a Frontier. And you may rectify it in different ways—by equivalents and so forth. But, my Lords, my observations on that subject in another place were made rather with reference in my mind to certain wild ideas that were then prevalent, to the effect that it was the intention of the Government to invade and conquer Afghanistan and annex it to our Empire. I explained that that was not our object, and that a scientific rectification of our Frontier would effect for us all the results we desired. And, my Lords, what is a scientific Frontier compared with a haphazard one? Why, it is, as a military authority has said, this—a scientific Frontier may be defended with a garrison of 5,000 men; while, with a haphazard one, you may require for its defence an army of 100,000 men, and even then not be safe from sudden attack. It is not for us now to consider what arrangements may be made with this object further than to say that Her Majesty's Ministers, after all that has occurred, will feel it their duty to take care of the security of our Indian Empire. My Lords, whatever may be the objections to the present North-Western Frontier of our Indian Empire, I have little doubt things would have gone on much in the same way—Members of the Indian Administration would have been equally conscious of the deficiencies of that Frontier—and yet so difficult is the task of amending a Frontier, and so great are the obstacles which certainly present themselves, things would have gone on, I dare say, as they had gone on for 28 years, had it not been for the sudden appearance of Russia in the immediate vicinity of Afghanistan. I would, my Lords, speak on that subject with frankness. It is, no doubt, much easier to speak of it now than it would have been a year ago, or eight months ago. Eight months ago war was more than probable between this country and Russia; and an imprudent word might have precipitated that war. At present we know, from the language of the gracious Speech from the Throne, that Her Majesty's relations with all Powers are friendly, and they are not less friendly with Russia than with any other Power. I will say of the expedition which Russia was preparing in Central Asia at the time when she believed that war was inevitable between our country and herself—I will say at once that I hold that all those preparations on the part of Russia were justifiable; and if war had occurred, of course they would have contributed to bring about the ultimate result, whatever that might have been. Had we been in the position of Russia, I doubt not we might have undertaken some enterprize of a similar kind. No doubt there were a great many wild expressions uttered by persons of some authority. No doubt there have been dreams indulged in by individuals which were never realized. I dare say there are Russian officers who would not have disliked to have cooled the hoofs of their chargers in the waters of the Indus; on the other hand, I dare say there were some English soldiers who would have liked to have caught a glance of the Caspian, and to have exclaimed θαλαττα, like the soldiers of Xenophon. We may dismiss from our considerations all these dreams and wild expressions, and admit that if war had occurred between the two countries, all the preparations in Central Asia against Great Britain and India were justifiable; but when it was found that war was not to be made, Her Majesty's Government made becomingly courteous representations to St. Petersburg, and it was impossible that anything could be more frank and satisfactory than the manner in which they were met. The Emperor of Russia said—"It is very true we did intend to injure you as much as we could on your Indian border; but war has not occurred—war, I trust, will not occur between Russia and England. We have already given orders for our troops to retire to their old stations beyond the Oxus; our Ambassador shall be merely considered as a provisional Ambassador on a Mission of courtesy, and as soon as possible he shall disappear." I think that was sufficient and satisfactory conduct on the part of Russia in regard to this matter. But, my Lords, it was totally impossible for us, after all that has occurred, to leave things as they were. After we had found the Russian armies almost in sight of Afghanistan, and their Embassy within the walls of Cabul, we could not go on with the old system and indulge in the fancy that our Frontier was a becoming and secure Frontier in the circumstances. It was, therefore, absolutely necessary to consider what course we should take. My noble Friend who spoke last night from the cross Benches (the Earl of Derby) made a most ingenious speech, marked by all his characteristics. I never was more pleased. I listened for a long time to what seemed a complete vindication of the Government; and remembering it came from an old comrade in arms with whom I had worked for a quarter of a century, who had ever possessed my entire confidence, but who had left me, unfortunately, from circumstances over which, I assume, he had no control, I thought he was making the *amende* by taking an early opportunity of vindicating the policy of the Government. But before he sat down, all that romantic flutter of the heart which I had experienced entirely ceased when I found that, notwithstanding his approbation of the Government policy, he was going to vote for the Amendment. What surprised me more than anything else was the reason he gave for it—that was, because we did not go to war with Russia. My noble Friend said—"If you acted logically and properly you ought to have gone to war with Russia, and therefore I must vote for the Amendment. You ought not only to have gone to war with Russia, but in regard to Afghanistan you ought to have treated the Ameer with more courtesy and kindness. You ought to have made appeals to him, and taken every step which might gain his confidence and guide his policy." My Lords, that is the very course which we have pursued. Really, the Ameer of Afghanistan has been treated like a spoiled child. He has had messages sent to him; he has had messengers offered to him—he has sent messengers to us, who have been courteously received. We have written him letters, some of which he has not answered, and others he has answered with unkindness. What more could we have done? Yet my noble Friend is going to vote against the Government, because—with, we think, an imperfect conception of our conduct —he says we have behaved harshly to the Ameer, and not taken the proper course of behaving hostilely to Russia. But Russia has taken every step to make honourable amends to England, and her conduct presents the most striking contrast to that furnished by the Ameer. Then there was another point, which at this late hour of the night I cannot dwell upon, but which I will notice, because it has been treated with great misconception. It refers to the financial part of the question—to the expenses. My noble Friend on the cross Benches (the Earl of Derby) has no confidence in our finance. He recalls the instance of the Abyssinian War, and he says that there was an estimate of £3,000,000, and it turned out to be £9,000,000. My noble Friend ought to be well informed on that subject, because it was at his instance and by his advice that we decided upon that war. I believe better advice was never given; a more necessary war was never undertaken. But when that war took place it unfortunately occurred very late in the season, and the Cabinet were of opinion, and were informed by those who were competent to advise them in such matters, that the affair could not be finished in one campaign. But information subsequently reached the Government which convinced them that by great exertions and expense it might be concluded in one campaign, and we did not hesitate to incur that expense, which amounted to a very large sum, and which was chiefly spent in obtaining means of transport. But it was through that expenditure that Lord Napier, in addition to his great qualities and skill, was enabled to conclude the Abyssinian War in one campaign. If you had had two campaigns you would have spent not only £9,000,000, but more. In the second campaign you might have had a very bad season, instead of the very fine season that we had; and you might, instead of savages, have found European officers who would have assisted them in resisting their enemy. But instead of that, Lord Napier conducted the one campaign to a successful issue without, I believe, the loss of a single life. Well, my Lords, the question is—What is the course we ought to take at the present moment? I was in hopes, after the debate the other night, in which no one interfered with those Members of your Lordships' House whose conduct was implicated in the various Blue Books on the Table, that we might have discussed the political character of the question much more fully than we have done, and that we should not be again lost in a series of what I must call wrangles about the conduct of Ministers who are in office and those who are out. If the noble Viscount who has just sat down (Viscount Cardwell) is satisfied with the triumphant speech of the late Viceroy of India, as he describes it, I can only say that it is not a speech which will give to the people of England that knowledge which is desirable, and which they wish to have of the great question at issue. If I am to sum up the three nights' debate which we virtually have had upon this matter, I should say it might be summed up in a sentence, so far as the discussions have gone — we have done something which in theory you approve, and which, if England had acted in time, you would have done yourselves. In a despatch of the noble Earl (the Earl of Northbrook), who addressed us at such length this evening, your Lordships will find this statement—His Government is alarmed by an account that the Russians are going to occupy Merv, and what he proposes is this: He proposes that we should make—I do not know that it was not to be an offensive and defensive alliance—but certainly a defensive alliance, with Afghanistan, and that English officers should be immediately admitted to Herat. What is the difference——

THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK: I never made any such proposal.

THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELD: I am sorry that the noble Earl has the habit of contradicting without appealing to documents. I can give the date to the noble Earl. He will find it in June, 1875. His despatch says—

> "Much discussion has recently taken place as to the effect that would be produced by a Russian advance to Merv. We have before stated to Her Majesty's Government our apprehension that the assumption by Russia of authority over the whole Turkoman country would create alarm in Afghanistan, and we think it desirable to express our opinion of the course which should be adopted if it should take place."

Here it is —

> "It would then become necessary to give additional and more specific assurances to the Ruler of Afghanistan that we are prepared to assist him to defend Afghanistan against attack from without. It would probably be desirable to enter into a Treaty engagement with him," (not merely an assurance but) "a Treaty engagement with him; and the establishment of a British Resident at Herat would be the natural consequence of such an engagement and of the nearer approach of the Russian Frontier."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, pp. 134-5.]

I appeal to your Lordships whether this quotation does not entirely substantiate my statement as to the policy of the noble Earl, and whether my summary between the policy of the late Viceroy and our own is not correct and complete? I have no objection at any time to be interrupted, and the only reason why I regret it now is that it will add to the few moments during which I shall have to trouble you. I received yesterday a communication from Lord Napier of Magdala, who expresses his regret that he cannot arrive in time to take part in this debate. He says—

> "Afghanistan, if in the hands of a hostile Power, may at any time deal a fatal blow to our Empire. We cannot remain on the defensive without a ruinous drain on our resources. Our Frontier is weak; an advanced position is necessary for our safety.

When I am told that no military authority justifies the policy of Her Majesty's Government, I can appeal with confidence to one who, I believe, must rank among the highest military authorities. I will not detain your Lordships, because it is impossible in your exhausted state, having met at an extraordinarily early hour to-day, to enter into any great discussion. What I want to impress on your Lordships before you divide—which you will do in a few minutes—is that you should not misapprehend the issue on which you have to decide. It is a very grave one. It is not a mere question of the Khyber Pass, or of some small cantonment at Dakka or at Jellalabad. It is a question which concerns the character and the influence of England in Europe—and your conduct to-day will animate this country and encourage Europe if it be such as I would fain believe you are determined to adopt. My Lords, I object entirely to this Amendment of the noble Lord. It is an absurd position almost in which to put the House of Lords to come down and appeal to them to stop the Supplies to Her Majesty. If the Amendment is substituted for our original Motion, that would be the inevitable result. I cannot believe that many noble Lords opposite, when they accurately comprehend the issue which is before them, can sanction such a course. They can scarcely have been conscious of the dangerous precipice to which the noble Viscount the Mover of the Amendment is leading them. We have seen in this debate an indignant spirit hostile to these tactics evinced by some of the most eminent members of the Party opposite. The speech of the noble Duke (the Duke of Somerset), which was hailed from both sides of the House, was one which expressed the sentiments which I am sure the great majority must feel. My Lords, what I see in the Amendment is not an assertion of those great Whig principles, which no man respects more than myself. What is at the bottom of it is rather that principle of peace-at-any-price, which a certain party in this country upholds. It is that dangerous dogma which I believe animates the ranks before me at this moment, although many of them may be unconscious of it. That deleterious doctrine haunts and harasses the people of this country in every form. Sometimes it is a committee; sometimes it is a letter; sometimes it is an Amendment to the Address; sometimes it is a proposition to stop the Supplies. My Lords, that doctrine has done more mischief than any I can well recall that have been afloat in this century. It has occasioned more wars than the most ruthless conquerors. It has disturbed, and nearly destroyed, that political equilibrium so necessary to the liberties of nations and the welfare of the world. It has dimmed occasionally even the majesty of England. And, my Lords, to-night you have an opportunity which I trust you will not lose, to brand these opinions — these deleterious dogmas — with the reprobation of the Peers of England.

On Question, That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Motion? their Lordships *divided*:—Contents 201; Not-Contents 65: Majority 136.

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Hertford, M.
Salisbury, M.

Amherst, E.
Bathurst, E.
Beaconsfield, E.
Beauchamp, E.
Belmore, E.
Bradford, E.
Brownlow, E.
Cadogan, E.
Cawdor, E.
Clonmell, E.
Coventry, E.
Dartmouth, E.
De La Warr, E.
Denbigh, E.
Devon, E.

Doncaster, E. (*D. Buccleuch and Queensberry.*)
Eldon, E.
Ellesmere, E.
Erne, E.
Ferrers, E.
Fitzwilliam, E.
Fortescue, E.
Gainsborough, E.
Haddington, E.
Hardwicke, E.
Harewood, E.
Howe, E.
Jersey, E.
Lanesborough, E.
Lonsdale, E.
Lovelace, E.
Lucan, E.
Macclesfield, E.
Malmesbury, E.
Mansfield, E.
Manvers, E.
Mar and Kellie, E.
Mount Edgcumbe, E.
Nelson, E.
Onslow, E.
Orford, E.
Pembroke and Montgomery, E.
Powis, E.
Radnor, E.
Ravensworth, E.
Redesdale, E.
Romney, E.
Rosse, E.
Rosslyn, E.
Sandwich, E.
Stanhope, E.
Strange, E. (*D. Athol.*)
Tankerville, E.
Verulam, E.
Waldegrave, E.
Westmorland, E.
Wharncliffe, E.
Wicklow, E.
Wilton, E.

Bangor, V.
Bridport, V.
Clancarty, V. (*E. Clancarty.*)
Cranbrook, V.
Doneraile, V.
Falmouth, V.
Hardinge, V.
Hood, V.
Melville, V.
Sidmouth, V.
Strathallan, V.
Templetown, V.
Torrington, V.

Bangor, L. Bp.
Chichester, L. Bp.
Gloucester and Bristol, L. Bp.
Hereford, L. Bp.
St. Albans, L. Bp.
St. David's, L. Bp.

Abinger, L.
Airey, L.
Alington, L.
Ashford, L. (*V. Bury.*)
Aveland, L.
Bagot, L.
Balfour of Burley, L.
Bateman, L.
Blackburn, L.
Blantyre, L.
Bloomfield, L.
Brancepeth, L. (*V. Boyne.*)
Braybrooke, L.
Brodrick, L. (*V. Midleton.*)
Byron, L.
Charlemont, L. (*E. Charlemont.*)
Churston, L.
Clements, L. (*E. Leitrim.*)
Clinton, L.
Colchester, L.
Colville of Culross, L.
Conyers, L.
Cottesloe, L.
Crofton, L.
De L'Isle and Dudley, L.
De Mauley, L.
Denman, L.
de Ros, L. [*Teller.*]
De Saumarez, L.
Digby, L.
Dormer, L.
Dunmore, L. (*E. Dunmore.*)
Dunsany, L.
Ellenborough, L.
Elphinstone, L.
Ettrick, L. (*L. Napier.*)
Forester, L.
Foxford, L. (*E. Limerick.*)
Gage, L. (*V. Gage.*)
Gerard, L.
Grey de Radcliffe, L. (*V. Grey de Wilton.*)
Grinstead, L. (*E. Enniskillen.*)
Gwydir, L.
Hampton, L.
Harlech, L.
Hartismere, L. (*L. Henniker.*)
Hastings, L. (*E. Loudoun.*)
Hastings, L.
Hawke, L.
Hay, L. (*E. Kinnoul.*)
Heytesbury, L.
Houghton, L.
Howard de Walden, L.
Inchiquin, L.
Keane, L.
Kenlis, L. (*M. Headfort.*)
Ker, L. (*M. Lothian.*)
Kesteven, L.
Leconfield, L.
Londesborough, L.
Manners, L.
Massy, L.
Monteagle of Brandon, L.
Mowbray, L.
Northwick, L.
Norton, L.
Oranmore and Browne, L.
Ormonde, L. (*M. Ormonde.*)
Penrhyn, L.
Penzance, L.
Poltimore, L.
Raglan, L.
Ramsay, L. (*E. Dalhousie.*)
Rayleigh, L.
Rivers, L.
Rodney, L.
Romilly, L.
Ross, L. (*E. Glasgow.*)
Rossmore, L.
Sackville, L.
Saltersford, L. (*E. Courtown.*)
Saltoun, L.
Scarsdale, L.
Sheffield, L. (*E. Sheffield.*)
Skelmersdale, L. [*Teller.*]
Somerhill, L. (*M. Clanricarde.*)
Sondes, L.
Stratheden and Campbell, L.
Strathnairn, L.
Tollemache, L.
Tredegar, L.
Truro, L.
Tyrone, L. (*M. Waterford.*)
Ventry, L.
Vernon L.
Vivian, L.
Walsingham, L.
Wentworth, L.
Westbury, L.
Willoughby de Broke, L.
Windsor, L.
Winmarleigh, L.
Wynford, L.
Zouche of Haryngworth, L.

NOT-CONTENTS.

Bedford, D.
Devonshire, D.
Saint Albans, D.
Westminster, D.

Bath, M.
Lansdowne, M.
Northampton, M.
Ripon, M.

Airlie, E.
Camperdown, E.
Carnarvon, E.
Cowper, E.
Derby, E.
Ducie, E.
Dudley, E.
Grey, E.
Kimberley, E.
Morley, E.
Northbrook, E.
Portsmouth, E.
Shaftesbury, E.
Spencer, E.
Sydney, E.
Zetland, E.

Cardwell, V.
Gordon, V. (*E. Aberdeen.*)
Halifax, V.

Oxford, L. Bp.

Aberdare, L.
Acton, L.
Beaumont, L.
Belper, L.
Blachford, L.
Boyle, L. (*E. Cork and Orrery.*) [*Teller.*]
Carew, L.
Carlingford, L.
Chesham, L.
Coleridge, L.
Crewe, L.
De Tabley, L.
Dunning, L. (*L. Rollo.*)
Elgin, L. (*E. Elgin and Kincardine.*)
Emly, L.
Hammond, L.
Hatherton, L.
Lanerton, L.
Lawrence, L.
Leigh, L.
Lyttelton, L.
Meldrum, L. (*M. Huntly.*)
Monck, L. (*V. Monck.*)
Moncreiff, L.
Monson, L. [*Teller.*]
O'Hagan, L.
Oxenfoord, L. (*E. Stair.*)
Ribblesdale, L.
Rosebery, L. (*E. Rosebery.*)
Sandhurst, L.
Sefton, L. (*E. Sefton.*)
Selborne, L.
Strafford, L. (*V. Enfield.*)
Sudeley, L.
Waveney, L.
Wolverton, L.
Wrottesley, L.

Resolved in the *Affirmative.*

Then the original Motion *agreed to.*

House adjourned at a quarter before Three o'clock, to Tuesday next, a quarter before Five o'clock.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Tuesday, 10*th December*, 1878.

MINUTES.] — Public Bills—*Ordered—First Reading*—Select Vestries* [54]; Patents for Inventions* [55]; Sale of Food and Drugs Act (1875) Amendment* [56]; Gun Licence Act (1870) Amendment* [57].

QUESTIONS.

BORNEO—THE BRITISH BORNEO COMPANY.—QUESTION.

Sir CHARLES W. DILKE asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, with reference to the Statements made on behalf of Government on the 8th of April and 20th of June last, that all action in the matter of a cession of territory in Northern Borneo to a British Trading Company had been suspended till the arrival in this country of the promoters of the Company, Whether he is now in a position to supply any further information on the subject; and, whether Her Majesty's Government have now decided whether the proceedings of the Company and the British Representative in Northern Borneo are such as can properly be sanctioned?

Mr. BOURKE, in reply, said, that within the last few days a statement of the views of the Company had been submitted to the Foreign Office; but sufficient time had not elapsed to allow Her Majesty's Government to come to a decision on the subject.

TURKEY—PROPOSED GUARANTEED LOAN.—QUESTION.

Mr. W. CARTWRIGHT asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether Her Majesty's Government has cognizance of any project involving a loan to Turkey under British guarantee; and, whether he can give any assurance that there is no intention on the part of Her Majesty's Government to entertain a proposal involving such guarantee by this Country to a Turkish loan?

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: Her Majesty's Government have had their attention repeatedly called to the financial difficulties in which the Porte is placed, and many suggestions have been made to them as to the assistance which England might render. But these suggestions have, for the most part, been of a wholly impracticable character, and the Government have nothing at present before them in a tangible shape. They have deputed a gentleman well versed in accounts to make inquiries into the real condition of the Turkish finances. Every facility has been promised him for making these inquiries, and the Porte has placed him on the Financial Commission which is now charged with the revision of the whole financial system. It is obvious that financial considerations must enter largely into the reforms which Her Majesty's Government are urging upon the Porte, and it is, therefore, essential that they should be well informed. It must not be forgotten that Her Majesty's Government are already guarantors of a portion of the Turkish Debt; but no financial engagements will be entered into without the previous consent of Parliament.

TREATY OF BERLIN—SPEECH OF THE PRIME MINISTER AT GUILDHALL. QUESTION.

Mr. ANDERSON asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether, on the 9th November, when the Prime Minister spoke at the Guildhall, the Government had received information of the Czar's assurance of his wish to give all due respect to the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin, as communicated to the British Embassy by the Russian Minister on the 9th November, but published by Her Majesty's Government here only on the 13th?

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: I have made inquiries as to the exact time of the receipt of the communication to which the hon. Member's Question refers, and I find that the communication was telegraphed from St. Petersburg by Her Majesty's Ambassador on the 9th of November at half-past 6 in the afternoon, was delivered at the Foreign Office a few minutes before 10 on that evening, and afterwards had to be deciphered—because it came in cypher—at the Office.

Therefore, the Prime Minister was not informed of it when he spoke at Guildhall.

AFGHANISTAN—NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE AMEER.—QUESTION.

MR. EVELYN ASHLEY asked the Under Secretary of State for India, with reference to the Statement made on the 20th April 1877 by the then Under Secretary of State for India, in reply to the hon. Member for the Elgin Burghs, who asked, "Have the negotiations with the Ameer entirely ceased," namely—

> "I believe that the Ameer has expressed a wish to carry on negotiations, and the matter is under the consideration of the Government of India."

Whether any such expression of a wish to carry on negotiation was received from the Ameer; and, if so, why no record of it appears in the Papers now laid before Parliament?

MR. E. STANHOPE: I can give the hon. and learned Member no information beyond what is contained in the Papers already laid before Parliament. My noble Friend's answer was given before the despatch from the Government of India was received, and when no official report of it had yet reached us, and it expressed only his own belief in the matter.

AFGHANISTAN—THE AFGHAN CORRESPONDENCE.—QUESTION.

MR. MORGAN LLOYD asked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether any Correspondence relating to the affairs of Afghanistan passed between the Secretary of State for India and the Indian Government between February 28th 1876 and May 10th 1877; and, if such Correspondence did pass, whether he is prepared to lay the same upon the Table?

MR. E. STANHOPE: No official Correspondence passed between these dates, except the Reports of the Government of India already published and a few other unimportant Cabul diaries.

TURKEY — REFORMS — THE ANGLO-TURKISH CONVENTION.—QUESTION.

MR. E. JENKINS asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether any arrangements have been come to with the Ottoman Porte under the Anglo-Turkish Convention; and, if so, whether he can state the nature of such arrangements; and, when Papers on the subject will be laid upon the Table?

MR. BOURKE: Negotiations are going on with the Ottoman Government with regard to the reforms to be carried out under the Anglo-Turkish Convention; but the state they have reached is not such as to permit of their being published.

AFGHANISTAN AND CENTRAL ASIA—UNDERSTANDING WITH RUSSIA.

QUESTION.

LORD ROBERT MONTAGU asked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether "the information" which Lord Lytton

> "placed before the Indian Council after personal conference, not only with Her Majesty's Government, but also with the Russian Ambassador in England,"

was in writing, or was given only verbally and from memory to the Council in India; in what way it "influenced the consideration," by the Indian Council, of Lord Salisbury's published instructions of 26th February 1876; and, the date of the last understanding between the Russian and English Governments with reference to Afghanistan or Central Asia generally?

MR. E. STANHOPE: The noble Lord can hardly, I think, really expect that I can give him any answer to his first two Questions. We have no information on the subject; and I am quite unable to say in what way the Indian Council were influenced by Lord Lytton's statements, beyond what they themselves explain in their despatch. In answer to the last Question of the noble Lord, I suppose that the last understanding to which he refers is the one of May 11, 1875; but the noble Lord is aware that there has been a great deal of subsequent correspondence on the subject.

LORD ROBERT MONTAGU: I asked is that the last?

MR. E. STANHOPE: So far as I know, I believe it is the last understanding.

INDIA—AUGMENTATION OF THE MILITARY FORCES.—QUESTION.

Mr. FAWCETT asked the Under Secretary of State for India, If he will inform the House what is the addition to the strength of the Native Army in India which was agreed to by the Secretary of State in Council on Tuesday last; what is the estimated annual cost of such increase; and, whether it is proposed to make any proportionate increase in the strength of the European Army in India?

Mr. E. STANHOPE: The addition to the strength of the Native Army in India sanctioned on Tuesday last was about 15,000 men. The rough estimate of the monthly cost is from £22,000 to £23,000. No proposal has come from India for a proportionate increase in the strength of the European Army; but two battalions of Infantry which would have come home in ordinary course have been detained in India, and three garrison batteries have been temporarily added to the Indian establishment.

AFGHANISTAN—THE COUNCIL OF INDIA.—QUESTIONS.

Sir WILLIAM HARCOURT asked the Under Secretary of State for India, If he could state the day on which Lord Salisbury's Despatch of the 28th February 1876 was laid before the Viceroy's Council; the dates at which Sir H. Norman, Sir W. Muir, and Sir A. Hobhouse respectively ceased to be Members of the Viceroy's Council; and, the date of the withdrawal of the native agent from Cabul after the Peshawur Conference? Also, whether the letters of the Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan of September, 1878, have been sent home; and, if not, whether there is any reason why letters now nearly three months old should not be sent home?

Mr. E. STANHOPE: As to the first Question of the hon. and learned Member, I can only say that we have no official information beyond that contained in the 21st paragraph of the despatch of May 10, 1877. Sir William Muir ceased to be a Member of the Viceroy's Council on or about November 6, 1876; Sir Henry Norman on March 18, 1877; and Sir Arthur Hobhouse on the 10th of April, 1877. After the Conferences at Peshawur Atta Mahomed went to Simla and remained there; but the Agency was not abolished until November 10, 1877. Her Majesty's Government have only in this country telegraphic reports of the letters of the Nawab; but it does not appear likely that there is anything important in the letters beyond what is contained in the telegraphic despatches.

THE RHODOPE COMMISSION.

QUESTION.

Mr. Serjeant SIMON asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether Her Majesty's Government place reliance upon the Report of Mr. Consul General Fawcett, their own Commissioner in the Rhodope Inquiry, which is identical with the Reports of the Commissioners of France, Austria, and Italy, to their respective Governments; and, if so, whether they intend to take any and what measures in consequence?

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: Sir, Her Majesty's Government do place reliance on the Report of Mr. Consul General Fawcett, and in consequence they are considering proposals for the relief of the sufferers; and if they make these proposals to Parliament they will, of course, state the grounds on which they make them: but what I have already stated is this—that the absence of such agreement as would have been shown by a joint Report renders the question of political action one requiring great consideration. I never intended to say, in answer to a Question yesterday—as has been thought by some hon. Gentlemen—that we did not place reliance upon the Report of Mr. Fawcett.

BOARD OF WORKS (IRELAND.)

QUESTION.

Major NOLAN asked the Secretary to the Treasury, If the Government intend to take steps to re-organise the Irish Board of Works, and if the Government purpose to make an announcement on this subject before the Christmas Recess?

Sir HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON: Sir, the Treasury have not yet decided as to what steps are to be taken, because they are considering the information from the Committee which inquired into the Board of Works in Ireland. The Report deals with a great variety of subjects, and some of the changes which it proposes would require legislation. The subject is under the consideration of the Council, and the House will perceive it will necessarily occupy a certain amount of time; but I hope that when the House meets again I shall be in a position to announce the course the Government intends to take with regard to it.

AFGHANISTAN — THE WAR — NEWSPAPER CORRESPONDENTS.

QUESTION.

MAJOR **NOLAN** asked the Under Secretary of State for India, If newspaper correspondents with the Army in Afghanistan are allowed to proceed to the front, and to send letters and telegrams home without restriction; and, if not, what rules have been framed to govern their correspondence?

MR. **E. STANHOPE**: We have no information whatever on the subject beyond what is contained in the newspapers.

MAJOR **NOLAN**: I beg to give Notice that on Monday I shall again ask the Under Secretary of State for India a Question with respect to the war correspondents.

SOUTH AFRICA—THE CAPE COLONIES —TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION.

QUESTION.

COLONEL **MURE** asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether he can give the House any information as to the prospect of telegraphic communication between this Country and the Cape of Good Hope?

SIR **MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH**: Last Session, in reply to a Question from the hon. and gallant Member, I informed the House that in view of the great necessity of establishing telegraphic communication between this country and South Africa, and the improbability that it would be established by private enterprise within any reasonable time, Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to co-operate with the several Colonies interested in carrying it into effect, and that I had been authorized to inform the Colonial Governments of that decision, and obtain their views. This was accordingly done; and from replies since received, I understand that the Cape Parliament and the Councils of Natal and Mauritius are prepared to guarantee annual subsidies, on certain conditions, for this purpose. These replies are now being carefully considered; but I fear I cannot yet state that it has been found possible to base any definite arrangements upon them. The undertaking is a great and costly one, and some time may yet elapse before all financial and other details can be settled; but I can assure the House that we are fully sensible of the desirability of the early completion of a work which recent circumstances have shown to be so much required.

AFGHANISTAN—THE MISSION TO CABUL—MR. MARSHALL'S DESPATCH.

QUESTION.

MR. **GLADSTONE** asked Her Majesty's Government, with reference to the Despatch of Mr. Marshall, No. 164, dated 13th September, and received by post on the 18th September, Whether they were in possession of the substance of that Despatch with respect to the Mission to Cabul on any earlier day; and, if so, what day?

MR. **BOURKE**: Sir, we received a telegraphic despatch from Mr. Plunkett on the 13th of September stating that he had received the Ameer's Note, and he was sending it home, and giving a brief statement with regard to its purport; but that was, of course, superseded by the full despatch.

ORDER OF THE DAY.

THE ADDRESS IN ANSWER TO THE QUEEN'S SPEECH.

ADDRESS REPORTED. AMENDMENT (MR. WHITBREAD).

ADJOURNED DEBATE. [SECOND NIGHT.]

Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Amendment proposed to Question [9th December], "That the said Address be now read a second time."

And which Amendment was,

To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "this House disapproves the conduct of Her Majesty's Government which has resulted in the War with Afghanistan,"—(*Mr. Whitbread,*) —instead thereof.

Question again proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question.

Debate *resumed.*

Lord JOHN MANNERS observed, that the hon. Gentleman who introduced the Amendment on this subject wished them to confine themselves to the past, and told them he would refer neither to the present, nor to the future. But the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. W. E. Foster), who concluded the debate last night, took a somewhat different line. He explained to the House the alternative policy of which, if there were a change of Administration, his Friends would seriously recommend the adoption. The right hon. Gentleman fairly faced a difficulty which the hon. Gentleman who introduced the Amendment shrank from. That policy would be the old, exploded, barren, and useless policy of "masterly inactivity." He (Lord John Manners), proposed to make a few observations, first, with reference to the criticisms which had been made on the policy of the Government; and, secondly, on the alternative policy of "masterly inactivity." He gathered from the observations of the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition on the first night of the Session, that there was no material difference of opinion between the two sides of the House as to what ought now to be done. The noble Lord told the House that he was prepared to vote all the Supplies which were necessary to bring the existing war to a satisfactory and honourable conclusion. Before he proceeded to make his observations, he would reply to two questions with which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford concluded his observations. The right hon. Gentleman, fixing upon an isolated paragraph in the record of a conversation between Lord Lytton and his own confidential Agent, asked with great triumph: "Are we upon the eve of a second secret Treaty with Russia?" He did not know whether the right hon. Gentleman expected a solemn and serious answer to that question; but if he did, he might rest assured that there had been no secret Agreement or Treaty between this country and Russia on the subject of Afghanistan, and as long as the present Government remained in power he ventured to say there would be none. Should, however, the Amendment before the House be carried, and should right hon. Gentlemen opposite, as a consequence, return to power, what the result would be he did not claim to decide. From their past conduct and language it might not be uncharitable to suppose that overtures of that kind from Russia might receive a somewhat more favourable hearing than they were likely to do so long as the present Government remained in office. The right hon. Gentleman asked another question, also on the subject of Russia. He asked, if we were content with the answers received from the Russian Government as to the Russian Mission to Cabul; and, if so, why did we make the reception of that Mission one of the principal causes of the war? The answer to that question was, that as soon as the Government heard of the reception of a Russian Agent at Cabul, they lost no time in making proper remonstrances on the subject at St. Petersburg; that those remonstrances had been successful; and that the Envoy had been withdrawn. That being so, did the right hon. Gentleman mean to say that we should pick a quarrel with Russia? But, then it was asked why, if Her Majesty's Government and the Indian Government were satisfied with the withdrawal of the Russian Envoy, they had made the reception of that Mission one of the principal causes of their quarrel with the unfortunate Ameer? Now, if the right hon. Gentleman who put that question would read the Proclamation of War he would find that no less than seven causes of war were carefully enumerated, and that the reception of the Russian Mission came sixth in order, and merely led up to the seventh, which was, no doubt, the principal motive which caused the war which was now unhappily being waged. We had not quarrelled with the Ameer because he had received the Russian Mission, but because, having received it with great pomp and unwonted solemnity, when the Indian Government asked him to receive a peaceful English Mission, he not only refused to do so, but refused with insult and violence. He now came to the main charge which was brought against the Government with respect to their past policy, and he really trembled when he thought of the number of quotations which had been made on the previous evening from the Yellow Book. [*Ironical cheers.*] There were various modes of trembling. He had brought down to the House a number of extracts from it also; but for the sake of hon. Members he hoped he should be able to continue his observations without untying the elastic that was round the volume. Well, the whole of the great charge brought against the Government and which had been supported by such voluminous quotations, was that they had changed what was called the traditional policy of this country with regard to Afghanistan. Now, to that statement he demurred. He contended that, in the true sense of the word, the policy of the Government had not been changed at all. What, he would ask, had been the policy of Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo and Lord Northbrook? It had been to establish, if possible, on our North-Western Frontier in India, a State which should be strong, friendly, tolerably well-governed, and, in a certain sense, independent. That policy we endeavoured to carry out during many years by the method of what was known as "masterly inactivity." He was not about to say that 10 or 20 years ago that might not have been a very proper method to pursue. All he was contending for was that the change of circumstances, the immense advances which had been made by Russia, and the feeling which from year to year more and more animated the Ameer himself, all necessitated a change in the method of establishing a policy in which statesmen generally concurred. So long as Lord Mayo lived, his personal ascendency over the Ameer enabled that method to be successfully maintained; but no one could study the records before the House without seeing that after Lord Mayo's death the Ameer began to feel year after year more discontented with his position, seeing the pressure of the Russian advance towards his dominions, more discontented with the position which he occupied with regard to the Indian Government, and more and more pressing for a change of relations between him and that Government. It was true that up to the very last Lord Northbrook was not prepared to admit that the time had come for a change; but he contemplated that at some period the necessity of a change for the purpose of securing an independent ally in the Ameer might arise, his contention being that up to the moment of his departure from India that time had not arrived. Lord Northbrook went further, it having been his opinion that it would not arrive until Russia was in occupation of Merv. Now, that was a position which it was, of course, perfectly competent for any hon. Gentleman in that House to maintain; but it was not the opinion of Her Majesty's Government. They felt that they could not view with indifference the advance of Russia to Merv or to the neighbourhood of the northern boundary of Afghanistan. Their views in that respect were, he might add, shared by the Ameer. Year after year he had been impressing on the Indian Government the necessity of taking more vigorous steps to secure his dominions against the onward pressure of Russia. Time after time, however, those representations had been disregarded by Lord Northbrook and his Government; and at last the Ameer, as it seemed to him, in despair, recognizing the fact that the Indian Government did not share in his apprehensions, and were preaching their unlimited belief in Russian goodwill, apparently prepared to throw himself into the arms of Russia. That being the state of the case, when Lord Salisbury came into office the feelings of the Ameer had been still further injured by Lord Northbrook's interference on behalf of his son, Yakoob Khan. Lord Salisbury accordingly instructed Lord Northbrook to attempt, by a more vigorous policy, to recover the lost confidence of the Ameer, and to improve the relations which existed between the two Governments. Now, all through the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford it had been assumed that Lord Salisbury's instructions and those given to Lord Lytton were hostile to the Ameer. He would, however, venture to say that that was a complete misapprehension and mis-statement of the facts of the case. It was to cement and strengthen the relations between England and Afghanistan that Lord Salisbury desired. The Ameer had for years been pressing a particular point on the attention of the Indian Government, and Lord Salisbury's instructions were that those points on which the Ameer had laid so much stress should be conceded with the natural and proper condition that the Indian Government should have the power of verifying the real facts of the case. Lord Northbrook was, therefore, instructed to make the proposal to the Ameer, that if he would consent to the establishment of a British Agent at Herat, the objects which he had at heart should be substantially complied with. Lord Northbrook gave the reasons why, in his opinion and that of his advisers, that course should not be taken, and it was not carried out during the remainder of his Vice-royalty. Then Lord Lytton went out with full and complete instructions and information on the subject; and what, he would ask, could have been more friendly than Lord Lytton's mode of acting upon those instructions? Lord Lytton, in the first instance, proposed that the Ameer should receive an Agent at Cabul to discuss the matters to which he had referred. On the Ameer's declining that proposal, Lord Lytton was not betrayed into any act of animosity, but accepted the counter-proposal of the Ameer, which was that his own confidential Prime Minister should go to Peshawur and there discuss and consider the important subjects of deliberation. Surely that argued no animosity on the part of Lord Lytton to the Ameer. The Prime Minister was in the confidence of the Ameer, and nothing could have been more considerate than the arrangement made. What had happened? Lord Lytton had made it perfectly and distinctly understood by the Ameer that unless the primary condition of his acceptance at Herat of an English Agent was conceded, it would be impossible that the large boons he requested should be granted. That was the basis of the negotiations. Three weeks were consumed by the Prime Minister of the Ameer in a very long statement of his master's wishes; but not a single step was gained towards the primary condition on which the whole Conference was based. At the end of that period the Prime Minister died, and Lord Lytton naturally thought it best to close the Conference. Enough had passed to show that there was no sincere intention on the part of the Ameer to come to any conclusion whatever, seeing that three weeks had elapsed and the preliminary condition had not even been assented to; so that the Indian Government could not but fall back on the *status quo* and terminate the Conference. Upon that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford had seemed to think that the Ameer had some considerable grounds for his discontent, and had been deprived, by the action of the Home Government, of certain securities for which he thought he had a right to look. He could not quite understand how the right hon. Gentleman established that proposition. He had read a paragraph in a very remarkable way, so as to omit the statement and to quote the consequence. He was able to supplement the omission, and to give the extract as it really occurred. It was in a despatch of Lord Salisbury's, summing up the whole subject; but the following preceded and governed the passage quoted by the right hon. Gentleman:—

> "His Highness has now been informed in unmistakable language that under the terms of the Treaty of 1855—which alone of the two Treaties contracted between the British and Afghan Governments has a character of perpetuity—the British Government has incurred no liabilities whatever on his behalf; and it has been distinctly intimated to him that neither by Lord Mayo in 1869 nor by Lord Northbrook in 1873 was any assurance given of unconditional protection, nor any obligation contracted towards him which was not dependent on his future conduct towards the British Government and his own subjects."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, pp. 223-4.]

That showed that what Lord Salisbury had said was that the Ameer had then learnt distinctly what was in the minds of Lord Mayo and Lord Northbrook; and that throughout the whole of the Correspondence the Ameer had previously had an impression of obligations on the part of the British Government much larger than they were willing to admit. So, instead of the Conference at Peshawur being unfavourable to Shere Ali in its results, it was genuine kindness to him to show him the true facts of the case and his real position. And apart from that, anyone would fancy, from the speeches that had been made, that Lord Lytton was hostile to the Ameer, while, in fact, from the moment the Conference was terminated, no part of his conduct was so in the least degree, either in word or deed. The Ameer was left perfectly free to conduct the affairs of his territory in any way he chose, and neither by Lord Lytton nor by any one else was the slightest pressure put upon him.

GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOUR: Will you tell us when Quetta was taken and occupied? ["Order!"]

LORD JOHN MANNERS: But what had that to do with the question? Did the hon. and gallant Gentleman not know that in occupying Quetta we were acting under our Treaty rights and wanted no permission? He had really been surprised at such a suggestion from so learned an Indian pundit as the hon. and gallant Gentleman. He contended that for 14 months the Ameer suffered no pressure either from Lord Lytton or the Government, and he might have gone on in the ordinary way for a considerable period, had not a Russian Mission made its appearance at Cabul, and had not he, for reasons of his own, accorded to it an ostentatious welcome, and received it with unwonted solemnity. What was the Indian Government to do? He now came to the alternative policy, which, he supposed, hon. Gentlemen who had supported the Motion would be prepared to undertake. But what was the Indian Government to do when the Mission had been received in the manner he had described? Were they to do nothing? He heard no response from the front Opposition benches to that question. A sudden silence seemed to pervade those benches. Or were they to rest content and wait? Was the policy of "masterly inactivity" to be followed on such an occasion? If the Indian Government were not justified in waiting, and if some action was required on their part, what action, he asked, was it right to take? He ventured to argue that the course adopted with the sanction of the Home Government was a friendly and not a hostile course. A distinguished soldier, who was well known to and highly appreciated by Shere Ali, was selected as the head of the Mission, and no effort was spared to give the Mission an amicable character. The escort, moreover, was cut down to the very lowest point compatible with the dignity of the Envoy and the safety of the Mission itself; and letters were written to the different officials on the road in order to avoid even the possibility of a collision. That being the character and purpose of the Mission, how was it received? As all know, with violence and insult. He asked, again, what would the critics of the Indian Government and the censors of the Government at home have done had they been in the same position? The Mission, he repeated, was rightly sent; and though it came with a friendly object, its rejection was accompanied with insult and violence. Was the Envoy of Her Majesty the Queen of England and Empress of India, and the Representative of the Viceroy, to wait outside the gates of Ali Musjid until it pleased the Ruler of Afghanistan to admit him to his gracious presence? Was he to be, like Charles XII. at Bender—

> "Condemned, a needy supplicant, to wait
> While ladies interpose, and slaves debate?"

Was that the answer the Opposition were prepared to give? Well, after this insult and violence had been perpetrated, was the next manifestation on the part of the Indian Government one of hostility? He might answer, quite the reverse; for a considerable period was given to the Ameer to reflect upon his conduct and upon the impropriety of the steps he had taken. Did Gentlemen opposite condemn that; and were they going to pass a Vote of Censure on the Government because they afforded the Ameer time to reply to the remonstrance against his insulting conduct? To resume; the time of grace having expired, the Government felt that the necessary consequence was an expedition to enforce submission to their modest and reasonable demands. Was the Government going to be condemned for having, after so much pains and forbearance, vindicated by the only legitimate means left to them the honour and dignity of the Crown of England? That being so with respect to the past, he felt confident that the House would reject the Vote of Censure moved by the hon. Member for Bedford; but he appealed to the House with ten times more confidence when that Vote of Censure was coupled with the future policy of those who would succeed to power. What was it the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford told the House? He did not know whether the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) gave the right hon. Gentleman authority to speak in his name, or if it was a voluntary effort on his own part; but one who filled so important a position in the councils of Gentlemen opposite must be taken to speak on behalf of the whole of the Opposition. The right hon. Gentleman told them that after all these steps had been taken—after the war had progressed and been brought to a satisfactory and glorious issue—he was prepared to recommend that the Indian Government should fall back into the old beaten groove of "masterly inactivity," and trust to the chapter of accidents to recover or not recover our influence at Cabul.

Mr. W. E. FORSTER: I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord, but he has not given a fair account of what I said. It was this:—That I thought, speaking for myself, the Government ought to return to the old policy, and I defined that as, first, to try to convince the Ameer that it was neither our interest nor our wish to take from him his territory or deprive him of his independence; and, secondly, to convince him that it was our interest and intention to guard him against any unprovoked aggression of Russia or any other Power. I said that that was my definition of the old policy; and that what I considered the new policy brought in by the present Government was that they assured the Ameer of protection against Russia solely upon conditions, which he considered—and considered rightly—would destroy his independence.

Lord JOHN MANNERS replied that this was precisely what he meant to summarize under the title of "masterly inactivity." He wanted the House to understand this clearly, and also that when he spoke of the old method as being exploded, he did so on the authority of men of great weight. In the course of that debate the opinion of Sir Henry Norman, of Sir William Muir, and of Sir Arthur Hobhouse and others had been quoted against this view. But every person of authority on these matters did not agree with them. The old policy had been condemned not only by the facts of the case, but also by men of high authority. In Lord Lytton's despatch of May 10, 1877, occurred these words—

"Whilst still alive to the difficulties and risks inseparable from any attempt to enter into closer and more responsible intercourse with a barbarous neighbour so suspicious, discontented, and untrustworthy as Shere Ali, we certainly could not regard with unconcern the increasing inconvenience, and possible peril, of the extremely ambiguous and uncertain character of our existing relations with him. It was impossible to deny that the practical results of the Afghan policy, patiently pursued by us for several years, were far from satisfactory."—[*Ibid.* p. 165.]

This despatch was signed by Sir E. C. Bayley, Sir A. J. Arbuthnot, and Sir A. Clarke, who had in the previous year signed the Minute approving Lord Northbrook's despatch. He remembered that the hon. Gentleman the Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett), in the course of a speech some time ago, had made a point of the opinion of Lord Napier of Magdala, as being unfavourable to the policy of the present Government. Well, on page 226 of the Blue Book he held in his hand, Lord Napier of Magdala's opinion was given in these words—

"Our policy of masterly inactivity, or rather of receding from every difficulty until what were matters easy of suppression have grown into serious dangers, has continued too long, and if it is maintained will lead us to disaster."

He thought that on such authorities as these he was justified in saying of the policy to which the right hon. Gentleman would have the country return, that it was a policy condemned both by the facts of the case and also by the authority of some of the greatest living statesmen and Generals of India.

Mr. FAWCETT rose to disclaim having misquoted the words of Lord Napier of Magdala.

Lord JOHN MANNERS said, he did not accuse the hon. Member of misquoting Lord Napier's words, for the Book containing them had not at that time been published. Many years ago the policy of masterly inactivity might have been good and proper; but wise men did not adhere in a bigoted manner to opinions formed in one condition of things when the circumstances had altogether changed. What did the right hon. Gentleman do? He asked the House not only to censure the past policy of the Government, but to place on record their approbation of a recurrence to this condemned policy, and that at a moment when the lives of our gallant British, Irish, and Native Indian soldiers were being risked, when feats of the greatest heroism and endurance were being performed. At such a moment the right hon. Gentleman said to them and the world at large—"Never mind what sacrifices are made, what victories gained, they shall all end in nothing; we will turn back to the old exploded views of 30 years ago; and we will in that manner humbly hope that the Ameer will at some time or other—we can't presume to indicate when—think better of his conduct and graciously permit us to look upon Afghanistan as a real protection in future to the advances of Russia." Surely neither the House nor this country would never sanction such a policy. If they were asked what end the Government placed before them, they would reply—"We must prosecute this war until the Ruler of Afghanistan makes due submission; and then we shall be prepared to grant terms as moderate and as generous as would be consistent with the inviolability, the security, and the peace of our Indian Frontier."

MR. GLADSTONE: I wish to advert for a moment to the closing sentence of the speech of the noble Lord. He says he will prosecute the war until the Ruler of Afghanistan makes due submission. He has bound himself by that pledge in the face of the country. But suppose, Sir, the Ruler of Afghanistan does not make due submission? The Rulers of Afghanistan do not always make due submission. They have a habit of disappearing. Suppose Shere Ali, without making due submission, disappears from the scene of your military operations: what is the noble Lord to do then? He is, I presume, to keep an army of occupation in Afghanistan. How long is he to keep that army there? Quarrels with Afghanistan are not apt to reach a very speedy conclusion; and I think that if the noble Lord saw fit thus liberally and generously to give us his future intentions, he ought to have contemplated an alternative which is perfectly possible, and which, if we are to judge from the case of Dost Mahomed, might even be more probable than the due submission he contemplates with so much complacency. Now, Sir, the noble Lord assumes to himself two privileges, which undoubtedly very greatly facilitate his task. In the first place, he thinks himself entitled to ask of hon. Gentlemen on this side of the House not only in what respect they differ from and condemn the general features of the policy of the Government, but when the Government have entangled themselves by their own errors and misdeeds—in consequence of which we have had to travel over the ground of a multitude of embarrassing situations at every stage, produced by those errors—he thinks it fair to turn upon hon. Gentlemen on this side of the House and say—"What would you have done then?" No doubt the ingenuity of the noble Lord suggested to him that he should fall back upon that. But the noble Lord puts forward another claim, the justice of which I must contest. He claims not to be compelled to refer to the Papers laid upon the Table of the House. ["No!"] I beg pardon—what the noble Lord said was that he would not remove the india-rubber band with which those papers were bound; and he delivered to us a lengthened narrative of the proceedings of the Government, which was not supported, as it should have been, from point to point, by proofs drawn from these Papers. That, therefore, is a claim which I cannot assent to. No doubt it suited the purposes of the noble Lord that he should make that claim, and insist upon it; and that upon only one or two occasions should he furnish us with even so much as a thread of proof of any assertion he made. Our course is a very difficult one. The noble Lord taunts us with going back—that is, with going back to the evidence. It is true that we do not put forward unsupported assertions but with as much care and caution as our unfavourable circumstances and conditions will admit. ["Hear, hear!"] Yes; I thank the hon. Member for that cheer. I thank him for admitting that we do occupy an unfavourable position, when five days before a debate of this character commences, when five days before the speech from the Throne, we are saluted with 500 closely-printed pages of documents and are invited to pass judgment upon them. But, short as the time has been for mastering the Papers, I shall not follow the easy mode of dealing with them of the noble Lord the Postmaster General. In fact, I cannot follow his example and allow the Papers to remain tied up in their tape. On the contrary, Sir, I shall have to refer to these documents; and, more than that, I shall have with great reluctance, but with great deliberation, to impeach those documents. I shall have to point to them as containing the most gross mis-statements of fact—I will not say such as raise the suspicion of wilful untruth, because it is far from my mind to impute that to anyone—but mis-statements of fact involving a reckless negligence, of which, so far as I know, there has been no example in connection with a subject of Imperial policy ever before in my experience presented to Parliament. That is a startling assertion, and I am not going to ask you to accept it until proved. I will, in the first place, refer briefly to the observations of my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham (Mr. Chamberlain). My hon. Friend said that he could not have voted for any Motion which would have confined the debate to the merits of the war and which would not have included the manner in which Her Majesty's Government had acted on this occasion with reference to the privileges and the rights of Parliament. I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. I certainly could not have voted for any Motion as one adequate to the occasion which did not leave it open to us to comment upon the conduct of Her Majesty's Government in denying to Parliament its proper position. As far as I know, the concealment practised by Her Majesty's Government upon this occasion is alike without precedent and without excuse. For two years and a-half a policy has been deliberately carried on by Her Majesty's Government, and the nature of that policy has been kept back with the utmost care from the knowledge of Parliament. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer says—and I really was surprised to hear him say it—that he apologized for the late appearance of these Papers, on the ground that there was such a number of them, and that it was very difficult to prepare and arrange them. The right hon. Gentleman speaks of them as though they had resulted from the transactions of the last few weeks; whereas, in fact, they are the result of transactions which have been spread over a series of years, and the major portion of them have been in the possession of Her Majesty's Government for a long period. I ask, is it right that Parliament should have been kept in the dark so long on this subject? Is there any reason why these Papers should not have been laid before us long ago? I can understand that there are many occasions, when diplomatic or executive steps are being taken, when it is fitting that Papers of this character should be kept back; but there are many stages in the course of such negotiations when a fresh start is made, and when all reason for keeping back such Papers ceases to exist. I take it that such an opportunity for producing these Papers occurred at the time of the total change of the Government policy which followed upon the solemn Conference at Peshawur between Sir Lewis Pelly and the Prime Minister of the Ameer. I ask whether, when Her Majesty's Government resolved upon that total change of policy, they should not have communicated that fact to Parliament? All that Her Majesty's Government did at that time, however, was to say that there was no change in their policy. How happened it, I ask, that Parliament being prorogued on the 16th of August last, the Mission to Afghanistan was despatched on the 19th? That was the crown and consummation of that policy of concealment from Parliament which has marked the conduct of the present Government; and which in the case of the Anglo-Turkish Convention did so much to endanger the continuance of the Treaty-making power of the Crown and to jeopardize the Prerogative of the Crown to make peace and war. I will not enter into that point, however, upon the present occasion. My belief is, that they have broken the Statute; and, at the proper time, I shall be prepared to give my reasons for that belief. I am now going to call the attention of the House to what I believe to be a very grave matter, and that is the total untrustworthiness of the allegations of fact contained in the most important documents in the Book which has been presented to the House. I do not refer now to the famous paragraph 9 in Lord Cranbrook's despatch, in which the art of saying one thing and of suggesting another has been carried to such a pitch of perfection that I doubt whether the future, with all its development, will ever be able to improve it. I hope that the noble Lord will begin to remove his elastic band now. In order that there may be no mistake, I say that I impeach the trustworthiness of the allegations of fact contained in the despatch from the Government of India, dated the 10th of May, 1877, and in that equally important Paper read by Sir Lewis Pelly to the Envoy of the Ameer at Peshawur in November, 1877. I take first the despatch of the Government of India. Of course, it is an essential part of the case of Her Majesty's Government that the Ameer had a great and growing stock of grievances against the Government of India at the time of the departure of Lord Northbrook; and in this despatch, which will be found at page 167 of the Papers, it is stated that the Indian Government had discovered that the Ameer had four special classes of grievances. First of all there was the grievance relating to Yakoob Khan; the second was that which related to the Seistan boundary; the third was with reference to the Chief of Wakhan; and the fourth was that which was involved in our refusing to conclude a defensive alliance with him. Let us turn to the source of the account of the grievances of the Ameer. Now that we have got the Papers we know what were the materials upon which they founded that statement. They had before them two accounts of the grievances of the Ameer, and the account that they have given does not correspond with the other. Those two accounts are very different in authority and value. One of them was a report by our Native Agent. It purported to be a statement of the Ameer. He did not say that he knew the grievances of the Ameer. It was only upon being hard pressed by the Viceroy or by the Agents of the Viceroy—I do not recollect which—that he would consent to give an account of what he thought were the grievances of the Ameer, so that in truth the opinion he gave was only his own opinion of the grievances of the Ameer. Perhaps this may be doubted, and I would therefore read from the Book the authentic record—

> "Being pressed to explain more in detail the views or wishes which the Ameer expressed at his interview, the Agent repeated that the Ameer had no further wishes than those already on record, and deemed that a renewal of the request for their fulfilment would lead to no solid result, as nothing had come of his previous efforts. The Agent was then requested to state in particular his own estimate of the feelings and causes which had estranged the Ameer from the British Government, and had induced His Highness to object to the reception of a complimentary Mission. The Agent replied that he could not pretend to be acquainted with all that passed in the mind of the Ameer on the above subjects; but as far as he could ascertain them the grievances were as follows."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 180.]

Then he goes on to repeat, not four special causes of grievance, according to the doctrine of the despatch of the English Government, but eight causes of grievance, with no speciality at all marked out among the eight, and to say that these eight were among the causes of complaint which the Ameer may have resting upon his mind. That was the inferior source of information to which the Government resorted, and even that they could not state with decent accuracy, for they mis-stated the number of the grievances and they mis-stated the specialities. The truth is—and I challenge contradiction—that they set forth four grievances when there were eight, and they stated that there were four special grievances, while the Agent stated that there was no speciality whatsoever. The Government had before them at this time another statement of the Ameer's grievance, which was of a very different character—a statement made by the Prime Minister of the Ameer himself in writing directly and authoritatively from the Ameer when he met Sir Lewis Pelly at Peshawur. And what was the case then? He gives them only four grievances—only the list does not include that which the Indian Government hoped as the special and great grievance —namely, the refusal of an offensive and defensive alliance. They resort to an inferior authority, because that inferior authority does give them, among the grievances, that one specially marked. They pass by without any note the authentic statement of the Ameer's grievances. [An hon. MEMBER: Give the page.] Page 206. Why do they resort to the inferior authority and pass by the superior? Listen to the list of grievances made by the inferior authority. He had received no reply to a Paper about some Kalut Chiefs; then the affair of Yakoob Khan, and the arbitration of Seistan. So that, according to the statement of the Ameer's Minister, this great and special grievance of the refusal of the defensive and offensive alliance does not appear in the list at all. According to the intention of the British Government, resorting to inferior authority they obtain that which they wish to bring out. ["Oh, oh!"] What I say is this—I do not suppose that these gentlemen were conscious of what they were about, but that is the observation—that they did give the statement of an inferior authority inaccurately, and pass by the statement of the superior authority; and the statement of the superior authority does not contain that one point that it is material for Her Majesty's Government to make—namely, that the Ameer has a grievance, that being, the refusal of former Viceroys to grant him an offensive and defensive alliance. Well, that is the case. I will mention another point, which is certainly a small one, but goes to prove the reckless carelessness with which the Papers were compiled. On page 170 you will find that owing to the Envoy's increasing ill-health several weeks were occupied in the delivery of his long statement. What a statement, that it occupied several weeks in the delivery! The fact is the statement was begun on the 8th of February, and was closed on the 12th of February, and the official statement says it occupied several weeks. I will pass from this point of minor importance to one which I regard as by no means possessing that character. In that famed despatch of the 10th May, 1877, paragraph 32, there is a long series of charges brought forward against the conduct of the Ameer. You will find in paragraph 33 that Sir Lewis Pelly

> "Demanded from the Envoy an explanation of the reported hostility of the Ameer's language and conduct, at a time when the representative of His Highness was still engaged in friendly and pacific negotiation with the British Government."—[*Ibid.* p. 170.]

You would suppose from that Sir Lewis Pelly had demanded an explanation of the charges which had been laid before the Viceroy, but which we now know were not in the statement of the Ameer at all, and he never had had an opportunity of being heard upon them as they stand in that despatch. Sir Lewis Pelly made a quite different appeal to the Prime Minister of the Ameer and, in fact, only touched upon one of the eight raised in the preceding paragraph of the despatch. Is it tolerable, I ask, that these gross inaccuracies upon vital parts of the proceedings are to be made the basis of the official case which we are called upon to criticize and answer? That may be the view of the noble Lord; but it is not the view of those who think a judgment in a case of this kind ought to be based upon evidence. In the beginning of paragraph 34 the Envoy replied that—

> "The reports which had reached us of the Ameer's utterances and proceedings were, he trusted, much exaggerated; he feared, nevertheless, that since his own absence from the Cabul Durbar His Highness had fallen under mischievous influences which he himself deplored and condemned; he would lose no time in addressing to the Ameer strong remonstrances on the subject."—[*Ibid.*]

I ask Her Majesty's Government to refer me to an authority for one word of that statement. Where is it? "There is great silence on the opposite Benches," to use a phrase of the noble Lord; but as the noble Lord has doubtless studied these Papers, perhaps he or any other Member of the Government will give me a single passage in support of the statement. Some new Papers were produced yesterday, and in these new Papers there is an appeal made by Sir Lewis Pelly, which does not in the slightest degree correspond with the description of the misconduct alleged by the Viceroy, and there is also the answer of the Ameer's Envoy to the appeal. The Envoy's answer is on pages 12 and 13 of these Papers. I ask you to give me one word out of that answer which supports a single assertion of the Viceroy as to the answer given.

Mr. E. STANHOPE: I distinctly challenge the statement of the right hon. Gentleman, and state that in the letter will be found distinct authority for that statement.

Mr. GLADSTONE: Read it. ["Order!"]

Mr. E. STANHOPE: I will not read it.

Mr. GLADSTONE: You will not read it! Oh, yes; but I have seen you ready enough to read——["Order, order!"] Well, I am desirous to know, and hoped references would have been given me to a portion of that letter. Will anyone give me those references? [An hon. Member: No.] No; no one will do that. I have, as the House knows, read to you frankly the statement of the Viceroy which I challenge;

and I ask that it may be proved or withdrawn—as, if it can be proved, it establishes a great portion of his case against the Ameer. You produce what you call your authority; and, so far as our best energies go to read and study, there is not one word to support the statement of the Viceroy, and you are not able to refer us to one passage that supports it. The substance of that Paper is that evil rumours are in circulation; that news letters are not to be believed; that he knows nothing of any of those statements; and it is a general protest to the effect that to entertain such statements upon such slight and worthless evidence is contrary to the friendship between States. There is a great regard for Order, and no one will read anything in my speech; but I hope the Gentleman who next rises to speak on behalf of the Government will read again that most important passage from the despatch of the Government of India which I have read, and those most important assertions which it contains, and will show us how those assertions are supported from any Papers now on the Table. I think I have laid something before the House with regard to the reckless negligence with which this Paper has been compiled. I am now going to refer to another Paper, in which the proceedings are in no degree less extraordinary, and that is a very important one, which is attributed to Sir Lewis Pelly, but which appears to be the production of the Indian Government. It is the answer to the statement of the Ameer. I must use the name of Sir Lewis Pelly; but I wish to add I have not a word to say against the accuracy of Sir Lewis Pelly. This was a Paper supplied to him, so far as I can see; and I place no mark of carelessness or of inaccuracy against him. It appears to me this is a genuine production of the Government of India, and it bears the same character of reckless assertion which I have already proved upon the despatch of the 10th of May; and here I may say that if I have not dwelt upon other cases it is not that there are none to dwell upon, but I think I have quoted enough to the House. Now, in this Paper of Sir Lewis Pelly there is a sort of indictment brought against the unfortunate Minister of the Ameer; and I must say, that while the language of Sir Lewis Pelly appears to be usually courteous and kindly, the language of this indictment of which he was the vehicle and the mouthpiece does not deserve such a description. On the contrary, it is discourteous almost to the point of vulgarity. But I will deal with two of the assertions. Two things are said—

> "The British Government has never desired or attempted to re-open the question of appointing a British officer to reside at Cabul."—[*Ibid.* p. 215.]

And yet, though they never attempted to re-open that question, they complain that the Envoy talked about that and nothing else. With regard to the desire not to re-open the question, that is not a very accurate statement. Sir Lewis Pelly's instructions are full of injunctions to re-open the question. It was proposed to bind the Ameer by Treaty to receive an Envoy at Cabul as often as an Envoy was required; but the statement that the Envoy had incessantly discussed this question—which is made a ground of complaint against him—is totally without foundation. The Envoy never discussed it at all. I have read through these long statements with all the care I can; but again I ask Her Majesty's Government to point me to any one sentence of the statement of the Envoy in which he discusses the proposition that a Resident should be sent to remain permanently at Cabul. I believe there is no such passage from beginning to end. But what am I to say of the second accusation made against him? It is this—that while he discussed the question not before him, he carefully and studiously avoided discussing the question that was before him—namely, receiving British officers on the Frontier. I must here quote Sir Lewis Pelly's words—

> "You have carefully avoided all reference to the reception of British officers in other parts of Afghanistan."—[*Ibid.*]

And again—

> "You have left altogether unnoticed the proposals which are the only ones your Excellency is authorized to discuss."

That is a very remarkable allegation—that the Envoy had entirely declined to discuss the proposal of the Viceroy, which was that British officers should be placed on the Afghan Frontier. It is totally untrue. [*A laugh.*] The gallant Admiral (Admiral Edmonstone) laughs. He frequently does laugh. He is an experienced Member of this House, and he is one who opens his mouth oftenest. But perhaps the gallant Admiral has not read these Papers. Perhaps not; but I will give him information which, with his intelligence, he will value. While Sir Lewis Pelly is instructed to say that the Envoy nowhere touched the subject of placing British officers on the Frontier of Afghanistan, there are 11 passages in which he distinctly and expressly discusses this matter. If you are disposed to question my statement—and I think you should question it—I will give you all the passages. You will find them at pages 200, 202, 207, 208—four times over—211, 212, 213—twice over—making 11 in all. Really this is a most extraordinary method of the transaction of public business. The Envoy of the Ameer is arraigned for a kind of insolence—and he is arraigned with something approaching it—in discussing that which he never discussed at all, and in avoiding the discussion of a matter which he frequently discussed. After saying that, I ask the House whether I am justified in challenging the trustworthiness of these official Papers? That despatch of the 10th of May, from which I have quoted such gross mis-statements, is the very despatch which receives from Lord Salisbury the cordial approval of Her Majesty's Government, and especially for the "patience and discrimination" with which it handled the subjects to which it referred. I do not know what to suppose about the Members of the Government. I ought to suppose that they have studied this Conference at Peshawur fully. If so, have they discovered these things? If they have not discovered them, why not? And why is Parliament, which has nothing to go upon but this information, produced after two years and a-half, entertained with documents that are absolutely contradicted in most material points by others to which references are made and on which they profess to be founded? So much for the question of the untrustworthiness of the two Papers to which I have referred. It is an extremely irksome and painful process to track all these gross and unpardonable errors. As a rule, we receive with absolute confidence all the statements of fact contained in official Papers laid on the Table of this House. We have had these Papers ten days in our hands, and the labour, therefore, of reading them is great; but it is increased fourfold when we have to watch them at every turn, and track the extraordinary deviations from fact in the statements they contain, and in which I am afraid they too much abound. There has been a great deal said—and no doubt there remains still a great deal to be said—ranging over the whole of these transactions; but I shall not attempt to go over the entire history of the case. It appears to me the case is brought to a head in one portion of it, on which the Government, not unnaturally, perhaps, have hardly touched at all. The Under Secretary of State touched with a very light hand indeed on the Conferences at Peshawur. They are not the most agreeable reading, and they are voluminous and very closely printed; but here we have the whole case brought into a focus. We can there see what is the course of action that has placed us in our present position. It is the abandonment of the old policy and it is the adoption of the new; and the first price we have to pay for this new policy is a war that has now begun. It is a war attended with this remarkable feature—that, as the Duke of Wellington said, a victory was the most woeful thing next to a defeat; so in this war military success will be the most painful and embarrassing next to military disasters, which might shake the whole fabric of the Indian Empire. Now, I want to know by the light—the ample and redundant light—which these Conferences afford, what was the situation of things when Lord Northbrook quitted India? There had been no change in the Indian policy between the accession of the present Government and the departure of Lord Northbrook from India. That was not owing to the present Government. Lord Salisbury, at the earliest period, began to feel the pulse of Lord Northbrook on the subject of a change. The reception of the first overture was not favourable. He devised a more formidable attack. He instructed the Government of India to alter its policy. The Government of India, in the first place, ascertained that some short time would be given; and, having ascertained that, they wrote a despatch, manful and dutiful, but, I think, in bold resistance to the injunctions of the Secretary of

State. The Secretary of State returned to the charge, and repeated his injunctions. The Indian Government and Lord Northbrook returned to the charge, and repeated their objections, and what I do not mean to call refused in any unbecoming or improper sense, but returned an answer declining, and giving reasons against the injunctions of Lord Salisbury. That is the great epoch. Lord Northbrook then quitted India, a new Viceroy was sent out with new views and new ideas, and what we want is to make an effective comparison of the old and the new. Well, we have the best opportunity of doing that in the Conferences at Peshawur, because the persons are each of them potential, fully authorised and instructed; and because the Papers which were exchanged, and the records which were drawn, give us a most copious account of all that had taken place, but, at the same time, enabling a judgment to be formed. The noble Lord opposite described this old policy with the following epithets. He calls it old. I should have thought that might have been an epithet of praise from the noble Lord. He calls it battered. He calls it beaten. He calls it exploded. He calls it barren, and he calls it useless. Those are the epithets which he applies to the policy of Lord Canning, of Lord Lawrence, of Lord Mayo, of Lord Northbrook, of the other Viceroys of India since the time of the first Afghan War, and of every Government, including his own Government, that have held office in England during these 25 years. That is the description he gives of this policy, I cannot for a moment think of checking the luxuriant imagination of the noble Lord in his choice of epithets; but when the noble Lord, leaving the ground of imagination, passes from adjectives to substantives, and when he deals with matter of fact, I beg leave to contest outright his fundamental propositions, although I fully admit that I have no means of confuting them, except by reference to the Papers which have been produced. The noble Lord says that the Ameer from year to year became more and more anxious for a change in his relations with the British Government, That is the statement of the noble Lord. It is on the ground of a statement like that that he absolves himself from reference to the Book. "He became more and more anxious for a change in his relations with the British Government, and he desired that more vigorous steps should be taken, and that desire he expressed time after time." A change in his relations with the British Government is the cardinal phrase of the statement of the noble Lord. What I say is this—that the change in policy was that undoubtedly the present Government renewed the promise of protection which had been given by Lord Northbrook in a manner substantially the same, but somewhat less cautiously worded. Lord Northbrook, in the words which my hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for India said he did not understand, described the kind of assistance that he was disposed to give. I have such an opinion of the intellect of my hon. Friend opposite that I know not how to comprehend his words, and I do not understand his not understanding. There never was a plainer passage than that in which Lord Northbrook conveyed his assurance of support to the Ameer.

MR. E. STANHOPE explained that what he said he could not understand was the telegram of the right hon. Gentleman's Government.

MR. GLADSTONE: I am sorry if I misunderstood my hon. Friend; but I thought I heard him say the explanation was obscure. As to whether he understands the telegram which was not sent to him, it is a matter of very little consequence, because Lord Northbrook understood that telegram. As the Ameer knew nothing about the telegram, but only knew what Lord Northbrook said to him, I do not think we need trouble ourselves with that matter; but I beg pardon of my hon. Friend if I misconstrued him. The difference between the assurance given by Lord Northbrook and the assurance given by Lord Salisbury, as I understand it, is this. Lord Northbrook said—"I affix two conditions. One is that you must not bring the war upon yourself by your aggressive policy; and the other is you must be guided by us in the questions of policy that arise with regard to that war." These were the two conditions he laid down. Lord Salisbury, I think, cut off—certainly did not repeat explicitly—the second condition. I cannot say that was an improvement. It might be that the Ameer might be engaged in a war not brought on by his own aggression, and yet he might have brought it on by such folly and mismanagement that it would be very hard that we should be liable to assist him in it; and, therefore, I cannot say that I think that was an improvement on Lord Northbrook's definition of the conditions. They are the only two he affixed, and they appear to me to have been perfectly just and wise. But, at any rate, in the main I take it the same or nearly the same assurance of protection was given as Lord Salisbury contemplated in the despatch in which he first instructed Lord Lytton. Lord Lytton undoubtedly, and the Government of India, went beyond what Lord Northbrook had promised, and I should have said seemingly beyond what Lord Salisbury had enjoined, but I do not dwell upon that. They promised the Ameer apparently a total identification with his foreign policy. That was not what the Ameer wanted at all. He did not want them to be identified with his foreign policy; and it is quite evident that the reason why he took alarm was that he was afraid of interference with his foreign policy, and through his foreign policy of interference with his independence. But the present Government of India, while granting to the Ameer more than Lord Northbrook had been disposed to grant, annexed to it conditions which were absolutely intolerable, and which, in the view of the Ameer and of his people, in their ultimate operations were fatal to the independence of his country. Why, I will not quote the 11 passages to which I have referred; but I will read a few words from one of them. The Ameer says—

> "In the first place, the people of Afghanistan have a dread of this proposal, and it is firmly fixed in their minds, and deeply rooted in their hearts, that, if Englishmen or other Europeans once set foot in their country, it will sooner or later pass out of their hands. In no way can they be re-assured on this point, and it is impossible to remove these opinions from their minds, for they adduce many proofs in support of them, the mention of which now would greatly prolong this discussion."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 208.]

He speaks of it there with regard to the reception of these officers generally; in almost all the 11 passages he refers especially, and in terms, to their residence upon the Frontier, and urges against them, in a great variety of forms of expression, the very same objection that I have read. Well, now, the case of Her Majesty's Government is this—that the old policy was worn out; that it was necessary to have a new one; that the results were unsatisfactory to both parties—unsatisfactory to the Indian Government, and unsatisfactory to the Ameer; and, as I have quoted from the noble Lord, the Ameer from time to time, and from year to year, more and more pressed for a change in the policy of Her Majesty's Government. I have promised to confine myself to the Conferences at Peshawur in a great degree, and consequently I will not quote the declaration of Sir Richard Pollock, which referred to a date early in 1874, and which was founded upon information confidentially obtained about the sentiments of the Ameer. It will be remembered that the effect of that declaration was, that there was no unfavourable change whatever in the sentiments of the Ameer. But I will take the evidence which I suppose is the strongest in the case. It is said that the Indian Government of that day on the one side, and the Ameer and his Government on the other side, were fundamentally dissatisfied with the relations which subsisted, and that, consequently, there arose the necessity for a change. I will contradict that statement by the most distinct evidence that can be conceived on the part of the Government of that day, and likewise on the part of the Ameer. I will take first the Indian Government of that day. In January, 1875, these are the words of Lord Northbrook—

> "This being so, and if we have formed a correct judgment of the sentiments of the Ameer towards the British Government, the main objects of the policy which was advocated by Lord Canning in the time of Dost Mahomed—which was renewed by Lord Lawrence on the first favourable opportunity that occurred after the death of Dost Mahomed—which was ratified by Lord Mayo at the Umballa Conferences—and which we have since steadily pursued—are secured. We have established friendly relations with Afghanistan: that country is stronger than it has ever been since the days of Dost Mahomed, and our influence is sufficient to prevent the Ameer from aggression upon his neighbours. It is to be regretted that old animosities and other causes have hitherto prevented the establishment of true intercourse between European British subjects and Afghanistan, and the location of British Agents in that country. But we believe that these things will naturally follow in course of time when our motives are better understood."—[*Ibid.* p. 134.]

There is the difference clearly brought

to issue. The Government assert that the object of our policy had not been attained; but the Government of India of that day, who were the paramount authority at the time, give it as their opinion that it had been obtained—at least in substance. And the Paper from which I have quoted was signed by Lord Napier of Magdala, in whose case the charge relied upon by hon. Gentlemen opposite has reference not, I apprehend, to the question of policy generally, but to the occupation of Quetta. The two Governments are, in fact, directly at issue with one another. The present Government, on the 10th of May, 1877, say—

> "It is impossible to deny that the practical result of the Afghan policy, patiently pursued by us for several years, were far from satisfactory."—[*Ibid.* 165.]

Now, that is a statement which is perfectly at variance with the passage which I have just quoted from the despatch of the Indian Government of Lord Northbrook. I have shown that the two Governments were entirely at issue; while Lord Northbrook, at least, completely contradicts the view of the noble Lord opposite with respect to the temper of the Ameer. And what was the temper of the Ameer? I will state it in the shortest possible form, in order to save the time of the House. It is a matter so important, however, as it comes out of the Conferences at Peshawur—since it entirely destroys the case of the Government with regard to his discontent and dissatisfaction—that I must trouble the House for a few moments with the evidence. The Cabul Envoy, in his interview with Dr. Bellew, says—

> "The Ameer and his people thoroughly appreciated the friendship of the British Government."—[*Ibid.* p. 202.]

On the 10th February the Envoy says to Sir Lewis Pelly—

> "That very arrangement and agreement at Umballa is sufficient, so long as from the side of Her Most Gracious Majesty, the great Queen of England, the foundation of friendship shall remain intact and stable."—[*Ibid.* p. 205.]

How does he go on? You will find him saying at page 206—

> "Therefore, till the time of the departure of Lord Northbrook, the previous course continued to be observed."

Again—

> "Lord Northbrook left the friendship without change, in conformity with the conduct of his predecessors, and in conformity with the preceding usage."—[*Ibid.* p. 208.]

What does the noble Lord now think about his representation of the Ameer being from year to year in a state of greater excitement, becoming more and more dissatisfied with his relations with the British Government, and demanding a change? What says the noble Lord to this? The declaration of the noble Lord is, that it was the desire of the Ameer that a great change should take place in his relations with the British Government. The exact reverse was the case. His wish was—"That the usual friendship should remain firm upon the former footing." Then, says the noble Lord, the Ameer was in a state of great alarm about Russia. No such thing. For the Envoy, speaking of Russia, declares, after referring to the communications made to him in consequence of the understanding between the late Government and Russia, that Lord Northbrook had thoroughly reassured him. Well, how did the Envoy sum up all this; because recollect that these alleged disturbances in the Ameer's mind are the only foundation for that change of policy of which we have heard so much. The Envoy says—

> "Therefore the authorities of the Government of Afghanistan have the most perfect confidence that there can be no deviation from the tenor of these writings"—the writings he had received from Lord Canning, Sir John Lawrence, Lord Mayo, and Lord Northbrook—"which have been briefly mentioned, in respect to the peace and tranquillity and lasting friendship of the States, in accordance with the reply of His Highness the Ameer to the letter of Lord Northbrook of the 6th September 1873. If there should be a want of confidence in the substance of these successive writings approved by Governments, or the probability of a causeless want of confidence in them becoming a reason for displeasure to the Governments, what propriety is there in this?"—[*Ibid.* p. 202.]

Then, further on in the same page the Ameer says—

> "The Ameer is, with sincerity of purpose, in accord with his Excellency the Viceroy, in accordance with those communications and the former course. And, as to according his Excellency the Viceroy a 'means,' I beg to say that no better means exist than those of the past, which formerly, in the time of perplexity, and subsequently up to the present time, have produced sincerity and good deeds from time to time."

Here we have a flat contradiction of the description which has been given us by the noble Lord. The Envoy winds up with a final appeal to the Viceroy and the Government of India, and with the expression of an earnest hope for the welfare of the two Governments, and

> "That his Excellency, through your good offices, will, with great frankness and sincerity of purpose, act in conformity with the course of past Viceroys, and that by means of his own good acts the relations of friendship and unity may be increased."—[*Ibid.* p. 213.]

Note the words—"By his acting in conformity with the course of past Viceroys." What, then, becomes of the main allegation of the noble Lord? We have two parties in relation to one another — the Government of India and the Ameer's Government. The present Government of India say, in substance, that they felt that their relations with Afghanistan had become unsatisfactory. The past Government of India declare that to them those relations did not appear unsatisfactory; and, on the other side, the Government of the Ameer, on whose supposed dissatisfaction Her Majesty's Ministers build their case, in every one of these citations which I have made simply appeals to Lord Lytton to let them alone and to act upon the relations which already existed, merely improving them; but, whatever was done, not to insist, above all, in making that most perilous and fatal proposition for the admission of British Residents into their country. That evidence as to the state of the case up to 1876 is complete. It does not leave a gap, a rift of any kind, for the suggestion of a defect. I know there were certain subjects of dissatisfaction in the Ameer's mind; but the Envoy is careful to make it understood that, whatever be these subjects of dissatisfaction, they are collateral to the main issue, and you have heard his own word in which he again and again beseeches and entreats the Representatives of the Government to let present relations subsist. The Prime Minister of the Ameer within four days of death said he wished to put a meeting off, and it was said it was evident he was trying to gain time. The poor man was trying to gain time. Death had laid his hands upon him in four days after that kind suggestion was made. The Ameer wished to send another Envoy. The former Envoy had found that you were immovable and inflexible. You knew that you had superior power. You knew that you were secure from the scrutiny and criticism of Parliament. You knew that no criticism could be directed against you; and I do not hesitate to say that if these Papers as to the Conference at Peshawur had been laid on the Table within a short time of that Conference you would have had no Afghan War. The iron hand of necessity was on the Ameer; and after all he had said about the prospect of danger to his country and its independence, still he knew that he could lean only on England, and he clung to that hope with a kind of desperate fidelity and tenacity. He was prepared to send a new Envoy, and, when driven to the last extremity, to concede all you demanded and to run the risks and danger of internal disturbances, which he had described to you in such just and pathetic and such moving terms. But he was not permitted to send a new Envoy to a new Conference. The Viceroy believed that concessions would be made; but he would not allow them to be made, because the Ameer was not eager enough to make them. A strong Power—the strongest in the world—dealing with almost the weakest in the world, forced that weak Power to concessions, which it shows in 11 pleas for another Conference meant its future ruin; and when they express their readiness to make those concessions you refuse them the opportunity, because they have not shown eagerness enough to give in to those terms which they believe in the long run would ultimately destroy their country. These things are hardly credible, and if they had not been known they could not have been believed. You find the Ameer satisfied in the main, though dissatisfied on minor points with his relations with you, and he begs you for God's sake not to disturb and tamper him. How did you leave him? Did you leave him as you had found him? No; you entered upon a discussion of Treaties with him. I have sometimes heard the "faith of Treaties" and the "sacredness of national engagements" talked about from the Bench opposite. But what was the mode of action that was adopted? We had certain engagements with the Ameer, and we proposed to give him our opinions about those engagements. What was the first communication made to him by Sir Lewis Pelly? He actually went to the length of using these words—

> "The only obligations ever contracted between the British Government and the Barakzai Rulers of Afghanistan are embodied in two Treaties, of which the first was signed in 1855 and the second in 1857. The second of these two Treaties was contracted for a special and limited purpose, and with exclusive reference to an occasion which has long since passed away. This second Treaty, therefore, belongs to the class of Treaties known as transitory Treaties; and on both sides the obligations contracted by it have lapsed, as a matter of course, with the lapse of time."—[*Ibid.* p. 216.]

In the first place, I conceive that that statement is an untrue statement. The Article in question—the second Treaty—has not lapsed, for there is no time fixed at which the obligation under that Article is to lapse. But that is not the point to which I wish to call the attention of the House. It is this—The declaration of Sir Lewis Pelly on the part of the Government as it affects the only two Treaties ever contracted by the British Government and the Rulers of Afghanistan. Lord Mayo had said that he would view with the utmost displeasure the acts of those who might try to disturb Afghanistan. Lord Northbrook had embodied his declaration in writing, and sent it to the Ameer, to the effect that he would assist the Ameer against unjust aggression. The present Government of India, representing the gentlemen who are eloquent on the subject of the faith of Treaties, informed the Envoy of the Ameer that the engagements of 1855 and 1857 constituted the only obligations of the British Government towards him, and that the promises of Lord Mayo and Lord Northbrook were cast away to the winds. I think that the minds of the Gentlemen opposite, if I may say so without offence, ought to be sensitive on that subject — a little more sensitive than they are. Those obligations of Lord Mayo and Lord Northbrook were extinguished by implication, and I am now showing that they are expressly extinguished by the declaration of Sir Lewis Pelly. He referred to the writing on which he depended, and to which he said nothing beyond could with advantage be added. There is a statement that protection would be given to the Ameer if his inclinations were in accordance with those of the British Government. On page 219 you will read as follows:—

> "But His Highness has evinced no such desire; and it is absurd to assume that, because the British Government would have viewed with severe displeasure in 1869 any attempt to disturb the throne of a loyal and trusted ally, it is, therefore, bound in 1877 to protect, from dangers incurred regardless of its advice, the damaged power of a mistrustful and estranged neighbour."

The declaration of Lord Mayo is, therefore, distinctly annihilated. He then proceeds lower down the page to deal with Lord Northbrook's promise as he has already dealt with Lord Mayo's promise.

> "Lord Northbrook declined to give the Ameer the Treaty which His Highness asked for. And therefore, as in the previous case at Umballa in 1869, it is clear that any subsequent verbal assurances given by Lord Northbrook to the Envoy were not intended to commit, and could not possibly commit, the British Government to any of those liabilities which it would have contracted on behalf of the Ameer had the Viceroy felt able to comply with the request of His Highness by signing with him a Treaty of Alliance."

What is the meaning of that sentence? It is this—"Beware of certain obligations contracted towards you by Lord Northbrook as there have been by Lord Mayo in 1869. You have declined to go into a Treaty of Alliance which the Viceroy has offered to you; and as you have declined to go into it, it is absurd to suppose that the British Government now stands by any promise which it then made." That annihilated the protection which the British Government had held out over the Ameer, and leaves him entirely exposed to every blast of adversity. That is the condition of the Ameer at the close of this Conference, but that was not all. You closed the Conference; you shut the door in his face; you stripped him of the protection which had formerly been granted to him; you denied that the promise of Lords Mayo and Northbrook remained in force. But that was not all—you adopted other measures of hostility towards him—you occupied Quetta. The answer of the noble Lord to that is, that you occupied it in accordance with Treaty right. True; but suppose France occupied Belgium in conformity with Treaty rights, how would that satisfy us? In former days the great confidence of the Afghans always lay in the fact that the great Power lay outside the Khyber and the Bolan Passes. Was it nothing, then, to occupy Quetta, and was it not likely to prove a grievance with the Ameer? At page 242 of the Afghan Papers there is a reference which uses these words:—"He reiterated his Quetta grievances," showing that they had been a usual subject of discussion. But it was not Quetta alone. You had built a bridge across the Indus and amassed your troops in a way that must have conveyed to the mind of the Ameer very great alarm. Whether the object of that military occupation was to attack Afghanistan or somebody else beyond it is not necessary for me to inquire. It was not very pleasant for the Roumanians when the Emperor of Russia had to attack Turkey on the other side of their territory; and the Ameer must have viewed with dread your military preparations on the Indus. You had encouraged the Maharajah of Cashmere to move troops towards his Frontier, and were, by a variety of measures, doing everything in your power to increase his sense of destitution and weakness. When you had reduced him to that feeling, in what condition did he stand? Was he still to maintain the same attitude towards Russia as he was glad to do when he had your promises of support? And now occurred the great offence of the Ameer. He received a Mission from Russia; but he did so only when you had annihilated your promises of support; when you had withdrawn from him your Native Agents, and left him without the slightest token of amity remaining; and now, last of all, and, perhaps, least credible of all, you have treated this reception of the Russian Mission as an offence, and have visited it with the penalty of war. For if this Proclamation is intelligible at all, it has this meaning—that at a time when you have accepted the pretexts of the Russian Government, you have made war upon the Ameer for accepting the Russian Mission. They are thin, transparent allegations. Well, Sir, there may be those whose knowledge is wider than mine; but I will say this—that the Ameer did not voluntarily accept this Russian Mission. It was an unwilling reception on his part. You turn round upon him now and say he accepted it with much pomp and display. But I have not been able to find this in the Papers. That is one of the conveniences of not referring to the Papers. The Central Asia Papers last presented to us show this—that the Russians forced their Mission upon the Ameer; but the Russians knew how to go about it, and, in consequence of this, although they sent an urgent and imperative demand, they sent that demand beforehand. We also sent an urgent and imperative demand; but then, instead of waiting to let the Ameer have time to settle that matter with his own subordinate agents, we sent an Envoy on the heels of our demand, and, in consequence, he was met by the subordinate agents saying to him—"We have had no instructions, and have, therefore, no authority to let you pass." And that you call an insult. It is no insult; it is merely a consequence of the grossest blundering. What does the Ameer say? Major Cavagnari says, on the 16th of June, 1878—

> "The Ameer desires that Afghanistan may remain independent, and that there should be no Envoys of a different religion to Mahommedanism in his kingdom."—[*Central Asia* (No. 1), p. 139.]

We are supplied with a document of the 5th of June, 1878, that tells us the Ameer's first impulse was to send a Mission to Tashkend to deprecate the Russian Mission; but before he did this, we are told,

> "A letter was received by him from Kauffman, corroborating the Agent's statement, and adding that the Envoy must be received by the Ameer at Cabul, as he had been sent by the express commands of the Emperor."—[*Ibid.* 140.]

Now, Sir, the Russians sent an absolute command to the Ameer; but, being men of business, they sent that command to him without sending the Mission on its heels, and thus they enabled the Ameer to take his decision without shaming himself in the face of his own servants. But you send your demand with your Mission close behind it, before he has time for consideration; and the consequence is it is stopped, not by the act of the Ameer, as you most unjustly accuse him, but by the act of his subordinates, who could not let it pass without authority. Such are the circumstances in which the Ameer received the Russian Mission. But what have been our transactions in Russia? The India Office appears to avow a good deal more courage than the Foreign Office. It suggests, on the 8th of August,

> "The adoption of such language at St. Petersburgh as may be best calculated to bring about a result such as the engagements of Russia entitle us to expect."—[*Ibid.* 143.]

So Lord Salisbury writes to Mr. Plunkett—

> "Should it prove that there is any truth in the statement that a Russian Mission has proceeded to Cabul, you will express the hope of Her Majesty's Government that it may be at once withdrawn, as being inconsistent with the assurances so frequently received from his Highness."—[*Ibid.* 150.]

And then M. de Giers writes to Mr. Plunkett that the Mission is

> "of a provisional nature, and one of simple courtesy; it cannot, therefore, interfere in any way with the pacific assurances which you mention."—[*Ibid.* 164.]

But Lord Salisbury did not ask whether it was a Mission of a merely courteous and provisional character; he asked whether there was a Mission at all, and, if there was, he asked that it might be withdrawn. And the answer is—"We have got a Mission, but we think fit to call it a 'Mission of courtesy and of a provisional character." But I should like to know who is to draw the distinction? If there was such a distinction at all, it should have been embodied in Lord Salisbury's letter, and directions should have been given to ascertain of what character it really was. The Russians refuse to withdraw the Mission, and say it is within the understanding with our Government. Her Majesty's Government have committed themselves to that. But I venture to say that it is not within the understanding, and I think I have some right to speak upon this matter. The understanding was, that Russia should exercise no influence in Afghanistan, and the sending of a Russian Mission to Cabul was an exercise of Russian influence. Russia justified her military measures by the disturbed state of relations with her which you had created. Why did not she justify on the same ground her Mission to Cabul? Why, if she had done so, the Mission to Cabul must have passed away at once, and it could never have been renewed. But she put it upon a new ground, as to which she may have obtained information beforehand, that you were prepared to admit it. And, therefore, Russia has got now, by the allowance of the Government opposite, and for the first time and in complete derogation of the communications with Lord Clarendon and Lord Granville, a title to send what she may think fit to call a Mission of courtesy and of a provisional character to Cabul as often as she pleases. That is the humiliation to which you have subjected yourselves by first making a demand and then tamely submitting to the rejection of it. And, now, how are the facts? Has the Mission come back? It is of no avail whether the Envoy has come back. You have established and allowed a title which may be renewed at the pleasure of the Russian Government. But we do not even know that the Mission has come back. It may be there at this moment, while you are making war against the Ameer. I do not like to appeal to national pride; but I think it requires a very small share of national pride to feel sentiments of very strong aversion to a tame submissal to Russia, while at the same time you are making glorification of marching your legions to Cabul. My hon. Friend the Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread) referred last night to vicarious punishment, and he did so with considerable justice. You have a ground of complaint against Russia, and you make war on the Ameer; and, having made war on the Ameer, you are going to exact compensation from the Border Tribes. The policy of Her Majesty's Government has been to make war upon the innocent for the faults of the guilty. First, the Ameer must be punished for the offence of Russia, and then the Frontier tribes must suffer for the vicarious faults of the Ameer. I do not know whether the House is aware of it, but I have here a curious document. It is a Treaty with the King and the Chiefs of Old Calabar and Duke Town, made by the Representative of Her Majesty, Mr. David Hopkin. The names of the Chiefs I need not attempt to read. The substance of the Treaty is this—"That the undersigned King and Chiefs of Duke Town, Old Calabar, undertake to forbid the old practice of inflicting punishment upon the innocent in room of the guilty in the whole regions of Old Calabar." The Government will not object to this reference. The noble Lord has declared, in language which must recommend itself to all the Liberals in the House, that we should always be ready to change our ideas and our measures, and to receive instruction from all sources. Do not let Her Majesty's Government, then, be ashamed to take a lesson from Old Calabar. Let them put an end to this system of making the innocent suffer for the guilty. If the Ameer has offended you—justly offended you—do not visit his sins upon the Frontier tribes; and if Russia has broken her engagements with you, do not visit the punishment of the breach of engagement upon the Ameer. I have now touched upon nearly all the points to which I need refer. The House has done me great kindness in listening to me for so long; but this question has an enormous range, and it requires time to deal with it. You have proceeded, as I have already stated, to make the reception by the Ameer of the Russian Mission a cardinal ground of offence and of aggression upon him at a time when you left him no other option whatever, and at a time when he was ready to endanger his own independence as a Sovereign for the sake of pleasing you. When you sent your Mission you received Reports from your own Vakeel on the 17th and 18th of September which should have led you to pause before you pressed its reception upon the Ameer. The Vakeel was a man you trusted; you had no other Agent; there was no other person to whom you could refer; and your own Agent, as reported by Sir Neville Chamberlain, advises you to postpone the project. He says the Mission should be held in abeyance, otherwise some harm will ensue. On the 18th you sent that to which no Member or Representative of Her Majesty's Government, so far at least as I know, has supplied the slightest answer. On the 18th September Sir Neville Chamberlain telegraphs another message—

> "Another letter received from Nawab Gholam Hasan Khan after an interview with Wazir Shah Muhammad, who assured Nawab, on his oath, that the Ameer intimated that he would send for the Mission in order to clear up mutual misunderstandings, provided there was no attempt to force this Mission upon him without his consent being first granted according to usual custom; otherwise he would resist it, as coming in such a manner would be a slight to him."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 242.]

What had the poor man done? He had lost the advantage of all your promises, and he had seen your hostile preparations at Quetta and elsewhere, and he had even been ready to endanger the internal tranquillity of his country for the sake of meeting your views, and was now ready to receive your Mission, if you would only send it in such a way as to preserve his honour, his self-respect, and his dignity in the face of his Asiatic subjects. But then we are to be told that this poor quarrel did not turn upon the rights or wrongs of the Ameer, but upon the supposed necessity for the creation of a scientific Frontier. Before Lord Mayor's Day the whole world was filled with idle rumours and with newspaper tales; but on that day, when Ministers were to unbosom themselves, all these foul vapours were to be dispersed by the rising sun. But what the rising sun did was to show us the necessity there was for our having a scientific Frontier in India. I am really loath to dwell upon the historical aspect of these extraordinary transactions. We are now at war; our gallant Forces are engaged in mortal strife. You have made this war in concealment from Parliament; in reversal of the policy of every Indian and Home Government that has existed for the last 25 years; in contempt of the supplication of the Ameer, through his Minister, that you would let things alone; in determined refusal to hear a new Commissioner, when the Commissioner he sent to Peshawur was dead; in opposition to the views of your own Vakeel at the moment when he told you that the Ameer, if his sense of honour and self-respect were spared, and the men were withdrawn, would grant you a Mission; at the time when you had accepted the Russian Treaty; at this time you declared that you wanted a scientific Frontier. Such are the extraordinary circumstances in which you are placed. And it is impossible to refrain from the recollection that an Afghan War is no new war. We made war in error upon Afghanistan in 1838. To err is human and pardonable. But we have erred a second time on the same ground, and with no better justification. That may also be human; and if, as such, it be pardonable, it is certainly, to say the least, lamentable, and repeated error is a grief. This error has been repeated in the face of every warning conceivable and imaginable, and in the face of an unequalled mass of authorities, and in the face of your own Agent on the spot. It is proverbially said that history repeats itself; and certainly the repetition is in some cases singular and touching. There has rarely been an occasion in which there has been a nearer approach to identity than in the case of the present and the former wars. We have plunged into war upon the same ground, to act against the same people, and to fight against the son of the same man whom we previously fought against. There is still many a living being in Afghanistan whose memory bleeds at the recollection of the horrors we carried into their country and which we ourselves endured not yet 40 years ago, and yet all this is to be done over again. May Heaven avert the omen which may next suggest itself! May Heaven avert that catastrophe which befel our Army in 1841, and that sanguinary massacre which followed upon that catastrophe! But Her Majesty's Government must surely feel that the terrible calamities of those four years could not pass away without leaving upon the minds of the people of Afghanistan most painful traces. How is it possible they could look with favour, except as the result of the long-continuance of kindly relations, upon the people who had invaded them without cause, and had suffered and made them suffer so profoundly as the consequence of that invasion? However, it so happened that after 1842, and after the successful march of Pollock and the operations of Nott, 25 years of wise and cautious and far-seeing government prevailed, both in England and in India, and every effort was made to efface these painful memories, and to lay the foundation of a lasting concord. I remember a beautiful description of one of our modern Poets of a great battle-field during the Punic Wars, in which he observed—

> "Wherefore a moment Nature was laid waste, and nothing but the tokens of carnage were left upon the ground; but day by day and hour by hour she, returning to her kindly task, removed one by one, and put out of sight these hideous tokens, and restored the scene to order, beauty, and peace."

It was a crisis like this that the Viceroys of this country were running through, and the Governments of this country, irrespective of Party, supported these Viceroys. I now ask, is all this to be undone? The sword is drawn; the bloody hand is to be manifested again, and is already manifested, in that unhappy country. The struggle may, perhaps, be short. God grant that it may be short! God grant that it may not be sharp! But you, having once entered upon it, cannot tell whether it will be short or long. You cannot tell what will be its limits. You have again brought in devastation and again created a necessity which, I hope, will be met by other men, with other minds, in happier days; that other Viceroys and other Governments, but other Viceroys especially—such men as Canning, Lawrence, Mayo, and Northbrook—will undo this evil work in which you are now engaged. It cannot be undone in a moment, although the torch of a madman may burn down an edifice which it has taken the genius, the skill, the labour, and the lavish prodigality of ages to erect. As I have said, it cannot be undone in a moment. The best way we can act is to look for the re-instatement of that pacifying and mitigating process which will ultimately, though remotely, result in success. In the meantime, I should have some hope of this Division, if I really believed that many hon. Members of this House had made themselves individually masters of the case which is disclosed in the deep recesses of those two volumes of Parliamentary Papers. They have not done and cannot do this, and, therefore, this vote will go as other votes have gone. You will obtain the warrant of Parliament and the triumph of military success for the moment. That military success has not been quite so unchecked up to the present; but it has in substance corresponded to that which led us on in 1838, and blinded us to the perilous nature of the step which we were taking. Be that as it may, however, you will probably obtain sanction and the warrant which you seek. The responsibility which is now yours alone will be shared with you by the majority of this House. Many will decline to share it. Many will hope in the ultimate disapproval and reversal of your course by the nation; but even if the nation should refuse, and should indeed bow in submission to the tribunal of ultimate appeal, they will still feel they have discharged their duty in this critical moment—a duty absolutely incumbent on them, as they believe, if they are right in thinking that truth and justice are the only sure foundation of international relations, and that there is no possession either for peoples or for men so precious as a just and honourable name.

Sir ROBERT PEEL: I feel, Sir, that I rise at an immense disadvantage in following the right hon. Gentleman; and I must, therefore, ask the indulgence of the House while I refer to some subjects which he has mentioned, and some, perhaps, to which he has not alluded. I cannot but give my admiration and entire concurrence to the concluding sentences of his speech; for I should be one of the last men in this House who would wish to see this country engaged in an unjust and unnecessary war. But while I admire that passage in the speech of my right hon. Friend, I cannot help saying that I thought the first part of his speech was marked by a very narrow and bitter spirit. I fail to see why a man of his eminence should have thought it necessary to enter into a close and narrow verbal criticism which, surely, does not constitute the point at issue. I was also surprised to hear the right hon. Gentleman object to the observation of the noble Lord who commenced the debate this evening, that "we shall continue our hostility until we have received the due submission of our enemy." The views of the noble Lord are those of a majority of this House, and are shared, I believe, by a very large section of the public, both at home and in India; and I cannot, therefore, understand anyone, in face of the fact of such a policy being approved, expressing a hope that our Forces should turn back until the object with which they were put into the field had been attained. Again, the right hon. Gentleman was rather hard upon the noble Lord when he charged him with having made statements that could not be verified by the Books and which had no shred of truth. [Mr. Gladstone: Proof.] Well, proof. Then, again, he charged the Government with having saluted the country with 500 pages of information, and then asked the House, at a short notice, to give an opinion upon that information so afforded. But the right hon. Gentleman has spoken often enough on this subject in the country, and has, in language sufficiently strong to satisfy anybody, attacked the policy and the conduct of the Government without having in his possession a single one of those 500 pages. We know perfectly well that he has been making his case without sufficient facts to support his statements and arguments; and it is, therefore, rather hard for the right hon. Gentleman to come down here now to charge the Government with reckless negligence and gross mis-statements in the course of these Papers.

Mr. GLADSTONE: I do not wish to be misunderstood. I have only made the charges this evening against two documents.

Sir ROBERT PEEL: It is quite true that the charges have this evening only been made against two documents; but in the country he has charged the whole Government with reckless and gross misconduct and mis-management. [Mr. Gladstone: No.] But I say yes; and I intend to prove it. The right hon. Gentleman says there has been a broken statute; but he defers his proof of his statement to another day. I, however, do not propose to let that statement alone. I am going to call attention, not only to what the right hon. Gentleman has said in this House, but to speeches which he has made beyond its walls—speeches which ought, in my opinion, to be brought to the bar of public opinion by means of the debates which proceed in this House. Before proceeding with this branch of my subject, let me say, in reference to the speech of the hon. Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread), who raised this debate, that I never heard a mass of Parliamentary Papers handled with more precision and accuracy by a Member occupying a seat on a back Bench than was shown by the hon. Gentleman. He based upon his quotations and references some rather sweeping charges against the Government; and the House will agree with me that there never was a time when more sweeping invective was applied to an Executive Government than has been used within the last three months. As I have said, the hon. Member for Bedford used some rather strong expressions; but they were the very milk of human kindness compared with what we have been lately accustomed to; it is like sucking painted lollypops, after the expressions we have so recently heard out-of-doors—expressions the consideration of which ought not to be postponed, but at once proceeded with. Once so brought forward, it is easy to show the country how little foundation there is for the charges, except in the fever by which they were engendered. On another point, also, I must give credit to the hon. Member for Bedford for the way he advocated the case of Lord Lawrence. He has tried to make out as good a case, perhaps, as could be made out for the blundering and impotent policy of Lord Lawrence. ["Oh!"] That it was blundering and impotent I can prove from documents laid on the Table of the House. Lord Lawrence has taken a very active part in this matter; therefore, I am desirous to refer to him for a few minutes. He is an ex-Viceroy of India, and the confidence and the favours of the Sovereign have been heaped upon him. He is at this moment the head of the Ameer's Afghan Committee in London. It is the same Lord Lawrence whose epistolary indiscretions have astonished the town; and it is he to whom, not through any Party feeling, the public opinion of the country, through the papers and correspondents, points as one of the principal authors of the mischief and troubles in which we are now placed. ["Oh!"] That may be contested; but I shall prove it. I take the opinion of one of the best of the men who have written on this subject — Sir Henry Rawlinson. I look upon Sir Henry Rawlinson as a most impartial witness. [*A laugh.*] The noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) laughs at that; but no one can doubt that Sir Henry Rawlinson, from his long experience in matters affecting Eastern interests, is fully capable of giving an opinion on such a question. Well, he says our troubles commenced with the hesitation of Lord Lawrence in recognizing the Ameer Shere Ali as the rightful Ruler of Cabul after the death of Dost Mahomed; and if the noble Marquess questions the accuracy of Sir Henry Rawlinson, I must refer him to the Duke of Argyll, who, in a letter published in the newspapers, also admits the troubles with Afghanistan have been owing to the period while he was in the Gladstone Administration. After finding that repeated over and over again in the papers, I was surprised to hear the hon. Member make this audacious statement. The hon. Member said—"The front of the offence was Lord Salisbury's letters in 1875, and to him must be attributed the cause of the present war." I have been in Parliament a good many years, and heard a great many statements and hostile remarks against the policy of Members of different Governments; but I do not think that I ever heard a more unfair or ungenerous statement in attacking a Government than to assert publicly that the cause of this war is due to Lord Salisbury. I was anxious to bring the point before the House, in order to show that the Papers cannot sustain that view of the hon. Member for Bedford. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich says he has listened to everything in the course of this debate, and has read all the Papers. I have also listened to the debate, and have read the Papers with as much ability as I can bring to bear upon them; but I must say that after all the explanations and declamations against the Government, I fail to recognize or to accept the full weight and burden of the indictment which has been so freely levelled not only against the Executive of this country, but against Parliament itself which has supported the Executive; and, indeed, one of the accusations of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich is that Parliament having supported the Government, that Parliament ought to be got rid of. I am anxious, however, to express my feeling —which, I believe, is shared by a great many hon. Gentlemen in this House as well as in the country—and that is a feeling of anxiety and concern as regards these affairs that are going on in the North-Western Frontier of India. It is an anxiety which arises, not from any mistrust as to the result of the military operations in the difficult Passes and mountain fastnesses which separate Afghanistan from our Indian Empire. I hope—and I am sure I am expressing sentiments which everyone will share — that the arms of England, under God's Providence, will be completely successful in the work in which they are engaged. We trust that the gallant little army—not "our legions;" the right hon. Gentleman says we are pouring our legions into Afghanistan; there is an army of 30,000, not one-half of them within the Ameer's territory at present —will rival and emulate the heroic valour and discipline of the British arms, which have on every field shone conspicuous. Even at this moment we have proof of that in the successful strategic achievement of General Roberts and his comrades. No one can doubt or mistrust the success of this expedition; but I share the opinion expressed to-night by the right hon. Gentleman. I see dangers that may arise from the very success and the victories which we may achieve. I think nothing has been more truly said than that our difficulties will arise with the anxieties and troubles of the diplomatic negotiations which must ensue not only in dealing with the Ameer of Afghanistan, but probably, and most certainly, with an enemy concealed behind the Ameer's back, who has had, no doubt, a great hand in these troubles. It is because I share the anxieties of both sides of the House in this respect that I am glad the suggestion of the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington), on the first night of the Session, did not find acceptance. I am glad that the Motion of the hon. Member for Bedford has given this House an opportunity of stating its opinion frankly and fully before Christmas. We shall now know fully the views entertained upon this most serious and grave question. No doubt the object, in a Party sense, is to pass a Vote of Censure upon the Cabinet; and if the hon. Member succeeded there would, probably, not only be a change of Government, but, what is far worse, a change of policy also. The right hon. Gentleman has said a good deal to-night, in answer to the noble Lord (Lord John Manners), about the old way and the new way, and I think he has put a very unfair construction on the object which the noble Lord had in view when he made that remark; but certainly I should be very much surprised if, after the vehemence of the right hon. Gentleman, the suggestion of the noble Marquess had been allowed, that we should say nothing. It is important to bear in mind the sudden change of front made by the Opposition. Let us recollect the first night of the Session. Earl Granville said—["Order!"] — perhaps you will repudiate it — ["No!"]—Lord Granville said—

Mr. SPEAKER: Order, order!

Sir ROBERT PEEL: It was observed by Lord Granville the other night—["Order!"]—I think, Sir, I am in Order in referring to this? Well, Lord Granville was understood to say that it was almost impossible to move any Amendment expressing any definite opinion upon the action of the Ministers. In this House, the same night, the noble Marquess went a great deal further. He was most emphatic. On the first night he said—"The Papers are so voluminous, and the matter is so new and requires such careful consideration, that no hon. Member would be justified in calling attention to this grave question and pronouncing a final opinion on the conduct pursued by Her Majesty's Government." A great change, then, has come over hon. Members. I have referred to strong language. The hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands) used some strong language. He was very angry with the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) for making the suggestions he submitted on the first night of the Session, when so many hon. Members were ready to rush into the fray. The right hon. Member for the City of London (Mr. Goschen) made use of an expression also bearing upon the policy of the Government, and said that the Government had intentionally kept back the Papers. I must say that, in my opinion, if ever there was a Government which has been lavish not only in the information it gave, but in the anxiety and desire it has shown to communicate it, it is the present Government. Why, the House has had a Book of 500 pages got ready for its use in the course of a few days. Then there is the junior Member for Birmingham (Mr. Chamberlain), who is not satisfied with the statements of anyone. The hon. Gentleman will excuse me for saying so; but he has not had much experience in this House, and he is always ready to bring forward his patent medicines for remedies. "Chamberlain's plans" are so constantly brought forward in the Midland Counties that I am quite sick of them. Then there is the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett), who, of course, cannot sit still, though I must say that the hon. Member's knowledge of Indian affairs always commands the respect of the House, and although many hon. Members do not share his opinions they are sure to catch the attention of the House. This change of front on the part of the Opposition is very curious. Here we have seven or eight malcontents—what a hideous chorus of malcontents from every Liberal point of the political compass—all finding fault with the noble Marquess for what he has done, with the policy and wishes of Lord Granville expressed in "another place," and with the policy of the Government. From whence comes this change of front? It is quite clear that the fever heat, the virulent spirit, and the active mind of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich, is the cause of it. The Motion of the hon. Member for Bedford is a Vote of Censure and Want of Confidence. That is the broad issue; but the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich calls it a "narrow issue." There must be a difference even in the mind of the right hon. Gentleman between broad and narrow. It is quite clear from what we have heard to-night that if he did not want to turn out the Government, he wanted a change of policy in the affairs of India, and to bring back those who in his Administration had been the cause of the war. I think that the difficulties which have arisen have been occasioned by the policy of the Gladstone Administration; and that the stain to which the right hon. Gentleman eloquently alluded in his concluding remarks, notwithstanding all the apologies for ex-Cabinet Ministers, all the profuse recriminations and epistolary correspondence of ex-Viceroys of India, must be on the Members who acted in that Administration. The right hon. Gentleman said he should like to see those who had broken the statutes brought to the bar of public opinion. The right hon. Gentleman is one of those who has for a very long time, from very incomplete information, been indulging in severe charges against the Government; and he and Lord Lawrence are, perhaps, the two men who have most embarrassed the Government. Lord Lawrence has published a correspondence of 17 columns of *The Times*. I do not know whether hon. Members have read it, but I have, and I must say it was most weary, weary reading. Lord Lawrence is a man of very great authority; but, under the circumstances, I should pay very little respect to his opinion on this subject. Lord Lawrence has made many statements in the country as to the Ameer and to the Committee in London, and he is one of those who have given the most information to our enemies. Lord Lawrence, however, when invited to attend a public meeting at Bradford to discuss the war, and the causes which brought it about, wrote to the Committee declining to attend — the Papers having then been presented —and said—"I am so busy with the Papers on the Afghan affair that time alone would not permit me to be present at your demonstration." Now, we must recollect that for weeks before Lord Lawrence was so thoroughly well-informed on the case, in his own opinion, that he had been attacking the policy of the Executive, and making accusations in the newspapers, which every-one thought were wholly uncalled for. Well, then, there is a Member (Mr. Childers) whom I see the solitary occupant of the front Opposition Bench. I hope he may have a vested right in that Bench. I do not wish to disturb him from it; and I think he is most likely to have a vested interest in that Bench, if the Members of the Opposition to which he belongs continue to be so profuse in their differences of opinion. I was shocked at the remarks which he made the other day at Pontefract on the conduct of the Government; for it would be wiser for a man who has been a Cabinet Minister to abstain from criticism until he is able to inform himself of the facts of the case. But what we most complain of on both sides of the House is the vulgarity with which Lord Salisbury has been treated, and the bad taste that has been displayed with reference to Sir Bartle Frere. I must say I believe Sir Bartle Frere is one of the most distinguished servants of the Crown. He has administered a Colony, and is serving his country in very difficult circumstances. An immense responsibility has been cast upon him; and I do think it was a bold thing, not to use a stronger term, for the right hon. Gentleman to have made use of the sort of expression which he did with regard to Sir Bartle Frere.

MR. CHILDERS: The right hon. Baronet will forgive me for interposing. The expression I made use of, to which I presume he alludes, did not in any way refer to Sir Bartle Frere. It was altered in a newspaper in such a way as to make it refer to Sir Bartle Frere. The moment I read that misconstruction of what I said I wrote to the newspaper in question, stating that the expression was not rendered as I had rendered it; that I, being one of

Sir Bartle Frere's oldest friends, and valuing most highly his public services, could not by any possibility have used such an expression about him. That letter has been printed; but I presume the right hon. Baronet cannot have read it.

Sir ROBERT PEEL: I am extremely sorry if I have misrepresented the right hon. Gentleman. But the right hon. Gentleman will, no doubt, feel indebted to me for having given him an opportunity of making the remarks he has just made. I now come to the opinions expressed not only here, but elsewhere, by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich. He is one of those who indulge in violent invective, and the violence of his invective against the present Government almost exceeds the bounds of probability. His speech at North Wales and his speech at Greenwich contain language that is almost surprising. The contents of his speech at Greenwich, I am sorry to say, I have at my fingers' end. He spoke two hours by Greenwich time. The right hon. Gentleman began his indictment against the Government in this way. He said—"During the last three months we hoped we might have a period of repose." Now, nobody can for a moment suppose that the right hon. Gentleman stands in need of any repose. All I can say is, that during that period he found himself at leisure to interfere in a great many things, and, amongst others, in election matters in the borough which I have the honour to represent (Tamworth), although I am not at all afraid that his interference will produce the effect which he may have anticipated from his kind good office. But the right hon. Gentleman, on the occasion to which I am referring, went on to say—

> "We cherished a hope that by refraining from criticism—a hope even against reasonable expectation—the aim of the Government might at length be directed towards appeasing the prolonged troubles and perils which they had so considerable a share in creating. How were we rewarded? By the disclosure of a new danger, a new peril, in the controversy which has been opened with the Ruler of Afghanistan."

Now, let me observe, in passing, that this question, instead of being only now opened by the Ameer of Afghanistan, is a question which, I think, ever since the time of Lord Dalhousie, has been constantly under the notice of the Government of this country. One of the last acts of Lord Dalhousie's official life was to invite the attention of the Government of the day to the necessity of having—what the right hon. Gentleman was pleased to sneer at to-night, though I was glad to observe his sneer fell flat on the House—a scientific Frontier on the north-western portion of our Indian Empire. The right hon. Gentleman also complained of the Government having studiously withheld information from the country and Parliament in regard to their dealings with Afghanistan; but the charge, like many others, met with little encouragement. Well, the speech of the right hon. Gentleman from which I was quoting runs on very much in the same groove. He seems to be of opinion that the occupation of Quetta, which was not in the territories of the Ameer, was a great cause of complaint and a just offence to that Ruler. [General Sir GEORGE BALFOUR: Hear, hear!] The hon. and learned Pundit, I am not surprised to find, concurs in that opinion. But the right hon. Gentleman further pointed out that if any offence had been given it had been given by Russia. "Russia," he said, "solemnly undertook to abstain from all interference in Afghanistan. The agreement was made with us." Well, no doubt an agreement was made in 1869 that Russia should not interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan or have a Mission there; but I was sorry to find the right hon. Gentleman follow up his statement by the question—"Why do you fight with Afghanistan? why do you not go to war with Russia? Why attack the poor Ameer, a poor weak savage; why not fight Russia?" The right hon. Gentleman knows perfectly well that that is not the real way to look at this question. You may, by means of your rhetoric, put it with some apparent force in that light; but, in my humble judgment, that is not the way in which it ought to be regarded. A great insult has been offered to this country by the Ameer of Afghanistan, and for that insult he ought, in my opinion, to be made directly responsible. But the right hon. Gentleman goes on to say—"I hope the people of England will make some comparison between the England of 1873 and the England of 1878." Well, I think they have already made such a comparison, and that public opinion has in the clearest manner run entirely counter to the policy of the right hon. Gentleman's Administration in 1873. More than that, we now occupy a position in the eyes of the world which we could not then command. I have taken pains to find out not the opinion of the people of England, because that we know, but that of foreign nations; and there are few things to my mind more remarkable than the way in which the Government of 1873 is spoken of by eminent foreign statesmen in Germany, France, and elsewhere. How, for instance, does Prince Bismarck speak of the Gladstone Administration in the Memoirs which have been recently published? He treats it with contempt. We are told that when Prince Bismarck read Lord Granville's despatch about Russia and the Black Sea, he smiled and said—

> "They speak of future complications. Future, indeed! that is not the way in which resolute people speak. They are Parliamentary talkers, and dare not do anything. No; nothing is to be feared from them, just as nothing was to be hoped for from them four months ago."

I will now give the House the opinion of M. Gambetta, who is decidedly the first man in France, and who will occupy a great space in the future history of that country, if he will only keep himself from fighting duels at less than 35 paces. In a remarkable article in *The République Française* he expresses his astonishment that the revelations made by Lord Cranbrook, saddling the Gladstone Administration with the responsibility of having alienated the Ameer, should not have silenced the Liberals. *The République Française* says—

> "This does not prevent the Afghan Committee, which has the support of Mr. Gladstone, from pursuing its task of harassing the Government, even at this critical hour. Lord Lawrence is no more deterred now by the reflection of the ill he can do to his country than was Mr. Gladstone during the crisis in Eastern Europe."

That is a very remarkable statement to appear in such a journal. But to return to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman. He goes on to say—

> "It is the duty of the people of England to think of the condition in which we are as citizens and politicians. Government by reserve, government by mystery, government by breach of law, government by bringing the Crown out of the position in which the Constitution has placed it to expose the Sovereign to personal responsibility! It is idle to tell you that the attempts of the present Government have been to magnify the Sovereign. Make her Empress, forsooth! Yes, ladies and gentlemen ("I should think the ladies must have been pleased at the compliments to their Sovereign") the Liberal Party will be the special champion, at the next election, of the ancient Monarchy against those who, that they may cover it with flattery and adulation, are adopting measures but too likely to sap its foundations."

Now, it appears to me that for an ex-Prime Minister to allude to his Queen and Sovereign in that way is open to the gravest objection, and I should have thought that he would have abstained from that sort of language. The right hon. Gentleman comes next to the despatch of Lord Cranbrook. We have heard a great deal about the famous paragraph 9, and I have listened to the right hon. Gentleman when, almost in solitary grandeur, he said seven times over that it was not only with the 9th clause he found fault, but that there were many other counts of indictment against the Government which he intended to bring under the notice of the House. How does the right hon. Gentleman talk of Lord Cranbrook? He says—"I will endeavour to avoid severe epithets," and then he goes on to characterize this able despatch and says—"The entire effect of paragraph 9 produces an impression absolutely false." He says—"The despatch asserts what is totally untrue." "It is also untrue," he adds, "that the Viceroy was instructed to postpone the subject," which subject, however, according to the Papers, he did postpone. Then he goes on to say—"This paragraph conveys a totally wrong impression, as if it had been expressed in the severest language of calumny." But these, of course, are not severe epithets! Then, again, "these Papers are garbled." What can go further than this? And the right hon. Gentleman is not using severe epithets when no language can be made more severe. I am really ashamed to trespass on the time of the House with these extravagancies of language of the right hon. Gentleman, and I will not now go through these Papers. I do not even wish to give an outline of that despatch of Lord Cranbrook; but I should like to warn the House that they must not believe a great deal they hear about the responsibility resting on Lord Salisbury. This question of the Ameer was always to the front since the time of Lord Dalhousie, who, with the approval of Lord Aberdeen, made the Treaty to which reference has been made. Then came the transfer of the Government of India, and then the internal troubles of Afghanistan. Lord Lawrence was in India in 1869, and pursued that policy of masterly inactivity, which, to my mind, was the most blundering shortsightedness any Viceroy could employ. The way in which he regarded the various claimants to the Throne of Afghanistan is instructive. Within a few months we find him recognizing three sons of Dost Mahomed as each comes up. No doubt it is a want of decision in his character that led to the difficulties in which we are placed, and where a man like Lord Mayo would certainly have created a very favourable impression on Shere Ali. Matters went on, as we have heard, till this Mission, which the right hon. Gentleman has described in strong terms. May I state the conclusions to which I think we must arrive and pray the attention of the House for a short time longer? We must recollect that affairs in Central Asia in 1878 are not as they were in 1876, and why? Surely owing to Russia. Now, the question is—and it is brought home to the country—can Afghanistan be safely surrendered to Russia? Does the altered position of Russia in Central Asia entail a corresponding change of policy on our part? The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) endeavoured to show that we had left the old path; but new events obliged us to leave it. The Duke of Argyll himself said that we ought not to allow Afghanistan to become in any degree subservient to Russia; and yet look at the position of Merv and Herat, and see how Russia is gradually drawing its meshes round Afghanistan. You cannot deny it. The Duke of Argyll, however, qualified his remark by saying that "the ordinary consideration of an enlightened policy are enough to guide us." That is a beautiful and philosophical expression; so philosophical, in fact, that the Ameer did not understand it. Hence Russia is pressing on every side but the North-West Frontier of our Indian Empire on the territory of Afghanistan. And, lastly, one point that has not been referred to in the debate rises in my mind; you may blame the conduct either of this Government or of the last; but the real fact of the case is that there is a fundamental difference between the policy of the two. I will tell you in what it consists. It is a difference in the manner of regarding Russia. The former Administration made common cause with Russia; the present Government is not blind or indifferent to the interests of this country. Over and over again I have heard the right hon. Gentleman use the expression—"Let us imitate the good deeds of Russia." That was the policy of the late Government, and they were sent about their business. This present Government adopts the wiser policy of Lord Palmerston, which was expressed in these words, and which said of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg—

> "When there is moderation at St. Petersburg you may be quite sure it will be followed by duplicity of action."

Take the advice of Palmerston—the most truly British statesman that ever ruled the country; recollect how all through his life he foresaw our difficulties and always set his face against this Power. Over and over again have I expressed my dissatisfaction with the action of Russia; and I am a disciple of Palmerston, and advocate facing the intrigues with which Russia works her way. When I condemn the action of Russia I condemn it as a most hideous despotism, which accepts no law but the will of an Autocrat, and recognizes no liberty but its own licence. For these reasons I differ from the right hon. Gentleman opposite, and concur in the policy of the present Government. During these troubles in India many people have expressed an opinion that the burden of Government is too great for this country. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich concluded his remarks to-night with a most eloquent peroration about the services of Lord Canning, Lord Mayo, and many others, in which he told us how their great object was to sow peace and prosperity on the borders of our Empire. And this is very true. But we must recollect that the right hon. Gentleman is one of those who think that our Indian Empire is too much for us to bear, and that, therefore, we might part with it. ["No!"] The hon. Gentleman says "No;" but there is a periodical called *The Nineteenth Century*, in which the right hon. Gentleman had an article on the duties of England, in which he says, with regard to our Possessions in India—

> "Here is a tutelage unexampled in history, one-sixth of the human race. The truth is, we are met on every side with proofs that the cares and calls of the British Empire are already beyond the strength of those who govern and have governed it."

What does that mean? Does that quotation not bear out my statement with regard to the right hon. Gentleman? Perhaps, under another Government than the present we might possibly find its cares and calls too much for those who attempt to govern it. I have to thank the House for the kindness with which it has listened to my remarks; and, in conclusion, I will venture to supplement them with only another sentence. I recollect on the first night of the present Session an hon. Member said—"After all, Afghanistan is but a buffer, as it were, between England and Russia." I, in common with many others, repudiate altogether such a sentence as that. England requires no buffer between herself and any other Power. She meets her Allies with frankness, and her enemies face to face. We require no buffer in our dealings with any other Power. It is, therefore, with feelings of confidence that the Government will follow a wise policy in these matters, difficult though they may be, that I am prepared, on this grave occasion for the country and the House of Commons, to support the Government as against the Vote of Censure that has been proposed. And, in spite of all the bickerings of Party malice, in spite of the grave indiscretions of those who ought to have known better, and—I say it with feelings of shame and sorrow—in spite of the attempts that have been too often made of late to run down our country to the profit of our enemies, I believe from my heart that the Executive in these grave and serious circumstances have followed the straight and honest path of duty, of honour, and of national self-respect, without which qualities the character and the influence of the proudest nation in the world—like Carthage of old and Rome in her decline—must soon wither and decay.

MR. LEATHAM: Mr. Speaker, the right hon. Baronet who has just sat down (Sir Robert Peel) has made, as he always does, an amusing and energetic speech; but I do not think that he has given us very much to reply to. He has taunted us with making a change of front. There has been no change of front. The noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington), on the first night of the Session, distinctly referred to the Motion of my hon. Friend the Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread); and if he stated that he would not pronounce an opinion until he had read the Blue Books carefully, his hesitation was probably due to the fact that he did not possess the remarkable memory of the right hon. Baronet. I will not follow the right hon. Baronet in his attack upon the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich, for he is here to defend himself, and is quite able to do so; but I think the right hon. Baronet might have spared him the comparison with a pettifogging attorney, which was rather a strong expression to fall from so great a purist as the right hon. Baronet. The right hon. Baronet has found fault with the right hon. Gentleman for the terms in which he has referred to Russia, which he said were unbecoming in an ex-Minister; but before he sat down he himself spoke of Russia as "a hateful and insidious Power." In attacking Lord Lawrence, who is not here to defend himself, the right hon. Baronet attacked his own Friends, who were in Office at the time and fully approved of the policy of Lord Lawrence. In his despatch of 26th December, 1867, the right hon. Gentleman the present Chancellor of the Exchequer writes to the Indian Government, that there was nothing in the Treaty of 1855 requiring Great Britain to support the pretensions of Shere Ali Khan, or of any other Chief, unless his policy appeared likely to promote the internal tranquillity and independence of Afghanistan. With regard to the progress of Russia in Central Asia, Her Majesty's Government "see no reason for any uneasiness, or for any jealousy." The conquests which Russia has made, and, apparently, is still making, in that region are, in their opinion, the natural result of the position in which Russia was placed, and

> "afford no ground whatever for representations indicative of suspicion or alarm on the part of this country."

The right hon. Baronet attributed

the whole of the present difficulties to the policy of the late Government. I regret very much that the Government had not the benefit of the right hon. Baronet's counsel. It might have saved them from the "stains" of which he spoke. But I do not attach much importance to the controversy—as to whether or not the late Government can be made to appear, remotely, indirectly, and wholly unintentionally on their part, responsible for the present war. I cannot help thinking that the plea which we so constantly hear, whenever the acts of the present Government are impugned, that the late Government said something, or did something, which countenanced or caused what the present Government are doing now, is a little unworthy of Her Majesty's Ministers. Surely, it is neither very dignified, nor very courageous, the moment your policy is assailed, to seek to throw the blame upon an Administration which ceased to exist nearly five years ago; but I have observed that this is the course which is almost invariably resorted to by the apologists of the Government, whenever they find themselves in an awkward corner. For example, if we call public attention to what we regard as the extravagance of the Government, we are told that the vast expenditure of the country is not due to extravagance, but to measures which were passed by the late Government eight or ten years ago. Now, no doubt measures were passed which gave an opening for expenditure; but the opening has been most diligently improved. Again, I remember that when the Government found itself in what I must call its first scrape—with reference to the Slave Circular—the Diplomatic Correspondence of the last 50 years was ransacked in order to find something which Lord Palmerston or Lord Clarendon had written, which was supposed to justify the course then being pursued by the Government, but which they afterwards happily abandoned. And now, when we complain of this Afghan War as unnecessary and unjust, we are triumphantly told that but for something which Lord Northbrook said to the Ameer five years ago it would never have occurred. Surely, Sir, we have had a great deal too much of this "Please, Sir, it wasn't me" line of defence; a great deal too much for the credit of a Government which ought to have a policy of its own, and one which is susceptible of defence on its own merits. Every one admits that it would have been preposterous if the late Government had done what the Ameer demanded, and engaged to defend him, through thick and thin, against all comers, without taking adequate guarantees that their support should not be abused. How were they to know what whim might enter his head with regard to his own succession? Were they to make themselves parties to all the intrigues of an Oriental harem? and as regards his foreign relations, how was it possible that they should guarantee him against the consequences of acts over which they could exercise no control? The late Government was not quite so ready with its guarantees and protectorates; it was not quite so eager to back everybody's bill, and to mortgage the resources of the country. But I will engage to say that even the present Government, lavish though it has been beyond all precedent with the national guarantees, and prodigal beyond all example of the national future, would have paused before they committed themselves to that kind of guarantee, the denial of which is now assigned as the reason for the estrangement of the Ameer. Indeed, we have the despatch before us which contains the instructions of the Government to the new Viceroy upon this very point; and if we take into consideration the new condition as to Residents in the Afghan cities, the assurances to be given to the Ameer were certainly not more liberal than those which Lord Northbrook gave him. Well, then, if placed in the same circumstances you would have acted in everything which is essential in the same way, is it generous, is it quite manly, to seek to lay this disaster—for disaster it is—at their door? I must confess, Sir, that if I had not formed an opinion already as to the justice of this war, I should conceive the gravest prejudice against it merely from the line of defence which has been adopted by Her Majesty's Ministers. First we have this attempt to shuffle off the responsibility on to other shoulders. Then we have the secret despatch, prepared with a strict regard to publicity. Or is it because the Government wholly despair of keeping anything whatever secret that they send a document, which is not intended to see the light, to the

Press before the ink is dry? Why is there this extraordinary discrepancy among the authorities as to the object of the war? Why have we so much circumlocution at the India Office, and so much candour at the Mansion House? Why is it that we hear nothing about a scientific Frontier at the India Office, and nothing about anything else at the Guildhall? To read the despatch one would suppose that we were driven into war by the intolerable insults of the Ameer. To listen to the Prime Minister one would suppose that we were making war with the most brutal indifference to right and wrong. Whom are we to believe—the Secretary for India, writing secrets for everybody to read, or the Prime Minister proclaiming before Gog and Magog reasons which everybody would desire to keep secret? The Prime Minister's reasons I must decline to discuss. It is enough that there is no living casuist, except perhaps *The Times*, who would dare to defend them on moral grounds. This is a Christian country; and if the Premier wishes to know what is to be said against his reasons, we must leave him alone with the Archbishops. Well, Sir, if that be so, an observation which is attributed to one of the greatest of our living poets exactly describes the situation. He said—

> "Now that the robbery had commenced, he hoped it would be conducted with as little murder as possible."

But are the reasons of the Indian Secretary much better? If we refer to the Ultimatum, we find the *casus belli* described in effect as follows—namely, the reception of a Russian Envoy

> "at a time when a war was believed to be imminent, in which England and Russia would have been arrayed on opposite sides,"

and the repulse of the English Mission. The Secretary of State says—

> "Such Missions are customary between friendly neighbouring States, and are never refused except when hostility is intended."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 254.]

Now, surely, there is an exquisite *naïveté* in these words. Just as though the controversy as to whether such Missions should be received at all—or any Missions—or whether any Englishman, official or non-official, should be admitted to the territory of the Ameer had not been going on all through this voluminous Correspondence. It is simply absurd to treat the Ameer as though he were an European Power, who understood, and had made himself a party to, all the courtesies and requirements of European international life. The Ameer stands altogether outside such requirements. If he did not, all your diplomatic representations would have been unnecessary, and your Mission would have gone to Cabul as a matter of course. But he stands so far outside them that he will not permit even your traders to penetrate into his territory. It is laughable, after indulging in negotiations extending over many years with the view of bringing about a state of things which may approximate in some degree to that which exists as a matter of course among European nations, to turn round upon this half-savage Prince and to apply the rules of Europe. In Europe you receive Embassies, as a matter of course, from every nation with which you are not in a state of war. Why? And this leads me to the kernel of the whole matter. It is because in Europe Embassies are not sent with a view of dictating your foreign policy and crippling your independence. But will the hon. Gentleman who represents the India Office in this House (Mr. E. Stanhope) deny that those were the objects of the Mission which we proposed to send to Afghanistan? Who ever heard of an European Mission 1,000 strong, and armed to the teeth? But if such a Mission presented itself at any European Court, where is the Court so craven as to receive it? And let the House bear in mind that we had received no encouragement to send this Mission. No attempt had been made to ascertain whether it would be distasteful to the Ameer. Everything which had occurred would lead to the inference that it would be distasteful in the extreme. You had no right to expect that your Mission would be received in a friendly manner; yet, because it was not received in a friendly manner you pronounce the act to be one of "enmity and indignity against the Empress of India," and the right hon. Baronet talks about the "direct insult" which the country has sustained. But the Ameer, basing his notions upon the state of things which you had not only permitted, but sanctioned—the practical isolation of Afghanistan—and upon the understanding which you had with him, and with Dost Mahomed before him—that these Missions should not be sent without his permission—could not fail to regard the approach of an armed and uninvited British Mission as an act of enmity and indignity done to himself, and an insult which he could not put up with, if he were to retain the respect of his subjects. As it seems to me, no pains were spared to insure the failure of this Mission. Not only did you demand its admission in a peremptory tone — not only did you back it up by the assembling of a great armed force, but you proclaimed throughout all India what you were about to do; and you went the length of summoning neighbouring Native Princes to witness the success of your exploit. Your exploit did not succeed; and I must say that I respect the Ameer for the line which he took. It was not a prudent line; perhaps many persons will consider it almost a foolhardy line; but the act was the act of a man who did not lose his self-respect in the presence of great dangers, and who resolved to fall an independent Prince rather than to live on in shameful vassalage. But no doubt I shall be told that the Ameer had departed from his position of isolation by admitting the Mission from Russia, and that he did so at a time when his marked preference for Russia was very galling to this country. I admit it; and if the war with Russia had taken place, you would probably have been justified in regarding him as the ally of Russia, and in making war upon him. But the war with Russia did not take place; and this episode in your quarrel with Russia ought to have gone the way of the quarrel itself. There have been diplomatic representations with regard to the Russian Embassy; and we are told that they have been successful. But the point to which I wish to draw the attention of the House, after the remarks of the right hon. Baronet, is this—that the offence for which you are chastising the Ameer was not the offence of one man. There were two parties to it. There was the man who received the Embassy, and the man who sent it. Who is the greater offender—the petty Prince who yields his trembling friendship, or the great Emperor who demands and extorts it? His designs, at all events, were distinctly hostile. His Mission was intended at the moment as a deliberate menace. If there is anything about the Mission which constitutes a *casus belli*, you are fighting the wrong man. Nothing appears to be too bad for the weak one; the strong one you leave altogether alone. Is it because you very much prefer punishing the weak one? If so, I commend your prudence; but I have no words of commendation for your magnanimity. And what a moment you have chosen for this war? Granting, for the sake of argument, almost everything which you ask; granting that you had a right to make this war; where was the supreme necessity of making it at a time when every enterprize in the country absolutely demands repose? Right hon. Gentlemen seem to live in a paradise of their own, and in utter ignorance of what is passing around them. The oldest Member of this House cannot recall the time when all the great interests of the country have suffered as they are suffering now. There have been periods of depression in trade, periods of depression in manufacture, and periods of depression in agriculture; but when have all three been smitten by the same simultaneous overthrow? Do right hon. Gentlemen reflect that if the cloud which is hanging over the country be not speedily removed, we shall have to face times of the most frightful penury—if not of the most dangerous discontent? Is this a time to go about brandishing your sword in everybody's face? You have reduced the industry of the country almost to despair already by your incessant menaces and your perpetual appeals to arms. Hardly have we escaped one danger before we find ourselves in the presence of another. But, whether escaped or not, they are all equally costly. Did anyone ever hear of such preparations as those for this Afghan Expedition? I hear that we have purchased 60,000 camels —that is, a chain of camels tied head to tail and extending for 120 miles! The first camel would be marching into the market place at Bristol when the last camel was still stalking through the streets of London. It is monstrous that such expenses should be thrown upon the half-bankrupt Treasury of India. It is almost equally monstrous that they should be thrown upon us, with our declining resources, saddled, as we are, with another war, and thrown upon us, too, for the maintenance of a policy which we have never sanctioned? What is that policy? Is it the policy of the Mansion House? That is a policy from which the conscience of the country openly revolts. Is it the policy of the India Office? Are we making war because the Ameer will not receive our Residents into his cities? That is the concession which only the other day Lord Mayo pledged the good faith of the country should never be asked of him. Some persons say that we have gone to war because the Government have roused a war spirit in the country which they cannot control, and which they are anxious to gratify at the least risk. That reminds me of the story of the learned attorney, who was being run away with in his carriage, and cried out to his coachman—"John, can you stop the horses?" "No, sir," said John. "Then drive into something cheap." But whatever may be the object of the Government in making war, there is an uncomfortable suspicion abroad that the quarrel has not been forced upon us, but that we have picked it. How otherwise can we explain the breaking down of the Conference at Peshawur? No one can read this Correspondence without arriving at the conclusion that the Government resolved to force our Residents upon the Ameer by fair means or foul. To crown all, comes the declaration at the Mansion House. I must confess, Sir, that I find it quite impossible to reconcile all this with a policy of prudence and justice; and therefore that I am unable to sustain the Government by any vote of mine in a course which, I am convinced, all honourable men, when they cease to be blinded by Party and prejudice, must eventually condemn.

MR. FORSYTH said, it was highly improbable the Government would, in the present state of trade and commerce of the country, drive the country into war if it could be avoided. He did not think the people of England would take much interest in recriminations in Parliament. What they were concerned about was the question—Was the war a just and necessary war? If it were proved to be just, they would approve of it; if not, they would condemn it, and the Government who were responsible for it. He believed the war was just; and an attentive perusal of the Papers had convinced him that the man who was to blame was the Ameer himself. It was his perversity, obstinacy, and folly that brought the calamity on his country. Those who blamed Lord Salisbury for a change of policy should bear in mind that the policy of a country changed with circumstances. To show how capricious and untrustworthy this Ameer was he would like the House to see what appeared in page 126 of the Papers on this subject. They would there find the following telegram from the Viceroy to the Deputy Commissioner at Peshawur:—

> "The Viceroy has been informed that Sirdar Mahomed Yakoob Khan came to Cabul under a safe conduct from the Ameer, and that notwithstanding the safe conduct he has been placed in custody by His Highness. The Viceroy, as a friend and well-wisher to the Ameer, hopes this report is untrue, and desires strongly to urge His Highness to observe the conditions under which the Sirdar has come to Cabul. By so doing the Ameer will maintain his good name and the friendship of the British Government."

From first to last the Ameer had insisted upon an offensive and defensive alliance with England—first, to guarantee him against civil war, to uphold him on the Throne against all rivals, and to guarantee to him the nomination of his son as heir apparent; and next, to guarantee him against external aggression, and hold him harmless against all foreign foes. Our policy had been not to entangle ourselves with intestine quarrels with Afghanistan, irrespective of the good conduct and rule of the Ameer. At a time when Europe was in a most critical state, when Russia was on the confines of Turkey, and a war was about to begin, the issue of which no man could foresee, and in which we might ourselves very possibly be engaged, we made a request of the Ameer that an Envoy should be sent from Simla to Cabul to discuss with the Ameer the relations between the two countries. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich said that the Government took the statement of that Envoy, and treated his representations as containing a true account of the grievances of the Ameer, when we should have relied entirely on what was said by the Cabul Envoy who came subsequently to Simla. That contention on the part of the right hon. Gentleman was, in his opinion, altogether wrong, for the Agent whose version of the Ameer's grievances was accepted gave it to us after having been in the most confidential communication with the Ameer. Upon the statement of the Ameer himself the Viceroy was justified in saying that the grievances put forward by that mouthpiece were those upon which the Ameer insisted. At the Peshawur Conference between Sir Lewis Pelly and the Ameer's Envoy, the latter was informed that the Ameer's accepting a British officer to reside on the Frontier would be the condition of our agreeing to an offensive or defensive alliance. The Treaty was actually proposed, and it rested on that condition. The Envoy said he had no power to accept the condition, and the negotiations were broken off. Then it was said we had, in that case, acted precipitately, because another Envoy was on his way, who had full powers to treat. Why should they believe that, when we had for months before been negotiating with Envoys from Afghanistan, and all this time four or five Russian Agents were intriguing at Cabul? The Russian Mission to Cabul was, he might point out, received with great pomp and parade, and was by no means to be regarded as a matter of mere courtesy, as was shown by the evidence contained in the Papers. What, then, were we in those circumstances to do? It had been said that we ought, instead of dealing with Afghanistan, to have gone to Russia; but we had taken that course, and had asked for explanations. As a matter of mere self-defence we were bound to do something to prevent Russia from intriguing in Afghanistan and converting it into a Russian Province. But it was a mistake to suppose that we intended the Envoy whom we proposed to send to the Ameer to be a permanent official; we had merely asked the Ameer to allow us to send an Envoy on a temporary Mission for the purpose of placing the relations between the two countries on a more satisfactory and a sounder footing. It was contended that we had violated International Law by trying to force an Envoy on the Ameer; but that was not so, and it had been distinctly laid down by that eminent jurist, Sir Robert Phillimore, that to refuse to receive an Envoy at all amounted to a breach of International Law. Our Mission having been rejected by the Ameer, we had given him ample time to repent of the insult which he had inflicted upon us; and he wished to know from hon. Gentlemen opposite what other course they would, in similar circumstancs, have pursued than that which had been taken by the Government? Were we to retire from Afghanistan baffled and defeated? Such a course would, he maintained, be unworthy of England, and would have disgraced us in the eyes both of Asia and Europe. The war, therefore, in his opinion, had been forced upon us not by any fault of our own, but by the misconduct of the Ameer himself, and we were bound to uphold the honour, safety, and dignity of the country.

Sir CHARLES W. DILKE said, that his hon. and learned Friend who had just sat down had set out by declaring that although there might be those who would not agree with him, he believed that the sole cause of this war was the conduct of the Ameer himself, and he ended his speech by a statement which implied that he evidently believed that he had proved what he asserted; but the whole tendency of his remarks went to prove that the cause of offence came from Russia. His hon. and learned Friend had remarked that it had been asserted that there was another Envoy on the road at the time the Conference was ended at Peshawur; and he used words, which he afterwards qualified, that he would not believe a word of it, and that the Envoy had no power. [Mr. Forsyth: I said no power to accept a Mission.] The hon. and learned Member could not know that. The Viceroy evidently believed it. At page 222 would be found these instructions to Sir Lewis Pelly—

> "If, in the meanwhile, new Envoys or messengers arrive to continue negotiation you will tell them that your powers are terminated."

So that it was quite clear that Lord Lytton had considerable reason to believe that there was another Envoy on his way with permission to treat, and even to agree to our proposal. His hon. and learned Friend had said it was a just and necessary war, and he defined a just and necessary war as a war in which there was a just cause for offence. In order to ascertain whether a war was just and necessary, the first document to which it was usual to refer was the Proclamation. Any hon. Member, however, who looked into the Proclamation of Lord Lytton, which had been circulated only that morning, would find that it consisted of unsupported assertions, hardly any one of which was capable of direct proof; and it was somewhat singular that no speaker who had followed the right hon. Member for Greenwich had taken up his challenge to justify the terms of that document. He now came to the speech of the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth (Sir Robert Peel), which to those who sat waiting for the customary fireworks gave the impression that for once the powder must have been damp. The right hon. Baronet had referred to Sir Henry Rawlinson as being an impartial witness on the Afghan Question; but the fact was that, eminent though Sir Henry Rawlinson might be in many respects, he was upon that question a very one-sided authority. The right hon. Baronet then went on to speak of the foreign policy of the late Government; but it was somewhat singular that he, who had at the time supported it, should now lose no opportunity of making an attack upon it. Again, the right hon. Baronet probably knew that the language used by M. Gambetta referred to a transaction of which he had most warmly approved; and when he spoke of the policy of the Opposition as supporting Russia over much, he might remember that no speech was ever more strongly Russian than that of the Prime Minister in 1876. The case against the Government was that the Ameer was not, on the whole, unfriendly until he had been forced into the arms of Russia by Lord Lytton's policy, as revealed to him in July, 1876. To this the Government speakers had replied that a few communications had passed between General Kaufmann and the Ameer before that date. Now, those communications had been made known by Shere Ali to the British Agent; they were not important, and they were made by means not of Russian, but of Russian-Afghan Agents. They were, in short, communications of which just complaint should have been made to Russia rather than to the Ameer. The Under Secretary of State for India had declared that Lord Salisbury had had the gift of prophecy, and had foretold the attempt of Russia to establish influence in Afghanistan. But he was reminded by that statement of that astrologer who prophecied long life to an English King. The King having died immediately, the astrologer, in disgust, prophecied his own death upon a given day, and killed himself in order to make his prophecy come true. Lord Salisbury, by his instructions to Lord Lytton, had made his own prophecies come true—that the Ameer would be thrown into the arms of Russia. It was not his intention to examine once more the question that was at issue between the occupants of the two front Benches. He thought the verdict of the country would be that on this secondary point victory rested rather with Lord Northbrook than with the Government, in spite of the casuistry of Lord Salisbury. The Government speakers had tried to show that the late Government had refused to guarantee Shere Ali against foreign conquest; and that for that reason he had thrown himself into the arms of Russia. That was not the case. The late Government had offered to guarantee Shere Ali against foreign conquest; but he wanted a guarantee against domestic insurrection. It might just as well be said that the present Government had refused to guarantee him, for they had made conditions—conditions which they knew he would not accept. Lord Northbrook would not consent to force Residents on the Ameer at the certain cost of war; and Lord Lytton, a more convenient person, had been found—not so much a Viceroy as a diplomatist; a Secretary of Legation rather than a ruler of men, and consequently a puppet in the hands of the Government at home. War had been determined upon. Everybody knew, but Lord Lytton said he did not know, that war was the certain outcome of the policy devised in Downing Street, and carried out by him. War for prestige; war for the rectification of a Frontier. His hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham (Mr. Chamberlain), in the addition to the Amendment which he had placed upon the Paper, but which he had not moved, had singled out for special attack the concealment by Government from Parliament of their policy. He (Sir Charles W. Dilke) had already said his say with regard to that concealment. The Government would seem to have been too busy preparing the candidature to the Bulgarian Throne of his hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) to lay Papers at the proper time before the House. For example, Lord Lytton's Proclamation of War, published on November 22 at Lahore, and which ought to have been published in London on the 23rd, had not been circulated till the morning of December 10. Had it been published at the earlier date they would have been able to have verified its astounding and apparently unsupported statement that—

> "The Ameer had openly and assiduously endeavoured by words and deeds to stir up religious hatred against the English, and incited war against the Empire of India."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 2, p. 20.]

Lord Lytton did not come into court with clean hands, for he had made, also without proof, a year and a-half before, a similar assertion in his memorable despatch about Khelat and Quetta. That Quetta case was, indeed, worthy of more notice than it had received; for it was both the strongest of all the instances of concealment of information from the House, and the main cause of the present Afghan War. There had been frequent allusions in that House, in the other House of Parliament, and in the Press, to many debates in which various Members of the Government had, on different occasions during the last three years, declared that they had initiated no change in our Indian Frontier policy. Little allusion to the Quetta debate had yet been made; for his hon. Friends the Members for the Border Burghs and for Birmingham had quoted it only for another purpose. Now, the only open sign of the change of policy which had occurred had been the advance to Quetta. That advance—the vast moment of which was clear now, but obvious at the time to all who were acquainted with the history of our Frontier policy — had been, according to the practice of the present Government, made without the knowledge of Parliament. Several Questions which had been put in that House had elicited a portion of the facts; but again, according to the practice of the present Government, re-assuring words had been spoken, the effect of which had not afterwards been confirmed. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had, as usual, talked to the House in the manner in which a dentist would talk to a child. The force sent forward had been called an "escort." The House had, over and over again, been informed that the occupation of Quetta was not intended to be permanent. Now, even at that time, it was intended that the occupation should be permanent, and contracts for permanent barracks had been made. He himself (Sir Charles W. Dilke) was not opposed to the occupation of Quetta from what might be called the military point of view; indeed, he had written in its favour as long ago as 1867, distinguishing carefully between political and military considerations; but the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in the debate of August, 1877, had taken exactly the opposite view, and had declared that he was opposed to the occupation from the military point of view, and that political considerations alone might be adduced in its favour. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, in his speech, said that he belonged to the school which was

> "rather for keeping back, and not committing us to advancing beyond our Frontiers. . . . I have always demurred to the idea which has been put forward by some, that the best way to meet danger is to advance beyond our Frontier, and have always held that the true lines we ought to lay down for ourselves are these—to strengthen ourselves within our Frontiers, and to do so by a combination of measures, moral and material. . . . It is most important that we should in every possible way endeavour to husband the wealth and resources of India . . . . rather than that we should expend our force by distance, and weaken ourselves by an unwise advance."—[3 *Hansard*, ccxxxvi. 718-19.]

The Chancellor of the Exchequer went on to explain that these were the views which he had always held as to the best means of protecting India from attack, and "there was no change whatever in the policy of Her Majesty's Government." Looking to the vast importance in its bearing upon our relations to the Ameer—that was to say, from the political point of view, which our occupation of Quetta had had—it was interesting to note that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had used the words, "as to the occupation of Quetta, or rather what has been called the occupation of Quetta"—for he denied that there had been an occupation—

> "If we are to regard that advance from a military point of view—a step in the nature of taking up a certain position to defend ourselves against an apprehended attack—then I should maintain the opinion that it would be a false move."

But, he went on to explain, all that had been done had been

> "to send an Envoy there . . . accompanied by a sufficient escort to secure him an honourable reception."—[*Ibid.* p. 720.]

Now, it was very singular to notice that those were exactly the same words which were afterwards made use of by the Government with regard to the despatch of Sir Neville Chamberlain and his lancers as Envoy and escort to Cabul. He did not know whether Shere Ali read the Parliamentary debates: they had his own statement for the fact that he read Sir Henry Rawlinson's books and memoranda, so perhaps he did. If he did, or if he was advised by those who did, he must have drawn his own conclusions. With regard to Quetta, at all events, the mask was off; and it must be borne in mind that the House had been kept in ignorance of the advance until the occupation of Quetta had become an accomplished fact. The House had then been assured that it was no occupation at all, and had been told that all that we had done was to send an Envoy accompanied by a sufficient "escort" to secure him an honourable reception. Yet, at that very time, the erection of permanent barracks had already been begun; the telegraph had partly been laid down; and a survey had been made with a view to the extension to Quetta of the Indian railway system. There was another singular resemblance between the action of the Government in the Quetta matter and their action in the present case. The Papers with regard to Khelat and Quetta had been asked for in March, 1877, and they had been pressed for anxiously in April. They had been promised "immediately" in April, and they had been distributed on the 21st July, when it was altogether too late for the House of Commons to interfere. Three and a-half months appeared to be the usual time during which the present Government was accustomed to keep back Papers of vital moment which they had promised to give "immediately." Now, even Sir Henry Rawlinson had admitted that the occupation of Quetta was a most serious matter, and had said—

> "It is doubtful how such a proceeding would be regarded at Candahar and Cabul. . . . . If, as is more probable, the tribes in general regarded this erection of a fortress—above the passes, although not on Afghan soil—as a menace, or as a preliminary to a further hostile advance, then we should not be justified, for so small an object, in risking the rupture of our friendly intercourse." — [*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 41.]

That was exactly the view which he (Sir Charles W. Dilke) had always taken. It was the view which the present Government had taken at one time, and their sudden departure from it had had the effect which everybody, which even Sir Henry Rawlinson himself, had anticipated. Yet, as he had shown, the Government had kept all knowledge of the momentous step from Parliament until it was too late, and even after it was accomplished had assured the House that there was no occupation, and no change of policy. He would now, for a few minutes, dwell upon the facts revealed by the Papers "Central Asia, No. 1." It was a humiliating story. On August 8 last the India Office had written to the Foreign Office to the effect that Shere Ali had received a Russian Mission backed by "four columns" with "15,000 men," and suggesting that he had received the Mission "under pressure." The India Office insisted that the Russian Government should be brought to book, the "Russian Cabinet" as they said—a phrase which was rather wild, as there was not, and never had been, a Cabinet in Russia. These were their words—

> "It is the Russian Cabinet alone which is responsible for the acts of its Agent, and it is the Russian Governor General of Turkestan, rather than the Ameer Shere Ali, who, with or without authority, is at this moment pursuing a policy of which the effect must be to seriously agitate the minds of Her Majesty's subjects throughout India." — [*Central Asia*, No. 1 (1878) p. 143.]

He (Sir Charles W. Dilke) thought so too; but what had their valiant Government done? They had begun by the use of brave words. They had informed Russia of what they, very properly, had called her "breach of her engagement." They told Russia that she was "menacing" the "integrity of Afghan territory." It was Russia, not England, who, according to England, was menacing the integrity of Afghan territory in September last. On the 19th August, and again early in September, we had been defending the integrity of Afghan territory. On the 9th November we were "rectifying our Frontier" by helping ourselves to Afghan soil. Looking to the present condition of Afghanistan, it would seem as though our defence of the integrity of the Afghan territory had been as fatal to that integrity as our defence of the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire had been fatal to the integrity of Turkey. Our Government had told Russia that it was "impossible for us to ignore or overlook" what had occurred. They insisted that the Russian Mission should "be at once withdrawn." Russia had laughed at us. The Russian Foreign Minister was away; the Czar was away; the Acting Minister was away, having left the capital without sending a note to the British Embassy, although he had been courteously informed by the Embassy that we wished for an immediate answer. On the 10th September we had again insisted. Our Government then said that there was "no excuse" for what had occurred, and "pressed for a reply." At last, after more than three weeks' delay, we got a sort of reply. The words used with regard to the Russian Mission to Cabul were those which the Chancellor of the Exchequer had used a year-and-a-half before with regard to our "Mission" to Quetta. The Russian Mission to Cabul was "of a provisional nature." Naturally dissatisfied with this reply; afraid to hit Russia, yet determined to hit somebody, our brave Government hit Shere Ali; in fact, they tied him down to hit him, not giving him time to get away. He had received a Russian Mission, received it, as we ourselves admitted, "under pressure" from "four columns" of "15,000 men," and because he had done so we, shrinking from the possible consequences of our big words to Russia, fell on Shere Ali. The conduct of the Government had been the conduct of a bully; of a big boy afraid of another big boy, and hitting that big boy's acquaintance, who was small. England had suddenly turned from its defence of the integrity of the Afghan territory in September, and in November was "rectifying her Frontier" by the annexation of the Koorum. What could we expect to be the consequence of this cowardly policy? Had it made us any the safer against Russia? The result would probably be the occupation by Russia of Merv, which had been, over and over again, declared to be the key to Herat, itself the key to India. The rectification of our Frontier would do nothing towards preventing that occupation. Had or had not our Government, by their action, made our possession of India more secure? The attack on Afghanistan, like the bringing to Malta of 7,000 under-officered black troops, like the Anglo-Turkish Convention, like the occupation of Cyprus by a fevered battalion as a "strong place of arms," were all measures which had had for their object the security of India. Was India more secure at the present moment than it had been in the days of Lord Northbrook's rule? What was to be the outcome of the quarrel in which, by the action of the Government, they had become involved? They had been assured that there was to be no large annexation. But it was necessary to provide securities that the well-meaning section of the Cabinet should not be dragged by Indian fire-eaters into an annexation, or veiled annexation, of Afghanistan. Annexation had been disowned, but Sir Henry Rawlinson was still awake and active, and possessed great influence with the present Indian Government, and with some members of the Cabinet. The first Napoleon had said—"There is but one disease of which great Powers die; they die of indigestion." The Government had swallowed Fiji, Cyprus, and the Transvaal, and these had not agreed with us too well. They had the power, if they so pleased it, to swallow Afghanistan; and in the spring their friends were certain to insist that they should do so. Should we be able to digest it? It was a tough morsel, as we should find to our cost. He denied that our Indian prestige could possibly be raised. On the contrary, he asserted that it must be lowered by conduct of the kind he had described. The rectification of our Frontier was, of course, intended to make us safer against the advance of Russia; but he doubted whether it would have that effect; and a rectification of our Frontier obtained at such a sacrifice of honour and dignity as had been incurred could certainly have no consequence of the kind. And as regarded its material and physical effects, the probability was that Russia would think that her prestige in Asia would receive a blow if she did not make a move, which we would not be able to prevent, and our material and physical prestige would have suffered vastly more than it would have gained by this unjust war.

LORD GEORGE HAMILTON said, it was with great regret that he found himself, for the first time, taking part in a Party debate on Indian affairs; but he should not complain if the debate had been carried on calmly, deliberately, and in argumentative language, such as the hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea had throughout used. But his charge against the Government for withholding information about the occupation of Quetta was most unjust. His (Lord George Hamilton's) own statements on a former occasion were perfectly consistent with the Papers now laid upon the Table of the House. In 1875, owing to the policy—or rather to the want of policy—which had been adopted, the affairs of Beloochistan were in frightful confusion. Lord Northbrook had before him three alternatives—first, the annexation of that country; second, the total abstinence from interference with it—in which case, in all probability, some other Power would have interfered—and, thirdly, the course which Lord Northbrook himself had adopted. At the time that Lord Lytton was on his way to India he telegraphed to Lord Northbrook not to send an Envoy to Beloochistan until he arrived, because he wished to state the reasons for his interference in Beloochistan to the Ameer of Cabul, in order to allay any suspicions he might have as to our objects. Lord Northbrook, however, did not comply with that request, but sent his Envoy a week before his successor arrived with his own instructions. Major Sandeman succeeded in temporarily pacifying that country. Lord Lytton was far from wishing to occupy Quetta; even up to the end of 1876 he was adverse to it. The only reason of his doing so at last was because Major Sandeman and the military officers who went with him reported that Quetta was the only place the occupation of which would protect our trade, and fulfil the objects of our interference. He believed that if Lord Northbrook had been Viceroy he would have pursued the same policy. They might, however, dismiss altogether this question of Quetta in discussing the affairs of Afghanistan. In the early part of the evening a very remarkable speech was made by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich. The right hon. Gentleman had carefully selected extracts from the context for quotation, the words of which were capable of bearing the exact construction which he wished to have placed upon them, and he made the choice for that sole and special purpose. Upon those quotations the right hon. Gentleman based one of the most formidable indictments, or rather series of indictments, ever thrown at any Government. He stated positively that when Lord Northbrook left India the relations between the Indian Government and Afghanistan were perfectly satisfactory.

MR. GLADSTONE: No. In the main.

LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: Oh! in the main.

MR. GLADSTONE: Yes, certainly. I said, "in the main;" and I repeated the phrase over and over again.

LORD GEORGE HAMILTON said, he would accept the correction of the right hon. Gentleman that he used the phrase "in the main"—whatever that might mean. The right hon. Gentleman next said that at the time at which we came into Office there was no reason whatever for attempting in any way to alter those relations. The right hon. Gentleman next said that the Indian Government deliberately and wantonly, contrary to the opinion of everybody who had any experience of Afghanistan, insisted upon forcing upon the Ameer officers whose location in Afghanistan would have been absolutely fatal to the independence of that country; that the negotiations were so conducted that they were intended to fail; that at the very moment the Viceroy knew the Envoy was coming to accept his terms, he deliberately broke off negotiations lest they should be accepted; and that the Indian Government had forced and hunted the Ameer into a corner, and had then on some frivolous pretext made war on him. The right hon. Gentleman then expressed his own opinion that the policy of the Government had not been what they pretended; but that their sole object throughout had been to annex a certain portion of Afghanistan. And the right hon. Gentleman, before he undertook to prove these allegations, took a course which it was to be hoped, for the credit of the House, would not be taken again—he deliberately stated that documents, signed by the Viceroy of

India, the Commander-in-Chief in India, and six of the ablest men in the most incorruptible service in the world, were, he would not say false, but contained gross and unpardonable errors and extraordinary deviations from fact, which, as they all knew, was merely an oratorical device for stating that the despatches of the Indian Government were not true. The right hon. Gentleman then found that there was one person in whom he could place implicit confidence; one whose every syllable was true, and against whose word any utterance of the Viceroy or his Council was not for a moment to be placed—this was the Envoy of the Ameer, who came down to Peshawur to negotiate on behalf of his master with the Indian Government. Now, the right hon. Gentleman had had 50 years of experience in political life, and he must know that when negotiations of that kind were entered upon it was the invariable custom for the negotiators to assume things which were not altogether correct for the purpose of obtaining the successful issue of such negotiations; and that all through these Conferences the Afghan Envoy always acted upon the assumption that the Ameer had got everything he wanted, though this assertion was the exact reverse of the language used by the same Envoy in 1873. The right hon. Gentleman then proceeded to charge Lord Lytton with having thrown to the winds all the assurances of Lords Northbrook and Mayo; but it was capable of proof that the interpretation put upon those assurances by Lord Lytton was identical with those of the right hon. Gentleman's own Government. In support of the charges which the right hon. Gentleman made against the accuracy of the Papers, he commented upon a statement in them that certain negotiations occupied several weeks which only took up a few days; but if he had examined the Papers a little more closely he would have found that these negotiations occupied exactlyt hree weeks. Then with regard to the number of the grievances of which it was said the Ameer complained, the right hon. Gentleman endeavoured again here to make a strong point; but here again he would find that the statements made by different Envoys were described accordingly; and, further, that all the statements as well as the reports upon them were fully set out in the Papers which had been presented to Parliament, without any attempt at concealment. All the Indian Government did was, finding there were eight grievances stated by the first man, of which four were very trivial, to select four out of the eight, calling them special grievances; and, as regarded the statement of the Afghan Envoy, they call especial attention to it in the following words:—

> "The statement of the Afghan Envoy, which is herein enclosed, in an interesting, instructive, and important document."

He could not understand how an ex-Prime Minister, possessing more official experience than anybody in the House, could come down and deliberately state that he would put implicit confidence in the statement of an Envoy from Afghanistan—when it was in accordance with his own views—and would not credit what was set forth on their authority by the Viceroy and his Council. He regretted the right hon. Gentleman should have adopted such a course. Speaking from his own knowledge and experience as Under Secretary of State for India at the time when these transactions took place, he could assure the right hon. Gentleman that the officers whose statements he had impugned were men of honour as high as was his own. The right hon. Gentleman had eulogised every other Viceroy, but had held up Lord Lytton to the opprobrium of the House. He could not understand why Lord Lytton, whose responsibilities and difficulties since his assumption of office had been so grave and continuous, was to be thus treated by a political opponent. Lord Northbrook had recently made some amazing statements; but the noble Lord was a man of honour, and he (Lord George Hamilton) implicitly believed in his good faith. He saw no reason, therefore, why Lord Lytton and his advisers should not be treated with a moiety, at any rate, of the confidence and consideration which we reposed in his predecessor. The charges launched against them by the right hon. Gentleman were very formidable; and he hoped the House would excuse him if he went at some little length into what the actual state of affairs in India was when the present Government assumed office. If everything was at that time perfectly satisfactory, then he would admit they were unwise and deserving of blame in altering the situation. If, on the other hand, it could be shown that their relations were unsatisfactory; that every year they were getting worse and worse; that they might at any moment have been involved in a war with Russia, on account of entangling and undefined obligations, then he thought the position was altered, and that that which was in the one case unwise would be in the other absolutely necessary. It seemed to him that it was not thoroughly understood why successive Viceroys had attached such enormous importance to having a friendly and independent Power in Afghanistan. Afghanistan had a Frontier from which at any moment the Natives could invade or make a raid on India. The people who inhabited those mountains were, to use the language of Lord Lawrence, "a faithless, lawless, plundering people," who would join *en masse* an invasion of India from the West. It was an utter delusion to suppose that mountains were insuperable obstacles to invasion. India and Italy resembled each other in their geographical peculiarities; but no two countries had been so frequently and so successfully invaded as Italy and India, and in every single instance, save in our own case, the invaders of India came through the mountains. The reason there was so little danger there was that England was stronger in military power than Afghanistan. It was because they placed a large number of soldiers along the Frontier that they overawed the Afghans; and in proportion as the Afghans became disciplined and organized, so must we increase our Frontier forces and our military expenditure. It was said that it would be much better if they devoted their attention to internal reforms rather than to strengthening their Frontiers externally. This was true to a certain extent, but to a certain extent only. In any country, the people of which were homogeneous and self-governing, the more contented the majority were, the stronger was the Government of that country. But the people of India were not homogeneous, nor in any sense self-governing. The history of India for centuries before our advent was the rule of successive warlike minorities over peaceful agricultural majorities. The intrigues, cruelty, and rapine of these warlike tribes and castes made India for many years one battle-field; we were, in consequence, forced to interfere, and little by little to absorb the whole country. We, by the strong arm of the law, gave to the majority of the Natives of India a protection, such as they had never had before, from those who for centuries had fattened on them. To keep these elements of turbulence and disorder under control, we sent large numbers of troops from this country, and their presence maintained peace and order. The larger the number we had to station on the Frontier, the less there were for this purpose. To put our position in a graphic way before the House, let us assume that England was in such danger of invasion that it became necessary to garrison Portsmouth and Plymouth with Metropolitan police. The absence of the guardians of the peace might incite the criminal classes of London to do that which their presence would effectually prevent. It was for grave practical reasons such as these, and not for any chimerical dread of a Russian invasion, that we declined to allow the influence of any European Power to become predominant in Afghanistan, for the presence even of a few European officers with money and artillery would give us an infinity of trouble and expense. The next thing they had to consider was the means by which to attain that object. They made a mistake in 1838. They attempted internal interference and they failed, and for many years afterwards they did nothing to re-establish friendly relations. The history of Afghanistan for that period was well known to the House; but he must express his opinion that the policy which was sometimes called the "masterly inactivity" of Lord Lawrence, in 1864, had one great merit. It was a safe policy; but in every other sense it was absolutely unworthy of a great civilized Power. What he said to the Afghan Princes was this—"You may fight and kill each other; we shall keep the ring. Nobody shall interfere with you; and the successful combatant, who shall temporarily establish his Sovereignty, shall be entitled to the recognition of the English Government." To such an extent was this carried that there was a record of a letter being sent to the then Sovereign of Cabul, and the messenger was instructed to be careful who got it, as someone else might be in power when he arrived there. When Shere Ali overcame his opponents Lord Lawrence departed from his policy, and assisted him with arms and money. That was done at a time, certainly, when Shere Ali least required them; but he was grateful. Lord Mayo succeeded in ingratiating Shere Ali at Umballa, not because he followed the policy of Lord Lawrence, but because he departed from it; for there was no identity whatever between the original policy of Lord Lawrence and that of Lord Mayo and Lord Northbrook. Lord Mayo said that the policy which his Government had adopted was an intermediate policy. An intermediate policy meant that it was the natural consequence of something already done; and, in this instance, consisted of laying down certain lines of action capable of expansion as time went on. The right hon. Gentleman opposite had said that Lord Lytton had extinguished the promises of Lord Mayo; but what authority was there for that assertion? If the right hon. Gentleman would look at the official letter addressed by Sir Lewis Pelly to Shere Ali, he would find these words—"The British Government repudiates all liabilities on behalf of the Ameer. It does not withdraw from any obligation previously contracted by it; but it emphatically denies that it ever incurred such obligations as those alleged by Shere Ali, and will never undertake such obligations without the amplest guarantees." The interpretation which Shere Ali's Envoy put on Lord Mayo's assurances was that which already had been repudiated both by the Duke of Argyll, in 1869, and Lord Northbrook in 1873. Lord Mayo, during his Viceroyalty, succeeded in satisfying Shere Ali. He succeeded, not because he acceded to all or to most of his requests, but because Shere Ali felt that he was dealing with a man he could thoroughly trust. Between 1869 and 1873 our relations with Shere Ali were most satisfactory—more so, indeed, than they had been at any period before or since. Then Lord Northbrook succeeded Lord Mayo, and was Viceroy from 1872 to 1876. He had a very high personal opinion of Lord Northbrook; but it could not be denied that during the time Lord Northbrook was Viceroy Lord Lawrence's policy absolutely collapsed under the management of the late Government. The basis of that policy was this. "Be quiet in your Frontiers; do not in any way frighten the Afghans: and the nearer Russia approaches towards Afghanistan, the more she will gravitate towards you—not from love to you, but from fear of the Russians." What Lord Lawrence predicted took place. The Ameer became thoroughly alarmed at the advance of Russia, and applied for definite assurances of protection. The Papers showed that his one object was to obtain definite assurances against Russian aggression. There had been some recrimination with regard to what took place in connection with the meeting at Simla. He thoroughly accepted Lord Northbrook's assurance. But the question was not what interpretation we now, in 1878, placed upon Lord Northbrook's assurance; but what interpretation Shere Ali placed upon it in 1873. This was a point of some little importance. Shere Ali believed, as was clearly shown by his letter, that his request with regard to an alliance had been unconditionally refused; and what steps did the late Government take to remove that impression? With the single exception of two telegrams from the Duke of Argyll, there is not a single line in the Office of despatches from the Duke of Argyll to Lord Northbrook on the subject during the whole time he was in India. When, however, the Duke of Argyll found his Party interests or his personal reputation attacked, he was not content to defend himself with meagre telegrams, but wrote three columns in *The Times* of vigorous invective. If but a moiety of the same industry had been displayed in 1873, in correcting Shere Ali's misapprehension, how different would our relations with him have been. While, on the one hand, Shere Ali found that his advances for an external alliance were rejected, on the other hand, unfortunately, Lord Northbrook was compelled to interfere, by protesting against the imprisonment of his son, Yakoob Khan. Thus the two principles of our previous policy were reversed; we refused an external alliance; we interfered internally in what Shere Ali believed to be the most sacred of the internal affairs of Afghanistan. When he contrasted the state of the relations which existed between Shere Ali and the Indian Government when Lord Lytton arrived in India and those which existed on the arrival there of Lord Northbrook, he was, he must confess, surprised at the observations on the subject which had been made by the right hon. Gentleman opposite. During the Viceroyalty of Lord Northbrook the advance of Russia in Central Asia had been greater than during any former period. Khokand had been annexed; Khiva had been annexed, contrary to the assurances which had been given by the Russian Government; and a Treaty had been made with Bokhara which made Russia practically supreme in all those regions. If, therefore, there was any efficacy in the policy of Lord Lawrence Shere Ali ought to have been more friendly to us when Lord Northbrook left India than when he arrived there, because Russia was much nearer to our Frontier. Now, everybody who knew Lord Northbrook must be aware that he would leave no stone unturned to bring a policy in which he so thoroughly believed to a successful issue. Neither was he in any way overruled by the Home Government. Let the House contrast our relations with the Ameer in 1873, when he was ready to receive an English officer on a friendly Mission to Cabul, and those which subsequently existed in April, 1876. The first act of Lord Lytton was to make exactly the same request, which was curtly refused. Up to 1873 Shere Ali gratefully received a subsidy from the Indian Government; for years previous to 1876 that subsidy was sullenly refused. Up to 1873, almost to the end of 1874, not only were the letters of General Kaufmann sent to the Indian Government, but they were asked to answer them. In the year preceding 1876 the Ameer made no such request, and there was reason to believe that he was receiving a far greater number of letters then than before. Up to 1873 every request of the Indian Government and all their advances were graciously granted and accepted by Shere Ali. Between 1873 and 1876 they were invariably ignored. The Ameer positively refused, in the most discourteous terms, to allow Mr. Forsyth and other Englishmen to pass through his territory. He absolutely ignored altogether Lord Northbrook's intervention on behalf of his son; and he could not, in short, conceive a more unsatisfactory state of affairs than that which then prevailed. That was not all. During the time Shere Ali received 12 cannons, 21,000 rifles, 1,200 carbines, and £250,000. How, under those circumstances, he would ask, could the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich contend that our relations with the Ameer were so satisfactory, as he had described them to be? The right hon. Gentleman had used very strong language with regard to certain statements which had been made by Lord Lytton; but he should like to call the attention of the House to a statement which had been made by the right hon. Gentleman himself. The right hon. Gentleman, speaking a short time ago, said—

> "We found the Indian policy of the country justly and wisely guided by a man who, though he did not belong to our political Party—I mean Lord Mayo—yet was as honest and as good a Governor General as ever held the high Office of Viceroy of India. Within three or four months after we acceded to Office a meeting of the most friendly character was held at Umballa, where Shere Ali, the Ameer of Afghanistan, and his favourite son, stood upon the platform as friendly, by the side of Lord Mayo. Lord Mayo, at a fixed point in the proceedings, produced a jewelled sword, and handed it to Shere Ali, and said—'I trust Your Highness will use this sword with effect against your enemies;' and Shere Ali replied—'I will use it against every enemy of the Queen of England.' That was the state of feeling; that was the state of affairs which prevailed at the commencement of our government on the North-Western Frontier of India; and that was the state of affairs when we handed them over to the charge of our successors in Office."

MR. GLADSTONE said, that he was not responsible for the accuracy of the newspaper reports from which the noble Lord quoted; but he, in truth, spoke of the state of affairs as being substantially the same.

LORD GEORGE HAMILTON said, that the word "substantially" did not appear in any report of this speech. But that our relations were, at the time of which he was speaking, eminently unsatisfactory, he thought he had demonstrated. He now had to deal with by far the most embarrassing part of the circumstances which they found to exist on their assumption of Office. Lord Northbrook had undertaken that, under certain circumstances, the Indian Government would assist Shere Ali by force in resisting Russian aggression; but he had made no arrangement whatever for carrying out that assurance. At any moment General Kaufmann might advance, and we should have found ourselves in this position—either we must acquiesce in his annexation, and imperil our influence as well as the sanctity of our assurances, or else go to war with Russia. Her Majesty's Government believed the maintenance of peace to be one of the greatest of British interests; they declined, therefore, to allow the greatest of British interests to rest on no safer foundation than the validity of General Kaufmann's assurances, or the whims of a sulky and semi-civilized barbarian. He had, he thought, revealed a state of affairs that called for some remedy. Lord Salisbury, he wished to add, had not acted in a haphazard or hasty manner in the matter. He had deliberately looked through the records, and he had ascertained, upon evidence which to his mind was perfectly indisputable, that Shere Ali was willing, in 1869, to receive British Agents in certain places. Captain Grey, whose opinion was of the greatest weight—for he was not a mere interpreter between the Ameer and Lord Mayo, but had been specially told off to attend to that Potentate—had said that the Ameer did freely consent to the appointment of British officers in Balkh, Herat, and other places. That statement was confirmed by the terms of the despatch from Lord Mayo, as well as by the letter of Shere Ali in 1869. Yet they were now told by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich that the introduction of an Agent into Afghanistan was impossible and inconsistent with the independence of that country. In the year 1869 the language of Shere Ali was exactly the reverse. He said—

> "I strongly hope that the British Government will always do good and be kind to me, and keep me under its protection."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 91.]

Lord Salisbury, therefore, communicated with the Indian Government, and asked them to take measures to ascertain whether Shere Ali would agree to the appointment of an Agent at Herat. That Agent was to be placed there simply in order to report the proceedings and advances of the Russians, and thus to give the British Government in India time to avert a collision which everybody wished to avoid. If there was any doubt upon the matter, the reply of the Indian Government was conclusive. They said that if Russian authority were established over Turkestan

> "It would then become necessary to give additional and more specific assurances to the Ruler of Afghanistan that we are prepared to assist him to defend Afghanistan against attack from without. It would probably be desirable to enter into a Treaty engagement with him; and the establishment of a British Resident at Herat would be the natural consequence of such an engagement and of the nearer approach of the Russian frontier."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, pp. 134-5.]

To that despatch Lord Salisbury had replied that he could not accept the opinion that we ought to wait until Merv was occupied, as then our opportunity would, in all probability, be past. Then he said that, although a refusal to receive an Agent would illustrate the feebleness of our interest with the Ameer, yet no useful purpose would be served by keeping up an appearance of influence with him without the reality. He went on to say that he considered it of paramount importance that our whole relations with the Ameer should be put upon a satisfactory footing. The first step would be to induce him to receive an Envoy, for which a pretext must be found, or, if necessary, "created." To this expression "create" a great deal of strong language had been very needlessly devoted. He would undertake to say that there was not a sensible man in that House who, finding that, through misapprehension, his relations with some neighbour were becoming unfriendly, would not take an opportunity—or, failing that, create an opportunity—by which he could correct that misapprehension. That was what Lord Salisbury did; for the Envoy was to be sent for the purpose of discussing matters with Shere Ali and ascertaining what his real views were. In reply to that despatch the Indian Government once more invited the Home Government, if they wished to establish fresh relations with Shere Ali, to give instructions to the Viceroy to do so, and that was exactly what Lord Salisbury did. He gave instructions, in the most definite terms, to Lord Lytton to act in as friendly a manner as possible towards the Ameer. The hon. Gentleman opposite had assumed that our relations with the Ameer were thoroughly satisfactory. He thought he had proved that nothing could be more unsatisfactory and dangerous than the state of those relations when they came into Office. Such being the real state of affairs, it might be a matter of opinion how best they could be remedied. Some were inclined to do nothing; shut their eyes to the danger of the position, and trust to the chapter of accidents. Such a policy of inactivity was justifiable and "masterly" on one condition alone—that time was on your side. But if every year your difficulties grew, and your position became worse, a policy of inactivity was both culpable and cowardly. We wished to avert war; and, with the unhappy precedent of the Crimean War before us, we believed war could be best averted by plainly stating what we could allow and what we could not. The first essential of such a policy was to obtain accurate information as to Russian movements in Central Asia. Those who placed implicit confidence in the assurance of an Autocrat, because he had, or was supposed to have, complete control over his servants, committed a great blunder. The more autocratic a State was, the more dependent the Sovereign was upon the good-will of his Civil and Military Services. When once any policy of aggression became so ingrained in the minds of a Service as to become a tradition, there was nothing to prevent the realization of that tradition except the personal will of the Head of the State. He was liable, however, to removal by death, and other agencies. The prosecution of the policy of aggression was continuous, whilst the opposition was intermittent and uncertain. Everybody knew that there was a tradition among a certain section of Russian society that it was their mission, one day or other, to conquer India. It was also known that there were certain adventurous generals in Central Asia who utterly disregarded the assurances given at St. Petersburg; and until the British Government had the power to put an Agent at Herat they were in continual danger of the outbreak of war with Russia. Every possible precaution was taken to insure the success of the Mission to the Ameer. But the tone which Shere Ali had adopted towards the Indian Government was one in which it had never been addressed before; his Envoy throughout had endeavoured to cause delay. At the very time—at the very moment—when we were proposing to concur with his master in an unconditional alliance, by which we should undertake to support him under all circumstances, there came rumours from all quarters that he was engaged in stirring up a Jehad, or religious war, on the Border. These rumours were the source of the greatest possible anxiety to Lord Lytton's Government, though they did not like to break off negotiations on that account, for it would then have been necessary to make it a *casus belli.* But, on the other hand, Lord Lytton did not think, in the exercise of the discretion with which he had been intrusted, that he would be justified in concluding a dynastic Treaty with a man who was endeavouring to promote a war of extermination against us. He must again protest against the manner in which the right hon. Gentleman had quoted from the despatch of Lord Lytton—that the negotiations were broken off simply because the Ameer did not show sufficient eagerness to reciprocate our friendship. If he had only read one line lower down in the despatch he would have seen what Lord Lytton's real reason was, and how, by promptly seizing the opportunity afforded by the death of the Envoy, he extricated himself from the difficulty. A great deal had been said about a change of policy, and much hard language had been used against the Government in consequence of that change having led us into war. What was this change of policy? There was no proposal to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, nor had it ever been proposed to force upon the Ameer a Resident at Cabul whose presence would have overshadowed the authority of the Ameer. No such proposal was ever made; and it was a totally different thing to sending an Agent to the Frontier to enable the Indian Government to carry out the guarantee that had been entered into with the Ameer. In the Instructions given by Lord Lytton to our Native Agent at Cabul, which would be found on page 186 of the Papers, it was stated that

> "It will be the duty of any such British Agents to watch the external affairs of the Frontier, furnishing timely and trustworthy intelligence thereof to the Ameer, as well as to the British Government. Should the Ameer at any time have good cause to complain that any British Agent has interfered in the internal affairs of the country, the Agent will at once be recalled."

The present Government were in agreement with the late Government as to the internal policy in Afghanistan; but as regarded the external policy there was this difference—that Lord Northbrook had offered the Ameer a binding, but not unconditional assurance; whereas the present Government had given an assurance which was unconditional, except for this one stipulation—that if we undertook responsibility in the matter we must have an Agent on the Frontier to prevent Shere Ali from embroiling us in war, as without it he could have done at any moment he liked. The main reason for making our assurance unconditional and definite was the evidence, of which the Indian Government were possessed, that Lord Northbrook's proposal in 1872 being conditional had caused great displeasure to the Envoy from the Ameer. In 1873, when the Ameer's Envoy came to Simla and asked Lord Northbrook to give him an English guarantee, that noble Lord, in reply, gave him a Russian assurance to the effect that General Kaufmann's intentions were perfectly friendly. He scarcely liked to refer to the sarcastic observations of the Envoy on the subject of the introduction of the name of Russia into the negotiations. He said—

> "As regards the name of Russia, which I mentioned in connection with aggression, it was owing to an observation made by Lord Northbrook in the interview of the 12th of July, who said, 'It is necessary that the Ameer should be informed that, since the country of Afghanistan is a 'buffer' between the territories of the English and Russian Governments, it is therefore advantageous for Hindustan that Afghanistan should be strong and independent.' Therefore, since he called Afghanistan the buffer against Russia, does this, or not, prove the aggression of Russia? Ultimately the Viceroy observed that 'even a friendly Government can become an aggressor. But the English Government, considering the repeated certain assurances which they have received from the Russian Government, cannot entertain any likelihood of it.' After hearing this, I remained silent, because I thought that unity and friendship between Governments is a matter of the greatest importance."—[*Ibid.* p. 205.]

He did not know how the English Government, with the knowledge it possessed that Russia did not care for its own assurances, could expect Afghanistan, which was most liable to attacks from Russia, to place implicit confidence in its assurances. He thought that he had shown that the situation which existed when he came into office was one with which it was absolutely necessary for them to deal. His firm belief was that if right hon. Gentlemen opposite had been in Office, and had known the facts, they would have taken the same course. Unfortunately, the Ameer did not trust the sincerity of the British Government; from first to last he had played with them. Then came this unhappy business of receiving the Russian Mission. When hon. Gentlemen opposite said that we had gone to war with the Ameer because he received the Russian Mission, they totally and entirely mistook the cause of the war, which was not because he received the Russian Mission, but because he by force refused to receive ours. For years past the Ameer had said that he would not receive any English Mission, as he could not be responsible for their lives; and that if he received English officers he must also receive Russian officers. At a moment when our relations were most strained with Russia he ostentatiously received a Russian Mission at Cabul, thus plainly showing that his previous reason against receiving English officers was a mere pretext. It must be remembered that the Ameer of Cabul was not the only Asiatic Prince with whom we had to deal. There were a great number of Princes under our protection who possessed far greater wealth and power than he did, and who were besides far superior to him in culture and intelligence. They would never be allowed, and they had never attempted, to treat the English Government in the way that the Ameer had. But because a man was a barbarian he could not be allowed to set us at defiance. They were watching our conduct in this matter; and, in all probability, if we were to act without firmness in his case some of the Indian Princes would be adopting the tactics of the Ameer. He trusted that he had shown that the action the Government had taken did not in any way deserve the language which had been applied to it; and he hoped that he had also shown that a very considerable number of the charges which had been brought against the Government were mere fictions. There was another question which had been raised. It was said that if we went to war with anyone we ought to have gone to war with Russia. But the main object and policy of the British Government as regarded the North-Western Frontier of India was to have upon it not only a friendly, but also an independent Power. If they had had a war with Russia because it had sent a Mission to Cabul, they would at once have made Russia responsible for the conduct of the Ameer, and, by making her responsible, have placed Afghanistan under Russian tutelage. We should then have had to fight Afghanistan, *plus* Russia; and the object of the war being to maintain the independence of Afghanistan, we should, at the outset, have destroyed it. If we were successful in the war having destroyed the independence of Afghanistan, we should have been compelled to annex it, a consummation all wished to avert. He could not conceive any single object which would have been gained by going to war with Russia. Had a little more care and attention been exercised some years ago, it was his firm opinion that the necessity for war at the present time would have been avoided. If, on the other hand, finding matters as they were, the British Government had allowed the Ameer to set it at defiance, and had not insisted upon the reception of its Mission, war would only have been postponed for a time, and would have inevitably broken out at a later period; perhaps under more disadvantageous circumstances. Before he sat down, he wished to say a word concerning the Viceroy of India, who, he thought, had not been very fairly treated in the course of that debate. It had never been the fashion before to distinguish between the Viceroy and the Government under which he served, and to hold him up to opprobrium and ridicule on questions of veracity. And if any man might have expected exceptionally considerate treatment, surely that was Lord Lytton. He was not, it should be borne in mind, a Member of one of the great political Parties, like Lord Northbrook or Lord Mayo, with many great and powerful friends in the Legislature. He had served for many years with distinction in the Diplomatic Service, and it was known that he, with great reluctance, accepted the office of Viceroy of India. From the moment he arrived until the present day, he had had to deal with a succession of the greatest difficulties. He had had to contend with famine, financial and currency difficulties, great administrative changes, and the anxiety any Viceroy must always feel when there was a great upheaval in the social and political affairs of the Eastern world. Throughout all this Lord Lytton had shown the greatest courage and ability. It must be admitted that he had not been always understood; but there never was an abler, more courageous, and, he might say, more industrious Viceroy. And when Lord Lytton's tenure of office came to its natural end, and it was possible impartially to consider his conduct, and, to study the numerous State Papers which, on almost every conceivable subject, he had written, he was sure that the almost universal verdict would be that under the genius of the poet there lay the true instincts of the statesman. He was very much obliged to the House for the attention with which it had listened to him while he had thought it his duty, at very great length, to endeavour to lay before the House what the course of events had been. He would not attempt to anticipate what the decision of the House would be. If adverse to Her Majesty's Government, they would once more resume their place as an united Opposition; but if, on the other hand, the verdict was in their favour, by a majority much in excess of that which they generally obtained from their supporters, he thought they might fairly take that majority as a censure upon the peculiar tactics of the past two years—tactics which, while they had elevated and popularized the Government they were intended to degrade and destroy had, on the other hand, systematically endangered those great national interests, to promote and protect which should be the common object of all.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Debate be now adjourned."—(*Mr. Grant Duff.*)

Motion *agreed to.*

Debate *further adjourned* till *Thursday.*

SELECT VESTRIES BILL.

On Motion of Mr. JAMES, Bill to amend the Law relating to the nomination of Overseers by Select Vestries by custom or usage, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. JAMES, Mr. HERSCHELL, and Mr. JOSEPH COWEN.

Bill *presented,* and read the first time. [Bill 54.]

PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS BILL.

On Motion of Mr. ANDERSON, Bill to amend the Patents for Inventions Laws, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. ANDERSON, Mr. MUNDELLA, Mr. DALRYMPLE, and Mr. ALEXANDER BROWN.

Bill *presented,* and read the first time. [Bill 55.]

SALE OF FOOD AND DRUGS ACT (1875) AMENDMENT BILL.

On Motion of Mr. ANDERSON, Bill to amend "The Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875," *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. ANDERSON, Mr. P. A. TAYLOR, and Mr. WHITWELL.

Bill *presented,* and read the first time. [Bill 56.]

GUN LICENCE ACT (1870) AMENDMENT BILL.

On Motion of Sir ALEXANDER GORDON, Bill to amend "The Gun Licence Act, 1870," *ordered* to be brought in by Sir ALEXANDER GORDON, Mr. CLARE READ, Mr. M'LAGAN, and Mr. MARK STEWART.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 57.]

House adjourned at a quarter after Twelve o'clock.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Wednesday, 11*th December*, 1878.

MINUTES.]—SELECT COMMITTEE—Land Titles and Transfer, *re-appointed.*

PUBLIC BILLS — *Ordered* — *First Reading* — Joint Stock Banks (Auditing of Accounts) (Scotland) * [58]; Bankruptcy (Scotland) * [59]; Prenuptial Contracts * [60].

Second Reading — Disqualification by Medical Relief [22].

ORDER OF THE DAY.

DISQUALIFICATION BY MEDICAL RELIEF BILL.

(*Mr. Rathbone, Sir John Kennaway, Sir Charles W. Dilke, Mr. Ritchie.*)

[BILL 22.] SECOND READING.

Order for Second Reading read.

MR. RATHBONE, in moving that the Bill be now read a second time, said, that he really thought it would not be necessary to detain the House long, as a simple explanation of the Bill would be quite sufficient. The object of the measure was to provide that no person should be deemed to be disqualified to be registered as a voter at Parliamentary or Municipal Elections by reason that he, or any member of his family, had received medical treatment or relief for any infectious or contagious disease as an in-patient or out-patient of any hospital, infirmary, or dispensary. He thought that anyone who had observed the spread of certain diseases, and who had taken any part in attempts to limit or control their spread, would see the importance of allowing the medical authorities to have the earliest information of their outbreak, and the fullest control over, or the charge of, those patients who were afflicted with typhus or scarlet fever, small-pox, and cholera. Those were the diseases which we had most to dread, and which required to be treated promptly in order to prevent them spreading, especially in large towns. Taking the case of scarlet fever, it was known that articles of clothing—even a single bit of rag, or a pocket-handkerchief, which had been infected at a certain stage of the disease—would, after lying years in a cupboard, spread the disorder afresh throughout the whole household; and, therefore, the necessity of inducing patients at once to enter a sanitary institution was of the utmost importance. It was possible to have a complete and proper organization over districts where these diseases broke out. He spoke with knowledge of these things, as it was his duty to assist in preventing the spread of an outbreak of cholera at Liverpool some years ago, when they tried to confine the disease to small areas. Cholera broke out in two quarters of the town, and they took means to get hold of every case the moment it was attacked, and by doing that they confined the cases to those two districts. Perhaps the most important point was to persuade persons to go into hospitals where they would be properly taken care of; but there was in the minds of many of the working classes a prejudice against doing that, which it was highly desirable to remove; and this prejudice would be greatly increased by the knowledge that if they did so they would be disfranchised, and that disqualification the Bill proposed to remedy. A case very recently came before the Vestry of Kensington, where it appeared that a householder, whose name was on the list of voters, and two of whose children, attacked with small-pox, had been removed, against his will, by direction of the local medical officers of an hospital, was objected to before the Revising Barrister, who held that he was disqualified from exercising the franchise because he had received parochial relief. In consequence of that decision the Guardians had taken up the question, it being one of considerable importance; and it was now proposed to place these four diseases upon the same footing as public vaccination when the patients were sent to any hospital. From a paper which he held in his hands it appeared that in February, 1877, the proportion of patients in the hospitals who were paupers was under 10 per cent, so that

90 per cent, who were not paupers, became disqualified by the law in force from exercising the franchise. That was a great injustice to those persons; and now that public attention had been drawn to the subject, the prejudice against going into hospitals would be greatly increased; and as there would be more difficulty in dealing with these diseases by the sanitary authorities, it was proposed by the Bill to put them, as he had stated, upon the same footing as public vaccination. Another body—namely, the medical officers of Vestries—had taken the matter up strongly. They said that the proposition was a reasonable one, so far as the Metropolis was concerned. This was not an instance in which the danger of pauperizing by relief arose, for there was no fear of people becoming purposely affected by these diseases in order that they might receive medical relief. The Bill was confined to those diseases which might spread and become a public danger; and therefore there was a reason for inducing patients to go into a hospital. It had been suggested that instead of allowing these patients to go into the general hospitals already provided other hospitals should be provided at the expense of the parishes, and be placed under the control of the sanitary authorities, and that the going into those hospitals should not disqualify any person from the exercise of the franchise; but to provide fresh hospitals would inflict upon the community a very large and unnecessary expense, and perhaps for only temporary purposes. Such a course would be oppressive in ordinary parishes, though it might not be felt in large towns or in the Metropolis. Others said that persons who went into the hospitals for these diseases should be re-instated in their rights upon repaying the expenses of being treated there; but that was not a reasonable proposition, nor, indeed, would it be practicable to carry it out. He could not help thinking that it would be very hard, as had been sometimes suggested, that poor men, whose wages were perhaps not more than 20*s*. a-week, should be called upon to repay the cost of the maintenance of their children during their treatment in public institutions. Rather than agree to such an arrangement many poor men with children suffering from contagious or infectious diseases would run the risk of keeping them at home, and he contended that as the sufferers were removed to an hospital for the public safety the public ought to bear the burden. He trusted, in concluding, that the House would give approval to the principle of the Bill, of which he would now move the second reading.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."—(*Mr. Rathbone.*)

MR. GREGORY said, if the Bill received a second reading it would require to be dealt with with considerable care in Committee. As he understood it, the Bill provided that a voter should not be disqualified because he, for the public benefit, was compelled to go into the hospital or other place provided for contagious diseases. But they must take care that the Bill was confined to the object for which it was intended, and it appeared to him the Bill, as it stood, would go somewhat beyond that. It was a virtual alteration of the Representation of the People Act, and they must see that it did not affect the disqualification inflicted by the receipt of ordinary parochial relief. They must take care to mark the exceptions, and separate them from the receipt of parish relief. They should confine the Bill to the case of an individual or a family sent into one of these places for the benefit of the public and for the purpose of preventing contagion and the spread of the disease. That he took to be the intention of the Bill, and it was a fair and legitimate object, and one which met with his approval.

MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY said, he thought the suggestion just made by the hon. Member (Mr. Gregory), as to the safeguards to be attached to the Bill, were worthy of consideration. If poor persons receiving parochial relief—that was, relief other than that contemplated by the Bill— should be retained on the franchise, it would undoubtedly be an abuse, but, subject to that suggestion, he thought the Bill deserved to be read a second time. In Ireland the Bill would be a very great advantage, and would not alone prevent persons who received such medical relief from being excluded from the franchise, but it would be an inducement to them to co-operate with the sanitary authorities, and so lead to the prevention of the spread of disease. In the City which he represented (Limerick) they had adopted economical measures somewhat similar to those suggested by the hon. Member for Liverpool (Mr. Rathbone). They had been obliged to withdraw assistance from the various hospitals in the city, and they had brought round them various institutions to meet those contagious diseases and prevent their spread among the poorer classes. It often happened that a tradesman, or one of his family, who would never have sought relief under ordinary circumstances, went into the Union fever hospital or small-pox hospital, and remained there until the disease had been removed and all dread of contagion had disappeared. It was quite evident that in the case of such a man it would be a very great hardship, and an unnecessary stigma, to deprive him of his civil rights because he had gone to such a hospital to obtain relief. It was not merely from a civil point of view that he thought the Bill desirable. He considered it was necessary in order to remove a stigma which attached now to occasional relief at the expense of the rates. Under the present circumstances, they found it very difficult to get poor people affected with those diseases to avail themselves of relief from the rates, and the medical relief got in poorhouses; but if the Legislature came forward and said that no disgrace attached—that there should be no deprivation of civil rights in connection with such medical relief as that—the difficulty would be greatly reduced. Therefore, both on the ground of constitutional fairness and sanitary disciplinary administration, he hoped that the Bill, guarded by the suggestion made by the hon. Member opposite, would deserve the support of the House.

Mr. MARTEN said, he thought the subject one of great importance, and well deserving the attention of the House; but he must call attention to the fact that the Bill was only delivered to hon. Members on Thursday, and that there had not, therefore, been time to communicate with the different persons throughout the country who were best qualified to express an opinion on the proposal contained in it. [Mr. Rathbone said the Bill was the same as that of last Session.] Last Session the Bill was not publicly discussed, and just now public attention was absorbed by foreign affairs, and had not, therefore, been so fully directed to this Bill as would otherwise have been the case. Previous to the Reform Act of 1832 parochial relief given on an outbreak of cholera or small-pox or an unforeseen accident did not disqualify. The old law thus recognized cases of emergency as exceptions to the general rule. In modern legislation exceptions had been established on the principle that the subject should be manifestly one involving the public benefit, and should be one of compulsory legislation. The Compulsory Vaccination Act of 1867, and the Education Act of 1870, proceeded on this basis. He would also point out that the Bill did not appear to fit in with the Public Health Act of 1875. That Act contained provisions respecting Infectious Diseases and Hospitals, and the prevention of epidemic diseases. The Bill extended to contagious diseases, and should be limited in this respect. Where there was compulsory action by local sanitary authorities for the general public benefit—as in the case of education and vaccination—there might be fair grounds for considering that exceptions should be made, but the present Bill seemed to have been drawn without much regard to this principle. There was great danger that if they adopted the Bill as it was they would do more than they intended, and thus lead to mischief. He thought a fair ground for exception from the disqualification of voters that was the consequence of parochial relief would be made out in the case of persons who were medically treated by the parish authorities for the protection of the public. It was, however, desirable that the Bill should not go beyond that; and therefore, although he was not prepared to support the Bill as it stood, he was ready to give his assent to its second reading, on the understanding that it should be amended by the introduction of certain safeguards into it in Committee. If the Bill was designed simply to extend exceptions already recognized by the law in regard to disqualifications, he should not be disposed to give it any opposition even in Committee. The Bill should, however, be amended, so as to make it applicable to the municipal franchise as well as to the Parliamentary franchise. The object of recent legislation had been to assimilate the Parliamentary and municipal franchise in boroughs, and it would be very undesirable to introduce a new element of difference between them. If the Bill were read a second time, he thought it would be desirable to postpone the Committee for a considerable time — say until March—in order that opportunity might be given to ascertain some local opinions, which would be of great value on this subject.

MR. RITCHIE thought it was most desirable, from every point of view, that the disqualification should be removed. He therefore gave the measure his most cordial support; and while he agreed that it was desirable that safeguards against abuse might with advantage be introduced into it, he hoped that no Amendments would be made upon it of a nature to make it inoperative. The real object of the Bill was to prevent the spread of infectious diseases. He thought it was even more important to prevent people who already had disease from spreading it than it was to insist upon vaccination. In the case of public vaccination, which was paid for out of the rates, no disqualification was the consequence; while as the law at present stood there was a disqualification in the other case. The Bill was introduced last Session, and the question had received a great deal of consideration in the country, in consequence of some recent decisions of the Revising Barristers. He therefore would not advise his hon. Friend to put off the Committee till the period suggested by his hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Marten).

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE said, that as his hon. Friend (Mr. Rathbone) could not speak a second time, he would say, on his behalf, that he would confer with hon. Members who had stated their views in favour of the principle of the Bill, but advocated certain Amendments in its details, and the Committee could be postponed. He would suggest that the Committee should be put for Monday, in order that, in the meantime, the question as to the time for discussing the Bill in Committee might be considered.

MR. WATNEY thought the Bill was too wide in its scope. He objected to out-patients being included in its operation, and should move an Amendment in Committee with a view to their exclusion. He would also suggest that it might be fair to ask people who had been treated in hospitals to contribute a sum towards the expense of their treatment.

MR. SALT said, that hon. Members on all sides would sympathize with the motives which had led to the introduction of the Bill, for he thought there was a general agreement that cases of infectious disease should be carefully isolated, and that poor people afflicted with infectious disorders in the crowded alleys of great towns were deserving of all kindness and consideration; but they must be careful lest they deviated from the general principles that guided the administration of the Poor Law. Those who had taken any part in the administration of the law had acted on the principle that when a man accepted relief under any circumstances he accepted the position which was entailed upon him in consequence; and it was necessary, for the good administration of the law, that principle should be jealously preserved. No doubt the Legislature had made an exception in the cases of vaccination and of education, and it might be that the exception should be extended to infectious diseases. The hon. Member for Liverpool (Mr. Rathbone) suggested that working people were afraid that in accepting relief they would lose the power of voting. The difficulty that he (Mr. Salt) had found among the working classes with regard to the matter was this—not that they feared the loss of the vote, but that they objected to their children going into a hospital, because then they could not themselves look after them. That was a natural and a kindly feeling, and one honourable to the parent's feeling, but it tended to spread disease. He did not suggest on the part of his right hon. Friend (Mr. Sclater-Booth), who was absent, any opposition to the second reading of the Bill; but, at the same time, it must be closely watched at the next stage, lest it might be so framed as to do more than was intended, and thereby do more harm than good. He was prepared to assent to the second reading of the Bill; but he must not be considered as in any way pledging his right hon. Friend the President of the Local Government Board as to the course which he would take in Committee.

Motion *agreed to.*

Bill read a second time, and *committed* for *Monday* next.

MOTIONS.

LAND TITLES AND TRANSFER.

Select Committee of last Session, "to inquire and report whether any and what steps ought to be taken to simplify the Title to Land, and to facilitate the transfer thereof, and to prevent frauds on purchasers and mortgagees of Land," *re-appointed*:—Committee to consist of Nineteen Members:—The Lord Advocate, Mr. Attorney General, Sir George Bowyer, The O'Conor Don, Mr. Gregory, Lord Francis Hervey, Sir Henry Jackson, Sir Harcourt Johnstone, Sir John Kennaway, Mr. Shaw Lefevre, Mr. Charles Lewis, Mr. Lowe, Mr. Alfred Marten, Mr. Patrick Martin, Mr. Ryder, Mr. Walpole, Mr. Walter, Sir Sydney Waterlow, and Mr. Osborne Morgan:—Power to send for persons, papers, and records; Five to be the quorum.

JOINT STOCK BANKS (AUDITING OF ACCOUNTS) (SCOTLAND) BILL.

On Motion of Mr. M'Laren, Bill for the better Auditing of the Books and Accounts of the Chartered and other Joint Stock Banks in Scotland, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. M'Laren, Sir Alexander Gordon, Sir George Balfour, and Mr. Whitwell.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 58.]

BANKRUPTCY (SCOTLAND) BILL.

On Motion of Dr. Cameron, Bill to assimilate the Law as to the discharge of Bankrupts in Scotland to that of England, *ordered* to be brought in by Dr. Cameron, Mr. Baxter, Mr. Mackintosh, Mr. M'Laren, and Mr. Ramsay.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 59.]

PRENUPTIAL CONTRACTS BILL.

On Motion of Mr. O'Shaughnessy, Bill to enable persons about to marry to make valid and binding Agreements with regard to the bringing up of their Children, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. O'Shaughnessy, Mr. Courtney, Mr. Sullivan, and Mr. Joseph Cowen.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 60.]

House adjourned at Two o'clock.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Thursday, 12th December, 1878.

MINUTES.]—New Member Sworn—George Courtauld, esquire, *for* Maldon.

Public Bills—*Ordered—First Reading*—Public Health Act (1875) Amendment (Interments)* [61]; Medical Appointments Qualification* [62].

QUESTIONS.

AFGHANISTAN—THE RUSSIAN ENVOY AT CABUL.—QUESTION.

Sir WILLIAM HARCOURT: I beg to give Notice that to-morrow I shall ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer Whether, when he stated the other day that the Russian Envoy had left Cabul, he intended that the Russian Mission had left Afghanistan; and, if he can inform the House as to the state of the case as to the Russian Mission in Afghanistan, and whether it still remains there or not?

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: Sir, I may be allowed at once to answer that Question. At the time that I gave that Answer I gave it according to the information which we then possessed. I understood — the Government understood—from what had passed between our Representatives and the Russian Government, that the return of the Envoy from Cabul was equivalent to the recall of the Mission; but we have received quite recently—since this debate commenced—information which leads us to form an opposite conclusion. I can assure the House that it may be quite certain the Government will not acquiesce—and does not intend to acquiesce—in the exercise of Russian influence in Afghanistan in that or any other form.

ARMY—THE ARMY MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.—QUESTIONS.

Mr. LYON PLAYFAIR asked the Secretary of State for War, Whether it is true that the Committee of the War Office on the Army Medical Department has recommended that open competition for appointments of Medical Officers should be discontinued, and a system of nomination be substituted; and, if so, whether he will lay the Report of the Committee, and the reply thereto of the Board of Examiners, upon the Table of the House, before any action is taken by Royal Warrant to carry out such recommendation?

Mr. ERRINGTON asked the Secretary of State for War, Whether he will lay upon the Table a Copy of the Report of the Committee appointed by Lord Cranbrook to inquire into the causes of the insufficient supply of eligible

Candidates for the Army Medical Service, together with the evidence taken?

COLONEL STANLEY, in reply, said, it was true that the Committee referred to had recommended that open competition, to the extent of one-half, for appointments of medical officers should be discontinued, and that a system of nomination should be substituted. Each nomination was to be, however, from the Medical School. He had no objection to lay the Report upon the Table; but with regard to the reply of the Board of Examiners, though in the concluding paragraph they requested publicity to be given to it, it was somewhat contradictorily marked "confidential." He would therefore have to communicate with them on the subject; but there was no doubt that it would be laid on the Table.

RAILWAYS—RAILWAY BRAKES.

QUESTIONS.

MR. BAXTER asked the President of the Board of Trade, If it is true that the majority of railway carriages fitted with brakes during the year 1878 were supplied with brakes which do not comply with the conditions stated by the Board in August 1877 to be essential to safety, and embodied in the recent Act of Parliament; and, if so, if he will adopt measures with a view of discouraging useless expenditure upon brakes which have been condemned, and of compelling the Railway Companies to take the necessary steps for the prevention of serious danger to the public?

MR. D. TAYLOR asked the President of the Board of Trade, If all the Railway Companies have complied with the requirements of the Board of Trade as regards the use of continuous brakes as specified in their Circular of 30th August 1877; and, if not, if he has reason to believe the Railway Companies are taking active measures to carry them into effect?

MR. J. G. TALBOT: Sir, perhaps the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Montrose and the hon. Member for Coleraine will allow me to give one Answer to their two Questions. All the information the Board of Trade has with regard to continuous brakes is contained in the Returns with regard to that matter which have recently been laid before the House. From those Returns it appears that "The majority of railway carriages fitted with brakes during the year 1878 were supplied with brakes which do not comply with the conditions stated by the Board in August, 1877, to be essential to safety," and, consequently, that "all the Railway Companies have not complied with the requirements of the Board of Trade as regards the use of continuous brakes;" and, further, that the Board of Trade have no "reason to believe that the Railway Companies are taking active measures to carry those conditions into effect." It is, however, only fair to mention that one Company has entirely, and others have partially, adopted brakes which comply with the conditions laid down by the Board of Trade. I greatly regret not to be in a position to report a more satisfactory state of things. The matter is one of very serious importance, and we are now considering how it can best be met. When the House meets after the Christmas Recess further Returns on this subject will be laid before them, as required by the Continuous Brakes Act of last Session, and we will not fail to give to Parliament as early an intimation as we can of the course which we propose to adopt.

MR. BAXTER gave Notice that he should renew his Question as soon as the House met after the Christmas Recess.

AFGHANISTAN — COST OF MILITARY OPERATIONS.—QUESTION.

SIR HENRY HAVELOCK asked the Under Secretary of State for India, If any estimate has yet been framed of the cost per month, or for any other period, of the measures taken in India for carrying on the Afghan War; and, if no such estimate exists, whether he sees any objection to having one prepared and laid upon the Table of the House?

MR. E. STANHOPE: Sir, I wish to appeal to the courtesy of the hon. and gallant Member to allow me to postpone any answer to his Question until I make my Statement on Monday next, when I will give to the House all the information we possess on the subject.

INDIA—AUGMENTATION OF THE MILITARY FORCES.—QUESTION.

SIR HENRY HAVELOCK asked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether the proposed increase to the Native Army of India will include any addition to the number of British Regimental Officers; and, if not, whether he can give the House any information as to the grounds on which such decision has been arrived at; and, whether the General Commanding in Chief in India and His Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief have been consulted on the subject?

MR. E. STANHOPE: Sir the Government of India have made no recommendation for any increase of the number of English regimental officers. No opportunity has, therefore, arisen for consulting His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge on the subject. I presume that whatever decision is come to on the subject by the Governor General in India will be upon the advice of his responsible military advisers.

SOUTH AFRICA—EXPENSES OF THE WAR.—QUESTION.

MR. WHITWELL asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether he can now state what he could not state last Session, how the Government proposes to provide for the expenses that have already been incurred and which may arise out of the war in South Africa?

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, I am afraid that I cannot at present answer the most important part of the hon. Gentleman's Question, with regard to the expenses that may arise. I can add, to some extent, to the Answer which I gave last year with regard to the expenditure to the time of making up the financial estimate for the year. I informed the House that I had reason to believe that there would be an excess upon the accounts of the year 1877-8 in consequence of the war expenditure at the Cape, and I made some allowance for that amount. I am happy to say that, as far as we have gone in making up the accounts for the year 1877-8, we have reason to think that any excess that there may have been on that Vote will be fully covered, and more than covered, by saving on other Votes. Therefore, so far as the expense incurred for the financial year goes, we shall be better off than we were at the time I made that statement. With regard to the coming expenditure, I am sorry to say that the news from the Cape has been of late disturbing, and we have reason to fear that there will be considerable expenditure there; but I am not at present in a position to say what the amount of it may be, or what arrangements we shall have to make with regard to it.

MR. CHILDERS asked, If the right hon. Gentleman could give the particulars of the items on which there would be an excess?

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: No, I have not got the particulars; but it will not exceed the amount stated last Session.

POOR LAW—DEPORTATION OF IRISH POOR.—QUESTION.

MR. M'CARTHY DOWNING asked the President of the Local Government Board, Whether it is his intention to introduce in the present Session a Bill to amend the Laws regarding the removal of the destitute poor receiving relief from the poors' rates from one kingdom to another in the United Kingdom; and, whether he intends to deal with the Law of Settlement, with the view of abolishing or amending the same?

MR. SCLATER-BOOTH: Sir, in reply to the Question of the hon. Gentleman, I have to state that the subject is under the consideration of the Government; and they hope to be able to make some proposal with reference to it within the present Session, sometime after the Recess. The Resolution of last year come to by this House has been undergoing careful consideration; but there are many difficulties in the way, and these I cannot enter on. I can only repeat the promise I have already given—that the matter is under our consideration, and we will deal with it as soon as possible.

ISLAND OF CYPRUS—MR. DI CESNOLA. QUESTION.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether in October last Mr. di

Cesnola, an American citizen, was tried for an offence against Turkish law in digging up objects of antiquarian interest without a Firman, by the district Court of Larnaca in Cyprus; whether the Court was presided over by a Turkish Cadi, assisted by an English assessor; whether Mr. di Cesnola was sentenced to a fine, afterwards remitted by Sir Garnet Wolseley, and the confiscation of the objects found pronounced by the Court; whether the latter portion of the judgment was carried into effect; whether any protest was made by Mr. di Cesnola against the jurisdiction of the Court; whether Turkish sovereignty continues to exist in Cyprus; and, if so, what power there is to try foreigners, not being British subjects, in disregard of the capitulations; whether appeals from the Courts in Cyprus to Constantinople will be allowed by Her Majesty's Government; and, whether there exists any Correspondence upon the subject of jurisdiction in Cyprus?

MR. BOURKE: Mr. di Cesnola, who described himself as an American citizen, was tried, on the 23rd of October, before the Court of the Medjliss Davi at Larnaca, assisted by an English assessor. The Court was presided over by a Turkish Cadi, assisted by an English assessor. Mr. di Cesnola was sentenced to a fine, afterwards remitted by Sir Garnet Wolseley, and the confiscation of the objects found was pronounced by the Court. The latter portion of the sentence was carried into effect. Mr. di Cesnola protested against this. As to whether Turkish sovereignty continues to exist in Cyprus, I must refer the hon. Baronet to the Convention on this subject. [*Laughter.*] I hope the hon. Baronet does not think that I mean any discourtesy by that answer. [SIR CHARLES W. DILKE: No, no.] It is the best answer I can give. In regard to jurisdiction in Cyprus, I have to state that, pending arrangements which are now in progress, I hope this point will very soon be completed. Every precaution is taken to secure a fair trial to any foreigner who is charged with any offence.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT: Have negotiations been concluded?

MR. BOURKE: Arrangement is a better word. There is no negotiation going on between the Porte and Her Majesty's Government. With regard to appeals, no appeal from Cyprus to Constantinople is allowed by Her Majesty's Government. There is no Correspondence whatever with any foreign Government in regard to jurisdiction in Cyprus.

ARMY (INDIA) — OFFICERS' SICK LEAVE.—QUESTION.

MAJOR O'BEIRNE asked the Under Secretary of State for India, Under what Indian regulations Officers of the British Service, ordered to England from India on medical certificate, have to pay their own travelling expenses and expenses for conveyance of baggage from Portsmouth to London, and do not receive detention allowance whilst waiting in London till the Medical Board assembles; whereas Officers of the same Service, arriving home from any other foreign station are paid their travelling expenses from Portsmouth to London and receive detention allowance until the Medical Board assembles?

MR. E. STANHOPE: Sir, I am informed that the Government of India have never required officers coming to England on sick leave to appear before a Medical Board on arrival. Accordingly, expenses incurred by such officers under other than Indian regulations and for other than Indian regiments have not been admitted as a proper charge against Indian revenues. The War Office Regulation to which the hon. and gallant Member refers has been abolished as regards India and the Colonies.

CHINA—THE CHEFOO CONVENTION.

QUESTION.

MR. EVELYN ASHLEY asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether anything has been yet settled with regard to the 3rd clause of the 3rd section of the Chefoo Convention; and when the Papers relating to this subject will be presented to the House?

MR. BOURKE: Sir, nothing is as yet settled with regard to the clause in question. Sir Thomas Wade is visiting India on his way to Pekin to confer with the Viceroy on the subject, and it is hoped the Convention will soon be completed. Further Papers will be laid on the Table when a final arrangement has been arrived at.

PEACE PRESERVATION (IRELAND) ACT, 1875—DONEGAL.—QUESTION.

Mr. O'DONNELL asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Whether the districts of Donegal proclaimed under the Coercion Acts (Ireland) on the occasion of the murder of the late Earl of Leitrim are still proclaimed districts?

Mr. J. LOWTHER: Sir, the districts referred to by the hon. Member were placed, by Order of Council, dated April last, under proclamation, and that Order still remains in force.

Mr. O'DONNELL: Then, Sir, I beg to give Notice that I shall call attention to the matter on going into Committee of Supply.

THE RAILWAY COMMISSIONERS—LEGISLATION.—QUESTION.

Mr. A. MILLS asked the President of the Board of Trade, Whether it is the intention of the Government to introduce any Bill continuing the powers of the Railway Commissioners, which will otherwise expire in August next?

Mr. J. G. TALBOT: Sir, it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to introduce the Bill referred to by the hon. Member.

ORDER OF THE DAY.

THE ADDRESS IN ANSWER TO THE QUEEN'S SPEECH.

ADDRESS REPORTED. AMENDMENT (MR. WHITBREAD).

ADJOURNED DEBATE. [THIRD NIGHT.]

Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Amendment proposed to Question [9th December], "That the said Address be now read a second time."

And which Amendment was,

To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "this House disapproves the conduct of Her Majesty's Government which has resulted in the War with Afghanistan,"—(*Mr. Whitbread,*)

—instead thereof.

Question again proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

Debate *resumed.*

Mr. GRANT DUFF: There is a passage in Holy Writ which the learned now tell us is mistranslated in our version, but which has passed into current use in the form in which it there appears — "O that mine adversary had written a book!" If, Sir, there are any nations which wish us ill—if, above all, it be true, as some appear to believe, that there is a great nation lying between Asia and Europe whose statesmen spend their time in little else than in scheming against us—those nations, or that nation, need not say — "O that mine, or our, adversary had written a book." We have written a book, and written one with a vengeance. Some such reflections, I think, must have occurred to the mind of most people who have read the astonishing document which the India Office put forth a fortnight ago, for seldom, I suppose, has there been seen so wonderful a revelation. There stand for all eyes to see those astounding Instructions with regard to sending a special Mission to Cabul which Lord Salisbury gave to Lord Northbrook; there stands Lord Northbrook's reply, which it can hardly have been agreeable to receive; there stand, in page after page, proofs of the painful truth that the Rulers of this great civilized people whose fathers conquered India, who advanced our outposts in that country during the military service of one single man over 1,000 miles of fertile territory, are now trembling because a Power 100 years behind us in civilization and strength is humbly following our example amidst deserts and oases. There stands, amongst many other strange things, the account of that Conference at Peshawur between the Envoy of the Viceroy and the Envoy of the Ameer, which reads like a scene in a comedy. Would to God it had not been the prologue to a tragedy! This Blue Book, or Drab Book rather—strange colour for a volume so redolent of war — contains, as I have said, many strange things. There are two things, however, for which we search its pages in vain. The first is an explanation of the reasons why the policy to which statesmen on both sides of politics were so deeply committed from 1868 to a very recent period has been so completely thrown aside; and the second what it is proposed to effect by the new policy. As no light is cast upon these most important points by this large and interesting mass of Papers, it is all the more satisfactory that we have in this House the statesman who having, as Secretary of State for India, introduced the policy with respect to Afghanistan which we took up and followed when in Office, has, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, felt himself obliged to give up that policy and adopt a new one. A living authority when we can get it is better than the letter of any Book—blue, or other—and the right hon. Gentleman can, if he so pleases, sweep away by a short statement all our doubts and many of our difficulties. I will endeavour, accordingly, to make as clear as possible what we desire to know from his lips. Before, however, I do this I should like to advert to some of the remarks which fell from the noble Lord the Vice President of the Committee of Council and the Under Secretary of State for India. The noble Lord told us "that the policy of masterly inactivity had one great merit. It was a safe policy; but in every other sense it was absolutely unworthy of a great civilized Power." In that phrase I recognize a thought which I believe to be much in the mind of the Viceroy, as to whom I take this opportunity of saying, that in spite of all that has occurred in connection with this disastrous Frontier business, I think there is a great deal of truth in the account which the noble Lord gave of him. Others have been more to blame than he in this matter—others who, happily, are nearer at hand, and whom we can attack with the satisfaction of feeling that they can have their say in return—although he, too, set by them on a wrong road—has latterly been misled by the magic of his own misconceptions. But as to the thought itself, I think it is a mistaken one. The whole thing is a question of relative duties. Shall I be thought very parochially minded if I say that these people are not in our parish? India is, after all, only a corner of the great British Parish, and it contains 250,000,000, for whom we are doubtless doing much, if we look at it from the point of view of our numbers and position on the earth's surface, but on whom, after all, we are producing very moderate results. Is it, then, wise to enter upon a course of policy which is but too likely to end in landing us with the additional responsibility of what a friend of mine epigramatically described the other day as "Four Switzerlands inhabited by savages?" The noble Lord further explained that the reason why we desired to have an independent and friendly Power in Afghanistan was that Afghanistan had a Frontier from which, at any moment, "the Natives could invade or make a raid on India." Well, if that is so, all I can say is that I trust not 24 hours will pass before the India Office telegraphs to Lord Lytton to wind up the Indian Empire and come home. Talk of British India being invaded by the Afghans! Talk of England being conquered by the gipsies! To base a policy on a dream like that is, indeed, strange. But the noble Lord went on to quote Lord Lawrence's account of the plundering propensities of the Afghans. Who doubts them? I do not mean to say that they would not be too glad to invade India if they could, and I dare say the gipsies would be very glad to conquer England. We want the Afghan Ruler to be strong, because we want from him, as I have said before, "that kind of indirect assistance which a civilized Government must always derive from being known to exercise a pacifying and semi-civilizing influence around its own borders." But as for fearing the Afghans, I cannot understand what it means. Has it come to this, Sir? Has the shadow gone back upon the dial? Are we really not living in the year 1878, under the auspicious reign of Lord Beaconsfield and a Government which loves a spirited foreign policy? Are we afraid even of the Afghans? Is this not 1878 but 1761? Is Ahmed Shah, and not Shere Ali, on the Throne of Afghanistan? and we, are we like the last great ruling race which preceded us in India, about to suffer a crushing defeat at the hands of the Afghans? What! am I to be told that when our troops have to meet this Afghan invasion, they will advance to do so as the Mahrattas are said by a historian of those times to have advanced at Paniput, with "every symptom of hopeless despair, rather than that of steady resolution?" Would "everything in our host bespeak the despondency of sacrifice prepared rather than the courage of victory determined?" And when the fight was over, would our commander have to write a letter to the Viceroy like that one which the Mahratta commander wrote to the Peishwa, and which broke his heart, as well it might, Sir, for it conveyed in figurative Oriental language only too true an impression of agonizing and intolerable disaster? Is that what is feared by this Government, which talks so much of a spirited foreign policy? India, as the noble Lord told us, has been often invaded from beyond the Passes. Doubtless it has, and England has been often invaded by the Norwegians and Danes. Are we afraid of the Norwegians and the Danes now? There are real dangers enough in India without inventing new ones. Did the noble Lord ever hear the Mahratta saying—"If each of us only threw a single clod of earth, we could overwhelm the white faces." Of course, they could; but did this prevent our taking fort after fort, each a sort of inland Gibraltar, and making the Mahratta country in no long time as quiet as Buckinghamshire or Kent? But we are told that a few Russian officers and a little money can do all sorts of dreadful things against us in Afghanistan. Supposing they could. Our policy is to keep them out of Afghanistan. Of course, if we went to war with Russia, we could not prevent her sending officers and money to Afghanistan, or anywhere else she could; but as long as we are at peace with Russia, we have a right to hold Russia to her engagements, one of which is to consider Afghanistan as wholly beyond her sphere of action. I am not hostile to Russia, but friendly to her, as long as she keeps her engagements, as a civilized Power should; but if she really sent into Afghanistan those European officers and that money of which the noble Lord speaks, I, for one, would desire to see it made a *casus belli.* I have ever been against fidgetty interference with the advance of Russia; but I have always maintained that we must draw a line at Afghanistan. Southern Central Asia is her affair—not to annex, if she be wise, but to influence; Afghanistan is our affair, not to annex, if we be wise, but to influence. There were a number of other things in the noble Lord's very interesting speech, as to which I shall state my views later, incidentally. I pass now to the speech of the hon. Gentleman who represents the India Office (Mr. E. Stanhope), to whom I should like to say that, although we are at the opposite poles of opinion about this particular matter—which is, indeed, not an Indian matter, but a broad question of Imperial policy—I shall hope usually to be able to give on purely Indian matters the kind of support which the right hon. Gentleman who now leads the House gave to me, and which I tried to give to the noble Lord, as he so gracefully acknowledged the other night. The hon. Gentleman, with more courage, I think, than discretion, attacked Lord Northbrook for his disregard of the orders of the Home Government. That, Sir, was a manifest afterthought, the offspring of disappointment at the course Lord Northbrook has seen it his duty to take in this business. If it was not an afterthought, why did the Government make Lord Northbrook an Earl? A Viceroy who disobeys the Secretary of State is criminally responsible. Bad as the consciences of right hon. Gentlemen may be, they cannot think that being raised two steps in the Peerage by them is equivalent to a prosecution. But if Lord Northbrook was so guilty, why did the noble Lord who represented India on August 9, 1877, defend him in a manner so honourable to both parties? Then the Under Secretary of State complained of the mist of conditions and doubts in which, as he said, Lord Northbrook wrapped up his assurances to the Ameer. Would he, then, have wished that the assurances should have been unconditional? If so, he is in conflict with Lord Cranbrook, who expressly says that it was clearly impossible to make them unconditional. But perhaps he does not object to the assurances being conditional, but would have put conditional assurances in somewhat different words? If so, why did the Government which he represents never give a hint to Lord Northbrook that it would have preferred different words? Why did Lord Salisbury fail to authorize the Government of India, all the time Lord Northbrook remained at the head of it, to make any new concession to Shere Ali—new either in form or in wording? Is not this attack on Lord Northbrook equally good as an attack on Lord Salisbury? Then the hon. Member attacked Mr. Seton-Karr, and pooh-poohed his evidence about what went on at Umballa with respect to having British Agents in Afghanistan, Well, Sir, who is Mr. Seton-Karr? Mr. Seton-Karr is a gentleman who has been distinguished from the very beginning of his life, as all readers of Stanley's *Life of Arnold* know. After a long and successful Indian career, he found himself in 1869 Foreign Secretary. Through him went every single communication between Lord Mayo and Shere Ali which was of any real importance, and his evidence is, that Shere Ali and his people would not tolerate the idea of having British Agents in Afghanistan. Now, what do the Government set up against the evidence of Mr. Seton-Karr, who is, by the way, a strong Conservative, and has, in consequence, no bias in favour of our views? Why, chiefly the authority of Captain Grey, his own subordinate, and they make such reckless use of Captain Grey's evidence, that they quote him as an authority for what passed at an interview at which he was not even present. Then they press into the service a paragraph from a despatch of Lord Northbrook's Government, which runs as follows:—

> "On the whole, however, we think that either the Ameer himself or his Minister Noor Mahomed Shah, did in confidential communications with Captain Grey express a readiness to accept at some future time not far distant the presence of British Agents at places in Afghanistan, excepting Cabul itself."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 131.]

But they take precious good care not to quote the final conclusion of Lord Northbrook and his Government, which will be found at page 132, paragraph 20—

> "Looking to all the circumstances of the case, the absence of any formal record of the alleged admission, its entirely private and confidential nature, and the uncertainty as to its scope and intention, we consider that we should not be justified in founding any representation to the Ameer regarding the Mission of a British Agent to Herat upon the assumption that he had, when at Umballa, expressed his willingness to agree to such an arrangement."—[*Ibid.* p. 132.]

But what will hon. Members say when I tell them that Lord Northbrook authorizes me to mention that if, previous to sending that despatch he had been able to consult Mr. Seton-Karr, who was in England, and not in India, he would have considered his evidence as absolutely conclusive. That carries the matter a long way, but I can carry it further; for I am permitted to read an extract from a private letter from Lord Mayo to the Duke of Argyll, which absolutely settles the question. On June 3, 1869, Lord Mayo writes—

> "The only pledges given were that we would not interfere in his affairs; that we would support his independence; 'that we would not force European officers upon him.'"

Now, any hon. Member who re-opens this question, of which so much has been made in this controversy, simply asserts that Lord Mayo deceived his official Chief—which no one will, I think, venture to do. I was led to these remarks by speaking of Mr. Seton-Karr; but Mr. Seton-Karr is not the only distinguished Indian who has been hardly treated by eminent persons during this controversy. Lord Lawrence has fared even worse, and the name of Lord Lawrence is too closely associated with some of the most stirring Indian memories for one who has represented the Indian Government in this House to hear him attacked without pain. In a great foreign city takes place a ceremony which I have never had the good fortune to see, though I know the place well, but which some who hear me may have been fortunate enough to have seen. Year by year the garrison of Seville marches into the great Cathedral, and lowers the colours to the tomb of St. Ferdinand; the King who took the city from the Moors six centuries and more ago. Sir, I think that, at least as long as he lives, Members of both Houses of Parliament would consult their self-respect if, when speaking of the North-West Frontier, they were to lower—observe, I do not say to strike—their colours to John Lawrence of the Punjaub. Are great men so abundant in this age of ours that the son of a great man should speak of one of our not too numerous great men, as the right hon. Member for Tamworth (Sir Robert Peel) did the other night? Great men come only, Sir, at distant intervals, for opportunity must unite with Native force to make men great. Just look at some of our families most favoured by fortune. Take the Cecils. In the Elizabethan age there were two Cecils, one or possibly both of whom, at least as seen through the dimness of history, may fairly be called great. Well nigh 300 years have passed away before another Cecil has appeared who has risen sufficiently high on the ladder of success to have a chance of attaining even that sinister, that ill-omened greatness which comes from involving your country in grave calamity. Then an attempt was made to show that Shere Ali began to waver in his dependence on the British before Lord Lytton arrived in India. Had Lord Northbrook's policy been continued by his successor, I believe Shere Ali's ill humour would never have turned into anything like hesitation about the value of our alliance. But had not Shere Ali's uneasiness a good cause? Did the Under Secretary of State ever hear of a book called *England and Russia in the East*, and does he know by whom that most interesting book was written? That book was written by a Member of the Secretary of State's Council, Sir Henry Rawlinson. That book is full of most valuable things; but that book contains some passages which well might have frightened Shere Ali out of his senses. Well, that book, or parts of that book, are known to have been translated and to have reached his hand. I deeply regretted that that most valuable work was not weeded of some passages which could not fail to do mischief. I said so at the time, and I had some controversy with Sir Henry Rawlinson about it. I owe him, however, an apology, and I will make it. Trusting to the assurances given by the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir Stafford Northcote) in 1873, and by Lord Derby in 1874, I believed that Sir Henry Rawlinson's book was to be blamed, as giving a view of English policy different from that of the Government. I now see that I was mistaken, and that Sir Henry Rawlinson, although writing under his own responsibility, spoke the secret mind of his official Chief; but, I still think as I thought, that passages in that book are most deeply to be regretted. I should be sorry to be misunderstood. I think Sir Henry Rawlinson's writings are of the greatest value. I have been in the habit of reading them for years with the keenest interest; but Sir Henry Rawlinson is like fire, an excellent servant—a bad master. The right hon. Gentleman made him a Member of the Indian Council, and acted most wisely in so doing. But did the right hon. Gentleman follow Sir Henry Rawlinson's advice about Central Asia? No, Sir; he knew better. What did he do? He took Sir Henry's Memorandum of 1868 and sent it out to India, thereby eliciting from Sir John Lawrence and his Council, by way of criticism and objection to that document, one of the most valuable sets of State Papers ever laid before the British public. The Duke of Argyll succeeded the right hon. Gentleman. He, too, valued Sir Henry Rawlinson, and found him most useful. But did he follow Sir Henry's advice in Central Asia? No, Sir; he knew better. Time passed, however, and another Secretary of State ruled where the Duke of Argyll and the right hon. Gentleman had ruled. Then was seen a *pendant* to the old story of the magician and his apprentice. The right hon. Gentleman was an accomplished magician. He could raise his familiar spirit, make it do his bidding, and then lay it again. Not so the apprentice. Not so Lord Salisbury. He could raise the familiar spirit, and make it do his bidding for a while, but he could not lay it again. The familiar spirit was the stronger of the two, and imposed its will. Then the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State told us that no ordinary human being could understand the telegram which the Duke of Argyll sent to Lord Northbrook about Afghan affairs in 1873. Well, Sir, Lord Northbrook, to whom it was sent, understood the telegram, and acted on it. What more would the hon. Gentleman have? It has further been made a matter of complaint that the Duke of Argyll did not embody his views as to the affairs of Afghanistan in a formal despatch to Lord Northbrook in 1873. Why should he have done so? He had no new policy to announce. He found a very sensible policy in operation when he arrived at the India Office—the policy of the right hon. Gentleman opposite. He held to that policy, never varying it in any one particular. Long before 1873, it had become, as he considered a "settled policy," past all discussion, so far as he was concerned. Had anyone called his policy in question in "another place" he would have been ready to defend it. He is not particularly slow in defending himself—rather likes, I should say, a free fight of an argumentative kind. When his policy was criticized in this House, I had his orders to defend it, and did so to the best of my ability. Whether I did so successfully or not is another question; but at least, neither in 1869 nor in 1873 did I leave in any doubt what his policy as to Afghanistan or the Russian advance in Asia really was. If those who called it in question thought they could have got any considerable minority of hon. Members to agree with them, I suppose they would have tried their luck in a division; but they knew that they would have had not only the then Government to fight, but all those Members on the other side who could be influenced by the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who spoke on our side in both debates. And now, Sir, I turn from the noble Lord and the Under Secretary of State, to the great living authority to which I alluded some time ago. The right hon. Gentleman who now leads the House was Secretary of State for India when Sir John Lawrence came to the conclusion that Shere Ali was really the person whom the bulk of the Afghan people desired to support; and, when he determined, in consequence, to give material aid to that Prince, that step had the full support of the right hon. Gentleman, just as Lord Lawrence's previous policy—a policy absolutely commanded by our Treaty engagements, and advised by Dost Mahomed, of refusing to take a side as long as the issue of the civil war in Afghanistan remained doubtful—had also his full support. What I may call Sir John Lawrence's second policy remained the policy of successive Viceroys up to the time of Lord Northbrook's retirement. There was not one jot nor one tittle of difference between the Afghan policy pursued by Lord Lawrence at the end of his career, by Lord Mayo, and by his successor. All three assisted the Ameer, all three gave him to understand that, as long as he conducted himself reasonably, he might rely upon our friendship; but not one of them was rash enough to give him the guarantees for which he constantly showed himself anxious. More than once, as I have said, the affairs of Afghanistan were before this House during the Vice-Royalties of Lord Mayo and Lord Northbrook, and the views which commended themselves to Her Majesty's then Advisers, and which were identical with those which he had held when in office, received the support of the right hon. Gentleman. Now, however, we find the right hon. Gentleman supporting a totally different policy, and what I want to discover are the reasons which have led the right hon. Gentleman to change his opinion. It may be that when we have heard his explanations we, too, shall be convinced. It will not be enough to say vaguely that circumstances have changed. How have they changed? It will be replied that Shere Ali has shown himself in less good humour with this country than he was at various periods since 1868—say, for instance, at the time of the death of Lord Mayo. Well, but I presume that the right hon. Gentleman when he sanctioned Lord Lawrence's later policy did so with his eyes open. If so, he knew two things; first, that Shere Ali, though a man of natural ability, was a moody barbarian, with a dash of something very like insanity; secondly, that Afghans surpass the rest of the world in their addiction to the common practice of giving too little and asking too much. He must then have foreseen the inevitable. He must have foreseen that the course of true love between Calcutta and Cabul would not run smooth; that Shere Ali would want more than he got, and would, from time to time, be very cross indeed with us. If he did not foresee this, then the policy which he inaugurated was wrong, and Mr. John Wyllie, the highly-gifted man, whose chance expression in an article in *The Edinburgh Review*—the expression, I mean "masterly inactivity"—has become one of the winged words of our generation, was right, in clinging to Lord Lawrence's first Afghan policy, and in censuring both the right hon. Gentleman and us. Up to Lord Lytton's taking charge of the Government, there was nothing whatever in Shere Ali's bearing to this country which might not have been expected by those who had studied his character. We had recognized his rights in the North to all the Dominions which had belonged to his father, from Wood's Lake along the Northern Oxus, and so right down the main stream to Khodja-Saleh; but we had not, in order to oblige him, done injustice to another of our Allies, the Persian Monarchy, nor would we give him guarantees, which would have been agreeable, but also it is but too probable fatal to him. Why would they have been probably fatal to him? Because, if we had given them the guarantees which he wished, the result in all likelihood would have been, first, that he would have embroiled himself with his neighbours; and, secondly, that he would have ruled so harshly at home as to cause the civil war to break out again. Take the case of Seistan. Will anyone tell me that if Shere Ali had thought he could reckon upon us to the uttermost, he would have allowed that question to be settled without a war? And what should we have gained by backing him in committing a wrong against Persia? Then as to his home government. Who that knows how influenced is the Court of Cabul by the lowest and worst kind of intrigues, would have thought it wise to go further than Lord Mayo did in his general assurances of goodwill with respect to Shere Ali's internal administration? Would it have been pleasant to have found ourselves engaged to support the side of one of the parties in a raging civil war, perhaps against the wishes of the bulk of the people? Supposing, for instance, we had guaranteed the succession of Abdoollah Jan, as Shere Ali wished us to do, and that that unhappy youth had lived, but that the bulk of the Afghan people had declared for Yakoob Khan, or some one else, would that have been pleasant? The world moves fast, and we forget the history of yesterday; but let anyone look back to Mr. John Wyllie's article, now re-published, on the old civil war, and see in what a pleasant predicament we might have found ourselves. All these considerations, I think, must have been present in outline to the mind of the right hon. Gentleman when he sanctioned Lord Lawrence's second policy; and, if so, the state into which Shere Ali was thrown when he wanted us to give everything he asked, while refusing to give anything soever in return, must have appeared perfectly natural. I should have expected then that the right hon. Gentleman would have exerted his influence in the Cabinet to have left things in *statu quo;* to have allowed the Ameer having got out of humour to get into it again, as he doubtless would have done, whenever the pressure of necessity made him anxious once more to receive our liberal presents of money and arms. Unfortunately, however, this course was not followed. No sooner had Lord Lytton got to India than attempts were made to open negotiations with the Ameer, and proposals were pressed upon him of a nature most disagreeable to him. Now, I want to know from the right hon. Gentleman why this course—so contrary to all that he had done and to all that he had said during a long series of years—was adopted. I think I have made it clear that there was nothing in the attitude of the Ameer himself which should not have been foreseen by the right hon. Gentleman. Had then circumstances changed elsewhere? Had the attitude of Russia become such as to require us to throw over the old policy of the right hon. Gentleman, and to adopt a new policy with regard to Afghanistan? I reply that, in 1868, when the right hon. Gentleman was at the India Office, and when he sanctioned Lord Lawrence's second policy with regard to Afghanistan, every reasonable man who studied the question—and the right hon. Gentleman, a very reasonable man, must have studied it as a matter of political duty—ought to have come to the conclusion that the advance of Russia within a few years to the point which she has now reached was quite inevitable. Any policy adopted in 1868 with regard to Afghanistan which did not keep in view that Russia would gradually, and not slowly, advance in the three Khanates was a shortsighted policy and a bad policy. If the Afghanistan policy begun by the right hon. Gentleman and continued by us was to be rendered obsolete by the advance of Russia during the last decade, then it was built upon a shifting sand, and was altogether a wrong policy. I maintain, however, that as far back as 1868 the only wise way to look at this whole matter was this—Our interests are in no way so affected by anything that Russia can do in the three Khanates as to make it worth our while to take any steps with reference to her advance there. Our interests do not become affected till she approaches Afghanistan; but with regard to Afghanistan—and especially with regard to Herat—it must be distinctly understood that we could not for a moment tolerate any hostile interference. That country we hold to be within the legitimate sphere of our influence; and under no reasonable interpretation of Russian interests can it be of the slightest advantage to Russia to interfere with its boundaries. Then if the Ameer got into a panic because the Russians succeeded in their Khivan expedition, was it the part of men of firm mind to share his panic, to change their policy with regard to him, and to begin to negotiate with a view to counteracting Russian influence at his Court? That does not seem to me to have been the part either of firm men or of men who had a proper sentiment of their own dignity. It was with St. Petersburg, and not with Cabul, that we should have negotiated—if it was necessary to do anything at all. We should have reiterated to the Ameer the assurances so repeatedly given to him, and so solemnly renewed by Lord Northbrook under orders from home; and if we had not said it sufficiently before at St. Petersburg, we should have again said there that any aggression on Afghanistan meant war with us. That position would have been intelligible and honourable, and would, I believe, have been supported by the whole people. Well, then, I think I have shown it to be extremely improbable that the right hon. Gentleman can have changed his frequently expressed policy for the reasons which I have examined. There must be some other reasons, which I cannot even guess, but which the right hon. Gentleman will, doubtless, be able to explain to us with his usual clearness. Granted, however, that the right hon. Gentleman had some good reason for changing his policy, I want to know what his new policy is? What is the Government driving at? Why are we making war? What end do we propose to attain when that war closes? Upon what do we propose to insist when we come to dictate the terms of peace? Is the war waged—as we have been told by a high authority—in order to obtain a scientific Frontier? or is it waged in order to force Shere Ali into being in all time coming an attached friend of the British Government? or is it waged because the Ministry, having by their mismanagement put themselves into the position of being slighted by Shere Ali, saw no other way of getting out of their scrape without a sacrifice of *amour propre?* or is it waged in order that in some mysterious way we may strengthen ourselves against Russia? or if for none of these, then for what other objects? First, then, as to the scientific Frontier. That opens two questions. Can we improve our present Frontier, and have we a right to improve it by going to war? As to the former of these questions, most diverse opinions are held by good authorities, My own impression, after comparing a great many different views, both at home and in India, is that, if you take political and military considerations together and balance the advantages and the disadvantages of your present position, you have got, on the whole, a very good Frontier. I do not at all mean to say that those military men are not right, who tell you that for the purpose of defending yourselves against a great and well-appointed European Army, you ought not only to have the line of hills on your Frontiers, but the open country beyond. I have no doubt, for instance, that the Balkan Frontier—which the Government so much congratulated itself upon obtaining for those unhappy Turks at the Treaty of Berlin—is a very bad Frontier; and if everything were entirely different from what it is now, if Russia were five times richer than she is, and if she were ruled by a man as able and as warlike as Napoleon I., who was determined to invade India, it might be desirable before he started on his enterprize that we should, with the assistance and goodwill of the Afghans, who would have to bear the first brunt of invasion, be holding the triangle formed by Cabul, Ghuznee, and Jelallabad, with your present Frontier for your second line. I daresay that is true enough; anyhow, I am, for purposes of argument, perfectly willing to assume it to be true. But what has such a speculation as that got to do with the present state of affairs? Does anyone, not a candidate for Bedlam, believe that the Russia of 1878 could invade India if she wished so to do? and are we now going to go to the vast expense and trouble necessary for acquiring under present circumstances that coveted triangle, because it might conceivably be useful 50 or 30 years hence? It is hardly possible to imagine that any sane men should propose to embark on such an enterprize. Well, but perhaps it is not of this large rectification of the Frontier that the Government are thinking. Are they, then, going to turn Candahar and Herat into fortresses in advance of our Frontier, as has been proposed by another high authority? If so, have they counted the cost? The advance to Quetta looks very like taking the first step toward that most unwise and dangerous policy. If they are thinking of either of these two rectifications of our Frontier, no doubt they could not obtain them, as things stand, without war. But are they thinking of something much smaller—of certain little improvements at different points of our Frontier, then, I say, probably there are some improvements that they might make; but these would be at the expense not of the Afghans, but of some of the wild tribes between us and the Afghans. There is a little district very near Peshawur which, if there were no such thing as the eighth Commandment, or if our neighbours would sell it to us, I, for one, should be delighted to see in our possession, and I daresay our Frontier officers could show a good many such places. To attack the Ameer, however, in order to obtain those coveted spots, would seem a vain labour. Many of them do not belong to him, but to the wild tribes between us and him. To beat the Afghans in order to produce an effect on them is to invite a reply in the spirit of that which the English proprietor of Irish estates made to his agent when the unhappy man wrote to say that his life was in danger—"If my tenantry expect to intimidate me by shooting you, they are much mistaken." But is it, perhaps, of none of these Frontiers that the Government is thinking, but of a fourth, a new suggestion which has been lately imported into the controversy? Well, I, for one, am anxious to hear all that can be said for that new suggestion; but it is obviously open to many of the objections I have brought forward to the others. And one word now, Sir, about this scientific Frontier. What is a scientific Frontier? The phrase is a translation from the French, and in that tongue *une frontière scientifique* means a Frontier for which Nature has done nothing, and man has been obliged to do everything. The Frontier of France towards the Low Countries, which was defended by Vauban and others, with the line of fortresses which has become so famous, is the *frontière scientifique, par excellence.* The Frontier which Nature has defended by the Pyrenees is not a *frontière scientifique.* What the Prime Minister meant when he told us that we went to war for a scientific Frontier, goodness or the opposite of goodness only knows; but what he said was, that we went to war for a Frontier which we should be obliged to defend by a costly line of fortresses, leaving in order to do this a line of Frontier which Nature had made so strong that very little expenditure would be needed on it, even if an invasion were imminent, and none at all unless invasion were imminent. Under no circumstances could this scientific Frontier be found without taking in the whole of the wild tribes, nor, so far as I can see, without going right over into the valley of the Helmund. But supposing you take in the wild tribes, the proceeding is surely a most surprising one from a military point of view; while from a civil point of view, it is just as if a beekeper should annex 10,000 wasps' nests by way of a profitable investment. Supposing, however, that there is really some "scientific Frontier" in Afghan territory which we can obtain, and against which none of the objections I have stated can be brought—some "scientific Frontier" which has not yet been explained, but which the right hon. Gentleman will explain in his reply—have we a right to obtain that scientific Frontier by war? I do not think we have, unless it is a question of necessary self-defence. If it were proved that we should not be able to continue the vast civilizing process which we are carrying on in India without obtaining this "scientific Frontier," war might, no doubt, be a justifiable though hard necessity. But then it would have been our manifest duty to have put this scientific Frontier into our Ultimatum, to have said—"This scientific Frontier is to us a matter of life or death—give us it, or we will take it." No other course is consistent, I will not say with justice to our neighbour, but with justice to ourselves. Yet we have done nothing of the kind. We have never asked for a scientific Frontier, and it has, of course, never been refused to us. But perhaps this idea that we are going to war for a scientific Frontier is all nonsense, and we are going to war to shoot and sabre Shere Ali and his people into loving us for all time to come. If that be so, I will simply observe that the method has rarely succeeded in history; and our experiences with the Afghans in time past are not encouraging as to its success now. What is it that makes it so difficult to station British officers in their country? Chiefly the bitter recollections of the last war. The men who remember that war are beginning to die out, and it was probable that with time you might have overcome inveterate prejudice and suspicion. Now, however, you deliberately revive all the old feelings. Is that in accordance with common sense? But perhaps you do not wage war for a scientific Frontier; you do not expect to beat Shere Ali into good temper; and war has been merely resorted to as the easiest way out of a humiliating position. I confess it looks to me very much as if this were the case. I am afraid that when Lord Lytton was sent out, those who gave him his instructions were thinking rather of the effect to be produced at home by playing the card of a spirited foreign policy, than of anything else. I am afraid they did not calculate upon Lord Lytton going either so far or so fast, and that vast amounts of blood and treasure are now being sacrificed to questions of *amour propre.* If so, it may possibly pay for the moment. There are a great many people who like to find, when they open their papers in the morning, that we have taken a fort over night. They do not much care where or what the fort is. Undoubtedly the feeling which was expressed by the ferryman who, having asked a passenger if there was any news, and having been told, in reply, that the Dutch had taken Holland, thoughtfully observed, as his boat touched the further shore—"Guess we must turn them out of that, Sir," is a feeling pretty widely spread in this country, but it is not the deepest feeling in the breast of our people; and those who trust to it will find that they can build upon it neither enduring power nor enduring fame. But, perhaps, I do the Government great injustice, and it really has before it some vast scheme of policy with reference to Russia, of which this Afghan War is merely the prelude. If so, what is it? Are the Russians going to be driven over the Jaxartes? I firmly believe that that would be about the best thing that could happen to them; for I hold that their Central Asian possessions will, before the account is closed with them, cost them very dear indeed, in more ways than one. For Central Asia, however, I believe that it would be a great calamity. Russia in Central Asia has committed, doubtless, sins enough, and will commit many more; but she is, on the whole, a good and not a bad influence. But perhaps the Government is not dreaming of anything of the kind; if so, what is it dreaming of, or planning for, towards what goal are we advancing? May we not hope to have not vague phrases, but a clear, intelligible, definite statement of what we are fighting for? Of course, as I have admitted, the right hon. Gentleman may have something to tell us which will put an altogether new aspect upon this matter; but, if we are fighting merely to make the Ameer sue for peace, and promise to be our loving friend in the future; or, if we are fighting to make him accept a British Embassy at Cabul and elswhere; or, if we are fighting to make him receive British officers into the towns along his Northern Frontier, and not at Cabul itself; or, if we are fighting to obtain a small rectification of our marches; or, if we are fighting in the hope that Shere Ali will be overthrown and a more pliant Ruler substituted for him, then I say that, irrespective altogether of the moral aspects of the transaction, we are buying brass with gold—we are pursuing, at vast expense and trouble, objects, some of which might be worth attainment, but none of which are worth making great sacrifices for. The Opposition has been taunted with not having a policy. It is not the business of an Opposition to find a policy; but, I presume, if we were in power, we should try to conclude the war as creditably as possible which the Government has so rashly begun, and then go back, as nearly as circumstances would permit, to the state of things when Lord Northbrook left India. The right hon. Gentleman does not wish to annex Afghanistan; of that I am sure. But what are we to think who read the following passage in a recent article of Sir Henry Rawlinson's:—

> "The master of the upper plateau of Afghanistan commanding access to the Passes from the North is, in fact, the master of India, and it was in recognition of this military necessity, and not from any lust of territory or any hope of a re-imbursement of expense, that the Delhi Kings, whose rule we have inherited, held Afghanistan for 200 years as a province of the Empire. Afghanistan, indeed, is both geographically and politically a part of India, although, since our last conquest of Cabul, in

1842, we have virtually and for our own convenience admitted the independence of the country."

It will be said that Sir Henry Rawlinson, in writing this, is merely acting as a private person, and not as the trusted adviser of the Secretary of State for India, and at this very moment the head of the Political Committee in the Indian Council. In fact, Sir Henry does say so in so many words. He said, however, precisely the same thing in his book, *England and Russia in the East*, which was, as I have pointed out, one of the most important factors—perhaps the most important factor—in throwing the Ameer into the state of discomfort and suspicion which has led at last to this unhappy war. When Sir Henry published that book, he found himself in flagrant opposition to the views repeatedly put forward here by the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer; yet it is Sir Henry's policy which has prevailed. Who shall say that his forecast will not turn out to be correct now also? If that be so, we shall only have gained a loss; we shall have brought about prematurely that meeting of the Sepoy and Cossack on the banks of the Oxus, which all wise politicians, who have studied the question, have at once foreseen and desired to postpone. It will not be necessary, even if they do meet, that they should meet as enemies; but, looking to the unjust and erroneous estimates of each others' characters which prevail in the two countries, it is but too probable, if they meet soon, that sooner or later they will engage in an armed conflict, while Asia stands by in silent amazement. If wise counsels had prevailed, it might have been that the meeting of our Frontiers would not have occurred till that weary group of East European and West Asiatic questions, which are the real cause of the estrangement between us and Russia, had been put in the way of settlement. Never were truer words spoken than some that were spoken to me in 1876 by the late Prince Tcherkasky, when he said that Central Asia was to Russia "*l'Orient de fantaisie*, while Turkey was *l'Orient serieux*." Now, however, the same Government which has upset the old arrangements between Peshawur and Samarcand has committed us, to the best of its ability, to strenuous opposition to Russia in Asia Minor. Just in so far as that opposition is successful do we increase her pressure upon us on the Oxus. If ever there was a state of circumstances which repeated trumpet-tongued to politicians the saying—"Can't you let it alone," it was that which has prevailed for many years back in the region lying between us and the outposts of Russia. An event once occurred which has not been very much noticed, but which struck Lord Ellenborough, who was Governor General at the time, very much indeed, and which may be worth mentioning. No sooner had the army which avenged our disasters in Cabul returned to India, and with all its vast train of followers put the Sutlej between it and the work which it had completed, than that mighty river came down in flood and swept away both the bridges by which it had crossed. There could hardly have been a more fitting ending for a melancholy chapter in our national history. It really almost looked as if a Higher Power had meant to give us a warning not to re-commence to play at the expense either of England or of India what was lightly and wickedly called, ere yet our first ill-fated army crossed the Frontier, the Great Game of Central Asia. I apologize, Sir, for having spoken at so much length; but there are numbers of points of the greatest interest which I have advisedly passed over. My wish has been chiefly to put a series of questions which might elicit from the right hon. Gentleman a statement as to the reasons why he has changed his old policy, together with a statement as to what he proposes to effect by the new one, and, in doing this, to indicate that unless he has some great surprises in store for us, I think he will find it difficult to convince us that the situation on our North-Western Frontier—difficult and anxious at the best of times—is likely to be improved by anything that has been done since Lord Northbrook left India. It is for the right hon. Gentleman, rather than for the Representative of the Indian Government in this House, to do this; for it cannot be too distinctly kept before the minds of hon. Members that none of the responsibility for this unhappy affair is shared by the Indian Council. The Indian Government had no more to do with the despatch of Lord Cranbrook, which let loose the dogs of war, than had anyone who read it for the first time in the newspapers, as was, doubtless, the case with many Members of that Council. Despatches about Indian affairs which have passed a Council of specialists, many of whom have been studying these affairs since boyhood, carry with them quite a different kind of authority from a despatch in which they have neither part nor lot; and to which not a few of the most experienced Members of the Council must have given the most determined opposition, had an opportunity been afforded them, unless they were to turn their backs upon some of the most important opinions they had held and expressed in a long and honourable career. It is the right hon. Gentleman and his Colleagues alone who are responsible for the blood which is now being shed. The Cabinet is quite peculiarly responsible in this matter. In 1877, attempts were made throughout all the Session to extract from the Government explanations as to what was going on on the North-West Frontier of India. We were met again and again by dilatory pleas; and when at last, on the 9th of August, I was able to bring the matter before the House, the right hon. Member assured us that "the main lines of our policy on the North-West Frontier were unchanged"—I say, Sir, that we were not met fairly in that debate. Things were kept back which should not have been kept back—it was not fair as between man and man. But what happened "elsewhere" was a great deal worse. The answer given to the Duke of Argyll prevented the two highest authorities in this country upon Indian affairs initiating a discussion which would, as I verily believe, have roused the attention of the country in time, and have prevented this war altogether. The right hon. Gentleman will not, I hope, meet us in this debate, as he did in the Quetta debate. Of course, he will tell us the truth; but he will, let us hope, tell us the whole truth. There are certain people with whom, if I were addressing them, I should have to make some stipulations as to the kind of truth. I should ask them not to give us the kind of truth which would have made Escobar's hair stand on end, not the kind of truth which is thought good enough for the Duke of Argyll. The right hon. Gentleman will give us, I am sure, the good old-fashioned English article which goes down with the House of Commons—["Hear, hear!"]—I say, Sir, the House of Commons. There was once a great historical Assembly, I forget where, but in some far-off country, I suppose, in which a Minister, having been charged with giving to an ex-Minister a reply which it is impossible to characterise in language which I dare to use in your presence, calmly replied—"If such answers are not satisfactory, you shall have no answer at all." In that great historical Assembly the Members represented themselves. The Minister does not live who would venture thus to address the Representatives of the British and the Irish people. I have the greatest respect for the Chancellor of the Exchequer; but I pity the Chancellor of the Exchequer. A Chancellor of the Exchequer must have many bad quarters of an hour who belongs to a Cabinet which is prodigal of everything except authentic information to the two Houses of Parliament. I have, as I say, the greatest respect for the Chancellor of the Exchequer for many reasons; amongst others, because I also have respect for that old-fashioned virtue, economy, and I believe the Chancellor of the Exchequer to be an economically-minded man. Yes, Sir; but let him be economical of everything except of the facts which are necessary to enable the great Council of the nation to do its duty to the people and the Crown, and convince us that we are wrong. If he does, I, for one, am ready to follow him into the Lobby. I have expressed no opinion to-night which I have not expressed again and again in this House and out of it. I do not put Party above principle. I am open to conviction of the wisdom of the Government policy; but unless the right hon. Gentleman is going to burst upon us with some entirely new revelation, I cannot conceive how any man, unless he is actuated by mere Party motives, can do otherwise than vote with my hon. Friend the Member for Bedford.

MR. BOURKE said, the hon. Member who had just sat down began his speech by making an announcement they were all glad to hear—namely, that he did not mean to make any imputations upon the character of Lord Lytton; but he had ended by casting aspersions upon the character of Lord Salisbury, against whom he had ingeniously made certain inuendoes; and he had also cast aspersions upon the proceedings and acts of the Members of Her Majesty's Government which he did not think the most subordinate Member of that Government could sit and hear and refrain from endeavouring to answer. The story of the answer given last year by the Marquess of Salisbury to the Duke of Argyll was now before the public; and he could not for the life of him see anything in the answer of Lord Salisbury that was not consistent with perfect truth, or that the answer was not as ample as the responsible position he occupied enabled him to give. Lord Salisbury was asked categorically by the Duke of Argyll whether we had endeavoured to force an Envoy upon the Ameer at Cabul? The Duke of Argyll knew as well as any person did that the gist of the question was in the words "forcing an Envoy at Cabul." Lord Salisbury answered that question with a distinct negative. The Duke of Argyll asked whether troops were being brought up to the Frontier; and Lord Salisbury answered that part of the question with perfect candour. The Duke of Argyll further asked, whether there were any boats being prepared on the Indus; and Lord Salisbury answered that with the most perfect candour. The Duke of Argyll further asked, and it was last year, whether there had been any change in our relations with Afghanistan? Lord Salisbury replied that there had been no change for the last 12 months. Lord Salisbury gave the perfectly candid answer with which they were all acquainted; and, considering his position, he would not have been justified in going further than he did. Upon this incident the hon. Member had founded a general charge of want of candour on the part of Ministers in answering questions. He did not believe there ever was a Government that had been so much questioned as the present, and personally he had not been the least catechized; and he challenged the ingenuity and research of the hon. Member to detect any error of fact in any answer he had given.

Mr. GRANT DUFF: I never dreamt of charging the hon. Gentleman with inaccuracy.

Mr. BOURKE said, he knew that the hon. Member did not say so; but he made a general charge against the Government. Not being acquainted with the archives in the Offices of his Colleagues, of course he could not do more than speak for himself; and he challenged the ingenuity of the hon. Member to find a single error of fact in any answer he had given to a Question. He must add that he had been asked many Questions suggestive of a great many things that it would not have been his duty to have gone into in his Answers. The gravamen of the charge against Lord Salisbury was that he did not choose, in his responsible position, to embark in all sorts of speculations with regard to Central Asia which now, a year afterwards, hon. Gentlemen thought would have thrown some light on the circumstances then occurring, but which had nothing to do with circumstances anterior to 1877. A great portion of the hon. Gentleman's speech was taken up with taunting Her Majesty's Government on the assumption that they were afraid of the Afghan tribes, and the hon. Member founded that charge upon the speech of the noble Lord sitting behind him (Lord George Hamilton). The hon. Member seemed to have misunderstood the tenour and purport of the noble Lord's speech, just as much as he did the Answer given by Lord Salisbury. Certainly, so wild a notion as our being afraid of the Afghan tribes was never entertained by his noble Friend, who only said that Afghanistan was peopled by turbulent tribes, whose incursions had given us trouble for some years, and urged how desirable it was to terminate this state of things, both from a financial point of view, and also because of the effect these continual incursions had upon the minds of the people of India. That was a perfectly sound position, and entirely different from that which the hon. Member had described. The hon. Member went at some length into the question of the neutral territory. He stated that he would have left the question with regard to neutral territory just as it was; but he would have gone to Russia and said—"If you invade that territory in any way we will make it a *casus belli*." Well, why did the hon. Gentleman not do so? That was not the policy of the Duke of Argyll or the last Government. Lord Northbrook suggested that something of that kind should be done. He suggested that a despatch upon the subject of our relations in Central Asia should be brought to the notice of the St. Petersburg Cabinet, and they had on record in the last letter of the Central Asian despatches the distinct refusal of the Foreign Office to do anything of the kind. The hon. Gentleman complained of the expression which had been used with reference to Lord Northbrook's letter to the Ameer that it was involved in such a mist of conditions that it was calculated to confuse and irritate the mind of the Ameer. He thought any candid mind reading these Papers must come to the same conclusion. That letter certainly did mystify the Ameer. The hon. Gentleman also referred to the Memorandum, with which all were acquainted, written by Sir Henry Rawlinson, which certainly had evoked some very valuable opinions, and no one who read that Memorandum carefully and candidly could hesitate to admit that there was a great deal of truth in it. Whether the author of the Memorandum or its critics were right, he would leave to the judgment of those who were most competent to form an opinion. The hon. Gentleman described at considerable length what he conceived to be the policy of the Duke of Argyll in regard to this question. A great many hon. Members, no doubt, knew from his speeches what was the policy of the noble Duke on this question. It was, however, unfortunate, and it might be regarded as an extraordinary omission in these Papers, that for a period of nearly five years there was not a scrap of paper to be found from which any human being could detect what the policy of the Duke of Argyll was. It was, therefore, so far satisfactory to hear an authentic account of that policy from the hon. Gentleman; but it would have been still more satisfactory if the House could have known from the Blue Book what that policy really was from 1869 to 1874 with regard to this great question. The hon. Gentleman devoted the latter part of his speech to the criticism of what was called a scientific Frontier, and he said we had gone to war for a scientific Frontier. We had gone to war for no such purpose. We had gone to war to wipe out an insult offered to the honour of England; and no British Minister could have avoided going to war for that purpose. As to the questions which the hon. Gentleman had raised with reference to a scientific Frontier, he would only say Her Majesty's Government would be perfectly prepared to justify any arrangement that might be arrived at; but the time had not yet come when they could talk of such a thing as our Frontier arrangement of the future. The hon. Gentleman had spoken of the improved state of feeling in Afghanistan while the old policy was maintained; but he (Mr. Bourke) had failed to discover any satisfactory evidence of this in the Papers which had been produced. On the contrary, all that could be seen from the Blue Books was that our relations with Afghanistan since 1869 had been going from bad to worse, and the Border inhabitants could not visit Afghanistan without encountering hostile manifestations. But the hon. Gentleman said this was the effect of British policy in the East. Why, the measures to which the hon. Gentleman thus alluded were defensive measures. They were calculated to avert evils for which we were not responsible—against which we protested from the first—evils which were directed against the power and liberties of Europe; and those measures were ratified and approved by that House in a most signal and emphatic manner. And now, forsooth, these measures were to be condemned, according to the hon. Member. And why? Because, according to the theory of the hon. Member, they had been the means of developing the danger which some public men had foreseen, but which the public did not before believe in, and which some, who should have known better, refused still to believe in with obstinate simplicity. A great deal had been said upon authority on this subject and on personal character connected with it. He did not complain of any hon. Member for citing authorities, and when one cited living authorities the citations had necessarily more or less of a personal character. But there was one great difference between the authorities on the one side and on the other upon this question, and that was that the authorities who had been in favour of the inactive or old policy had been the means of landing us in the failure of 1873, from which we had never recovered; while those who had been on the side of Sir Bartle Frere and others had seen their prophecies altogether fulfilled. But this was not a question on which the House of Commons should be guided by authority only. They had the means of judging for themselves. No person with half the intellect of an ordinary Member of the House of Commons could fail to arrive at a conclusion satisfactory to his own mind. He would put aside the question the hon. Gentleman had addressed to the Chancellor of the Exchequer; when his right hon. Friend had the opportunity of speaking he would, no doubt, explain the opinions he had formerly expressed in a manner that would be satisfactory to the House. The hon. Gentleman stated that the estrangement of the Ameer had been caused by persistent attempts on the part of the Indian Government to locate British Residents in his territory. He would undertake to prove that the estrangement of the Ameer happened before 1876, and there was no reason to believe that the Ameer in his heart really objected, under certain conditions, to have British officers resident in his territory. At any rate, he should be able to show that the demand for the residence of British officers in Afghanistan was a necessary and just demand. Between 1869 and 1873 active negotiations were carried on between the Cabinets of St. Petersburg and London with regard to Afghanistan; and the main result was that the good offices of England were to be exerted to restrain the Ameer from aggression on Bokhara, whilst, on the other had, Russian influence was to be exerted to restrain Bokhara from aggression on Afghanistan. Those negotiations were brought to the notice of the Home Government and they took them into their serious consideration. They were referred to in a despatch from Lord Northbrook, which would be found in the Blue Book dated June 30, 1873, No. 28. Lord Northbrook, after reviewing the general features of the case, said—the passage would be found at page 106—

> "At the same time, much will depend on the firm adherence to the policy of non-annexation both by England and Russia; for we have good reason to believe that an advance of the Russian Frontier towards that of Afghanistan would undoubtedly revive in that country the uneasiness which the frank avowal of the good understanding between Great Britain and Russia on the general question of Central Asian policy has done much to allay."

It was suggested that a copy of that despatch should be sent to St. Petersburg; but the Government of that time were certainly not of the opinion either of the hon. Member who had just addressed the House or of Lord Northbrook, because the despatch was not sent. Lord Lawrence was much of the opinion of the hon. Member—namely, that we ought to have entered into an arrangement with Russia, and if Russia violated it, we were bound to go to war. But that was not the opinion of the late Cabinet. Well, the Ameer evidently became alarmed at this time by the advances made to him by the Governor of Turkestan. His alarm was expressed in a letter from the Vakeel at Cabul, which would be found at page 197 of the Central Asia Papers. In it were the following passages:—

> "Yesterday a murrasila from the Russian Governor in Turkestan was received by the Ameer in answer to His Highness' communication mentioned in my petition of 18th May, 1872. . . . . His Highness in private said that he gathered from this murrasila that it was the wish of the Russian authorities to establish a regular and frequent correspondence with the Cabul Government. What demands careful thought in their inconsiderate language is, that notwithstanding that the Russian Government must have thoroughly apprehended and been convinced that the weal or woe of the Afghan State is entirely bound up in and associated with that of the British Government, still when writing about boundaries they make use of this unguarded expression, which may indicate God knows what intentions in their minds, viz., 'for as much as the slightest alteration in intention leads to displeasure between parties, it destroys entirely the harmony which may exist between them.' Further, when the Governor of Turkestan writes in his letter that the instructions of his Sovereign are to avoid all interference with or annoyance to his neighbours, it is a cause of astonishment that the Russian interpretation of harmony with neighbours is a strange one, for in but a few years they have extended their possessions from the foot of the Throne of Russia to the borders of Bokhara, and now style the Afghan State 'their neighbours,' oblivious of the fact that Bokhara and Khiva intervene. If (which may God forfend) the country of Bokhara and Khiva becomes theirs, and their Frontier is extended without the intervention of any buffer ('pardah') to the limits of Afghanistan, which may indeed be truly styled the Frontier of Hindustan, God only knows what line of policy or demeanour they will adopt towards Afghanistan, and what troubles may be in store for the Afghan and English Governments. On these considerations he was induced to hope that when the British Government has read and understood the drift of this murrasila, they may bestow even more serious attention than they have hitherto done on the establishing and maintenance of the boundaries of Afghanistan."

[*Cries of* "Date!"] The date was July 20, 1872. It was perfectly clear, therefore, that the Ameer was at that time thoroughly alarmed; but the Government of India, relying on the engagement with the Russian Government about the Ameer's territories, treated his alarm as visionary, and wrote a letter telling him to regard the matter in a friendly spirit. We were told that anxiety day and night pressed on the Ameer; and when, after receiving such a letter from the Governor of Turkestan and attaching such a meaning to it, he found no notice was taken of it by those whom he had been led to look to as his protectors in case of need, he was naturally estranged. And, again, in a translation of a letter from the Agent at Cabul to the Commissioner at Peshawur, which would be found at page 110 of the Afghan Papers, there was an account of a conversation in which the Ameer said—

> "My anxiety which I feel on account of the Russians will never be removed unless the British Government adorns the Afghan Government with great assistance in money and ammunitions of war for the troops, and unless great aid is given for the construction of strong forts throughout the northern Afghan border. And, further, if an emergency arises for the Afghan Government to oppose the Russians, such opposition cannot take place without the co-operation of the disciplined troops of the British Government."

At that time, therefore, it was perfectly evident that the Ameer was ready to admit the disciplined troops of the Indian Government into his territories, and that he was not averse from seeing British Residents in his dominions under certain circumstances. An Envoy was sent from the Ameer to Peshawur, and on his arrival he made two distinct propositions which would be found at page 114 of the Afghan Papers. He requested, in the first place, that in the event of any aggression in the Ameer's territories the British Government would distinctly state they would consider the aggressor an enemy; and the next was that the contingency of aggression by Russia should be specifically mentioned in the written assurances to the Ameer. Telegrams, therefore, passed between the Indian and the Home Governments, the result of which was that the Ameer's Envoy was told it was advisable to postpone the question to a more convenient season. This refusal of the British Government to allay his anxiety was warmly resented by the Ameer, for he always looked upon that Mission as a failure. The Ameer's feelings could be gathered from the reply which he gave to the Viceroy. That was the satirical reply which had been read before and which, of course, he would not read again. He would only say he did not think that anything more clever or satirical had ever been penned by a Potentate, and it certainly showed that the Ameer was then smarting under feelings of the deepest kind—feelings from which he feared the Ameer never recovered. After indulging in this sarcasm the Ameer curtly refused a very plain request of Lord Northbrook with regard to a General who proposed to pass through his territories. About that time—1873—Yakoob Khan, his eldest son, who had for years been on bad terms with his father, was summoned to Cabul, where he went on condition that he should not be detained. He was arrested, however. We know that Lord Northbrook wrote a letter to the Ameer on the subject, and there was no one in this country, he was sure, who would blame Lord Northbrook. If he had been in Lord Northbrook's place he would have been inclined to do the same thing, accompanied, perhaps, by other suggestions. But that proceeding, whether prudent or not, had always been resented by the Ameer, and over and over again he had looked back to it as one of the greatest grievances from which he suffered. He should not have mentioned this subject had not the hon. Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread) brought forward the charge that the estrangement of the Ameer began in 1876. As great reliance was placed on that assertion by the opponents of the Government, it was important to meet it, and to show that there was not only an estrangement, but a decided feeling of injury in the mind of the Ameer before that time. We could not be much surprised at this; because at that period the Ameer's chief object was to obtain the recognition by the British Government of his favourite son Abdoolla, and he naturally thought that otherwise all the evils and misfortunes he had suffered himself would devolve upon his favourite son. He would now proceed to the second proposition—that there was no reason to believe that the Ameer entertained originally any real objection to receive British Residents in Afghanistan under certain conditions.

The hon. Member opposite (Mr. Grant Duff) seemed to attach greater importance to the testimony of Mr. Seton-Karr than to that of Captain Grey, simply because the former gentleman was the official Secretary. He was happy to say he believed he enjoyed the friendship of Mr. Seton-Karr; but that was no reason why he should not express his opinion that as Mr. Karr did not speak Persian, and as Captain Grey had a colloquial knowledge of that language, the latter would be the better authority as to a conversation carried on in Persian. At page 143 of the Blue Book it was stated that—

> "From a reference to the secret records of the Persian Office, it appears that on the 17th March 1869 (while the Ameer was at Lahore) X. Y. reported the substance of a discussion which took place at Cabul on the receipt of the Viceroy's letter of the 9th January 1869. In this discussion the Ameer, Noor Mahomed Shah, and others took part, and the conclusion arrived at was that the British Government had no intention of interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. This discussion was followed next day by a private discussion between the Ameer and Noor Mahomed Shah, at which no third person was present. It turned upon the following passage in the Viceroy's letter:—'It will be left to the Head of the Government of India year after year to determine what shall be done by the British Government in proof of its desire to strengthen your Highness' power, and what assistance in the shape of money and arms shall be given year after year for the consolidation of your Highness' Government and in evincing the good-will of the British Government.' Syud Noor Mahomed Shah observed that 'it does not appear from the wording of the passage what are the wishes of the British Government. If the Government desires to ask for any place in Afghanistan wherein to establish a cantonment, it is impossible to comply with its wishes, considering the usage of Afghanistan. If the Government should desire to send its troops to this country under the name of an auxiliary force, this will alienate the tribes from us and unsettle men's minds. What is practicable is this, that the money and arms be given by the British Government; the men composing the troops should be provided by us, and the power and management should rest with ourselves.'"

SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL: Who are you quoting from?

MR. BOURKE replied that he was quoting from the secret records of the Persian Office in India. This document, which would be found at page 143 of the Blue Book, purported to be a conversation with the Ameer and his friend in 1869 when he came down to Umballa.

SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL: Who is the witness?

MR. BOURKE: The hon. Gentleman will find it all in the Blue Book.

SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL: The witness is X.Y.

MR. BOURKE: Yes; I hope the hon. Gentleman will not follow the example of others who say that these documents are untrustworthy.

SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL: I want to see evidence that they are trustworthy.

MR. BOURKE said that, at any rate, all these documents were prepared *ante litem;* so that there could be no aspersions as to the wish of any individuals connected with the Government of India to put forward anything after the facts of the case were before the public. The document went on to say—

> "Hearing this interpretation the Ameer said —'May God will that at the time of treaty the wishes and requisitions of the British Government be such that there may seem nothing to prevent our complying with them. I would agree even to this, that the troops be our own and the military officers and drill instructors be furnished by the British Government, and that a confidential Agent of the Government be stationed in Balkh and Herat!' Syud Noor Mahomed Shah said—'Be that as it may, at the present time the British Government has also its own objects in view. You are the same Ameer Shere Ali Khan who after the defeat at Candahar repeatedly asked for assistance. Why did not the English agree then? Now both the parties have their own objects. May God vouchsafe all that is good!'"

Then it appeared that—

> "On the 18th March X.Y. repeated a discussion that took place in the Saniman Boorj in the Lahore Fort on the 17th March, at which the Ameer observed that personally he would have no objection to an English Envoy being stationed at Cabul, but that owing to the turbulent character of the people it would not be safe. The same objection, however, did not apply to Balkh, Candahar, or Herat, and the arrangement by which an English officer should be stationed at these places would be beneficial to both Governments. A translation of this report was sent to the Foreign Office, and printed *in extenso.*"

MR. CHILDERS: Read the context.

MR. BOURKE proceeded to read as follows:—

> "The Ameer and his councillors are reported to have said—'The object of the British Government appears to be to place their own men on the Frontier. On every account the best plan would be that the Ameer arrange himself to procure intelligence and send it to the British Government. His Highness would be prepared to expend two lakhs of rupees annually for this

purpose from his own treasury. On the 2nd April 1869 X.Y. reported that the previous night Syud Noor Mahomed Shah had represented to the Ameer that it would be advisable that the British Government depute Mahomedans to the borders of Afghanistan, Candahar, and Herat, and after the conquest of Balkh to Balkh, for the purpose of procuring information."

That, however, was only the opinion of Noor Mahomed, and he had already directed the attention of the House to what was the opinion of the Ameer. He hoped hon. Members would observe the sentence which followed—

> "No more than one European or Native news-caterer should be stationed at one place. The Ameer approved of this advice."

Mr. CHILDERS: Read the last sentence.

Mr. BOURKE read as follows:—

> "X. Y. now states that, so far as he could ascertain at Umballa in 1869, it was the belief of the Ameer's councillors that he never agreed to the location of British Agents in Afghanistan."

He was perfectly content to put the question in the way in which Lord Northbrook put it; and this disposed of the contention of Mr. Seton-Karr and other persons. There was no trace in 1873 that the Ameer would object to the presence of British Agents in Afghanistan, excepting Cabul itself. At page 131 of the Correspondence this passage occurred—

> "On the whole, however, we think that either the Ameer himself or his Minister, Noor Mahomed Shah, did in confidential communications with Captain Grey express a readiness to accept at some future time not far distant the presence of British Agents at places in Afghanistan, excepting Cabul itself. But our impression is that the intimation was intended to be contingent either upon the receipt of far more substantial assistance than was promised the Ameer at the Umballa Conferences, or upon the conclusion of a Dynastic Treaty, that is, upon obtaining the recognition, in a Treaty with the British Government, of his son Abdoolla Jan as his successor. Such a formal recognition His Highness was anxious to secure, but Lord Mayo, for obvious reasons, declined to entertain the proposal."

That placed the whole case quite clearly and fairly. The truth was, that until the Ameer got alarmed in regard to the invasion of Central Asia, he looked much more to the safety of his own Throne from his family than to anything else. He hoped he had clearly established that up to the year 1876 there was no reason to believe that the Ameer would have objected to Residents being placed on his Frontier on certain conditions. He would next proceed to show that the demand that British Agents should be established in certain towns in Afghanistan was a demand which it was wise, necessary, and just for the Government to make. When Lord Salisbury assumed the Seals of the India Office in 1874 this country, it must be remembered, had undertaken very serious obligations with regard to Afghanistan, and he hoped he was not egotistical when he said that he took an opportunity of pointing them out to Her Majesty's Government at the time. The arrangement made in 1873 with Russia was the cause of an entirely fresh consideration of the whole affairs of the country; and from the very nature of the case, from the very circumstances in which the Ameer was placed, and the unsettled state of Turkestan, and all the regions between Persia and Merv, it was perfectly clear to the Government that what was now called the old policy, or rather the old method of proceeding, should be revised, and our position re-considered. At page 56 of the Central Asia Correspondence it would be found that Mr. Doria wrote from St. Petersburg, on October 6, 1875, to Lord Derby, saying that Baron Jomini had read to him a paragraph from a despatch from Krasnovodsk, in which it was stated that the Ameer of Afghanistan was said to be intriguing and exciting ill-feeling among the Turkoman tribes near Merv, which, his Excellency added, it was very desirable should be avoided. It was, therefore, perfectly clear that the Russian Government was ready to cast upon us the responsibility for what occurred with respect to Afghanistan and Merv; and that was quite sufficient to induce the British Government to take into serious consideration the whole of our relations with Afghanistan. Lord Salisbury's object, when he came to consider the state of the Ameer's mind, and to read the documents that were forwarded to him from India, was to win back the Ameer, if he possibly could, to the disposition in which he was when he left the Umballa Conference, and to draw closer the relations between the two countries. Then was written the despatch of 1875, which had been so much commented upon. Lord Salisbury directed that measures should be taken for establishing a British Agency at Herat. A great deal had been said about the *animus* shown by Lord Salisbury at that time; and the hon. Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread) had given the House to understand that he was guilty of a very high-handed proceeding in pressing the admission of an Agent at Herat. He did not think that was a fair charge. But in order to understand what was really in Lord Salisbury's mind and intention, they should read the concluding paragraph of his despatch to Lord Northbrook, in which he said—

> "I have dwelt upon the importance of an English Agency at Herat exclusively for the sake of the information an English officer might collect. But it will have other material, though more indirect, results. It will be an indication of English solicitude for the safety of our allies, and may so tend to discourage counsels dangerous to the peace of Asia."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 129.]

So that when he wrote that, Lord Salisbury had the most kindly intentions towards the Ameer. Then came Lord Northbrook's despatch objecting to that course. But considering what they knew regarding the advances made by Russia, and considering the communications which the Governor General of Russian Turkestan was making to the Ameer were becoming every day more frequent, was it not, then, the duty of Her Majesty's Government to ascertain what was really passing in Afghanistan, and not to be dependent on Native Agents for the information which should guide their relations with that country? At that time it was perfectly clear that their means of obtaining information were extremely unsatisfactory. Sir Richard Pollock's testimony on that point was thus referred to at page 137 of the Blue Book—

> "Any Native Agent who took a perfectly independent tone at Cabul, and made no secret of reporting regularly to his Government, without reference to the wishes of the Ameer, all information that he believed to be correct, would very shortly find his position at Cabul unbearable."

That showed that the means of obtaining real information did not then exist, and that the proposal to place British Agents in certain places was politic and necessary. The hon. Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread) was extremely indignant with Lord Salisbury; and the House evidently went with the sentiment which that hon. Gentleman uttered when he described the suggestion of Lord Salisbury to Lord Northbrook, that the latter should find some opportunity, some pretext, for pressing that matter on the Ameer, as "conduct unworthy of a British statesman." The words used by Lord Salisbury were, he thought, "find occasion." [Mr. CHILDERS: "Create."] It was very easy to put an evil construction upon anything. And it was impossible really to argue with anyone who came to the discussion with a foregone conclusion that some person or other, whose writing he was about to discuss, had been guilty of an ignoble action. But he asked the House to take that paragraph and compare it with one which appeared in Lord Northbrook's despatch in answer to one of these very communications. Speaking about the question of having a resident Agent at Herat—the advantage of which, the House should recollect, was never disputed for a moment by Lord Northbrook—that noble Lord himself, at page 133 of the Correspondence, wrote thus—

> "We recommend that no immediate pressure be put upon the Ameer, or particular anxiety be shown by us upon the subject, but that advantage be taken of the first favourable opportunity that his own action or other circumstances may present for the purpose of sounding his disposition and of representing to him the benefits which would be derived by Afghanistan from the proposed arrangement."

Well, as he read that, it was almost a paraphrase of Lord Salisbury's words "find occasion." Lord Northbrook, very naturally and very properly, did not wish to deal brusquely with the Ameer, but desired that the Ameer himself should afford or create an opportunity, and that when that opportunity was presented it should be taken advantage of to discuss the matter. There was really no difference between the proposition thus made by Lord Northbrook and that for which Lord Salisbury had been so much blamed. The proposal that an Envoy should be received was made and rejected. A Vakeel was sent down to Simla to have communication with Lord Lytton. It was at this time that Lord Lytton first became acquainted with the real feelings of the Ameer on the subject. He wished here to refer to what was called the "*aide mémoire* for the British Agent at Cabul," given at page 185 of the Afghanistan Papers. Lord Lytton had been accused of using at that time imprudent language, of bullying the Ameer, and of authorizing the Vakeel to use most imprudent language to the Ameer. It was no part of his duty to defend every word of the language which had been used by Lord Lytton to the Vakeel. But before the House came to any decision upon this question it must be understood that Lord Lytton did not wish his conversations with his own confidential Agents to be conveyed to the Ameer as expressing his views, but rather the *aide mémoire*, which was drawn up with the special intention that it should be presented to his Highness as the expression of the views of the Viceroy; and he defied any hon. Member to find anything in that document which was not of the most kind, considerate, and flattering character. The words of Lord Lytton's *aide mémoire*, to which he wished to call attention, were the following:—

> "I authorise the Agent to tell the Ameer that I am glad to find it in my power to relieve his mind from many apprehensions as to my intentions, which appear to have been caused by circumstances previous to my assumption of the Government of India. 2. I authorise the Agent to tell the Ameer that, if His Highness wishes to make me his friend, I will be a warm and true, a fast and firm, friend to him, doing all that is practically in my power to stand by him in his difficulties, to cordially support him, to strengthen his throne, to establish his dynasty, and to confirm the succession in the person of his son Sirdar Abdoolla Jan. 3. I am, therefore willing to give him a Treaty of friendship and alliance, and also to afford him assistance in arms, men, and money, for the defence of his territory against unprovoked foreign invasion. I am further willing to give him immediate pecuniary assistance, and to give to his son, Abdoolla Jan, the public recognition and support of the British Government. 4. But I cannot do any one of these things unless the Ameer is, on his part, equally willing to afford me the practical means of assisting His Highness in the protection of his Frontier, by the residence of a British Agent at Herat, and at such other parts of that Frontier, most exposed to danger from without, as may be hereafter agreed upon. I do not even wish to embarrass the Ameer, whose present difficulties I fully sympathise with, by carrying out this arrangement until after the signature of a Treaty of Alliance between us, on terms which ought to satisfy His Highness of the perfect loyalty of our friendship; nor until after the Ameer shall have had the means of making known to his people that the presence of a British Agent in Afghanistan signifies that he is there without interfering in internal State matters, as the firm supporter of the Ameer and of the heir-apparent, to aid them with all the influence and power of the British Government in defending their country against foreign aggression, and to discourage attempts on the part of the disaffected to disturb its internal tranquillity or weaken the throne of His Highness. 5. It will be the duty of any such British Agents to watch the external affairs of the Frontier, furnishing timely and trustworthy intelligence thereof to the Ameer, as well as to the British Government. Should the Ameer at any time have good cause to complain that any British Agent has interfered in the internal affairs of the country, the Agent will at once be recalled."
> —[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, pp. 185-6.]

What more could be said than was actually said by Lord Lytton in the document which he had quoted? He could not help thinking that if the hon. Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread) was aware of the actual state of the facts at the time when he spoke he acted unfairly in basing this part of his case against the Government, not upon the *aide mémoire*, which was, but upon the record of confidential communications, which was not, intended to be laid before the Ameer as the expression of Lord Lytton's views and wishes. So far as he was personally concerned, it was no part either of his desire or his duty to justify the wisdom of Lord Lytton in stating, so freely as he did to the Vakeel, his own opinion as to the position of the Ameer; but he challenged the hon. Member for Bedford to show that Lord Lytton desired to convey to the Ameer any language that was really offensive. An attack had been made upon the Government for the manner in which the Conference was closed; and it was said by the hon. Member for Bedford that Lord Lytton took the step because he found that the British officers would not do what he wanted, which was to obtain an extension of Frontier, and that the Government were anxious to pick a quarrel with the Ameer. He did not think anyone could read the history of the Conference without concluding that Sir Lewis Pelly, who knew exactly the mind of the Viceroy on the subject, and was in close relationship with him, showed the greatest patience, temper, and skill in the way in which he managed the negotiations. Sir Lewis Pelly's account of the whole business was perfectly clear; and it was not only grossly unfair, but inconsistent, for the Opposition to base their whole case upon confidential communications which had passed between the Vakeel and the Viceroy — communications which were never intended to be repeated to the Ameer—and to ignore altogether the *aide mémoire* used by Sir Lewis Pelly which was intended to be read to the Ameer, and which declared the opinions of the Viceroy. The negotiations for the Conference were broken off, and the whole case was fully stated in the final letter of the 15th of March, 1877, from Sir Lewis Pelly to Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, one passage in which was as follows:—

> "If, however, as would seem to be the case, the Ameer, influenced by circumstances or considerations still unknown to the Viceroy, has completely changed his mind since he entered upon the negotiation (which, in its present form, was originated by His Highness), the very last thing desired or attempted by the British Government would be to pin His Highness pedantically to the fulfilment of an understanding from which he now wishes to withdraw, or the adoption of an arrangement which he does not regard with satisfaction. So far from wishing to urge upon his reluctant consideration the expediency of British Officers being appointed to assist him in the defence of his Frontiers, I am to inform your Excellency that the proposal of this arrangement was regarded by the British Government as a great concession; and that the British Government will most assuredly not allow its officers to undertake duties on behalf of Afghanistan involving a residence in any part of that country, unless their presence there is specially invited and cordially welcomed by the Ruler of it."—[*Ibid.* p. 216.]

It was also said that the Conference was broken off because Lord Lytton feared he should not be able, in consequence of it, to carry out his own peculiar views—a most unwarrantable statement. The Ameer was increasing his military strength, massing his troops on the Frontier, inciting his troops to a religious war, soliciting the support of the Akoond of Swat, tampering with the tribes, and corresponding with the border Chiefs. In such circumstances, Lord Lytton believed it would have been wrong then to continue the negotiations; but he did not close the door to their resumption between the months of March, 1877, and September, 1878. The Ameer, however, took no advantage of that. Finally, the Ameer, who had based his refusal to receive English Residents in the towns on the ground that he would, in that event, have to receive a Russian Mission, and that Christian lives would not be safe in his territories, received a Russian Mission at Cabul with great pomp and ceremony, and prepared to fire on a British Mission. It was a mistake to suppose that our relations with Afghanistan had ever been of a neutral character. Afghanistan had always been regarded as under British protection. All the negotiations between the Russian and British Cabinets in the years from 1869 to 1873 proceeded on that basis. We were looked upon as the protector of that country by every Power in Europe, and by the Ameer himself. Large subsidies of money had been given to the Ameer, and extensive supplies of guns and firearms of every description, so that his conduct, in the face of these facts, indicated base treachery. He should like to know what the result would have been had England sent a Mission to Bokhara, and had it been received in a pompous manner, a Russian Mission in the meantime being fired upon. He thought there would soon have been an end to the Ruler of Bokhara. The Viceroy had treated the Ameer with full consideration, and after all that had passed the Government placed Shere Ali in a *locus penitentiæ.* They gave him a month to consider, but it was all to no purpose. If there had been further procrastination, what would have been the effect on the tribes of the Frontier, who had already entered into friendly arrangements with the Representatives of the Viceroy, and with whom it was so essential, under any circumstances, to be on good terms? What would have been the effect on the Princes of India generally, who were looking on with anxiety? They had seen an insult offered to the troops of their Empress, and they spontaneously came forward with offers of aid to wipe out the insult. There was, in his opinion, nothing more gratifying in the whole of this business than the fact that from all parts of India Her Majesty had received the most cordial offers of the great Princes to co-operate by force and sympathy. The Nizam had sent from Hyderabad to offer his support; the Maharajah of Cashmere had offered to send a large number of troops into the field. The Maharajah Scindia of Gwalior, and the Maharajah Holkar of Indore, had done the same; and so had all the Rajpootana Chiefs, whose long lines of ancestry gave them a most commanding influence in the public life of India. All the great Rajahs of the Punjab, who 30 years ago were their enemies, had come forward to support them. Apart, therefore, from all other considerations, it behoved England to be careful not to do anything to discourage what was in the minds of the Indian Princes, or to tarnish in their eyes the honour of the Empire. But it was said by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich that the Papers had been "kept back." This was a very convenient phrase, and one that it was always desirable to fasten on a Parliamentary opponent. He could not help thinking, while the right hon. Gentleman was denouncing the Government, that he had laid himself open to a very obvious retort. If the House would turn to the Blue Book, it would be found that more than one-half of this Book was "kept back" by the right hon. Gentleman himself. One hundred and seventeen pages of the Book recorded transactions which had occurred before the present Government came into power. It might be said that no opportunity had arisen for the production of the Papers; but he would be excused for mentioning that in 1873, when the discussion took place on the Central Asian Question, he (Mr. Bourke) expressed regret that the House had not at that time the opinion of the Indian Government upon this question. Several hon. Gentlemen had spoken about the Prerogative of the Crown being strained by the Government. He regarded that charge as the most serious that could be brought against a Government. He looked upon the Prerogative of the Crown as being just as much a portion of the liberties of England as trial by jury or *habeas corpus.* These rights had been given to the Crown to exercise for the benefit of the people; and the Constitutional Advisers of the Crown ought to be the last to suffer any interference with them. But he held there was no wiser Prerogative of the Crown, or one which contributed to, or was more necessary for, the liberties and safety of this country, than that which threw upon the Crown—or, rather, upon the Constitutional Advisers of the Crown—the responsibility and solemn duty of declaring war to be necessary. To deny that right would be fatal to the best interests of England. He believed that our commerce would not be safe for a single day in any part of the world if retribution did not follow upon insult. He believed that English life in many portions of the world would not be safe if quick retribution did not follow upon outrage to English life; and he thought it would be a serious gain to great military and arbitrary Powers if, restrained by no Constitutional shackles, as we were, they could inflict a blow upon our honour or our territory, and that that blow could not be returned without the dilatory process of a vote in Parliament. What would have been the consequences in the present case had they been compelled to make a representation to Parliament before undertaking the war? They would then, in all probability, have lost advantages which had now been gained. They would, in all probability, have found Afghanistan fully armed; they would have found it fortified; they might have been obliged to sacrifice much more of English life; and they would, no doubt, have been engaged in a protracted war. In addition to all that, if they had been compelled to consult Parliament they would have been landed in a diplomatic antagonism which, under the circumstances, might have brought on serious difficulties. The Peace Party said—"Why did you not go to war with Russia?" All he could say upon that point was that they had done what they invariably did in dealing with a weak Power—and which, he thought, was very much to their honour—they had submitted to that from the weak which they would not have endured from the strong. If any great State had given England a tittle of the offence which Shere Ali had given, there would have been war long since. Lastly, he had to refer to another point which had been raised in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) at Greenwich—with reference to the Russian Mission to Cabul. The right hon. Gentleman quoted two despatches—the first, in which Lord Salisbury wrote to Mr. Plunkett—

> "Should it prove that there is any truth in the statement that a Russian Mission has proceeded to Cabul, you will express the hope of Her Majesty's Government that it may be at once withdrawn, as being inconsistent with the assurances so frequently received from His Highness." — [*Central Asia*, No. 1 (1878), p. 150.]

and that in reply, in which M. de Giers wrote to Mr. Plunkett—

> "I should add that the Mission, which you erroneously attribute to General Abramoff, is of a provisional nature, and one of simple

courtesy; it cannot, therefore, interfere in any way with the pacific assurances which you mention."—[*Ibid.* p. 164.]

And the right hon. Gentleman founded upon that the theory that Lord Salisbury acquiesced in that construction. That might be, if these two passages stood by themselves; but the right hon. Gentleman omitted to quote these important words from M. de Giers' despatch—

> "The dispositions of the Imperial Government . . . . . have necessarily been affected by the political condition in which we were placed by the attitude of England during the recent crisis in the East."

But he entirely denied that Her Majesty's Government had ever admitted that the Russian Mission to Cabul, being one "of a provisional nature and one of simple courtesy," was, on that ground, consistent with the engagements of Russia. But if the Russian Mission was at Cabul on account of the political condition of the relations between England and Russia, that was an answer the justice of which we could not dispute. That was the ground taken by Lord Salisbury. The provisional or courteous character of the Mission did not affect the question, but the relations between the two Powers did; and the Russian Ambassador had admitted that the Mission was an infraction of the agreement. He was sorry for having detained the House so long. He had endeavoured to meet some of the arguments that had been advanced in support of the proposed Vote of Censure, and he had endeavoured to prove that the war was just and necessary. He hoped and prayed most sincerely that, as it had been undertaken in self-defence, it would come to a speedy conclusion. He believed there never was a war undertaken more strictly in self-defence—that was, the defence of our Indian Empire, which he trusted would ever be as dear to the House as our own homes and our own honour.

MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY: I have endeavoured to examine this question strictly on its merits, and to form an independent opinion, entirely apart from Party considerations. I have tried to guide myself by a sense of right and justice, having regard also to the lives and taxes which the inhabitants of Ireland—and of Scotland and England too—may have to expend on any foreign quarrel that may arise. I have had to record a good many votes against the Government on foreign questions on which the Government appeared to trench on the rights of this House, or where they appeared to be leading us into very undesirable wars. At last, when Her Majesty's Government at the end of the last Session brought us peace—peace with honour—and saved us from a war—at least kept us out of one—I felt no hesitation in recording my vote for them. It turns out now that while we were discussing the Berlin Treaty, and for months and years before that Treaty came under discussion, a series of proceedings were being carried on under the direct guidance of statesmen in this country, which were calculated, if they were not intended, to launch us into the war in which we are engaged. I confess if I had known when the Berlin Treaty was before us that the Government, while holding out peace on the one hand, was on the other engaged in the measures which have led to the present war, I should have hesitated before I recorded that vote. Within living memory there never was a time when such commercial depression and agricultural distress prevailed both in this country and in Ireland, and it is in the midst of a state of things like that that this war comes upon us. I have spoken of the proceedings of the Government as being calculated, if not intended, to produce the present war. I do not believe that the wise and prudent heads in the Cabinet, to whom we particularly owe it that we escaped war with Russia last Session, could be fully acquainted with the proceedings of the last three years between Lord Lytton and the Ameer; but I think it is evident that by one head or by two heads—and those ingenious ones—the diplomacy and negotiations of the last two years were intended deliberately to produce the war, though they give but a very poor justification for the aggression now made. All through it has been argued, and all through the negotiations have proceeded on this footing—that those negotiations were intended to enforce the reception of British Envoys in Afghanistan. I venture to say that after the statements that have been made, and the debates we have listened to, no one can believe that the reception of those Envoys in Afghanistan was the end and object of the negotiations.

Why, we have been told by the most experienced Indian administrators that the Native Envoys we had in Afghanistan were sufficient to give us all necessary information. We were told furthermore—and the negotiations proved it—that the insistance on the reception of those Envoys could only have one effect, and that was to add to their refusal the irritation of the ancient and faithful ally we had in the Ameer. We are told all these things, and yet we are asked to believe that the First Lord of the Treasury, and an able statesman like the noble Lord who represents this country as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and who was then connected with India, conducted these long negotiations simply for the purpose of procuring the reception of British Envoys into a country in which it was admitted that the lives of British Envoys would not be safe, and where Native Envoys admirably performed all the duties that could be expected from delegates of any kind. There is further proof that it was never intended to make the reception of the British Envoys the end and object of the negotiations. When the first Envoy at the Peshawur Conference died, the Viceroy of India knew, as has been stated—and it remains uncontradicted in this House—that a second Envoy was coming, and that the second Envoy came prepared to concede what had been put forward as the pretext of those negotiations for two years. Then suddenly, and without any reason being given, the Conference of Peshawur was closed, because it was found that the pretext which was to lead to this war was about to disappear. Something further—the moment war becomes inevitable, I suppose in the one unguarded moment of his career, the First Lord of the Treasury comes forward, and says that the result of the war was to be an appropriation of territory. That was the object of the war. Was that a just object? I will not ask whether it would be worthy of the memory of our former conquests in India, because that is a delicate subject; but I will ask whether it is worthy of the principles which are supposed to govern this country in its foreign relations? It seems to me that it would have been more dignified and more worthy for this country to have negotiated openly with the Ameer for the cession of those territories, and to have said—"Give us those territories, which will be useful to us against our common foe, and our alliance will be cemented." Thus, under pretext of an object which would have been futile if persevered in, we have got into war, and I believe the result will be to lower the honour and prestige of this country. A few moments ago the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs congratulated us on the loyalty shown by enlightened Native Princes in coming forward with offers of assistance. Enlightened truly! They are enlightened as to the course the British Government will pursue towards any Native Prince who would thwart its purposes. They know that the sword of Damocles hangs over their heads, and that their safety depends on their offering assistance when required. We have been consoled, at an early stage of the Session, by the announcement that the people of India were to bear the burden of the cost; but it is a poor consolation to any generous mind in either of the two Islands we represent that the expense should be thrown on the wretched people of India, who have already greater burdens than they can bear. For my part, although I represent a population who complains of its taxes, and which can hardly bear them, I reject the consolation. If the spirit which dictates this war proceeds we shall find ourselves engaged in other contests, and the poor taxpayers of India may not be able to bear the cost of extended operations of the kind. A great deal has been said by the hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Chamberlain) on the infraction of Constitutional rights involved in the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government, and we heard from the Under Secretary of State the old doctrine literally advanced of the right of the Crown to declare war. There is no question of the right of the Crown to declare war—the question is whether, for the sake of the harmony which ought to prevail in a great Empire like this—where union is strength and dissension is weakness—the Crown ought to have declared war without consulting the other Estates of the Realm? Her Majesty's Government have put us in such a position that no man dare refuse the Supplies, because he will then be charged with failing to support the Government at a grave and critical moment. They take away the right of deliberation by Parliament; they take away the right of refusing Supplies. No Englishman would be willing to refuse Supplies when he knew the troops were depending on them. This Ministry has uniformly deprived us of all real control over the foreign affairs of this country. I have heard weak men say that Parliamentary government is on its trial at present. That means that if Parliament does not assent to the proceedings of the Government—if it insists on the right of the people of these Islands to see that their money is wisely, honestly, and justly spent—Parliament must be in some manner passed over, and its influence set at nought. I entertain very little fear on this score. There have been occasions in the history of this country when the power of Parliament was put in opposition to the power of another branch of the Government, and put into that position by the unwise exercise of the authority of the superior branch; and if the present course was persevered in, and a reverse were to happen to the arms of England, what branch of public authority would be in danger? Would it be the House of Commons, representing millions, whose prosperity was interfered with—whose fortunes were spent, whose blood was lavished by the authority of Ministers—or would it be that authority which Ministers abused? Everyone must know which would be the victor. In the history of the country from which I come we have in the past seen such negotiations entered upon, and Treaties made and tortuous diplomacy exercised, just as they have been exercised against us for definite purposes. We have seen Native Chiefs and Native owners of property and Native sources of authority and administration trapped and led into these negotiations, and we have seen the framework of social disorders. We have seen property taken away from the people, and we have seen Chieftains deprived of their inheritances, and that, too, in not very remote days, for it is only 180 years ago since the thing was finished. We have seen all this fresh in our history, and it is the same thing as that which we are now carrying on in Afghanistan. You will conquer this Afghanistan Monarch—you will add strength to your Frontier; but where is your civilizing influence to govern now when you have driven Afghanistan into the arms of Russia?—if, indeed, you have not planned with Russia a nefarious scheme of dividing the territory among yourselves. ["Oh, oh!"] I make no hesitation in repeating a view which occurred to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich, and a view which has not yet been contradicted on either side of the House. ["Oh, oh!"] At any rate, if it has been contradicted, it is yet open to me to say that if you have no plan with Russia implicitly or explicitly, you have given Russia an excuse for doing North of Afghanistan what you have done to the South; and it is not by appealing to British justice, by appealing to your own spotless conduct, that you will prevent Russia from following your own course. If you want to do that, you will do that which will at last drive this country to go to war with Russia. I have felt that it is the duty of Irish Members to make this protest, though some of us have doubts whether we do not make some sacrifice of opinion by taking part in any but Irish affairs. I do not share those feelings. I have always felt, however small their weight, that Members coming here should discharge their duty according to the oath they have taken to be true to the Queen. It is their duty to stand up against what appears to them to be unjust to foreign countries. Perhaps we do not exercise as much influence as we ought; and perhaps those unfortunate dissensions which appear so amusing to you, but are so disastrous to us, prevent the voice of Ireland being raised, as it ought to be raised, in defence of the weak and in defence of right and justice in other countries. I think that if the voice of Ireland could be heard now it would be proclaimed against the unjust acts to which I have referred; and that I am acting in unison with my constituents, and the large majority of the Irish people, in joining the Liberal Party to-morrow in protesting against a war which it seems to me there is no necessity for, and for which, if there was a necessity, it is a necessity created by the conduct of the Ministry, and which necessity admitted has led in any case to a most unjust and un-Christian war.

Lord WILLIAM HAY said, they had been told that this war had been undertaken for the purpose of resenting the insult which England had received. Nobody doubted that an insult had been given; but the position which he took, and which was shared by many Members sitting on his side of the House, was that the collision which had ended in war ought never to have taken place. Before stating the grounds on which he supported this Vote of Censure he would for a moment refer to what had fallen from the last speaker, questioning the loyalty of the Native Princes of India. He had some knowledge of the feelings of those Princes, and that warranted him in saying that there was no foundation for any such assertion. He believed the policy pursued towards them continuously since the Mutiny had removed from their minds every feeling of distrust. He had in candour to say that he did not share in what had been said in the course of this debate in condemnation of the Secretary of State for India for initiating what had been called the new policy; because when he went into office he had information as to what was going on in Asia which induced him to come to the conclusion that some vigorous measures should be taken with regard to our relations with Afghanistan, and he was not going to blame him for so doing. Further, he would say this—that if they were to maintain their supremacy in Afghanistan, Russia should have nothing to do with that country, and he believed that was admitted by all leading statesmen; and if they were to carry out that policy, it could only be done by their having an Envoy in some part of that country. Everybody who knew anything of Indian affairs would tell them that it was utterly impossible to learn anything referring to Indian States unless there was a Representative in those States, and to ask that an Envoy should be received in Afghanistan was a reasonable and proper request. There was another point to which he would refer, and it was this. It had been assumed throughout the debate that what was called the policy of masterly inactivity had been universally carried out since we entered into relations with Afghanistan, and that there had never been the suggestion of any other policy. Such, however, as he understood the Blue Book, had not been the case. It was, in fact, impossible to maintain a uniform policy—our policy must be changed according to circumstances; and it was a reflection on Lord Lawrence to say that he was unable to change his policy in the face of a change of circumstances. He would mention an instance of this in the conduct of Lord Northbrook. In 1875, when it came to his knowledge that the Russians were making an advance upon Merv, did he recommend the policy of masterly inactivity? He recommended nothing of the kind. On the contrary, he said that, having regard to Turkestan, it would be desirable that we should have a resident Agent at Herat. There was another instance of this in the conduct of Sir John Lawrence in 1867, when it was rumoured that Shere Ali was negotiating with Russia to recover his position in Afghanistan by ejecting his brother, who then reigned as Ameer of Cabul. When that rumour reached Sir John Lawrence, did he suggest that nothing should be done? On the contrary, he said in his letters—

> "Should the rumour prove untrue, of course the necessity for any unpleasant action will no longer exist. But if it turn out to be founded on fact, then in that event we think that it might be highly . . . . . for the interests of British India to declare the Treaty at present existing between us and Ameer Shere Ali at an end; and to openly assist the party in power at Cabul."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 20.]

or, in other words, he declared that the proper policy, under the circumstances, was to declare war. No doubt further down he said it was not desirable to send a resident Agent into Afghanistan; but the distinction between going to war because of a refusal to secure a British Agent and going to war because of Shere Ali's intrigues in Russia was a distinction without a difference. He referred to these matters to show that there had been a great deal of unnecessary discussion with respect to the initiation of a new policy. The reason they were now at war with Afghanistan was not, as had been repeatedly stated, because a new policy had been initiated, but because Lord Lytton was sent out to India with a determination to have a war, and he did not believe in what had been said about the reluctance of Lord Lytton to engage in hostilities. He did not believe at all that there was that extraordinary repugnance on the part of the Ameer to receive an Envoy; and he felt that had the other conditions been different the Ameer would have accepted. But the fact was Lord Lytton never intended that the conditions of an exceptional kind should be entered into, and he came to that conclusion after a careful perusal of that part of the Blue Book relating to Lord Lytton's administration. He admitted that the position of affairs when Lord Lytton went out to India in 1876 was one of extreme difficulty, and he (Lord William Hay) was the last man not to make full allowance for it. At that time our relations with Russia were very much strained, and war with that Power was not only possible but probable. In Central Asia, on the Northern Frontier, there was a Russian officer, General Kaufmann — resolute, courageous, adroit, and not over scrupulous. In Afghanistan we had a country ruled over by a clever, energetic, but, at the same time, an affrighted Prince. He would not refer to the reasons which led to that state in Shere Ali's mind in which he refused the Mission. He believed that it was produced by various causes, not the least of which was the vulnerability of his Turkestan Frontier. He did not believe that Shere Ali was at any time thoroughly hostile to Great Britain; but that, on the contrary, he would have preferred an alliance with England to an alliance with Russia. What, in the face of these circumstances, was the duty of Lord Lytton? It was his duty to imitate the conduct of General Kaufmann, and to have done everything in his power in defence of the interests of his country; and he (Lord William Hay) would be the last to support this Vote of Censure upon that nobleman for anything he did up to the date of the Treaty of Berlin; but what he did complain of was the unworthy sentiment which prevailed in the despatches on this question. For instance, he found this expression in one of the letters—

> "As regards the latter, our only interest in maintaining the independence of Afghanistan is to provide for the security of our own Frontier." [*Ibid.* p. 183.]

Could they conceive anything more distasteful or abrupt? It did not appear that Lord Lytton cared an atom about the Chief or people of Afghanistan any more than if they were so many sheep upon the mountains, or, to use the expression of the hon. Member for Oxford, our only regard for Afghanistan was that it should act as a buffer between ourselves and Russia. As he had said, the spirit and tone pervading these documents were disastrous. Then followed the Conference at Peshawur. There was a story told of an officer of irascible temper being sent on an important Mission; and when it was asked why a person with such an infirmity should be entrusted with such a delicate duty, it was said he had been sent there to be a blister; but in saying this he did not wish to imply that Sir Lewis Pelly had been sent to the Peshawur Conference with any such intention: but from his knowledge of that clever and distinguished man he should say that he was the man least likely to effect an amicable understanding with the Ameer. He found no fault with what took place before the Treaty of Berlin was entered into; but the Treaty had effected a total change in the position of things. After the Treaty was signed it had become the duty of the present Government to make every representation in their power to the Russian Government to induce them to withdraw their troops from, and to recall their Mission from, the territories of the Ameer. He believed that the Government had very wisely and properly adopted that course; but, at the same time, to make their policy effectual, they ought to have sent instructions to the Indian Government to avoid the risk of collision with the Ameer. It was indispensable that that should have been done. The position in which Russia had been placed in consequence of this war was a most peculiar and unpleasant one. How was it possible for Russia to withdraw altogether from the position which she had taken up at Cabul when it was known throughout Central Asia that the war had been declared in consequence of her having taken up that position? To use an Eastern expression, if Russia withdrew from it now, her face would be blackened. Moreover, this war gave Russia the excuse she wanted for further extending her Possessions towards India. Had she been asked to withdraw her Mission, and had we at the same time acted in a conciliatory manner towards the Ameer, Russia would have had no excuse for doing what she was now doing—extending her forces to Merv, and perhaps, in a few years, to Herat. He believed that if Shere Ali had had a little time allowed him he would have come round, because he thought he was never really hostile to England. The Blue Book afforded evidence of his desire to be on friendly terms with England; and no better evidence of that friendly disposition could be furnished than the fact, that when choosing an asylum to which he could send his relations in time of trouble, he looked not to Russian territory, but to India. He would further say that, in his opinion—and he had some knowledge of the country—the military position would not have been in the least degree imperilled or prejudiced if a little further delay had been allowed; it would have been just as good next spring as during the autumn of this year. When they considered how mischievous would be the consequences of provoking this war, there was really no explanation of it, but that the Government were determined to go to war. The right hon. Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) said he believed this war was undertaken because the Government considered it necessary to maintain the prestige of England. He heard a very brilliant speech the other night, in which the speaker said that of all the fruitful causes of war he knew the most fruitful was the dogma of "peace-at-any-price." If that were so—and no doubt there was some truth in it—he ventured, on the other hand, to say that of all the other causes fruitful of mischievous and unnecessary war, this doctrine of prestige was one that exercised the greatest influence. The hon. Member for Oxford (Mr. Hall) said that prestige was like the credit of a bank or a mercantile institution. He agreed in that comparison; but what did the credit of a bank depend upon? It depended upon its resources, and upon the knowledge that those resources were adequately, carefully, and prudently administered. The prestige of a country depended exactly on the same conditions; and what he had to complain of was that the administration of this country was not at present conducted on sound and prudent principles. They had recently had melancholy experience of a bank sustaining its credit long after it had ceased to deserve it. It was badly managed, and not only that, but it was badly managed in secret. The innocent shareholders woke up one morning and found themselves on the brink of ruin. Our affairs were badly managed in India, and managed in secret; and we might wake up some day and find not only war declared, but the most disastrous consequences inevitable. It was because he sincerely believed that the management of the affairs of the State was now in hands that ought not to be trusted to manage them, and that mismanagement had led to an unnecessary and therefore unjust war, that he should heartily give his support to the Amendment.

MR. A. GATHORNE HARDY said, that the speech of the noble Lord who had just sat down had proved, at any rate, that any reason offered in support of the Amendment was sufficient to gain the approval of hon. Members below the Gangway, however much they differed among themselves. He desired to state, at the outset, that he considered it deplorable that they had been unable to carry on the debate on a great question of policy without importing into it imputations of dishonesty and fraud. Such a course was calculated seriously to lessen the dignity of that great Assembly. The hon. Member for the Elgin Burghs had thought it fitting in him to speak of Her Majesty's Government as being prodigal of everything but of authentic infomation. ["Hear, hear!"] He was obliged to hon. Gentlemen opposite for that cheer, as it showed that not only the hon. Member for the Elgin Burghs (Mr. Grant Duff), but other hon. Members, were content to make and to carry on those personal imputations. Another personal imputation had been made in reference to the despatch of Lord Cranbrook, which had been remarked upon in a similar way; but, for obvious reasons, he would not comment upon that matter. Nor would he quote the speeches which the right hon. Gentlemen the Members for Greenwich and Pontefract (Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Childers) had delivered to their constituents. But the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich had stated, in respect of the despatch of Lord Cranbrook, that in it

> "the art of saying one thing and of suggesting another had been carried to such a pitch of perfection that he doubted whether the future, with all its development, would be able to improve it."

He did not propose to say one word in defence of the character of Lord Cranbrook, or of his despatch. That he left in the hands of the House, in which the noble Lord had sat for 20 years. The right hon. Gentleman went on to say that the Blue Book involved mis-statements of fact amounting to reckless negligence, which he stopped short of saying raised suspicions of deliberate deception. That, as the noble Lord the Member for Middlesex (Lord George Hamilton) observed, was saying, as nearly as it could be said in Parliamentary language, that the Blue Books contained untruths. Well, he listened with interest for the proof which the right hon. Gentleman might adduce in support of those accusations; and he was astonished—as he was sure hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway were also—at the mouse which the mountain in labour brought forth. It turned out that the right hon. Gentleman had armed himself with the microscope of prejudice, and having scanned the Blue Book thought he discovered certain inaccuracies, which, if true, were of very little importance, for what did they amount to? For his part, he was far from admitting that the right hon. Gentleman had adduced any conclusive proof of his assertions. The despatch of the Indian Government to the Home Government of the 10th May, 1873, was, the right hon. Gentleman said, intended to deceive. How could it deceive, when it inclosed the 52 documents on which it was based? In like manner, how could Parliament be deceived by the despatch, when, with the despatch, they received copies of those 52 documents? Then, again, it was said that the Instructions to Sir Lewis Pelly, which he read to the Ameer's Envoy, were intended to deceive him. It certainly could not deceive the Envoy, who was thoroughly acquainted with all the facts; and it could not deceive Parliament, to which it was presented, with the explanatory documents. The imputations cast upon Lord Salisbury—greatly, as he thought, calculated to discredit both Houses of Parliament—he would not refer to, as they had been satisfactorily refuted by the noble Lord. It was, however, interesting to remember how Lord Salisbury, who, when he, for reasons which did him the highest honour, separated himself from his Party, became the idol of the Party opposite, as being a most honourable and straightforward man, was now sought to be degraded by them, so that among them there were "none so poor to do him reverence." He ventured to think that Lord Salisbury would disregard the blame passed on him now as he did the praise bestowed on him then by the Liberal Party from the same unworthy motives. There were three questions of varying importance to which he desired briefly to refer. The first was, Who was responsible for the estrangement and ill-will of the Ameer? Next, was it caused by the policy of Her Majesty's Government? And, most important of all, was it true, as hon. Gentlemen opposite asserted, that that policy was not an honest policy, but was one used as a pretext for going to war? That was a serious assertion to make. A Government might err, and could, in consequence, be turned out; but if they adopted a particular policy as a pretext for going to war, they would be guilty not of an error, but of a grave and serious crime. When he heard those accusations so freely made by hon. Gentlemen opposite, he was reminded of an anecdote told of a scion of a distinguished Liberal house, who had attained the advanced age of three years, and who, having heard a great deal of political conversation, addressing his mother, said—"Mamma, are all Tories born bad, or do they only grow bad?" He did not know whether it was the original sin of Toryism, or the Toryism that had grown up that they were now accused of. Well, but to what was due the blame for the estrangement of the Ameer from the British Government? He believed it was due to the policy pursued by Lord Northbrook in 1872. The cause was to be found there—the effect, the evidence of his estrangement appeared subsequently, and was evidenced by his letter, in which he showed the greatest proof of hostility that had appeared in any epistle ever addressed by an Oriental Prince to the British Government. The Ameer demanded certain assurances from us, and he was far from saying that he ought to have received them. One was that we should protect him against aggression from Russia. His Envoy entreated that such an assurance should be given, and he received one which was vague and unsatisfactory. But they were now told that the assurance given meant the same thing. But, if it did, why was it not given in plain terms? Hon. Gentlemen opposite said that such an assurance would have been offensive to Russia; but as Russia had declared that she did not intend to interfere in Afghan affairs, in what respect could it be offensive? No doubt the assurances given by Lord Northbrook to the Ameer were very much the same as those given by Lord Mayo; but it should be remembered that circumstances had considerably altered in the interval. The Russians had advanced; and while, at the time of the Umballa Conference, the Ameer had barely attained official recognition, and was glad to have Lord Mayo's friendship on any terms, at the period of Lord Northbrook's Viceroyalty he came forward to say—"I have Lord Mayo's assurances, but I want something more definite," and was met with the answer —"No; we will adhere to our settled policy." It was alleged that the negotiations carried on by Lord Lytton were nothing more than a pretext for war; but Lord Derby and Lord Carnarvon, who certainly could not be regarded as favourable witnesses for Her Majesty's Ministers, were in the Cabinet during the greater part of the time, and they saw no tendency in the policy of the Government to war. He had intended to deal with the Constitutional question, but he would not now take up the time of the House by doing so. He would only say, in conclusion, that he considered that the temporizing policy of the Ameer left the Government no other course than they had adopted. The Ameer temporized, in order to see whether he could come to terms with Russia. He (Mr. A. Gathorne Hardy) ventured to think that Her Majesty's Government had been treated, under circumstances of the greatest difficulty, as no other Government had ever before been treated. Their negotiations had been interrupted and their actions misinterpreted. The Opposition had shown but little generosity, and if the wish of the hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Chamberlain) were fulfilled—namely, a speedy appeal to the country—he believed the country would show more generosity than had the Members of the Opposition. He did not believe that the country was frightened by the Constitutional bogies that had been conjured up; but he believed it would support the Government, recognizing that, though under circumstances of great difficulty and danger, there might possibly have been some blundering, the Government had acted honestly, and had done its duty.

MR. FOLJAMBE dissented entirely from the three pleas which were offered in justification of the war—namely, the so-called insult to our Embassy; the danger apprehended from Russia; and the necessity for a rectification of Frontier. The insult to our Embassy, it seemed to him, had no better foundation than one of those convenient telegrams of which, unfortunately, we had had so many, official or unofficial; and which, having served their purpose of inflaming the passions and exciting the supposed patriotic zeal of Englishmen, were contradicted. With regard to our jealousy of Russia, surely there was no reason for its existence now that "peace with honour" had been brought back from Berlin, and that Russia was one of our Allies. And as for fear of Russia, under whatever Government might exist, he hoped this country occupied too high a position to do anything derogatory or unjust from fear of Russia. The third, or "rectification of the Frontier," plea was of all three the one that ought to have least weight in an assembly of Englishmen. In plain language, it meant nothing more nor less than coveting your neighbour's property and removing your neighbour's landmark. Nothing could be politically right which was morally wrong; and all the three reasons alleged for the war appeared to him abhorrent to his own moral sense as well as contrary to the principles of hon. Gentlemen sitting on the Opposition side of the House. The policy of the present Government reminded him of the lines of Moore—

> Has love to that soul, so tender,
>   Been like our Lagenian mine,
> Where sparkles of golden splendour
>   All over the surface shine—
> But, if in pursuit we go deeper,
>   Allured by the gleam that shone,
> Ah! false as the dream of the sleeper,
>   Like Love, the bright ore is gone."

MR. C. BECKETT-DENISON said, this was one of the rare occasions on which he was not content to give a silent vote, and it was with regret he found himself taking part in a "Party" debate on a grave Indian subject which ought to be looked at from a far higher point of view. But hon. Gentlemen opposite had chosen to depart from the healthy traditions of Parliament on such questions, and with them the responsibility of the matter lay. The debate, unfortunately, was not only to be regretted for itself, but also for the language imported into it, particularly by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich. He had always before listened to the right hon. Gentleman with pleasure and admiration, and more than often with instruction and advantage; but when he heard the right hon. Gentleman speak the other evening he said to himself—"How are the mighty fallen!" When he thought that the other day he was a powerful Minister of a powerful Party, always receiving for his opinions generous interpretation of motives, his language the other night was to his mind, he would say, deplorable. He could not better sum up his opinion than in the words of a favourite actor now living, in which he said—"Of all the shows that ever we did see, this is the most scorching exhibition of all." The right hon. Gentleman's speech was a scorching one, scorching in its terms, but certainly not from the strength of its arguments. Passing from that painful subject, he came to the indictment formulated against the Government. He would ask on what that indictment was based? and he thought the reply was that during the last 12 years —under a succession of Viceroys—a perfectly peaceful policy with regard to Afghanistan was pursued, and that all of a sudden, without adequate motive, and without the cognizance of the people of this country, that policy was designedly changed, and that Lords Salisbury and Lytton, acting in concert, so conducted their negotiations that they had virtually, and with *malice prepense,* brought on the war which was now upon us. That, if substantiated, would be the basest accusation that could be brought against public men; and, if so substantiated, they would certainly deserve to be driven from Office and from power. But what were the facts? Lord Lawrence and his successors pursued a policy which, perhaps, was fitted for the times in which they ruled—a policy designated by the high-flown title of "masterly inactivity." It was not a very appropriate title; for it was a policy of referring to a more convenient time and a later day subjects that might have been dealt with and grappled at the time. It was not necessary to say a word in disrespect of the three noble Lords, for they stood too high in public estimation to be affected by hard words. But he lamented, as did the country, that hon. Members in that and the other House should come home and, by implication, throw dirt on successors, who had to deal with the difficulties they bequeathed them. The case of Lord Lytton stood on different grounds. He was engaged in carrying the standard of the Queen in a far distant country, and consequently was not here to defend himself from the charges of misconduct that had been brought against him by the Opposition; and he regretted that the noble Lord (Lord William Hay) should have said that the present Viceroy went out to India with the settled purpose of provoking war with Afghanistan. When Lord Lytton read the debates, and found that all objections were centred on him, and that he had gone to India with the settled purpose of provoking a war—when Lord Lytton read that language, and saw that it was cheered by hon. Members below the Gangway, he would ask himself, was that the justice a man ought to receive from the British Parliament? There was no doubt but that his policy was the policy of the Home Government, because they were the last men to shrink from their portion of responsibility, and he should be ashamed to support any Government that attempted to shift their responsibility on to the shoulders of another. The point raised in the debate sorely touched the honour of Lord Lytton, for he was charged with having purposely, knowingly, and designedly so conducted the negotiations at Simla, and later on through Sir Lewis Pelly, as to make it impossible for the Ameer to come to terms and enter into a Treaty, and then carrying on until he had worked the Ameer up to give serious cause for offence. That was a view of the subject which it was impossible that he could take. It was not fair to Lord Lytton or Lord Salisbury; and here the indictment of the hon. Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread) broke down. There was nothing in Lord Salisbury's instructions to Lord Lytton at which any high-minded statesman need blush, or anything in them that might not see the light of day. No secret was made of the fact that the instructions were founded upon the altered position of Russia in Afghanistan; and the flaw in the Amendment, and in the arguments by which it was supported, was that sufficient consideration was not given to the changed circumstances in which Lord Salisbury found himself Was a statesman responsible for the government of India to shut his eyes to what was going on in Afghanistan and on the Oxus, and continue to treat Indian subjects as in the days of Lord Lawrence, and in the early days of Lord Northbrook? Any Minister would have been bound to take the changed circumstances into consideration and to issue instructions accordingly. Speaking of the Ameer, Lord Salisbury said in his despatch—

> "He may think himself bound to assert supposed rights which may trench on the claims of Russia or of her allies; and steps may be taken which, in the judgment of the Frontier commanders, may render a movement in advance necessary to the honour of Russia before your Government has had the opportunity of interposing either remonstrance or restraint. The chance that any of these opportunities would be offered for the establishment of a dominant Russian influence in Afghanistan would be materially diminished, if not wholly neutralized, by the presence of a British Officer in that country. The evils to which I have referred would lose their formidable character if warnings could be given to your Government, or advice tendered to the Ameer, in good time. They could only grow to dangerous proportions if their first commencement were hidden from your knowledge. . . . . The case is quite conceivable, in which Her Majesty's Government may be able, by early diplomatic action, to arrest proceedings on the Frontier which a few weeks, or even days, later will have passed beyond the power even of the Government of St. Petersburg to control. On all these grounds, Her Majesty's Government continue to attach very serious importance to the presence of a British Agent in Afghanistan. I do not gather that your Excellency is inclined to differ from this judgment. But, in your opinion, the moment for giving effect to it will not arrive until the advance of Russia is further developed, and its forces have occupied Merv. In this opinion it is impossible for Her Majesty's Government to concur."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 148.]

This showed that the dominant idea in Lord Salisbury's mind was that the altered circumstances on the Frontier required a different treatment; and the burden of subsequent despatches was that we could do nothing with the Ameer until we could use our own eyes and ears within his dominions, Cabul being always excepted, and rightly, because our presence there would have been unfavourable to the authority of the Ameer with his own people, though it was far different at Herat and other places. But the Ameer would not consent, not because he could not protect them, which was a fair pretence to put forward in negotiations, but because he was afraid that if Resident Political Agents came into his country his dignity would suffer, and that in course of time he would lose his authority and his independent position. ["Hear, hear!"] Hon. Members said "Hear, hear!" but did they mean to say that because of this we ought not to send Representatives there? The Ameer's ambition was to be placed on the same footing as the Shah of Persia, and the Shah had never objected to the British Consuls residing in his country. Was this an objection that we, having Treaty rights and material interests at stake, were bound to hold in regard? Was that a reasonable objection for the Ameer to make to the British Government after receiving at various times their subsidies of money and arms? He believed if Shere Ali had yielded that point we should have been at this moment on friendly terms—we should have had a British Resident at Herat, and would have had at the earliest moment information which would have enabled us to arrange by diplomacy matters which could now only be rectified by the sword. Then there was the Russian point of view. The Russians were making preparations for a state of warfare with this country. They were more on the alert than we were, and they took their measures in time. He read an extract from *The Vedomosti*, a St. Petersburg paper, published after the Treaty of Berlin, which said—

> "General Stolieteff's Mission was a diversion intended to withdraw England's attention from the East to the far East. But we certainly did not mean to rouse the somnolency of Great Britain to the extent we have. Great Britain is actually preparing to destroy Afghanistan, and thereby deprive Russia of all the fruits of her numerous Asiatic campaigns—campaigns carried on for so many years with such enduring patience and at such an enormous cost. Are we now to shrink from our duty and deliver our ally to the enemy? If we postpone succouring Shere Ali till the English have established themselves in Afghanistan millions of money and numerous armies will be required to turn the invader out of those Passes now thrown open to us for nothing. To render English attacks upon Afghanistan altogether impossible, it is sufficient to send some money, some artillery, and some officers to Shere Ali. This will defend the Passes, on the maintenance of which depends

the 'to be or not to be' of our position in Asia."

It would have been impossible for any Cabinet to ignore that altered state of circumstances in Afghanistan. The question, of course, remained whether what had been done with Shere Ali might not have been accomplished by other means—whether by prolonged negotiations during the winter they might not have brought the Ameer to a better sense of his position, risking the effect of all the arms and men and money that might be poured into Afghanistan. But, under all the circumstances of the case, we had no alternative, after the failure of Sir Neville Chamberlain's Mission, but to show that we were in earnest, and would not permit the Ameer to say "nay" to us while he said "yea" to Russia. The alternative presented by hon. Members opposite was that we should have declared war against Russia — that it would have been more magnanimous and more to the purpose; but that argument had been commented upon in "another place" and completely answered. After a diplomatic intercourse, renewed during the autumn, on the subject, we had no *casus belli* with Russia as regarded the Stolieteff Mission. Some hon. Members had asked whether the Russian Mission was still at Cabul? He did not know whether it was there or not; but if some members of it should still be there, from his point of view, pressure ought to be put upon Russia for their withdrawal, because it had been admitted in writing that the old understanding retained all its validity —that England had her exclusive rights in Afghanistan, and that Russia would maintain nothing but amicable relations. There need be no quarrel with Russia if she assented to that understanding. The case of the Ameer was far different; we had our own dignity and honour to defend in the face of India; and, in spite of the imputation of unworthy motives, he did not hesitate to express his opinion that Her Majesty's Government could not, under the circumstances, have acted otherwise than as they did. Indeed, had Gentlemen opposite been in their place they must have adopted the same course. Had they failed so to act, and continued to follow a policy of masterly inactivity, allowing Afghanistan to become subject to the dominion of Russia, they would have been arraigned before public opinion and condemned for two of the most damning crimes statesmen could be guilty of — the exhibition of moral cowardice and dereliction of public duty. With regard to the argument of hon. Gentlemen opposite, that the present time, when the industry of the country was depressed, was inopportune for going to war, he asked them to consider what the consequences would be if such an argument were logically acted upon. If we were never to make war except when the trade of the country was prospering, nations desirous of attacking us would wait until trade was depressed, and then say—"Now that they have not the courage of their opinions we will make war upon them." He hoped that the Government would not be betrayed into the trap of prematurely saying what they did or did not intend to do under given circumstances, but that they would judge for themselves when the events arose. As this war had been entered upon to defend the Indian Frontier, it would be unjust to throw the whole expense upon the people of this country; but it would be worthy of a great nation if it shared with India a large proportion of the cost in a spirit of chivalry and generosity.

Mr. RYLANDS: Sir, I am glad to agree with one remark of the hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. C. Beckett-Denison). The hon. Gentleman expressed his regret that this case which we are now discussing has assumed a Party complexion; and I am quite of opinion that it is a deplorable circumstance that when this House is sitting in judgment on the policy of the Government—a policy which involves most serious and most solemn issues—we cannot approach the consideration of that policy without being divided into sharp Party lines. I am quite aware that hon. Gentlemen on that side of the House are disposed to believe that we, in attacking the policy of the Government, are actuated by Party motives, and possibly from a desire to disturb the Government out of the seats that they now occupy. We, on our side of the House, look across at our opponents, and our belief is that hon. Gentlemen, the supporters of the Ministry, with that conspicuous loyalty to their Party which they continually manifest, are prepared at the present moment to shut their eyes to the most distinct evidence in regard to this question; and I believe they are prepared to sacrifice their judgment, and that hon. Gentlemen, rather than vote in favour of a Vote of Want of Confidence, would swallow a great deal for the sake of Party. Well, Sir, these are circumstances which we deplore. We have also heard a statement that the discussion of this Indian policy on Party grounds is a serious danger to our Empire in India. The noble Lord the Secretary of State for India in "another place," referring to this subject, used very strong language, and said if we make India a Party question the days of our Indian Empire are numbered. I quite believe that it is a danger to India if these matters of Indian policy are to be discussed as a Party question. I quite admit that it is very much to the interest of the Government of this country, in dealing with that Empire, that they should be supported, as far as possible, by the united voice of the Parliament of England. I can quite understand that in carrying out great operations, and when we are engaged in matters of very great delicacy, it is important that we should have a powerful Government. I can quite understand that the Government are embarrassed by the fact that there is a large and influential minority arrayed against them in this House, and that in the country there is a very great party against them. Sir, I admit that. But who are to blame for this feeling of Party on the question of our Indian Empire? I charge upon the Government the blame of making this a Party question. I say that the Government have taken an irretrievable step. They have declared a war without having consulted, in the slightest degree, the Representatives of the British people. They have ignored Parliament. And it is no answer to that charge to say that they have now called Parliament together. You called Parliament together. What for? To consult Parliament? Nothing of the kind. Parliament is called together; and in the Speech from the Throne certain accomplished facts are stated, about which it is impossible that Parliament can take any sufficient action. Now, Sir, what would have been the course if the Government had come down to this House some few months ago and had taken Parliament into its confidence? If full information had been laid on that Table—not with reference to accomplished facts, but in order to give the House an opportunity of expressing a judgment upon the policy and the circumstances brought to their knowledge—I know perfectly well that there would have been a certain amount of independent criticism from those Benches with hon. Gentlemen opposite, if this matter had not been absolutely determined beforehand. And there would have been a careful reading of the Papers; and with the feelings of that sense of responsibility which, I am sure, hon. Gentlemen opposite feel as well as ourselves, they would have taken up the solemn issues, and exercised their judgment upon them. The Government did not want the independent criticism of their own supporters. It would have had fair criticism from this side of the House, and also had the benefit of knowing what the public opinion of the country was with reference to these matters. If the Government had taken that course, there would have been no war. I have a very strong opinion that if the country had been in possession of information, and had been able to discuss the matter, I believe firmly that no war would have been declared. But if, on the other hand, the war had not been prevented, and the judgment of the House had supported the policy of the Government, I can only say that, under those circumstances, you would not have that strong antagonism that you are meeting with at the present moment. I believe that we should have approached the matter in a different spirit, and that a large amount of Party animosity would have been avoided. But the Government not only refused to consult Parliament, but they misled and hoodwinked Parliament. They did this, I am bound to say, by statements of such a character that it requires the greatest charity to believe that they were not made with a view to mislead. In taking this course the Government, as far as they are able, have made this House lose its hold on the Executive Administration of the country, and what will be the consequence if this course is persevered in? It so happened that on the 28th February, 1859, a very distinguished Member of this House—a gentleman of the highest authority—made some remarks upon this subject. He said—

> "If this House loses its hold over the Executive of the country, what happens? We fall back on a bureaucratic system, and we should find ourselves, after all our struggles, in the very same position which in 1640 we had to extricate ourselves from. Your Administration would be carried on by a Court Minister, perhaps a Court minion."—[3 *Hansard*, clii. 981.]

These were wise words, and they were uttered by the right hon. Benjamin Disraeli; and now the Earl of Beaconsfield, as Prime Minister of England, is adding to the marvellous inconsistency of his career by endeavouring to lose the hold of the House of Commons on the Executive Government. The Government in their proceedings have treated with contempt the Parliament of the people, and they have magnified the Prerogative of the Crown. Now, Sir, I venture to say that that course is not calculated to promote the interests of the Crown. I believe that it is a dangerous and a revolutionary course, because it tends to disturb the settled relationship which exists between the Crown and the people. It has been said that the British Constitution is a compromise. There are the Three Estates of the Realm, and each of these Estates have certain abstract rights; and it is understood that if one of these Estates presses its abstract rights, and pushes them to the utmost, you must inevitably have a dead-lock and have danger. We charge upon the Government that they are doing this. They are pushing to an extreme and dangerous extent the abstract right of one of the Three Estates of the Realm, and I think that that is a danger. Now, Sir, I think that, in view of these circumstances, we ought to remember that in this country we have called into existence, by recent legislation, a great democratic power. We have enabled the people of this country to take part, by their Representatives in this House, in the Government of the country; and so jealous have we been of the liberties of the Representatives of the people in Parliament, that we will not allow the Queen to impose a single farthing of taxation, unless with the consent of the Representatives of the people; and yet, although we are so jealous of the right of the Crown to tax the people in the slightest degree, we are prepared to give to the Crown a Prerogative which in its operation may, by involving this country in war, involve us in very serious burdens. Does the Government think that the people will allow this Prerogative to continue to be exercised, without some control? Hitherto, the Prerogative to declare war has been concealed and tempered by the understanding that it would not be exercised, except in cases of unexpected and immediate emergency. I very much question whether any case of such extreme emergency could arise sufficient to justify the exercise of the Prerogative without Parliamentary sanction. But there has been no such emergency in this case that could be pretended for a moment. This Prerogative has been paraded before the country in its most repulsive feature; and the challenge clearly given to the country is—whether this Prerogative should continue or not? We may estimate very accurately what the result of the challenge will be. I have no doubt that the present House of Commons will be willing, by supporting the Government in the action they have taken, to sacrifice the rights of Parliament and maintain the Prerogative of the Crown. This struggle will not end in this House. The people who elect the House of Commons will take up this challenge, and I believe firmly —that the people will not consent that this House—to use the words of Mr. Disraeli—

> "should lose its hold over the Executive of the country, or that the Administration should be carried on by a Court Minister or a Court minion."

["Hear, hear!"] Hon. Gentlemen opposite evidently cheer under the impression that the people of the country would consent to no alteration in the rights of the Prerogative. ["No, no!"] Well, I can tell hon. Gentlemen that this is not the first time that there has been a struggle in relation to the Royal Prerogative. Our forefathers had struggles in regard to the Royal Prerogative. ["Question!"] It is very close to the question. We are dealing, at the present moment, with the exercise of the Prerogative; and I say that our forefathers hated the very word, because they saw that the exercise of the Prerogative on many occasions had involved this country in serious difficulty. The result of the struggles in former days was the curtailment of the Prerogatives of the Crown; and I believe firmly that the result of the struggle we are now entering upon will be that there will be such a declaration on the part of the constituencies as will require that in future some restrictions should be placed on the right of the Crown to declare war. It is said that we have no right to complain in this matter. We are told that Parliament even now—although war has been declared under the Prerogative of the Crown—that Parliament has its remedy by passing a Vote of Censure upon the Government. We know perfectly well that that is futile—we know perfectly well that when war has been declared the House of Commons is powerless to deal with it, and the passing of a Vote of Censure on the Government would do little to alleviate or remove the injury which has been done. There has been a good deal said, in the course of this debate, as to the origin of the war; and no doubt the House of Commons, now that war has been commenced, are called upon to consider whether it is justified by facts laid before the House. I have carefully studied the voluminous documents laid on the Table; and I am bound to say that the conclusion I have come to is, that while Government have unnecessarily kept back information the House is entitled to receive, there has been an attempt, by means of Lord Cranbrook's despatch, to confuse the public mind as to the origin of the war; and that by disingenuous representations the Government seek to disguise the origin of the war, or to mislead the public as to why the war has been commenced. I am sorry that the hon. Gentleman the Member for Canterbury (Mr. A. Gathorne Hardy), who represented Lord Cranbrook in this House to-night, has left his seat: for I meant to tell him that certainly no one wishes to impute improper motives to Lord Cranbrook; we respect Lord Cranbrook, personally, most highly. But what we do say is, that this despatch to which his name is attached is, in our judgment, one which is not consistent with the actual facts of the case; we say that Lord Cranbrook has not fairly put the case before the public. Lord Salisbury, in "another place," has spoken of the "utter wretchedness" of this personal dispute between Lord Northbrook and other noble Lords connected with the Government of India. But it is by no means a mere personal matter—the question we have to deal with is this—Did or did not this despatch of Lord Cranbrook attempt to conceal an entire change of policy on the part of the Government, under cover of mis-statements which had the effect of throwing blame on the policy of the previous Government? On what ground can it be contended that the policy of Lord Northbrook and his Predecessors has had the effect of compelling the policy of the present Government? There can be no doubt that there has been a very decided change of policy. In 1877 the Chancellor of the Exchequer described in this House the two schools of policy in connection with the Government of India—

> "The school which advocates what may be called a forward policy, and the opposite school, which is rather for keeping back, and not committing us to advancing beyond our Frontiers."—[3 *Hansard*, ccxxxvi. 718.]

And on that occasion the right hon. Gentleman said decidedly that he was of the latter school, and that he was opposed to our advancing beyond our Frontier. But at that very time the Government were reversing the policy of their Predecessors and were adopting the "forward school," which the right hon. Gentleman condemned. My complaint against Lord Cranbrook's despatch is, that it gives an entirely inadequate and a misleading account of the origin of the war. It appears to be an indictment against the Ameer of Afghanistan, prepared with all the ingenuity of an advocate, and with a very unscrupulous disregard of the actual circumstances of the case. I am not prepared to accept in any way the statement of the Government as put forward in the official documents as a justification of the war. The Chancellor of the Exchequer the other night resented the idea, thrown out by the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition, that the Government had been picking a quarrel with the Ameer, and declared that if the Government had been attempting to pick a quarrel it would have been guilty of a great crime. I do not mean to say that they intended to force a quarrel; but we are entitled to say, if their measures were such as necessarily to create war, that whatever their intentions were, they actually provoked a quarrel. Every step they had taken for four months could only have one result, and that was to bring about a war with the Ameer of Afghanistan. I will not trouble the House by referring to the Blue Book, for I have no wish to trespass beyond the half-hour I have given myself. But I repeat that, step by step, the Government rendered war inevitable. Amongst other things, there has been an allusion made to the message which our Representative sent to the Ameer of Afghanistan, in which he threatens that if the Ameer did not come to our terms we would arrange with Russia, and wipe Afghanistan from the map. I think the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for India denied that there had been any arrangement whatever between the Russian Government and Lord Lytton. Do I understand that the hon. Gentleman is prepared to deny that Lord Lytton had any understanding with the Russian Ambassador before he left England for India? I can tell the Under Secretary that it is notorious that Lord Lytton had several interviews with Count Schouvaloff before leaving England; and what we are entitled to know is this—Had Lord Lytton any authority for saying, in the most explicit terms, that Russia was quite willing to join us in pulling to pieces the Ameer's territory, and that we by such an arrangement with Russia might be prepared to wipe Afghanistan out of existence? I think the Under Secretary ought to tell us which alternative he accepts. Did Lord Lytton make this statement without any foundation, and simply with the view of alarming the Ameer of Afghanistan, or did he base it on truth? If it were based on truth, then I think we should know what that basis of truth is. I am bound to say that I feel that the Government, in declaring this war upon such insufficient grounds, have incurred a very grave responsibility. I cannot imagine a more solemn position for the Government to be placed in. When a doubt existed in a case against a prisoner he was given the benefit of it; but in this matter, although the question was full of doubt, the Government did not hesitate for a moment, but launched our armies upon Afghanistan, causing not only the loss of many of our brave soldiers, but great loss of life and destruction of property in the country we are invading. Not only did a doubt exist in the case, but the Government could not justify the war. If we wish to find out what the objects and justification of the war are, and we look to the Proclamation of the Viceroy, or to the despatch of Lord Cranbrook, or to the speech of the Premier at the Mansion House, we find very distinct and separate explanations given of the objects which the war is intended to promote. I think, under these circumstances, we are entitled to say that the Government have entirely failed in laying before the House and the country sufficient reason for taking this precipitate step. ["Divide, divide!"] No doubt the hon. Gentleman who cries "Divide, divide!" calculates upon a large Parliamentary majority; and I have no doubt tha the thinks that Parliamentary majorities, like charity, cover a multitude of sins. But Parliamentary majorities cannot free you from the requirements of justice, and cannot blot out the obligations of morality and religion. I believe this war, so commenced by the Government, is contrary to the obligations of morality and religion; I believe it is altogether repugnant to the Christian feeling of the country. We have been told that we ought to look upon this question with Asiatic, and not with European, eyes; but I prefer our standard to the standard of uncivilized and barbarous countries. Surely we are not going to ignore morality and Christianity in the policy of our Government—principles which have been laid aside and forgotten by the present Government. I am obliged to the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Whitbread) for affording me the opportunity of voting against this war; because I am convinced that however small our minority may be, yet in entering our protest against the war we shall be justified in the eyes of the country, and when history records present events, the calm judgment of posterity will condemn the reckless and hasty policy of the Government.

Sir JOHN HAY regretted that the hon. Member for the Elgin Burghs (Mr. Grant Duff) should have made an attack on the Marquess of Salisbury; but he hoped the hon. Gentleman would, on reflection, withdraw it. The charge was one of such a kind that it ought not to have been brought in an Assembly of Gentlemen against one whose conduct as a public servant, and as a former Member of that House, should have spared him from such an attack. Since the hon. Member for Elgin had made his speech, he had referred to the report, given *in extenso* in *Hansard,* of the Question put in June, 1877, by the Duke of Argyll, and the answer made to it by the Marquess of Salisbury, then Secretary of State for India, with regard to our relations with Afghanistan. In that House their rules required Questions to be put categorically, and as categorically answered by Members; but the practice in the other House was different; and unless hon. Gentlemen consulted *Hansard,* they might be under the impression that a distinct Question had been asked in "another place," and that an evasive answer had been given to it. That, indeed, was the charge made by the hon. Member for Elgin. The fact, however, was that the so-called Question occupied five columns of *Hansard,* and the reply to it three columns. In the course of his remarks the Marquess of Salisbury spoke as follows:—

> "The noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) alluded to the fact that the Ameer of Afghanistan does not allow a British Envoy to reside at his Court. The noble Duke evidently regards this refusal as an act of semi-barbarism, and said that the Ameer of Cabul was the only Potentate with whom we had relations over the globe who would not receive our Envoy. I am not prepared to dispute the liberty of action belonging to the Ameer; but the result is, that we are obliged to communicate with him in a more formal and open method than would be otherwise necessary, and that suggestions, explanations, and requests which, if we had ordinary diplomatic relations with the Ameer would be sent through a British officer residing at his Court, have, as matters stand, to be sent through some other diplomatic channel." — [3 *Hansard,* ccxxxiv. 1834-5.]

The Marquess of Salisbury then epitomized the series of Questions, four in number, which had been put to him, and answered them all categorically, accompanied by the explanation that, for reasons of State policy, a more complete and positive answer could not then be furnished. The noble Marquess continued—

> "With respect to the information asked for by the noble Duke, I can hardly give him much positive knowledge; but I think I can give him some negative information. He has derived from the sources open to him the following statement, as I understood him—that we had tried to force an Envoy upon the Ameer at Cabul—that we had selected for that purpose Sir Lewis Pelly, whose vigour of mind and action might possibly inspire apprehension in the Councils of a Native Prince— that we had supported this demand by a large assemblage of troops on the North-Western Frontier, and that we were preparing boats upon the Indus. Now, we have not tried to force an Envoy upon the Ameer at Cabul—we have not suggested Sir Lewis Pelly as an Envoy to Cabul—the troops were assembled on the North-Western Frontier without the slightest reference to any such demand; and with regard to the boats on the Indus, I never heard of them until to-day. Our relations with the Ameer of Cabul have undergone no material change since last year. I do not believe that he is worse disposed towards us than hitherto, or that his feelings are in any way more embittered towards the British Government."—[*Ibid.*]

All who remembered the Marquess of Salisbury's bearing as a Minister while in that House would admit that his answers to Questions were uniformly as clear, distinct, and accurate as any statements which could possibly be conceived; and he was sure that the noble Marquess' vindication of his own character "elsewhere" had been quite sufficient in the eyes of the country to put a stop to these charges on his personal honour. Passing from that subject, he had heard with great interest and satisfaction the statement made by many hon. Gentlemen opposite, who had formerly held office, that they would be prepared, if now in power, in these circumstances, not to go to war with the Ameer of Afghanistan, but to declare war against Russia. In 1873, however, when hon. Gentlemen opposite had an opportunity of arresting the advance of Russia, they were afraid to make known to the Russian Government what Lord Northbrook, their own Governor-General of India, wished to be communicated to that Power. In the Central Asia Papers, page 206, No. 12, appeared the following letter from the Foreign Office, dated August 25th, 1873, and addressed by Mr. Hammond to Sir John Kaye:—

> "I am to request that you will state to the Duke of Argyll that Lord Granville would not think it desirable to communicate to the Russian Government, as suggested by the Indian Government, a copy of the former despatch, and so convey to it indirectly an intimation that any aggression by it on Afghanistan would be resisted by Great Britain with force of arms."

Hon. Gentlemen opposite thought it right now, when a different feeling existed in the country as to Russia, to swim with the tide, and to suggest that they were bold enough to make an attack on Russia, if necessary, for the interests of our Indian Empire. If the communication which Lord Northbrook recommended Lord Granville to make to Russia had been made, it would have given notice to Russia to withdraw Generals Kaufmann and Tchernayeff, who were working upon the Tartar tribes north of the Oxus, and the present complications would not have arisen. It had been said, on what he thought questionable information, that the action of the Ameer was not of a kind to justify a declaration of war. If any hon. Member would take the trouble to consult Vattel's *Law of Nations* he would find that the Ameer had, in resisting the Mission of Sir Neville Chamberlain, committed an act which, between thoroughly civilized States, was understood to necessarily involve a declaration of war. Vattel thus laid down the law on the point—

> "Every sovereign State, then, has a right to send and receive public Ministers; for they are the necessary instruments in the management of those affairs which Sovereigns have to transact with each other, and the channels of that correspondence which they have a right to carry on. . . Such being the rights of nations, a Sovereign who attempts to hinder another from sending or receiving public Ministers does him an injury, and offends against the Law of Nations. It is attacking a nation in one of her most valuable rights, and disputing her title to that which Nature herself gives to every independent society; it is offering an insult to nations in general, and tearing asunder the ties by which they are united. . . . . . A Sovereign cannot, without very particular reasons, refuse admitting and hearing the Minister of a friendly Power, or of one with whom he is at peace. But in case there be reasons for not admitting him into the heart of the country, he may notify to him that he will send proper persons to meet him at an appointed place on the Frontier, there to hear his proposals. It then becomes the foreign Minister's duty to stop at the place assigned. It is sufficient that he obtains a hearing, that being the utmost he has a right to expect."—[*Chitty*, new Ed. 1834, pp. 453-5-6.]

It was clear that if the Ameer of Afghanistan claimed to be a civilized Power and not a protected State, he had clearly infringed the law which he had quoted, and had justified the war against him; for he had opposed Sir Neville Chamberlain's Embassy at Ali Musjid, a fort, not in Afghan territory, but in Afridi territory, and if under the protection of any one, under ours. He supposed, however, we were not justified on that ground alone; but on the bold ground that Russia, having undertaken not to cross the Oxus or to interfere with Afghanistan, had sent a Mission to Cabul, and stimulated Afghanistan and its tribes to break off friendly relations with our Indian Government. He looked upon our necessity for entering Afghanistan with no fear; for he thought it would be advantageous that the time should come when the Sepoy and the Cossack should act as outposts on the Oxus, and when two civilized Powers could be placed in communication with each other without the intervention of savage tribes whom neither could control. He should give his cordial support to Her Majesty's Government.

MR. GOSCHEN: I think that in this discussion Her Majesty's Government, and those who have been the champions of the course which they have pursued, have almost forgotten two important facts—the one, that they have been five years in Office; and the other, that the Military Expedition to Afghanistan is, after all, but an episode in the great drama of Berlin. I state, that hon. Members opposite have forgotten the former circumstance, because they seem on no occasion to be able to meet the arguments of the Opposition, except by a *tu quoque*. Even the right hon. and gallant Member who has just sat down (Sir John Hay) had no better answer to give to the argument, that if war was necessary at all just now it should have been undertaken against Russia instead of Afghanistan, than by referring to an incident which occurred in 1873. The Opposition have been charged, both in and out of the House, with having been mainly occupied in examining into the mind and feelings of the Ameer, instead of discussing the policy of the future, and the great questions which are at present before the House. I myself do not propose to continue the psychological analysis of the motives which actuated that Oriental Potentate; but it must be remembered that the Opposition did not start that discussion—they consider that they are bound to deal with the present—but they were informed suddenly one morning that, although right hon. Gentlemen opposite had been five years in Office, the irritation of the Ameer of five years ago had prevented their carrying out the policy of their hearts, and had embarked them on a war with Afghanistan. Is it not a preposterous case to set up, that a Government with a large majority, containing strong men who manage to have their own way, even against their own supporters, and possessing distinct principles, should, after five years in office, have been baffled entirely by the irritation produced five years ago upon the mind of the Ameer? All this is entirely beside the mark—the complications had been produced by the events of the last year; and therefore we need not look so far back as the year 1873 to be able to find the precise and definite causes which have produced those results. I maintain that Her Majesty's Government, with all the advantages derived from their public officers, and with all the documentary evidence which they themselves have supplied, have not been successful in proving the case they thus got up; and I maintain that the Cabinet had not proved that at the time when the Government acceded to Office the mind of the Ameer was in the state which they allege. But, with the permission of the House, I will remove the sphere of the discussion from Cabul to St. Petersburg and Central Asia. The Afghan Blue Book is a most interesting document; but the documents relating to Central Asia are more interesting still. Hon. Members opposite will admit that fact; and if Parliament has been summoned on this occasion to consider large questions — questions which we are told vitally affect the future interests of the country—it is not because we have to deal only with Afghanistan, but because our relations with a great Power are really in debate. I do not propose for a moment to shun the difficulties of that position; but I think that hon. Gentlemen opposite will find, when they have carefully studied these Central Asia Papers, that the study will not afford them satisfaction as to the course which has been pursued by Her Majesty's Government. The Military Expedition to Afghanistan is the direct result of the turn which the Eastern Question has taken. In fact, if I may use the simile, they were more concerned to discuss the history of the iron pots than of the pipkin which was to be crushed. Let me at once indicate one or two salient points. In April, 1878, the Indian troops were brought to Malta; in May an Emissary went from Tashkend to the Ameer at Bokhara, and the first steps were taken in regard to the Russian Embassy. Those were significant dates. Then came the further tension between England and Russia, and the starting of the Embassy for Cabul. If dates are matter of curiosity, I think it will be found that those I have referred to form a remarkable coincidence; for in the same week in July, when the Prime Minister and Lord Salisbury entered London in triumph, and proclaimed "Peace with honour" from the windows of Whitehall, the Russian Envoy was entering Cabul in triumph, with salvoes of artillery, not carrying peace and honour, but the embers of a war, and that not against Russia, but with Afghanistan. That was as distinct a breach of an honourable engagement as, I believe, was ever committed on the part of one great nation towards another. ["Question!"] We have been summoned to discuss these matters in a serious light, and asked not to confine ourselves simply to the consideration of points in the mind of the Ameer of Afghanistan; and I trust that hon. Members opposite will not prevent me from discharging my duty, in discussing the entry into Cabul of the Russian Envoy — a circumstance which every Englishman must deplore, and which is deplored as much on this side of the House as on the other. I wish to make my point good by showing the connection that exists between the Eastern Question and the Afghan troubles. Following the example of an hon. Member who addressed the House a few moments ago —and who seemed to assume that the greatest possible importance ought to be attached to everything that issues from the Russian Press—I will quote an extract from a Russian newspaper, which is contained in the Blue Book, and was sent over from St. Petersburg to the Government, as an illustration of the state of public opinion there—

> "The concentration of our influence on the Frontiers of the territory of the Empress of India would be only a natural answer to the English seizure of Cyprus"—the seizure of Cyprus—"and all the approaches to Asia. Such may be the unobtrusive, even peaceable, object of the military operations undertaken by the troops of the Turkestan military circuit." (It would be something like the Cyprus business.) "As our correspondent at Berlin truly remarked the other day—'In Asia there are two political Powers confronting each other, and they must inevitably come into collision.' England wishes to be Russia's nearest neighbour in Asia Minor, and it is only natural, therefore, that Russia, in her turn, should desire to approach somewhat nearer to the English Frontiers in India."—[*Central Asia,* No. 1 (1878), p. 141.]

Well, we have acquired Cyprus, and

Russia might think it would be advantageous to her to acquire Bokhara and advance her territories to the Oxus. Possibly in that interview between Lord Lytton and the Russian Ambassador, before the former went to India, the mode of acquiring territory in this manner was made the subject of discussion between those distinguished statesmen. But in any case, this extract shows the connection existing in Russian minds between the Eastern and the Afghan Questions. The present Government acceded to Office in 1874; Khiva had been partly acquired by Russia at that time; and early in that year, as was pointed out by the right hon. and gallant Member (Sir John Hay), certain communications were made by the Indian Government to the India Office at home; and it had been made the subject of complaint that Lord Granville did not think it necessary to advise Russia of the attitude taken up towards that country by the Indian Government. The point is this—it is alleged that while the Opposition now said that the Government ought to deal with Russia, Lord Granville had preferred not to communicate to Russia the feeling entertained by the Indian Government at the period referred to. But we reply that the reason for this is perfectly plain—as would have appeared had the despatch of Lord Granville been published, instead of being only alluded to in a note—because at that moment an arrangement had been come to with Russia with regard to Afghanistan. This arrangement, made in the latter part of the year 1873, established the relations between Russia and Afghanistan on what was considered at that time, and what for some little time afterwards seemed, to be a satisfactory basis, and a basis which the present Government endeavoured to continue. About this same time the marriage was solemnized between the Duke of Edinburgh and a Russian Princess, and a thoroughly friendly feeling seemed to prevail. That was at the beginning of 1874; and Prince Gortchakoff, in an interview at that time with our Ambassador, took occasion to state that

> "Russia considered Afghanistan as beyond the sphere of her action, and that they would strictly adhere to this policy,"

and the same declaration was made almost immediately afterwards by the Emperor himself to Lord Augustus Loftus. Lord Augustus Loftus remarked to His Highness Prince Gortchakoff that

> "Her Majesty's Government had no doubts of the pacific desires of the Imperial Government, but that, unfortunately, those desires had been frequently counteracted by the military commanders, who acted on their own responsibility in contravention of the instructions of the Central Civil Government."

His Highness immediately replied with great decision that—

> "Although there was a party anxious for military activity and decorations, he felt that his influence was sufficiently strong to counteract such endeavours, and so long as he held power these efforts would be restrained."—[*Ibid.* p. 7.]

That was the position of affairs in 1874, when the Government acceded to Office. But there was at that time a little symptom of a significant character, in the shape of a scientific expedition, which was going towards the Attrek. Before very long this became a scientific and military expedition, and attention was drawn to that portion of Central Asia situated on the Attrek. Notwithstanding these orders had been issued to the distant military commanders, a new General proceeded to issue a Proclamation, in which it was assumed that he claimed authority over a large number of tribes who were not under the Russian power. This will be found in page 19 of the Blue Book, where attention is drawn to the phrase contained in a letter of General Llamakin, stating that—"Prince Michael has appointed me to be the supreme authority on the Attrek." I will not say that this led to a lively exchange of opinions between the Russian and the English Governments, because nothing is lively so far as St. Petersburg is concerned. Indeed, in reading over these Central Asia Papers I find the phrase "frank and friendly" is repeated throughout this volume in such innumerable instances, that I have been obliged to give up the endeavour to count them. But while the Foreign Office was constantly communicating with the Russian Government on friendly terms, despatches in a totally different spirit were issuing from the India Office, and being sent out to India; and this tendency becomes distinctly more marked when we reach the year 1875. I now proceed to that year, and beg the House to remember that in the beginning of that year the first great opening of the new policy was inaugurated by Lord

Salisbury. Lord Salisbury wrote to Lord Northbrook, and, as has been confessed, and claimed by right hon. Gentlemen opposite and by their friends, in view of the Russian advance in Central Asia, a new departure was to be taken. I now come to a very remarkable despatch, with which I ask to be allowed to trouble the House. It is on page 24, where Lord Derby writes to Lord Loftus, as follows:—

> "The Russian Ambassador called upon me on the 12th instant, being on the point of leaving England for a month, and expressed his wish to ascertain more clearly than he had as yet done the views of Her Majesty's Government on the Central Asian question."

This question had been settled only the year before, but Count Schouvaloff appeared to think there was a change of policy, and he wished to ascertain more clearly the views of Her Majesty's Government. He had noticed a certain reluctance to discuss that question, and considering it of extreme importance to the mutual good relationship of the two countries, he was anxious that there should be a frank understanding. "I told him," wrote Lord Derby, "that I had of late abstained from conversation on the subject because nothing new had occurred." I think that new things were occurring in Asia, but in 1875 Lord Derby knows nothing about them. He says he

> "abstained from conversation on the subject, partly because nothing new had occurred, or was occurring, in that quarter to which it seemed necessary to direct the attention of his Government, partly because I was reluctant to seem to indicate distrust or apprehension as to the course which the Russian Government might think fit to pursue, by unnecessarily requesting explanations as to their proceedings."—[*Ibid.* p. 24.]

Count Schouvaloff proceeded to explain his views, of which it is sufficient to say that they were unfavourable to annexation; and he asked Lord Derby whether he was right in supposing that there was no intention, on the part of England, to advance further in the direction of the Russian Possessions, unless such advance were considered necessary for defensive purposes? Lord Derby replied that

> "This view was undoubtedly correct, and that, so far from desiring to annex any part of Afghanistan, we should deprecate such a result as bringing only increased cost and trouble without advantage."—[*Ibid.*].

Now, why did Count Schouvaloff go to Lord Derby and assure him that he was personally opposed to annexation? But the Russian Government were exceedingly anxious; and evidently there was something brewing, because only a month afterwards Prince Gortchakoff sends Count Schouvaloff an historical notice of the whole of the transactions which had taken place with regard to England and Afghanistan. In that despatch there is a very important point to which I especially call the notice of the House, and though it is rather an intricate one, I hope Her Majesty's Government will follow me. It appears to me that the despatch of Russia endeavours to shift from the position settled under the previous arrangement, that if there was any neutral territory at all it was beyond Afghanistan. The present despatch of the Russian Government speaks, as it were, of Afghanistan itself as the independent zone, and that they might approach its borders on one side, while we approached them on the other. The inference is clear—that if we advanced on the one side they would be entitled to advance on the other, and that acquires great importance at the present day; because if that was in the Russian mind at that time, a similar line of argument might be held now—namely, that if we trenched on Afghanistan, she would be set free in a different direction. I think this is a matter which assumes considerable importance when we look at the action which we are taking at present in invading Afghanistan. There were two further Conferences which took place between the Russian and the English authorities, and they were practically to this effect—that Russia expressed a desire to put the question, why should not the boundaries of England and Russia in Central Asia meet and touch? Russia said—"As we are on good terms with Austria and Germany, why can we not join with England and live on friendly terms with her in Central Asia." The meaning of these despatches was that England should annex Afghanistan, and that Russia should annex Bokhara and the rest of the Khanates; that we should join; and, in effect, that Lord Lytton's simile of the iron pots should be carried out—the pipkin should be crushed between two great Powers. It seems to me a most remarkable coincidence that, in 1875, Russia should have voluntarily sounded Great Britain as to why our boundaries should not meet, and then that, in 1876, Lord Lytton should go out after that interview with the Russian Ambassador, and that one of the first things committed to writing on the Indian side should be the suggestion that such a plan might, in certain eventualities, take place—namely, that there should be a ring of iron drawn round Afghanistan, and that Afghanistan should vanish. We see the threats of Lord Lytton assuming a more definite character than if they were but a kind of imagination on his part, to which no further importance should be attached. It appears to me, from a careful study of the Papers, that the policy of Russia is to be able to continue its annexations, England annexing at the same time in proportion. And I am not sure but that we must charge Her Majesty's Government with committing, at this present moment, an act which is, in some degree, intended to be directed against Russia, but which may be carrying out the very policy which Russia is anxious we should pursue, and that she is laughing in her sleeve at having outwitted the astute diplomatists of England, and that nothing is more desired than that we should endeavour to annex Afghanistan. I do not know how far such a view would be accepted by the Government. But I am bound to say that these sounding interviews were not wholly confined to suggestions. There was something more. Three or four months afterwards Khokand was annexed. Count Schouvaloff had called to say that he was personally averse to annexation; and a few months afterwards Russia finds herself under the deplorable necessity of annexing Khokand. But what motive had the Russians for proclaiming that they were obliged to annex it? Will it be believed that the reason alleged for its annexation was that "some individuals had been raising a religious war?" The parallel between their conduct, in the face of a Jehad, and our own went a little further. Later on General Kaufmann reports to his Government that at last there is an entire rupture with Khokand. He says—"The situation is cleared up"—that is to say, that they were free from "entangling alliances"—the very words Lord Lytton used when the negotiations with Shere Ali were broken off. It is clear that Lord Lytton had studied in the school of the Russian General; and the same operations under which the Russians have been annexing in Tashkend are now being applied by Lord Lytton in Afghanistan. During the rest of the year 1875 Her Majesty's Government, whether alarmed by the further progress of Russia or not, were still holding comparatively mild language in St. Petersburg; but early in 1876 a despatch was written, and they sent out fresh instructions by Lord Lytton on Lord Northbrook being recalled. ["No!"] No, he was not recalled; but it would only have been natural if such had been the case, considering the unfavourable view taken of his character and policy. The Under Secretary of State for India said, with a certain amount of animation, that Lord Northbrook had disobeyed his instructions. It struck me as a remarkable statement to make with regard to the noble Lord, who had rendered such good services in India, and who, as was well stated by my hon. Friend the Member for the Elgin Burghs (Mr. Grant Duff), was rewarded with an Earldom by Her Majesty. Lord Lytton succeeded Lord Northbrook, and went out with the celebrated despatch in his pocket. There was to be a new *régime*, and matters had assumed so important an aspect in the eyes of Her Majesty's Government that an entirely new policy was to be opened, and the Ameer was to be coerced into an offensive and defensive alliance. Still, the same course of negotiations was going on between England and Russia at St. Petersburg in, to my mind, a most unsatisfactory manner, though the statements are continually made that everything was open and above-board on both sides. This culminated in 1876, when Lord Beaconsfield stated, much to the delight of the Russian public, that

> "Never was there a better understanding than at that moment between the two Governments."

At the same time, the Ameer was to be threatened, and that in consequence of the aggressions of Russia in Central Asia. It is impossible to reconcile these two policies, which appear to have been going on at the same time, of which a still more conspicuous instance is to be found later on. The House will remember the speech of the Prime Minister in May. Then the Ameer was to be coerced, and the Under Secretary, who spoke second this evening, stated that there was no intention that these views, which had been stated in such graphic language—these menaces, as he preferred to call them—should be communicated to the Ameer. It seems rather curious that Lord Lytton should make such a very elaborate statement to his own confidential Agent; but it was said to be like a man instructing his own counsel. I am not aware that it is usual to put down such instructions in writing, and then communicate them to Parliament in a Blue Book—indeed, anyone will see that it was intended to convey these threats to the Ameer. During this time the letters from General Kaufmann were increasing in frequency, and it is perfectly incorrect to say that the Ameer no longer communicated these matters to the English Government. That is not so. They were given to the English Government as late as 1876, and, what is more, they are all comprehended in the Blue Book. It seems strange that it should be argued that these matters were not communicated, while the very letters appear in the Blue Book.

LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: It is perfectly true that the letters appear in the Blue Book; but they were forwarded by the Cabul Agent. After 1874, the Ameer never once asked the British Government what answers he was to send to General Kaufmann. That is the point.

MR. GOSCHEN: Whether they were forwarded by the Ameer, or whether they were not, the Cabul Agent could only get them from the Ameer; and I fail to see the distinction. But it is stated here in the Blue Book that—

> "The paper that came from the Russian Officers was opened, and the wax and seal removed in the presence of this very Agent of the British Government, who is now present here, and who was summoned for the purpose."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 2, pp. 12-13.]

These letters from General Kaufmann were communicated seriatim to the English Government, and excited some natural apprehension; because Lord Lytton says in these Papers that now the time has come when these matters are to be taken into serious consideration. And here he would like to call attention to another point. We have had very elaborate arguments as to what was the intention of Her Majesty's Government in forcing Agents upon the Ameer. What was the chief motive? what was the natural motive? Was it not in order to get information? It was desired that English travellers should be allowed to move about in Afghanistan. I think hon. Members opposite will remember that one of the grievances alleged against the Ameer was that he would not allow Englishmen to travel in his dominions. Now, that was an unfriendly regulation; but will it be believed that at the same time when Englishmen were not allowed to travel in Afghanistan they were also, notwithstanding the statements of the Prime Minister as to the friendly relations of the two Governments, not allowed to travel in the Dominions of the Russian Czar; and that when we were forcing an Agent on the Ameer, we were recalling an English traveller who was in Khiva, and who might have supplied most valuable information? I am sure there is not an hon. Member in this House who does not remember the circumstance. The fact is, that in this case, as in so many others, we bullied at Cabul, but we flinched at St. Petersburg; and at the demand or wish of the Russian Government we recalled Captain Burnaby. [An hon. MEMBER: By the Commander-in-Chief.] Was he recalled by the Commander-in-Chief? Then who set the Commander-in-Chief in motion? Ask the noble Lord who questioned the Government in this House. I should like to know how many hon. Members opposite do not think that Her Majesty's Government made a considerable mistake in this affair by yielding to the Russian Government. Captain Burnaby has returned, and has been led about the Black Country by the Chancellor of the Exchequer as a fit representative of the pugnacious policy of Her Majesty's Government; while in his own person he has experienced the effect of what I must call as pusillanimous an act on the part of a great Power as has ever been committed. This is a fitting illustration of the whole of these negotiations, and it is in harmony with the position in which we find ourselves at present—

namely, the position of making war upon Afghanistan because Russia has pushed too near the Oxus. But I am warned by the hour that I must be brief, and that, although I should have wished it, I must forego the task of following these proceedings through the year 1877. But I will only quote this interesting fact — that the Turkoman expeditions again commenced in 1877; during the war they were stopped; but in 1878, as soon as the war was over, again these restless movements of troops on the Attrek re-commenced; and we shall be very glad to know what General Llamakin is doing at the present moment. I will only make one more observation, and that is to express my astonishment that the Russian Government, in the person of Prince Gortchakoff himself, should be able to send such a despatch, as I find it is stated he has sent, denying categorically that General Kaufmann is acting at Cabul by means of Agents or any other means, when, as a matter of fact, these extremely important letters had passed. It seems to me that nothing can be more striking than the answer of General Kaufmann, when he informed the Russian Government that he was rather surprised at the question put to him, considering that copies of these letters were deposited in their Asiatic Bureau. Why do I make these remarks, but to show that opposition to Russian encroachment and Russian trickery is not a duty to be monopolized by hon. or right hon. Gentlemen opposite, but that it is a duty in which we are all concerned; and I am sure that both sides of the House will be anxious that, while we are debating on the state of the Ameer's mind, we should not lose sight of this far more important question. The Postmaster General has been rebuked by an hon. Member on his own side for having drawn such a fine distinction between method and policy. But while I and those around me differ from the method pursued at this moment by Her Majesty's Government, as an unjust as well as necessary method, I know I am speaking the sentiments of every one in this House when I say that, on one point of policy, we are all unanimous in desiring to maintain intact our Possessions in India. I do not forget that it has been said that these debates may do damage by forcing discussion which may weaken the hands of Her Majesty's Government.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER wished it to be understood that the Government did not object to these debates.

MR. GOSCHEN: I am aware that you do not object to them; but it has been said that the attitude of bringing on a continuous debate at the time when Eastern matters are in their present position is unpatriotic. I am prepared to say that this debate will strengthen the Government when it is seen that with regard to Russia it is not a question of pro-Russian or anti-Russian, but a question as to the means of getting out of a difficulty created by themselves. But I must make this good—that the natural result of the Eastern policy of Her Majesty's Government was to bring the Russians to Cabul. I have alluded already to the fact that immediately you brought the Indian troops from India to threaten Europe the Russians began to threaten; but still more important are the questions of Cyprus and Asia Minor; and it was at the same time when you were negotiating the secret Treaty with Count Schouvaloff that orders were sent for this Embassy to Cabul. It is because the Government pursued a policy which was certain to lead to this kind of retaliation—departing from the old ways of English diplomacy—that these negotiations are no longer carried on in the light of day, as formerly they were, and the consequence is that these surprises are sprung upon Her Majesty's Government. We have to thank Her Majesty's Government that, while they were negotiating at Berlin, the Russians stole a march upon us and peacefully invaded Afghanistan. You ask us what is our policy? I have seen it stated that those who support this Motion are those by whom India is considered a burden. Sir, I think this is a statement that ought never to have been made; and it ought not to go forth, in language proceeding from a responsible person, that there is a Party in this House who consider India as a burden. The right hon. Gentleman does not think that if to-morrow, by some extraordinary result, we should assume Office, we should consider India as a burden. I believe that there are not five men on that side of the House who would endorse that view; but it has been stated by Lord Salisbury, in winding up a debate on this important subject in the House of Lords, and I cannot find words sufficient to express my indignation at such a charge having been made.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER wished to observe that reference to language used in debate in "another place" was irregular.

MR. GOSCHEN: I confess that it is irregular, and apologize for referring thereto. In this House we are continually treated with the courtesy which the right hon. Gentleman who led it so well knew how to show, and these reckless accusations against a great Party are less often heard here than "elsewhere." At the same time, we feel desirous of repudiating them on behalf of all who sit on this side of the House. At all events, we do not propose to be so shabby as to expect India to pay for the burdens to be imposed by this war. It might be supposed that if we thought India a burden we should be the first to reject such sacrifices as may be necessary to bear in its relief; but I have seen no symptoms of objection. It ill becomes those who have, at all events in the first instance, given the country and Europe to understand that they are not going to bear the first cost of their Imperial acts, to say that we consider that India is a burden. I cannot sit down without alluding to the most eloquent and convincing speech of my hon. Friend the Member for the Elgin Burghs (Mr. Grant Duff), which brought out the question and the important problem to which we have had no answer whatever — namely, what are the advantages to be gained by the present war? The Under Secretary, who followed him, was silent as to this. Her Majesty's Government refuse to tell us their policy; we are to approve the war, but we are not to be told what the result of that war is to be. With regard to the scientific Frontier, there is no single point which has so far outraged the sense of justice of hon. Members on this side of the House as the idea that the war was waged against the Ameer for one purpose while its object is for another. This is a matter to which I hope those who continue this debate will address themselves; and I trust they will enforce and strengthen the arguments of my hon. Friend, showing that we cannot see how this scientific Frontier will effect all that is desired. Besides this, I should especially like to know whether this is the whole that Her Majesty's Government propose to do with regard to this great question which we are summoned to discuss with so much solemnity. Is it to be the answer to the Russian advance that we are to have a scientific Frontier; and, if so, are we going to give up the remainder of Afghanistan? We want to know how, after a successful war, you intend to stop the Russians? Do you intend to take any further steps? It should not be forgotten that the Government entered into a very extraordinary resolution with regard to the Frontiers of Asia Minor, when they said that if the Russians should pass those Frontiers they would defend Turkey with arms. They might have contented themselves with a similar policy in Afghanistan. But when it comes to Afghanistan they make war upon the Ameer, after having pledged the country to an enormous liability in Asia Minor, which appears to be so much further from India than Herat and Merv. There is no consistency in the policy of the Government. They are prepared to go to any length with regard to the Balkans, and yet to put up with the most evasive Russian reply with regard to the Mission to Cabul. You see that you have accepted as satisfactory the declaration that in consequence of the disturbed state of political affairs this Mission was sent; you would not have accepted the explanation that it was a mere Mission of courtesy; but you are prepared to accept that it was done under exceptional circumstances. This is not, to my mind, a sufficient explanation or apology. You may move up troops to the Frontiers of another Power without committing an act of hostility or a breach of engagement. But to break a promise under exceptional circumstances is no excuse. And it seems to me that there was on the part of Russia a distinct breach of understanding; and therefore I consider that Russia has not given a satisfactory answer with regard to her Mission to Cabul. I trust that we shall hear more from Her Majesty's Government on this subject. I have felt painfully—what I am sure many hon. Members have also felt—that this subject is so large and complicated as to render it almost impossible to do justice to it within the limits of debate. But I trust that in the imperfect observations I have made several points are clear. I hope it will be understood that we are unanimous in our desire that this war, whatever may be the circumstances under which it is undertaken, will be brought to a safe and honourable conclusion. We are unanimous in sympathizing with the troops which are engaged. We trust that the war will be conducted with vigour, which, as the noble Lord (the Marquess of Hartington) had stated, was the most merciful way of conducting it. We are also unanimous on another point—namely, that of satisfaction at the loyal behaviour of the Princes of India, and the loyal attitude of all our subjects in those regions. If any of them had been present during this debate they would have seen that if we differed as to the justice and necessity of this war we did not differ as to the desire that our Indian Empire should remain intact, and that the beneficial results of English government are to be preserved to their millions of population. I trust also they would have seen that in many parts of the House there was an intense feeling that the Princes and Natives of India ought to be treated with justice, and that much of the opposition which has been shown on this occasion is due to the feeling that this is an unjust war. But, whether just or unjust, let credit be done to the feeling that we English think perfect justice should always prevail. I think we are also unanimous on the point that in Afghanistan there is no room for Russia and England together. But we, on our side, have contended that the Government have not gone the right way to work to bring about the result which both desire. We charge you with having brought the Russian Agent to Cabul; but we are unanimous in the desire that this Mission should be withdrawn, and that English influence should be supreme, as it must be, in Afghanistan. We differ as to the means by which this is to be secured, and think that an immense responsibility rests upon those who brought on the war; but I trust it may be known, both in India and in Russia, that Afghanistan must not be allowed to fall under Russian influence.

MAJOR NOLAN said, as there were many hon. Members most anxious to address the House, and as his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Limerick (Mr. O'Shaughnessy) had fully dealt with that aspect of the subject, he should not go into the complicated and entangled question of the justice of the war with Afghanistan. He should simply deal with the expediency of our action on the North-West Frontier, which he thought might be divided into two branches; and before he spoke of the expediency of the war itself, he was inclined to separate from it the question of the advance upon Quetta. He looked upon this latter as a good movement on the part of the Government, because it was made without the risk of war. He thought all the writers on the subject of the advance of Russia on our territory agreed that if she attacked us she must come by way of Persia or the South Caspian. If she advanced from Persia, as the Prime Minister said she might, or by the South Caspian, as was his own opinion, she must probably pass by Quetta, and certainly by Herat, which could be menaced from Quetta. He therefore in no way blamed the Government for the advance on Quetta, over which place the Ameer had very small, if any, rights or control, while the object in view was of the very greatest importance. But he regarded the war with Afghanistan in a different light, and could not approve its object. He did not think we should go to war because the Envoys were not received by the Ameer. It was not Envoys that the Ameer objected to, but British Residents. But the public view at present was, that our object was a scientific Frontier; and it had been proclaimed by hon. Gentlemen on that side of the House, that we would never have demanded a scientific Frontier if our Envoys had been received by the Ameer, but as soon as we saw that he would not admit our officers, we wished to rectify our Frontiers. It would have been a very good thing to know what that change of Frontier meant. There was one, and only one, natural Frontier, and anyone who looked on the map would see that it was the Hindoo Kush, which was 150 or 200 miles from our territory; but to obtain that we should have to annex a country very much larger than England. The rectification of our Frontier by the occupation of the other Passes would no doubt improve it as against Afghanistan, because we should then completely command Cabul; and if we advanced a little beyond Quetta we should completely command Candahar. There would then be nothing left to the Ameer but to become our slave, or to shift his dominion and go to Balkh, where he would then be completely under Russian control. The greatest writers on the subject said that all wars in a mountainous country were long and tedious, as much from the character of the inhabitants as from the features of the district. A war with Afghanistan was very different from a war against a people living in the plains. If we attempted to take a portion of Afghanistan by occupying the Passes at the head of the Khyber, and the Pass a little in advance of it, we should be engaging in a very long and expensive war. As there had never been a war of this kind in which breech-loaders had been in the hands of both the contending parties, no one knew whether improved weapons would, on the whole, benefit the civilized and regular, or the half-civilized and irregular combatant. He thought it possible that the Afghans might find that they could purchase breech-loaders of the Russians if the war lasted two or three years. Hon. Members seemed to think that if they had the Passes of Afghanistan we should be quite safe; but this was entirely fallacious. We should never be able to keep out an army by holding the Passes; although he admitted that holding the Passes would give us time to concentrate for a pitched battle. The time selected for this war was not a favourable one, and it could hardly be said that it had been forced upon us by the Ameer. We should have waited for a year or two. Afghanistan was not our main object; we ought to consider the political state of India, Persia, Afghanistan, and Turkey. It was of enormous importance to us that Russia should execute the Berlin Treaty, and to watch this was our main object at the present moment. As far as we could judge from the Papers, she was moving away some troops and bringing a larger number back again. She was raising Balkan levies, which would every day of the Russian occupation become more efficient and formidable. Russia, at the present time, was not on a peace footing; and it appeared to him that our great object was the execution of the Berlin Treaty, and not the raising of fresh complications elsewhere. He (Major Nolan) had advised the Government, before the Russians crossed the Danube, not merely to be neutral, but to observe an armed neutrality, and he would not have been then adverse to war—when Turkey was strong, and when the Russians were in a bad position—but he did not think we could now force the execution of the Treaty of Berlin with a crushed Turkey for our only Ally, although we should have some chance of this had we a great Power for an Ally. Every country in Europe had its reasons for not wishing to have a conflict with Russia, and would make their various excuses for not insisting, by war, upon Russia's going out of European Turkey. It would now be said that this was a private quarrel, and must be fought out between England and Russia. He thought that by our present move in Afghanistan we had imperilled the Berlin Treaty, and furnished a pretext to Russia. He believed we might be involved in a very serious war.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Debate be now adjourned."—(*Earl Percy.*)

Motion *agreed to.*

Debate *further adjourned* till *Friday.*

MEDICAL APPOINTMENTS QUALIFICATION BILL.

On Motion of Mr. ERRINGTON, Bill to amend the Law relating to the Qualifications required for holding certain Medical Appointments, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. ERRINGTON and Mr. BLENNERHASSETT.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 61.]

PUBLIC HEALTH ACT (1875) AMENDMENT (INTERMENTS) BILL.

On Motion of Mr. MARTEN, Bill to amend "The Public Health Act, 1875," as to Interments, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. MARTEN, Mr. GREENE, and Mr. COLE.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 62.]

House adjourned at One o'clock.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Friday, 13*th December*, 1878.

MINUTES.] — PUBLIC BILLS — *Ordered—First Reading*—Burial Grounds * [63] ; Bankruptcy Act (1869) Amendment * [64].

NOTICE OF RESOLUTION.

TURKEY—THE RHODOPE DISTRICT—GRANT IN AID.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: I beg to give Notice that it is my intention, on the earliest possible day, to make a Motion in this House for a grant in aid of the sufferers in the Rhodope district. I believe that the proper course to take would be to give Notice that I will on Monday next move that on the following day the House will resolve itself into Committee to consider the Resolution which I shall place on the Paper, if possible, to-night, or, if not, on Monday.

Afterwards—

MR. ANDERSON: As the extraordinary announcement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer has been received with silence by the front Opposition Bench, I beg to give Notice that, when the right hon. Gentleman brings forward that proposal I shall move the following Amendment:—

> " That in the face of the wide-spread distress prevailing in our own country, and likely greatly to increase during this winter, it is not expedient to take the money of British taxpayers for relieving the distress in the Rhodope districts ; and that such extraneous benevolence should be left to voluntary effort."

QUESTIONS.

THE LUNACY LAWS—LEGISLATION.

QUESTION.

MR. P. A. TAYLOR asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, If it is his intention to introduce this Session a measure for the reform of the Lunacy Laws?

MR. ASSHETON CROSS, in reply, said, the Report of the Committee which had sat on this subject was at the present moment engaging the earnest attention of the Lord Chancellor; and as soon as the House re-assembled after the Christmas Recess the course it was intended to pursue would be stated, and probably legislation would follow.

41 & 42 VICT. c. 49—WEIGHTS AND MEASURES ACT—LEGISLATION.

QUESTION.

MR. J. COWEN asked the President of the Board of Trade, If the Government propose to introduce an amending Act to mitigate the penalties permitted to be imposed by the Weights and Measures Act of last Session upon persons who, with no fraudulent intent, give publicity to market returns and price lists containing accounts of sales effected by local, customary, or heaped measures?

VISCOUNT SANDON: The matter is one which excites so much anxiety in many quarters, that I believe I had better inform the hon. Gentleman exactly what we have been advised respecting it. Section 23 of the Weights and Measures Act, 1878, is identical in every respect with section 31 of 5 & 6 *Will.* IV. c. 63. The offence is expressed in identically the same words. The penalties are the same, and are to be recovered in the same way—before two Justices. Section 32 of 5 & 6 *Will.* IV. c. 63, required some portion of the penalty, not exceeding a moiety, to be paid to the informer; whereas the present Act (section 57) (4) allows the Court a discretion as to whether they will or not assign any portion of the penalty to the informer. It is to be observed that, though the possible fine is a large one, it is a maximum only. It is not quite accurate to say that the penalties are imposed upon persons who give publicity to market returns and price-lists containing accounts of sales effected by local, customary, or heaped measures. What the section imposes a penalty for is, a person publishing a return in which the denomination of measure quoted implies a greater or less measure than that of the same denomination of imperial measure; that is to say, it prohibits a newspaper from quoting a return which may mislead by naming an imperial measure, when, in fact, it means a measure which is not imperial. This clearly ought to be prohibited, as it is misleading. The name of an imperial measure should, in any formal or public document, be used for that measure, and that only. The section does not prohibit a paper from quoting market returns of sales effected by local or customary measures, if it states those measures in terms which will not mislead. For instance, a newspaper publishing a quotation of a sale at Smithfield of meat at so much per 8 lb. would not be liable to any penalty under the section. Even if it quoted the sale, as is commonly done, at so much per stone of 8 lb., it is very doubtful, however undesirable such a mode of quotation may be, whether the paper would be liable to a penalty under the section, because the denomination quoted—namely, a stone of 8 lb., does not imply a less weight than is implied by the same denomination of imperial weight. After this explanation, I think the hon. Gentleman will agree that there is no need for us to introduce an amending Act.

THE "PRINCESS ALICE" CALAMITY.

QUESTION.

Captain **PIM** asked the President of the Board of Trade, Whether, in consequence of the national importance of the "Princess Alice" calamity, the length of time necessarily occupied by the Coroner and Jury on the inquest (from the 4th of September to the 27th of November), and the trying character of their duties, he will recommend to the proper authorities some official recognition of their arduous services?

Mr. **ASSHETON CROSS**: Sir, I wish to bear my testimony to the great amount of time and attention which the persons who were engaged on this inquest gave to the investigation of this terrible calamity, and I think that the thanks of the country are specially due to them. But I am sorry to say that is all I can offer to my hon. Friend. This question was very carefully considered at the time of what was called "the Bravo trial." And it was found that there was no precedent for making a grant to a jury for serving in such matters, and I do not think it would be wise to create one now.

AFGHANISTAN—STATEMENT OF THE VICEROY (LORD LYTTON) 10th OCTOBER.—QUESTION.

Mr. **ERNEST NOEL** asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether he can inform the House what was Lord Lytton's authority for saying to the Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, the British Agent at Cabul, on the 10th October 1876, that if His Highness the Ameer did not desire to come to an understanding with England, Russia did so, and desired it at Shere Ali's expense; whether, seeing that Lord Derby's published communications with Russia of the same date point to no such negotiation, Lord Lytton was authorized to state that there was nothing to prevent us from providing for the security of our Frontier by entering into an understanding with Russia which might have the effect of wiping Afghanistan out of the map altogether; and, whether the Viceroy's intention that all that was in his mind should be faithfully communicated without reserve to the Ameer was carried out by the Vakil?

The **CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER**: I must point out to the House that the Viceroy of India is not in the position of an Under Secretary of State, and that it is really impossible to expect that we should answer Questions upon matters of this kind, which really rest within the Viceroy's own discretion and competence. Therefore, I can only say, with reference to the first and second Questions, that it was not in consequence of any official communications from the Secretary of State that these things occurred; that Lord Lytton was perfectly authorized, from his position, in giving his opinion as Viceroy from such information as he had received; and that with regard to the last Question—

> "Whether the Viceroy's intention that all that was in his mind should be faithfully communicated without reserve to the Ameer was carried out by the Vakil"—

I am utterly unable to answer as to what was in the Viceroy's mind.

RUSSIA AND PERSIA.—QUESTION.

Sir **JOHN HAY** asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether Her Majesty's Government has information of the recent arrival of Russian Officers in Persia for the purpose of disciplining the Persian Army; and, if he can say whether the Shah has accepted their services?

MR. BOURKE: No, Sir; Her Majesty's Government have no information of the arrival of Russian officers in Persia for the purpose indicated in the Question.

LAW AND JUSTICE (SCOTLAND)—JUDICIAL ARRANGEMENTS.—QUESTION.

COLONEL MURE asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to fill up the vacancy on the Scotch Bench; and, what arrangements are in contemplation in regard to the office of Lord Clerk Register of Scotland?

MR. ASSHETON CROSS: Sir, with regard to the first Question, the learned Lord Advocate and myself have been in consultation upon this matter, and I think it most probable that some legislation will be brought forward after the Recess, which will make it unnecessary to fill up the post. With regard to the latter Question, I undertook to visit Edinburgh myself, in order to inquire into the condition of the Register Office. I have made arrangements that one of its officers should meet me there in the course of next week, and when Parliament assembles again I shall be prepared to state my view of the matter.

THE MERCANTILE MARINE—ARMED MERCHANT VESSELS.—QUESTION.

SIR EDWARD WATKIN asked the First Lord of the Admiralty, If efficient measures are in preparation whereby the Mercantile Marine may become, at short notice, available for the armed protection of our commerce on the sea, in the event of war and aggression; and, whether any legislation is proposed on the subject?

MR. W. H. SMITH: Sir, steps have already been taken by which the Mercantile Marine may become at short notice available for the armed protection of our commerce on the sea in the event of war. I do not apprehend that legislation will be necessary for the purpose; but if, at any future time, it may appear desirable that further powers should be obtained, I shall not hesitate to ask Parliament for any authority that may be necessary to make the Steam Mercantile Marine a valuable addition to the offensive and defensive strength of the country in time of emergency.

INDIA—FRONTIER MAPS.

QUESTION.

CAPTAIN PIM asked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether it is true that during Lord Northbrook's Viceroyalty a non-commissioned officer of the "Guides" set out, with the approval of his chief, and after many months' absence returned, bringing with him a map of the whole route traversed by him from the Afghan Frontier to the nearest Russian post, and that his chief at once forwarded this map to head quarters; whether the acknowledgment for such service was not a reprimand to all concerned; whether, although rewarded by the colonel of his regiment in the first instance, the non-commissioned officer was not dismissed the service by order of the Viceroy; whether such non-commissioned officer was afterwards reinstated, and by whom, and when; and, whether it is not the especial duty of the "Guides" to obtain all the geographical and topographical knowledge possible of our Indian Frontier?

MR. E. STANHOPE: Sir, I have made all inquiries possible since I saw the Question of the hon. and gallant Member on the Paper; but I cannot hear anything whatever of the statement to which it refers.

THE CHARITY COMMISSION.

QUESTION.

MR. W. H. JAMES asked the Secretary to the Treasury, Whether Her Majesty's Government have had under their consideration in the Recess the present charge of the expenses of the Charity Commission upon the Consolidated Fund; and, whether they entertain submitting any scheme to Parliament by which either the whole or part of the expenses of the Commission may be raised by a small sum raised upon the Charities within its jurisdiction?

SIR HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON, in reply, said, he was now in communication with the Charity Commissioners with regard to the present charge of the expenses of the Commission and the quarter from which it should be defrayed, and when Parliament met after the Recess he should be able, he hoped, to suggest some alteration in the present system.

LAW AND JUSTICE (SCOTLAND) — JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF NAIRNSHIRE. QUESTION.

MR. FRASER-MACKINTOSH asked the Lord Advocate, What steps Government intend to take with the view of remedying the inconveniences occasioned to the judicial business of Nairnshire from the want of a resident sheriff?

THE LORD ADVOCATE: Sir, there has not been a vacancy in the judicial office in Nairn for upwards of 50 years, and I think it is to that circumstance, rather than to the difficulty in getting their judicial work done there, that the inconvenience alleged by the hon. Member must be attributed. Her Majesty's Government propose to remedy that inconvenience by appointing a gentleman to discharge the duties of the vacant office; but it is right to say, looking to the terms of the hon. Gentleman's Question, that it is not intended to appoint a resident sheriff to perform the duties of the office. The Law Commissioners of 1860 recommended that the office should be united to that of a neighbouring sheriff substitute; and I think there has been no such change in the amount or in the character of the duties as would justify the Government in departing from that recommendation.

THE COMMISSARIAT DEPARTMENT. QUESTION.

SIR HENRY HAVELOCK asked the Secretary of State for War, with reference to his previous answers upon this subject and to the Warrant of 12th July last under which a number of Officers of the Commissariat Department have been retired, When the promised Warrant re-organizing that Department will be likely to be issued?

COLONEL STANLEY, in reply, said, the Warrant referred to by the hon. and gallant Gentleman had been under consideration a long time, and he hoped it would be issued very shortly.

LAW AND JUSTICE (IRELAND)—COURT OF BANKRUPTCY.—QUESTION.

SIR JOSEPH M'KENNA asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Whether there has as yet been any appointment made to the judicial position of Judge of the Irish Court of Bankruptcy; and, if not, when an appointment is likely to be made?

MR. J. LOWTHER: Sir, no appointment has been made in the Irish Court of Bankruptcy; but an appointment will very shortly be made.

AFGHANISTAN — THE CONFERENCES AT UMBALLA.—QUESTION.

MR. RYLANDS asked the Under Secretary of State for India, If he will lay upon the Table of the House the full Minutes of the four secret Conferences which took place at Umballa after the Durbar of 27th March 1869?

MR. E. STANHOPE: Sir, the Minutes of the four secret Conferences, which the hon. Member states to have been held in 1869, were not sent home by the Government of Lord Mayo.

TURKEY—PROTECTORATE OF CONSTANTINOPLE.—QUESTION.

MR. H. SAMUELSON (for Mr. DILLWYN) asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether his attention has been called to a Reuter's Telegram, which appeared in the morning papers of the 12th of Decr. and dated from St. Petersburg on the 11th, to the effect that Count Münster had proposed to Lord Salisbury that in consideration of the unification of Eastern Roumelia with Bulgaria being permitted England should be allowed to assume the protectorate of Constantinople, and should occupy certain neighbouring positions, that negotiations on this subject still continue; and whether there is any foundation for this statement?

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: No, Sir; it has no foundation. There is no truth in the report at all. The German communications were confidential, and they referred merely to questions connected with the carrying out of the Treaty of Berlin.

POOR LAW—LIVERPOOL—ALLEGED MISCONDUCT.—QUESTION.

MR. STANSFELD asked the President of the Local Government Board, Whether his attention has been drawn to an article in the "Freeman's Journal" of December 3rd, in which it is stated that a Poor Law officer charged with the convoy of one male and two female paupers from Liverpool to their native unions in Ireland, having reached Castleblayney and lodged one of the female paupers in the workhouse at that place, procured for the night admittance for the other female pauper, an orphan girl, to a cheap lodging house with himself as his wife; to inquire if this statement is true; and, if so, what steps are being taken against the officer in question, and by what measures it is proposed to prevent the possible recurrence of such misconduct; and, further to inquire, with reference to the Resolution of the House of Commons of the 2nd of July last, that the Laws concerning the removal of paupers in England and Scotland inflicted hardship and required consideration and amendment, whether he proposes to bring in a Bill to amend these Laws?

Mr. SCLATER-BOOTH: Sir, the statements made in the article quoted by the right hon. Member are, I believe, correct. The officer who was responsible for the conduct of the convoy was in the employment of the Select Vestry of Liverpool and a married man of good character, and believed to be thoroughly trustworthy. I am informed that he has been discharged since this account appeared in the newspapers. As to the amendment of the laws concerning the removal of paupers, I can only repeat what I said last night in reply to a Question from the hon. Member for Cork, that the subject was under the consideration of the Government, and I hope to be able, after Christmas, to make a proposal on the subject.

THAMES TRAFFIC REGULATION.

QUESTION.

Mr. GOURLEY asked the President of the Board of Trade, What measures he has in contemplation for the better security of life and property in the navigation of the Thames and other large rivers; and, whether it is his intention to give effect to any and which of the changes suggested by the Commissioners' Court of Inquiry respecting the collision between the steamers "Princess Alice" and "Bywell Castle?"

Viscount SANDON: Sir, we are giving our most careful attention to the whole question of the traffic regulations as to the navigation of the Thames, which is in a totally different position from any other river as to the authorities which are responsible for its management and as to the conditions of its traffic. I have referred the Report of the Wreck Commissioner's Court to the very able Committee which I appointed during the autumn to consider the Thames traffic regulations. Until the final Report of that Committee is received, and we have had the opportunity of considering it, together with other information which throws light upon the subject, it is not possible for me to say what course the Government will propose to take next year. We have laid upon the Table of the House the evidence which this Committee has already taken, with the view of bringing before Parliament the points which have been already raised, and of thus enabling other evidence to be offered to the Committee, if in any quarter there should be a desire to do so. I shall present to Parliament all additional evidence, as well as the Committee's Report, on this important subject.

CYPRUS — AFGHANISTAN — THE LATE DEBATES.—EXPLANATIONS.

Mr. BOURKE: Sir, I wish, with the permission of the House, to correct an Answer which I gave to the hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke). It will be in the recollection of the House that two or three days ago the hon. Baronet asked me a Question as to jurisdiction in Cyprus, and I told him there had been no Correspondence with foreign Powers on that subject. He repeated that Question yesterday; and I think it fair to the hon. Baronet to say that if he had asked me that Question to-day, my answer would have been different. It would have been to the effect that questions have been put to us quite recently with respect to judicial arrangements in Cyprus.

Mr. E. STANHOPE: Sir, I also have to ask the kind indulgence of the House while I offer a few words of personal explanation. In the course of the debate on Monday last I described a letter of Sir Henry Norman's as "misleading." That description still appears to me an accurate one. But I am sorry to learn from the gallant officer that it has caused him some annoyance; because he thinks that the inference might be drawn from it that I imputed to him a desire to deceive the public. With the permission of the House I wish, therefore, to state publicly what I have already said privately, that such was far from being my meaning. I did not say, or think of saying, or suggesting, that Sir Henry Norman wrote the letter in question with the intention of misleading the public, nor did I think of implying anything derogatory to his personal honour.

ORDER OF THE DAY.

THE ADDRESS IN ANSWER TO THE QUEEN'S SPEECH.

ADDRESS REPORTED. AMENDMENT (MR. WHITBREAD).

ADJOURNED DEBATE. [FOURTH NIGHT.]

Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Amendment proposed to Question [9th December], "That the said Address be now read a second time."

And which Amendment was,

To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "this House disapproves the conduct of Her Majesty's Government which has resulted in the War with Afghanistan,"—(*Mr. Whitbread,*)

—instead thereof.

Question again proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

Debate *resumed.*

EARL PERCY said, that it appeared to him the remarks which fell from the Opposition side of the House, and especially from the front Opposition Bench, were distinguished by a degree of acrimony very unusual, and such as had not characterized previous debates. Charges had been made of the gravest character and hurled at the heads of Her Majesty's Government. And the greatest master of the English language in the House had tortured his mother tongue to find words to frame his charges, which almost amounted to an accusation of forgery and fraud on the part of Her Majesty's Government. The right hon. Gentleman had managed to make those charges without violating the Rules of the House; but he doubted very much whether such a course of proceeding did not greatly tend to lower the dignity of Parliament. The climax, however, was reached last night, when the hon. Member for the Elgin Burghs (Mr. Grant Duff) thought it consistent with his duty to read an extract from a private letter written long ago by one who, alas! was no longer present among them to explain what he had written, and had read that letter for the express purpose of impugning the veracity of a Government of which Lord Mayo, if he were still alive, would have been a distinguished ornament, and of which his brother was at this moment a valued Member. But as an attempt to impeach the *bona fides* of the Government, the feat of the hon. Member was eminently futile, for the action of Ministers must be criticized by the light of public documents officially presented to Parliament, and not of unexplained statements and private letters which were never intended for the public eye. He hoped, however, the example set by the hon. Gentleman, of quoting from private and unauthenticated letters, was one which would never be copied in that House. He would not dwell further upon these matters, because he believed the public was very little interested in the disputes which had been going on between Ministers. Turning to the question then under discussion, the real point at issue seemed to him to have been very clearly stated by the hon. Member for Bedford, when he said the conscience of the country required to be assured that the present war was just and necessary. He might omit the word "just," because he did not believe that a war could be necessary unless it could be shown to be just. But how were they to find that out? Those who had spoken from the Ministerial side of the House had given their reasons for believing it to be just and necessary; and the only way, it seemed to him, in which hon. Members opposite could prove that the present war was unnecessary, was by showing that the difficulties which we had to meet could be overcome by some other means than those which had been adopted by the Government. That question was dealt with very fully by the Postmaster General, who put to the House a number of dilemmas which would have to be confronted, and from which he asked the House to extricate him. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich, indeed, in replying to the speech of the Postmaster

General, contended that it was not fair to ask the Opposition to state what course they would pursue in a position of affairs which he said had been brought about by the errors of others; but, admitting the force of that argument, he thought if it could be shown that the Opposition before the present Government was in power was already in a situation so embarrassing that they had never been able to recover from it—that one step taken after another rather increased than diminished their difficulties—the Government might at least demand that some hon. Member of the Opposition should state what they could have done to extricate themselves from difficulties which their own errors had created. The right hon. Gentleman had taken the Postmaster General to task for not quoting from the Blue Book; and he would therefore trouble the House with a few quotations for the purpose of showing that the right hon. Gentleman and his friends were not free from blame in connection with the present question. Now, he regarded what had occurred in 1873 as being the turning-point of the whole question. Russia had at the time made great advances in Central Asia. Shere Ali was alarmed at those advances, and applied for encouragement and assistance to the British Government, who had always professed to be his ally. The answer sent out by telegraph from this country, on the 26th of July, 1873, by the Duke of Argyll, was as follows:—"Cabinet"—that word included the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich and his Colleagues—

> "thinks you should inform Ameer that we do not at all share his alarm, and consider there is no cause for it: but you may assure him we shall maintain our settled policy in favour of Afghanistan, if he abides by our advice in external affairs."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 108.]

The settled policy referred to was set forth in the despatch, dated the 1st of July, 1869—than which he knew nothing in the whole of the Papers or in Parliamentary literature which contained a more grim piece of irony—in which it was stated that while no British soldiers should ever be permitted to cross the Frontier to coerce the rebellious subjects of the Ameer; that no European officers should be placed as Residents in his cities; that no fixed subsidy or money allowance would be given him for any named period; that no promise of assistance in other ways would be made; and that no Treaty would be entered into obliging us under every circumstance to recognize him or his descendants Rulers of Afghanistan; yet that we were prepared to give him all the moral support in our power, and that, in addition, we were willing to assist him with money, arms, and ammunition whenever we deemed it possible or desirable to do so. Now, the policy which was thus announced, and which was called an intermediate one, reminded him very much of the game of "Heads I win, tails you lose;" and it was his settled conviction that from that time Shere Ali gave up all hope of real protection from us, and determined to throw himself into the arms of Russia, for in the following November they found him writing in friendly terms to General Kaufmann. The Ameer knew that he was a weak Power between two strong ones; and unless England were prepared to give him the assistance at once that he had a fair right to expect, he (Earl Percy) could not see what he was to do but to look for assistance from the other Power. He did not mean to say that the Ameer had not other causes of complaint. It was, however, curious to see how often a statement that had been over and over again refuted was repeated in the debates of the House. He had supposed that it had been proved to demonstration that the sending an Envoy was not the cause of the Ameer's disaffection, and that he had at one time even been anxious to receive one. ["No!"] If the fact was still doubted, he would quote from a letter written by the Agent at Cabul to the Commissioner at Peshawur on April 14, 1872, in which the Ameer had said that "if the British Government preferred to depute an English officer to him he should have no objection to that course." That, then, was not the real cause of Shere Ali's discontent. There was another reason, equally weighty and more probable—namely, our interference on behalf of Yakoob Khan. To his astonishment the hon. Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread) the other evening had said that he highly approved that course. Certainly he had not imagined that that act would ever have been endorsed by the other side of the House; and, as that was one of the more or less immediate causes of Shere Ali's alienation, it was all the more necessary for the Opposition to say what steps they would have taken and what remedies they would have proposed—to quote the words of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich—to retrieve the errors of the past. But though he cordially approved the policy of the present Government, he could not fail to see that it had one defect—a defect, however, for which they were not responsible: that it had come too late. They were only shutting the stable door after the steed had been stolen. The policy of masterly inactivity towards Russia which had been pursued for the last 40 years had borne its fruit. Before every advance of Russia in Central Asia she had taken care to assure us that she had come to the very limits of her Empire; that accidental circumstances made the advance in question necessary; but that she had no desire for any increase of territory. But we had been deceived on each occasion. Once, indeed, we had fought Russia, and had stopped her advance in Europe; but no sooner had the Crimean War ended than we allowed her to destroy the Circassians, who in some measure barred her advance in Asia. Then, again, we had had assurances from her in 1864, followed by her advance to Tashkend; and at last, in 1871, she announced her intention of tearing up the Treaty of Paris, so far as it related to the Black Sea. The policy of masterly inactivity was then in vogue, and the Government of the day "saw no cause for alarm whatever." Finally, that same policy had permitted the Russian advance to Khiva; and, less than two years ago, had deluged with blood the whole of the East of Europe. Even at that time the policy of hon. Gentlemen opposite, which still fettered the country, was far from being prepared to stem the tide of Russian conquest; indeed, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich was perfectly ready to help Russia to drive the Turks out of Europe. He hoped he had not spoken of Russia with bitterness. He quite agreed with the hon. Member for South Northumberland (Mr. Ridley) in his remark that aggression was very often unavoidable; and that we, remembering our own conquests in India, could hardly complain of Russia succeeding in a similar exploit in another part of the world. So far from any intentional acerbity of speech towards Russia, he had only wished to show the danger of the policy of masterly inactivity. It was by no means a new policy, seeing that it had its parallel in the animal kingdom, in the conduct of those birds who, when pursued, buried their heads in the sand, and owed their destruction to their imagined security. Before many years hon. Gentlemen on the other side of the House would be in Office. ["No, no!"] Well, he hoped he was wrong; but suppose such an event to take place, they would have again the same spectacle which they had had for the last 40 years. The consequence of the constant change of Governments in this country was that they would never be able to compete in foreign policy with Russia. She could always outwit them; and a change of Government in this country was, so far as foreign policy was concerned, tantamount to a revolution. With this constant shifting and changing policy we could not expect to be able to meet a Power which had extended her conquests without cessation on a uniform plan for the last 200 years to an extent which had never been equalled since the creation of the Roman Empire. Our policy of masterly inactivity meant, as Lord Napier of Magdala had said, "receding from difficulties till they became serious dangers," and had been allowed to continue far too long. They had a serious duty to perform as Members of that House; and he hoped that the House and the country would show by their voice that they appreciated the change which had been made in the counsels of Her Majesty; and that they preferred the policy of the present Government to that of a Ministry which had neither skill, knowledge, nor courage to face the difficulties and dangers which confronted them.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT said, he was prepared to forgive the noble Lord who had last spoken for the hard words he had applied to Her Majesty's Opposition in consideration of the consolatory prophecy they had just listened to with respect to the change that was likely to take place in their position. He thought one sophism had been employed in that debate by which they were not likely to be deceived in that House. Certain journals were very fond of declaring that they had nothing to do with the past and had only to consider the present. That was a doctrine very pleasant and natural to journals, which, like the ephemeral insect, had a term of life of 24 hours. It was often expedient to them to forget the past. But the House of Commons had a very different function. They had to judge of a policy and to determine the justice of a war; and in so doing they must consider the past circumstances on which that policy was founded, and the causes by which that war had been occasioned. The noble Lord himself, and others on his side of the House, showed that they themselves admitted this; and therefore he brushed away this nonsensical rubbish, which he was sure would not occupy or command the attention of the House for a single moment. The questions they had to decide in that debate were these—had the policy of Her Majesty's Government been wise, and was the war a just one? The noble Lord the Postmaster General had heaped a great deal of abuse upon the old policy, and had used strong epithets about it, and the noble Earl who had just sat down seemed to share in his opinions. He was not himself a pedantic adherent of the old policy; but he thought it was a very good one in its time, for it was agreed to by eminent statesmen, both in India and England. To talk of it contemptuously as "an old, exploded policy" might suit the noble Lord the Postmaster General; but he did not think the noble Lord was a very great authority on Indian affairs. He admitted it was impossible to have a fixed policy, for when circumstances changed, the policy must be modified to suit the new situation of things; and if Her Majesty's Government justified the new policy on the ground that the old one required to be modified, he would not quarrel with that position. Now, in argument, he held it to be the best thing to grapple with the good points made by his adversaries, and not to waste powder and shot upon the bad ones. Therefore, he should very briefly dismiss what he called the bad points on the other side. He regretted, however, that a great deal of recrimination had been used which was quite beside the question; and he could not absolve hon. Gentlemen opposite from a share of the responsibility of introducing it. For instance, the Government contended that the policy of Lord Northbrook was the cause of the estrangement of the Ameer, and led to what followed. They said Lord Northbrook was too cold and cautious and repellent, and that when they came to deal with the Ameer they came too late, for they found him angry. But he did not think this view was just; and, at any rate, Her Majesty's Government were not entitled to advance it. If they thought, just before they took Office in 1873, that Lord Northbrook was too cold, too cautious, too repellent to the Ameer, and that he had been held back from going further, not by his own judgment, but by the influence of the Government, why did not they give him further and different instructions in 1874? But the remarkable fact was that though in 1874 Her Majesty's Government were in Office, they never thought for one moment of sending instructions to Lord Northbrook to offer better terms to the Ameer—to go further and secure his loyal and cordial support. If they thought Lord Northbrook did not go far enough, they were guilty of the most culpable negligence if they did not give him fresh instructions. In 1875, it was true, they did give fresh instructions to Lord Northbrook. But what were they? Not to offer better terms; but Lord Salisbury, in his despatches to Lord Northbrook, urged him to demand conditions which were of a most odious and obnoxious character. Therefore, the Government were not entitled to say that what had happened had happened because Lord Northbrook did not offer sufficiently good terms to the Ameer, because they themselves did not on the two subsequent occasions make any other offers. Why, then, did the Government say that Lord Northbrook was too cold, too cautious, too repellent—he might almost say, too costive in his offers to the Ameer? What were these instructions given in 1873? Lord Salisbury wrote that the Viceroy ought, by superior intellect and force of character, to triumph over the stubborn prejudices of the Ameer. Well, they had tried that superior intellect and that force of character, and they had not triumphed over the stubborn prejudices of the Ameer. During all that time they were not disposed to be the least degree more liberal than Lord Northbrook and the Duke of Argyll had been. He would now pass on to another point that had been brought forward, and, as he thought, had been much misunderstood. They said that the course they had taken had been made necessary because the Ameer had entered into objectionable communications with Russia. But the Papers proved that this was utterly untrue. Before the Government began their operations with the Ameer in the beginning of 1876, there had been no communications between the Ameer and Russia of a character of which they could, in the least degree, complain. It was true there were communications, as there always had been since the time of Lord Mayo; but the English Government had not disapproved them. In 1870 Shere Ali received a communication from General Kaufmann on the 15th of May, and he wrote to inform Lord Mayo of it, and, in reply, Lord Mayo wrote back to the Ameer—

> "These letters will, doubtless, be, when rightly understood, a source of satisfaction and an additional ground of confidence to your Highness."—[*Central Asia*, No. 1 (1878), p. 185.]

In fact, Lord Mayo congratulated the Ameer on having received these letters, and suggested to him, and advised him, to send a most cordial and friendly answer. It had been said that these communications originated in the time of Lord Northbrook. They did not. They originated with Lord Mayo, and were continued by subsequent Viceroys. In 1875, the present Government conducted an amicable negotiation with Russia on the subject of Afghanistan; and throughout the whole of the Correspondence which then took place there was not a word of complaint by the English Government that the Russian Government was holding improper communications with Shere Ali, and why was there not? If it had existed, that surely would be the first thing complained of. Was not the explanation that at that time there was no complaint to be made? Even in the instructions of Lord Salisbury to Lord Lytton there was not a word of complaint of these communications, although in those instructions the policy to be pursued was very fully set out. Why? because even then there was no reason to complain. The first complaint, indeed, was contained in Lord Lytton's telegram of September 16 and in his letter of September 18, in which he says—"the Ameer no longer communicates with us, and asks us what answer he shall give." Just so. That complaint was in September. It was in July that you had done the mischief, and it was in consequence of what you then said that he acted in this way. The Government were really responsible for the attitude of the Ameer, and their policy could not be defended on any such ground as that. Having thus swept away what he called the false points raised, he would next grapple with the real and true points at issue. The rupture of the communications to the Ameer was not the cause of the Government's policy, but the effect of their conduct. They said they were obliged to alter, or modify, the old policy for two reasons—because the Ameer was sore and alienated, and because Russia was advancing. Those were two very good reasons, because they acted and re-acted on each other. It did not signify much if the Ameer was sore if Russia were not advancing; or if Russia were advancing, provided the Ameer were staunch. But if Russia were advancing and the Ameer were alienated, things might turn out very awkwardly indeed. Had Her Majesty's Government taken the line of regarding that as a good reason for making a better offer to the Ameer, with the view of conciliating him, he should have said that they were perfectly right. He should have supported them in making any offer and in paying any bribe that would have secured to us the friendship of the Ameer, which he was aware was of vital importance to our Indian Empire. He made these admissions, because he wished to get at the actual fact that the Ameer was sore and irritable and suspicious, and that we wished to gain his friendship and to secure his alliance. But the question he had to ask Her Majesty's Government was, how did they proceed in these circumstances? Had they adopted methods best calculated to gain their end, and had the result of the course they had taken been to secure for us the friendship and the cordial alliance of the Ameer? If it were desired to mount a plunging, restless horse, it would not do to approach him flourishing a whip, and, when mounted, it was not desirable to begin jogging at the curb and sticking the spurs into his ribs; otherwise the rider would meet with a fall, just as we had met with a fall in Afghanistan in 1842. How did the Government begin to approach the Ameer? Instead of conciliating him, and so securing his friendship, they began by announcing that they were going to send Sir Lewis Pelly to Cabul. Did they think that that was the most agreeable way to approach the Ameer? Was that the way Lord Mayo dealt with him in 1869, or Lord Northbrook dealt with him in 1873? They knew his objection to receiving an Envoy, and the one met him at Umballa and the other received his Prime Minister at Simla. Why did not the Government follow this example? Her Majesty's Government must have known that if anything would make the Ameer irritable and discontented, it was to send an Envoy to him at Cabul. Then, whom had they selected as their Envoy? They had chosen Sir Lewis Pelly. He was a man of great ability; but, most unfortunately, with his name there were ominous associations, for he was the man who had just before been employed to depose the Gaekwar of Baroda. That he considered very bad diplomacy. He did not care to cast much blame upon Lord Lytton in this matter. He had had the good fortune to enjoy the friendship of that noble Lord for some time; and he did not desire, in the discharge of a public duty, to say a word that would imperil a continuance of that friendship. He believed that Lord Lytton had merely performed his duty in carrying into effect the instructions he had received from the Home Government. Therefore, he was surprised to hear the Chancellor of the Exchequer that evening speak as if he declined to accept the responsibility of a phrase used by Lord Lytton. He should hold the Government responsible for everything Lord Lytton did, and for every word he spoke; and he should no more think of blaming him for what had happened than he should of blaming the gallant General Roberts or Sir Samuel Browne in the Khyber. Above all, he did not blame him for the instructions sent out by Lord Salisbury, "to create opportunities of approaching" the sore and suspicious Ameer. That was language, he was happy to say, which was new in the instructions of English statesmen, and he was glad that Lord Northbrook made a worthy answer to so unworthy a suggestion. When it was made to him he told Lord Salisbury what his Lordship ought to have known. He told his Lordship not only that that was a course which ought not to be pursued, but that it was a course which was sure to fail, and that the only chance of success lay in honestly and frankly approaching the Ameer and telling him what we meant. But when Lord Lytton received those instructions to "create an opportunity," what occurred? In his despatch in reply he rightly interpreted the meaning of the Secretary of State, for he said—"I found a pretext." A pretext! That was not a nice word. They were going to approach a man whom they desired to conciliate, and whose confidence they wished to secure, and they used a pretext! And what was the "pretext" made use of? It was that of announcing to the Ameer the assumption by Her Majesty of the title of Empress of India. When the Secretary of State for India instructed the Viceroy of India to employ that grand new title of Empress of India to delude an Indian Prince, it was not a fortunate way of inaugurating the new title. Lord Salisbury had congratulated Lord Lytton upon his having the qualities of a Scotchman. He did not know whether the Scotch Members of that House would regard that left-handed compliment as very flattering. Lord Lytton, at all events, understood it to mean what was called "smartness" in America, although it had other names in other countries. He should say that a man who created opportunities and found pretexts was guilty of what was termed "sharp practice" in England. And it was the fundamental fault that he found with our policy in dealing with the Ameer that we had preferred "sharp practice" to being frank and open. His first great charge against the Government was that they had endeavoured to "bamboozle" the Ameer. They went to him with a pretext, and thought he would not find them out. But Lord Northbrook told them that he would, and he did. Yet they were told in proof of his hostility that at this interview he was suspicious. He had heard of these men as barbarians and savages; but, for his part, he thought the Prime Minister of the Ameer conducted himself at Peshawur with the greatest ability. To go to this man with the pretexts and opportunities that they had found, and yet think he would not be suspicious, showed an amount of pettiness and blundering diplomacy which it was impossible sufficiently to condemn. Our Native Agent told us the Ameer would be glad to come to terms, if he was convinced of our meaning real business; but that we must be clear and open in our communications, as the Afghans had come to suspect a secret meaning in all we said. And was the Ameer far wrong in that supposition? By sending Sir Lewis Pelly upon one pretext, in order that he might do another thing, they raised a suspicion of our conduct at the very outset. To this request for the reception of Sir Lewis Pelly the Ameer was said to have sent a hostile answer. The Ameer wrote that before he received Sir Lewis Pelly he would rather know what we meant; and then the Government said—"Here is this stupid, hostile, obstinate fellow who won't be satisfied by our pretexts." A more unfair, a more unjust, and a more ungrounded cause of war, in his opinion, had never been put forward. What was the consequence? On July 5 they wrote an angry letter, which was calculated to destroy all chance of a satisfactory arrangement with the Ameer. The Indian Government said they would not receive his Envoy because he would not receive theirs. Was that the conduct of Lord Northbrook's Government? They received the Ameer's Envoy, though he would not receive theirs. They adopted the course which was most likely to succeed. On July 8 the Indian Government wrote a letter to the Ameer, threatening that if he would not do what they liked they would have done with him. From that moment his communications with Russia began. In the telegram of September 16, and the despatch of September 18, Lord Lytton said that now the Ameer had ceased to ask advice from them; now he was dangerously communicating with Russia. They had refused, at first, to receive his Agent at all; but at last they consented—and it seemed to him one of the few sensible things they had done—that the Native Envoy should come to Peshawur, for the purpose of ascertaining the views of the British Government, and those views were frankly communicated to him. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had been challenged that night on the important preliminary statement which was made before the Conference.

> "What is there," said the Viceroy, "to prevent us from providing for the security of our Frontier by an understanding with Russia, which might have the effect of wiping Afghanistan out of the map altogether? If the Ameer does not desire to come to a speedy understanding with us, Russia does; and she desires it at his expense."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 183.]

The Chancellor of the Exchequer did not like that passage. Anybody who heard his answer that night must have seen that the Government felt the pinch of that part of the case. And that extraordinary statement admitted of being viewed in two aspects. It was true, or it was not true. If it was true, what did it mean? It was what might be called, in the language of the auction-room, a sort of international "knock-out"—that was to say, if they could not buy the man whom they wanted to conciliate at their own price, they were to settle the matter elsewhere. If it was not true, what was to be thought of that style of negotiation? He knew that in the Court of Chancery, if a man was found to have made such a proposal to a creditor, it would set aside the contract for fraud. He asked again, was it true or not true? Was it to go forth to India that this was the way in which the Government dealt with Eastern Princes—that they went to them and made statements of a particular character, for the purpose of influencing and compelling them to take a certain course, but that they afterwards came forward in the House of Commons and said—"Oh! it was not correct?" That was a transaction materially affecting the reputation of the British Government, and also affecting the maintenance of its authority in India, and a clear and distinct account should be given of it. Well, at Peshawur, they professed to offer the Ameer certain terms, and they imposed on him a certain condition. It was said that Lord Northbrook had offered him terms too narrow, too cautious, too reserved. They offered him no better terms. It was true they offered him a Treaty. He would not weary the House by going into the details of that Treaty; but anybody who compared them with the assurances offered by Lord Northbrook would admit that, in the main, the terms offered in that Treaty did not exceed the assurances offered either by Lord Mayo or by Lord Northbrook. The Ameer's Prime Minister, in answer to the proposals made at Peshawur, said he had got those things already under the Treaties of 1855 and 1857, and that he also had the assurances of Lord Mayo in writing, and likewise those of Lord Northbrook. The Indian Government declared the Treaty of 1857 to have expired; and, as to what had passed between Lord Mayo and Lord Northbrook, they said they were only verbal assurances. When he looked at those transactions he condemned them as regarded their bearing on the Ameer, but far more because they would ruin our moral authority and influence in India. What was meant by drawing that distinction between Treaties and verbal assurances? Of course, there was a difference between the two. There was a difference between a promise and a deed; but what would be thought of the man who, when another came to claim from him the fulfilment of a promise, turned round and said—"You might have got a deed, and you only got a promise?" That was the exact parallel to this case. He referred to pages 218 and 219 in the Afghanistan Correspondence; and he maintained that, explain it away how they might, the language held by the Viceroy on the distinction between verbal assurances and Treaties was most dangerous language, and likely to be most mischievous to our authority in India. It was, in practice, found very useful for the Government to give assurances on which the Indian Princes might rely where Treaties might not be convenient; but when the transactions contained in that Correspondence went forth to India, the confidence of the Native Princes would be shaken in assurances such as those given by Lord Mayo and Lord Northbrook to the Ameer. That was one of the gravest items in the indictment against the Government. Such was the character of the offers made at Peshawur; and he was not surprised that the Ameer was not at all inclined to accept them, because he had got quite as good before. But then what was the *sine quâ non*—the condition precedent—which they imposed on him? They said they would not discuss or enter into the negotiation with him unless he *ab initio*, and before all things, swallowed the condition, which they knew was the most obnoxious thing they could impose on him. All the Indian authorities had told them so—they knew he had always resisted it—and yet wanting to be conciliatory towards the Ameer and anxious to secure their influence in Afghanistan, was it fair to tell him that if he did not agree to accept a resident British Minister in his country they would renounce all their former arrangements with him? They might be wise in desiring to have a resident Minister in Afghanistan—he thought they were wise in desiring that; but all their former arrangements and assurances had been based on the principle that he was not to have a resident Agent; and they had no right to repudiate all previous understandings unless he would accept that condition. If they wanted that condition, they ought to have conciliated him by offering him handsome terms, and then at the end of the thing have said—"Dear Sir, we have done all that you wish, and now will you not waive the objection you had before?" To that there might not have been the smallest objection, and they might have achieved legitimately that which they desired. But that was not at all their course. They put it in the forefront of their battle; they said—"You shall give us the thing which you always have disliked giving us, and if you do not we will not discuss or negotiate, but we will repudiate everything that has gone before." It had been sought to show, by quoting Captain Grey's testimony, that the Ameer was once ready to accept a British Agent, and that having afterwards objected to receive one was evidence of his hostility. But the evidence as to that entirely broke down. A letter had been addressed by Lord Mayo to the Duke of Argyll—an authority which the noble Lord who had spoken last would respect—explaining exactly what was done in 1869. It had been supposed that Lord Mayo had gone too far in his pledges to the Ameer. Now, in that letter Lord Mayo said—

> "The only pledges given were that we would not interfere with his affairs; that we would support his independence; and that we would not force European officers or residents on him against his will."

The very thing that Lord Mayo promised should not be done against the will of the Ameer was forced upon him as a condition which if he did not swallow the negotiations would be broken off. That was unfair; it was impolitic; it rendered successful negotiations from the first impossible. In diplomacy you do not begin with an Ultimatum; but here the Ameer received an Ultimatum at the outset. That was a preposterous proceeding on the part of the Government. And there was this curious fact, which should be borne in mind. The Ameer said before the Envoy was sent—" I dislike this very much; but rather than quarrel with the English I will ultimately accept it. Only allow me to send my Envoy to Peshawur." In other words—" Only let me state my arguments against your proposed conditions, and if you still insist I will yield." What could be fairer than that? It was a proceeding to which, at all events, Her Majesty's Government could not object, because it was made the basis of the Salisbury-Schouvaloff agreement. He had always thought it was an effort of original genius to protest at the outset, but to state you were willing to yield; but now it appeared to be an Asiatic patent which Her Majesty's Government borrowed from the Ameer of Afghanistan. It was an ingenious method of settling matters, and Her Majesty's Government made use of it in settling matters in Berlin; they protested, but, as it was known they would, they ultimately gave way. Well, the negotiation was broken off, and Lord Salisbury, in his despatch, approved what had taken place, and he used language which was new to the Foreign Office, for he said—" You were quite right to take advantage of the death of the Envoy." Lord Salisbury was always taking advantage; he was always creating opportunities; he was always finding pretexts—and such was the new spirit of our foreign policy. What did they think would be its effect upon the Princes of India? The Government summoned the Envoy of the Ameer to Peshawur; they created opportunities; they invented pretexts; they knew that in the end he was prepared to concede that which was demanded; and then they took advantage of the death of the Envoy to close the negotiations. And that was the foundation of this just and necessary war; and in their telegram to the Viceroy the Government congratulated him that his proceedings would get rid of all entanglements. What were these entanglements? As he understood, they were the verbal assurances given by Lord Mayo and Lord Northbrook. They wished to repudiate all liability to the Ameer, and that was the way they terminated the sublime negotiations which were intended to conciliate the Ameer, and secure the cordial support of Afghanistan. Well, it did not belong to any man to dive into the motives of another; but all he could say was this—that if the object of Her Majesty's Government was exactly the opposite of that which they professed; if they desired to break with the Ameer; if they desired to lay the foundation of a war with him; if they desired to annex his territory and rectify their Indian Frontier, they could not have found a more successful method of doing so than that. This he did say—that the method they pursued, and the manner in which they pursued it, were indefensibly wrong from first to last. What could they expect to occur? In March, 1877, they had shaken the dust of the Ameer off their feet, and he turned to the Gentiles. What else could he do? As he stated in his letter, he saw the Russians approaching his Frontier; he saw himself deserted by the English, who denied all liability on their part to defend him; he was plied by his powerful neighbour, and he received a Russian Mission. How could he be expected to do anything else? Then Her Majesty's Government came to Parliament, having made this terrible and deplorable mess —["Oh!"]—yes, mess—by want of straightforwardness, temper, and common sense, and they asked—"In the name of Heaven, what are we to do now?" It was just like a ruined gamester, who had lost all his fortune, asking what he was to do; or like a man who had attempted suicide and half cut his throat asking what he was to do. When men got into such scrapes, how could they be aided? What did the Government do? The next stage was to find an opportunity to take in Parliament. These transactions were no sooner finished—no sooner had they forfeited the friendship of the Ameer and alienated Afghanistan, which was the bulwark of our Indian Frontier—than they were interrogated on the subject in Parliament. They were asked, was it true that they were forcing an Envoy on the Ameer, whether the Ameer was alienated, whether their policy was changed? That was a very grave matter. It went a great deal further than India; it struck at the very root of Constitutional government and Parliamentary control. The negotiations had broken down; the Ameer had been driven into the arms of Russia. There was only one way in which they could repair the disaster, and that was by a free and full discussion in Parliament. If Parliament condemned the proceeding, the policy would have been changed. On the other hand, if Parliament approved it, the war would have been justified. The Government adopted neither of these national and Constitutional courses. They were prevented by a statement. He would not condescend to criticize the words of people who spoke by the card; but he said, without fear of contradiction, that the answer given to the question asked was calculated to produce, and did produce, an impression that nothing serious had happened; that no change had taken place in policy; and that things stood as they had before in Afghanistan. He was not one of those who believed that negotiations ought to be conducted on the Table of Parliament. If Lord Salisbury had stated that affairs were in a critical and delicate state; that the matter, as he thought, ought not to be proceeded with; and that he should reserve any statement in Parliament, he would have been supported. He was sure the right hon. Gentleman opposite was always supported when he made such an appeal. Or Lord Salisbury might have said that he could not enter into details, as circumstances had arisen which made it necessary to change the former policy; he would then, too, have been supported; but he did neither of these things. What he did was to give to the English Parliament and nation an absolutely incorrect impression as to the state of affairs. Therefore he said with great regret, but he said it deliberately, that a course like that, taken not upon that occasion merely, would have this mischievous effect—that the assurances of Ministers henceforth could not, and would not, be regarded with that implicit credit with which they had hitherto been received. There was another feature of an extremely disagreeable character in these negotiations. The Conference at Peshawur was closed on the 30th of March last year, and it was not till the 10th of May following that a despatch on the subject was written by the Viceroy. Now, the Viceroy, unlike the Secretary of State, could not act alone; he was obliged to act with his Council. Well, as we now know, the policy of the Viceroy was protested against by one-half of the Members of the Council; but no hint of the difference of opinion among them was at that time allowed to transpire. On the 18th of April the last dissenting Member of the Council resigned; and it was not till after that date that the first despatch of the Viceroy in regard to the Conference was written. Thus, but for circumstances which he had seen complained of, the English nation would have been left in total ignorance of the very important fact that one-half of the Indian Council had dissented from the policy pursued by the Viceroy. Now, this secrecy and want of frankness was of most serious import to our Parliamentary system. He did not claim for Parliament a voice in all negotiations—that was impossible; but it often, and indeed generally, happened, that in matters of great public importance past Governments in this country had sought the sympathy and support of Parliament rather than attempt to conceal from it what was going on. The Government now boasted of their new policy. Why did they not boast of it in 1877? Why did they try to persuade us that there was no new policy at all then? If the old policy deserved the epithets which had been applied to it by the Postmaster General, why did we hear nothing of this in 1877? What the Government wanted—nothing else could explain what happened—was that nothing should be known about their new policy, and they took the course of smuggling it through. Well, what happened next? The Russian Mission went to Cabul, and the Government were then placed in an almost impossible situation. They thought they must send a Mission also, and he did not say that they were wrong—he thought, perhaps, they were right. It was the result of the difficulties which the Government had manufactured for themselves. But even then, considering what had passed, they ought to have sought a friendly solution, which, even then, he thought was not impossible. They ought to have made the matter as little humiliating to the Ameer as was possible under the circumstances. What happened? Our Mission was ordered to start on a certain day, and the time of its arrival was postponed somewhat in consequence of the death of the Ameer's son and heir, but still was pressed forward without much consideration for his feelings under the circumstances. Gholam Hussein was told to go on and force the Ameer into consenting to what was an odious and painful thing before the period of mourning was half over. It would be seen from the Papers that the conduct of our Envoy towards the Ameer must have been horrible and heart-rending. [Admiral Sir WILLIAM EDMONSTONE: Oh, oh!] Well, perhaps nothing would rend the heart of the hon. and gallant Admiral. Being made of the old British oak, it would take a good deal to rend his heart; still, he knew the hon. and gallant Admiral to be a most amiable man, and thought he would have respected one who had lost his son and heir. At all events, the conscience of this nation would have been quieter if the Government had had patience and waited until the days of mourning were over before compelling the Ameer to give an answer. The Ameer begged and entreated, and his Vizier swore that if the Government would have a little patience he would consent to receive a Mission at Cabul. But the Ameer was not listened to. The Government treated him differently from what they treated the Turks. They waited for months and years for the fulfilment of Turkish promises of reform, but would not wait for the answer of the Ameer a week. Gholam returned fromCabul on the 6th of October, and, no doubt, made a report to the Viceroy. Why was not that report produced? They had asked for it over and over again, but had never got it. Sir Neville Chamberlain's letter of the 12th of October showed that the Ameer would, if he had been shown a little indulgence, have ultimately received our Mission honourably; and, the Russian Mission being withdrawn, everything might have ended satisfactorily. But, no; such a course would not have suited the purposes of the Government, and so war was brought about. Well, what had been the result of all this? Had the Government secured Afghanistan? What was the present position of Afghanistan? What were the Government going to do with it? They proposed to set up a "scientific Frontier," of which no definition had been given by the Government, but which was understood to mean a line extending somewhere from about Jellalabad down to Candahar, and thence to Quetta. That, however, was but a narrow strip. What was to be done with the rest? If they did not know, he would tell them. We had made the Afghans our enemies, and in taking our scientific Frontier we should be making a present of Afghanistan to Russia. The result of the policy of the Government would be to make Afghanistan an Asiatic Bulgaria. The Afghans would detest us and love the Russians, as the Bulgarians did. That was the result of these negotiations. A more dangerous or more mischievous result than this—the natural and inevitable consequence of the policy of the Government—it was impossible to conceive. Do not let it be supposed that the Opposition disparaged the value of Afghanistan; on the contrary, they thought it more important perhaps than the Government did. But what was the meaning of the Russians having conciliated and secured the affections of the Afghans? It meant that Russia was increasing her influence over these parts and getting to the eastern flank of Persia, and that we were losing the only chance we had of countervailing that influence by making a present to her of Afghanistan. Every acre of Afghanistan which we did not occupy was secured by Russia. What were the Government going to do? Were they going into the course which they themselves had condemned by giving up the whole of Afghanistan to Russia? He charged the policy of the Government in this matter with exactly the same vices and injurious consequences as he charged their Eastern European policy. The Government had been opposing Russia for years, and what had been the result? The Government were to have secured Afghanistan to England exactly as they were to have maintained the integrity of the Turkish Empire, and a pretty job they had made of both. The result was that, during their Administration, the Government had been playing the part to Russia very much that the wind did to the kite, enabling her to soar. What they had done for Bulgaria they were now doing for Afghanistan. In the course of the past three years Russia, thanks to Her Majesty's Ministers, had made more progress than she did under the reigns of Peter the Great and the Empress Catherine put together. The Opposition predicted what would happen if Russia were allowed to make war against Turkey single-handed, and the anticipated consequences had followed from the policy protested against. The Government were told by Lord Northbrook what would happen if this policy were pursued towards Afghanistan; and the result had been that we had lost Afghanistan, just as we had lost half of European Turkey and allowed it to go practically to Russia. If this went on long enough, Russia would overshadow the earth under the influence of the same policy. This was only part of a still greater question. They had been told that they were to take these matters on a broad issue. He took it on the broadest issue of all. The Government said they had got a new policy in Afghanistan. Yes, they had got a new policy in Afghanistan, and the noble Lord who spoke last said they had got a new policy in Europe too. [Earl Percy remarked that he had not said anything of the kind.] He was sorry that he misunderstood the noble Lord. Well, the keynote of that policy was sounded the other night by the guiding and animating spirit of that policy. And they knew what it was. It was a denunciation of the deleterious doctrines of those upon whom the Divine blessing was once pronounced — those who sought peace and pursued it. It was not here a question of the Afghan Frontier. We were here face to face with the dangerous spirit of this new policy in Europe. No word had been spared, every endeavour had been endorsed, to arouse the suspicions of this nation—to exasperate its animosities—to provoke the pride of a high-spirited people. It seemed to him that they were going to make other wars inevitable, as they had made the Afghan War, to cover the deficiencies of the Government. They had roused a spirit which they could not repress; they had summoned this war spirit as their slave, and it had become their master; they had made this little shabby war to gratify the war spirit at the expense of a people who could afford it less well than ours. How far were we to-day off a great war? That was what he wanted to know. The policy of the Government was an Imperial policy! Yes, it was an Imperial policy—it was a servile imitation of the Imperialism of the Second Empire. That Empire began after a little war. It had a Mexican expedition. It was to exalt the Latin races. It was to gratify the pride of the French people. But the popularity of that little war flickered out, as the popularity of this war would flicker out. But then the Second Empire was obliged to have a great war—a war to rectify the Frontier of France, and they were to march to Berlin. Yes; the policy of the Government was not a policy of peace. Some of them might go farther and some might go less far in that direction. The Attorney General was one of the advanced guard, and he remembered the hon. and learned Gentleman's speech at Preston. The hon. and learned Gentleman was a most frank and independent man; when he differed from the Government to which he belonged he never was afraid to say so. He had told his constituents that the policy of the Government was wrong, and that if he had been at the head of affairs he would have made war with Russia long ago. And, therefore, they would have in him the best and truest exponent of this new blood-and-thunder policy. Yes; he knew it well. The Government had hoisted the old red flag of the Tory Party — the bloody red flag of the Tory Party — and he knew what the Tory Party was, and the crew that sailed beneath it; it was a gaunt and grisly company. [*Laughter.*] That was no personal observation. The company of which he spoke, which sailed under that flag, was war, taxation, poverty, distress. The Liberal Party had its flag too. It was the old flag. It bore very different words—the old words of peace, retrenchment, and reform. The time was not far distant when these two flags were going to meet in a General Election. To his mind, the sooner the better. There had been some single skirmishes since the last General Election; and in this Session some private Members had taken their seats who bore the latest voice of the country, and three-fourths or four-fifths of them would record their vote in condemnation of the Government policy.

Well, they knew the flag of the Government, and what the flag of the Liberal Party was too. For his part, he was not for this new, bastard, Imperial policy. He was for the old policy. The noble Lord would not contradict him now. The noble Lord described it as an interlude in the policy of the last 40 years. Yes; he was for the old policy of the last 40 years. During that period it had been the happy fortune of the Sovereign of these Realms to preside over the advance of this nation in a period of unmixed, almost unbroken, prosperity and peace. He feared that Her Majesty's present Advisers were preparing a very different future for her reign if this interlude continued. It seemed to him that during the last 40 years which the noble Lord condemned the prayer which was daily offered for the Throne had been answered, that peace and happiness had been established on the foundation of truth and justice. Every man in this House knew that in this English land to-day there was neither peace nor happiness; and he would vote in condemnation of the Government to-night because he believed that that unhappy result was mainly due to the cause that the Advisers of the Crown had departed from the paths of truth and justice.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir JOHN HOLKER) said, the attack of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Oxford was altogether so terrible that it almost seemed like temerity on his part to rise for the purpose of combating some of his statements, which, however, he hoped he should do calmly and dispassionately, and with a little less thunder than his hon. and learned Friend had used, and with arguments more relevant to the matter in hand. It was certainly very gratifying that the hon. and learned Gentleman contemplated the consummation of the prophecy of the noble Lord who spoke first with such great satisfaction. The possibility of its confirmation was not accepted with so much satisfaction by some hon. Friends behind him; and one hon. and gallant Member exclaimed against it in a very loud tone; and if there were the slightest probability of the prophecy being realized, he was sure the hon. and gallant Gentleman would accept an office of profit under the Crown. The hon. and learned Gentleman commenced by saying that we ought in this matter to have regard to the past as well as the future, and he alluded to some ephemeral journals which contended that the past ought not to be taken into consideration, remarking that he brushed away all that rubbish; but it was unnecessary that he should have had to brush it away, for it was introduced by himself. No one in this House had contended that it was not perfectly right and just to regard the past as well as the future; therefore he might have spared himself the trouble of sweeping this rubbish away. He agreed with the hon. and learned Gentleman that it was a wise and judicious plan to grapple with the sound and good arguments of your adversaries; and he should be willing and anxious to act on that maxim if there were any sound arguments to meet. Now, let the House consider what had been the burden of the speech just delivered. In the first place, the hon. and learned Gentleman said that the policy of 1873 was the right policy, and that the Ameer was not estranged by what had happened in 1873; but that he was estranged by the ridiculous policy of the Government in attempting to force Agents on him to reside in his territory. Now, was the Ameer not estranged by what took place in 1873? Let them forget all this declamation and bring their minds to bear upon the Blue Book; and could anyone, he would ask, read its contents with care and attention so as to understand and grasp them without being convinced that the Ameer was, at all events, seriously displeased before 1873? On the 5th of May, 1873, the Ameer wrote a letter to the Commissioner of the Viceroy, setting forth his alarm at the progress of Russia in Central Asia, describing in most graphic language how tribe after tribe had been conquered by her arms; how they were likely to take refuge in Afghanistan; how Russia would come down upon him demanding their surrender; how the Russians would pick a quarrel with him. He implored the Government of India to come to his rescue and send him succour in the shape of arms and money. The letter was full of earnest entreaty to the Government of India. He said—Don't let there be any hesitation in this matter, but yield to my entreaty, and yield at once. He did not say that the Government of India were bound to yield; but he did say that their action was very likely to cause disappointment and anger in the mind of the Ameer. He had set before them the danger of Russian progress; he had warned them of the helpless condition in which he would be placed if they did not come to his aid; but the Indian Government replied that they did not recognize the danger which stared him in the face. They could not conceive it possible that Russia would invade his territories; that if his territories were invaded they might perhaps at some future time come to his succour, and send him money and troops; but they would not promise—that must be left entirely to their own discretion. The Ameer asked for bread, and they gave him a stone; he implored their succour, and they met him with a hollow diplomatic mockery. It was, therefore, very likely the Ameer would be angry. The Ameer's view of the situation in 1873, barbarian though he might be, was more accurate with regard to his position than that of the Indian Government. He was seriously offended with their refusal, for it amounted to a refusal of aid. He wrote a letter, dated the 13th of November, 1873—a sarcastic letter, as full of disappointment and bitterness as any ever written by an Eastern Potentate. He told the Indian Government in terms of irony, almost of insult, the effect which their refusal to give him any definite promise of assistance had produced on his mind. But, said the hon. and learned Gentleman, the Ameer did not enter into any communication with Russia; but that was not so. He had communication with Russia over and over again. He had communication with Russia on the 16th of November, 1873, the 4th of September, 1875, and on the 3rd of February, 1876, he had a long letter from General Kaufmann, not one of which communications was sent to the Indian Government.

Sir WILLIAM HARCOURT: I beg my hon. and learned Friend's pardon. The letter of General Kaufmann was communicated by the Ameer to the Indian Government.

The ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir John Holker): Yes; it was communicated, but no advice was asked, as was usual when the Ameer made known his communications from Russia. All these communications took place before there was the slightest intimation on the part of the Indian Government that the Ameer was desired to allow a British Envoy to reside in his territory. What conclusion could be come to but that the Ameer was irritated and annoyed at the treatment he had been subject to at the hands of the Indian Government, and was preparing, to some extent, to throw himself into the arms of the Russian Government? It was most important to consider what was the position of the Ameer with regard to his engagements. He considered himself much wronged in the course of conduct pursued by the Indian Government; and he was under a misapprehension with regard to the engagements that had been entered into with him by the Indian Government. The Ameer was under the idea that engagements had been entered into by the Indian Government with him that the former did not acknowledge. If the Government of Lord Northbrook had been perfectly desirous of being frank, open, candid, and straightforward with the Ameer, they would have told him that the engagements were not binding, and that he did not put a proper construction upon them. It was said, by the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Oxford and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich, that there were other engagements apart from Treaty obligations; but the only Treaty, so far as he could learn, and the only one that could be said to be in force and binding, was the Treaty of 1855. The Treaty made in 1857 was made for a temporary purpose, which had been served long ago. But then it was said these were promises which had the binding effect and force of Treaties. He had no doubt but that the Ameer was under the impression that these were unfulfilled promises of the binding effect of Treaties; but he (the Attorney General) submitted, with the greatest confidence, that the Ameer's mind should have been disabused of that idea earlier than it was. The declaration of Lord Mayo had not, nor did his Lordship ever intend that it should have, the force of a Treaty. He declined to enter into a Treaty in reference to one particular subject; and then he gave the declaration which was not intended to have the effect of a Treaty in any way whatever. The House would find in the Blue Book, page 107—

"The Earl of Mayo informed the Ameer at Umballa, in the spring of 1869, that although the British Government did not desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, yet, considering that the bonds of friendship between the Government of India and His Highness had lately been more closely drawn than heretofore, we should endeavour, from time to time, by such means as circumstances might require to strengthen the Government of His Highness; and that we were willing to assist him with money, arms, ammunition, and in other ways, whenever we deemed it desirable to do so. The hands of the Government of India were left absolutely free as to the occasions on which and the circumstances under which such assistance was to be given to or withheld from the Ameer."

In a letter, dated the 15th of September, 1873, from Lord Northbrook's Government, there was the following passage:—

"From conversations with the Envoy we were led to believe that the Cabul Durbar had interpreted the friendly assurances of Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo to mean that the British Government had bound themselves to comply with any request preferred by the Ameer. It was necessary, therefore, in the first place to remove any incorrect impressions on this score, and in repeating to the Ameer the assurances given to him at the Umballa Durbar, we have given the Envoy distinctly to understand that, while the policy adopted towards Afghanistan by Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo will be maintained, the British Government reserve to themselves the right of judging as to the propriety of any request preferred by the Ameer."—[*Ibid.* p. 109.]

What did that passage convey? Why, that the assurances of Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo had no binding effect; that they were mere assurances, and nothing more; and that the Ameer was not entitled to rely implicitly upon them. Surely, if Lord Northbrook's Government had been really desirous to deal with the Ameer openly and fairly, and to tell him exactly the position in which matters stood, they would have taken more care than they had manifested to inform him that he ought not to rely upon the assurances being carried into effect? Things went on; the Ameer was sullen and reserved. He had sought the assistance of the Indian Government; that assistance was refused; he retired into his territories; and no communications passed between the Ameer and the Government of India during 1874, 1875, and some portions of 1876. Well, the present Government had come into power, and when Lord Salisbury became Secretary of State for India, it was felt that this state of things was very much to be deplored. It was felt by Lord Salisbury and the Government that it was most important for this country to have a proper understanding with the Ameer—to have a thorough, honest alliance with him; and it was also felt that the Ameer had not been treated altogether with that frankness with which he might have expected to be treated. Then a determination was come to that an interview with him should be sought, and that a real Treaty—a real alliance—should be suggested to him upon certain conditions. A great deal had been said about the harsh usage to which the Ameer had been subjected, and every epithet which ingenuity could devise had been hurled against the Government for what they did. But if hon. Gentlemen would consider the matter dispassionately, they would ask themselves whether the conduct of the Indian Government towards the Ameer was not perfectly fair and prudent. What they said to themselves, in effect, was this—as was shown in the Parliamentary Papers—"The Ameer has been under a misunderstanding. He has an idea that this Government is under obligations to him which it is not. It is very desirable that his mind should be instructed on this point, and that an alliance with the Ameer—a permanent and solid alliance—should, if possible, be established." There was some difference of opinion about the matter. He did not blame Lord Northbrook for having had a difference of opinion with Lord Salisbury; but it was finally arranged that an opportunity should be sought for opening up negotiations with the Ameer; and that in the course of the negotiations his true position should be pointed out, and he should be told that the Government of India, on certain conditions, were perfectly prepared to give him, not vague, uncertain, and delusive promises, but an absolute offensive and defensive Treaty, under which they would recognize the heir he had appointed. The hon. and learned Gentleman, in the midst of his thunder, had thundered out something about a pretext which was to delude an Indian Prince, and about some sharp practice on the part of Lord Salisbury. But when all Lord Salisbury did was to wish to open diplomatic communications with the Ameer, and to propose a perfectly fair, just, and equitable arrangement—a binding Treaty, offensive and defensive, with a recognition of the succession on the one side, and, on the other, what was necessary for our protection—namely, permission to our Agents to reside, not in Cabul, but in certain parts of Afghanistan—was it fair in his hon. and learned Friend to describe that as "a pretext to delude an Indian Prince?" Nothing in the world could have been more straightforward. Possibly hon. Gentlemen opposite might think that frankness and candour when applied to an Eastern Potentate were misapplied; but he ventured to think that if there had been more frankness and candour before 1876 we should have been better off. Hon. Gentlemen might say that when the occasion would have arisen, and at the proper time, we might have given him such a Treaty. That was the language of Lord Northbrook. But Lord Salisbury and his Government wished the language to the Ameer to be this—"You have with us no Treaty of any kind except the Treaty of 1855. The assurances given are mere assurances. You have no right to rely upon their performance. If you will only yield to this condition; if you will only allow our Envoys and Agents to be stationed on the Frontiers of Afghanistan at convenient points, so that we may be able to get information of what is going on and see if there is any danger of your Frontier being attacked; we will enter with you into a binding Treaty, offensive and defensive, and we will recognize the successor to the Throne whom you may desire." Communications were opened; the Ameer said he did not wish to have a Mission at Cabul, and the Government at once acquiesced. Then he suggested that a British Agent should be sent to Peshawur to meet an Envoy from him, and that was agreed to. The British Agent did come; the Viceroy explained his views in frank, clear, and unmistakable language. The Envoy of the Ameer, however, apparently was not armed with the powers to consent to what were to be conditions precedent, and he made long explanations of the Ameer's grievances. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone) had complained of the conduct of the British Agent; but he could point out, if he had time, how entirely unjustifiable those complaints were. However, he would not now detain the House. The Ameer's Envoy, no doubt, exhibited great reluctance to acquiesce in the suggestion that British Agents should be sent to Afghanistan; but if hon. Gentlemen would reflect upon what had passed from May, 1873, to the beginning or middle of 1876, when these negotiations were going on, they would come to the conclusion that it was no wonder the Envoy should have shown this reluctance. For what had been done? The Ameer had been disappointed; he felt that when he had appealed to the Indian Government he was cruelly repulsed; therefore, he lost all confidence in the Indian Government, and he sought for solace, support, and protection elsewhere. But the Ameer's was a weak power, and he did not like to have a quarrel with the Indian Government, if he could avoid it. Let hon. Gentlemen read the accounts of what took place between Sir Lewis Pelly and the Ameer's Envoy, and they would come to the conclusion that the Envoy was determined not to yield, or certainly not unless he were absolutely forced to do so. ["Hear, hear!"] Well; was it desirable that we should force our Treaties down the throats of any Power? The object of the Indian Government was to make a Treaty with a friendly Power—a Treaty which would be acceptable to the Ameer and of advantage to ourselves. When, therefore, Sir Lewis Pelly and the authorities at Peshawur found that the proposal was distasteful to the Ameer, and that he would do almost anything rather than accept it, surely the Government of India ought not to be upbraided because they thought it would be fair to insist no further, and to allow things to remain as they were. Some hon. Gentlemen apparently attempted to make out that the negotiations at Peshawur were improperly broken off; that the Ameer was deprived, by the action of the Indian Government, of some rights he had before enjoyed; that some Treaty obligations which we had undertaken were repudiated; and that the Ameer was discarded, so to speak, from our friendship. That was not the case. In proof of this assertion, he must trouble the House with one passage from the letter of Sir Lewis Pelly which put an end to the Conference. Sir Lewis Pelly says—

"The British Government has no sort or kind of quarrel with the people of Afghanistan. It sincerely desires their permanent independence, prosperity, and peace. It has no conceivable object, and certainly no desire, to interfere in their domestic affairs. It will unreservedly respect their independence, and should they at any time be united in a national appeal to its assistance it will doubtless be disposed, and prepared, to aid them in defending that independence from aggression. Meanwhile, the Afghan people may rest fully assured that so long as they are not excited by their Ruler, or others, to acts of aggression upon the territories or friends of the British Government no British soldier will ever be permitted to enter Afghanistan uninvited.

"But the British Government repudiates all liabilities on behalf of the Ameer and his dynasty. The British Government does not, indeed, withdraw from any obligations previously contracted by it; but it absolutely and emphatically denies that it has ever incurred any such obligations as those imputed to it by your Excellency; and it further affirms that it will never, in any circumstances, undertake such obligations without adequate guarantees for the satisfactory conduct of the Ameer.

"At the same time, the British Government will scrupulously continue, as hitherto, to respect the Ameer's independence and authority throughout those territories which, up to the present moment, it has recognized as being in the lawful possession of the Ameer, and will duly abstain from interference so long as the Ameer, on his part, no less scrupulously abstains from every kind of interference with tribes or territories not his own.

"The Ameer, therefore, so long as he remains faithful to those Treaty stipulations which your Excellency has involved on behalf of His Highness, and which the British Government fully recognizes as still valid, and therefore binding upon the two contracting parties, need be under no apprehension whatever of any hostile action on the part of the British Government."—[*Ibid.* p. 220.]

Here, then, was an express declaration of Treaty obligations. We said, in substance, to the Ameer—"If you do not like to enter into a Treaty you may decline to do so, and your position will then be exactly the same as it was before." If hon. Gentlemen doubted the accuracy of what he was stating, he would ask them to read the speech delivered by the Duke of Argyll in the House of Lords in 1877, in which the construction he had placed upon the letter of Sir Lewis Pelly was fully admitted. He submitted, therefore, with perfect confidence, that the Indian Government were unfairly treated when it was alleged that they improperly broke off the Conferences at Peshawur, and that by so doing they prejudicially affected the position of the Ameer. It appeared to him that this great issue had not been debated in altogether a worthy spirit. He did not see why hon. Members should be saying the responsibility for the change in the Ameer's conduct lay with this or that Government. In his opinion, the action of the Government of India in 1873 estranged the Ameer; but the policy then pursued might, for aught he knew, have been quite right. Still, the circumstances of 1873 were not those of 1877 and 1878. The Government of 1873 were under no obligations to exhibit any other policy. If they estranged the Ameer, that was a result to be deplored; although they ought not to be censured for it. On the other hand, he did not think it fair or reasonable to accuse the present Government of having taken strong action against the Ameer, and of having incurred his enmity in consequence of making a reasonable request to have British Agents in his territory. Perhaps that request might have annoyed the Ameer; but they were now discussing the question whether this deplorable war—for all wars were deplorable—in which we had been compelled to engage was a just one or not. The Ameer's position was this — For years he had been on friendly terms with the Government of India — For years he had been acquainted with the understanding, to put it no higher, which the Government of India had come to with Russia—that Afghanistan should be outside the sphere of Russian operations altogether. Over and over again, in early days, the Ameer had acted on the faith of that understanding. On the faith of the understanding that he was on friendly terms with, and, in a certain sense, under the protection of, this country, he had received from us large presents of money and of arms, and had obtained advantages which he would not have otherwise enjoyed. In addition to all this, the Ameer was bound by positive Treaty obligations. By the Treaty of 1855 the Ameer—or, rather, his Predecessor—solemnly engaged that the friends of this country should be his friends, and the enemies of this country should be his enemies. This, then, was a distinct and positive agreement; and if the Ameer was guilty of any unfriendly act towards us, he was guilty of the breach of a Treaty, which, according to all International Law, this country was entitled, if it chose, to regard as a *casus belli.* There had been no denial of this proposition. The House had listened to a long speech from a distinguished international lawyer—a speech filled with all sorts of topics, good, bad, and indifferent; but containing no word of denial of the principle which he had just laid down as to the rights and powers of the Government. Russia advanced through Asia, and the Ameer received at Cabul a Russian Mission. Was this country to do nothing, or to sit still and not utter a word, when the Government found the Ameer acting openly in this manner? The Ameer was bound to be friendly towards us; and we had a right to test his obligation to show friendship at a time when he was found to be contracting relations with another Power. If England had not done this, she could not have hoped to retain her self-respect, and certainly not the respect of the peoples of India. This being admitted, what other action could Her Majesty's Government take, except to require that the Ameer should receive an Envoy from us, as he had from Russia, and then to send a Mission of dignity, which should command the respect of the Ameer and his people? This requirement was addressed to the Ameer, who declined to answer. He was then asked again, and after much delay, no answer being returned, the Government determined to act. The Government sent a Mission, which was met at a fort outside the territories of the Ameer by his emissaries, and compelled to turn back, the process being accompanied by both force and insult. Nothing was then open to the Government but to take the proceedings which had been entered upon; and to those who said the war was not a just one, he would put this question—What right could be more clear as justifying a war than the deliberate breach of a Treaty obligation? The objectors next said, that in order for the Government to be held blameless, it must be shown that the war was not only "just," but "necessary." This last was rather a military question than any other, and he knew nothing of military science; but he thought the question of necessity was answered in the affirmative by the testimony of a General so eminent as Lord Napier of Magdala, who expressed his belief that our North-West Frontier of India was weak; that its weakness subjected our Indian Empire to great danger; and that, in fact, the continued existence of that Empire depended upon the Frontier being maintained. That line would be safe, and India would be safe, if the Ameer chose to be our friend and firm Ally. If he did not so choose, there was nothing for it but to take steps to induce him to come to our way of thinking; and, that failing, to adopt some other measures for our own protection. It had been said that we threatened the Ameer by going to Quetta; a statement and argument as futile as that used by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich, who went the length of asserting that we had insulted the Ruler of Afghanistan by making a bridge across the Indus, without first having obtained his consent. He, for one, was glad the Government had taken the other measures which he indicated a few moments back. He would not detain the House further than to say that he hoped the war would be a short and decisive one, and that it would be so conducted as to cause the least possible suffering upon the people of either India or Afghanistan. If it was thoroughly successful—as he hoped and believed it would be—the peoples of India would bless the Government for the course which they had taken—aye, he thought the people of Afghanistan would also bless them, because this war would probably save them from the fate of Khiva and of Khokand.

Mr. E. JENKINS said, that had he not obtained the opportunity of explaining his vote he could not have voted against the Government. It would be seen, from what he was about to say, that upon one or two points he happened to be unable to agree with the course taken by the hon. Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread). He did not agree with the whole of the right hon. Gentleman's (Mr. Gladstone's) vehement indictment against the Government. There were, nevertheless, grounds on which it was impossible for him to support the Motion. He thought no patriot could view our divided councils at this crisis without mortification and alarm. The spectacle was due in no small degree to the Government. When one considered the policy pursued by the Government during the last two and a-half years; when one saw the Chancellor of the Exchequer carried away by the extreme policy inaugurated by other and more dangerous men, and contrasted his mild speech at the outset of the Eastern Question with his present support of a Jingo policy, one could not fail to perceive that an education had been going on upon that side of the House opposed to the best interests of the country. The conduct of the Government had been at once cowardly and audacious. It had been audacious in this—that, trusting to the immovable and inconsiderate votes of a vast majority, the Government had used the Prerogatives of the Crown in a manner in which no Government had dared to use these Prerogatives since the time of Queen Anne. They had been cowardly in endeavouring, by secret manœuvres, to shield themselves from the operation of public opinion, and to commit the country to responsibilities of the very gravest possible character. With the general indictment against the Government upon the circumstances under which this war had arisen he cordially agreed. The only doubt in his mind was, whether this was a proper and convenient or a safe time in which to hold such a discussion as was now being taken. The effect of it upon foreign nations could only be depreciatory of the power, influence, and prestige of this country. The Government, whatever faults they had committed, were entitled to generous treatment from their opponents. The day might come when the Liberal Party in power might require the exercise of similar generosity at the hands of their opponents; and the precedent now created might afford an excuse for the factious division of the country in the face of a foreign enemy. We were at war, and he believed we were at war with the approbation of the majority of the people. ["No, no!"] His hon. Friends behind him had, perhaps, superior opportunities for information. But he did not hold the opinion without taking pains to ascertain its accuracy. He felt that, strongly as he suspected and condemned the character of the Government, it was hardly fair—if, indeed, it were wholly Constitutional in practice—to convey to foreign nations, and especially to Russia, the impression that there was any division in the determination of this country to resist, to the utmost of its resources, an attempted menace on the part of others. The combination in the Liberal Party of peace-at-any-price men and extreme humanitarians had undoubtedly conveyed to the country a false impression as to the general opinion of Liberals with regard to the continuation and permanence of the Empire, and to the maintenance of British interests; and were he asked to try to gauge the state of the public mind at the present moment, he would be inclined to say that its feeling was this—that confidence in the Government was much decreasing, and that, on the other hand, confidence in the Opposition was not increasing. But the Government, at all events, were professing to carry out what the people of the country believed to be a definite purpose—the ensuring of the safety of the Imperial interests of the country; and whatever wild or unwarrantable definitions of the term Imperial might be given by flashy Ministers when they were making flashy speeches at the Guildhall, the word Imperial had a real meaning, and might indicate a true policy. The people of the country did believe in the British Empire; and, regarding it as worth preserving, looked with just suspicion on those who talked lightly and contemptuously of an Imperial policy. The great edifice of our Empire, and the edifice of trade and commerce built upon it, depended in no small degree on the manner in which we insisted to all the world that we should maintain them. Had the Ministers come down with a policy intended to meet this feeling, and properly carried it out, it might have been adopted with unanimity on that side. No doubt when the nation, fearing danger to the interests of the Empire—which at all hazards must be preserved—turned to the other Party and found—as he feared they did, though it was not unnatural—that the Opposition not only criticised, but hampered the actions of the Government—as they often did properly, though they failed to give voice to that which the country desired—they were thrown into a state of difficulty, disunion, and discontent. The wider and more important issues should not be lost sight of amidst the invectives of partizans. What the country desired at this moment was a truly patriotic policy Constitutionally carried out. It wanted straightforward dealing and fair play.

It would neither be dragged at the chariot wheels of personal government, nor would it be embarked in the unseaworthy craft of faction. The charge which he brought against the policy of Her Majesty's Government was, that it appeared to be more the policy of a Party—a policy carried out for power—than for the good of the nation; and that the present Administration had most effectually and thoroughly played into the hands of Russia. With regard to this Afghanistan trouble, Lord Lytton's action might have been ill-advised and premature—he believed it was; the Viceroy might have been tricky—he would not say so; but the impression produced upon him by the Afghan Papers was, that we ought not, and we need not have been, at war with the Ameer. But it was the Central Asia Papers that called for the principal attention of the House; and one felt on reading these Papers that the Government was bound, in some way or other, to put a stop to the advance of Russian influence in Afghanistan. In saying that, was he separating himself from the general opinion of his Party? It was the undivided opinion of all the Governments and all the Viceroys. It would be, in his opinion, most unsafe to allow Russia to obtain such influence as would enable her at some future time to use the disaffection of Afghanistan for the purpose of paralyzing the influence of England in India. It was a highly desirable thing to check the advance of Russia; but the time and action for doing so were badly chosen. When the Treaty of Berlin was signed, Her Majesty's Government should have called upon the Russian Government to withdraw their Envoy, and then proceed to establish our influence in Afghanistan. The manner of their action was indiscreet; but then he felt bound to admit that, at the bottom, there lay an unquestionable disposition to resist any encroachment of Russia on Afghanistan. He thought the action against the Ameer was too severe, and he entered his protest against these proceedings. While feeling that, on the one hand, something might be said against the manner in which the Opposition had acted, he could not say too much against the manner in which the Government, while professing to carry out the policy which the people of the country had deeply and sincerely at heart, had taken advantage of the situation in order to establish the footing of their Party in the country, and in order to maintain themselves in power at the expense of other than the free principles of a great nation.

Mr. BAILLIE COCHRANE said, that he would not have thought it necessary to address the House, on the present occasion, if he had not called attention to the Central Asian Question in the years 1875 and 1876. At that time he had pointed out—and many hon. Members agreed with him—that the progress of Russia in the East might, in all probability, be attended with danger to our Indian Empire; but no one, though almost all had anticipated a crisis sooner or later, had expected its immediate arrival. Indeed, the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell) had said that it would not occur in the time either of our children or of our grandchildren; but it had come already. With regard to the present debate, he must remark that it had been marred by personalities. The question was one of great moment. The question was not what this or that Viceroy or Government had said or done, but was one of simple facts. What were these facts? In 1869, when Shere Ali met Lord Mayo at Umballa, there was perfect good feeling between him and the Government. That was undeniable, and was largely due to the great qualities of Lord Mayo, which the Duke of Argyll justly complimented in a letter to the papers. Those qualities were of the highest order; but, independently of them, there was no doubt that for some period after 1869 there was a cordial alliance with the Ameer. Why had that alliance now ceased? That was the plain question that the House had set itself to answer. The hon. and learned Attorney General had put this case well when he asked whether the war was forced upon us, and whether it was a just and politic war? while the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition had pronounced it an unjust war; but, to his amazement, he had followed that remark by a most warlike speech, than which no Jingoism could have been more earnest. He admired the patriotism of the noble Lord, but it was strangely inconsistent; for if the war was unjust, he could not see how hon. Gentlemen on that side of the House could go heart and soul into the military operations. There was also another inconsistency about the noble Lord. If he desired the success of our Army, why did he come down to the House and, not only there but out-of-doors as well, excite the feelings of the people against the Government at such a critical time? Was it right, by way of wishing success to the British arms, to make speeches which, when telegraphed to India, would infallibly convey the idea that the counsels of the country were divided, and that the people were not united in carrying on a war which, he maintained, was for the honour of the British Empire? He had the greatest feeling for the position of the Ameer. There never was any country so unfortunately situated as his, placed as it was between two colossal Powers, on the North and the South, both of whom were gradually encroaching on his dominions, narrowing the circle around him, and threatening to crush him. It reminded one of the striking story which appeared some time ago in *Blackwood*—"The Man in the Iron Shroud"—where the prisoner saw the iron walls of his cell gradually closing on him, and about to crush him to death. That was, at the present moment, the situation of the Ameer. The question for the Ameer was not what Power he should like to ally himself with, but what Power he had to fear the most. After the Crimean War the prestige of England was very great, not only in Europe, but in the East. It might be only a coincidence; but it was an undoubted fact, that during the long period of Liberal Government which had since elapsed that prestige diminished, and especially when the Treaty of Paris, for which Englishmen had fought and bled, was torn up by Lord Granville. That diminution of prestige must have naturally had the effect on a country like Afghanistan, which, on the other hand, saw Russia advancing like an ever-advancing tide upon her. Russia had, in fact, been advancing rapidly from the year 1740, since which period, after the absorption of about 1,500 or 2,000 miles of territory, she found herself with the Oxus as her boundary, and so in direct water communication with the Frontiers of India. That Shere Ali was alarmed at this progress would appear from a letter by him in 1873—

> "My anxiety which I feel on account of the Russians will never be removed unless the British Government adorns the Afghan Government with great assistance in money and ammunitions of war for the troops, and unless great aid is given for the construction of strong forts throughout the northern Afghan border."

And again, he said he wished the British Government would

> "set apart some property, either in India or in Europe, for my support, in order that if, which God forbid, a serious difficulty constrains me to quit Afghanistan, I may retire there with my family and children."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, pp. 110-11.]

He knew that when he mentioned the progress of Russia it would be objected that we had the assurances of the Emperor that he did not wish to extend his territories; and that was true; only they were not the safeguards generally supposed, and had not the validity often claimed for them. But those assurances had been given over and over again, and on each occasion Russia had made a considerable advance in Asia within a few months afterwards. In 1869 Sir Douglas Forsyth was told there was no intention of advancing in Central Asia; yet a few months afterwards the territory was pushed forward 500 miles. In 1872 Count Schouvaloff had been sent specially to this country to give the Emperor's word that Khiva should not be annexed; and within a few months of that time Russian troops were on the banks of the Oxus, and Khiva had fallen practically into the hands of Russia. After those occurrences, he would ask, what confidence could be placed in the assurances of Russia? Did not the Russian Mission to Cabul indicate danger to us in Central Asia? That was really the question they had to decide. And on this point he would quote the opinion of Lord Palmerston, who, in a letter addressed to Lord Russell, had said that a Russian force in occupation of Afghanistan might convert it into the advanced post of Russia, and would lead to great expense, require great efforts, and might create considerable damage. The hon. Member for the Elgin Burghs (Mr. Grant Duff) had declared that "any aggression on the dominions recognized as those of Shere Ali means war with England." Lord Derby, in a speech in the House of Lords, in 1874, had assured the House that to maintain the integrity and the territorial independence of

Afghanistan was, and ought to be, a most important object of English policy; and a similar opinion had been expressed by M. Terentyeff, by M. Ferrier, by Fuad Pasha, and many others; while M. Frederick von Heilward had declared, with regard to the increasing influence of Russia in Central Asia, that "the British statesman ought to have foreseen it and nipped it in the bud." Opinions such as these showed that it was no light matter. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone) had asserted that we had made war upon the Ameer in consequence of the Russian Mission; but, as he understood the matter, they had done nothing of the kind. The Russian Mission had opened our eyes to the fact that, in case of a war with England, Russia would have pushed her Forces towards India. We were thus forewarned, and were now taking precautions to be forearmed. The Government were perfectly justified in endeavouring to secure our safety in Afghanistan. If the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich had been in power during the last two years, and had acted in accordance with the views he had so loudly expressed, the Russians must have occupied Constantinople and Gallipoli and held the Dardanelles. They had heard a good deal of the policy of "masterly inactivity;" but, in his opinion, it might be better named the policy of "masterly imbecility;" and it was perfectly providential that they had a Government in power who were anxious and ready to maintain the honour and dignity of the country.

Mr. BURT said, after reading over carefully the official Correspondence and listening attentively to the defences of the Ministers, he felt that the country had been engaged in an uncalled for, an unjust, and an indefensible war. The war, if it had not had its origin in deceit and misrepresentation, had only been made possible by a suppression of the facts. At the very outset the public mind was inflamed by false reports with regard to insults that had been received, by the Ameer's Representative having threatened to shoot Major Cavagnari, and the alleged insolent answer of the Ameer to the English Government; but he thought that, for conciliation and kindness of tone, the Ameer's letter would compare most favourably with the letters he had received. These "lies"—these "Eastern fables"—came from their countrymen in India; but he did not, of course, blame the Government for that. What he did blame them for was that while these tales were going about they did not give out to the public the authentic information which must have been in their hands, and they afforded misleading assurances to Parliament and the country. It had been asserted that there had been no change of policy on the part of the Government with regard to the Ameer; but one result of this debate had been to show not only that there had been such a change of policy, but that the Government actually took credit to themselves for having changed their policy to suit what they termed the altered circumstances of the case. But, assuming that there had been a necessity for altering their policy, the question arose whether that change of policy had been carried out in a friendly and in a conciliatory manner? Was it probable that the policy of sending a British Agent to Cabul would prove acceptable to the Ameer? Lord Salisbury, in giving his instructions for this new policy to be carried out in a despatch of the 19th of November, 1875, had said—

> "The first step, therefore, in establishing our relations with the Ameer upon a more satisfactory footing, will be to induce him to receive a temporary Embassy in his capital. It need not be publicly connected with the establishment of a permanent Mission within his dominions. There would be many advantages in ostensibly directing it to some object of smaller political interest, which it will not be difficult for your Excellency to find, or, if need be, to create."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 149.]

He had heard a good deal respecting Russian diplomacy—its tricks and its unreliability; but he did not think that it could bear off the palm in this matter. He should like to hear a better defence than had yet been offered for breaking off the Peshawur Conference at the very time when the Ameer seemed most disposed to concede all our demands. The termination of that Conference no doubt showed that we were in earnest, but not for peace; and had we been outspoken and frank to the Ameer there would have been something to recommend the course we had taken. It was alleged that we required a new scientific Frontier for the purpose of preventing an invasion that was hardly practicable, and which we had satisfied ourselves we had no cause to dread from Russia, which had been almost as faithless, almost as unscrupulous, and almost as aggressive in Central Asia as we had been in Southern Asia. The logical course would have been to grapple with our great enemy in those parts of the world; but we had preferred to attack a weak Power in order, for political considerations, to obtain a cheap and easy triumph. He did not wonder that a war commenced in such circumstances was unpopular with the great mass of the people of this country. With regard to the feelings of working people, whose opinions he had exceptional opportunities of knowing, as they had always been his dearest associates and companions, he had received several letters from them in connection with meetings they had held upon the subject, one of them representing nearly 40,000 miners in the county of Durham, all these latter denouncing the war which had lately been entered into. During the last few weeks he had met some thousands of working men and interchanged opinions with them, and had not come across one single man who believed that we were in the right in this affair. He had not met one who did not believe that we were engaged in an unjust and a cowardly war. A good deal had been said about the depression of trade. He believed that such depression had never been more severe than now; it was universal; all trades were affected. Capitalists were losing money; many were failing in business; the wages of working men were being reduced in all directions. He knew hundreds of honest, intelligent, industrious men—men who were the very backbone of our wealth and independence—who at the present time could scarcely get bread to eat. He did not say that we should never go to war except during times of prosperity—that would be a very foolish doctrine—but he did say that there never was a time when, before entering on war, there should be more thoughtful deliberation. That deliberation had not been given. He did not blame the Government for the depression of trade, for that was, he knew, a matter over which Governments had very little control. At the same time, while the evil had not been originated by the action of the Government, it had been very greatly intensified and prolonged by their fussy and meddling policy. They had been told lately that the Government was not carried on by newspaper paragraph writers, but by Sovereigns and statesmen. Well, the business of the world was carried on by thinkers, workers, and merchants, and not by soldiers, adventurers, and buccaneers, who, sword in hand, went into other people's territories to carve out for themselves a "scientific Frontier." He should like to have heard more consideration given to the Constitutional question—Whether the Government had the right, irrespective of Parliament and of public opinion, to declare war? He was not going on that question to give an opinion which he knew would have no weight with the House. But he did say that if the Government had acted Constitutionally—if it were in the power of a few men, however eminent, to declare what thousands of people believed to be an unjust war, and what was admittedly an unpopular war—then it was a mockery to talk of our being a free and self-governing people, and the sooner the Constitution was changed the better. There was scarcely a redeeming feature in connection with the war. It was true our soldiers were fighting gallantly, and he admired their valour; but he was sorry they were not engaged in a just cause. For that not they, but others, were responsible. The right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth (Sir Robert Peel) had spoken as if it were wrong to imitate the good deeds of Russia. But why should England not imitate Russia's good deeds? What we were about to do was to imitate one of the worst deeds of Russia, and to appropriate the territory of the friendly mountain tribes, by whose good-will we had been enabled to get so easily into Afghanistan. The war only required one thing to complete its infamy, and there were signs that the Government were about to give it that finishing touch. To do this let them, while exempting from increased taxation the highly-paid Indian officials, many of whom had clamoured for that war, throw the greater part, if not the whole, of its burdens on the patient, dumb, and famine-stricken millions of India, who had no articulate voice, and who were now groaning under the military despotism of our Empire.

Mr. GORST said, he was sure they all lamented the existence of that war, but the question was, Who was to blame for it? When the present Ameer succeeded, without external aid, in establishing himself on the Throne of Afghanistan against all rival claimants, it was generally felt that some special precaution in regard to that country was necessary beyond the previous policy of masterly inaction, in order to preserve the interests of our Indian Empire. Lord Lawrence's Government had proposed, as an alternative policy to that of stationing English officers in Afghanistan, that we should come to a clear understanding with the Court of St. Petersburg as to its projects and designs on Central Asia, and that that Court should be given to understand that it could not be permitted to interfere with the affairs of Afghanistan and the States contiguous to our Frontier. That policy was accepted by the Home Government, who lost no time in carrying it out. Lord Lawrence's despatch came in January, 1869; and in March of the same year they had the celebrated declaration of the Russian Government that the Imperial Government regarded Afghanistan as being entirely outside the sphere in which it was called upon to exercise its influence. There was not very much in that declaration when they came to analyze it; but it satisfied Lord Clarendon; and in the following November both Governments agreed to abstain from all ambitious views and unfriendly feelings towards each other, and that the more frankly Central Asian Questions were discussed between them the less likely were they to come into collision. They all knew how the promises of Russia as to her interference with Afghan affairs had been kept; and it should be remembered it was upon a reliance that Russia would fulfil her engagements in that regard that the policy of Lord Northbrook depended for its success. The Papers in the hands of hon. Members showed the series of letters addressed between 1870 and 1872 by General Kaufmann to the Ameer, and the reply of that Potentate. In one of them, the fourth, the General —whose Government had undertaken to exercise no influence in Afghanistan— informed the Ameer that a former subject of his, who had been a General in the Russian Army, was about to settle down in his native country, and he requested that he might be re-instated in his ancestral estate, and—more important and more suggestive still—that he might be allowed to enter the service of the Ameer. At length, in the year 1872, the letters of the Russian General aroused the apprehensions of the Ameer's Government, and it was reported to the Indian Government that they entertained fears as to what the designs of Russia really were. All these facts were known to the Government of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich, although they were directly opposed to the policy of Lord Clarendon. The right hon. Gentleman declared that it was impossible to draw a distinction between a Mission of courtesy and a Mission of business. He (Mr. Gorst) should like to know if the right hon. Gentleman could make any distinction between a letter of courtesy and a letter of business? and letters had been going from Tashkend to Cabul for some years, while the right hon. Gentleman was in office, without any protest or remonstrance on his part. The hon. and learned Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt) asked why the present Government did not object to this Correspondence. He (Mr. Gorst) was surprised that the hon. and learned Member should put such a foolish question. If hon. Gentlemen had complained of the Correspondence, the answer would have been that it had been sanctioned for many years by the Government of the right hon. Member for Greenwich. It appeared that soon after the receipt of the letter which excited the concern of the Ameer's Government, the meeting in December, 1873, at Simla, between the Ameer and Lord Northbrook, took place, at which the assurances which had been given to the Ameer by Lord Mayo were qualified and explained away; and it was a remarkable fact that from that date no letter from the Representative of Russia to the Ameer and no reply of his appeared in the Blue Book. Nevertheless, it appeared from a letter of General Kaufmann's, incidentally quoted at page 64 of the Central Asia Papers, that subsequently to the Simla Conference General Kaufmann, while at St. Petersburg, received at least two letters from the Ameer, one of them announcing the important fact that the Ameer had appointed Sirdar Abdoolla Jan his heir-apparent. During the succeeding years

Her Majesty's present Government were disturbed by movements of the Russians in Central Asia, of which, however, they could get no information, except indirectly through Persia. They had, therefore, he contended, good reason to doubt the sincerity of the Russian promises with regard to Afghanistan and to desire to establish a British Agent at Herat. Before any active step had been taken to inaugurate this policy, they had a further proof of Russian duplicity in the denial of Prince Gortchakoff that General Kaufmann was acting at Cabul, while there were actually two Russian Agents there, and repeated communications with the Ameer were carried on. It was perfectly evident that Russia carried on a process of seduction in Afghanistan from 1870 to 1876, and that before the policy of Lord Lytton had been put into operation, it accomplished its object by making the Ameer our enemy. For the difficulties that had arisen in that quarter, therefore, he blamed neither the present Government nor the late Government, but Russia, who had flagrantly broken her understanding with this country.

SIR ALEXANDER GORDON: Sir, before I address to the House the few remarks I wish to make upon the question before us I think it is due to the House, as well as to myself, to state the reason why I rise on this side of the House, instead of upon that from which I have formerly addressed it. It had not been my intention to say a single word in this debate, although I have carefully studied the Papers and made up my mind upon the question; but the course of the debate in this House, and in "another place," has shown me that the sole remaining cause of the war is a supposed necessity for altering the North-West Frontier of India. That, Sis, is a military question which all military men of any standing in the Army have studied, and upon which they have very strong opinions. It is a question wholly removed from Party politics; and I am sure the opinion of military men on one side of the House is as good as that of military men on the other. But I know well from past experience that if I rise on the other side of the House to state an opinion, although it be only a military opinion, that is not concurred in by some hon. Members opposite I meet with interference, annoyance, and even obstruction which prevents my speaking freely. I do not refer for a moment to the courteous Member for Mid-Kent (Sir William Hart-Dyke), or any of his officially recognized assistants. Their conduct is always marked by courtesy and kindness. But there are some self-constituted lieutenants who think it their duty when a Member is not speaking in accordance with their views to cause him great annoyance. I have, therefore, thought it best, Sir, on this occasion to rise in the freer atmosphere on this side of the House. I wish, in the first place, to refer to what I consider the origin of the war which we are now discussing. I consider that it took its origin in the measure that was announced on the very first day that I took my seat in this House in 1876. On that occasion a measure was brought into Parliament, and I formed the opinion that that measure contained the germs of a policy which would bring trouble upon this country. That measure has developed itself into what is now called "Imperialism." It has now, in my opinion, resulted in this war. Sir, I would wish to mention to the House what has not yet been stated, and which I think a very remarkable circumstance. The measure to which I allude, and which was announced to the Government of India on the 28th February, 1876, was not brought before this House for the second reading of the Bill until the 9th of March, and it did not receive the Royal Assent until the 27th of April. But, notwithstanding that, we find that on the 28th February, 1876, Her Majesty's Government sent to India detailed instructions for carrying into effect an Act of Parliament which was not passed till two months afterwards. I think, Sir, that was an instance of disregard for Parliamentary procedure which would be dangerous to Parliamentary government. The despatch to which I refer is addressed to the Governor General, Lord Lytton, and will be found at page 156 of the Blue Book. It is not couched in language notifying an expected measure to be taken into his consideration and to be prepared for when it should be passed into law—explicit instructions are given to the Viceroy as to how his duties and relations were affected by the assumption of the Imperial title by the Queen, as if the Royal Titles Act were already a measure upon which

Parliament had decided. I think if hon. Members had known, during that heated discussion on this question, that two months before it was passed, and while we were discussing it in this House, the instructions for carrying it into effect were already in India, they would have been very much surprised. Now, Sir, it appears to me that the responsibility of this war rests upon the shoulders of one individual. It was announced at the Lord Mayor's dinner by the Prime Minister for the first time that the Government thought it necessary to have a rectification of our North-West Frontier in India. Military men immediately inquired who was the author of this rectification. No one had ever heard of such a proposal. It had never been officially brought before the public in any document. Military men had always congratulated themselves upon the strength of the North-West Frontier. Nature had given us a better Frontier than we could have devised for ourselves. But when this Paper was laid before Parliament, it appeared in a Memorandum from Lord Napier of Magdala. I find in that Memorandum this paragraph —

> "Our policy of masterly inactivity, or rather of receding from every difficulty until what were matters easy of suppression have grown into serious dangers, has continued too long, and if it is maintained will lead us to disaster."

That was the opinion given by Lord Napier of Magdala in a Memorandum dated May 30 this year, and recorded at page 226 of the Blue Book. But if you look to page 134 of these Papers you will find there a despatch from the Foreign Department of the Government of India, dated Simla, June 7th, 1875, with six signatures, including that of Lord Napier of Magdala, in which it is said—

> "Much discussion has recently taken place as to the effect that would be produced by a Russian advance to Merv."

It goes on—

> "To anticipate the Russian occupation of Merv by any active measures or specific Treaty engagements would, in our opinion, be more likely to prejudice rather than to advance the interests of Her Majesty's Indian Empire. . . . We would impress upon Her Majesty's Government our conviction that such relations will best be secured by a steady adherence to the patient and conciliatory policy which has been pursued by the Government of India for many years towards Afghanistan."—[*Ibid.* p. 135.]

That opinion was signed by Lord Napier of Magdala; and the House and the country have a right to know the distinct reasons which have caused him now, in the year 1878, to change the strong opinions which he expressed, in 1875, in concert with the Government of India. Something more is required than a telegram of two lines, read by the Prime Minister in "another place." That telegram stated that Afghanistan in the hands of another Power may deal a fatal blow to our rule, and that an advanced position is necessary for our safety. Lord Napier, in the Memorandum which he sent home in May, 1878, said—

> "It has been frequently asserted, by people with pretensions to speak with authority, that we shall be secure if we remain within our mountain boundary. But this is at variance with all history. A mountain chain that can be pierced in many places is no security if you hide behind it. India has been often entered through her mountain barrier, which was never defended. India waited to fight the battle in her own plains, and invariably lost it."—[*Ibid.* p. 226.]

But my opinion is that the country ought to be very cautious how it acts upon that opinion, even although it comes from one whom I respect so much as Lord Napier. In opposition to that opinion I would give that of the Archduke Charles, who, writing in the beginning of this century upon what the French call *La Grande Guerre*, stated that a great many Generals adopt the erroneous opinion that a country must be protected by the establishment of a long line of posts, and neglecting the essential principle of concentrating on decisive points, forgetting that by so doing they threw all the advantages into the hands of the enemy when he brought his whole force to bear upon a single point. The opinion of General de Faure, of the Military School of Instruction of Switzerland, is that the best method of repulsing an aggression consists in concentrating as much as possible, and in occupying in force all positions from which rapid advances upon the attacked points can easily be made. The last opinion I will quote is that of a distinguished officer of our own—General Hamley—who, in a work he wrote some time ago, said that whenever the theatre of operations was in a mountainous country, and although bodies of troops might manœuvre in the hills, the main action of the campaign will be in districts which will be practicable for the movement of large armies. It is a very singular circumstance that that distinguished officer this very afternoon delivered a lecture upon this very question at the United Service Institution, under the presidency of Sir Henry Rawlinson, and I was pleased to observe that he still held his formerly recorded opinion —that it was not necessary to take a single yard of country in front of that which we now possess in order to keep that country in a proper state of defence. After the events of 1842, the Duke of Wellington wrote to Lord Ellenborough that "No extension of our territory is desirable in India, even if a war for conquest could be justified;" and in the House of Lords he said—

> "Your Lordships would reject Afghanistan and Cabul, even if they were bequeathed as a peace-offering by Shah Shujah to England."

In a despatch from the Government of India, while he was a Member of it, addressed to the Government at home, Lord Napier said—

> "Should a foreign Power, such as Russia, ever seriously think of invading India from without, or, what is more probable, of stirring up the elements of disaffection or anarchy within it, our true policy, our strongest security, would then, we conceive, be found to lie in previous abstinence from entanglements at either Cabul, Candahar, or any similar outpost; . . . . in the construction of material works within British India."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 44.]

With these opinions before them I think I have a good right to ask why the Government have adopted a policy of extending our Frontier in that direction? It seems to me that if we advance at all in that direction we must advance so as to include the whole of Afghanistan —so as to obtain ample room for our armies to move, and to be supplied by the plains beyond the mountains. If we were to do that we should find ourselves in a position of considerable difficulty if France should attempt to carry out the design frequently attributed to her of annexing Belgium. No doubt we had entered into Treaties engaging us to defend Belgium in any such eventuality; but it would be awkward for us to raise our hands to prevent France from "rectifying her Frontier" in that direction, if we ourselves had annexed Afghanistan for a similar reason. It had been said that the Indian Frontier had never been invaded; but it must be remembered that India had never been attacked, since we had had it. If it ever were attacked, I am convinced that our present Frontier would be most gallantly defended. The Under Secretary of State for India has stated that during the last 28 years there have been 19 expeditions comprising 58,000 men. That gives an average of 2,000 men. I think it a very fortunate thing that the Frontier can be defended with so small a force. Too little pains have been taken to avoid the extremity of war. I find in a telegram from Sir Neville Chamberlain the following very remarkable expression:—

> "Cavagnari reports that we have received a decisive answer from Faiz Mahomed, after personal interview, that he will not allow Mission to proceed. . . . . Make another attempt to-morrow morning, and try to bring Faiz Mahomed to reason, or make him fire upon us."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 236.]

"Or make him fire upon us!" That expression appears to indicate a very remarkable frame of mind, and to some extent goes to show that sufficient pains have not been taken to avoid this unfortunate contact. In the words of Sir Charles Metcalfe deprecating in the strongest manner a somewhat similar proposal, he said—

> "It was a trick unworthy of any Government, which, when detected, could not fail to excite jealousy and indignation; and might not, impossibly, lead to war."

I have thought it my duty, intending to vote for the Resolution of the hon. Member for Bedford, to explain to the House why I do so, because I fear the country is embarking in a most serious and hazardous policy.

MR. R. E. PLUNKETT said, he hoped if he were surrounded by any of the self-constituted lieutenants of the Conservative Whip, they would not bring to bear upon him the system of annoyance of which the hon. and gallant Member (Sir Alexander Gordon) complained, and which he said compelled him to have recourse to the serener atmosphere of Opposition in order to state his opinions. He (Mr. Plunkett) contended that the alleged change of policy on the part of the Government did not begin with the letter which was sent to the Ameer's Commissioner at Peshawur in July, 1876, and he held that it could be satisfactorily proved that at that time there was a secret Russian Agent at Cabul. There had been evidence that the Envoy was at Cabul at that time; and on the 14th of September there was a complaint from our Foreign Office on the subject. So that the point so strongly urged by some of the leading speakers opposite simply fell to the ground. The hon. Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread) urged that the present Government had changed the policy of never sending a Resident Agent to Afghanistan. If, however, the words of Lord Mayo were to be taken as promising for all time that we should never send a Resident, it must be also taken that we had promised we should never for all time send British troops into Afghanistan, or enter into a Treaty with the Ameer, which was absurd. Accusations had been made against Members of the Government in connection with the Papers which had been produced, which perhaps it would be better not to allude to. Attacks made by hon. or right hon. Members in presence of each other were within the limits of Parliamentary debate, conducted on a fair field, and before the most generous Assembly in the world; but when they attacked those who were not there to answer for themselves, it should be with more moderation than had characterized the language lately used against the Viceroy of India. He did not complain of the language used by the hon. Member for Bedford or the hon. and learned Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt); but there was a point on which he thought they were almost entitled to ask for some explanation from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone). In the speech he made at Greenwich the other day he accused the Government of what really amounted to fraud and deceit, because, he said, they had suppressed three letters, which were the cause of the war. Now the three letters which the right hon. Gentleman said had been suppressed were identical with the letter to which he had referred, and the right hon. Gentleman had the substance of the letters in his hand when he brought against Lord Lytton this portentous charge of dissimulation and fraud. The right hon. Gentleman having described them as startling and astounding, expressed a hope that some explanation would be afforded of them. After making that speech and before he spoke in this House, the right hon. Gentleman might have consulted the Papers, where we were distinctly told the letters were copies of one another and might have acknowledged that he had been mistaken, but he took no such course. The letters were given *in extenso* in the Papers, where they were stated to be copies of each other, and this was what they said—

> "I write this friendly letter to inform you that the 16th or 17th September has been fixed for the departure of a Mission of high rank from the British Government to Cabul, and that the Mission will start whether Nawab Gholam Hussein shall or shall not by that time have had the honour of waiting on His Highness the Ameer. The object for which Mission is deputed is friendly, and the refusal of free passage to it, or interruption, or injury to its friendly progress will be regarded as act of hostility. I am to explain that the Mission will not in any case enter capital of Cabul before expiry of the month Ramazan. In conclusion may you keep well."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 2, p. 21.]

He (Mr. Plunkett) had no difficulty in seeing how the matter stood; but he probably read with less prejudice than the right hon. Gentleman. He listened attentively to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman, who, he regretted, did not appear to feel himself bound to make some retraction of so baseless a charge.

Mr. COURTNEY said, that having begun with the notion of a friendly Mission, we had gone on to a rectification of Frontier; and if the result of the present war should be a rectification of Frontier we should certainly be driven, as soon as we had crossed the crests of the mountain ranges, to pour down to the valleys on the other side as surely as water poured down a hill. We must go further if we advanced at all. He would therefore offer a view of this question which, as far as he knew, had not been presented to the House. It had been assumed in this debate that we were deeply interested in the maintenance of Afghanistan as a free, strong, independent and friendly territory. Its freedom and independence, indeed, might be limited so far that it must be free from all influence and all control except our own. In a very able paper, Sir Bartle Frere, with whom in many points he did not agree, had made some observations marked by very good sense. He pointed out what had been proved by experience over and over again—that, if two civilized

States have between them a Power less civilized that Power will be a source of embarrassment to both. Now, he maintained that so far from being a source of embarrassment to us, if Afghanistan ceased to be friendly, our position in India would be improved, even if Russia embodied Afghanistan in her own territory. And why? For this reason—we should be near our base, while Russia would be far from hers; we should have an admirable position such as we had now, Russia would have no position whatever; we should be well supplied and Russia ill supplied; and we should have all our forces at our command, while Russia would be at a great distance from her supplies. When he had the privilege three years ago of travelling in India, he went up to the very country to which the debate had reference, and he took the utmost pains, by consulting all authorities, to investigate the Frontier question. As the result of his inquiries he found a general concurrence of opinion among all authorities, civil and military, which fully confirmed the views expressed by the hon. and gallant Officer near him (Sir Alexander Gordon) in favour of the present Frontier, and protesting against any advance of it. Holding that opinion, he read with the greatest dissatisfaction the Central Asia Papers from end to end. More than that, the opinion which he put forward was the opinion of Her Majesty's Government. The Prime Minister himself had said that it was a wholly impracticable proposition to cross our present Frontier; and the present Foreign Secretary, who had a longer acquaintance with Indian affairs than the Secretary of State for India, had expressed a similar opinion. He believed that we might defy all Russian intrigue in India as long as we governed that country justly and honestly. He would now take into consideration what were our relations with Afghanistan when the present Government came into Office. The Ameer was not less favourably disposed towards us then than he had been for a long time before. Indeed, how was it possible for the Ameer to care very much for us? We had shown, over and over again, that we did not care the least for him or his dynasty, and that all we cared for was the maintenance of Afghanistan. He was astonished to hear hon. Members complain of Sir John Lawrence keeping himself aloof from the contest between the Ameer and his brother. It had been argued as if we ought to have known from the first that Shere Ali would be settled on the Throne; whereas, in fact, that result was brought about by a mere accident — the death of his brother. The Ameer had nothing to thank us for, and the particular things he desired were those which the Government absolutely refused to concede. Lord Salisbury, on coming into office, started this question of improving our relations with Shere Ali without even ascertaining whether they could be improved. The noble Lord, bent on doing something, was led step by step, from Mission to Mission, until at last he got to the question of the rectification of the Frontier. When the Duke of Argyll asked Lord Salisbury in the House of Lords what he was going to do in this matter, he made an answer which had been defended by hon. Members opposite. The defence amounted to this—that Lord Salisbury was speaking by the card; that he himself said so; and that everybody who heard him must have been aware of the necessity of paying great attention to his remarks so as not to misunderstand them. Surely Lord Northbrook, who was in the House at the time, must have listened most attentively to Lord Salisbury's remarks. Well, Lord Northbrook on that occasion made a short speech, in which he said that the policy of previous Governments had been to show the Ameer our desire to assist him with our advice whenever he required it, and not to press upon him the presence of British Residents in his territories, unless he really desired that they should go there and would give them a welcome. Whatever the intention of Lord Salisbury was, it was evident that his reply was misleading, and that it actually did mislead a man most competent to judge the question, as was shown by the speech of Lord Northbrook. More than that, Lord Salisbury heard those remarks of Lord Northbrook, but offered no correction of the misapprehension, although he corrected the statement of another noble Lord in reference to another question. This misleading policy on the part of the Government had recently received several exemplifications, and no time ought to be lost in stamping it with the reprobation of Parliament. All these transactions, the progress of which was marked, as he had shown, by the circulation of misleading despatches and telegrams, culminated in a war which the House was now asked to pronounce to have been alike unjust and unnecessary, those who opposed the war being described, amongst other epithets, as devotees of peace at any price. He denied the accuracy of the description as far as he was personally concerned. They were told that it was impossible to appreciate the insulting and sardonic character of the Ameer's reply to Lord Lytton unless they knew the Persian language; but what knowledge, he would ask, had Lord Lytton of Persian? It was, perhaps, about on a par with his knowledge of the Servian language, and those who paid any attention to current literature knew the extent of Lord Lytton's knowledge of Servian. His reason for supporting the proposal of his hon. Friend the Member for Bedford was that, being jealous of his country's honour, and anxious for her welfare, he saw that the policy of Her Majesty's Government tended to degrade the national character, and, at the same time, to set an evil example to the people of India, who were placed under our charge for education as well as for government.

Mr. NEWDEGATE said, the debates upon this great question had been marked by the exhibition of great talent; but there had been a good deal of bitterness displayed on account of the supposed suppression of information. He did not think that these suspicions were justified to the extent that had been urged. He desired, however, to recall to hon. Members the fact, that the House had placed itself at a great disadvantage in relation to every subject connected with India. By successive Acts Parliament had cut off every source of independent information. Formerly, India was governed by the East India Company, regulated to some extent by the Board of Control. The Directors of the East India Company were capable of being elected Members of this House, and some of the Directors were always Members of this House. [Parliament afterwards exhibited its consciousness of the necessity for the preservation of independent information, and of its authorised communication to this House, touching the government of India; for by the Act of 1853, not more than three nominees of the Crown were added to the Court of Directors, while the Government was retained in the hands of the Company. Again, by the Act of 1858, which transferred the Government of India to the Crown, Parliament retained seven Directors elected by the East India Company, as independent experts, in the Council created by that Act, and among other reasons in order that the Council might serve as a source of independent information for this House and for Parliament; but he must remind the Members of the late Administration, that India was now governed under the Acts of 1869, chaps. 97 and 98, by which the independence of the Council of India was wholly suppressed. The first of those Acts constituted the Government of India not in the Council, as it stood in the Act of 1858, but directly in the Secretary of State for India; and, instead of retaining seven Members of that Council, elected either by the East India Company, or self-elected by the Council, they made every Member of that Council the nominee, the creature of the Secretary of State. By passing those two Acts the House had, in his judgment, deprived itself of the means of obtaining that current information, from any source independent of the Minister of the day, which was really necessary for the exercise of its functions in relation to the Government of India. He (Mr. Newdegate) had felt the effects of that. He proved it from this fact—He had looked through *Hansard* to ascertain how far subjects connected with India had been considered by that House during the last three Sessions. In order to ascertain the time devoted by the House to Indian subjects, he counted the pages of *Hansard*, and he had the figures here, and they proved that little more than one-thirtieth part of the time of the House during the last three Sessions was devoted to Indian subjects. That was a natural effect of the lack of current independent information with respect to Indian affairs. But for the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett), to whom all honour was due, the House would have remained altogether without information. When, however, hon. Members on the Opposition Benches rose and complained that they had been kept too much in the dark, he could not help reminding them that it was by their own

Acts, passed during a Liberal Administration—the Indian Acts of 1869—that they had effectually provided against receiving independent information by having access to the Minutes of the Council and the independent opinions of experts. This was a very serious change, because it had always been held that it was essential to the safe government of India and to the retention of our Indian Empire that the action of "party" in this House and in Parliament should be, as far as possible, limited in its effects on the government of India. And what had they now? A Secretary of State, who must be a party-man, invested with the sole government of India. The hon. Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread) evidently entertained some feeling of this kind when he sought some opportunity, apart from the proceeding on the Address to the Crown, so that the party feeling and action of this House should bear upon the actual Government in India; since his Motion was couched in words condemnatory of the past conduct of the Government. The Government refused him all facilities; and he (Mr. Newdegate) ventured to recommend the hon. Member at once to appoint his Motion for some day at the command of the unofficial Members of the House. But the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) interfered. That right hon. Gentleman was more responsible than anyone else for the fact that the question before the House, which was intended to be a substantive Resolution, had been converted into an Amendment to the Address, thus giving the substance of the Amendment an immediate and distinctively party character—a character which, if too often repeated in its proceedings and maintained in its debates on Indian affairs, would incapacitate the House, in the opinion of the country, from exacting from Ministers their due responsibility for the government of India; because, if the action of parties in the House were to be represented in the Government of India, the reproach of Shere Ali would be verified, and the Natives of India and their local Rulers would not know from year to year what policy or what treatment they were to expect from the Government of India. Nothing could so completely shake their confidence; nothing could tend so essentially to endanger our Indian Empire; and beyond this, what would be the effect of this Amendment, if it were carried, upon the position of our Army in Afghanistan? He was old enough to remember the events of 1838, 1839, and 1840, and the present circumstances were in many respects wonderfully similar. In 1837 the Russian agent Vichovich was reported to be engaged in intrigues at Cabul. He was reported to have been poisoning the mind of Dost Mahomed, the Ameer, the father of Shere Ali, against this country and her government of India. It was a Liberal Government who, in 1838, dispatched an expedition to Afghanistan. That was an ill-omened expedition; it was dispatched at too late a period of the year; and when he asked himself how he would vote that night, he could not help thinking of the present severe weather, and the position of our troops in Afghanistan. When, on the previous day, the hon. and learned Member for the City of Oxford (Sir William Harcourt) lauded the old policy in preference to the new, the hon. and learned Member's speech touched a chord which vibrated, for he (Mr. Newdegate) was not in love with this new policy. It appeared to him that this war in Afghanistan was to be traced directly to the fact of the present Government having sent Indian troops to Malta last year—a measure in condemnation of the manner of doing which he had recorded his vote. He traced the present war directly to that expedition; and what had been the effect of it in other respects? Hitherto it had been the habit of that House to abstain from introducing into questions relating to European politics subjects connected with the government of India; European politics must ever be a matter of party debate and party action in that House. Now, if that House were habitually to adopt party action on questions relating to India, that would endanger our Indian Empire. If Indian subjects were to be mixed up with European politics, how would they be able to preserve continuity and stability in the government of India from the disturbance of the party action, which was inseparable from subjects connected with European politics? At that hour of the night he would not presume further to trespass on the kindness of the House. But if he recorded his vote against the Resolution of the hon. Member for Bedford, which he felt he must do, he should do so from a sense of duty—of duty to our Army in Afghanistan, a duty dictated by the conviction—that if our Army should now hastily retire from that country we should never be able to re-establish our old position there. Hon. Members opposite should consider what would be the effect of the success of that Amendment. At that moment, when our troops were far advanced into a dangerous country in winter, would, under such circumstances, hon. Members condemn the work of our Army and their action? [*Cries of* "No!" *from the Liberal Benches.*] At all events, by the success of that Amendment they would condemn the cause for which our Army was fighting. He was not in love with the new policy; but what chance had they, he asked, if the Amendment were carried, of re-establishing the old position? In his opinion, the time had not come when it might be safe to condemn—as he himself might possibly be disposed to condemn—much of the past in the administration of the affairs of India, as it had now affected our relations to Afghanistan.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: I am surprised that the hon. Member who has just sat down should have based the opposition he is about to give to the Amendment upon the effect which, if carried, it would have upon our Armies at present serving in Afghanistan. I think it has been made pretty clear, by those of my Friends who have had the opportunity of speaking, that whatever may be our opinion as to the justice of the causes which have led the Government to embark in this war, that there is no difference among us as to the necessity of supporting, by every means in our power, the gallant troops who are now engaged in it; and in no speech that has been delivered in any part of this House have I heard one single remonstrance against the opinion so expressed. And I am the more surprised that the hon. Member, who is generally so staunch a supporter of all Constitutional doctrines, should have put forward such opinions; because it seems to me to amount to nothing less than an assertion that when once the Government has involved the country in a war, the Houses of Parliament are to be debarred from expressing any opinion as to the justice of the war, or the policy of the Government that has led to it. The hon. Member also referred, in terms of some regret, to the personalities which have been introduced into this debate. I hope to be able to avoid the use of any personalities; but I must say that there is one thing which is still more to be regretted than the use of personalities, and that is the conduct which renders personalities natural or necessary. No doubt that is, and always will be, a matter of opinion; but as to the personalities that have been introduced into this debate, I can only say that we are ready to leave to the judgment of the House and of the country whether the personalities that have been introduced, or the conduct that has led to them, is the more deserving of censure. I stated, on the first night of the Session, that there was no difference of opinion among us as to the necessity of supporting Her Majesty's Government in the prosecution of this war until an honourable conclusion has been reached. I also stated that it seemed to me Her Majesty's Government had a perfectly legal right—and I believe, strictly speaking, a Constitutional right—to involve the country in that war. But while I expressed that opinion, I believe I intimated—and if I did not do so then, I must do so now—that it was a very different matter whether it was wise, or prudent, or Constitutional, in the strictest and best sense of the term, on the part of the Government, to involve this country in such a war, without giving Parliament or the country any opportunity of expressing, or even of forming, any opinion on the policy which had led up to it. I can well understand that, in the course of long and protracted negotiations on a subject well-known and understood by the country, a critical moment may arise when it may be the duty of the Government to commit the country to an appeal to arms before it is able to take the sense of Parliament formally upon the question. But I must say that I do not recollect that there ever was any precedent for the country finding itself committed to a war, while ignorant not only of the immediate cause which has provoked a declaration of war, but of the whole course of the circumstances and of the policy which have led to it. It cannot be denied that up to a very few weeks ago Parliament had not received from the Government the slightest information of the change of events in India and Afghanistan, which have been the cause of this war. It will not be asserted by the boldest Member of the Government, or by their boldest supporter, that any information has been vouchsafed to us by them, either in the form of Parliamentary explanations, or in the form of Papers laid before Parliament. Nay, more, I think they will not be unwilling to acknowledge that information which might have been laid before Parliament has been deliberately withheld. I said I would endeavour to avoid all personal recrimination; and I am not, therefore, going to enter into a subject which has been already so freely discussed—the correctness of the answers which have been given in this or the other House of Parliament when information as to our relations with Afghanistan has been asked for. The excuse which has been put forward with regard to the nature of those answers, is that nothing was stated in them which was not the fact; but I do not think that the Government themselves will deny that, in the replies to interpellations which were addressed to them, they did not communicate the whole state of the case either in this or in the other House. We are told that there were reasons which prevented a full and frank statement on the subject. Now, what I want to know is, without entering into the personal question, what those reasons were which induced the Government to abstain from making a free and full communication to Parliament—what reason existed why the Government should not have laid those very Papers which are now before us on the Table of the House? [An hon. MEMBER: They were not wanted.] The hon. and gallant Gentleman says they were not wanted. Does he mean that they were not asked for? ["Hear, hear!"] Exactly. My answer to him is that we were not in a position to know the real state of the case, and did not know what to ask for. But I would again ask, what was the reason which prevented the Government from laying the Papers on the Table? I suppose we shall be told that at that time, in 1877, our relations with Russia were, as the expression goes, somewhat strained, and that it was not desirable in a matter of this kind, which involved, to a certain extent, our relations with Russia, that a full disclosure should be made of the unsatisfactory state of our relations with Afghanistan. If that was the reason, it seems to me to be a totally inadequate one. Does the Government suppose for a moment that the Power with whom at the time our relations were supposed to be strained—that that Power of whose cunning and astuteness in diplomacy we have heard so much—was not accurately informed of all that passed between them and the Ameer, and that when they were concealing information from the House of Commons that they were concealing it from Russia also? I doubt very much whether they could for a moment have laboured under that impression; but even if such information with regard to our relations with Afghanistan would have been communicated to Russia in consequence of its having been laid before this House, I think the advantages gained from laying it before Parliament would have far outweighed any advantage obtained by concealing it. If we had been furnished with this information, there would probably have been debates in this House on the subject; and no doubt the Government would have been blamed then, as they are blamed now, for what we should have considered then, as we consider now, the clumsy and blundering manner in which these negotiations have been conducted. They would, unquestionably, have exposed themselves to an attack of that sort. But I think the result of an open discussion in the House of Commons, at that time as now, would have been to show, on the one hand, to the Government of Afghanistan, that no intention existed on the part of the Parliament or the people of this country — whatever intention might have existed on the part of the Government; and I will not impute anything of the kind to them—to interfere in the slightest degree, or to diminish to the smallest extent, the independence of their country. On the other hand, I think the result of the debate would have been to prove to Russia, that however great may be the desire which is felt on all sides of this House to remain on friendly terms with her, that no interference on her part with the integrity or the independence of Afghanistan would meet with the smallest countenance or approval from any Party, or portion of a Party, in this House. I think that a great advantage would have been conferred by a full discussion of the subject in this House; and it seems to me that, in order to avoid what might have been a Party embarrassment, the Government has withheld from this House and from Parliament information which Parliament had a right to expect that it would receive, and which it would have received with the greatest benefit to India, and even to our relations with Russia and Afghanistan. Passing from that point, I must put aside at this hour of the night a great number and variety of topics which have been the subject of much controversy and debate during the last four nights. I must put them aside—not because they are minor subjects, not because they are trivial, not because they are unimportant—but because the time at my disposal and the patience of the House would not be sufficient to enable me to go into them. I may, however, just refer in one or two words to some of the subjects which I cannot enter into at greater length. Charges have been made against the accuracy of the statements contained in the Papers laid on the Table. These charges have been designated as "trivial;" but, for my part, I cannot think that any question affecting the strict accuracy of the Papers which are laid before this House can ever be unimportant; and I must say that, so far as I have heard, no answer has been made, scarcely any answer has been attempted, to the impeachment brought by my right hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone) against the accuracy of much that is contained in these Papers. There is another subject which has been made a subject of considerable controversy, and it is far from unimportant. Much has turned upon whether the Ameer of Cabul has or has not ever at a previous time expressed his willingness to receive a British Resident. That is a subject well worthy all the attention which it has received, but it is one which it is useless to enter into, except at considerable detail; and it is one, therefore, which I must leave to the judgment of the House, after having heard all that has been said on the subject on both sides. There are still more important subjects upon which the controversy has been extremely keen—almost bitter—on both sides of the House: I refer to the conduct of Lord Lytton and the Indian Government in the proceedings preliminary to and during the Peshawur Conference; and, again, as to the conduct of Lord Lytton and his Government in the measures taken in the autumn of this year for securing the reception of Sir Neville Chamberlain's Mission, and especially regarding the imperious haste —as it is described on this side of the House — with which the Mission was pressed on the Ameer, and the manner and the nature of the Ultimatum which was finally addressed to him. These, Sir, cannot for one moment be described as minor points; they are subsidiary, perhaps, to the main issue; but they are by no means of a minor character. Without a thorough examination of the points which I have indicated, it is impossible for the House to decide upon what was the character of the policy of the Government; and it is impossible to decide, without a thorough examination of these points, whether the object of the Government has really been to bring about a better understanding and better relations between themselves and the Ameer; or whether, on the other hand, their object has been to impose conditions upon him which would, practically, have reduced him to the position of a vassal of the Sovereign; and, in the event of his refusing to accept them, to find the ground for a dispute with him to invade his territory and to destroy his power. It is impossible to form an opinion upon these all-important questions, without a thorough examination of the mode and the spirit in which the negotiations were conducted; and I cannot help expressing my gratitude—and, I think, I may say the gratitude of all who sit on this side of the House, at any rate—for the great care and labour and ability with which these questions have been entered into by my hon. Friend the Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread), my right hon. Friend the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster), my right hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone), my hon. and learned Friend who addressed the House this evening, and others, who have entered at great length into this part of the subject. I wish also to say to the House, that if I refrain from following their footsteps in a minute canvass of all the steps of the negotiations in the year 1876, and in the present year, it is not because I am not fully sensible of their importance and of their relevance to the subject now before us; but simply and solely because I feel that I could not enter into them without going again into that minute examination of the Papers laid before us, which I know that I, at least, have not the power of making sufficiently interesting to the House to justify me in asking it to listen to me at this time of the evening. Passing by these subjects, then, although by no means neglecting them, I want to ask the House to turn its attention for one moment to what I am afraid may, perhaps, alarm them, though I think they need not feel any undue alarm on the subject. I am going to refer for a moment to the despatch of Lord Cranbrook of the 19th November of this year; and I do not think the Government can complain that I should make it the text of a few observations. The Government have themselves put forward that despatch as a summary of all these proceedings and negotiations, and they cannot, therefore, complain if I refer a little to that despatch. I want to refer to the 9th paragraph, and that may be an intimation somewhat alarming to the House, after all the controversy that there already has been on the subject. I can assure the House that I do not desire to refer to it in any spirit of personal imputation or recrimination—I do not desire to recur to that paragraph for the purpose of shifting the blame of what has occurred from one Administration to another; but simply because I think by reference to the 9th paragraph I can best place before the House what I want to advert to. If this debate is to be of any service to the country and both sides of the House—who I am sure desire that it shall not be in vain—it will be in that it will enable the country to form a better and a more balanced judgment upon the circumstances which have led to the departure of the Government from the old policy and the adoption of the new. There have been, as we all know by this time, for many years among Indian statesmen two policies. One has been described for some years—although I do not accept the sufficiency or the aptness of the description—as the policy of "masterly inactivity;" and the other, I believe, has been described as the "forward policy." Almost every statesman who has been responsible for the management of Indian affairs up to a short time ago—every responsible statesman—has been a supporter of what is described as the "masterly inactivity" policy; and certainly no Member of any Government has ever been a warmer or more able advocate of that policy than the right hon. Gentleman opposite, who I presume will follow me. I suppose he will not deny that, warm advocate of that policy as he has been, he is now forced to abandon it; and what I think will be one salutary effect of this debate will be, that the country will more completely understand what is the difference between these two policies, and what are the reasons which have induced the Government to abandon that policy which they formerly supported, and what are the reasons why we think that they have been utterly and completely wrong in doing so. I think the account given in the paragraph of Lord Cranbrook's despatch is calculated not to inform, but to mislead the country. The impression which is suggested by that paragraph is that in 1873 there existed a difference of opinion between Lord Northbrook and the Government of India and the Government at home, and that he was prevented by the Government at home from doing something which he considered necessary in the interests of India. I know that hon. Gentlemen opposite have come forward to say that they are willing to accept Lord Northbrook's statement, that there was no such difference of opinion. But that is not a satisfactory way of settling the matter. What we maintain—and what we think is shown from the Papers—is that upon the Papers that have been presented there never was any reason to suppose there was any difference of opinion between Lord Northbrook and the Government at home. I am prepared still further to assert, that not only was there no difference between Lord Northbrook and the Indian Government and the Government at home, but that for two years there was no difference upon the main principles of his policy between Lord Northbrook and the present Government. This point was referred to—and ably referred to—by my hon. and learned Friend earlier in the evening; but it seems to me so important, that I think the House will excuse me if I say another word or two on the subject. The impression sought to be conveyed in this despatch is that Lord Northbrook was prepared to make certain assurances to the Ameer of Afghanistan, but was prevented from doing so by Her Majesty's Government. Shortly after that time that Government was succeeded by the present Government, and a little time after that —early in the year 1874—Lord Derby made a speech in the House of Lords upon this subject. I will not read extracts from that speech—I am prepared to read one or two if I am challenged—for I think the Government will admit that it is not an unfair account of Lord Derby's statement to say that when he was challenged in the House of Lords and asked what view the Government took of the assurances which had been given by Lord Northbrook in the Conferences of Simla in 1873, he certainly did not in any way seek to extend or to explain those assurances. If anything he rather indicated, although he did not complain of what Lord Northbrook, under the instructions of the late Government, had done and said, that, in his opinion, he had said quite as much as was prudent, and quite as much as the Government which he represented were willing to say. Perhaps it may be said that Lord Derby was a very cautious Minister, and that subsequent events have shown that his views upon these subjects were not in accordance with those of the rest of the Administration. But Lord Derby was, and remained for a long time after that speech, a Member of Her Majesty's Government. He was the Member of the Government who was put forward to reply to the questions of Lord Napier and Ettrick upon this subject. The then Indian Secretary (the present Foreign Secretary) sat by his side, and his statements were accepted by his Colleagues as the exposition of the views of the Government. I might further prove my point by a more detailed reference to his speech, but it is not necessary for me to do that; because for two years after the accession of the present Government to Office, I am prepared to assert—and these Papers show it—that no instructions were ever addressed to Lord Northbrook directing him to extend, to strengthen, or to explain the assurances which had been given in 1873 by Lord Northbrook to the Ameer of Afghanistan. It is true that despatches were addressed in 1875 to Lord Northbrook, directing him to try a new policy—a policy that was, to a certain extent, new with the Ameer. But that policy had nothing whatever to do with the assurances which he had given, or was authorized to give, to the Ameer. On the contrary, it was Lord Northbrook himself who pointed out to the Government, if they were determined to insist upon that reception by the Ameer of a British Resident which they thought necessary, that the only way in which there was any chance of such a proposal being accepted was to extend the assurances he had been authorized by the late Government to give. Not even in their reply to Lord Northbrook, in December, 1875, was there the slightest hint or the slightest indication that, in the opinion of the Government, it was desirable to extend these assurances. That, Sir, seems to be a not unimportant fact. In these circumstances, what is the use of the Under Secretary of State coming forward in this House at the present time and telling us that Lord Northbrook's assurances to the Ameer were so vague and misty that it was impossible for him to understand them, and that he was not surprised if they puzzled the Minister of the Ameer? Why is there any controversy between us on this subject when it is proved, beyond the possibility of doubt, that up to the year 1875 there was no difference between either the Indian Government, or the late Government, or the present Government, as to the nature and the extent of the assurances and engagements which it was right and politic for this country to enter into with Afghanistan? Sir, it is true that a difference of opinion, which we shall very soon see was to bear fruit, did arise between the present Government and Lord Northbrook. The Government thought it was desirable—they thought it was necessary—that conditions should be imposed upon the Ameer of Afghanistan which had never been imposed upon him before. They thought it necessary that he should be required to admit British Residents, not to his capital, but to various points in his territory. I am perfectly willing to admit—and it has been admitted by my hon. and learned Friend—that that was a demand which it was perfectly legitimate on our part to make, and which it is possible it might have been in the interests of the Ameer himself to accept. There was only one objection to it, and that was the objection which was pointed out by Lord Northbrook and the Indian Government, that all experience showed, and all Indian authorities believed, that this condition would never be willingly accepted by the Ameer, and that it could not be pressed upon him, except at the cost of forfeiting his friendly alliance. The Under Secretary of State, or an hon. Gentleman opposite, has said that subsequent events have proved that Lord Northbrook was wrong and Lord Salisbury was right; but has experience proved that? Why, the Government have tried the experiment with their own Viceroy and with their own Envoy. They had in their hands the selection of the time, the circumstances, the manner, in which the proposal was to be made; and therefore we may assume that it was made under what I suppose they thought would be the most favourable circumstances; and it has failed—utterly and completely failed. Was Lord Northbrook right, or Lord Salisbury right, in this matter? Sir, I am not going to argue now whether when the Ameer declined to accept the conditions which you sought to impose upon him you had, in strict justice and equity, a right to take advantage of that refusal to repudiate the engagements—the verbal engagements, but still the engagements—which had been entered into by various previous Viceroys as to our relations with him. I am not going to argue the justice of the course which you took. I do not want to argue that at this moment; but were your proceedings politic? I will concede, if you like, for the purposes of that argument, that you had a right when the Ameer rejected your proposal, and the condition which you thought it necessary he should accept, to re-consider your relations with him. Well, you have considered them, and what has been the result? You had, I am thankful to say, not three courses open to you, but you had four; and I will enumerate them in the order in which it seems to me they were most likely to be advantageous to this country. You might have had, first, a friendly Afghanistan—that is, the Afghanistan which you tell us we might have had, and of which we missed the opportunity. Well, that may be; but it does not lie in your mouth to say it; because, as I have just shown, you had two years and more in which you might have recovered that opportunity which you say we lost, and in which you might have gained the friendly Afghanistan which you say we neglected to obtain. The second policy open to you was that you might have had what I will describe as a sulky Afghanistan—that is, the Afghanistan which you say we left you. I do not think you can describe the condition of things in Afghanistan as we left them in any more unfavourable terms than that, and you might have many a worse bargain than that. There was not much that you wanted from Afghanistan. It is perfectly true the relations of its Ruler were not friendly. He was unwilling to do a favour to you, and he was unwilling to accept one from you. But there was very little we wanted him to do. All we wanted of Afghanistan was that it should preserve its independence. We wanted it to be as jealous of interference from any other quarter as it proved itself to be of interference from us. And that was the condition in which we left Afghanistan. It was not, perhaps, the most satisfactory condition; but I maintain it was not an unsatisfactory condition. What was the third alternative? You might have an unfriendly, an alienated, a hostile Afghanistan, and that is the Afghanistan which you have secured by your Peshawur Conference. That is the Afghanistan which you have secured by your letters, your interviews, your threats, your allusions to iron pots and earthen pipkins; by your hints about an understanding with Russia; about the iron band which was surrounding the territories of the Ameer; about the rectification of Frontier which was to be made without reference to, or consideration for, the feelings of the Ruler of Afghanistan. That is the alienated and the unfriendly Afghanistan which you have secured. Then there is one policy worse even than this, and it is that which you appear to me to have begun, and which I am afraid you are determined to carry through. That is the policy of the military occupation either of the whole or a part of Afghanistan. That is the fourth and, as I believe, the worst policy of all. On this part of the subject I really hardly know where to begin or what arguments to use. Up to this time there had been so complete an agreement among all authorities, military and civil, as to the impolicy of a military advance upon, and the occupation of, Afghanistan, that the difficulty is not to find arguments against it, but to select from the arguments against it. This is, to a certain extent, a military question, upon which I am not competent to speak; but I have not observed that we have been favoured with many military arguments in the course of this debate and upon the side of the Government. I am not aware that we have been favoured with any military arguments at all. The hon. and gallant Member for Aberdeenshire (Sir Alexander Gordon) to-night addressed to the House what appeared to me to be a very sound and a very powerful military argument; but I have not heard from the other side of the House any military opinion upon this subject at all. Indeed, Sir, we have not been favoured with a great deal of information during this debate from the front Bench opposite. The noble Lord the Postmaster General, who certainly has never been considered to be a very high authority on the subject of India, is the only Cabinet Minister who has addressed the House during these four nights. Although the military administration of India is not immediately in his Department, I should have thought we might have been favoured by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War with the opinion of his advisers on the expediency and the advisability of a military occupation of Afghanistan. I am averse from troubling the House by reading extracts at this time of night; but I have said I am not a military authority, and I do not think I can do better—I feel certain I cannot express my views more shortly—than by reading one or two extracts from the opinions of military men of high distinction, who I do not think have been referred to in the course of this debate; and I simply read them because I can bring the views I entertain more shortly and much better before the House in that than in any other way. The first is the opinion of Sir Henry Greene, who is certainly not an advocate of the masterly inactivity policy, and who, I believe, is one of the advocates of a forward policy. Writing in 1873, and alluding to the Afghan tribes, he says—

> "The country bordering on the valley of Peshawur and skirting the Pass leading from Jellalabad to Ismael Khan is held by various tribes of mountaineers, numbering perhaps 200,000 men, who in many a border fight against other tribes have shown their high courage. To occupy the valley of Jellalabad we should have to pass through and leave in our rear the most dangerous and numerous of these tribes, and we should also leave in our rear some of the most difficult defiles of the Jellalabad Pass. Having arrived, we should be surrounded by similar mountains, inhabited by the same warlike tribes, and the communications with Peshawur would be always most precarious. They are the most intractable people on the whole border country, and the necessity of sending frequent expeditions among them has proved this. It appears to me, therefore, that to place a force in their midst would be to place it in a position of great jeopardy. Consequently, I think our safest plan is to hold the Valley of Peshawur and to complete, as far as possible, the railway to Lahore, in order to re-inforce the garrison at Lahore as quickly as possible when necessary."

That is the opinion of Sir Henry Greene as to the occupation of Afghanistan. I have another extract which I should like to read, from an authority who, I dare say, will not command much respect from that side of the House. I do not quote it as an authority, but because the view is well put, and because it is the most convenient form of expressing my own opinion. It is a Memorandum by Sir William Mansfield, the late Lord Sandhurst. He says—

> "I can conceive of no greater political mistake than a course which would unite the whole population of Afghanistan in actual hostilities against us, and so compel us to meet their hostility on ground most unfavourable to us and entailing great waste of our forces. I believe nothing could be more true than that, supposing that at some future time Russia and England were engaged in a struggle for Asiatic dominion, that party will enter on the contest with great advantages which has abstained from forestalling events by an invasion and annexation of Afghanistan. If it is assumed that Russia wishes to invade India through Afghanistan, it would become necessary to hold the country very strongly, otherwise the population would rise to drive out the invading army, and its forces might be divided in a most dangerous manner on ground most unfavourable to itself. In this manner Afghanistan would be a cause of weakness to Russia, and so would become our worst ally. If we invaded Afghanistan the problem would be exactly reversed, and Afghanistan would become our worst enemy. We should have to hold it with a force of some 40,000 or 50,000 men, and at the same time to meet Russia with a great strain upon our resources, and under conditions most unfavourable to ourselves."

That is the most important part of the despatch, and nothing can be more true than the case which is there put hypothetically. This question is not discussed very much in the Papers laid before us. There was one passage, however, in a despatch from Lord Lawrence, which expresses the same ideas in very much the same language. So much for the military opinion upon the military occupation of Afghanistan. I know it is said that military opinions expressed two years ago are now very much overweighted by the necessity of doing something on account of the advance of Russia in Central Asia. Well, Sir, I want to know exactly what this advance in Central Asia is which has so alarmed the Government and impressed upon it the necessity of doing something. I referred the other day to a despatch contained in these Papers—a despatch written in answer to one by Sir John Lawrence, pointing out not only what had been done, but what was likely to be done by Russia—which the right hon. Gentleman opposite (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) very properly reminded me was 10 years old. In that despatch the Government said that they felt not the slightest jealousy or alarm in reference to Russia in Central Asia. It was pointed out with extraordinary accuracy, as far as I am able to judge, not only what those designs have been in the past, but what they were likely to be in future years; and the right hon. Gentleman put the assurance aside with the utmost calmness, and stated that we had not the slightest cause for alarm. That is not the last pronouncement of the Government upon the subject of the advance of Russia in Central Asia. I cannot now go into details; but the House remembers very well the speech of the Prime Minister in this House, in 1876, in which he expressed—I thought in a very reasonable and sensible way—his views with respect to that advance in Central Asia. Now we have these Papers, expressing, in the most frank and friendly manner, their perfect comprehension of the course of events, and the entire absence of alarm and jealousy, both Governments being on most amicable terms. We know very well, while the Government were making speeches in this House, and were writing frank and friendly assurances to Russia, that they did feel alarm; that in 1876, when Lord Lytton went out, or when the despatches to Lord Northbrook were written, the Government had begun to consider that the state of things affecting the Russian advance was extremely grave, and demanded measures which they were pleased to call "of timely precaution." They may be right; but what I want to know is, what the particular advance of Russia was that they considered altered the situation, and made these measures of timely precaution, involving the invasion, and perhaps the annexation, of Afghanistan a necessity to us? I stated very generally the other night my ideas upon the Russian advance. That advance may be a very serious one; but I do not care to be put aside generally by such a reply as—"Oh! the advance of Russia has been terrible, and something must be done." It is more business-like, and more prudent, to look the matter boldly in the face, and to say where we are threatened, and to point out the exact danger to which we are exposed. Is the actual invasion of our Indian Empire the danger which we may expect? I cannot imagine it is that. The Prime Minister himself has put aside that view; for Lord Beaconsfield at the Guildhall the other night said that Her Majesty's Government entertained no apprehensions of the invasion of India by our North-West Frontier. The noble Lord said the "aspect of the country is so forbidding, that I do not believe any invasion of our North-West Frontier could be possible." It is true that Lord Beaconsfield is a great authority; but there is a greater. The noble Lord the Vice President of the Council does not agree with him, and contradicts him in the flattest possible manner. He says it is a great mistake to suppose there is no danger of invasion. He says that the configuration of India and Italy very much resemble each other; that no country has been so often, or so successfully, invaded as Italy; that India has also frequently been invaded.

Lord GEORGE HAMILTON: I am very sorry to interrupt the noble Lord. What I said was that the only reason why the Afghans did not invade India was because we were a greater military Power; and I also pointed how, under certain conditions, we might cease to have this immunity from invasion.

The Marquess of HARTINGTON: I understood the noble Lord in his allusion to say that Italy and India, in their configuration, very much resembled each other; that Italy had often been successfully invaded; and that India had also been previously invaded; and if the argument was not pointed to the danger in which India stood of a formidable invasion, I really should like to know what point his observation has. It is true that India has often been invaded, and through these Passes; but I want to know whether India has ever been held before by a Power such as ours; and whether the danger of an invasion of India is not every day becoming a danger less likely to occur? In the opinion of most men, I believe, the invasion of Afghanistan in 1838, under the influence of a scare somewhat similar to the present, was a great mistake; but, at all events, Lord Auckland's Government at that time had some excuse which the Government of this day cannot plead. Our power in India was not the same as it is now. Our power in India has been greatly consolidated since 1838. Our policy in India has been greatly consolidated by the wise administration of a succession of Viceroys, not the least of whom is that Viceroy whose name has been so often mentioned in these debates, and whose name has been mentioned with scarcely sufficient respect from the opposite benches. I am not certain; but I am rather under the apprehension that the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for India (Mr. E. Stanhope)—I hope I am not misrepresenting him—made some somewhat disparaging remarks upon Lord Lawrence's conduct at the time of the Mutiny. [MR. E. STANHOPE: It was not I.] I beg your pardon; but disparaging remarks have been heard from that side of the House, and there can be no doubt that a violent attack has been made upon Lord Lawrence by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Tamworth (Sir Robert Peel), and we have not had the conduct of Lord Lawrence vindicated, as I should, under those circumstances, have expected. But I am sure that when the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer rises he will not fail to notice these matters, for he is in so responsible a position for everything that Lord Lawrence has done with reference to the North-West Frontier. There is one other paragraph in the despatch to which I must direct notice. Writing in 1867 the right hon. Gentleman says, addressing Lord Lawrence — "Your Excellency is so intimately acquainted with the general views of the Government, and with the whole condition of Afghanistan, that the Government feel we may safely leave it to your discretion to act as you think best, in case any emergency should arise." Now, Sir, I think, if the Members of the Government who have spoken before had their position in this matter in view, they would have taken an opportunity of vindicating the character and policy of Lord Lawrence from the attack which has been made upon him from that side of the House. Since 1838 the power of England has been greatly strengthened and consolidated in India; and in no respect has a greater or more remarkable change been made than in the improvement of our systems of communication. In 1838 it would have taken weeks, perhaps months, to mass any considerable portion of our military strength on our North-West Frontier. Now, in consequence of the system of railways and other improved means of communication, we could mass our whole available military strength in a comparatively short time to meet an army far from its resources and with difficult communications. It does seem to me the wildest idea that ever disturbed any Government in this country to think that there is the slightest danger to our rule in India from an army, manœuvring far from its base, with difficult communications, issuing through the narrow defiles and Passes of Afghanistan to meet the disciplined forces—Native and European — of England ready to crush them. I know that actual invasion is not the only danger in that region—there is the danger of intrigue. That, I fully admit, is a more real danger than the one to which I have referred. But it is one which cannot be removed or done away with—on the contrary, it might be increased by any action in the direction of an advance to Afghanistan. What is the argument? It is, as I understand it, that if the Russians are permitted to acquire an influence in Afghanistan, they will make use of it by intriguing across the border of the Native States, in order to make them unfriendly. Is that prevented by our advancing and occupying either the whole or any part of Afghanistan? Suppose that we do occupy the whole;

we do not get rid of Russian intrigue—on the contrary, Russia can intrigue from Bokhara. Russia has, then, the same opportunity to cross the border into Afghanistan, and into a far better field to work in. Supposing it is only the rectification of the Frontier, the annexation of a part of Afghanistan would give Russia a far better opportunity for intrigue in the remainder, and provide her, at the same time, with the very means. Either you displace the present Ameer from his Throne, or you have him hostile to you, enraged by the loss of a part of his territory, and what more convenient plea can Russia have? Supposing you drive the Ameer out of his Kingdom across the border, has not Russia an equally good instrument for intrigue; and how does the Government explain, how will it prevent the possibility of Russian intrigue advancing? I believe, on the contrary, such a course will hasten and facilitate any operations that Russia may desire in that direction. I am happy to admit—and have admitted—the possibility of danger; it must be dealt with; it must be met as one of the facts which cannot be ignored. No one can suggest that Russia can be put back. It is a difficulty which the Government must face, and face as best they can. It is for them to prove that the only way it can be dealt with is by an advance to meet Russia. If it is to be dealt with, I believe, in the opinion of the most eminent statesmen, that Russian intrigue will be best met by a wise and prudent administration of our own dominions. But supposing that it has to be met and dealt with by some direct means, then sooner or later we must deal with Russia herself. I am not advocating any rash or hasty proceedings with regard to Russian intrigue. I do not know what explanation Russia may give of her advance; but I am quite sure that you will not stop Russian intrigue by merely punishing a subject upon whom Russia is practising. You will not stop Russia by punishing or even by dethroning the Ameer—you will only give her new and increased opportunities of playing her game more effectually than she would be able to do in any other way. For these reasons, it appears to me that the policy you have adopted—a hostile policy—is about the most unwise which you could have chosen. We have been asked very often in the course of this debate—"What would you do under the circumstances?" I think the answer given by my right hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich is a sufficient answer. It is a question which I do not think any Government has a right to put to any Opposition. How are we to say, when we think that your conduct has been a succession of mistakes, what is the precise position which we should have taken under the circumstances? But I will say—although I do not admit that the question is one to which we are bound to give an answer—that there are one or two things which I think it is possible we should do. I will say that, whatever the result of this war, the more speedy its conclusion and the greater its success the better—I will say that, whatever the result of this war, no permanent occupation of any part of Afghanistan, contrary to the wish of any of its inhabitants, ought to be sanctioned. I believe that any strategical advantage which might be gained—I doubt whether the balance of military opinion is that any advantages would be gained—would be dearly purchased with the lasting ill-will of the whole of the people of Afghanistan. It will be difficult, certainly, but it may not be an impossible task to convince the people and the Ruler of Afghanistan that we do not desire to interfere with their interests; and I believe that no proof, no better proof, could be given to them than that after a successful war we should retire within our own boundary without annexing one inch of their territory. I do not think we could find any more effectual or better barrier against any possible dangers we may apprehend from the advance of Russia than the conviction that such a proceeding on our part would give to the minds of the people of Afghanistan of our real desire for their independence. What have the people of that country done to lead us to suppose that they have already sacrificed their independence to Russia? It is we—and we alone—who have thrown them into the arms of Russia; and the only policy in my mind by which the errors of the last two years can be repaired is to replace once more in the minds of the Afghan people the conviction that their independence is as great an object to us as it is to themselves. There is one more indication of policy I may suggest. Whatever else may be done, I think the present Viceroy should be recalled. I admire the genius of Lord Lytton, and I believe that in Europe his diplomatic talents would be useful; but I cannot help saying that as a military diplomatist in India he is a mistake. Sir, I think that Lord Lytton should be recalled; because he appears to me to be the incarnation and embodiment of an Indian policy which is everything which an Indian policy ought not to be. Except when some danger or some trouble, such as the present, threatens us, we do not see or hear very much of what goes on in India. But when during the last two years we have had a glimpse of what is passing in India, what have we seen of Lord Lytton? We have seen him at one time mimicking at Delhi the forms and state of the Mogul Emperors, and obscuring in the minds of the Princes and of the people of India the real nature and the real sources of the greatness of our rule, by endeavouring to impose upon them an imitation of the pomp and state of former days. We have seen him at another time fidgeting about the harmless eccentricities of the Indian Press. Now, in these Papers we see him—I do not think the sight is calculated to impress respect for our rule in the mind of any Indian Prince—at this Conference at Peshawur, addressing the puzzled and frightened Envoys in a letter, which seems to me to be composed of language borrowed partly from a lawyer's letter, and partly from a tale of *The Arabian Nights.* Sir, I am afraid that if we are to part with Lord Lytton, we shall have to part with something besides. I do not expect that Her Majesty's Government will recall him. I do not think it would be just or generous to do so. Lord Lytton has faults; but all Lord Lytton's faults are not the faults of Lord Lytton alone. I own he has faults—great faults—but his fault has been that he is only too faithful an embodiment of the policy of the Government he represents. This policy is either a part of, or the result of—or perhaps both—of the policy we have had for the last two years. Her Majesty's Government have boasted of a spirited foreign policy, and all the time they appear to me to have acted like men possessed with the most abject and most unworthy terror. Not a movement could take place in any part of Europe or Asia, but that it was discovered by the Government that some harm was threatened, that some danger impended to English interests or English honour. An insurrection takes place in Bosnia—the Government immediately rush off to buy shares in the Suez Canal. The Bulgarians revolt against their oppressors, and there is immediately a cry of "British interests in danger." Well, Sir, it is not difficult to find a reason—Her Majesty's Government seem to me to have no confidence in the strength of England, or in the resources or energy of Englishmen. Like most men who are deficient in true courage, they make great parade of their courage and of their power. They bring over 8,000 Indian troops to Malta, and they leave it to be understood that behind them are the whole troops and resources of the Indian Empire. All this time that they are parading this demonstration of Indian troops, Russia is preparing, without ostentation and without anybody knowing anything about it, a trap which they felt quite certain Her Majesty's Government would fall into—which Her Majesty's Government have fallen into, and which has given occupation to the 8,000 Indian troops in Afghanistan. It will be fortunate, indeed, if it does not give occupation to troops from England also. I hope—I cannot express any confident opinion—that this is a policy of which the country has had nearly enough. I agree with the opinion which has been expressed by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt). I do not care how soon the country has an opportunity of expressing its opinion on this policy. We have been told—and I have no doubt we shall be told still more freely and more openly in the country than we have been told in this House—that we are indifferent to the honour and the greatness of our Indian Empire. The imputation has not been made, that I know of, by any hon. Gentleman in this debate. It is one which is so false that I can scarcely condescend to deny it. But there are some of us who have read something of the way in which that Indian Empire was raised and was extended. There are some of us who have watched that Empire contending with difficulties and dangers which, compared with any that now threaten us, are as the mountains and gorges of the Himalayas compared with the hills and valleys of an English county. We have read also the history of the events which led to and which caused the only check that in recent times our arms have ever received in India, and the only blow which our power, and, if you like, our prestige, in India has ever received; we have watched Lord Canning, and the band of heroes by whom he was surrounded in the midst of the tremendous dangers of the Indian Mutiny, meeting them with the calm courage of Englishmen. It is, Sir, because we believe that the present policy of Her Majesty's Government is founded rather upon an imitation of the errors which have marred than of the wisdom which has saved our Indian Empire, that we ask the House to-night to express its condemnation of the policy which has resulted in its present position.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: I must confess, Mr. Speaker, that I am somewhat puzzled at the motives which can have actuated the noble Lord in the last few sentences he has addressed to the House. We have heard from him a temperate and, I will not deny, a well-argued speech upon matters of great importance which have been brought before us in this debate. But towards the end of that speech the noble Lord, without any accusation having been levelled against him — as he himself confesses — indulged in an outburst of patriotism, and of admiration for the greatness of this Empire, and especially of our Indian Empire, which, I confess, had it not been for one or two casual expressions, I should have felt great difficulty in understanding. But a word or two which fell from the noble Lord furnished us with the key of the matter. He gave us very clearly to understand that this was not a speech addressed to the House of Commons, but was intended for the hustings. Well, Sir, when the proper time may come for meeting our constituents, we shall not be afraid to measure swords with the noble Lord. Meantime, let us understand what it is that we in the House of Commons have to-night to decide upon; and let us consider frankly what the issue is which the noble Lord has raised. I thank him for the distinct way in which he has raised that issue towards the conclusion of his speech. Throughout these long debates we have been sometimes rather at a loss to know what the precise issue was that we were met here to try. Sometimes one point, sometimes another, was presented to us; but to-night, at the close of the debate, the noble Lord, in his character of Party Leader, has very frankly and fairly said that the real and true object of the whole matter is to turn out the present Government. ["No, no!"] I hear cries of dissent. I do not know whether they proceed from the opposite side of the House; but the statement of the noble Lord could hardly be plainer. I may say for myself and for my Colleagues that we in no degree complain of an attack so directly and fairly made. There was only one point in that attack which I did hear with regret and with some degree of pain, as coming from the noble Lord. It was when he commenced his attack upon the Government by suggesting that the first thing to be done was to recall the Indian Viceroy. In that he was anticipating, of course, what came afterwards; because anything more impossible—anything more disgraceful—than that the Government at a crisis of this importance, and in the pursuit of a policy for which they themselves are responsible, should recall him who is charged with the conduct of that policy in a distant part of the Empire, it would be impossible to imagine. The noble Lord did not intend that; because he said immediately after that the recall of the Viceroy must inevitably mean also the downfall of the Ministry. Of course, it must; and, therefore, I would ask him why, with his patriotic feelings so loudly expressed—and I have no doubt so honestly entertained—did he use language which is calculated, as long as we have our Viceroy in India, to shake his position there? Turn out the Ministry if you can; replace them if you will; and when you have taken their places, recall the Viceroy, and substitute another in whom you have greater confidence. But, for heaven's sake, while he still remains in that anxious and important charge, do not endeavour to debase him in the eyes of those over whom he rules by heaping on him epithets and appellations which are not directly connected with his policy, but which are calculated to lower him in the eyes of those amongst whom he is now placed.

A greater injustice was never done to any man. His policy, and the policy of the Government, is, of course, a fair subject for criticism. But I am bound to say his merits are systematically ignored and overlooked, and that he is "checked like a bond slave, all his faults observed and conned by rote." Everything which can be urged against not only his policy, but the minor incidents of his life, is brought against him; and we are taught—and our fellow-subjects and the Native Princes of India are to be taught—that this man, the Representative of the Government and the power of England in that Empire, is such as the noble Lord has represented. I will appeal to the condition of India as against the patriotic outburst of the noble Lord. Never was there a time when the people of India were more loyal; never was there a time when the Native Princes were better affected to our Government than at the present moment, and in all those matters on which you challenge our policy. You say we were wrong in bringing the Native troops to Malta. [*Opposition cheers.*] Yes, of course you do; and that we were wrong in organizing this expedition into Afghanistan. But this, at all events, you will not deny—that in this expedition, and in all these movements, we have had not only the Native soldiers, but the Native Rulers cordially and heartily with us, and in favour of your present Governor General. Is not all this something of an evidence of the regard and the respect with which the policy and the conduct of England are regarded in that portion of our dominions? Do you suppose that we should have been able to obtain, and to retain, that respect and that cordial support on the part of our Native soldiers and Native Princes and Indian subjects if we were for a moment liable to all the charges which have been brought against us? Now, Sir, I am most reluctant at this late hour of the night to detain the House at any great length; but it is necessary for me to throw myself upon the indulgence of the House. The noble Lord has truly said that but few of the Members of the Cabinet have addressed the House. Indeed, my noble Friend the Postmaster General is the only Member of it besides myself who has done so. But we have been supported by my hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Bourke), by my hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for India (Mr. E. Stanhope), and by my noble Friend the Vice President of the Council (Lord George Hamilton)—all three of whom are thoroughly acquainted with these subjects, and all three of whom, I venture to say, have done their part in this debate in a manner that leaves nothing to be desired. If others of my Colleagues have not spoken, it has been from no indisposition on their part to take their share in the labour of the debate, but from a feeling that there were many Members who wished to speak, and from a natural desire not to interfere with the opportunities of these hon. Members. As I said a little while ago, we have been a little confused by the issues that from day to day have been raised in this debate; and I venture to think that it will be of the greatest importance that we should endeavour to clear our minds as to the real issues presented to us by this Motion. Before I proceed to this, I am bound to take notice of—I will not call them side or bye—issues which have been raised, and which it is impossible to leave unanswered. I do not intend to go into these questions of detail as to the accuracy of certain parts of the Papers—properly raised and very ingeniously argued by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone)—because I think he was very fairly and very fully answered by my noble Friend the Vice President of the Council (Lord George Hamilton). [*Ironical laughter from the Opposition.*] Be that as it may, these are questions which the House has before it; they have been argued on both sides; and it only remains to give the verdict on the pleadings on the one side or the other. There are, however, one or two questions upon which it is my duty to say a very few words. We have been charged with a great many offences; with offences against Parliament, against the law, and against the Constitution. Though I hope, considering the very large field that I have to travel over, and the important questions that I have to raise, that I may be excused from going too minutely into these questions, yet it is impossible that I should not take some notice of them. With regard to our violation of the law, my right hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich says that is a sin which we are so very much accustomed to commit that we have almost rendered the House callous to it, and that he hardly thinks it worth while to take notice of such a trumpery thing. With regard to that, therefore, I will not go into details. I do not for a moment admit that we have in any degree violated the law. I believe that we have entirely kept within it, and that we are perfectly in consistence with the law in its letter and in its spirit. But I will not argue that question, for it has not been much discussed. Well, then, it has been said that we have been guilty of reticence, and even of worse than reticence, in misleading the House; and very severe remarks have been made both upon my noble Friend, Lord Salisbury, my noble Friend, Lord Cranbrook, and myself, with regard to some of our sins of omission and commission. I do not intend to go at length into these matters. My noble Friend, Lord Salisbury, has been spoken of in this House in a manner which I think was unworthy of the Member who used the expression. The language of the hon. Member for the Elgin Burghs (Mr. Grant Duff) was such as under no circumstances should have been used in this House; but I do not think that is worthy of any serious remembrance. My noble Friend has explained in the House, where the statement was made, the grounds of his statement—and I think we may leave the matter very well where he has placed it — that he was called upon to answer particular questions, and that he answered them with reserve. [*Opposition cheers.*] Yes; with a reserve which he stated at the time that he was exercising. He stated that he was obliged to speak with reserve, and could only give negative answers. I think that anybody who would take the trouble — which I suspect very few have done — really to read the whole of the conversation which then took place, will form a very different opinion of my noble Friend's language from that which has been so current in this House. With regard to Lord Cranbrook's despatch, that, perhaps, occupies different ground, and upon that my noble Friend has spoken at length and with great energy in the other House. I have endeavoured, on previous occasions, to explain generally what our views are; and I utterly deny that there was anything unfair or unreasonable in the statements contained in the celebrated 9th paragraph of that despatch. We accept entirely the disclaimer by Lord Northbrook of the construction which we have put upon his part of the transaction; but I say now —as I have said before—that to persons reading those telegrams, and comparing one with another, the impression which was made on our minds was, I think, a very natural impression. At all events, it was a case in which, whether the Viceroy was overruled by, or whether the Viceroy coincided with, the Home Government, does not really very much matter to the main argument of the despatch, which was that the policy adopted in 1873, either dictated by the Government at home, or by Lord Northbrook himself, was a policy which produced a certain effect. With regard to myself, I really do not know whether I am accused seriously of having attempted to mislead the House in the speech to which reference was made. The hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke) told me that I was to be compared to a dentist trying to soothe a timid child by holding out quieting and soothing promises and statements. I have read and re-read the discussion to which reference is made, and I can see nothing in what I said that was, in the slightest degree, chargeable either with misleading the House, or with failing to give proper information. The question then raised was the question of Quetta. Now, I frankly admit—it is no admission, because I readily say—that at the time I was at the India Office the question of the occupation of Quetta was the particular form which was then given to what is called the "forward policy;" and I have always been—and I have been reminded that I was and always have been — an opponent of what is called and known as the "forward policy." Quetta being then the word which was, as it were, the flag of that policy, when I heard there was something going on about the occupation of Quetta, I frankly admit that I became somewhat alarmed. I came down to the House and saw my noble

Friend, Lord Salisbury, and my noble Friend the Under Secretary of State (Lord George Hamilton), to know what it was. I was told what it was, and it was this — It had no connection with the forward policy, or with any idea of advancing to meet the Russians; but the occupation, as it was called, of Quetta was the movement of a certain number of troops in company with one of our Commissioners with a view to the settlement of certain questions which had arisen in Khelat. It was a totally different question from that of an advance to anticipate Russia. When I was challenged particularly by the noble Lord after that discussion to say what I had to say upon that subject, I began by admitting that I was not very well acquainted with the details of the matter, and then I repeated my own articles of faith. I held them, and I still hold them, and I deny that I misled the House. Passing from these personal matters, I wish to take notice of two very serious statements which have been made in the course of this debate. They are serious statements, because they go forth with the *imprimatur* of Members of authority in this House, and because they are calculated to have great effect in India, and to do great harm in other countries, by giving the impression that there is something underhand and discreditable in the style of our proceedings, and in the way in which our diplomacy is conducted. A great deal has been said about an expression which was used by my noble Friend, Lord Salisbury, in his despatch of the 19th of November, 1875, directing, or recommending, the Government of India to find, or, if need be, to create, an opportunity of communicating with the Ameer, in order to induce him to reconsider his views as to the reception of a friendly Mission. [Mr. FAWCETT: To find a pretext.] I beg the hon. Gentleman's pardon. These are the exact words used by my noble Friend—

> "The first step, therefore, in establishing our relations with the Ameer upon a more satisfactory footing, will be to induce him to receive a temporary Embassy in his capital. It need not be publicly connected with the establishment of a permanent Mission within his dominions. There would be many advantages in ostensibly directing it to some object of smaller political interest, which it will not be difficult for your Excellency to find, or, if need be, to create."—[*Afghanistan*, No. 1, p. 149.]

That seems to be regarded by hon. Gentlemen opposite as a most objectionable passage. But let me just say something about it. It occurs in a despatch of November 19, which is an answer to a despatch written from Simla on the 7th of June, and signed by Lord Northbrook and the Ministers of his Government. This was the recommendation of Lord Northbrook and the Members of his Government—

> "We recommend that no immediate pressure be put upon the Ameer, or particular anxiety be shown by us upon the subject, but that advantage be taken of the first favourable opportunity that his own action or other circumstances may present for the purpose of sounding his disposition and of representing to him the benefits which would be derived by Afghanistan from the proposed arrangement."—[*Ibid.* p. 133.]

So that, to my mind, the chief difference between the first proposal and the second letter is, that the one was written by Lord Northbrook's Government and the other was written by Lord Salisbury. I can conceive of no fair interpretation which can be put upon Lord Salisbury's words which distinguishes them from the words of Lord Northbrook. I do not wish this to be considered as if it were a mere matter of retort. It was said the other night that nothing was more common in diplomacy than that opportunities should be taken to seek some reason for discussion when important subjects were involved, which it was not thought desirable to approach too abruptly. Murmurs were heard at that, as though there were something discreditable in such conduct. I venture to say that I could find scores upon scores of such instances—some of them taken from Colleagues of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich himself. But I do not wish to take modern, and perhaps Party, precedents. I will take an authority which I think will be recognized as one that is above suspicion. Certainly, there is no statesman whose name and whose praise have been more frequently in the mouth of the right. hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich than those of Mr. Canning; and there is no Englishman whose name stands higher, for everything that is honest and straightforward, than the name of the Duke of Wellington. Well, let me read from an Instruction given by Mr.

Canning to the Duke of Wellington, in the year 1826—

> "His Majesty the King having been pleased to make choice of your Grace to convey to the Emperor Nicholas His Majesty's congratulations on his Imperial Majesty's accession to the Throne of Russia, I have received His Majesty's commands to take advantage of the favourable opportunity which your Grace's access to the Emperor and to his Ministers will afford, for ascertaining the real views of the new Emperor with respect to the affairs of Turkey and Greece, and for endeavouring to come to some direct and confidential understanding upon that subject with the Court of St. Petersburg."

I will leave myself there; and I can only express my own conviction that these words are an illustration of the old saying—that one person may steal a horse, while another may not look over a hedge. We have had some very serious remarks made upon the apparent disregard and repudiation of their assurances by the Government. Nothing more serious, I think, can be alleged than that the English and the Indian Governments are indifferent to the sacredness of the assurances which may be given, however those assurances may be given. There has been no repudiation, that I can find, of verbal assurances, or of any other. What I understand by the repudiation of an assurance is, that if an assurance is given, and if the occasion arises upon which that assurance is relied on, and it is not acted up to, then I consider there is a breach of faith which is, in the highest degree, to be condemned. But what was the case here? There was no repudiation whatever of any assurance upon which we were called upon to act. What took place was this—Notice was given to the Ameer that, in consequence of uncertainties which had arisen from the different constructions which were put upon verbal assurances which were vague, and to which he attached one meaning and others another, it was desirable to put an end to those assurances and to substitute for them a clear, well-defined, carefully drawn-up Treaty, which would be intelligible, and from which there would be no escape. That was what was done, not that we drew back from our verbal assurances. I have heard it said—it was said by the hon. Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread) himself—that he believed Shere Ali put a more favourable construction for himself upon the words of Lord Mayo than they were intended to bear. So he did also upon the words of Lord Northbrook; and it was because there was this great difficulty of dealing with him, because he put different constructions upon mere loose verbal assurances, which could be repeated one way by one person and another way by another person, that Lord Lytton desired that a Treaty should be substituted. That is the whole explanation of that of which such incorrect accounts have been given. Now, Mr. Speaker, I am anxious to come to a clear understanding as to the real issue before us; and in order that we may have that clear understanding of the issue, it is important that we should have a clear understanding of the occasion and the causes of these hostilities. That is a point which has been very much obscured in the course of the discussion. We have been told by some that we have gone to war to get a scientific Frontier; by others that we have gone to war to punish the Ameer for the sins of Russia; and various other statements have been made which I think will be dispelled by a consideration of what the real cause and the real occasion of the war was. What was the immediate occasion of the hostilities? It was that a friendly Mission sent by the Government of India to the Ameer of Cabul was repelled by him, in territory not his own, by force and under circumstances which gave his act the character not only of a defiance, but even, to some extent, of a menace. It was absolutely impossible, when matters had been brought to that pass—[*Cheers*]—no; let us go step by step and listen to me—it was absolutely impossible that after that we could do anything but that which we did. After giving the Ameer the fullest opportunity of recalling and apologizing for his conduct, we could have done nothing less than take the steps which we did. We could not have remained inactive. As I said the other day, the security of our Frontier and our dominion in India depends upon the conviction of the Indian people that we are both just and strong; that we are strong not only in the sense of having strength, but of being prepared, if necessary, to use it. What would be the consequences if any of our subjects should be under the impression, which the Ameer himself was under, that there was a greater power than ourselves, and that we were afraid to meet that power? Depend upon it any faltering or quavering at that moment would have been productive of the most serious and fatal consequences. It is said—"You might have gone and reckoned with Russia." But the point was not that Russia had sent a Mission to the Ameer, but that the Ameer had refused our Mission. The connection of the sending of the Russian Mission was this—that, in the first place, it disproved and cut from under his feet the ground upon which he had always refused to receive our Mission. He had said—"I cannot receive it, because I cannot with safety allow Europeans at my Court; and secondly, because, if I did so, I should be obliged to receive the Russian Mission also." A Russian Mission had been received—and received under circumstances which seemed to show anything but a friendly feeling of the Ameer towards ourselves. I should like to read a very few, but very significant, words from the conversation at Simla, on the 7th of October, 1876, between Sir Lewis Pelly and the British Native Agent at Cabul—

> "Another reason advanced by the Ameer for declining the Mission was, that a pretext would thereby be afforded to the Russians for deputing a similar Mission to Cabul; that the circumstance of their having given assurances to the contrary would not stop them; that the Russians broke Treaties at pleasure, were very pushing in their policy, and feared no one."

Let me call attention to the next few lines—

> "The recent political history of Europe showed that the English were unable to compel the Russians to adhere to Treaties, and were equally impotent to arrest Russian aggressions."—[*Ibid.* p. 181.]

That was very shortly after the Black Sea Treaty had been torn up. It would never have done for us to allow that idea to get abroad in India. It is bad enough that it should be in the mind of the Ameer of Afghanistan; but if it should be supposed in India that we are unable to stop Russia, I will leave anyone to consider what the consequences would be. I was cheered just now when I said that it was when matters came to this pass that we were obliged to do what we did. I have, of course, to acknowledge the fact, and that is what I am about to come to, that the main issue raised by the hon. Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread) is not so much as to what was done after the Mission had been repelled, as it was a condemnation of the policy which he says led to its being so. I imagine the hon. Member would accept that as a fair description of the greater part, at all events, of his speech. He has endeavoured to show that the bad state of feeling between us and the Ameer, which immediately gave rise to this repulse, was produced—if you are to believe him, entirely produced—by the action of the present Government. The hon. Member has a most convenient mode of dealing with these questions. He was complimented, in the course of the debate, on his skilful handling and management of the Blue Books. I quite admit he has a very skilful mode of managing them. The other day he gave us a history of these transactions in a manner which was quite agreeable to listen to, from the skilful and easy manner in which he dealt with a complicated and difficult task. But there is one part of his method which, I must confess, I thought was more to be admired than imitated, and that was the cool and quiet way in which he began at page 129, as if there had been nothing before that. At page 129, after the first despatch that Lord Salisbury wrote, things, it appears, began to go wrong. *Ex illo fluere et retrò sublapsa referri spes Danaûm.* We can hardly admit that the whole of the mischief really arose from the conduct that was pursued after page 129, and from nothing else. The hon. Gentleman, when he was managing and reading his extracts, found occasionally that there was one great secret for making his tale complete and consistent, and at the same time not wearying to the House, and that may, perhaps, be best described by the title of a little book, some of us I dare say have seen, *Where to Stop and Why.* The hon. Member read and laid great stress upon a portion of the Memorandum of Dr. Bellew and his communications with the Envoy at Peshawur. He read a good deal, telling us at the same time that this Envoy was particularly free and frank in his communications with Dr. Bellew, as he certainly was. In particular, he read us a passage to show how it was that the confidence of the Ameer had been turned from the British Government. But he stopped short just before this curious paragraph—"Now I will tell you what has turned the Ameer's confidence from your Government." Considering he was particularly confidential to Dr. Bellew, that was surely worth knowing—

> "But what came to pass in the time of Lord Northbrook? I will now tell you. Lord Northbrook wrote to the Ameer on behalf of Yakoob Khan, ... to send him back to Herat. The Ameer was angry, and resented this interference."—[*Ibid.* p. 195.]

and he goes on to explain what his grievances are. They turn out to be this, which has remained, as we know by subsequent evidence, in his mind, and remains there—rankles in his mind, as the chief grievance he has against us. Do not let it be supposed that we find fault with Lord Northbrook for his interference. No. But the argument addressed to us is that anything we have done which has caused offence to the Ameer must be wrong; while anything done by Lord Northbrook which gave offence to the Ameer is to be judged on its own merits. That has run all through this debate. There are two standards. There is one which is two applied to us, and another which is applied to our Predecessors. I am sorry that I am now obliged to go into a matter of considerable importance, though it seems to be rather of a personal nature, which has been put to me very distinctly, and in a manner which I cannot possibly avoid answering, especially by the hon. Member for the Elgin Burghs (Mr. Grant Duff), by the noble Lord, and by others. It has been said to me—"What is the explanation of your own turn of policy? How is it that you who, according to these despatches, appear at one time to have been, and are known to have been, an advocate of one policy, have completely turned round and become an advocate of another?" Well, I do not admit the charge; but in order to explain my position, it is necessary that I should endeavour to clear up another matter which, I think, has not been made quite clear in any of these discussions, and that is what the policy of Lord Lawrence actually was. Certainly, as I understood and accepted it—and as I think I shall be able to show I had very good grounds for believing it to be —that policy was different in several respects from what it has sometimes been reported to be. It was a policy which, if pursued to its consequences, and under the circumstances which have since arisen, must necessarily have led to the views we now entertain. The views of Lord Lawrence have been stated in many ways. They are officially recorded in despatches in this Blue Book. But I have asked for, and received, the permission of Lord Lawrence to read some extracts from private letters addressed to me by himself while I was Secretary of State and he was Governor General upon this subject, in which he expresses himself with more freedom, and which, I think, will show rather more clearly what his real views were. This is a letter which he wrote to me at the very first moment of receiving by telegraph the information that I had been appointed to the office of Secretary of State. It was a letter which he wrote in order to put me in possession of his views upon many of the particular topics of the day, and part related to the affairs of Afghanistan. He says—

> "There is only one other subject on which I wish at present to trouble you. Hitherto we have steered clear of all Afghan troubles; we allowed the contending factions to fight out their own battles on their own resources. The Ameer Shere Ali has been, I anticipate, practically beaten without hope of recovery, unless he receives foreign aid, or some very extraordinary turn of fortune should take place. His only hold of Afghanistan is the possession of Herat and the country in its vicinity. He is not a man, however, to sit down and content himself with the remnants of his kingdom so long as he has life. He has now sent down one of his Envoys to the Commissioner of Scinde. . . . Until I hear what this Chief has to say, I can come to no definite conclusion; but I anticipate he comes to seek aid from us, and probably with an intimation that he will be compelled to seek assistance from the Persians, or even the Russians. Now, it is one thing to leave the Afghans alone to fight out their own battles, and quite another to stand by in the same attitude when others are interfering. I do not think there is much to choose between the two parties in Afghanistan. I do not think that either of them is in the least degree to be trusted if any strong inducement were to arise in which it was the interest of the ruling power to turn against us. I do not think any one Chief if he were to obtain supreme authority could count on retaining it for six months. But though little inclined to interfere, and with little expectation of doing real good, I think, on the whole, it would be the best course, if Shere Ali adopt the policy I have indicated, to tell him plainly that though we have not helped him yet we have taken no part on the other side. That we still cannot consent to send him aid, yet so long as he can hold Herat by his own power we will continue to maintain our Treaty with him, and recognize him as the Ruler of Herat. But that if he

should resolve on calling in the aid of Russia or Persia, and either of those Powers should send him material aid, it would lead us to give assistance to his enemies, the two brothers who are now in possession of Candahar and Cabul."

That was a letter which was written by Lord Lawrence on the 9th of March, 1867. Subsequently he wrote a letter on the 18th of August, in which he refers to a rumour that Persia had designs on Herat. He goes on to say—

> "Neither of the Afghan parties are in the slightest degree trustworthy, and both would equally use us for their own purposes. . . . If the news which I send you prove true, I am for helping the party now in power with money and arms to maintain their position. Of the two parties I rather prefer the one which is out, that of the Ameer Shere Ali; but this seems to me to be one of secondary importance. If he fail to recover power we shall have done good service to his enemies. If he succeed his position would be precarious, and he would, in all probability, be willing to make common cause with us. In that case I should help him. There would be no treachery to the other party in this, for I would let them know in the first instance—indeed, they already know—that such would be our policy. All Afghans are prepared for such changes. They understand that we do not care for this or that Chief; but that we desire Afghanistan should not fall into the hands of any foreign Power. In this feeling the great body of the Chiefs and the people would go with us."

These are the letters which I received, and which preceded the official letter which will be found in the Blue Book. When that letter arrived I circulated it among my Colleagues in the Cabinet, and I made some memoranda of my own upon it, from which I will read a short extract showing my own views. I wrote—

> "I think that it would be reasonable that we should either hold ourselves absolutely aloof from Afghanistan politics and recognize the *de facto* Ruler of the day, whoever he may be, or that we should so far ally ourselves with one Chief as to support him with arms and subsidies, as Sir John Lawrence proposes, should occasion require it. But I cannot bring my mind to the proposal that we should subsidize first one and then the other, according as accident brings up Shere Ali or Abdul Rahman to the head of affairs. I have great confidence in Sir John Lawrence's knowledge of the Afghan character; but I doubt whether such a course as this would be compatible with our own, or would be understood by the public. I think, however, that he might safely tell Shere Ali that any tampering with the Persians as respects Herat will lead us to give aid to his rival."

That shows the principle of the policy of Lord Lawrence at that time, and such it continued to be—that is to say, we held the great object to be to exclude the influence of any foreign Power in Afghanistan. Well, then, there is the other point in Lord Lawrence's policy. The other point was, that we were not to be led by a fear of the advance of Russia into advancing beyond our own Frontier to meet her; and he argued that against those who said that it was desirable that we should counteract the efforts of Russia in Bokhara or the other Khanates by advancing ourselves into Beloochistan, Quetta, and other parts. Lord Lawrence always said—"That is a wrong policy. Wait until Russia comes nearer, till you see the real moment of danger has arisen, and then defend yourselves within your own Frontier." At the same time, he says in one of these letters—"I am not ignorant of the faults of our own Frontier." That was accordingly the policy England adopted. The hon. Member for the Elgin Burghs speaks of this policy as Lord Lawrence's second policy, and then asks me why I have changed my policy? If Lord Lawrence, who has spent all his life in India—and of whom no one can speak too highly for the great services he rendered to England, or for his knowledge of the Indian character, and especially of the Afghan character—was himself induced to lay aside his first policy and to take up his second, surely it may not be thought unreasonable that one who had come so recently to the study of Indian affairs might also be allowed to have a second policy. But I do not admit that it is a second policy. I say it is a development of the first, according to the change of circumstances. So long as the Russians were only moving in Central Asia, so long as their movements were confined to Bokhara, or Khiva, or any of those Khanates, although we might find reason for remonstrating against some of their proceedings, I think it was not a case for advancing beyond our Frontier to meet them. But when there was a Russian Mission sent to Cabul, and sent avowedly because there was an unfriendly feeling between England and Russia, avowedly because Russia thought that was a point at which we were vulnerable, I say all the circumstances on which Lord Lawrence founded his policy of inactivity, of not advancing, were so completely revolutionized that the very arguments which we supported in one case and in the one policy would, I think, have supported us—would certainly have supported me—in taking a totally different view of what was to be done in Afghanistan. This is a matter upon which there has been no inconsistency whatever. I do not wish to throw any blame upon the Russian Government for sending a Mission. The world was, as it were, turned upside down at that period; and when that happens you must not be surprised to find a few chairs and tables out of their places. No doubt when the state of our relations is considered, it was not unnatural that Russia should send a Mission to Cabul for the purpose of seeing what it could do there that might be injurious to us. But though not unnatural it was very significant. It showed that these bugbears were now becoming pretty tall bugbears. It was all very well, in 1867, to take up one ground on the understanding that the Russian advance in Central Asia would stop there. I believe we should have been acting very foolishly if we had advanced to meet it half-way. But it is a very different thing when the circumstances are changed. That is the explanation of the policy which Her Majesty's Government have pursued, and which, to a certain extent, has been, no doubt, a departure from the policy of the past. It has been a policy forced upon us by events. I can only say for myself that when we had to consider what was to be done when we heard the Russian Mission was at Cabul, the alternatives which presented themselves to me were these—If we had done nothing it would have been a weakening of our position and an alarm to our population. It is said—"Why not go to Russia?" Well, we remonstrated with Russia; but, as I have said, the grievance against Russia was one not easy to remove quickly. That, also, would not have met the particular difficulty with which we had to deal, which was the impression produced in India by these manifest advances of Russia. What would the people of India have known of your negotiations with St. Petersburg or Livadia, of all the notes passed and the explanations given, and the promises made, and the orders sent, and the delays which would have taken place in the reception of those orders, and all the while the Russian Mission a fact, and received and made a great deal of in Afghanistan? If we had taken more peremptory measures for its withdrawal, that might have brought about a more serious conflict than that in which we are at present engaged. What we proposed to do was to meet in the most friendly and, at the same time, the most efficacious mode the difficulty in which we were placed. We thought we would send a friendly Mission to counterbalance the Russian Mission at Afghanistan. Had it been received—and we had every hope that it would be received—all the difficulty would have been got over without any quarrel whatever. Unfortunately, the matter had gone too far. We have been told that we have been vicariously punishing one man for the sin of another. The course we took was with no idea of punishing anybody at all. Our object was to counteract the move of Russia by that which we believed to be at once the most salutary, and, at the same time, the most efficacious course. So far as the Border Tribes are concerned, nothing can be clearer than our duty to them. We applied to them to give us a safe conduct. They gave it through their own territory, where the Ameer had no business; and when they had done that, they said—"Give us protection. We have for your sake incurred the wrath of the Ameer—he is our enemy," and we were bound by every consideration of justice and policy to give it to them. I thank the House for having listened to me with so much patience and at such an hour. There is much more that one could say; but I think I have said enough to make good my case. I will merely repeat that the views of the Government, and more particularly the personal views of my noble Friend, Lord Salisbury, and myself, might, perhaps, have been more charitably considered by those who remember what our views in former times have been. I was glad to see the noble Lord the Member for the Haddington Burghs (Lord William Hay), and hearing him speak in the House. I could not help remembering that the last time we crossed swords in an Indian debate was at a time when I was carrying out a policy initiated by Lord Salisbury, but somewhat coldly looked upon by Members of the Liberal Party, for the restoration of the Principality of Mysore to a Native Ruler. I think it is hardly from those who have held such views as that, that you would expect to find a policy of annexation proceeding. Nothing can be more contrary to our feeling, nothing can be more contrary to our principles, than such a policy as this. On the other hand, charged as we are, and still may be for some little time longer, in spite of the noble Lord, with the fortunes and the destinies of this great Empire, we intend to do our duty by it, and not to be deterred by any misrepresentations that may be made of us.

SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL said, many Members who had had great experience of India, and who had held the highest offices there—such as the hon. Member for Orkney (Mr. Laing), the hon. and gallant Member for Sunderland (Sir Henry Havelock), and others—had desired to speak. They would have an overwhelming case, if they asked for an adjournment; but he acknowledged that it would be most inconvenient, as that was the last day of the week. He hoped, however, it would be understood that those Members who could not do so now would have an opportunity of expressing what they now felt on the Motion of the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett).

Question put.

The House *divided*:— Ayes 328; Noes 227: Majority 101.

AYES.

Agnew, R. V.
Allcroft, J. D.
Allsopp, C.
Allsopp, H.
Anstruther, Sir W.
Arbuthnot, Lt.-Col. G.
Archdale, W. H.
Arkwright, A. P.
Arkwright, F.
Assheton, R.
Astley, Sir J. D.
Bagge, Sir W.
Bailey, Sir J. R.
Balfour, A. J.
Baring, T. C.
Barne, F. St. J. N.
Barrington, Viscount
Barttelot, Sir W. B.
Bates, E.
Bateson, Sir T.
Beach, rt. hon. Sir M. H.
Beach, W. W. B.
Bective, Earl of
Benett-Stanford, V. F.
Bentinck, rt. hon. G. C.
Bentinck, G. W. P.
Beresford, Lord C.
Beresford, G. De la P.
Beresford, Colonel M.
Birley, H.
Blackburne, Col. J. I.
Boord, T. W.
Bourke, hon. R.
Bourne, Colonel J.
Bousfield, Col. N. G. P.
Bowen, J. B.
Bowyer, Sir G.
Brady, J.
Brise, Colonel R.
Broadley, W. H. H.
Brooks, W. C.
Bruce, hon. T.
Bruen, H.
Brymer, W. E.
Bulwer, J. R.
Burghley, Lord
Burrell, Sir W. W.
Buxton, Sir R. J.
Cameron, D.
Campbell, C.
Cartwright, F.
Castlereagh, Viscount
Cave, rt. hon. S.
Cecil, Lord E. H. B. G.
Chaine, J.
Chaplin, Colonel E.
Chaplin, H.
Charley, W. T.
Christie, W. L.
Churchill, Lord R.
Clive, Col. hon. G. W.
Close, M. C.
Clowes, S. W.
Cobbold, T. C.
Cochrane, A. D. W. R. B.
Cole, Col. hon. H. A.
Coope, O. E.
Cordes, T.
Corry, hon. H. W. L.
Corry, J. P.
Cotton, W. J. R.
Crichton, Viscount
Cross, rt. hon. R. A.
Cubitt, G.
Cuninghame, Sir W.
Cust, H. C.
Dalkeith, Earl of
Dalrymple, C.
Davenport, W. B.
Denison, C. B.
Denison, W. B.
Denison, W. E.
Dick, F.
Dickson, Major A. G.
Digby, Col. hon. E.
Douglas, Sir G.
Dyott, Colonel R.
Eaton, H. W.
Edmonstone, Admiral Sir W.
Egerton, hon. A. F.
Egerton, Sir P. G.
Egerton, hon. W.
Elcho, Lord
Elliot, G. W.
Elphinstone, Sir J. D. H.
Emlyn, Viscount
Estcourt, G. S.
Ewart, W.
Ewing, A. O.
Fellowes, E.
Finch, G. H.
Floyer, J.
Folkestone, Viscount
Forester, C. T. W.
Forsyth, W.
Foster, W. H.
Fremantle, hon. T. F.
Freshfield, C. K.
Gallwey, Sir W. P.
Galway, Viscount
Gardner, J. T. Agg-
Gardner, R. Richardson-
Garfit, T.
Garnier, J. C.
Gathorne-Hardy, hn. A.
Gathorne-Hardy, hn. S.
Gibson, rt. hon. E.
Giffard, Sir H. S.
Giles, A.
Gilpin, Sir R. T.
Goddard, A. L.
Goldney, G.
Gordon, W.
Gore-Langton, W. S.
Gorst, J. E.
Goulding, W.
Grantham, W.
Greenall, Sir G.
Gregory, G. B.
Guinness, Sir A.
Hall, A. W.
Halsey, T. F.
Hamilton, Lord C. J.
Hamilton, right hon. Lord G.
Hamilton, Marquess of
Hamilton, hon. R. B.
Hamond, C. F.
Hanbury, R. W.
Harcourt, E. W.
Hardcastle, E.
Harvey, Sir R. B.
Hay, rt. hn. Sir J. C. D.
Heath, R.
Helmsley, Viscount
Herbert, H. A.
Herbert, hon. S.
Hermon, E.
Hervey, Lord F.
Heygate, W. U.
Hick, J.
Hildyard, T. B. T.
Hill, A. S.
Holford, J. P. G.
Holker, Sir J.
Holland, Sir H. T.
Holmesdale, Viscount
Holt, J. M.
Home, Captain D. M.
Hood, Captain hon. A. W. A. N.
Hope, A. J. B. B.
Hubbard, E.
Hubbard, rt. hon. J.
Isaac, S.
Jervis, Col. H. J. W.
Johnson, J. G.
Johnstone, Sir F.
Jolliffe, hon. S.
Jones, J.
Kennard, Col. E. H.
Kennaway, Sir J. H.
King-Harman, E. R.
Knight, F. W.
Knightley, Sir R.
Knowles, T.
Lacon, Sir E. H. K.
Lawrence, Sir T.
Learmonth, A.
Lechmere, Sir E. A. H.
Lee, Major V.
Legard, Sir C.
Legh, W. J.
Leighton, Sir B.
Leighton, S.
Lennox, Lord H. G.
Leslie, Sir J.
Lewis, C. E.
Lewis, O.
Lewisham, Viscount
Lindsay, Col. R. L.
Lindsay, Lord

The Chancellor of the Exchequer

Lloyd, S.
Lloyd, T. E.
Lopes, Sir M.
Lowther, hon. W.
Lowther, rt. hon. J.
Macartney, J. W. E.
Mac Iver, D.
M'Garel-Hogg, Sir J.
Makins, Colonel W. T.
Mandeville, Viscount
Manners, rt. hn. Lord J.
March, Earl of
Marten, A. G.
Master, T. W. C.
Mellor, T. W.
Merewether, C. G.
Miles, Sir P. J. W.
Mills, A.
Mills, Sir C. H.
Monckton, F.
Montgomerie, R.
Montgomery, Sir G. G.
Moore, A.
Moore, S.
Moray, Colonel H. D.
Morgan, hon. F.
Morris, G.
Mowbray, rt. hon. J. R.
Mulholland, J.
Muncaster, Lord
Naghten, Lt.-Col. A. R.
Newdegate, C. N.
Newport, Viscount
Noel, rt. hon. G. J.
North, Colonel
Northcote, rt. hon. Sir S. H.
O'Leary, W.
O'Neill, hon. E.
Onslow, D.
Paget, R. H.
Palk, Sir L.
Parker, Lt.-Col. W.
Peek, Sir H.
Peel, rt. hon. Sir R.
Pell, A.
Pemberton, E. L.
Pennant, hon. G.
Peploe, Major D. P.
Percy, Earl
Phipps, P.
Pim, Captain B.
Plunket, hon. D. R.
Plunkett, hon. R.
Polhill-Turner, Capt. F. C.
Powell, W.
Praed, C. T.
Praed, H. B.
Puleston, J. H.
Raikes, H. C.
Read, C. S.
Rendlesham, Lord
Repton, G. W.
Ridley, E.
Ridley, Sir M. W.
Ripley, H. W.
Ritchie, C. T.
Rodwell, B. B. H.
Roebuck, rt. hn. J. A.
Rothschild, Sir N. M. de
Round, J.
Russell, Sir C.
Ryder, G. R.
Salt, T.
Sanderson, T. K.
Sandon, Viscount
Sclater-Booth, rt. hn. G.
Scott, Lord H.
Scott, M. D.
Selwin-Ibbetson, Sir H. J.
Severne, J. E.
Shirley, S. E.
Shute, General C. C.
Sidebottom, T. H.
Simonds, W. B.
Smith, A.
Smith, F. C.
Smith, S. G.
Smith, rt. hn. W. H.
Smollett, P. B.
Spinks, Serjeant F. L.
Stafford, Marquess of
Stanhope, hon. E.
Stanhope, W. T. W. S.
Stanley, rt. hn. Col. F.
Starkey, L. R.
Starkie, J. P. C.
Steere, L.
Stewart, M. J.
Storer, G.
Sykes, C.
Talbot, J. G.
Taylor, rt. hon. Col.
Tennant, R.
Thornhill, T.
Thwaites, D.
Thynne, Lord H. F.
Tollemache, hon. W. F.
Torr, J.
Tremayne, A.
Tremayne, J.
Trevor, Lord A. E. Hill-
Turnor, E.
Verner, E. W.
Wait, W. K.
Walker, O. O.
Walker, T. E.
Wallace, Sir R.
Walpole, rt. hon. S.
Walsh, hon. A.
Walter, J.
Warburton, P. E.
Ward, M. F.
Watney, J.
Watson, rt. hon. W.
Welby-Gregory, Sir W.
Wellesley, Colonel H.
Wells, E.
Wethered, T. O.
Wheelhouse, W. S. J.
Wilmot, Sir H.
Wilson, W.
Woodd, B. T.
Wroughton, P.
Wyndham, hon. P.
Wynn, C. W. W.
Yarmouth, Earl of
Yeaman, J.
Yorke, J. R.

TELLERS.

Dyke, Sir W. H.
Winn, R.

NOES.

Acland, Sir T. D.
Allen, W. S.
Amory, Sir J. H.
Anderson, G.
Ashley, hon. E. M.
Backhouse, E.
Balfour, Sir G.
Barclay, A. C.
Barclay, J. W.
Barran, J.
Bass, A.
Bass, H.
Baxter, rt. hn. W. E.
Bazley, Sir T.
Beaumont, Colonel F.
Bell, I. L.
Biddulph, M.
Blake, T.
Blennerhassett, R. P.
Brassey, H. A.
Briggs, W. E.
Bright, Jacob
Bright, rt. hn. John
Bristowe, S. B.
Brocklehurst, W. C.
Brogden, A.
Brooks, M.
Brown, A. H.
Brown, J. C.
Browne, G. E.
Bruce, Lord C.
Burt, T.
Cameron, C.
Campbell, Lord C.
Campbell, Sir G.
Campbell-Bannerman, H.
Carington, Col. hon. W.
Cartwright, W. C.
Cave, T.
Cavendish, Lord F. C.
Cavendish, Lord G.
Chadwick, D.
Chamberlain, J.
Chambers, Sir T.
Childers, rt. hn. H. C. E.
Cholmeley, Sir H.
Clarke, J. C.
Clifford, C. C.
Cole, H. T.
Colebrooke, Sir T. E.
Collins, E.
Colman, J. J.
Corbett, J.
Cotes, C. C.
Courtauld, G.
Courtney, L. H.
Cowan, J.
Cowper, hon. H. F.
Cross, J. K.
Davies, D.
Davies, R.
Delahunty, J.
Dickson, T. A.
Dilke, Sir C. W.
Dillwyn, L. L.
Dodds, J.
Dodson, rt. hon. J. G.
Downing, M'C.
Duff, M. E. G.
Duff, R. W.
Dundas, J. C.
Earp, T.
Edge, S. R.
Edwards, H.
Egerton, Admiral hn. F.
Ennis, N.
Evans, T. W.
Fawcett, H.
Ferguson, R.
Fitzmaurice, Lord E.
Fitzwilliam, hn. W. J
Fletcher, I.
Foljambe, F. J. S.
Forster, Sir C.
Forster, rt. hon. W. E.
French, hn. C.
Gladstone, rt. hn. W. E.
Gladstone, W. H.
Gordon, Sir A.
Gordon, Lord D.
Goschen, rt. hon. G. J.
Gourley, E. T.
Gower, hon. E. F. L.
Grant, A.
Gray, E. D.
Grosvenor, Lord R.
Hankey, T.
Harcourt, Sir W. V.
Harrison, C.
Harrison, J. F.
Hartington, Marq. of
Havelock, Sir H.
Hay, Lord W. M.
Hayter, A. D.
Henry, M.
Herschell, F.
Hill, T. R.
Holland, S.
Holms, J.
Holms, W.
Hopwood, C. H.
Howard, hon. C.
Howard, E. S.
Hutchinson, J. D.
Ingram, W. J.
Jackson, Sir H. M.
James, W. H.
James, Sir H.
Jenkins, D. J.
Jenkins, E.
Johnstone, Sir H.
Kay-Shuttleworth, Sir U.
Kingscote, Colonel
Knatchbull-Hugessen, rt. hon. E.
Laing, S.
Laverton, A.
Law, rt. hon. H.
Lawson, Sir W.
Leatham, E. A.
Leeman, G.
Lefevre, G. J. S.
Leith, J. F.
Lloyd, M.
Lowe, rt. hon. R.
Lubbock, Sir J.
Lush, Dr.
Lusk, Sir A.
Macdonald, A.
Macduff, Viscount

Mackintosh, C. F.
M'Arthur, A.
M'Kenna, Sir J. N.
M'Lagan, P.
M'Laren, D.
Maitland, J.
Maitland, W. F.
Marjoribanks, Sir D. C.
Marling, S. S.
Martin, P.
Massey, rt. hon. W. N.
Matheson, A.
Meldon, C. H.
Middleton, Sir A. E.
Milbank, F. A.
Monk, C. J.
Morgan, G. O.
Morley, S.
Mundella, A. J.
Muntz, P. H.
Mure, Colonel W.
Noel, E.
Nolan, Major J. P.
Norwood, C. M.
O'Beirne, Major F.
O'Brien, Sir P.
O'Conor, D. M.
O'Conor Don, The
O'Donnell, F. H.
O'Gorman, P.
O'Reilly, M.
O'Shaughnessy, R.
Otway, A. J.
Palmer, C. M.
Palmer, G.
Parker, C. S.
Pease, J. W.
Peel, A. W.
Pender, J.
Pennington, F.
Perkins, Sir F.
Philips, R. N.
Playfair, rt. hon. L.
Portman, hon. W. H. B.
Price, W. E.
Ralli, P.
Ramsay, J.

Rathbone, W.
Richard, H.
Roberts, J.
Robertson, H.
Russell, Lord A.
Rylands, P.
St. Aubyn, Sir J.
Samuelson, B.
Samuelson, H.
Sheil, E.
Sheridan, H. B.
Simon, Serjeant J.
Sinclair, Sir J. G. T.
Stansfeld, rt. hon. J.
Stanton, A. J.
Stevenson, J. C.
Stewart, J.
Stuart, Col. J. F. D. C.
Sullivan, A. M.
Swanston, A.
Tavistock, Marquess of
Taylor, D.
Taylor, P. A.
Temple, right hon. W. Cowper-
Tracy, hon. F. S. A. Hanbury-
Trevelyan, G. O.
Vivian, A. P.
Vivian, H. H.
Waddy, S. D.
Waterlow, Sir S. H.
Weguelin, T. M.
Whitbread, S.
Whitwell, J.
Whitworth, B.
Whitworth, W.
Williams, B. T.
Williams, W.
Wilson, C.
Wilson, I.
Wilson, Sir M.
Young, A. W.

TELLERS.
Adam, rt. hn. W. P.
Kensington, Lord

Main Question put, and *agreed to.*

Address accordingly read a second time. [See page 88.]

Address *agreed to*:—To be presented by Privy Councillors.

SUPPLY.

Resolved, "That this House will, upon Monday next, resolve itself into a Committee to consider of the Supply to be granted to Her Majesty."

WAYS AND MEANS.

Resolved, "That this House will, upon Monday next, resolve itself into a Committee to consider of the Ways and Means for raising the Supply to be granted to Her Majesty."

BURIAL GROUNDS BILL.

On Motion of Mr. WILBRAHAM EGERTON, Bill to give additional facilities for the provision of Burial Grounds, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. WILBRAHAM EGERTON, Earl PERCY, Mr. HEYGATE, and Mr. BIRLEY.

Bill *presented,* and read the first time. [Bill 63]

BANKRUPTCY ACT (1869) AMENDMENT BILL.

On Motion of Mr. SAMPSON LLOYD, Bill to amend "The Bankruptcy Act, 1869," *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. SAMPSON LLOYD, Mr. NORWOOD, Mr. WHITWELL, and Mr. RIPLEY.

Bill *presented,* and read the first time. [Bill 64.]

House adjourned at half after Two o'clock till Monday next.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Monday, 16*th December,* 1878.

MINUTES.]—NEW MEMBER SWORN—Lewis Fry, esquire, *for* Bristol.

SELECT COMMITTEE—Kitchen and Refreshment Rooms (House of Commons), *appointed* and *nominated.*

PUBLIC BILLS — *Ordered* — *First Reading*— Bankers' Books (Evidence)* [65]; Dispensaries (Ireland)* [66].

Committee—Report—Disqualification by Medical Relief* [22].

QUESTIONS.

AFGHANISTAN (MILITARY OPERATIONS)—PRESS CORRESPONDENCE.

QUESTION.

MAJOR NOLAN asked the Under Secretary of State for India, If newspaper correspondents with the Army in Afghanistan are allowed to proceed to the front, and to send letters and telegrams home without restriction; and, if not, what rules have been framed to govern their correspondence?

MR. E. STANHOPE: In consequence of the hon. and gallant Member's Question, we telegraphed to India, and have received the following reply:—

"(From the Viceroy, Lahore.)
"16th December, 1878.

"Following substance of rules issued by Government regarding Press correspondence:—

Approved correspondents allowed to accompany field columns, receiving carriage and camp equipage on same terms as other officers, and staff officer's rations on payment. No restriction or supervision over correspondence. Officers commanding columns empowered, if they think necessary, to require telegraphic messages to be submitted for inspection. Officers commanding at Frontier stations authorized on emergency temporarily to order stoppage of all telegrams relating to movements of troops, unless countersigned by staff officer. Commander-in-Chief has further issued orders prohibiting staff officers writing for papers, as he considers their time should be fully occupied with their proper duties."

MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACT, 1870—CASE OF MRS. M'CARTHY.

QUESTION.

MR. P. A. TAYLOR asked Mr. Attorney General, If he has received any further information in regard to the case of Mrs. M'Carthy, whose husband having taken away in her absence certain property belonging to her (she having a protection order as well as a decree of judicial separation, and all her property having been upon her marriage settled upon her for her absolute use), Mr. Headlam, stipendiary magistrate for Manchester, has decided adversely to her upon the ground that he "did not believe that section" (section 11 of "The Married Women's Property Act, 1870") "was intended to enable a woman to prosecute her husband for stealing her goods;" and, if he can now state whether the Government intend to propose any amendment of the Law?

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir JOHN HOLKER), in reply, said, he believed the facts were correctly stated in the Question of the hon. Gentleman. It was not for him to pronounce any opinion on the correctness of the decision of the stipendiary magistrate for Manchester, because if it were incorrect it would, no doubt, be reviewed by a Court of Law. The section referred to, providing that a married woman should have in her own name the same remedies, civil and criminal, against all persons whomsoever, for the protection of such wages, earnings, property, and chattels as are hers for her own use, as if they belonged to her as an unmarried woman, was very plain and intelligible in its provisions, and no amendment of the Law was necessary.

FRIENDLY SOCIETIES ACT, 1875—LEGISLATION.—QUESTION.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, If his attention has been called to the decision given by the Court of Queen's Bench in the case of Holt and the United Patriots Benefit Society, and to the remarks of the Judges on the construction of the Friendly Societies Act; whether the Friendly Societies had previously been informed by the Registrar that by section 22 they had the power to settle disputes by their own arbitration, and that section 30 only applied to societies receiving contributions by collectors, and at a greater distance than ten miles from their registered office; and, whether the Government intend to propose further legislation in consequence of the judgment of the Court?

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, in reply, said, that so far as he could understand the decision it was not in accordance with the intentions of the framers of the Act. It was not for him to dispute the decision referred to; but Friendly Societies had previously been informed by the Registrar in accordance with the intention of the Act, and, undoubtedly, if the decision referred to was right it would be necessary that some short amending Act should be passed.

MEDICAL ACT, 1858.—LEGISLATION.

QUESTION.

MR. A. MILLS asked the Vice President of the Council, Whether it is the intention of the Government to introduce any measure to amend the Medical Act of 1858; and, whether, in the event of any such Bill being brought in, it is proposed to deal with the constitution of the Medical Council?

LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: We hope to be able to introduce and pass this Session a measure amending the Medical Act of 1858. The constitution of the Medical Council is a matter of considerable difficulty and importance, in respect to which we think further inquiry is necessary before any legislation could be attempted.

EDUCATION ACTS — THE REVISED CODE—RETURNS.—QUESTION.

MR. MUNDELLA asked the Vice President of the Council, Whether he is now prepared with a scheme for relieving certificated teachers from the large amount of compulsory and unremunerated clerical labour imposed upon them by the Revised Code?

Lord GEORGE HAMILTON: We have considered the question, and shall be prepared after Christmas to state how we propose to reduce to a minimum the Returns necessary to carry out the Education Acts. It will not, however, be possible this year to dispense with the Returns required to be made on the 1st of January, 1879, to the local authorities under the Education Act, 1876.

SOUTH AFRICA—THE TRANSVAAL AND ZULULAND—THE BOUNDARY DISPUTE.

QUESTION.

Mr. WHITBREAD (for Mr. James) asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether he can inform the House when the Arbitration on the subject of the boundary between the Transvaal and Zululand will be completed; and, whether it is true that Colonel Wood crossed the disputed territory with a military force before the question of ownership had been settled?

Sir MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: The subject which is generally known as the boundary dispute between the Transvaal and Zululand was referred to three Commissioners, appointed by Sir Henry Bulwer, who were directed to hold an inquiry on the spot and report the facts of the case, but not to make any award or arbitration with respect to it. Their Report was sent to Sir Bartle Frere, who is now in Natal, the principal object of his visit there being to arrive at a decision upon this matter; and I understand that he has already informed Cetywayo that he is prepared to communicate that decision to him. I believe that the action taken by Colonel Wood was to the following effect:—The settlers at Luneburg, a place north of the Pongolo River, to which it does not appear that the Zulu King has any right whatever, and which is outside the disputed territory inquired into by the Boundary Commission, were reported to have received notice to quit their farms from a Zulu Chief. Colonel Wood took a small body of Her Majesty's troops to Luneberg for their protection, and in doing so may have crossed the territory which is now the subject of arbitration. I believe he acted on his own responsibility; but so far as the accounts which have yet reached me enable me to judge, I do not see how he could have taken any other course consistently with his duty.

THE RAILWAY COMMISSION—LEGISLATION.—QUESTION.

Mr. D. TAYLOR asked the President of the Board of Trade, If it is the intention of Government to increase the powers of the Railway Commission as suggested in the Report of the Royal Commission on Railway Accidents, and recommended by the Chambers of Commerce?

Viscount SANDON: As I informed the House last Session, it is the intention of the Government to introduce a Bill next year for continuing the Railway Commission. I am giving my most careful consideration to the subject; but I must beg leave to be excused from stating what will be the provisions of the intended Bill until we bring the measure itself before the notice of Parliament.

ROYAL HIBERNIAN MILITARY SCHOOL (DUBLIN)—QUESTION.

Major O'BEIRNE asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Why the appointment of Commandant of the Royal Hibernian Military School, Dublin, is not subject to the five years' rule, this appointment being hitherto filled by an Officer of the Army unattached; and, is it to be understood, from a statement recently made in the "Irish Times" newspaper, that the present Chairman of the Irish Board of Works is to be transferred to the Command of the Royal Hibernian Military School?

Mr. J. LOWTHER: Mr. Speaker—Neither of the posts to which the hon. and gallant Gentleman refers are in the gift or under the control of the Irish Government. I had not myself previously heard any rumour similar to that which the hon. and gallant Member mentions, and I cannot say if there is any truth in it.

JAPAN—CASE OF JOHN HARTLEY.

QUESTION.

Mr. MARK STEWART asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign

Affairs, Whether the Report from Sir Harry Parkes, our Minister in Japan, in reference to Mr. Wilkinson's judgments in the case of John Hartley, accused on two occasions of smuggling opium into Japan, has been received; whether the judgment is confirmed or reversed; and, whether the Papers will be laid upon the Table of the House at this time?

MR. BOURKE, in reply, said, the Report had been received at the Foreign Office. The Foreign Office had no power to confirm or reverse the judgment. He did not believe there would be any public advantage in producing the Papers.

EGYPT—THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE DAIRA LANDS.—QUESTION.

MR. B. SAMUELSON asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether he will lay upon the Table of the House any Papers showing the agreement between this Country and the Khedive of Egypt which enabled the Marquis of Salisbury, in his Letter to Lord Lyons of 24th October 1878 (Papers, Egypt, No. 2, 1878), to state that the person nominated by Her Majesty's Government as one of the Commissioners of the Daira Lands shall not be divested of his functions without their previous consent?

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: There would be no objection to the production of these Papers when the Correspondence is complete, which it is not quite at the present moment. When it is the hon. Member can have them by moving.

PARLIAMENTARY REPORTING — RE-APPOINTMENT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE.—QUESTION.

MR. NEWDEGATE asked the First Lord of the Admiralty, Whether it was the intention of Her Majesty's Ministers to propose the re-appointment of the Select Committee on Parliamentary Reporting after the adjournment for Christmas?

MR. W. H. SMITH: Yes, Sir; it is the intention of the Government to propose the re-appointment of that Committee after the re-assembling of the House in February.

TURKEY—RUMOURED ANGLO-TURKISH CONVENTION.—QUESTION.

MR. DILLWYN: I beg to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer a Question, of which I have given him private Notice, Whether there is any foundation whatever for the report of a new Anglo-Turkish Convention? I would not have asked this Question if it were merely a rumour; but I am aware of the fact that the report is believed in foreign Embassies.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: There is no truth in the report, except, of course, so far as it may relate to the negotiations that have been going on with regard to the arrangements to be made in relation to Cyprus.

SOUTH AFRICA—THE ZULU KING.

QUESTIONS.

MR. COURTNEY asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether there was any truth in the statement made in a Reuter's telegram, published that morning, to the effect that Sir Bartle Frere had addressed an ultimatum to the King of the Zulus; and, if so, whether the right hon. Gentleman could give any information as to the nature of that ultimatum?

MR. WHITWELL asked, If there was no truth in the report, what were the present relations between the King of the Zulus and the Government of South Africa?

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: The present state of our relations with the Zulus is undoubtedly threatening, but not, I hope, quite of the nature that might be assumed from the telegram which has been referred to by the hon. Member. The last telegram which I received from Sir Bartle Frere was as follows, dated November 19:—

> "We have desired Cetywayo to summon his councillors and send proper persons to receive the award regarding the disputed territory, and further communications regarding our future relations."

That, I think, must be the message which is described in *The Times* telegram of November 26 as an ultimatum. So far from bearing the character ordinarily attached to that term, I think there is good reason to hope that it may lead to a peaceful settlement of the questions at issue; but this, of course, greatly depends on the disposition of the Zulu King.

ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS—THE DEAN OF ARCHES.—QUESTION.

MR. NEWDEGATE asked Mr. Attorney General, Whether it was the intention of Her Majesty's Ministers to propose, after the adjournment for Christmas, any measure for reconciling the conflict of jurisdiction which has arisen between the Court over which Lord Penzance presided, the Court of Queen's Bench, and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council?

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir JOHN HOLKER): The Court of Queen's Bench has, I understand, power to grant a prohibition such as that which has recently been issued by that Court. That prohibition is, I understand, to be brought before the Court of Appeal; and until the point has been decided it will not be necessary for the Government to take any proceedings in regard to it.

MOTIONS.

HER ROYAL HIGHNESS THE GRAND DUCHESS OF HESSE (PRINCESS ALICE).

ADDRESS OF CONDOLENCE.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, since we last met a great sorrow has fallen on the Queen and on the country, and I am sure I express the universal sentiment of this House when I propose that we should join in an Address of Condolence to Her Majesty on the lamented death of the Grand Duchess of Hesse—our Princess Alice. Sir, it has been, and is, the habit of this House to sympathize and to express sympathy with Her Majesty on all occasions of domestic joy or sorrow. There are, I do not doubt, many here—I know there are some—who can remember the Address of Congratulation on the birth of Princess Alice, and the Address of Congratulation on her happy marriage. Now, alas! it falls to me to ask for an Address of Condolence on her decease. I feel it would be superfluous—indeed, presumptuous—on my part to speak of one so well known to us all, and so highly appreciated for the nobleness, tenderness, and true womanliness of her character. At the same time, one can hardly avoid lingering for a moment on the recollection of one whose life has been cut short so early, and, looking at human considerations, one would say so prematurely. Apart altogether from her Royal birth and her exalted station, Princess Alice had qualities to command love and admiration—whether we think of her as a daughter ministering at the dying bed of her father, as a sister exerting herself as a careful, affectionate, and skilful nurse to her brother when he lay almost at the point of death, as a tender mother who may be said to have sacrificed her life in her affectionate care of her own children, or whether we recall the time when she came forward to alleviate the sufferings of the sick and wounded of her adopted country. We remember how every English heart throbbed to know that these noble deeds were done by a daughter of England. Whatever may be the capacity in which we recognize that combination of qualities—that combination of warmth of heart, soundness of judgment, and practical energy which go to make up the type of a perfect woman—we feel that she is to be lamented for the sake of those she has left behind, especially in her own family, where we see that strong instinct of domestic affection which endears them so much to the people of this country. Most of all do we lament her death because of the blow that has fallen on the Queen. This is the first great domestic sorrow that has come upon Her Majesty since, 17 years ago, and on the same day, that one great blow of her life was given. We feel that before such a sorrow it is almost impossible to speak; and yet we know that words of sympathy are most valuable, and that by no one is the power of sympathy more valued than by Her Majesty, for we have her own example to show that no calamity falls upon any portion of her people but she is the first, by kindly words and kindly message, to manifest her own sympathy. I feel convinced the House will unanimously agree to an Address which will testify at once our personal affection for the Sovereign, our deep sorrow for her loss, and our earnest prayer that God may support her in her affliction. I beg to move—

"That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, to express the deep concern of this House at the great loss which Her Majesty has sustained by the death of Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Hesse, Princess Alice of Great Britain and Ireland, second daughter of Her Majesty the Queen, and to condole with Her Majesty on this melancholy occasion; to assure Her Majesty that this House will ever feel the warmest interest in whatever concerns Her Majesty's domestic Relations; and to declare the ardent wishes of this House for the happiness of Her Majesty and of Her Family."

The Marquess of HARTINGTON: Sir, I rise to second the Address which has been proposed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and to say I feel that every man in this House will agree with every word that has fallen from the right hon. Gentleman. There is no need of many words on such an occasion as this. The English people, I believe, feel deeply; but they are not prone to express their emotions loudly. There is something very grand and touching when an emotion either of joy or sorrow spreads itself over a whole people—when those deep and tender feelings which are excited by the events of human life, but which are generally and necessarily restricted within a narrow circle, extend to the utmost limits of a great Empire. Her Majesty and her children may be assured that when they rejoice, or when they mourn, the people of this country rejoice and mourn with them. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has referred to that time, 17 years ago, when the first great calamity afflicted the Royal Family. Most of us can remember how at that time every man felt that he had suffered, not only a public, but a private sorrow. A few years later, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer has also reminded us, the whole nation watched, as it were, by the sick bed of His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales. The memory of Her Royal Highness Princess Alice will always be associated with the recollection of these periods of mourning and suspense; and the devotion she showed as a daughter and a sister will never be forgotten by the people of this country. Sir, we do not desire to intrude on the grief of Her Majesty and the Royal Family; but if sympathy under such circumstances as the present be any consolation, Her Majesty may rest assured that the sentiments which are expressed in this Address are but the faithful reflection of the feelings which exist throughout the country.

Resolved, *Nemine Contradicente*, That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, to express the deep concern of this House at the great loss which Her Majesty has sustained by the death of Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Hesse, Princess Alice of Great Britain and Ireland, second daughter of Her Majesty the Queen, and to condole with Her Majesty on this melancholy occasion.

To assure Her Majesty that this House will ever feel the warmest interest in whatever concerns Her Majesty's domestic Relations; and to declare the ardent wishes of this House for the happiness of Her Majesty and of Her Family.

To be presented by Privy Councillors.

THE RHODOPE COMMISSION.

WITHDRAWAL OF NOTICE.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: I have now, Sir, to move that the Orders of the Day be postponed until after the Notice of Motion relating to the Expenses of the Military Operations in Afghanistan; and in making that Motion, which is but a formal one, I wish to take advantage of the opportunity to offer a few words of explanation with regard to a Notice I gave on Friday night, for the House to go into Committee of Supply for the purpose of granting a sum of money in aid of the sufferers in the Rhodope district. I need not detain the House by entering into any account of the circumstances which led to the appointment of the Rhodope Commission, or of the circumstances in which not one Report, but four identical Reports, were presented by four different Members of the Commission. In the circumstances in which those Reports were presented it was impossible for us, as I have stated to the House before, to take any political action without very serious consideration. I have also stated to the House on a previous occasion that, considering that those Reports concurred in representing the distress as very severe and beyond the reach of the charity either of private persons or of the Turkish Government, it had been recommended that some assistance should be given, and it was in contemplation by Her Majesty's Government to take steps, in communication with foreign Governments, for acting upon that suggestion in the Report. In order to do anything of that kind it was necessary to apply for the sanction of the House; but the Notice I gave on Friday has certainly produced a response which, though it has not been given in any formal manner, is sufficient to show that there would be very considerable difference of opinion on the subject. This, we think, is not a Vote which ought to be proposed if it is not to be generally accepted. Under these circumstances, Her Majesty's Government have suspended their communications with foreign Powers on this subject; and it is not my intention to move that Vote. With regard to the position in which the House now stands, I do not know how long the discussion upon my hon. Friend's (Mr. E. Stanhope's) Motion, and the Amendment of the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett), is likely to occupy. I am quite aware that there are many Gentlemen who take a great interest in the subject who wish to address the House, and I do not know whether it will be possible to close the debate this evening. If it should be, I hope the House will agree that after the debate is so closed, I should be allowed to move the adjournment for the Recess. If that should not be the case, and if the debate should be adjourned, then I shall give Notice to-night that to-morrow at the opening I shall move the adjournment. I should propose either to-night or to-morrow that the House, at its rising, do adjourn till Thursday, the 13th of February.

The Marquess of HARTINGTON: Sir, the unexpected and extraordinary announcement that has just been made renders it, I think, necessary that one or two remarks should be made upon the statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, although I must say that I did not come down to the House with the slightest expectation that it would be necessary to take any course of this kind. My hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow (Mr. Anderson) characterized the other day the Notice which was given by the Chancellor of the Exchequer relating to the proposal for a grant in relief of the distress in the Rhodope district as "extraordinary." No doubt it did take the House greatly by surprise, especially after the fact that an announcement had been made a short time since by the Chancellor of the Exchequer that the House should not, during this period of the Session, be asked to consider any other Business than that which related to the war which had broken out in Afghanistan. But extraordinary as that announcement was, a still more extraordinary one has been made this evening. We are informed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer that the Government have had under their serious consideration the Reports of the Rhodope Commission, and that, having given them that serious consideration, they had resolved to make a proposal to Parliament. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has also informed us that Her Majesty's Government have entered into communications with foreign Powers on the subject. Now, I think we may be informed, at all events, whether it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government to make this proposition to the House without giving them some information—for we have received none as yet—as to the nature of these communications with foreign Powers and the answers which have been received from those foreign Powers? But, Sir, what is the reason that is given for the withdrawal of this Vote? It has been, as I have said, under the serious consideration of Her Majesty's Government; but on account of something that they have heard in the Lobby of this House, or some paragraphs which they have read in the newspapers, they have arrived suddenly at the conclusion that their serious consideration is altogether misplaced, and that the proposal should not be made. Sir, I do not think that I ever recollect an instance of a very grave and serious proposal being made so deliberately and being withdrawn with so much haste. I do think it is unfortunate that the withdrawal has taken place in a form which gives Parliament no opportunity of expressing an opinion on the conduct of the Government. I think the House is entitled to know whether the proposition is entirely abandoned, or whether it is merely suspended until further communications have been made with foreign Powers, or until some other temper be found to prevail in the public mind? I think that a little more explanation than has yet been vouchsafed to the House on this subject is required; and that we ought to make some protest against a proposal which is brought forward after serious consideration on one day being withdrawn, without any reason assigned, on the next.

MR. ANDERSON said, that the announcement which he had just heard from the Chancellor of the Exchequer had taken him as much by surprise as that which he had made on Friday last. The House would remember that not many days ago the Chancellor of the Exchequer answered a Question about the Rhodope Report in such a manner as to throw very considerable doubt on the veracity of that Report. Subsequently the right hon. Gentleman gave another answer, affirming the veracity of the Report; and, as if to emphasize that assertion, he came down on Friday night with the announcement that he was to move for a grant in aid of the distress in the Rhodope district. He now came down and withdrew that proposal, and so relegated them back to their old position in regard to the veracity of the Report. He (Mr. Anderson) regretted that the House was to be deprived of the opportunity of discussing the Report of the Rhodope Commission, because it was a Report which deserved some discussion. The origin of that Report was, to say the least, open to question. Her Majesty's Government invited Sir Henry Layard to select a Commissioner, and the Commissioner whom he selected was Consul General Fawcett; and these two facts were alone sufficient to throw doubts upon the veracity of the Report. ["Oh, oh!"] These facts tainted the Report, perhaps not in the minds of hon. Gentlemen opposite, but certainly in the opinion of half the people of the country, who remembered perfectly who those two gentlemen were, and how they were steeped to the eyes in philo-Turkish prejudices. He believed that, under those circumstances, it was impossible for those gentlemen to give an unbiassed Report. Well, what the grant was intended to do they were still left in ignorance of. They did not know whether it was intended as a rebuff to Russia—which they that morning learnt was the opinion expressed in Constantinople—or whether it was a small sop to the great Jingo Party. They were deprived of the opportunity of knowing that. At all events, they did know that the proposal was most inopportune and almost unprecedented. But at the time when their country was in a state of the deepest distress, when factories and mills were standing, when iron and coal mines and other means of productive industry were at a standstill, that they should be asked to constitute themselves into a sort of International Committee for the relief of other nations in distress, was, he thought, rather too bad. He had looked carefully into the subject, and the only case in the shape of a precedent that he had been able to find was a very different one, and that was when a few shiploads of sea-stores were sent to the suffering inhabitants of Paris just after the siege. There was a famine in China a few years ago, where millions perished, and the Government did nothing; and when our fellow-subjects in India were in great need—one-third of the inhabitants of Orissa having died of starvation—the Home Government did nothing. As regarded the late Indian Famine the Home Government again did nothing. All these were left to voluntary beneficence. And were they now to go out of their way to grant a sum of money to a small district in Roumelia? The proposal was altogether preposterous and absurd. He regretted they had not had the opportunity of discussing the proposed grant fully, and, most of all, he regretted they had been deprived of the opportunity, before the Recess, of discussing the present condition of their own country, which the Government evidently failed to appreciate.

SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL wished to bring under the notice of the House and the Government a circumstance which came under his own personal notice. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that the distress in the Rhodope district was beyond the means of the Turkish Government, and he (Sir George Campbell) wished to ask whether the Government were aware that the Porte had found the means for purchasing large additional quantities of arms and ammunition in America? That great purchases of arms were made was shown by the fact that a ship which started from America loaded with arms for Turkey, stranded just after starting, and remained so to the present time. He wished to know if Her Majesty's Government realized that Turkey was spending money in that way whilst she was unable to help her own starving people? With reference to the selection of Consul General Fawcett as a Commissioner, he wished to say that he knew him to be an honourable and upright man, and thoroughly to be believed in regard to matters coming under his own personal observation. At the same time he also knew, as a matter of personal knowledge, that Mr. Fawcett was one of the most notorious Turkophiles and Russian haters in all Constantinople, and that was saying a great deal. As regarded that portion of Mr. Fawcett's Report which related to matters of opinion and not to matters of fact, he should receive it with the greatest mistrust.

Sir WILLIAM HARCOURT: I am sure that the House will feel on both sides for the Government that sympathy which is always felt for persons who have placed themselves by their own fault in a very humiliating position. A more humiliating position I have never seen a Government placed in in my life. They receive the silent sympathy of their own Party, and the cordial approval in the course they pursue to-day of ours. Now, I think that the Government may have learned one lesson from this experience—that the ardent and somewhat vociferous supporters whom they have in the country and on that side of the House will do anything for the Turks except pay for them. The Government have avoided that test up to this time. They postponed payments, they borrowed money; but they did not ask for the means of paying. They seemed to have a suspicion that these Turkophile Gentlemen would not like to ask their constituents to pay for their opinions, and they were quite right. But in an evil moment they thought they would come down to this House and ask these Gentlemen to go to their constituencies and ask them to back their opinions, and then there was a rebellion. They said—"For God's sake do not send us to our constituency loaded with a claim for payment to the Turks," and so the proposal has disappeared. But what can we think of a policy conducted upon such principles as those? If it is merely a question of money, and you want to relieve these unfortunate people, I wonder why you (the Government) have not taken your favourite course. Did not this Rhodope affair arise out of your Eastern policy? But for your Eastern policy all these transactions which have occurred in European Turkey—this unfortunate and unhappy lot of misery—would not have occurred. But then your Eastern policy was a part of the defence of India, and why do you not propose to put this Rhodope grant on the Revenues of India? That would relieve you from the situation in which you are placed, because then the Tory Members would not have to ask their constituents to pay for Turkey. You can put it upon India as you put your other expenses for this policy, and that might reconcile them to it. I wish to ask a question of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and it is this—What are you going to do for the Rhodope sufferers now you have withdrawn the grant? My noble Friend the Member for Haddingtonshire (Lord Elcho) has disappeared in this catastrophe. He was very loud in his cross-examination, almost menacing to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, upon the subject of the Rhodope district. Now you have got your Rhodope Report, and have made communications to foreign Governments, I want to know what foreign Governments will think when, after asking them to join you, you say you find the Conservative Members will not support you? A nice position that for a Government with a great foreign policy. But there remains the question—What are you going to do now? The answer to that question will interest the people of Rhodope; it will interest most of the foreign Governments whom you have solicited to join you; it will be very interesting to Eastern nations, and also to the constituents of Conservative Members.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN said, he was a little surprised to find that no hon. Member on the other side of the House had got up to defend the policy of the Government, or to find a precedent for them. He certainly was not on other occasions accustomed to take that task upon himself; but it certainly did appear to him that the position of the Government was perfectly natural under the circumstances. He had in his mind a precedent that he thought might stand them in good stead. There were once two Americans who found themselves in great danger in a small boat at sea, and they thought the time had come for some devotional exercises. So as they could recollect no hymn, and they had forgotten all their prayers, they made a collection. It appeared to him that Her

Majesty's Government had got into very great straits with their foreign policy, and recent elections gave them reason to believe they would soon be in difficulties at home, and so he was not surprised that, under the circumstances, they made a collection.

Mr. DILLWYN said, the policy of the Government could very well be understood on the ground that "the least said was the soonest mended." The questions put by the Leader of the Opposition ought, however, to be answered; there should be some explanation. He hoped that this affair would be settled finally and at once.

Mr. Serjeant SIMON said, he had been perfectly astonished at the course taken by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and had been unable to find any precedent for such a grant. He believed both Sir Henry Layard and Consul General Fawcett to be honourable men, and incapable of wilful misrepresentation; but he must say it was impossible to read the Report without feeling that there had been a large amount of exaggeration and much looseness in the evidence upon which it was founded. He, as his votes showed, was anything but a Turkophile; but still he did not share with some hon. Members on that (the Opposition) side of the House in admiration of the Russian Government, on whose conduct he looked with great suspicion. He wanted to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer what he meant by saying that he placed reliance on Consul General Fawcett? Did the right hon. Gentleman place reliance in every part of the Report, including the statement of facts, or only in some part of it? The Report, notwithstanding some exaggeration and a great deal of looseness, contained serious and grave charges against Russia. If these allegations were true, he appealed to the Chancellor of the Exchequer to know whether the case could be met by a grant of money? Was the right hon. Gentleman going to confine himself to asking Parliament to pay for the misdoings of the Russian soldiery and Bulgarians; or was he prepared to announce what further action the Government would take?

Sir ROBERT PEEL: It appears to some of us sitting below the Gangway that the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite (Sir William Harcourt) made a great deal more of this matter than it really deserves. It occurs to me that the case might have been much more grave had the Motion been proceeded with. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has gracefully withdrawn the Motion, when he found upon inquiry—and it is only upon inquiry that the feeling of the House upon such a question can be ascertained—that the proposal would, in all probability, not meet with the general approval of the House. The hon. and learned Member made a statement to which not only I and many who sit near me demur, but upon which the House itself has already distinctly pronounced an opinion directly the reverse of that entertained by the hon. and learned Gentleman. The hon. and learned Gentleman said that the state of affairs in the Rhodope district was owing to the Eastern policy of the Government. Now, that must have been a mistake, because the Eastern policy of the Government had proved an entire success. [*Laughter.*] At all events, the votes of this House and the opinion of the country go to show that it is so. [An hon. Member: Bristol.] The Chancellor of the Exchequer having withdrawn his Motion, when he found it was not met with general approval, the best course we can adopt is to put a stop to further discussion upon this small matter and to proceed with the other Business before us.

Mr. GLADSTONE: I cannot agree with the right hon. Baronet who has just sat down in thinking that the best mode of dealing with this subject is to make little of it, and at once to pass to the other Business of the evening. The question appears to me to be a very serious one indeed. I do not propose to widen the issue by discussing the very large question which the right hon. Baronet has raised as to the entire success of the Eastern policy of the Government, and as to the attainment of the objects with which they entered into the Berlin Congress. That may be a tempting inducement; but I think the present subject is important enough for consideration. The present proposal appears to me to have been a very unhappy mistake. The proposal of Her Majesty's Government, made on Friday and withdrawn on Monday, has not been the result of a sudden emergency, the Report having been signed by the

Commissioners as far back as the end of August. Her Majesty's Government have had more than three months in which to consider this matter. The Report of the Rhodope Commission raises two points of the utmost importance: first, the conduct attributed to the Bulgarians and to the Russian soldiery as against the Mahomedan population of Rhodope; and, secondly, the alleged distress of the Mahomedan population of that district. It is very unfortunate that when the question of that distress is so prominently raised at the present time no step was taken by Her Majesty's Government with regard to it until so late a period; and that the proposal to make a grant for its relief should not have been included in the objects with which Parliament was summoned. It is evident that the idea of making that proposal was only born on Friday last—or, at least, on the day immediately before that day. It may be that there is a difference of opinion as to the propriety of the proposal and also as to the propriety of withdrawing it when it was made; but there can be no difference of opinion as to this—that in withdrawing that proposal Her Majesty's Government are morally bound to make known to us what their intentions are in reference to the matter. It has been alleged as a reason for withdrawing this proposal that the communications with foreign Governments with regard to Rhodope have been suspended; but we have been informed that the people of that district are on the verge of starvation, and the suspension of communication has no effect in arresting starvation. Her Majesty's Government, in dealing with this matter, are bound to take into consideration what course has been taken in reference to it by their friends, and by their Ambassador at Constantinople. Their friends have not only promulgated throughout the country—and they were perfectly right in so doing—the severity of the sufferings of the refugee Mahomedan population, but they have bestowed the most unmeasured and severe condemnation upon those who, as they have thought fit to say, have called the attention of the world to the sufferings of the Bulgarian Christians, but who do not care one rush for the sufferings of their Mahomedan fellow-countrymen. Sir Henry Layard has in the most unjustifiable manner embodied in a despatch, which was immediately published by Her Majesty's Government, a complaint of this kind; and our Ambassador at Constantinople, whose business it is to represent his country as a whole, has presumed to say that those who made the sufferings of the Bulgarian Christians the subject of public interest and discussion have remained coldly silent when the sufferings of their Mahomedan fellow-countrymen are in question. Having seen that extraordinary statement, I made a private and personal appeal—not without the knowledge of the Foreign Office—to Sir Henry Layard on the subject and pointed out to him the notorious injustice and the total and absolute untruth of the charge of silence which he had brought against us. Naturally, I concluded myself to be included within that charge; and I pointed out to him that on the first intimation of the sufferings that had been caused to the Mahomedans of the district I had published a letter addressed to the Christians of Bulgaria, in which I had stated that Christian cruelty was quite as bad, if not worse, than Mahomedan cruelty. Sir Henry Layard, in his reply, stated that he had not named me in his despatch, and that, therefore, he did not consider that I had any title to call him to account in the matter. That is the manner in which these things are carried on. Having pointed to the manner in which subjects of private concern are managed, let us see how matters which are of public concern are managed. The inquiry into the alleged atrocities in Rhodope commenced in a manner which may almost be called august. It arose out of statements made at the Congress of Berlin. A Commission was given by that Congress to the Representatives of the Powers at Constantinople, ordering and authorizing them to make inquiries on the subject. I confess I cannot think that the steps taken in the matter, so far as this country is concerned, were of the most judicious character. Consul General Fawcett, our Representative on the Commission, whatever his ability may be, was marked in the most eminent degree with the character of a partizan. On a former occasion, when an inquiry was to be made into alleged atrocities in Bulgaria, Her Majesty's Government made in the person of Mr. Baring, a most careful selection of a gentleman who bore no such character; and, consequently, the Report of the Commission on which he had sat was received with absolute credence and carried the greatest weight. But, on the contrary, no sooner had the Report of the Rhodope Commission been published than it became the subject of the most severe criticism. But a heavy responsibility lay on Her Majesty's Government. It was for them to consider whether the evidence was credible or not. They did consider it, and declared it to be credible by adopting the Report of the Commission. The matter was of the utmost urgency, for the honour and character of a nation was involved in giving it effect, because it was a Report in answer to inquiries which were instituted on international authority. Her Majesty's Government having declared that they gave credence to the opinion, likewise gave Notice of a Motion in connection with which it was understood that they would explain their views to the House. That being so, how have we been met to-night by the Chancellor of the Exchequer? This matter cannot rest where it is. You cannot institute inquiries of this kind; appoint agents; declare that you have faith in them; receive from them statements which describe the most horrible sufferings, and which remark upon their continuance down, as we are given to understand, to the present time; announce, in consequence of all these proceedings, a proposal to Parliament for the relief of the sufferers; and then simply withdraw the proposal on the ground that communications with foreign Governments are suspended. I do not enter into the political part of the question at all. If I have referred to the proceedings of Sir Henry Layard, it is because I feel that he has exhibited a portion of his fellow-countrymen to the world in a most odious and offensive light. He advanced the charge against them that they were willing to excite feeling on the subject of Christian misery, but that Mahomedan misery appeared to be to them a matter of indifference. Sir, it is no matter of indifference to us. We can draw no distinction between Christian and Mahomedan suffering. I should have thought that Her Majesty's Government would have exercised a sounder discretion if, originally, in lieu of suggesting a grant of public money, a large proportion of which must have been paid out of the pockets of our own labouring population, they had adopted the means which were in their power, and which are still in their power, for instituting and recommending a voluntary subscription with the view of relieving the sufferings of these refugees. I do not know whether the consideration of that matter has been before them, nor whether it has met, or will meet with their favour. My view of the matter is entirely practical. It does not relate to the manner in which the Government or any particular section of the House will appear, but to the attitude in which the whole nation is represented if, after a solemn inquiry of this kind into the misery of a population has been instituted, and if, after a proposal has been made to Parliament, upon deliberation by the Government, the matter is allowed to be postponed *sine die* upon the mere statement that communications with foreign Governments are suspended. I hope, therefore, that the Government will satisfy the opinion which I cannot but think is general in the House—that this a matter with which both the interests of humanity, and the credit of the nation to some extent are concerned; and that if they do not think fit to persevere with the Vote which they proposed to submit to Parliament, they will let us know distinctly whether that Vote has been finally withdrawn; and, if so, whether they mean to take any and, if so, what measures with a view to the relief of these unfortunate people in pursuance of the Report of Mr. Consul Fawcett and his Colleagues, to which they have told us that upon consideration they give their credence.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, I have no wish to disturb the good humour of hon. Gentlemen opposite, or the amusement which they seem to have derived from what has just passed. Perhaps they wanted something to put them in a good humour after what has lately befallen them. But I must ask the House not to allow itself to be drawn into a general discussion of the Turkish and Russian question. We did not come here expecting such a discussion, but to transact other Business, and it would not be convenient for the House to drift irregularly into such a discussion. I do not take any exception to what has just fallen from the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Gladstone). He may have had special reasons for wishing to say what he has done. But I hope the House will not permit itself to be carried into a discussion which might become animated, and which we could hardly enter upon with advantage at the present moment. The first question which has been put to me is, whether this proposal is altogether withdrawn? That is a question which may be fairly asked. In fact, this proposal has never been formally made, and there is no intention of making it. I am told that this is an extraordinary and unprecedented position for the Government to find itself in; but if we searched the records of this House, even for no distant year, I think we should find cases in which measures, even of much importance, have been brought forward with great solemnity, and have been elaborately introduced, and yet they have afterwards been quietly dropped out of sight, because it was not thought desirable to bring them to the test of discussion. But be that as it may, the position in which we really now stand is this—A Commission was appointed by the joint action of several Governments. The Commissioners held their meetings; they instituted an inquiry; but when it came to the time for reporting, it was found that they could not agree. The Report was prepared, not by Mr. Consul Fawcett—on whom rather unfair imputations have been cast —nor by Sir Henry Layard, but, I think, by the French Commissioner; and that Report was accepted identically by other Commissioners—namely, by the Italian and the Turkish Commissioners. The Reports were presented, not as one Report, but as identical Reports presented separately by the different Commissioners to their several Governments; three important Commissioners dissenting from the conclusions. In these circumstances the course to be pursued was obviously one which required considerable care and reflection. I do not think that we ought to be taunted or enticed into any discussion of that subject before we are really prepared to discuss it. At the present moment, and especially without a formal Notice and invitation to discuss the subject, I am not ashamed to say that I am not prepared to do so. But there was another matter, which stood apart or aside from the question in dispute between the Commissioners, and that was the undoubted fact, recognized by every one, that there was severe suffering, and suffering which it would be desirable, if possible, to relieve. It appeared to us that it might be a convenient and proper course to hold communication with other Governments, and, to a certain extent, such communication was opened; but in the particular case in which it was opened I do not think that the reception which the suggestion met with was such as entirely to make it clear that that course would have led to a successful result. And, at all events, when we made the proposal in this House we found there could be no doubt that there was a very widely-spread feeling that it was not desirable that such a proposal should be made and discussed. [*A laugh.*] It is all very well to raise a laugh, but we must look at these matters with the eye of common sense; and everybody must see that even if the Government should, at the risk of incurring ridicule, not make a proposal that would lead to repeated debates, and which, if it were adopted, would only be adopted by a majority, it is better that they should not persevere with a proposal which ought not to be accepted in a grudging spirit. I am quite prepared to take my share of any blame that may be cast on us for the manner in which we have acted, and I accept a considerable personal responsibility; but I hope the House will not now consent to be drawn into a wider discussion, and that we shall be allowed to proceed with the Business of the evening.

Motion *agreed to.*

Ordered, That the Orders of the Day be postponed until after the Notice of Motion relating to the Expenses of the Military Operations in Afghanistan—*(Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer.)*

AFGHANISTAN (EXPENSES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS) — APPLICATION OF THE REVENUES OF INDIA.

RESOLUTION.

MR. E. STANHOPE, in rising to move—

"That, Her Majesty having directed a Military expedition of Her Forces charged upon Indian Revenues to be despatched against the Ameer of Afghanistan, this House consents that the Revenues of India shall be applied to defray the expenses of the Military operations which may be carried on beyond the external frontiers of Her Majesty's Indian Possessions,"

said, that the discussions which had recently taken place both in that and the other House of Parliament had relieved him of a great deal of the difficulty which he must have felt in proposing the Resolution which stood in his name; and, therefore, in discharging the duty which now devolved on him, he assured the House that it would not be necessary for him to trespass on its attention at any considerable length. On the 21st of November last a Proclamation of War was issued by the Viceroy of India, and on the same day war against the Ameer of Afghanistan began. The duty which devolved on the Government in consequence of that act was a very simple one. They were bound, according to statute, to give Notice of it to Parliament within three months; or, if Parliament should not be then sitting, they were bound to give that Notice within one month after the date of its meeting. What the Government had really done was this—On the fourteenth day after the proclamation of the war Parliament was assembled, and the Government had made that announcement; and he now asked the House to enable it to fulfil the other Constitutional obligations cast upon it under the Act of Parliament. The section of the Act of Parliament on which his Resolution was founded was as follows:—

> "Except for preventing or repelling actual invasion of Her Majesty's Indian Possessions, or under other sudden and urgent necessity, the Revenues of India shall not, without the consent of both Houses of Parliament, be applicable to defray the expenses of any Military operation carried on beyond the external frontiers of such possessions by Her Majesty's Forces charged upon such Revenues."

The history of that clause was very simple. While the Bill for the better government of India was going through that House, a clause was proposed by the right hon. Member for Greenwich, the effect of which was that, unless the consent of Parliament was given for the purposes of war, the Military forces of Her Majesty charged on the Indian Revenues should not be employed in any operation beyond the external Frontier of Her Majesty's Indian possessions. That clause was accepted in that House. When the Bill reached the other House the late Lord Derby, then Prime Minister, explained a grave Constitutional objection to which it was liable in its existing form; and although he admitted that the case was very unlikely, yet he pointed out that under the law as it then stood, it was possible, if we happened to live under a Sovereign less Constitutional than Her Most Gracious Majesty, that it would be in the power of the Crown to employ the Indian Forces in war without ever obtaining the assent of Parliament. His Lordship proposed, therefore, that a financial check should be attached to such an exercise of power, and submitted the clause which he had just read, and which became law; the effect of it being that the consent of Parliament to the purposes of the war was required, not before the Indian Army could be employed beyond the Frontier, but before the Revenues of India could be applied in payment for such an expedition. In consequence of that provision application had been made to the other House of Parliament; its consent had been given by a unanimous vote; and the Government now asked the House of Commons to ratify that decision. When a charge on the Revenues of India was proposed, the first question every hon. Member would be disposed to ask himself was—"What is the real interest of India?" Were we, as the ruling Power in India, vitally interested in the results which we hoped by means of this war to secure? From the time of the Viceroyalty of Sir John Lawrence, when out of Indian Revenues we used to make contributions of arms and money towards the support of Afghanistan, down to the present day, it had been a cardinal maxim of Indian policy that the maintenance of Afghanistan as a strong Frontier Power—not, indeed, subject to our interference in its domestic affairs, but under British influence—was a vital necessity of our position. The whole Indian world had always watched the politics of that part of the country as a matter of the most pressing and vital interest. Successive Viceroys declared that the subject was one to which they attached the greatest importance; he might have said no Viceroy could possibly have neglected it. Governments at home had ratified that policy, which had been sanctioned over and over again by Parliament. That being the state of public opinion at home, and still more strongly in India, events had recently happened that were calculated to test the sincerity of the convictions which had been arrived at. We had suddenly found that British influence in Afghanistan, to which we attached the greatest importance, was not only upon the wane, but in danger of being absolutely extinguished. We had learned that the Ameer, not content with receiving a Mission from a foreign Government, in circumstances which gave its reception a decidedly hostile character, was also prepared to repel with insult, in the eyes of the people of India, a friendly British Mission. What was the result? From every part of India there came a cry that in these circumstances inaction was impossible. Native Princes had vied with one another in offering us troops and money, and in testifying their loyalty to the Government of India. They were prepared to take up arms and to make sacrifices in defence and in support of the Government of India by Her Majesty. In a word, Indian opinion, Native as well as British, declared without any hesitation that for the interest of India and for the defence of onr North-West Frontier, it was absolutely necessary that steps should be taken by the Government of India to vindicate the honour of the country. The consent of the Home Government having been obtained, the Army was moved forward beyond the Frontier under the orders of the Viceroy of India; and, that step having been taken, the next question that came before the House was the manner in which the expenses of the war were to be met. He did not suppose many persons were prepared to take the sort of view which, judging from his Amendment, was taken by the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett). If what he (Mr. E. Stanhope) had just stated were true, it was impossible to say that India had no interest in the results of the present war. Yet that was what the hon. Member for Hackney appeared to be prepared to say. The hon. Gentleman's argument appeared to be that India was not only not to pay a single penny towards defraying the extraordinary, or the ordinary expenses of the war, but she was to receive a sum of money for having entered upon a Frontier war, and was to have an inducement to embroil us in the future in similar wars. That was a position which, he believed, hon Members generally would not for one moment support. But, as a criticism of the Resolution which he should presently have the honour to propose, it might be said—"Why do you propose, in that Resolution, to charge the whole expense to India? Has not England a sufficient interest in the matter to induce her to be generous and contribute a portion of the expenses?" That was a matter of the gravest importance, and it had been, and was now, under the consideration of Her Majesty's Government. His Resolution did not prejudge this question in the smallest degree. If the House should think fit at any time to declare that a portion of the expenses incurred by the war—nay, even that the whole of them ought to be borne by the Imperial Exchequer, there was nothing in the action he now asked the House to take which would place any impediment in the way of the adoption of such a course. Certain opinions expressed by Members of the Indian Council had been referred to. They would be read with the attention due to the position of the writers. But in his opinion no proof whatever was needed that the Members of the Council of State for India were prepared cordially to support his noble Friend (Viscount Cranbrook) in the duty cast upon him by the Constitution of this country of watching over the interests and the Revenues of the people of India. It was said that the House could not regard this question fairly, because India was not represented in the House of Commons. A more gross illusion it was impossible to conceive. Ten years ago the hon. Member for Orkney (Mr. Laing) pointed out the growing disposition of England to regard fairly matters affecting India. There could be no doubt that the Members of the House of Commons considered themselves to be, as regarded India, trustees of that great country. They had shown on many occasions a scrupulous regard for the interests of the people of India, and they certainly could not be justly charged with neglecting that important consideration. The special duty of the Secretary of State for India was to watch over the interests of India in the Cabinet; and if his noble Friend should come to the conclusion that India was unable to pay these expenses, or that she ought not in justice to bear more than a certain proportion of them, his noble Friend was not the man to shrink from the consequences of that opinion, or from enforcing it with all the vigour of which he was capable on his Colleagues and the country. But looking at the character of this war and its reasonable and possible consequences, he confessed that, regarding it solely from an Indian point of view, he was induced to say

> "Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes."

What was the character of the war? Was it at all like various precedents that might be adduced? In the first place, there was the precedent of Abyssinia. In that case there was the most conclusive testimony that India was well represented in the Cabinet, because the present Chancellor of the Exchequer, who was then Indian Secretary, succeeded in inducing Parliament to say that India should not contribute a single shilling towards the cost of that war. That, however, was a very different case from the present. Again, in the case of the Persian War, in which the interest of India was very much more remote than in the present case, Parliament decided that India ought properly to bear the whole of the ordinary and one-half of the extraordinary expenses of the war. But when they came to the present instance they found it was nothing more nor less than a mere Frontier war, not at all dissimilar in principle from many other Frontier wars in which India had been engaged. It might, perhaps, assume larger proportions, and in that event it would have to be considered from a totally different point of view. The Government hoped and believed, however, that it would remain throughout a mere Frontier war. He hoped the House would not for a moment suppose he was prejudging the matter; but he desired to submit one or two reasons why, from an Indian point of view, if a subsidy were offered to India, she ought to hesitate before accepting it. In the first place, India was not and had never been a financial burden on this country. Unlike other conquerors, we had never attempted to derive any revenue from the country we had conquered; while, on the other hand, in all her troubles and difficulties she had paid her own way. If this rule were broken through, a danger would at once arise of weakening the position of India in the eyes of the world, and altering in a very material degree the relations between India and this country. India while not imposing any financial difficulties upon England was one thing; but India as a financial burden was another. Not very long ago, in the course of the Famine in Madras, a strong feeling existed in this country that a contribution out of Imperial funds was not only desirable, but absolutely necessary. That temptation, most honourable to this country, was fortunately resisted, and the result was that India had not only been able to pay the whole cost of the Famine, but had been induced by it to make most laudable exertions for establishing a fund for insurance against similar calamities in the future. In the second place, the only true security for economical administration in India was the responsibility laid upon India to provide means for the payment of its debts. Once take away that security, let it be supposed that, save in exceptional circumstances, English assistance was forthcoming whenever needed, and the great check upon expenditure was lost. If Frontier troubles arose, there would be no financial considerations to counsel prudence. And, if unfortunately they were engaged in war, why restrict expenditure, when the English taxpayer was behind? It would be said, indeed, that with a subsidy it would be necessary to assume more complete control over Indian expenditure. That was a large question, upon which he would not now enter. He would only say, that men far wiser, and of very much greater experience than himself, had often pointed out, that there could be no greater danger to India than would arise from England usurping too much control over it, and so weakening alike the actual responsibility of the Government of India and the independence of action which had hitherto been used justly and wisely. He wished it to be understood that the whole question of the war was in no way prejudged by the Motion which he was about to move, the simple point involved in his proposal being that no shilling of the Indian Revenues could be expended for the purposes of the war until after the assent of Parliament had been obtained thereto. The House would next wish to know what was likely to be the cost of the war, and how far the Indian Exchequer was in a position to meet it. On this point he wished to give the fullest possible information; but in doing this, to the best of his ability, he must guard himself against being supposed to be able to give all the details. Only that morning he had received information from India by telegraph, and it was not so easy at short notice to understand and explain a communication of that kind as to deal with a more full and written despatch. If, therefore, any blame should attach to any one for any error in the statements he was able to make, let the House bestow the whole of it upon him. He was not able, as he had hoped to be, to give any statement as to what would probably be the monthly cost of the war—a point upon which the hon. and gallant Member for Sunderland (Sir Henry Havelock) had very reasonably and properly expressed a desire to have information. The Indian Government had made a calculation as to what the war was likely to cost; but their estimate did not extend beyond the present financial year, which closed on the 31st of March. It amounted in gross to £1,200,000; but a part of this sum would be carried forward to the next financial year, and the cost likely to be incurred before the 1st of April next was put down at £950,000, or say £1,000,000. He would now remind the House of the exact position, as far as he had been able to ascertain it, of the finances of India. In August last he stated that the Estimate of surplus, made up in the previous April, was £2,156,000 for the current year. Since that time many circumstances had occurred considerably to alter that position. In the first place, there had been a depreciation in the value of silver, which had caused, and was still causing, great anxiety; in the second place, there had been a large increase in the cost of the Army, owing to the enhanced prices of provisions; and, lastly, the depression of trade had very considerably reduced the receipts. Taking all these circumstances into consideration, he was compelled to reduce the Estimate of surplus at the close of the financial year from £2,156,000 to £1,550,000.

Mr. FAWCETT asked, whether in this Estimate both productive and unproductive Public Works were included?

Mr. E. STANHOPE was glad that the hon. Member had asked the question, because he had always succeeded in throwing the whole question of Indian finance into a muddle by mixing up matters of Revenue with questions relating to capital. The answer to the hon. Member's question was, that all ordinary Public Works were included in the Estimates; all extraordinary Public Works—called "productive," and in many cases likely soon to prove productive—were included in the capital expenditure. Did the hon. Member for Hackney suppose that we could maintain our position in India without engaging in any Public Works? The surplus being of the amount he had mentioned, it must be perfectly obvious that the Indian Government could pay the whole cost of the war during the present year without adding a shilling to the taxation or the Debt of the country; but it had been pointed out that we were pledged to form what was called a Famine Insurance Fund. His information on this point was very scanty, and he could not definitely state the amount we were bound to provide for the purpose out of the surplus of the year. We were bound to find £1,500,000, if the new taxes produced as much, towards the relief of famine, or insurance against future famines. A large sum had already been expended in the relief of famine, and the amount now due and to be provided out of the surplus to fulfil the famine insurance pledges was £700,000. These figures, he thought, contained nothing to cause very serious alarm. He knew the House would shortly hear a very desponding speech from the hon. Member for Hackney, and he would ask hon. Members not to believe either himself or the hon. Member for Hackney, but to look to the facts for themselves. As far as he was concerned, he had no desire to make any statement which would not bear the fullest examination; and he might say, further, that his statements were not made on his sole authority, but arose out of frequent conversations with the Indian Finance Minister, who was lately in this country, and whose services to Indian finance would, he hoped, before long be adequately appreciated. While he did not disguise from himself the dangers lying before them in the way of Indian finance, he could not admit that the state of affairs was at all unsatisfactory. During the past week the House had been discussing with some warmth, but in a most interesting manner, the question of the conduct of Her Majesty's Government towards Afghanistan. At the conclusion of that discussion the House, like the House of Lords, expressed, by a large majority, approval of the conduct of the Government. This being so, and the war having begun, he would only ask the House to accept the very wise advice tendered by the noble Lord opposite (the Marquess of Hartington), in the course of the debate to which he referred, and say that, the war having been begun, they were now prepared unanimously to strengthen the hands of Her Majesty's Government to bring it to a satisfactory and speedy conclusion. The hon. Member concluded by moving his Resolution.

Motion made, and Question proposed,

"That, Her Majesty having directed a Military expedition of Her Forces charged upon Indian Revenues to be despatched against the Ameer of Afghanistan, this House consents that the Revenues of India shall be applied to defray the expenses of the Military operations which may be carried on beyond the external frontiers of Her Majesty's Indian Possessions."—(*Mr. Edward Stanhope.*)

MR. FAWCETT, in rising to move, as an Amendment,

"That this House is of opinion that it would be unjust that the Revenues of India should be applied to defray the extraordinary expenses of the Military operations now being carried on against the Ameer of Afghanistan,"

said, although the speech of the Under Secretary of State offered him many temptations to go astray, he would endeavour, to the best of his ability, not to say a single word which should lead the House to loose its hold upon the issue which it now had to determine, and which he should be able to show was as important to England as it was to India. But there were some remarks in the closing sentences of the Under Secretary's speech which he could not pass over without some notice. He knew it would be said that the effect of passing this Resolution would be to stop Supplies, and to prevent the Government from bringing this war to an honourable and a speedy conclusion. Nothing could be more unjust than to attribute to him, and to those who were going to support him, any such intention to place the slightest obstacle in the path of the Government as regarded the expenditure hitherto incurred. Before Parliament met he declared to his constituents—and he repeated the declaration—that when war had once been commenced nothing was so idle as to suppose that the House of Commons could stop the expenditure which had been incurred. The duty of the Opposition when war was declared was stated with admirable force and admirable clearness by the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition, when he stated that, however anxious he might be to limit the scope of the war, he could be no party to any effort to stop the Supplies. The reason of this was obvious. The soldiers who were in the field must be paid; the stores procured or ordered must be paid for, unless the House was prepared to sanction an act of national repudiation; if bribes or promises of money had been offered to independent tribes, however greatly he might regret the fact on moral grounds, there was something which would be worse still—namely, a disregard of the promises so made. Therefore he desired, in the most emphatic way possible, to state that it was unfair, because they opposed this Resolution, to fasten upon them the responsibility of attempting to stop the Supplies. Indeed, so absolutely impossible, when a war had been once begun, was it to stop Supplies, that the House of Commons could practically exercise no control; and he felt this so strongly that he had no hesitation in saying that he did everything in his power to get Parliament summoned before war was declared; and he felt that had that been done, and if before the war they had only had the information they now possessed, this war would never have begun. The question they had to determine was not whether or not the money should be paid, but whether it should be paid by England, or, as was proposed by Her Majesty's Government, entirely by India. The Under Secretary had attempted to put a gloss upon the Amendment. The proposal of the Government amounted to this—that India should pay every sixpence of the ordinary and extraordinary expenses of the war, and that at some future time—it might be when the Greek

Kalends arrived—the Government would take it into their serious consideration whether the Imperial Revenues should not pay some portion of the cost. It was said his Amendment was not sufficiently specific. Then nothing would be easier than to introduce some words to make it more distinct. He did not, of course, propose that India should make money out of this war, or that the pay of soldiers, whom it would otherwise have to maintain, should be paid by England; but all that he did propose was to give a direct and absolute opposition to the Government. They declared that this war was for Imperial far more than Indian purposes; and therefore it was as unjust as it was ungenerous to come down and say—"India should pay everything, and some day we will take it into our consideration whether some slight contribution towards the expense ought not to be made by England." This question was in no sense a Party one, and he said this not as an ordinary common place, but because the debate in "another place" had shown that many of those who were most strong in their support of the Government most strongly objected to the entire charge being thrown upon India. The Under Secretary had spoken of the unanimous decision of the other branch of the Legislature; but, as a matter of fact, every single Peer who spoke, whether he was a supporter of the Government or not, and who referred to the proposal to throw the entire charge of the war upon the Revenues of India, unhesitatingly condemned it. Therefore, so far as the opinion of the other branch of the Legislature was ascertained, instead of being unanimous in approval, it was one of unanimous condemnation. Further, a specific fact would show that, however much they might differ as to the justice or the necessity of the war, some of those who were strongest in supporting it were foremost in declaring that it was a great Imperial undertaking, and that it could not be fairly treated as if it were a purely Indian war. Another remarkable fact was that there were three Peers in the House of Lords who had all held high office in India. Two of them (Lord Lawrence and Lord Northbrook) opposed the policy of the Government; while Lord Napier of Ettrick, a former Governor of Madras, cordially supported it both by speech and by vote. Yet Lord Napier was, if possible, still more opposed than Lords Lawrence and Northbrook to throwing the charge for the war upon the Revenues of India. He thought this showed that the issues they had to discuss were entirely and absolutely distinct from the issue discussed on Friday. The Under Secretary stated that nothing would be more unfortunate to the financial stability of India than that she should receive subventions from England, and in that view he entirely concurred. Now, he wished to discuss this question as one of absolute justice, and not as one of honour and generosity to India. He was accused of taking a gloomy view of Indian finances; but he never took so gloomy a view of them as to suppose that if they were judiciously and wisely administered, India could not pay all claims justly made upon her Revenues. He was not expressing that opinion for the first time. It would be remembered that when last September twelvemonth the suggestion appeared to gain much approval that a grant should be made out of the Imperial Revenues for the relief of the Famine in Madras and Bombay, so great was his objection to subventions that he felt it to be his painful duty to oppose the movement in question. He should have occasion to show how entirely the Under Secretary had misstated the condition of the finances of India, and to call attention to the heavy burdens which were placed upon the people of India. The question before them must, however, be determined by a consideration of the character of the war. If this were an Imperial war, England was bound, both legally and equitably, to pay for it; and he based this opinion on the 55th clause of the Government of India Act, which had been read by the Under Secretary of State for India, and which clause especially said that—

> "Except for preventing or repelling actnal invasion of Her Majesty's Indian Possessions, or under other sudden and urgent necessity, the Revenues of India shall not, without the consent of both Houses of Parliament, be applicable to defray the expenses of any Military operation carried on beyond the external frontiers of such possessions by Her Majesty's Forces charged upon such Revenues."

He did not raise the question whether it was legal to spend the Revenues of India before Parliament was summoned, which might be deferred to another occasion.

There could be no doubt of the meaning and purport of the clause, for it was introduced into the other House by the late Lord Derby, who had charge of the Bill, and who said he introduced it for the protection of the Revenues of India: that if the Indian forces were employed in a war beyond the Frontier of India it would be for Parliament to decide whether the war was an Imperial or an Indian one, and that if it were an Imperial war the money must be paid by England. This was the common-sense and the reasonable interpretation of the clause. What would be the position of the House and the country if it were possible to employ the Indian troops in Imperial matters, and maintain them out of the resources of India without first obtaining the sanction of Parliament? One of their greatest and most precious privileges would be swept away, and an Imperial war might be carried on without the sanction of the House, as the Government would be able to carry it on entirely out of the Revenues of India without asking for a single Vote of Supply. Therefore, this clause he considered as vital to the liberties of Parliament, and to the protection of the people of England. As to the interests of the people of India, nothing seemed to him more unfair than that the Government and their supporters, when they wanted to obtain approbation, represented to Parliament and the country that this war was a great Imperial war, and that, when on the other hand, they wanted to obtain money from the unfortunate Indian people, they should minimize the scope of the war, making it out to be a "mere Frontier war." They must have one thing or the other. For weeks the supporters of the Ministry on the platform and in the Press had been saying to their opponents—"You do not appreciate the true character of a great Imperial enterprize; you are such parochial politicians you won't understand that this is only a branch of the great Eastern Question." When Lord Lytton went to India he declared that, having had personal interviews on the subject with the Secretary of State for India, he went out determined to treat Indian Frontier questions as indivisible parts of a great Imperial subject, mainly to be determined by the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government. Nothing could be more distinct and precise than that. But supposing hon. Gentlemen opposite were to discover that this war did not simply concern a small cantonment, but that it was distinctly intended to maintain the influence and uphold the greatness of England in India, would not they be the first to say that nothing could be more mean, nothing more shabby than that the greatness and influence of England should be maintained by the money of the people of India? Lord Beaconsfield himself had said that this war was not merely one concerning the Khyber Pass, or some small cantonment at Dakka or Jellalabad; but that it was one which concerned the influence and character of England in Europe. How could they escape from that? If the war was to maintain the influence and character of England in Europe, could there be anything more unfair, more unworthy of this country than to use the moneys of the people of India to maintain that position and character, and to enable us to parade ourselves before the world as a great Imperial Power? Every cloud had a silver lining however, and in this matter there was something good. He did not think that that Imperialism would long survive, which was decked out in garments purchased with the money of starving ryots and the miserable peasantry of India. To support the view that India was prosperous enough to bear the cost of the war, it was said that when he spoke of Indian finances, he produced confusion by deducting extraordinary expenditure from the estimated surplus; but in doing so he was supported by the highest financial authorities in England, and it was almost a financial truism to assert that extraordinary Budgets and extraordinary expenditure had been in numerous instances the ready resort of embarrassed European Powers. In this case he asserted—first, that there was no surplus at all; secondly, that the money about to be taken was money that had been appropriated as a Famine Fund, and was obtained by some of the most onerous taxes ever imposed upon the Indian people; and, thirdly, that this was the most extraordinary proposal ever brought forward, as it was intended to show that India was so rich and England so poor that England must come like a suppliant pauper and ask India to relieve her in her necessities, and this was done by a Ministry which wanted to exhibit their country's influence and power. To make India pay for this war, instead of exhibiting England as a great European Power, would exhibit her as a mean, grasping, and selfish nation. He was not objecting now to expenditure on Public Works; but he contended that in order to arrive at the true financial position of India, that expenditure must be considered in estimating the surplus. To spend on Public Works £3,000,000 or £4,000,000, borrowed at 4½ per cent, and receive a return of ½ per cent was like a landowner forgetting that he had spent £10,000 on farm buildings. The late Secretary of State for India had stated that millions had been spent upon irrigation works in Bengal, borrowed at 4½ and 5 per cent, and that it was yielding to the Government a return of only ½ per cent per annum. What was the good of ignoring the fact? It was beyond any possibility of dispute that this £1,200,000, which the Government was now about to apply to the purposes of the war, was money raised for a distinct object. It was raised by enormous taxation to provide a security against famine; but the latest news from India was that the public works in Bombay were to be stopped—that water which was to have been brought to the parched land was not to be brought; and why? Because the Government had not the courage to come to the House and ask for a special Vote. This money had been obtained by imposing a tax on incomes of 4*s*. a week, and raising the salt duty by 40 per cent on the famine-stricken people of Bombay and Madras. In the levying of these taxes they must remember that there were no exemptions on incomes of £150 a-year as in this country, the tax reaching £10 a-year. True, there were some exemptions in the case of the military and other professional men, Civil servants, and others, who went to the country clamouring for war, knowing full well that they would not have to pay for it, that part of the duty falling on poor carpenters and day-labourers. And the result of this appropriation of Indian money to Imperial purposes, according to the latest news from India, which the Under Secretary of State had judiciously avoided alluding to, was that almost all public works in Bombay were to be stopped—works which the Government themselves had declared to be necessary for the prevention of famine. They knew that not long ago no less than 2,000,000 of Indian people died from the most terrible of all deaths in Madras and Bombay; and what was the first news they heard when just able to lift their heads from the suffering which laid them low? That the salt duty had been increased to 40 per cent. They accepted that strain in calmness, in order to protect their country in future years from the terrible famines which came upon it; but did the people of this country think that the people of India would learn with calmness that it was intended to use that money to maintain our influence and greatness? The Government could not escape from the fact that the present Indian surplus had been obtained from the two taxes which he had described, and Lord Salisbury knew that taking this money meant taking it from the actually starving. In a speech on the subject of the Indian Famine, Lord Salisbury said—

> "The recent mortality and distress were not due so much to a want of food or to a want of means of bringing that food to the people, but that distress and mortality were far more due to the people not having the means of buying food when it was brought within their reach."

After such a statement as that, he proposed to take still more from these unfortunate people in order to enable himself to perorate in "another place" about our great Imperial policy, and the magnificent position occupied by England under the auspices of the present Government. The House should remember that the expenditure of £1,000,000 of Indian money was far more serious than the spending of £20,000,000 of English money. Though he was fully aware of the distressed condition of England at the present, he considered that that was the relative position. No doubt, additional taxation in England meant a diminution in the comforts of the people, and would be a serious burden upon many; but such taxation as he had indicated in India was altogether of a worse character. The financial condition of India had been so desperate that the Government did not know how to raise an additional £1,000,000. If they did, why were they so unjust as to impose such taxation as he had alluded to last year?

The only justification of the Government policy, then, was that the money must be forthcoming, and this was the only way in which it could be obtained. With regard to precedent, it was true that the former Afghan War was borne out of Indian Revenues; but two blacks did not make a white. The circumstances of that time were different from those of the present. The former war was not professedly undertaken as an Imperial enterprize; and India had a protection at the time of the East India Company, which she did not possess now. An authority whom hon. Members opposite would respect, speaking of that war, said—"If it had been undertaken to check Russia or to assert the Imperial position of England in Europe, he should like to know how England could possibly refuse to pay the bill?" The speaker was no less a person than Lord Beaconsfield, the present Prime Minister. Another point which had been lost sight of was that, even if the Resolution of the Under Secretary of State were rejected, a great part of the charges connected with the war must necessarily fall on India and not on England. If the war expenses came to £5,000,000, it would represent only an addition of about £160,000 per annum to England; but the expense to India in any case should be carefully considered. Lord Lawrence, and his Council, in a memorable despatch, said the "forward policy" would paralyze the finances of India. That despatch was important, not only considering the high authority from which it proceeded, but because it was endorsed by the present Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Government of which he was a Member. Lord Sandhurst, distinguished alike as a financier and soldier, said the forward policy would cost India not less than from £3,000,000 to £4,000,000 a-year. On Tuesday last the Under Secretary of State for India told them that before the war had lasted one month, the Native Army of India had been increased by 15,000 men. That increase amounted to about 12 per cent; and there was not a military authority, in the House or out of it, who would not be prepared to say that a proportionate increase of European officers would also be necessary. That would involve at least £1,500,000 a-year. If India was to bear the burden how was the money to be provided? Would they come forward with proposals to extend the income tax from incomes of 4*s.* a-week to incomes of 2*s.* a-week? Were they prepared to increase the salt tax from 40 per cent to 80 per cent? Increase of taxation in India was not to be regarded as a mere financial question; it was a political question of the greatest moment. Lord Mayo had said that an increase of taxation would produce discontent, which would create dangers the magnitude of which could not be exaggerated. Before the Committee last Session Lord Northbrook was asked a question with reference to this statement, and he said that, after careful inquiries, he had come to the conclusion that Lord Mayo was right. He (Mr. Fawcett) asked for justice, not for generosity, for India. It was a most serious thing for the House to throw on India the entire expense of this war—at any rate, until the Government were in a frame of mind to suggest some different proposal. It might appear hard to suggest that additional burdens should be thrown on England when trade was bad, employment scarce, and thousands could not find the means of maintenance. He believed the depression of trade would continue for some time longer. It was hopeless to look for a revival of industrial prosperity in the midst of wars and rumours of wars, and at a time when no one knew what new entanglement or fresh complication to-morrow might bring. He represented a district (Hackney) upon which additional taxation would fall as heavily, if not more heavily than upon others. No one could suppose that the inhabitants of the East End of London were anxious for additional burdens; but grievously as they would feel it, they would sooner bear it than be exposed to the reproach that they were relieved of the expense of maintaining England's influence and character by the starving millions of India. The Government were certainly not pursuing a popular course; it was a course characterized by meanness and the absence of everything like generosity, and he believed it would be repudiated by every constituency in the Kingdom. India, it was said, should not be treated in that House from a Party point of view, and if he thought of it solely as a Party question he would not attempt to prevent the Government doing as they desired; but to maintain our position in

India we must, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer said, be just and strong, but strength without justice was nothing but despotism. His only desire was that this question should be considered as one of strict justice, not of generosity to India, and on principles laid down by that distinguished statesman, the Leader of the Constitutional—not the Imperial—Party, the late Lord Derby—namely, that, if an Imperial war, the charge ought to be borne by England; if solely, or chiefly, an Indian war, the charge ought to be borne by India. If the charge was to be apportioned between England and India, then why did not the Government come forward and let the House know what portion England and what portion India was to bear? If Her Majesty's Government would not produce such an estimate, they would set Parliamentary control at defiance. It was stated the other evening by the Secretary of State for India that it was not necessary to consult his Council on the subject; and if the House were to pass this Resolution it would virtually give the Secretary of State for India power to draw to an unlimited extent on the Revenues of India for the purpose of carrying on this war. This was a question which involved one of privilege, and if the Supporters of the Government asserted that it was never intended to allow India to bear the whole expense, he hoped some Member on the front Opposition Bench would rise and assert the Constitutional principle that a war could not be carried on without some Vote of Supply. As far as they were given to understand at present, if the cost of the war did not exceed £1,200,000, the whole of it would be borne by India. Feeling that the proposal of the Government would be looked on throughout India, as it would be in England, as one which could not be defended on any considerations of generosity or justice, he would ask the House to reject it. The hon. Gentleman concluded by moving his Amendment.

Mr. GLADSTONE: I rise to second the Amendment of my hon. Friend, not regarding it as a Party question, but still regarding it as of great importance with reference to Parliamentary and Constitutional interests. I likewise think it of serious moment as to the basis on which we are to deal with India. The Under Secretary of State for India assumed in his speech that the Amendment was to exclude India from paying any part of the ordinary expenditure on the Military forces employed in the expedition against Afghanistan. That certainly is not my understanding of the Amendment, and my hon. Friend (Mr. Fawcett) has now altered the wording of it so as to make it more clear and explicit on that point. Therefore, it should be understood by the House that the Amendment intends to object to the charge to India, on this occasion, of war expenses connected with the expedition against Afghanistan. Now, Sir, with respect to the Motion itself, I do not think the Under Secretary of State satisfactorily explained to the House the great importance of the Vote we are called upon to give. He has laid before us an Estimate, which he says is a very inadequate one, and one which I will say is a very sanguine one. He says that it was up to the 1st of April; but the Vote he calls upon us to give is not limited to the 1st of April at all. The Motion thus modestly proposed by him is a Motion by which the House is invited to part with its entire control over the direction of the war, and whatever expense is incurred in connection with it. I do not know why that most important aspect of the question was never presented to us by the Under Secretary of State. On another subject I hold that the statement of the hon. Gentleman, which had all the appearance of being clear, ought to be cleared up. It is as to the bearing of this expenditure upon the finances of India in their present condition. According to the figures given by the Under Secretary of State, I understand the state of the case to be this—He says he had a surplus of £2,000,000. Unhappily, owing to various circumstances, he now stands worse by £600,000 than he did at the time when he stated to the House that amount as the estimate of his surplus. So from £2,000,000 we have got to £1,400,000.

Mr. E. STANHOPE: It was originally £2,156,000.

Mr. GLADSTONE: But I think that by some preliminary amputation it was reduced to £2,000,000.

Mr. E. STANHOPE: My original estimated surplus was £2,156,000. I then said it was likely to be reduced by the reduction of the salt duty to

£2,000,000. Since then it has been reduced, by other circumstances, to £1,550,000.

MR. GLADSTONE: Out of that sum, as explained by my hon. Friend, £1,500,000 is pledged to a Famine Insurance Fund. My hon. Friend has, indeed, said that only £700,000 remains due to the Famine Insurance Fund; if so, it must be because he has already spent £800,000 upon famine. If so, out of what fund is my hon. Friend to pay the £900,000 which, according to his very sanguine Estimate, is to be the charge for the war down to the end of the present financial year? On the one side my hon. Friend has got to his credit £1,550,000. On the other side he has applied £800,000, and is to apply £700,000 more to the Famine Insurance Fund.

MR. E. STANHOPE: I did not give the exact figures. So far as I was able to give the result, I said there remained due about £700,000 out of this Fund of £1,550,000.

MR. GLADSTONE: I am aware my hon. Friend has said that £800,000 has been already spent, and that £700,000 will be expended. But if his surplus is £1,550,000, and he has already spent out of that £800,000——

MR. E. STANHOPE: It was spent on the Famine, before we had the surplus at all. In estimating the expenditure for the year 1878-9, I included £550,000 for the relief of Famine. It was only when the expenditure had been reckoned upon that we arrived at the surplus.

MR. GLADSTONE: My hon. Friend states that £550,000 out of the £800,000 had been provided for. How does he make up his £1,000,000?

MR. E. STANHOPE: I am very reluctant to rise again, but the questions are put direct to me. I can hardly explain the matter fully in this way. The difference is only something like £200,000, and I believe I can give the right hon. Gentleman a satisfactory explanation.

MR. GLADSTONE: I quite agree as to the inconvenience of trying to settle these matters by a discussion across the Table. Probably some Member of the Government will, as early as possible in the debate, give us the exact figures, so that those who follow me may precisely understand the situation. I will not detain the House with any further remarks upon this part of the case; but I must say some words on the subject of the Act of 1858, under which it appears that Her Majesty's Government consider they are performing a legal and Constitutional duty. I stated on a former occasion that, in my view of the case, the Government had already broken the Act of Parliament. That is my clear and deliberate opinion. In my view, it was the purpose of this clause to require the preliminary consent of Parliament to the issue of Indian money for the purpose of operations carried on by the Forces charged upon India beyond the Indian Frontier, except in certain special cases which were very carefully defined. It was, in fact, to prevent the use of Indian money for military operations. I remember this, for I myself was the author of the clause; and the present Lord Derby, who was Secretary of State for India at the time, completely concurred with me as to its object. It is mistakenly supposed that an essential change was made in the operation of the clause by the House of Lords; but it was nothing of the kind. It was not so in my view, and it was not so in the view of Her Majesty's Government of that day, who communicated with me upon the alteration before it took place, and who obtained my consent. I strongly felt that to place the restraining power of Parliament on the question of finance was a far better mode of proceeding than to place it in the shape of an absolute veto upon the war, though the Act of Mr. Pitt had already limited the Prerogative of the Crown by a stringent prohibition going far beyond anything I ever proposed. The real truth of the case is this—that that clause, as regards its main purpose, has been completely destroyed by the action of Her Majesty's Government. I am not finding fault with the Government, as distinguished from the majority of this House; but I do say that the construction of the Government, which has been supported by the majority of the House, is a destruction of the clause, so far as the main purpose of the clause is concerned. Those who refer to the debates will find that there were evidently two objects in contemplation—one to prevent, under the new system, any undue charge upon the Revenues of India; and the object of the clause is not brought out into great prominence in the debate, because we certainly believed that we were reposing in the hands of the Indian Council far more effective checks upon Indian military expenditure than those checks have been allowed to become in practice. But the main object of the clause was to restrain the action of the Executive Government in using the Indian Revenues for military purposes. I will read a few words from a speech by the late Lord Derby in the House of Lords. He said—

> "The same constitutional check, therefore, was imposed on the Crown with regard to troops serving in India which was imposed with respect to troops serving in every other part of the globe. If the clause were not agreed to, it would be perfectly competent for any unconstitutional Sovereign"—or unconstitutional Minister—"to employ the whole of the Revenues and troops of India for any purpose which the Crown might direct, without the necessity of going to Parliament for the advance of a single shilling."—[3 *Hansard*, cli. 1697-8.]

Clearly what Lord Derby contemplated was a preliminary consent. What is any consent but a preliminary consent? It is stated that—

> "The Revenues of India shall not, in the case of the war now pending, be applicable to defray the expenses of military operations in Afghanistan."

But they have been applied, and their application has been in course of operation ever since this military expedition was ordered. What is the answer? "Oh! this is a temporary operation, and does not require, therefore, that they shall be permanently charged to the Indian Revenues." But the Act of Parliament says nothing about "temporary operations." It says "shall not be used to defray." What is the usual meaning of the term "defray?" I will refer the House to that question, which any modern political dictionary will enable us to answer. It can only mean one of two things—either as to the issue of the money from the Exchequer, or to its ultimate allocation by authority on the final account, and in this Act there is not the least doubt that it refers to advancing the money. The hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State states that the Revenues have not been applied to defray these charges. I see the hon. Gentleman shakes his head; but I should like to know have Indian monies been applied or not? In this case I think I am entitled to an answer to that question. The Act of Parliament says they shall not be applicable; and Her Majesty's Government and their Friends have their own construction of the Act of Parliament. I want to know whether they have been applied or not. It is a singular thing that on the most elementary points of knowledge it is sometimes very difficult to extract information. In my opinion, the issue of the money is the only rational construction of the word "defray." Therefore, I have not the smallest doubt that the Act of Parliament has been broken by the application which has taken place, to a large extent, without the consent of either House of Parliament. Let us observe the practical effect of this. It destroys by far the more important of the two modes in which Parliament can act against a war of which it does not approve. The object of the clause, according to my view, was to enable Parliament to prevent such a war. And prevention is the mode by which Parliament ought to operate in any war of which it disapproves. I do not recollect any war in which this country was engaged for many years without the consent of Parliament. I do not remember any case in which the Government has gone forward to so great an extent without being well assured of the consent of the nation and the sanction of the people. I know we are in a condition where it does not matter to the Government one rush whether we approve or not. If instead of a minority we were a majority, if instead of 227 we were 328, we should have no power to resist, because it would not be in our hands, except by the exercise of that which, happily, is not yet taken from the House of Commons—what may be done I cannot say — namely, a Vote of Censure of Her Majesty's Government. I frankly admit that their conduct in bringing the Indian troops to Malta has been completely covered by the votes of the majority of this House; but we are left in this predicament—when war has been declared we know we cannot stop the Supplies or order the stoppage of the war, so we are reduced to the unsatisfactory alternative of censuring the Government who made the war. It is not desirable that we should sit here passing Votes of Censure on the Gentlemen who form the Executive Government. What we want is the power to stop mischievous wars; and I maintain that the power which Parliament gave us by the Act of Parliament for this purpose has been taken away by the action of Her Majesty's Ministers, and the sanction given to that action by the present Parliament. The object I intend to state is plain and palpable. The Government is entrusted with the disposal of the Home Army, but in that disposal it is restrained by the Votes for the Army in this House and the passing of the Mutiny Act; but over and above this restraint a wise Government, and Tory Governments in the days when they were wise—or at least when they were wiser—thought fit to secure the concurrence of Parliament, as Mr. Canning did in the case of sending his troops to Lisbon in 1826. Such, then, is the predicament, that while as regards the Home Army the statutory and customary regulations which have been laid down, and which have been found to work well, in India you have an independent and extraneous Army, over which there is no statutory limitations whatever, except those which are imposed by the Indian Government Act. The 55th clause has now been rendered utterly null and worthless, so far as regards its main object, with reference to restraining the Prerogative of the Crown. When this question was under discussion in the House of Lords, in 1858, Lord Ellenborough pointed out that, under the old system, it was within the power of the East India Directors to plant their foot and to say—"We will not give you money for making such and such a war;" but, according to the practice which now prevails, that restraint, which was formerly embodied in the Charter of the Company, has now been removed. The powers of the Council for restraining military expenditure are utterly null and futile, and the power reserved to Parliament resolves itself into this—that after the thing has been done and the charge incurred, the Government come down and ask for sanction to an expenditure which it is a great deal too late to recall. But, although the main purpose of the law has thus been frustrated, and although the Government have now at their disposal anywhere, except in the United Kingdom—and God forbid that wars should be carried on in the United Kingdom, they have not been carried on for many centuries — according to their doctrines, the doctrine of this Parliament, and the doctrine of the Law Officers opposite, 180,000 men and a Revenue of between £50,000,000 and £60,000,000, totally free from antecedent Parliamentary control, and liable to be employed for purposes of which Parliament has no knowledge whatever, yet there remains this—that, when in the good and gracious pleasure of the Government they determine it is right to submit to us a Motion, under the 54th clause of the Act, we have something to consider of the case as it stands between England and India. And what is the case as it has been put by the hon. Gentleman. He says — "I am not at all asking you to give a final pledge as to the imposition of this charge. Anybody may, in perfect consistency with the Motion which I now ask you to adopt, come forward and propose that the charge shall not be borne by India, but shall be met, if the House is willing, out of British Revenues." He seemed to imply that it was open to the Government to make some proposal of that kind. Well, I think we are entitled to know whether, so far as the Government are concerned, this is a definitive proposal to lay the expenses of the war upon India; or whether it is a proposal to hold over the whole question until they may find it more convenient to make some final proposal on the subject? I say it ought not to be held over; there is no reason for holding it over. We ought to decide, and decide now, whether India or England is to bear this charge. But how does the doctrine of the Secretary of State suit the terms of the Act of Parliament? What is the meaning of the word "defray" in his Resolution? We consent to defray the charges of this military expedition. I presume that they have not been defrayed as yet. The whole doctrine of the Government has been in contrariety to the intention of the law that the word "defray" does not mean the first expenditure, but that it does mean the ultimate imposition of the charges. Then what does the Resolution mean? The hon. Gentleman says it does not mean the final imposition of the charge. Well, if I understand it correctly, it means nothing at all; because, according to him, it does not give a final consent to spending the money, and it does not give the prior sanction to advancing the money, because that has been done already. Now, I admit the force of what fell from the Under Secretary of State in regard to the very serious and grave nature of the question as to the payment of Indian wars out of Indian, or other than Indian, Revenues. We have hitherto had a tolerable understanding on the subject. Up to the time of the Indian Government Act the East India Company were the official and proper defenders—and they were not very ineffective defenders—of Indian interests in such matters. Since the Indian Government Act I do not know that there has been any case which the Members of the House would look back upon as a case involving matter of scandal or gross disagreement. In the matter of the Abyssinian War, what was done was done with the full consent of Parliament. I am not willing to lay down any new doctrine whatever with regard to the payment of Indian or Eastern wars out of Indian or British money. I look at this case simply and solely by itself, as it stands upon its own grounds, and to draw from it no authority or to establish by it any precedent, excepting a precedent applicable to an instance which might in every substantial and important particular correspond. The Under Secretary of State says—"India has a great interest in this war." India, indeed, has a very great interest in it, just as a man has a great interest in the gambling table, in which he ruins himself. India has a ruinously heavy interest, I am afraid, in this war. The Under Secretary of State considers that this war is beneficial to India. In that case I cannot be surprised that he should say India ought to pay for it; but he ought to say so plainly, and not come down to the House on the part of the Government, when hostilities have advanced to a certain point, and ask you to come to a certain Resolution which will satisfy the law, but leaving it an open question as to who is really to pay for the war. That is not the course—that is not the language—of a man who has a firm conviction on any part of the question. If he really believes that the Russian Mission was received by the Ameer under circumstances which gave it a hostile character, and that Shere Ali rejected the British Mission with insult, he ought not now to be shirking the financial question and difficulty of the day; he ought not to leave it to the future to be solved, but he ought to be facing it like a man, and telling us how the expenses of the war are really to be met. My opinion is a very simple one. I consider that this war is an unjust, a guilty, an unreasonable, and an impolitic war—one of mischief to the fame of England—one of mischief to the future of India. God grant that its scope may be limited, and its issues speedy! so that the range within which these condemnatory epithets are applicable may be as narrow as possible; but, with that view of the war, I find myself thus circumstanced—the Indian people have had nothing to do with this war; they are wholly guiltless; they wash their hands in innocence, so far as this war is concerned. They have no Representative here, or elsewhere. The very powers which the law once gave to defend them, when the East India Company existed, have either been taken away by Parliament, or nullified by the action of the Government and the vote of the House of Commons. Under these circumstances, seeing a war before me to which I am compelled reluctantly to attach such a character as that, I ask myself, can I bring myself to vote that the expenses of this struggle, which is wholly our act, shall be placed upon India? I say, "No;" and I will go freely into any assembly of Englishmen and tell them I say "No," and appeal to them whether they will not say "No" also. Nay, I am persuaded—such is my opinion of their generosity—that when they thoroughly understand the facts of the case, they will say distinctly that those who make the war should pay for the war. Those who make war for purposes, whether they be or be not Indian purposes, are the right persons upon whom should rest finally the charges. I am not surprised that there is a difference of opinion upon this subject. It is a very puzzling one. Sir, I have heard of some who are disposed to say—"We have made our protest against the war, and, having done so, we will not now proceed to place the burden of it upon the people of England." Yes; but we, the minority, unfortunately do not for the time—although some day, perhaps, we hope we shall—represent the people of England. The people of England have chosen a certain majority. They have chosen to constitute a certain Government, which has chosen to make a certain war entailing certain charges; but with the making of that majority and the making of that war the people of India had nothing whatever to do. It is the people of England who have had all the glory and all the advantage which have resulted from the destruction of the late Government and the accession to Office of the present Administration, and it is they who must take the *pros* and the *cons*, and who must be content, after having reaped benefits so immeasurable, to encounter the disadvantage of meeting charges which undoubtedly the existing Administration will leave behind it as a legacy to posterity.

Amendment proposed,

To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "this House is of opinion that it would be unjust that the Revenues of India should be applied to defray the extraordinary expenses of the Military operations now being carried on against the Ameer of Afghanistan,"—(*Mr. Fawcett*,)

—instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir JOHN HOLKER) said, that although the right hon. Gentleman had used extremely strong language with reference to the war in which we were engaged with Afghanistan, denouncing it as unjust and impolitic, a large majority of the House had declared it to be their opinion that it was a war both necessary and just, and which, if waged successfully, would result in very great advantage to India. That majority might, of course, be entirely in error, and that was the view of the right hon. Gentleman, who, no doubt, thought that if he had an opportunity of appealing from them to the constituencies he would be able to convince the country that they were wrong. But he would remind the right hon. Gentleman that he had already brought to bear on the subject all his great knowledge and ripe experience, and all the powers of his impassioned eloquence; that he had been supported by the forcible arguments of other hon. Members; and yet that the war had been pronounced by the House, as he had already stated, to be just and necessary. If that were so, he, for one, could not see how it could be considered unfair that India, which would be greatly benefited by the war, should be called upon to pay some portion of the cost of its prosecution. He had not, however, risen to discuss that point at all, because it hardly came within his sphere; and there were in the House hon. Members who were far more competent to pronounce an opinion whether it was right and proper that India should bear a part of the expenses of prosecuting the war or not. He rose chiefly for the purpose of combating the views which had been put forward by the right hon. Gentleman with respect to the construction of the Act of Parliament with which the House had now to deal. He at once admitted that there were difficulties in the construction of this Act, whichever way they looked at it, and that it was not easy to arrive at what the intention of the Legislature was in framing it; but this was true of many other Acts passed by both Conservative and Liberal Governments. However, he understood the contention of the right hon. Gentleman to be, that before the Revenues of India could be made applicable to defraying the cost of the war, the consent of the two Houses of Parliament should be obtained before the war began. [Mr. GLADSTONE assented.] He was glad to have stated the contention of the right hon. Gentleman correctly. Now, that was a contention which turned on the construction of the 54th and 55th sections of the Act, in the first of which it was set forth that when an order was sent to India directing the actual commencement of hostilities, the fact of such an order having been sent should be communicated to both Houses of Parliament within three months after the sending of the order if Parliament happened to be sitting, and, if not, within one month after it next met. Then came the second section, where it was stated that, except to prevent actual invasion, or to meet some other sudden and urgent emergency, the Revenues of India should not be made applicable to meet the expenses of a war unless with the approval of both Houses of Parliament. Taking those two sections together, it was impossible to say that they meant what the right hon. Gentleman had laid down. The Act contemplated the commencement of a war before Parliament could be, or need be, acquainted with the fact, and no war could be carried on without expenses being incurred day by day. Then if a war might be commenced before the fact was communicated to Parliament, expenses must have been going on from time to time up to the date when such a communication was made ; and one would think that it would be almost necessary that some part of the cost of that war would have to be defrayed. If that were so, how would it be possible, he would ask, to obtain the consent of Parliament to that expenditure before the war commenced? A war might be begun when Parliament was not sitting and might be carried on for a considerable time before Parliament met; and yet it was contended that a single shilling of the cost could not be charged on the Revenues of India unless the prior sanction of the Legislature had been obtained. That appeared to him to be a completely erroneous view of the question. In his opinion, section 55 of the Act was quite as applicable to the case of ratification by both Houses of Parliament as to that in which the previous sanction of both Houses had been obtained. As the right hon. Gentleman was aware, there was a maxim in law, as well as in politics, to the effect that ratification dated back, and was equivalent to prior consent and direction. As in the present instance, if both Houses chose to consent by Resolution to a war being carried on that amounted to ratification, went back to the commencement of the war, and was equivalent to a prior direction by both Houses. He saw the difficulty presented by the right hon. Gentleman. Supposing a war had been waged some time and the Revenues of India had been applied to pay the expenses, and that when the Government appealed to Parliament both Houses refused to sanction such application, those who so applied them might, he admitted, find themselves involved in a difficulty. There was no doubt of that difficulty, which arose out of the construction of the Act of Parliament; but there was, on the other hand, a much greater difficulty if the view taken by the right hon. Gentleman were correct, and that was that if the necessity for war existed great disadvantage might result from not commencing it at once. The expediency of beginning it before Parliament could be consulted was, therefore, contemplated by the Legislature; and if it was to be so begun, the Government must depend upon the ratification of their act when Parliament assembled. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich disputed the construction put upon the Act by the Government and the Law Officers of the Crown ; but he did not know that the Law Officers of the Crown had had much to say with respect to it. The right hon. Gentleman had spoken as if the Law Officers of the Crown had delivered themselves upon this subject on previous occasions. For his own part, he did not say that they had; but even if they had, it did not follow that any opinion they might have expressed was the right one. Then the right hon. Gentleman said that the Government might avoid calling Parliament together. But they could not avoid coming to Parliament unless they wanted to be turned out for something which was contrary to law and the Constitution; because they were obliged within three months of the commencement of hostilities, if Parliament was sitting, or, if not, within a month after Parliament was summoned, to come down and explain the whole business to Parliament, and get the consent of both Houses to their proceedings. For these reasons, although admitting that the right hon. Gentleman had with great ingenuity raised difficulties, and shown that there might be some inconvenience, yet he contended, with as much confidence as it was in his nature to possess, that the view of the right hon. Gentleman was not the correct one ; but that the true construction of the two Acts of Parliament taken together was this—that the two Houses of Parliament might, by consent given after war had been commenced, ratify that which had been done, and that such ratification was equivalent to prior sanction.

Sir GEORGE BOWYER said, it seemed to him that the argument of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich would lead to the conclusion that the Prerogative of the Crown in declaring war must be either taken away altogether or practically annulled by making Parliament participate in it. The right hon. Gentleman had said that when war was declared without the knowledge of Parliament the only remedy was a Vote of Censure upon Ministers, and that this was utterly unsatisfactory. But this was the Constitution of the country. A Vote of Censure would be followed by removal from Office or impeachment. If those checks were not sufficient, a previous restraint would have to be put upon the Prerogative of the Crown. Parliament was not always sitting, and it might be of the utmost importance to declare war before it was possible to summon it; and, therefore, the Prerogative of declaring war had been vested in the Crown and its Advisers, subject to the *ex post facto* control of Parliament. This was a fundamental principle of the Constitution. Was the right hon. Gentleman prepared to bring in a Bill to deprive the Crown of the power of declaring war without the consent of Parliament? And, if so, what did he mean by Parliament? Was it both Houses, or one only? He ventured to say that the right hon. Gentleman would not dare to face such an undertaking, which would effect a fundamental change in the Constitution of the country. This, however, would be the logical conclusion to which his argument would lead. The right hon. Gentleman had dwelt upon the 55th clause of the Act of Parliament; but that clause supported the Constitutional view. It put a restriction upon the use of the Indian Revenue, and not upon the use of the Indian troops; and even with respect to the application of the Revenue, it did not insist upon a previous consent of Parliament. The consent of Parliament might be given afterwards, in which case it had a retrospective effect, and was equivalent to a previous consent. *Rati habitio retro trahitur et mandato equiparatur.* It was not a new thing, as the right hon. Gentleman seemed to suppose, for Indian Revenue to be so applied without the previous consent of Parliament. When the Indian troops were brought to Malta the expense was, in the first instance, borne by the Indian Revenue, although it was afterwards recouped by England. The right hon. Gentleman had said a great deal upon the meaning of the word "defray;" but it seemed to him that he had been in error. The word "defray" was not an advance or loan, but a final payment. It could not be said, for instance, that the expense of bringing the Indian troops to Malta was defrayed by the Indian Revenue, because it had been recouped by England. A portion of the money in the present war with Afghanistan had been paid out of the Indian Revenue without the knowledge of Parliament; but Parliament, he had no doubt, would consent to that which had been done, and this consent would be equivalent to an original authorization. But the expense had not been defrayed by India until it had been decided that the payment was a final one. It had been maintained by the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett) that the present war was an Imperial and not an Indian war, and therefore that it ought to be paid for by England. There was a certain amount of speciousness in that argument; but the hon. Gentleman had not laid down any distinct principle to guide them upon this matter. Doubtless this war had its Imperial aspect as undertaken for the preservation of the integrity of the Empire; but it was mainly an Indian war, and, as such, India ought to pay for it. Had this country been in a high state of prosperity, and a handsome surplus was to be expected at the end of the financial year, he should have had no objection, as a mere matter of generosity, to our having taken upon ourselves a considerable portion of the expenditure incurred for the purposes of the war. But, as matters stood, trade being in a very depressed state, and a deficit, instead of a surplus, looming in the future, we should not be justified in taking any additional burdens gratuitously upon ourselves. He considered there had been a want of reality in the debates that had taken place with reference to the war. The war was to be dealt with as a fact; but the causes were matters of history and political speculation. The true reason why the Opposition had refrained from moving an Amendment to the Address was because they felt that certain defeat must result from adopting such a course. The effect of the Amendment, if carried, must have caused our withdrawal from the war, which would have been a great discouragement to our Army, and have been positively disastrous to our rule in India. The hon. Baronet was proceeding to discuss the Law of Nations with regard to war, when——

Mr. T. CAVE rose to Order, and asked whether the remarks of the hon. Baronet were applicable, as the question under discussion was who was to pay for the war, not whether it was justifiable or not. That question was discussed last week.

Sir GEORGE BOWYER said, that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich had gone at some length into the matter, and he was simply answering the right hon. Gentleman. He (Sir George Bowyer) argued that the right to send a friendly Embassy to discuss matters with a foreign State was an indefeasible right, resting not merely on authority, but on the interests of mankind and the interests of peace. The refusal of that right to us by the Ameer, while conceding it to a rival Power, clearly gave us a cause of war against him. He also contended that the allegation, that due time had not been allowed the Ameer to give proper orders for the reception of our Mission, was refuted by the evidence contained in the official Correspondence, as was also the charge that the Government had excited the hostility of Shere Ali by changing their policy. The policy of the Indian Government had not been changed, although there had been a change in the application of that policy, which was required by a material alteration in circumstances. The advance of Russia in Central Asia and her position in regard to Afghanistan had become so menacing as to justify Lord Salisbury in desiring to place British Agents not at Cabul, but in certain other parts of the Ameer's territory; and if those Agents had been received, they would not have interfered with the authority or the independence of the Ameer, but might have cleared up those difficulties between him and our Government which might, from time to time, have arisen. The hon. and learned Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt) was very unfair the other night in his accusation against Lord Salisbury.

Mr. SPEAKER reminded the hon. Baronet that in referring to what had taken place in a debate during the present Session of Parliament he was quite out of Order.

Sir GEORGE BOWYER said, he would bow to the Speaker's authority. It had been stated somewhere that Lord Salisbury had made use of the words "create an opportunity." What Lord Salisbury plainly meant was that, as a misunderstanding existed, an opportunity should be found or made for explaining matters and clearing away misconceptions. That was perfectly fair and honourable, and what anyone would do in private life, without being reproached with acting in a tortuous or improper manner. All who knew Lord Salisbury must be well aware that he could never have intended anything unfair, or anything that was not English and straightforward. He had no doubt the campaign would end successfully; and the question—a very difficult one—would arise, what were they to do then? It would require wisdom and statesmanship to solve that question; but he confidently hoped that the Government would reject all idea of annexation. To maintain an army in Afghanistan to keep in order its very unruly and warlike population, would cost us in men and money more than that country was worth. To make war for the sake of getting possession of part of a neighbour's territory would be unjust; but, being now at war—justly as he thought—we had a right to exact such conditions as would secure our Frontier and prevent the recurrence of danger in future. We might seek, he would not say the rectification, but the improvement of our Frontier. He deprecated a Frontier that would require an army of 100,000 men to guard it. What we wanted was possession of certain strategical points which, while encroaching very slightly on the Ameer's territory, would enable us with an army of 5,000 men to defend our Frontier He trusted the Government would confine themselves to that, and would have every consideration for the Ameer, who had not shown himself to be a bad man in any way, and who had been placed in a difficult position between two great Powers. If they took that course, the end of that campaign would be "peace with honour."

Mr. LAING said, that having been in India, and seen something of the real conditions of that mighty Empire, it was with sadness that he found two-thirds of the time in this discussion of a great question of policy taken up with dissertations on passages of Grotius and clauses of Acts of Parliament. He would endeavour to break new ground by calling attention to the political aspect of the financial question. As to this, he should like to quote some few opinions of eminent men on the subject. For instance, Lord Mayo said—

> "The increased taxation which has been going on in India is producing a most serious amount of discontent, and this discontent, if continued, will be a danger, the magnitude of which can scarcely be exaggerated."

That was not by any means a solitary instance. There was the opinion of Lord Canning, who said—

> "Danger for danger, he would rather hold India with 40,000 men without an income tax than with 80,000 with one."

Another authority on this subject was Lord Salisbury himself, who had said—

> "The difference between England and India in matters of finance is this—that in England you can raise a large increase of taxation without in the least degree endangering our institutions, whereas you cannot do so in India."

Were these statements true or untrue? If they were not true, let them be denied; if true, how could responsible statesmen—statesmen responsible for the fate of that great Indian Empire—totally overlook this point? Taxes in this case were so mixed up with other considerations of policy that it was difficult to separate them, and especially in poor States the political aspect was dominated by financial considerations. It was the financial difficulty in Turkey which paved the way for the other complications which followed. These were not mere theoretical considerations, for everybody who knew anything of India acknowledged that Native opinion in India, such as it was, had been more frequently and more warmly excited about finance than it had upon any other set of questions whatever. When in India, 17 years ago, he found the country in a ferment upon the subject of the income tax, and at the present time the country was wonderfully sensitive upon this question of finance. Only the other day when the licence tax was imposed, meetings were held in Bombay and Calcutta and strong feelings were expressed against that impolitic tax upon Native incomes. Only that day they had found that upon receipt of the intelligence of this Motion a Petition had been forwarded to the Government by the British Association, which represented the public opinion of Bombay, protesting that it was unjust that the cost of the war should be borne by India. The only species of taxation which had not excited public opinion in India was the salt tax; and the explanation of that was that it only pressed upon the poor, who were too feeble to make their cry heard. But when the Government talked about their surplus, they must remember that it was obtained by the imposition of an additional 40 per cent on the salt tax upon a set of poor wretches, in order to save their finance from absolute bankruptcy. It was necessary to look at Indian finance broadly; and looked at in that light, its present condition would be found to be one of extreme tension. The history of Expenditure in India since the time of the Mutiny showed that it gradually got ahead of Revenue until Lord Mayo went out, and he, by great effort, managed to restore something like a balance. Two great calamities, however, occurred—one was the recurrence of famines, and the other the depreciation of silver. The first caused an annual expenditure of £1,500,000, and the second a loss of £3,000,000, making thus £4,500,000 a-year to be provided for in a state of finance in which it was already difficult to adjust the balance. To show the extreme distress, he referred to the licence tax, and asked if any Government would have imposed a tax upon incomes of only 4*s.* a-week unless they had been in the greatest straits to find money? Did they suppose that, unless that was the case, statesmen of ordinary ability and of ordinary humanity would have done that? He wondered how Conservative Lancashire would like that state of things. The fact was the limit of taxation in India had been reached, and its revenue was singularly inelastic. As an illustration of how the taxation had been served up, he pointed to the fact that on the items of land, opium, salt, Customs, and direct taxation there was an increase from £24,000,000 sterling 20 years ago to £36,000,000 in the present. The land tax could not well be increased. As regards opium, that depended upon China; and as to the Customs, Manchester would not permit an addition; and he believed, if an addition were proposed, there would be such an outcry in this country that the Secretary of State would at once telegraph to the Viceroy to stop such a proposal being put into operation. When they came to direct taxation, no one without a knowledge of the country could imagine the jealousy and fright caused by a suggestion of inquiring into their private affairs. He remembered the case of a man who hanged himself from sheer fright on the receipt of an income tax assessment notice. The income tax was not only unpopular in India, but it would never produce more than £1,000,000. This all pointed to the necessity of economy; and he agreed with Lord Canning that it was better to decrease the army and be without an income tax than to increase the army and have an income tax. Economy meant military reduction; and, in his time, out of a saving of £5,000,000, £4,000,000 were effected by military reduction. Out of the £40,000,000 of regular Indian expenditure, £20,000,000 was a fixed charge, which could not be touched; and for the remaining £20,000,000, £15,000,000 or £16,000,000 consisted of the cost of the military. If they wanted to govern India satisfactorily to the people of India, and to escape the great and increasing political discontent which advanced in proportion with the spread of education, the advance of commerce, and extension of railways, that could only be done by following the course of Lord Canning in reducing taxation. It ought to be borne in mind that what was known in, and might perhaps suit, this country as an "Imperial policy" was altogether unsuited to the circumstances of India—he meant a policy of a showy, restless, sensational character. He believed that if India had been ruled by statesmen who knew India from having lived there, and whose only thoughts were for the good of the country, considered by itself, the present unsatisfactory state of things would never have sprung into existence. He was quite sure the licence tax would never have been necessary, and the salt tax might have been levelled down instead of levelled up. The expenditure on the Indian Army had increased by £2,000,000 since the time of Lord Canning, although the Army was 15,000 men less now than at that date. The removal of the troops to Malta—although the mere expense of their removal had been paid by this country—had necessitated a large Reserve. With respect to the present Afghan War, to what was it due? Would it have been likely to occur if the policy of masterly inactivity had been continued? He thought not. Lord Salisbury, however, reversed that old policy; but, for his part, he preferred a policy of masterly inactivity to a fidgetty, restless policy. They remembered the line of the poet—

> "Then shrieked the timid and stood still the
> brave;"

and he could not but think that the brave man in India who at the recent crisis would have stood still would have avoided taking measures to ward off a possible contingency to arise 15 or 20 years hence. He would not, after the lengthened debates that had taken place, go into the question as to the policy of the war. Her Majesty's Government told them that the war would cost this financial year about £1,200,000. Well, he had seen Estimates of two China Wars, and the Estimate for an Abyssinian War, and in every case the reality exceeded the original Estimate—not only twice, but four, five, and even six times. It was his opinion that the present war would show a like increase over the Estimate. The first step in the war now commencing involved an increase of the Native Army by 15,000 men, costing £270,000 a-year. That was a serious matter for a country suffering from financial distress; but it was a mere tithe of what would follow. He assumed that they did not intend to depart from the salutary rule which had been laid down by successive Viceroys, that for every two Natives added to the Indian Army they should add one European—or 60,000 Europeans as against 120,000 Natives; or, as at present, 7,500 Europeans to 15,000 Natives—to preserve the normal proportion. It was not, therefore, a question of £270,000 a-year; but it would involve one of £1,000,000 or £1,500,000 a-year. The policy of increasing the Native Army was a subject of great delicacy, which he would not dwell upon at length; but he could not help saying that the increase of the number of Native Troops, and the inspiring of them with a love of campaigning and military adventure, was, in his mind, the most dangerous policy they could pursue, having regard to the future interests of India. The Indian Army was just now, beyond all doubt, thoroughly well affected, and a large proportion of them were zealous in the matter of this war, for the Afghans were their ancient foes. But our difficulty in respect of the Native Army arose, not in time of war, but in time of peace. How was it, he asked, that they would not trust the Native Army with artillery? Everybody knew that we kept 60,000 European troops in India to guard against possible risks arising from the Native Army. By the policy now adopted, the Government were not only encountering the enormous dangers of political discontent arising from financial depression, but were also making more dangerous in the future that Native Army which had already shaken the Indian Empire to its foundations. What was the prospective result of the policy of the Government on the financial condition of England? He hoped sincerely that our troops would be speedily victorious, and that the war would soon terminate—as it only could—in the present Ameer, or some one placed in his stead, suing for peace. And on what conditions would peace be established? He supposed that the first condition would be the sending of an English Resident to Cabul, to be supported by an armed force. Seventeen years ago Lord Canning carefully considered the advisability of such a course, and had decided against it, on the ground that it would inevitably lead us into further interference with Afghan complications; and such action, if taken now, would practically mean an assumption of a Protectorate of Afghanistan. Then there would be a rectification of Frontiers; and so they would go on step by step, until they arrived at something very like an annexation of the country. Now, the hon. and gallant Member for Kincardineshire (General Sir George Balfour), who was a great authority on these matters, told them it would take 15,000 European and 35,000 Native troops to keep the country in time of peace, to say nothing of what they would have to do in the event of war with Russia, or, still worse, in the event of internal insurrections. But what did this mean? It meant bankruptcy for India? Was Afghanistan worth purchasing at that price? Was it worth while to go to so great an expense for the purpose of obtaining mere prospective contingencies? He was perfectly certain that if this question were to be decided in India by Indian statesmen, acquainted with the Indian public opinion, it would have been decided differently, and that this action had been forced upon India by Lord Salisbury. The noble Lord sent out Lord Lytton, an incompetent man, as diplomatist, who had had the worst possible training for such a post, to inaugurate his policy, and to do his bidding. He did not wish to deal with the political question; but, as a matter of fact, we were dealing with Russia in this war, and not with Afghanistan. There was, no doubt, a vast amount of dislike to Russia in this country; but it arose from other causes than the fear of a Russian invasion of India. Indeed, when we were on the point of going to war with Russia recently, Her Majesty's Government, so far from despatching troops to India to defend our present "unscientific" Frontier from invasion, actually brought troops from India to Malta. This dislike to Russia dated from the time when Russia was the advocate of absolutism and the soul of the Holy Alliance, opposing England everywhere as the champion of liberty and free thought, and checkmating her wherever she could. But in India the case was very different. He had the authority of the Prime Minister for saying that we might be very good friends with Russia there. The fear of Russia was not a plant of Indian growth. It had been planted and nurtured in England. The truth was, that we had been led into our present position with respect to Russia by the showy and sensational policy of Lord Beaconsfield. As far as India was concerned, our policy was to cultivate a good understanding with Russia; and having thus made sure of our Frontier, to devote ourselves to Indian internal reforms. But a different policy had been chosen. The Government were working up the vast Native distrust of Russia; and if it occurred to any poet of the future to write an account of the present time, he might, in imitation of the Horatian line—

"Quidquid delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi"—

wind up with the following:—"The Jingoes bluster and the ryots pay."

Mr. SMOLLETT said, that at the commencement of the present year he had occasion to address his constituents at Cambridge, and he took the liberty of telling them that the recent victories of the Russians in Asia Minor and in Turkey, coupled with their advance in Central Asia, would at an early period lead to trouble, and the result which he had pointed out had taken place in Afghanistan. But he did not know at that time that the Russian Governor of Turkestan had engaged in vile and atrocious intrigues with Shere Ali, or that the latter had been estranged altogether from his English connection. The present position of affairs, therefore, if somewhat prematurely brought about, did not surprise him. Both Houses of Parliament having approved the policy of Lord Lytton by overwhelming majorities, the question now before hon. Members was, who should pay the piper? The war had been undertaken to punish the treachery of an Asiatic Prince, with whom the Government of India had entered into a friendly Treaty and a distinct alliance; and so long as the war was local—that was to say, confined to Afghanistan—he held that India should pay the entire cost of it. The Indian Exchequer, in his opinion, was amply sufficient to provide the requisite funds for a purely Afghan War, provided only that Indian finances were managed with anything like propriety, and that economy was enforced in every department of the Indian Government. That had not hitherto been done; but he hoped that the result of the present war would render it necessary. The debates in that House during the past week were, in his opinion, singularly dull and uninteresting. They were replete with personal attacks, and everything was said except what affected the real question at issue. It was repeatedly asked why we were engaged at war? and he did not think the question had ever been distinctly answered. [*Opposition cheers.*] He was prepared for those cheers; but he did not think hon. Gentlemen opposite would cheer him when he came to the end of his discourse. The causes of the war were not far to seek; and, as he was untrammelled by any official connection, he would tell them what they were. The war was not undertaken by Lord Lytton from any desire to acquire territory, or because Sir Neville Chamberlain was refused admission to Cabul. It was undertaken—first, because in July last the Russian authorities in Turkestan sent a Mission to Cabul well knowing that it was the settled determination of England to let no Power obtain a footing in Afghanistan except herself; second, because the Russian authorities, in sending that Mission, broke a solemn and honourable engagement; and third, because Shere Ali received their Mission, which he knew would give mortal offence to England, with a salute of 115 guns. In thus receiving the Russian Mission Shere Ali, in his opinion, courted his own fate. The war at present was local, and he hoped it would remain so; but if Russia interfered by sending men, arms, or ammunition to the Ameer, he trusted that England would come forward in her might to protect her Indian Dominions, and bring the Czar to a proper sense of his situation. The war had been described by hon. Gentlemen opposite as unjust and immoral because, it was said, Afghanistan was an independent State, and the Ameer was an independent Ruler who could choose his own society, who might hob-nob with a Tartar and insult a British officer. He denied entirely that Afghanistan could be called an independent State, in the true sense of that word. Afghanistan was a poor, impotent, weak, and sterile country; it was incapable of defending itself against foreign aggression by a strong Power; for many years the Ameer had admitted that he could hardly defend himself against domestic foes; and for many years, on account of his helplessness, he had been receiving subsidies of men, guns, and ammunition from the protecting State, for Afghanistan had been protected by the Indian Government. More than this, the Ameer had been importuning the Viceroys in India to protect his personal rule in Afghanistan against his own subjects; he had been demanding that our Viceroys should give him a guarantee that any son, heir, or member of his family he might designate should be acknowledged as his successor. For many years he had been importuning our Viceroys to ratify a Treaty, offensive and defensive, which should protect Afghanistan from invasion, and he had particularly pointed out that it was from Russia he expected to be invaded. Of late years every Viceroy had humoured this savage;

Lords Mayo, Northbrook, and Lytton had been ready to enter into engagements of that sort, provided only he would permit the Government which was thus to protect him to have officers stationed on the Frontiers of Afghanistan to see that he did not embroil himself and us in quarrels with other Powers. These demands were rational, modest, just; but the Ameer would not hear of such terms, and would give us no security at all. Neither Lord Northbrook nor Lord Lytton would concede his demands, and there was no change of policy at all, except that Lord Lytton went further than Lord Northbrook in humouring the Ameer, who every day became more insolent and morose. The only excuse for him could be that he was mad, and was not capable of ruling at all. At last he threw over the allegiance of Great Britain and allied himself with the Russians; and, of course, he must be brought to reason and submission. This would probably be done without any very great expense; it was likely that we should soon hear of the termination of the war, which he trusted would be short, sharp, and decisive, restoring peace to Central Asia and our Indian Dominions. It had been said that Shere Ali was the victim of a bastard Imperialism—a charge that was utterly absurd and perfectly ridiculous. Contrast the moderate treatment Shere Ali had received from the present Government with the insolent manner in which his father, Dost Mahomed, was treated, not many years ago, by a Liberal Government! Men spoke of a return to our traditional policy towards Afghanistan, as if this were our first expedition into that country, forgetting that our first entanglement occurred in 1838, when Lord Palmerston was the Foreign Secretary, and Sir John Cam Hobhouse, a noted Radical, watched over the interests of India as President of the Board of Control. At that time the nearest Russian station to Afghanistan was 3,000 miles distant, and our own territories were separated from it by a distance of 500 miles at least, and one would have thought there was very little danger in that direction; but the Liberal Government had authentic proofs in their possession that intrigue was rife in Cabul for the overthrow of British interests in India. Lord Palmerston thought that the intrigues carried on by Russian and Persian Agents must be counteracted, and he instructed the Government of India accordingly. The first step taken by Lord Auckland was to send a Mission to Cabul, selecting as its head Sir Alexander Burnes, of the Bombay Army, a man of very great ability and of uncompromising political integrity—a man, in fact, who was a great deal too honest to be a successful diplomatist, for diplomacy was a very rascally trade. The Ameer, Dost Mahomed, had no objection to receive an Envoy from any country on the face of the earth. He had at his Court a Russian Agent, and he professed to receive Sir Alexander Burnes with great friendship and much favour; in fact, Sir Alexander Burnes and the Ameer became fast friends. In every despatch sent to Calcutta Sir Alexander Burnes spoke of the Ameer in the best terms, and represented him as anxious for an English alliance, and as having no faith in the Russians. All he wanted was money, guns, and ammunition; but Sir Alexander Burnes was not authorized to give him anything more than moral support, and moral support did not go a very long way in Afghanistan. The last thing that Sir Alexander Burnes hoped for was that Dost Mahomed should be driven from his Throne; but Lord Palmerston and Sir John Cam Hobhouse were persuaded that he was a tool in the hands of Russia, and Lord Palmerston accused Sir Alexander Burnes of being beguiled by an Afghan Prince. Orders were sent out to dethrone him, and Lord Auckland carried them out with reluctance. It was necessary, however, to have some puppet to succeed to the Throne, and we selected Shah Soojah, who had been driven from it for incapacity, and was a fugitive at Loodiana. Lord Auckland sent an army with Shah Soojah to place him upon the Throne, and he was also given a guide, philosopher, and friend in Sir William M'Naghten, Chief Secretary to Lord Auckland. Our army marched to Cabul with very little opposition. Dost Mahomed fled to the mountains, was hunted down, and taken prisoner, and sent to Bengal. If he was an independent Sovereign that was very remarkable treatment for a Liberal Government. This was Imperialism with a vengeance. It was insolent and violent; it was characterized by what people now called Jingoism, which was attributed to the Conservative Party, Jingoism being, he believed, a cant word for ruffianism. This policy was not even successful. In the course of 18 months, when the British Army had been reduced in numbers, an insurrection broke out; the insurgents put Shah Soojah to death; Sir William M'Naghten was barbarously murdered; while our small Army, badly handled and treacherously led into mountain defiles, under promise of a safe conduct, miserably perished in the Jugallic Pass. Compare, therefore, the treatment which Dost Mahomed, the Ruler of Afghanistan, received from previous Governments—Liberal Governments—with the forbearance that was shown in the present day to Shere Ali. He left unnoticed the history of the second expedition to Cabul, undertaken by Lord Ellenborough to avenge the betrayal of the British Army, in 1842. He had introduced this matter mainly to show that these two campaigns, undertaken at the instance of a Liberal Administration, without the knowledge of Parliament, had cost, at least, £15,000,000, and that these charges were wholly borne by the Indian Government. No Liberal Member came forward then to ask that the cost should be charged to the English Exchequer, and yet that took place under the Liberal Government of Lord Melbourne. There was one other point on which he would say a few words. The arguments of hon. Members opposite, in discussing the conduct of the Government with regard to this war, had turned a good deal on alleged manipulation of official Papers. The right hon. Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone) had stated that the Papers produced had been manipulated in a manner and to an extent he had never known before. The right hon. Gentleman had, it appeared, a very convenient memory. He would, however, tell him of such a case. In the year 1861, when the right hon. Gentleman was Chancellor of the Exchequer, a Motion was brought forward about the trickery and falsification of official documents under Lord Palmerston at the Foreign Office. The Papers which were manipulated were the Afghanistan Papers. In 1840 the despatches of Sir Alexander Burnes were laid on the Table by the Foreign Office, in order to show that Sir Alexander Burnes had recommended the dethronement and deposition of Dost Mahomed, while he had always represented him in the best possible light. The fact was not discovered for 20 years afterwards, when the Papers were published as originally written. Then, in 1861, a Motion was made in the House of Commons by a Liberal Gentleman —Mr. Dunlop, Member for Greenock —inculpating the Government and denouncing the trickery. A Colleague of the right hon. Member for Greenwich— the right hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. John Bright) — supported Mr. Dunlop, and showed that the Papers had been grossly falsified, and denounced the forgeries. A division was taken on the question, for the manipulation was not and could not be denied. He had voted for that Motion on the 19th of March, 1861; but he would undertake to say that the right hon. Member for Greenwich did not vote for it, although the Papers were strangely falsified. In conclusion, he begged to say he would support the Motion of the Under Secretary of State for India, that the whole expense of this war should be charged to British India.

Mr. OSBORNE MORGAN said, he had been struck with the change which had come over the speeches of hon. Gentlemen opposite. Last week when they were endeavouring to rouse the war feeling of the House, the war was one undertaken to maintain the prestige and integrity of the Empire. This week, when it had become a question of paying the bill, it was a war waged to punish an Asiatic Prince and to protect an Indian Frontier. Speaker after speaker last week had concluded his speech by appeals to the honour and patriotism of Englishmen. What had become of their honour and their patriotism to-night? It was very easy to be patriotic at other people's expense. He could not conceive anything more delightful than to cut open one's newspaper in the morning and to read of the brilliant achievements of our troops, and to feel all the time that come what might our own pockets were perfectly safe. It reminded him of that patriotic individual—

"Mr. Brown, who of his great bounty,
Built a bridge at the cost of the county."

Now a word about the Act of Parliament. He had no doubt that the letter of the Act required that the Government should obtain the consent of Parliament before doing what they had done; for the consent of Parliament was made a condition precedent to the outlay which it was admitted had been made. If so, could they doubt that there had been a breach of the law? But if they turned from the letter to the spirit of the Act, was it not plainly the object of the section to preclude the possibility of applying Indian Revenues to Imperial objects? But the war had been described, over and over again, as an Imperial war, the outcome of events in Europe—a war, according to one hon. Member, as Russian as the Crimean War itself. It might be true that, thanks to a Revenue swollen by the most nefarious traffic which the world ever saw—the opium traffic—and thanks also to the stoppage of their public works and to their having trenched upon the Famine Fund, which they had pledged themselves to maintain, they had this year something which the Under Secretary of State called a surplus in India. But during 16 out of the last 20 years they had had not a surplus, but a deficit. And to whom did that surplus belong? Why, it belonged to the people of India. What did we do in this country when we had a surplus, or rather, what had we done when we had had one, for unfortunately surpluses with us had become matters of history? Why, we gave it back to the taxpayer in the shape of a remission of taxation. Were there no taxes to remit in India? Had hon. Members forgotten the salt tax, that dire impost on the first necessity of life, which, within the memory of men who were but lately living, had produced the most terrible revolution which the world ever saw? He had lately read an article in *The Nineteenth Century*, entitled the *Bankruptcy of India*, and if one-tenth of what the writer stated was true, the ryot of India was the most heavily-taxed person on God's earth. The writer said—

> "The natives say, and have said for years, that, as a whole, life has become harder since the English took the country. They are right; it has become harder, and will become harder still if we proceed on our present lines. They say also that the taxation is already crushing. That is true too; and it has become yet more crushing in this present year. There is evidence enough already and to spare, while we are staggering on with our committees and commissioners to a catastrophe which, unless facts and figures utterly lie, will be unequalled in the history of the world. When poverty-smitten cultivators in one part of India are taxed—permanently taxed—to support famine-stricken ryots in another, who in their turn are to be taxed again for the like service, the whole country being drained all the while by enormous military charges, home charges, interest, remittances, and loss by exchange, it needs no great economist, no far-seeing statesman, to predict that a crash is inevitable. The famines which have been devastating India are, in the main, financial famines. Men and women cannot get food, because they have not been able to save the money to buy it. Yet we are driven, so we say, to tax these people more."

It was said that this was to be a cheap war; but no war could be called cheap until it was over. Let them look for a moment to the future. The Under Secretary of State for India had laid it down that without a "strong and friendly" Afghanistan, there could be no peace or prosperity or retrenchment for India. Did they make men friendly by burning down their villages and shooting their fellow tribesmen? Recollect that an Afghan never forgets. He was the most Oriental of Orientals, the most vindictive of men. They were sowing the seeds of a blood feud which might survive to remote posterity. Then did they think that the war would give them a "strong" Afghanistan? Why, one thing was quite certain—that the war would destroy even the semblance of Government which Shere Ali had established, and hand the country over to anarchy and rapine. What would they do then? Could they stop where they were? Would they burn their fingers with another Shah Soojah? Why, in mere self-defence, they would have, in some form or other, to occupy Afghanistan; for, if they did not do so, they might be sure that Russia would do it. But how was the cost of the occupation to be met? They did not suppose that Afghanistan, like Cyprus, would be "self-supporting." The brother of an hon. Friend of his who sat in the House—one of the few survivors of the Afghan War—had described the country to him as a limestone desert peopled—as far as a desert could be said to be peopled—by the greatest scoundrels on the earth. Now, scoundrels and deserts were not, as a general rule, self-supporting; and it was this prospective expenditure, calculated by Sir Erskine Perry, in his very able protest, at between £3,000,000 and £4,000,000 a-year, which, of course, would be thrown wholly on the Indian Revenues, which rendered it especially hard to charge the whole of the burden of this war—for that was the Motion before the House—upon that country. He was as much averse to increasing the burdens of the country as any man in that House. He had voted on every occasion since he had entered it in favour of reducing those burdens. He believed that one great cause of the depression, which had invaded every industry in the country, was the reckless additions which the present Government had made to the military expenditure of the country. But when it came to wringing their last anna from a population which only the other day were dying by millions for want of the price of a handful of rice, in order to pay for our wars, he felt inclined to exclaim with Marcus Brutus in the play—

> "By Heaven! I would rather coin my heart,
> And drop my blood for drachmas, than to wring
> From the hard hands of peasants, their vile trash
> By any indirection!"

Talk of a "shabby war!" What were they to say of the mode of paying for it? Let them not forget that the people of India were in an exceptional position. Alone among the dependencies of the British Crown they had not even the semblance of representative institutions. They had not even liberty of speech. We had gagged their Press. They were as dumb as the sheep before his shearer. To whom, then, were they to look for protection? Was it to Viceroys and Financial Secretaries and that knot of highly-paid European officials to whom increase of territory meant increase of patronage, increase of promotion, and increase of pay? No! it was to the British House of Commons, who were not only the Representatives of the free and generous British nation, but the duly appointed and accredited guardians of the people of India, that they alone could look for help; and it was under a deep and full sense of the responsibility thus imposed upon him that he, for one, would never consent to claim for the richest and strongest country in the world the glory and the gain of this war, and to leave the burden and the cost to be borne by the poor starving ryots of the Deccan.

Sir WALTER B. BARTTELOT thought the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett) would have done better if he had not made out so extreme a case. When talking of the sufferings of the people of India from famine, he forgot to mention the liberality that had been shown by the people of this country to those famine-stricken people. The hon. Member looked upon this altogether as a question which ought not to affect the expenditure of India; but he and hon. Gentlemen on the other side had forgotten to tell the House what they would have done in the circumstances in which the Government were placed. Considering that Russia had an Envoy at Cabul—that Envoy being an European—and that it was because our Envoy was an European that he would not be received, he did not think any hon. Gentleman would say that Russia ought to have a predominant influence in Afghanistan. That was the question which had been settled last week. It was settled then that there was nothing this country would not do that Russian influence should not prevail in Afghanistan. Therefore, though, in the first place, this might be an Indian question, it was an Imperial question also. He would venture to ask the Government to look at it in its broadest point of view; because, though the Russians had tried to get their Agents into Afghanistan and to have supreme influence there, they would not have done so at so early a period had it not been for complications in Europe. We should not forget why Russia had an Envoy at Cabul, and why she was marching an army in three columns on Afghanistan. It arose, no doubt, from the possibility, nay, at that particular time, from, he might say, the probability, of war with Russia, and also from our bringing certain Indian troops to Europe. Look at it as we might, we must acknowledge that this war would not have occurred had not these complications in Europe arisen. If that were true—and no one in that House would deny it—he would ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer to state distinctly that they would consider the matter in a fair and candid spirit, and would ask this country to bear its fair proportion of the expense, leaving only that portion which India ought justly to pay to be borne by the Indian Revenues. Some hon. Gentlemen seemed to think that India should pay nothing; but it should not be forgotten that, in the first instance, this war was undertaken to protect the Indian Empire. The House had heard of Shere Ali sulking, but why should England think about sulking Afghanistan? Shere Ali had been faithless to this country, and the Ruler of Afghanistan, be he who he might, ought to be thoroughly under our control. He hoped, whatever might be the result of this war—and no one could tell where the war might extend to—the country would recollect that it had to deal with Russia, and that we ought to have some absolute and definite Treaty, and not trust to Russia's words and promises. England must know how far Russia was to be allowed to advance, and would then be able to decide where we were to stop. He believed Russia would never cease to advance until she found herself face to face with British sentinels. In conclusion, he said, he felt that only a little pressure was required to induce the Government to place a fair proportion of the cost of the war on this country, and a fair proportion on India.

SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL said, he might have been surprised at the sanguine statements of the Under Secretary of State for India were it not for the fact that Under Secretaries were always sanguine. India had never paid its way, but had always borrowed its way, and was continually adding to its Debt. The House was always told that there would be a surplus in India if something did not happen; but something always did happen. The something, in the present instance, was the war against Afghanistan. He had not determined to support the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett) without some hesitation. He could not support him on the general grounds he had alleged, for he (Sir George Campbell) was one of those who thought the interests of the mother country ought to be considered in her relations with India and her Colonies; and that the cost of all wars, great and small, ought not to be thrown upon her on the ground of Imperialism. In some wars England must pay, and in others India should. He was prepared to say that if the matter had been fairly dealt with, and a fair representation allowed of the interests of India in this matter, he should not have voted with the hon. Member. But after mature reflection he was prepared to vote with his hon. Friend, for this reason—that India had not been fairly treated in accordance with the law, and the interests of India had not been fairly represented. He was inclined to throw the expense incurred upon England, for much the same reason that the damage caused by the *Alabama* was thrown on England. The Government and Lord Lytton in this respect stood, in his eyes, in the same culpable position as the shipbuilders of Liverpool, and the Law Officers of the Crown did in the *Alabama* affair, and we must be responsible for them. He believed that the fault was chiefly the Viceroy's, and that, with the exception of the clear breach of the 55th section of the Act of 1858, which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich had pointed out, the Government at home had kept within the limits of the law, though it was a bad law. The law of 1858 had emasculated the Council of India so far as they were the custodians of the finances of India, for it enabled the Council to be completely overridden in practice. The Council of India having been emasculated, in this House the interests of India did not evolve great interest, except when important Party or personal concerns were involved. Towards the close of last Autumn, when we sent a Mission to the Ameer, there was an evident foreshadow of the war that was now progressing; but, unfortunately, the matter was not then discussed in that House as it ought to have been. But, however the Liberal Leaders had been wanting on former occasions, he was glad to acknowledge that the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition had spoken out like a man with reference to this war. The noble Lord had not flinched from the right issue, and it was not very doubtful what the result of an appeal to the country would be. He quite agreed with the noble Lord's remarks on Lord Lytton's conduct in India. The appointment of Lord Lytton as Governor General, he was willing to admit, was honestly made; but he believed he expressed the opinion of every man connected with India, when he said that that appointment was a failure, and the first step towards the peaceful solution of the difficulty would be to substitute a capable man, on whose judgment and discretion more reliance could be placed. The presence of Lord Lytton in India constituted a grave danger to this country. It was difficult to apportion the blame rightly between the Government and Lord Lytton in recent transactions, many Papers necessary to the elucidation of this matter being conspicuous by their absence. From all that he had learnt from India he was disposed to believe that Lord Salisbury had, as a matter of fact, restrained Lord Lytton, and that a very large portion of the blame which he was disposed to lay at the doors of the Government took the form rather of their being responsible for the appointment of that noble Lord as Viceroy than of any direct attempt on the part of Lord Salisbury to do all that had been attributed to him. When Lord Salisbury came back from Constantinople he found Lord Lytton was straining at the leash, and trying to go farther than the Government would allow him. Lord Lytton had been subsequently loud in his complaints that Lord Salisbury would not sufficiently support him. Lord Lytton managed, however, to force the hands of the Government, the Cabinet being divided between the Leaders of the Jingoes, and such prudent men as the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He felt, he might add, bound to protest against the idea which had been broached, among others, by the Under Secretary of State for India—that we were to suppose that country was more contented, because of the inspired telegrams which had been received with respect to the loyalty of the Indian Princes and troops. No man practically acquainted with Oriental customs could be misled by anything of that kind. He was quite willing to believe that the conduct of the Government had not yet succeeded in alienating them; but it was not safe to conclude, from those inspired manifestations, that Lord Lytton had been a successful Ruler in our Indian dominions. In the Mutiny the Native Chiefs rendered loyal service, and he believed they would do so again; still, he warned the Government that it was not the Native Chiefs that first offered their assistance who were most to be trusted. His impression was that some of the Native Princes, struggling to increase their armies, would be delighted to aid us in this war while we were prosperous; but they might possibly turn against us if unhappily we incurred disasters. As to our military successes, he would say that, although he did not believe we had many troops of the first quality in India, yet there were, in his opinion, a certain number who could do the work in which they were now engaged—or, indeed, any work—as well as the best troops in the world. The House had, however, been informed that evening that the correspondents who attended the Army were only the approved correspondents; so that they were not, perhaps, to be relied upon for telling the whole truth; and he had noticed that morning certain remarks about suffering among camp followers, which showed that everything was not of that *couleur de rose* which some persons seemed disposed to imagine. There was another point of very great importance to which he wished to call attention. On looking at the Correspondence, he found that the despatches from home were generally addressed — and rightly so — to the Governor General of India in Council. There was, however, a despatch of February 28, 1876, which was not so addressed, but addressed to a person not known to the law — the Governor General, without his Council. He would not demand the head of Lord Salisbury for this; but he wished to say he considered it a gross illegality. The Viceroy, on the receipt of that despatch, had concealed it from his Council; but had acted upon it all the same, telling the Council that he had the authority of the Queen's Government for sending an Envoy into Cabul. That was a very important step, for no Mission had gone there since the year 1841. From a Minute of the 19th of June, it was clear that the Councillors had been discussing the absence of Instructions at that time before the despatch of February 28 was shown to them. The Council had been kept in the dark, so that Lord Lytton was able to establish a personal rule, which was the cause of all our troubles. From that time he had acted, not through the usual channels of communication, but by agents of his own; indeed, the Papers in the Blue Book contained no mention of any Member of the Council of the Governor

General, but chiefly of Colonel Pelly and Colonel Burne, as the advisers of the Governor General. The result of that policy of personal government was the resort to mischievous activity and coercion of the Ameer which had been attempted. As for the position of Russia, he, for one, was inclined to deprecate the strong language that had been used with respect to her on that side of the House, but he was far from trusting to Russian assurances. He would mention a Paper in the Central Asian Blue Book, in which they would find a very important despatch from Lord Augustus Loftus, our Ambassador at St. Petersburg. This despatch was dated September 27th, 1878, and explained the views of the Russian Government with regard to the Russian Mission to Afghanistan. It seemed strange that the Government should have taken the House so far into their confidence as to publish it, without giving something more, for it contained an assertion of the Emperor's right to send such a Mission if he pleased. That was a claim on the part of Russia to which we certainly could not submit. His view, however, was that Russia's action in this matter might to some extent be justified by the excessive partizanship of our Government with regard to the whole course of the Eastern Question. He believed there was no Oriental Power on which we could place less reliance than on Russia—but at the same time we ought to deal fairly by Russia; he thought we had not done that, and that Russia was to a certain extent justified in the reprisals she had made. In his opinion, the great blunder the Government had made was in exhausting all their energies in aiding the Sultan to re-enslave the unhappy Bulgarians. If we had pressed Russia a little less with regard to Bulgaria, we might easily have made an arrangement with her to prevent this interference with Afghanistan. Russia was not likely to go to war on the question of Afghanistan; she only wished to induce us to coerce the Turks to carry out the Treaty of Berlin. Until a settlement had been made with regard to lines of demarcation in Central Asia as well as in Europe, Her Majesty's Government would not have achieved peace, honour, or safety. He was prepared to support the Amendment of the hon. Member for Hackney, but only on this special ground—that the Government had in his opinion broken the law and the Constitution in regard to India, and had rendered themselves responsible for what had occurred. He did not agree with the hon. Member for Hackney that a great saving could be effected in the Indian Army, which was as small as our great interests in India permitted it to be, and the Government were of the same opinion, for they had recently decided to increase it by 15,000 men. The 55th clause of the Act of 1858 was not the only one that had been treated unsatisfactorily by the Government. Their conduct was also open to question with regard to the 41st section, which provided that the Indian Revenues were not to be expended either in India or elsewhere without the consent of the Council. That provision had been completely overridden by successive Secretaries of State, and no satisfactory explanation of their conduct had been given. It was impossible to estimate the ultimate cost of the war from the expense that had already been incurred, because the Government had hitherto been using up their accumulated stores, the value of which was not taken into account. He believed that if it should be unhappily necessary to conquer Afghanistan the cost would have to be counted, not by hundreds of thousands, but by millions. His advice to the Government was to make peace as soon as possible, before the contest had been embittered by too much bloodshed and by too far an advance into Afghan territory. Her Majesty's Government had succeeded in making a certain advance into Afghanistan and in frightening the Ameer, and would be able to make peace speedily, provided they did not make their terms too stringent. The basis upon which peace should be made was, that the Ameer should consent to receive our Mission with every formal parade in his capital, that he should engage never to receive another Russian Mission, and that he should only communicate with Russia for the future through ourselves. We ought to be paramount and supreme in Afghanistan in comparison with Russia, but in no other sense, and we should bear in mind that the Afghans were a nation of soldiers whose subjection would be very difficult. The Prime Minister had spoken of the rectification of our Frontier.

Men of the greatest experience were entirely opposed to our taking possession of the defiles and passes of Afghanistan. But there was one rectification of Frontier which we might make without breach of faith and by keeping within our right. He alluded to the position of Quetta. He had never committed himself about the occupation of Quetta; but he thought they must either put a stronger force than they had there, or withdraw it altogether. Inasmuch as we had already gone so far, and we had now the right to maintain a force at Quetta, the right thing to do would be to establish ourselves there, constructing a railway, and making the place a base of operations both in a political and a military sense. He would not recommend, as General Hamley recommended, the occupation of Candahar, which would be completely inconsistent with the maintenance of a great Afghan State. With regard to the attempt to impose European Residents on the Ameer, in India a European Resident in a Native State was always regarded not as an Ambassador, but as a man who overlooked and over-rode the Native State. That was the light in which the Ameer and the Afghan people viewed a European Resident, and they could not persuade them to the contrary. Moreover the absence of a European Resident did not imply, the absence of diplomatic communication altogether. We had had a regularly equipped Mission in Afghanistan, of which the members were Natives. The Afghans were ready to admit as many Native Missions as we liked; but it would always be a source of extreme embarrassment if we insisted on their receiving European Residents, whom they regarded as supervisors who were imposed on them. He thought the demand that they should receive them was uncalled for and unreasonable. With respect to Merv, it was separated from Herat by a great mountain chain. The real road was through the Meshed district in Persia. There was only one demand of that sort which we should make. We should ask permission to keep a Mission at Balkh. In conclusion he earnestly trusted that in any arrangements which might be made, the Government would be indulgent towards the Afghans and would remember the provocation which they had received, otherwise they would never have peace in that country.

Mr. J. G. HUBBARD wished to appeal to the Government to extricate him from what appeared to him to be a considerable difficulty. Anxious as he was to vote for Her Majesty's Government, he could not vote for the Resolution proposed by the Under Secretary of State for India. The hon. Gentleman would pledge himself only within a considerable margin, and had endeavoured to show that the words of his Resolution were merely a protection by Act of Parliament to the proceedings of the Indian Government, and were required to put the action of the Indian Government upon a Constitutional basis. It appeared to him that the words of the Resolution meant a great deal more. The words as they stood bound the House to consent to the Revenues of India being applied to defray the expenses of Military operations which now were, and could be, carried on beyond the external Frontier of Her Majesty's Indian territory. The words further imported that the whole of such expenditure was to be defrayed, and it must be paid by the persons who defrayed it. Therefore, the Indian Government was to be at the costs and expenses of the present expedition. That was the logical interpretation of the words as they stood. If that were not the correct interpretation, he would be glad if the Govern- would say so. It had been said that the Indian Revenue showed a surplus; but that was no reason why this war expense should be put upon it. To judge whether the expense of sending an expedition into Afghanistan should be placed upon the Revenues of India it was requisite to keep two considerations in view. First, who made the expedition? and, secondly, who profited by it? He did not wish to trust to his own judgment on these questions, but would quote the opinions of Members of the Indian Council. A Paper was circulated on Saturday signed by five Members of the Indian Council, and they all concurred that the war in Afghanistan was a part of the Imperial policy of this country, and could only be ascribed to the action of our own Government. With regard to the particular point as to the incidence of the charge for the Army, there was a difference of opinion. Three Members of the Council—Sir Erskine Perry, Sir Robert Montgomery, and Sir Barrow Ellis—thought that none of the expenses should be borne by India; while Sir William Muir and Mr. Dalyell considered that some portion of the cost, at all events, should be defrayed by this country. Those gentlemen were, from their experience and position, capable of forming an intelligent and independent opinion on the subject; and he felt himself fortified in his own convictions that the whole charge for this expenditure ought not to be thrown upon the finances of India. He looked with a great repugnance upon a division of the interests of India and England. There ought to be no difference of interest between them; India was so integral a portion of the possessions of this country that what were her interests ought to be ours, and what was her prosperity ought to be ours also. Her finances should be husbanded with the same vigilance and administered with the same economy as those of Great Britain. There was yet another matter that should be remembered, and that was that India had a separate organization for taxation from this country, and that any increase in her expenditure would have the effect of increasing burdens which already pressed heavily upon her. It was because he believed India was very heavily taxed at the present time, that he demurred to any increase of that taxation by throwing upon her a portion of the expenditure to be incurred in this war. He would appeal to Her Majesty's Government to give an assurance that the extraordinary expenses of this expedition should not necessarily be borne entirely by India; but that they should be treated as expenses incurred by the Home Government, to be shared between India and England. If Her Majesty's Government would give him that assurance, he would vote for the Resolution, which he would then take to mean nothing more than that India was, in the first instance, to advance funds.

MR. LYON PLAYFAIR, remarking that several hon. Members on his side of the House wished to take part in the discussion, moved the Adjournment of the Debate.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Debate be now adjourned."—(*Mr. Lyon Playfair.*)

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: I had hoped earlier in the evening that it would have been possible to close this debate to-night; but I can entirely recognize the justice of the observation of the right hon. Gentleman, and I feel that the matter is one of such great importance to others, besides ourselves, that it would be undesirable that the debate should be, so to speak, huddled up; therefore, I will consent to the Adjournment to-night. I do not wish at the present moment to enter into any discussion of the arguments; but to prevent misunderstanding, it is as well that I should say, in answer to the question of my right hon. Friend (Mr. Hubbard) as to the intention of the Government in this proposal, it is not intended that the whole of the expenditure of the military operations should necessarily be thrown on the Revenues of India. That will be a matter for consideration; and I think it will be undesirable to attempt to lay down any rigid principle as to the amount of aid which the Imperial Exchequer should give till we know a little more of what the war is likely to cost. I wish to explain that it is not intended that India should bear the whole of the expenditure.

MR. CHILDERS wished to make a suggestion which he thought of some importance. In the course of the debate that evening the Under Secretary of State for India had quoted part of a very important telegram in relation to the finances of India. Certain figures were given which had a very important bearing upon the present financial position of India, as compared with the Budget Statement. He wished to ask whether, under these circumstances, as this telegram had been referred to in debate, the Government could have it printed and placed in their hands by 4 o'clock the next day. Considering the extreme importance of knowing exactly what was the financial position of India, he hoped the Government would not make any objection to the production of the document.

MR. BULWER observed, that he did not understand that the proposal of the Government was that either the whole cost of this war, or any definite portion of it, should certainly be defrayed out of the Indian Revenues; but they only asked at the present time that the decision as to what portion, if any, should be defrayed out of the Indian Revenues, and what portion out of the Imperial

Exchequer should be left to them. He had listened with surprise to many speeches which had been delivered that evening, and many of them, it seemed to him, might very well have been delivered in the preceding week. He could not understand what the finances of India had to do with the question now before the House. It seemed to him that the decision of the amount to be paid by the Indian Revenues should, for the present, be left with the Government. The House had not before it the materials to decide that question, and were only asked now to settle the principle that the Indian Revenues should, if the Government deemed it necessary, contribute to the expenses of the war. Surely the House was not going to say that the whole expense must necessarily be borne by the Imperial Exchequer.

Mr. HERSCHELL said, that no doubt his hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Bulwer) would be quite content to take the decision of Her Majesty's Government upon the question of paying the sum out of the Indian Revenues, or upon any other question. But those sitting on that side of the House were not so willing to leave the matter in their control. Up to the present time the Government had not pledged itself that any portion of this expenditure should come out of the Imperial Revenues. According to the terms of this Resolution it would be in the power of the Government to throw every penny of the expenditure upon the Revenues of India.

Mr. NEWDEGATE said, that the real question was, whether the Government considered that, under the circumstances of this war, they had by law any right to apply the Revenues of India in payment of the expenditure incurred for it? He did not go into the question, because the debate was to be adjourned; but perhaps he might say that it appeared to him to be a very grave Constitutional question, whether, under the circumstances of this war, and considering its nature and character, the Government was justified in throwing the expenditure for it upon the Indian Revenues.

Sir WILFRID LAWSON hoped that it would not be understood that hon. Members were debarred on this Motion, by any supposed understanding, from questioning the policy of Her Majesty's Government in undertaking the war. It appeared to him that the debate raised the question of the whole policy of the war.

Mr. E. STANHOPE observed, that he did not quote from any one particular telegram. The India Office had been in frequent communication with the Indian Government recently, and several telegrams had passed between them. If in any one of the telegrams there were facts which they could fairly put before the House, he had no doubt the Government would be able to assent to what the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Childers) proposed. Having regard to the form of the telegrams, so far as he remembered there was nothing which could be laid upon the Table of the House.

Mr. CHILDERS asked, whether, if that was so, the Government had any objection to give the House the substance of the financial information which they had received?

Mr. FAWCETT rose upon a point of Order. The Under Secretary of State for India, in his opening remarks, had made certain statements with regard to Indian finances from private information derived from telegrams. He had always considered it to be the rule that Ministers were not allowed to quote from documents which were in their possession, and not in that of hon. Members, without producing such documents, in order that they might be compared with the statements made. It was absolutely impossible for them to arrive at any clear opinion on this matter, however anxious they might be with regard to the position of the Indian finances. The Secretary of State for India, on Monday last, made certain statements as to the Indian finances, and then the Under Secretary, without presuming to lay a single document on the Table, came down to that House and stated that he had received a series of telegrams, the effect of which, as he understood, was to reduce the anticipated surplus of Monday last from £2,100,000 to £1,500,000. He wished to ask, whether it was not the invariable practice that, in financial debates, Ministers should lay upon the Table of the House the documents from which they quoted?

Mr. SPEAKER: The practice of the House is, that if an official document is quoted by a Minister it shall be laid before the House. At the same time, if the public interest should be opposed to that proceeding, that would be accepted by the House as a reason for withholding the documents.

MR. E. STANHOPE thought the hon. Member for Hackney was somewhat mistaken as to the effect of the telegrams referred to. They had received a good many telegrams on the subject, and there had been some difficulty in working out exact amounts, with the figures supplied from India in addition to those already known at the India Office; but the work had been done with the greatest possible industry and care. He did not wish to lay imperfect information before the House, and he felt that it would not be advisable to produce the confidential telegrams which had been received.

MR. MITCHELL HENRY said, he hoped that the Government would be able to-morrow to state the grounds on which they based their estimate that the expenses of the war would amount to £1,200,000. No one who had listened to the debate, or who remembered their experience of the Abyssinian War, could believe that there was the slightest real ground for thinking that the expense would be limited to that amount. He objected to be led into a trap of that kind by such vague statements. He was bound to say that he thought the cost of the war would far exceed £1,200,000; and it was absolutely impossible that the necessary provisions made for many months in advance, in the arrangements made for commissariat and ammunition stores, could be met by anything like that amount. Under these circumstances he thought the country was entitled to know the grounds on which the Government made that confident statement.

SIR PATRICK O'BRIEN said, if there was any information which the Government thought contrary to the interests of the public service to produce they had every right to keep it back; but the position was quite a distinct one when they first quoted the information and then refused to give the document on which it was founded. A similar question was raised in the Denmark Debate of 1869, and, if his memory served him rightly, one of the things insisted on most strongly on that occasion by Gentlemen sitting on the front Bench opposite, was that Mr. Layard, then Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, should produce the documents he referred to. If Sir Austen Layard was asked to produce those documents in the Denmark Debate, it seemed to him to be on all fours with the present position, when the Under Secretary of State for India used information which he might have kept back and then stated it was not in the public interest to produce the documents on which it was based. There might be statements in it which it would not be well to produce to the House, but, looking at it from a common-sense point of view, he could not see that, with the numerous and efficient Staff of the India Office, they were not in a position to give them almost immediately the information relied on by the Under Secretary of State to warrant the statement he had made to the House.

MR. DILLWYN suggested that the Government might give substantially the information which was required. In whatever form they gave it, so long as it was substantially correct, it would be sufficient.

MR. E. STANHOPE said, the Government did not desire in the least to keep back any information; they only desired that any information they gave should be in a form that would be satisfactory to the House, and that its publication should not be injurious to the public service. He would, therefore, look into the documents to-morrow morning and see if there was anything in them that could be given. In any case, the House might be assured that every satisfactory information should be given when it was received, and that there was no hesitation on the part of the Government in laying it before the House.

MR. GOSCHEN said, that what had fallen from the Under Secretary of State clearly showed that there was no desire on the part of the Government to put the House into a false position. If the Government were not able to give more than had been stated that day, it would be satisfactory to have the figures before them in a printed form.

Motion *agreed to.*

Debate *adjourned* till *To-morrow.*

DISQUALIFICATION BY MEDICAL RELIEF BILL.—[Bill 22.]

(*Mr. Rathbone, Sir John Kennaway, Sir Charles W. Dilke, Mr. Ritchie.*)

COMMITTEE.

Order for Committee read.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."—(*Mr. Rathbone.*)

Mr. Serjeant SPINKS said, that he did not wish to delay the progress of the Bill; but he thought it right to say that he had received communications that convinced him that before the House went into Committee upon it there ought to be a longer opportunity afforded the country for considering its provisions. He would therefore appeal to the hon. Member for Liverpool not to attempt to push the Bill through that night; he had already achieved a great success in getting his Bill to a second reading so soon in the Session; and, therefore, he did hope that he would be good enough not to press it through that night.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Debate be now adjourned." —(*Mr. Serjeant Spinks.*)

Mr. COURTNEY said, he had not the privilege of being present when the Bill was read a second time, but he understood that discussion of its principle had then been deferred, and the Government appeared still unwilling to say anything about it. He thought it would be much better for the Government to state its opinion of the Bill, rather than to wait until it went into Committee. It struck him as harmless; but as already indicated by the hon. and learned Member for Oldham, there might be some difference of opinion entertained. He hoped it was not asking too much to request the Government then to state what opinion they entertained of the Bill.

Mr. SALT was of opinion that a general assent had been given to the principle of the Bill, and did not wish on behalf of the Government to oppose the Bill; but he thought that the object of the promoters of the Bill would be best carried out if they would consent to go into Committee *pro forma*, in order to give time for further consideration. The Bill touched some very important questions, upon which opinions, and perhaps interests, in large towns in various parts of the country differed. With no wish to delay the progress of the Bill, he yet hoped the promoter would be content with going into Committee *pro forma.*

Mr. RATHBONE would be very glad to meet the suggestion, if he were sure of obtaining an opportunity of taking the sense of the House on the question. It must, however, be in the knowledge of the House, that in the course of Business last Session, after a certain period of the Session had arrived, it was perfectly possible for one single Member to defeat the wishes of the House with regard to the Bill. Under those circumstances, he did hope that the opposition to the Bill going into Committee would not be pressed, though he should be perfectly willing to concur in any opinion of the House if against the Bill. He thought it would be better to go on now rather than to sit up night after night, with the chance of carrying the Bill being liable to be defeated by a single Member, as was the case last Session.

Question put, and *negatived.*

Original Question put, and *agreed to.*

Bill *considered* in Committee, and *reported;* as amended, to be considered *To-morrow.*

BANKERS' BOOKS (EVIDENCE) BILL.

On Motion of Sir John Lubbock, Bill to amend the Law of Evidence with respect to Bankers' Books, *ordered* to be brought in by Sir John Lubbock, Mr. Herschell, Sir Charles Mills, and Mr. Rodwell.

Bill *presented,* and read the first time. [Bill 65.]

DISPENSARIES (IRELAND) BILL.

On Motion of Mr. Bruen, Bill to give facilities for providing Dispensary houses and dwelling houses for Medical Officers of Dispensary Districts in certain parts of Ireland, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. Bruen, Mr. Downing, Mr. Mulholland, and Dr. Ward.

Bill *presented,* and read the first time. [Bill 66.]

KITCHEN AND REFRESHMENT ROOMS (HOUSE OF COMMONS).

Ordered, That a Standing Committee be appointed to control the arrangements of the Kitchen and Refreshment Rooms, in the department of the Serjeant at Arms attending this House:—Mr. Adam, Mr. Dick, Sir William Dyke, Mr. Edwards, Mr. Goldney, Captain Hayter, Lord Kensington, Mr. Muntz, Mr. Richard Power, Mr. Stacpoole, Sir Henry Wolff, Lord Henry Thynne, and Mr. Monk: —Five to be the quorum.

House adjourned at One o'clock.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Tuesday, 17*th December*, 1878.

HER ROYAL HIGHNESS THE GRAND DUCHESS OF HESSE (PRINCESS ALICE).

ADDRESS OF CONDOLENCE.

THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELD: My Lords, when last I had the honour of addressing your Lordships it was in the warm controversy of public life. I little thought then that before we dispersed I should have again to appeal to your Lordships. The subject to which I have to refer on this occasion is one on which there will be unanimity—but, alas, it is the unanimity of sorrow. My Lords, you are too well aware that a great calamity has fallen on the Royal Family of this realm. A Princess, who loved us though she left us, and who always revisited her Fatherland with delight—one of those women the brightness of whose being adorns society and inspires the circle in which she lives—has been removed from this world, to the anguish of her family, her friends, and her subjects. The Princess Alice—for I will venture to call her by that name, though she wore a Crown—afforded one of the most striking instances that I can remember of richness of culture and rare intelligence combined with the most pure and refined domestic sentiments. You, my Lords, who knew her life well, can recall those agonizing hours when she attended the dying bed of her illustrious Father, who had directed her studies and formed her tastes. You can recall, too, the moment at which she attended her Royal Brother at a time when the hopes of England seemed to depend on his life, and now you can remember too well how, when the whole of her own family were stricken by a malignant disease, she had been to them the angel in the house till at last her own vital power perhaps exhausted, she has herself fallen. My Lords, there is something wonderfully piteous in the immediate cause of her death. The physicians who permitted her to watch over her suffering family enjoined her under no circumstances whatever to be tempted into an embrace. Her admirable self-restraint guarded her through the crises of this terrible complaint in safety. She remembered and observed the injunctions of her physicians. But it became her lot to break to her son, quite a youth, the death of his youngest sister, to whom he was devotedly attached. The boy was so overcome with misery that the agitated mother to console him clasped him in her arms—and thus received the kiss of death. My Lords, I hardly know an incident more pathetic. It is one by which poets might be inspired, and in which the artist in every class, whether in picture, in statue, or in gem, might find a fitting subject of commemoration. My Lords, we will not dwell at this moment on the sufferings of the husband whom she has left behind and of the children who were so devoted to her; but our immediate duty is to offer our condolence to one whose happiness and whose sorrows always excite and command the loyalty and affectionate respect of this House. Upon Her Majesty a great grief has fallen which none but the Queen can so completely and acutely feel. Seventeen years ago Her Majesty experienced the crushing sorrow of her life, and then she was particularly sustained by the Daughter whom she has now lost, who assisted her by her labours, and aided her by her presence and counsel. Her Majesty now feels that the cup of sorrow was not then exhausted. No language can express the consolation we wish to extend to our Sovereign in her sorrow—such suffering is too fresh to allow of solace; but, however exalted, there are none but must be sustained by the consciousness that they possess the sympathy of a nation. My Lords, with these feelings I beg to propose for your Lordships' acceptance the following Motion:—

"That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, to express the deep concern of this House at the great loss which Her Majesty has sustained by the death of Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Hesse, Princess Alice of Great Britain and Ireland, second daughter of Her Majesty the Queen, and to condole with Her Majesty on this melancholy occasion.

"To assure Her Majesty that this House will ever feel the warmest interest in whatever concerns Her Majesty's domestic relations; and to declare the ardent wishes of this House for the happiness of Her Majesty and of her family."

Earl GRANVILLE: My Lords, I feel your Lordships will expect, and indeed wish, me to join in the declaration which the noble Earl has made with so much feeling of the heartfelt loyalty and deep sorrow with which we all desire to approach our gracious Sovereign on the occasion of this Address. My Lords, the accidents of a political career gave me some opportunity of observing the domestic life of the Royal Family during the course of eleven years. At the beginning of that period Princess Alice was a singularly attractive child of seven years old. I doubt whether any childhood or youth was ever more joyous and bright, or ever gave a livelier promise of that which was afterwards so amply fulfilled. At the end of that time I had the honour of proposing an Address in this House on Her Royal Highness's marriage—a marriage which seemed founded upon all the best securities for wedded happiness. The child had grown into womanhood with all those personal, moral, and mental qualities which the noble Earl has so well described. The principal characteristics of the married life of the Grand Duchess appear to have been—first, absolute devotion to her husband and children; next, a course not merely of benevolence, but of unceasing thoughtful beneficence to all depending upon her; and, lastly, a remarkable talent for acquiring the sympathy and attracting the regard of some of the most gifted of the intellectual country which she had adopted, and to whose interests she was devoted without ever breaking a link in the chain of memories and associations which bound her to the country of her birth. The noble Earl has already alluded to the singular coincidence of three dates which will never pass from the pages of English history. My Lords, I trust that neither the writer nor your Lordships will think it indiscreet if, instead of trusting to my own language to impress your feelings as to the loss which has on this last 14th of December befallen the Royal Families of England and Darmstadt, I read to you a few words extracted from a letter written on the day of the sad tragedy by a brother passionately devoted to his sister, and who left England last night to pay the last sad tribute of affection and respect to her beloved memory—

"So good, so kind, so clever. We had gone through so much together—my father's illness, then my own; and she has succumbed to the pernicious malady which laid low her husband and children, whom she nursed and watched with unceasing care and attention. . . . The Queen bears up bravely, but her grief is deep beyond words."

My Lords, I will add nothing. I only ask to be allowed to second the Motion which has been made.

On Question, *agreed to, nemine dissentiente.*

Ordered, That the said Address be presented to Her Majesty by the Lords with White Staves.

House adjourned at half past Five o'clock, to Thursday the 13th of February next, a quarter before Five o'clock.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Tuesday, 17*th December,* 1878.

MINUTES.]—Public Bills—*Second Reading*—Ancient Monuments [52].
Considered as amended — Disqualification by Medical Relief * [22].

QUESTIONS.

POOR LAW—METROPOLITAN UNIONS—OAKUM PICKING BY FEMALE PAUPERS.—QUESTION.

Mr. COLE asked the President of the Local Government Board, Whether he is aware that in the Poplar and other Metropolitan Unions a rule has been adopted and acted upon that every female adult pauper, not suffering under temporary or permanent infirmity of body, who shall be relieved in the workhouse, in return for such relief shall, as a task, pick four pounds of unbeaten oakum per day; and, if so, whether he approves of such rule, or whether some other and less severe work could not be substituted?

Mr. SCLATER-BOOTH, in reply, said, the rule in question was sanctioned by the Local Government Board, and the Guardians had exercised their own discretion in putting it in force. He saw no reason for disputing the exercise of that discretion in the present instance. In the neighbourhood of Poplar, oakum picking was pursued by women and children as a regular industry.

CONDITION OF THE COUNTRY—THE PREVALENT DISTRESS.—QUESTIONS.

MR. J. G. HUBBARD asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether he can correct or corroborate the report that we are almost face to face with such a crisis of distress as this generation has never known; a distress affecting even the Metropolis, but operating with greater intensity in the cotton, coal, and iron districts?

MR. ASSHETON CROSS: I presume my right hon. Friend's Question refers to distress among the poor inhabitants of the localities he has mentioned, and not to any commercial distress? [Mr. J. G. HUBBARD: Yes.] Everyone—and no one more than myself and the Government, and, in fact, this House—sympathizes with the poor inhabitants of all the great centres of industry in their present distress; but from all the inquiries I have been able to make I think the statement contained in the Question of my right hon. Friend, is a considerable exaggeration and does not agree with the true facts of the case. Therefore, I hope that, at all events, no unnecessary alarm will be excited as to the state of distress that undoubtedly exists. I have here a letter which I have received from a highly respected gentleman, the Chairman of the Board of Supervision at Edinburgh. He says—

> "So far as I am able at present to judge, I am not apprehensive that the distress will be beyond the ordinary means of relief."

The Mayor of Liverpool telegraphs—

> "There is considerable distress here, and in this respect we anticipate a severe winter; but it is not likely to be greater than we have experienced before with a depressed state of trade in the cotton districts."

Another telegram, from the Mayor of Manchester, says—

> "There is scarcity of work and consequent distress, beyond doubt increased by severity of weather; but local sympathy is actively aroused and charitable efforts abound. There is no wish for Government aid. Manchester is quite able to bear the strain."

I am quite sure that everyone who has it in his power to relieve distress will very willingly do so.

MR. MUNDELLA asked, if there was any statement from the authorities in the coal and iron districts—Sheffield, for instance?

MR. ASSHETON CROSS: I have not had time to inquire into the state of the coal and iron districts since Notice was given of the Question. The right hon. Gentleman's Question was only put on the Paper last night.

MR. ANDERSON asked, if any communication had been received from Glasgow?

MR. ASSHETON CROSS answered in the negative.

Afterwards,—

MR. HANBURY TRACY asked the President of the Local Government Board, If, in the present state of severe distress in some parts of the country, he will consider whether it may be necessary in any cases to modify the rules ordinarily governing the administration of poor relief, in order to tide over the emergency?

MR. SCLATER-BOOTH, in reply, said, that no evidence had as yet been brought to his notice of such severe distress as to require exceptional measures. On the contrary, he found that in 20 of the largest Lancashire Unions, the increase of paupers in the first week of December was 13,482. In 15 of the West Riding Unions it was 3,063; in the whole of Durham, 196; in seven Unions in Staffordshire, 1,141; in South Wales, 727; in the Metropolis, 52. Without wishing to depreciate the distress which undoubtedly prevailed, he might illustrate these figures by a comparison with a period of severe pressure on the rates. In Manchester there were at the end of November, 1862 (the period of the cotton famine), 39,023 paupers; there were now 6,243. He would add that the General Regulations of the Local Government Board, contained numerous exceptional provisions to enable Boards of Guardians to deal with extraordinary emergencies. These provisions had quite recently stood the test of severe distress in the South Wales iron and coal districts.

THE SLAVE TRADE—ZANZIBAR. QUESTION.

Mr. WHITWELL asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether any information has reached the Foreign Office regarding a renewal of the Slave Trade from Central Africa through Zanzibar; and, whether any measures can be taken or are in contemplation to check this traffic at its source in the interior of Africa?

Mr. BOURKE, in reply, said, a despatch had been received from Dr. Kirk in November last, stating that a caravan of 300 slaves was said to have reached the coast of Zanzibar. These slaves were conducted, not as usual by Arabs, but by Natives of the interior. One of the Governors of the Sultan behaved very well, and refused to allow the slaves or any part of the caravan to enter the villages on the coast. They were taken into the interior, and placed under the protection of the Abdallah. When the Sultan heard of the circumstances he sent for the Governor, and they have been detained by the Sultan ever since. The Government had no means of stopping the traffic at its source, which was a long way in the interior of Africa. All they could do was to do their best to make it unremunerative by stopping it at the coast.

TURKEY—RUMOURED GUARANTEED LOAN.—QUESTION.

Mr. H. SAMUELSON, asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether any communications have passed from Sir H. Layard to Her Majesty's Government containing references to a proposed guarantee of a Loan of a considerable amount to be raised by the Turkish Government; and, if so whether he will lay them, or any part of them, upon the Table of the House?

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER, in reply, said, a letter relating to a proposed guarantee of a loan of a considerable amount, to be raised by the Turkish Government, had been received from Sir Henry Austen Layard by the Foreign Office and the Treasury. He had not had time fully to examine it, but he might observe, that as far as Sir Henry Austen Layard was concerned, he stated that he had not held out any hopes to the Sultan that the proposed loan would be guaranteed by Her Majesty's Government. No such engagement or guarantee would be entertained by Her Majesty's Government without the previous approval of Parliament.

THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN—INDIAN FINANCE—BOMBAY.—QUESTION.

Mr. MUNDELLA asked the Under Secretary of State for India, If it is true, as stated in the "Times" telegram of yesterday, dated Calcutta, December 15th, that, having regard to the cost of the war in Afghanistan, the Bombay Government have issued an order directing

> "that, in view of the immediate importance of avoiding or deferring expenditure where it is possible till next year, no new works are to be commenced, and all allotments provided for them are cancelled; all works in progress are to be suspended, except in cases of urgent necessity; nor are any repairs to be effected beyond such as are absolutely essential, repairs of that description having, moreover, to be reduced to a minimum. No further purchases of tools or plant are to be made, and all applications for grants for public works are to be retained until such time as the state of the finances will permit;"

and, if it is true, will he lay such Order upon the Table of the House?

Mr. E. STANHOPE: We have no information on the subject beyond that contained in the telegram in *The Times.* I think it most probable that the Government of Bombay is taking steps to restrict expenditure as much as can reasonably be done. The hon. Member assumes that it is done with regard to the war in Afghanistan; but I find no such statement in the telegram.

TURKEY—COMMERCIAL TREATIES. QUESTION.

Mr. WHITWELL asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether any and what Commercial Treaties are in progress by which British productions and manufactures will be admitted on satisfactory terms into the states made independent, or newly constituted, in what was recently European Turkey; and, whether the eight per cent Import Duty said to be charged on goods imported into Cyprus will be charged on British goods?

Mr. BOURKE, in reply, said, that no Commercial Treaties were being negotiated with the States to which the Question of the hon. Gentleman related—unless Roumania were referred to. A Treaty with that country was, as he had previously stated, in process of negotiation. The commercial relations with the other States were regulated by the Berlin Treaty, and those with Servia were prescribed by a clause in that Treaty. As regarded Cyprus, things remained as they were.

AFGHANISTAN—NORTH-WEST FRONTIER—LORD NAPIER OF MAGDALA.

QUESTION.

MR. **LEITH** asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether, with reference to the use which has been made by the Government of the opinion, by telegram, of Lord Napier of Magdala in favour of the alteration and rectification of the north-west frontier of India, the Government have obtained any other opinions of military men on the subject, either in favour or against the alteration; and, if so, whether the Government will lay those opinions upon the Table of the House; and, whether they will also lay upon the Table the telegram sent by the Government to Lord Napier, and to which his telegram was a reply?

COLONEL **STANLEY**, in reply, said, the hon. Gentleman would, perhaps, allow him to answer the Question, although, as he had become aware that it was to be put only within the last hour, he was afraid he had not been able to acquaint himself so fully with the matter to which it related as he otherwise would have been. The last part of the Question, he might add, showed that some misapprehension existed in the mind of the hon. Gentleman on the subject. He (Colonel Stanley) had been informed by General Dillon, who was now Assistant Military Secretary at the War Office, and who formerly served on the Staff of Lord Napier, that the latter had telegraphed to him to say that he was most anxious to be present at the discussion on the Afghan Question in the House of Lords; but, not being able at the last moment to make arrangements for the purpose so as to be in time, Lord Napier sent to General Dillon by telegraph a Memorandum, which he desired him to place before the Commander in Chief, with a request that His Royal Highness might make of it any use he might think fit. The message was communicated to His Royal Highness; but as he did not take part in the debate in the House of Lords, he handed the Memorandum to the Prime Minister. He understood that Lord Napier was anxious, as a Peer of Parliament, that his views should not be misrepresented; but he wished to add that no telegram asking him to express them had been sent to him on the part of the Government, and that his telegram was not to be considered in any way as a reply to one from them. As regarded the opinions of military men on the question of the rectification of Frontier, he had to state that the Government, as a Government, were not in possession of any such opinions at the present moment; but, of course, in the exercise of his office, he was in communication with various military authorities on all questions of military interest. He did not, however, deem it to be consistent with his duty to lay such communications, which were necessarily of a private and confidential character, on the Table of the House; but, at the same time, he should not use in debate any memorandum which was not of a public nature.

PARLIAMENT—QUESTIONS—STANDING ORDERS.—QUESTION.

COLONEL **BERESFORD**, who had given Notice to ask the Chairman of the Metropolitan Board of Works, Whether his attention has been directed to the reports in the newspapers of the 13th July and the 3rd of August, of a case wherein a complaint was made against the London Street Tramways Company by a private resident to enforce penalties for having failed to keep in good condition and repair, and so as not to be a danger or annoyance to the ordinary traffic, the rails of their tramways and the substructure on which the same rested, in the Hampstead and Kentish Town Roads, and in High Street, Camden Town, and in which the fact of the non-repair was admitted, but the magistrate decided that the Act of Parliament referred to gave no remedy to a private inhabitant but to the Metropolitan Board of Works, who only had power to enforce penalties of five pounds per day; whether in consequence any and what steps had been taken to enforce the law against the Tramway Company, or to recover such penalties; and, what had been done by the Metropolitan Board in consequence of the receipt of a Letter from a Correspondent to the Chairman of the Board, of May 1st, 1878, and the subsequent Correspondence thereon, was proceeding to put his Question accordingly, when——

Mr. CHILDERS rose to Order. *Primâ facie* the hon. Gentleman was acting in violation of the Standing Orders of the House in putting a Question which was addressed neither to a Minister of the Crown with reference to public matters, nor to a private Member with regard to any Bill or Motion before the House. On the other hand, he believed it had on a previous occasion been ruled by the Speaker, that it had for some time been the practice to permit Questions relating to matters of public interest to be addressed to the Chairman of the Metropolitan Board of Works, who, although not a Minister, might, perhaps, become one, and who meanwhile discharged very important public functions. These Questions had always been confined to matters of public importance. The point involved in the Question of the hon. and gallant Member for Southwark, however, referred merely to an action which had been brought by some person against a Tramway Company and to a letter from an anonymous correspondent, and he did not think the Chairman of the Board ought to be called upon in his place to answer a Question of that kind. If the Rules of the House were to be violated in that way, Questions might be put to every Mayor or Chairman of a Local Board who happened to have a seat in it with respect to the affairs of that municipality or local authority.

Mr. WHITWELL said, it was not customary to put Questions such as that of the hon. and gallant Member for Southwark to private Members.

Mr. SPEAKER said, the right hon. Member for Pontefract had stated quite accurately what the Rules of the House were with regard to putting Questions. He was also correct in saying that it had for some years past been the practice to make an exception in enforcing those Rules in the case of Questions addressed to the Chairman of the Metropolitan Board of Works, in consideration of the magnitude of the interests which he represented. That practice, which had been the practice of his Predecessors in the Chair, he had followed by permitting Questions to be put to the Chairman of the Metropolitan Board on matters of public importance. He must, however, say that the Question now addressed to the hon. and gallant Member seemed to him to be against the spirit of the Rules of the House; and if his attention had been previously called to it he should have pointed out to the hon. and gallant Member for Southwark that it would be scarcely proper to put it.

Sir JAMES M'GAREL HOGG asked the permission of the House to state his readiness to answer that or any other Question which might be put to him by any hon. Member.

INDIA—FINANCIAL CONDITION.

QUESTION.

Lord FRANCIS HERVEY asked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether he can give the House any information with respect to the telegram to which he had referred on the previous evening relating to the condition of Indian Finance?

Mr. E. STANHOPE: In consequence of what occurred last night, I have looked over the recent financial telegrams, and found that they would have conveyed very vague information to hon. Members who are not conversant with the Finance Accounts of India. But as I understood that what right hon. Gentlemen opposite really wanted was the best information we have at our command, I have had a short statement printed giving all the details as clearly as we can; and copies of it are in the Vote Office.

ARMY—THE AUXILIARY FORCES.

QUESTION.

Colonel KENNARD asked the Secretary of State for War, If the Committee that sat last summer on matters relating to the Volunteer Force had concluded their inquiries; and, if so, when the Report was likely to be issued?

Colonel STANLEY, in reply, said, that the Committee had reported, or were just about to sign their Report. He would be happy to lay all the Papers connected with the subject on the Table of the House.

AFGHANISTAN (EXPENSES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS).—QUESTION.

MR. J. G. HUBBARD asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether he could give any definite information as to the intentions of the Government in relation to the distribution of the expense of the Afghan War between Great Britain and India?

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: It is difficult within the limits of an Answer to reply satisfactorily to the Question of my right hon. Friend, because the matter involves very serious considerations, affecting, as it does, both England and India, and requires more discussion than I can now venture upon. I hope to be able to refer to the Question at more length in the course of the evening. We should certainly not assent to any principle upon which the military operations of the war would be conducted by one Government—the Government of India—on the understanding that the expenses would be defrayed by another—the Government of England—and the same objections would equally apply to any fixed proportion being arranged, as my right hon. Friend suggests. I believe that that would lead to extravagance, and would throw more, rather than less, of the burden on India in the long run. Nevertheless, I fully admit that the subject is one which requires special consideration, and by-and-by I shall be prepared to enter on it, and to state my views. This, however, is not the proper time for doing so; for without knowing the extent or the expense of the war, I am not able to say what fixed sum, or what proportion, ought to be borne by the Indian Revenue.

MOTION.

ADJOURNMENT.

Motion made, and Question proposed,

"That this House will, at the rising of the House this day, adjourn till Thursday the 13th day of February next."—(*Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer.*)

THE RHODOPE COMMISSION.

OBSERVATIONS.

MR. RYLANDS said, he thought the statement just made by the right hon. Gentleman fully justified the remarks he was about to make. He thought that before they agreed to the Motion for the Adjournment of the House, they were entitled to more information than had been afforded respecting the charges of the Afghan War. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer had told them that the question of apportioning the expenses raised very grave issues. ["Order!"]

MR. SPEAKER said, that there was an Order on the Paper for a Motion dealing with the subject, which was to be discussed at a later period of the evening. The observations of the hon. Member were, therefore, irregular at that time.

MR. RYLANDS said, the object of his rising was simply to ask the right hon. Gentleman to tell them, before they passed this Motion for Adjournment, whether the Government had come to a determination to charge any portion of the expenditure in connection with the war upon the Imperial Exchequer?—because, if so, it had always been the practice of previous Governments, when making a charge upon the Exchequer for such a purpose, to take the earliest opportunity possible to come forward and lay upon the Table a Vote of Credit for the purpose they proposed. He hoped he should not be considered out of Order if he impressed upon the Ministry the necessity of giving the House some information on this point before they adjourned——

MR. SPEAKER said, the hon. Gentleman was altogether out of Order in the remarks he was making.

LORD ELCHO wished to make a few remarks on a subject which had been debated on the previous day, but on which he had not been able to give his opinion at the time. On a former occasion he had asked, but had some difficulty in getting an answer to his Question, whether the Government believed or did not believe in the trustworthiness of the Report of the Rhodope Commissioners?

MR. DILLWYN rose to Order.

MR. SPEAKER said, that the ruling he had just given in the case of the hon. Member for Burnley did not apply to that of the noble Lord, who was not debating a subject ordered to be taken into consideration on that day. At the same time, he doubted whether the subject could be introduced conveniently on a Motion for the Adjournment of the House.

Lord ELCHO said, he thought he should be in Order in referring to a subject which had been debated on a previous day—he meant the Rhodope Commission. He was in the House when the Question came up; but he took no part in the debate, partly because he had not the necessary documents with him, and partly because he was not very well satisfied with the course that had been taken by Her Majesty's Government. It would be in the recollection of the House that on a former occasion he asked a Question on the subject, and had considerable difficulty in getting an answer. He wanted to know, whether the Government believed or not in the trustworthiness of the Report of the Rhodope Commissioners?

Mr. DILLWYN said, that as his hon. Friend the Member for Burnley had been called to Order for alluding to the Afghan War, he wished to ask, if the noble Lord was in Order in alluding to the Rhodope Commission?

Mr. SPEAKER said, he had ruled the hon. Member for Burnley to be out of Order, because he was anticipating the discussion of a subject that would come on later in the evening. That objection did not apply to the remarks of the noble Lord; but, at the same time, he reminded him of the inconvenience of the course he was pursuing.

Lord ELCHO said, that it would be the last thing he should wish to do to intrude himself upon the House; but he was very anxious to say a few words now, because he might not have the chance of introducing the subject in the subsequent debate. The authenticity of the Rhodope Report was questioned by several hon. Gentlemen opposite, although it was the result of a Commission appointed by the Berlin Congress, and it had been signed by four out of the six Commissioners appointed. When the "Bulgarian horrors," as they were called, took place, no sooner was there a notice of anything in the newspapers than Questions were asked in Parliament concerning them. Thus, he found that when a voice—an almost solitary voice—sounded over sea and land, the voice of a newspaper Correspondent — when that voice sounded in *The Daily News* of the 23rd of June, on the 26th and three days afterwards, the Duke of Argyll in the House of Lords, and Mr. W. E. Forster in the House of Commons, asked Questions regarding it. On the 8th of July another notice appeared in *The Daily News*, and on the 10th, Mr. Forster renewed his inquiries. On the 17th Mr. Baxter, revived the interrogatories. On the 16th of August, the question of the cruelties to the Bulgarians was again raised, and further attempts were made to penetrate the mystery in the official mind on the 6th, 7th, and 9th, and the 11th of August. The writer of the pamphlet from which he was reading said on the 5th of September that he was still depending upon a foreign source for any official information, and that foreign source was Mr. Schuyler. That pamphlet was dated Hawarden, the 6th of September, and it was entitled "Bulgarian Horrors," by the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M.P. Now, he had quoted that pamphlet to show that no sooner was the question of those "Bulgarian Horrors," raised in an anonymous way in the columns of the Press than five, six, seven, eight, eleven times was the subject immediately brought before the House by the hon. Gentlemen opposite, having no evidence whatever of the trustworthiness of the Report, except what the pamphlet contained and a foreign writer supplied. On the other hand, what happened with regard to the Rhodope Commission? As he had said—it was appointed by the Berlin Congress. It went into the inquiry—it took evidence in the way that the Commissioners had agreed upon among themselves, and the inquiry went on until the evidence became unfavourable to the Russian soldiery. No sooner did that take place than the Russian Commissioner objected; and his objection was backed by the Austrian Government, who said in a telegram—"The evidence of most of the refugees concerning the atrocities committed by the Russian soldiers is unanswerable." The Russian Commissioner wished to stop these accusations, and threatened if they went on he would retire, and so put an end to the Commission. But in spite of the remonstrance of the Russian Commissioner it did go on, and the Report had become a Parliamentary document. Now, hon. Gentlemen opposite declined to admit that evidence. They looked upon as trustworthy the anonymous evidence which appeared in *The Daily News* and other papers. Now, Consul General Fawcett, in his Report, had said that Mr. Baring's evidence was taken in precisely the same way as the evidence taken by the Commission. He also stated that he knew that, for atrocities committed at Batak, Mussulmans had been hanged upon no other evidence than that of these Reports. He (Lord Elcho) had addressed a letter to Lord Shaftesbury—who had been Chairman at one of the meetings at St. James' Hall, and who was not the least intelligent man or the least accustomed to deal with public affairs—with reference to the Rhodope horrors. In his letter in answer, Lord Shaftesbury said—

> "I share the belief that the atrocities reported by the Rhodope Commissioners are strictly accurate. No one, I think, can read that document without coming to the conclusion that though it has not the usual cold and stilted tone of official papers it has a character of authenticity, and that the Russian Commissioner, aided by the German Commissioner, endeavoured in every way to suppress or evade the evidence. Probably, since the days when the Goths and Huns and Vandals overran Christendom, there is nothing to equal what is now recorded against the armies of the Czar."

This was the ground upon which he ventured to bring this subject before the House. He would make no comments upon the inconsistencies of hon. Gentlemen or right hon. Gentlemen opposite. They no doubt shared the horror of Lord Shaftesbury and himself with regard to these atrocities; but it was to be regretted they showed so much anxiety to bring justice home to Mussulmans who had perpetrated horrors upon Christians, and so little desire to bring it home to Russian soldiers, who were guilty of horrors upon Mussulmans before which those other horrors paled.

MR. E. JENKINS rose to move the adjournment of the debate until after the debate upon the expenses of the Afghan War had been concluded. He supposed he should not be out of Order if, without referring at all to the substance of the debate, he pointed out that in the position in which the House was now placed, after the declaration of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, it was impossible that they could separate without having received from the right hon. Gentleman some more specific statement as to what was the intention of the Government with regard to the apportionment of the expenditure.

MR. SPEAKER said, that it was not competent to the hon. Member to make this Motion, there being at this time another Motion before the House.

MR. HERSCHELL said, he could not allow the speech of the noble Lord the Member for Haddingtonshire to pass in silence. No doubt, it was extremely inexpedient to enter upon a discussion of the subject, because it was impossible to exhaust it on that occasion. He had himself gone into the matter very carefully, and was prepared to discuss it at the proper time with the noble Lord or with anyone else. Nothing could be less chivalrous than to vent any ill-feeling they might have against Russia by too great an eagerness to believe reports against her troops. The evidence was not of such a nature as they themselves would be willing to be condemned on. For the present, however, he would merely enter his protest against the views of the noble Lord, believing that when the time came he should be able to show that the Report, though it might have some foundation, was not to be accepted as absolutely to be relied on. He deprecated the raising of a question by the noble Lord as to the humanity of those who sat on that side of the House. It was not their custom to regard such matters from a religious standpoint. They were all at one in denouncing any cruelties that had been clearly established; and he did not think it a pleasing mode of commencing a discussion to cast aspersions upon one another or claim a monopoly of humanity.

LORD ELCHO explained that he had not accused hon. Members opposite of inhumanity. He had no doubt they had as much humanity as hon. Gentlemen on his side of the House; but the inconsistency of their conduct required to be pointed out.

MR. ANDERSON said, he had been about to make similar remarks upon the subject; but what he intended to say on the subject of the Rhodope Report had been much better expressed by the hon. and learned Member for Durham (Mr. Herschell). He thought it would be extremely inconvenient to discuss the matter then; but he had examined the whole question, and should at some other time be prepared to enter into a discussion upon it. What he had risen to say was upon a totally different question. He could not avoid feeling very strongly, from the reply given by the Home Secretary earlier in the evening, that the Government did not appreciate the real gravity of the industrial prospects of the country. The right hon. Gentleman quoted telegrams to prove that the country was not in a very bad state; but those telegrams were in no case from industrial centres. If he had gone to Glasgow, or to the coal districts, or to Sheffield, he would have found a very different state of things indeed. He (Mr. Anderson) had learned from Glasgow that there were 25,000 people there who were on the brink of starving, and who were only saved by the action of temporary relief. That state of affairs would become worse and worse; and the Government, before they knew where they were, might have to consider the wants, not of a small number of Rhodope refugees, but of the starving millions of this country. He desired that the Government would consider what the state of the country was at the present moment. He did not mean to charge the present Government with having brought it about—he did not believe that they had done so—but he did believe that their policy had immensely aggravated it. He believed that by the state of irritation in which they had kept the world, keeping them always on the brink of war, and then plunging into an unjust war by way of variety, they had entirely prostrated the commerce of the country, and had ruined its industrial prosperity. He did not believe that they would see any remedy or any improved state of things as long as the present Government were in Office.

Mr. H. SAMUELSON said, that those who had taken action with reference to the horrors in Bulgaria would be equally ready to take action in the case of the alleged Rhodope horrors, if those horrors should be proved. But he did not exactly see what Government could do in the matter. They had already proved their incapacity to make the Turks, their sworn allies, punish convicted offenders, as in the case of Chefket Pasha, who, after Lord Derby had categorically demanded his punishment, had received promotion and reward, and was at that time occupying a high official position in Thessaly. Under these circumstances, it was not likely that the Russians, even if guilty, would submit to their dictation.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN moved the adjournment of the debate on the question of the adjournment of the House, because he understood that that was the only way in which, in strict Order, he would be able to ask the House whether it would not be better to adjourn the discussion on the main Question until Her Majesty's Government had furnished them with the information which they had promised to lay upon the Table. Her Majesty's Government had themselves to blame if the House was unwilling to put so much confidence in them as to separate before the promised information was given. They had deliberately left the country in the dark; and he did not feel inclined to assent to the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman until full information on this large question had been laid before the House. He begged to move the adjournment of the debate.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Debate be now adjourned."—(*Mr. Chamberlain.*)

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: I am afraid, from what has fallen from the hon. Member for Birmingham, that he and others are under a misapprehension in assuming that I have promised to give the House some further information on this question. I made no such promise. I merely said that I wish to state my views, and the views of Her Majesty's Government, with regard to the main principles which should be observed in the arrangement and the distribution between England and India of the burdens connected with the military operations. The propriety of those views will, of course, be open to argument. What Her Majesty's Government have all along proposed, and what Lord Cranbrook proposed in "another place," is that the House should now pass the Vote which is necessary to give legality to the application of the Indian Revenues towards the expenses of the military operations now going on in Afghanistan, and without which the application of a single rupee of such funds to that purpose would be illegal. I have already stated that this Vote is not intended in any way to prejudge the question with regard to the ultimate apportionment of the cost and burden of the war between the two countries; and I stated last night, and I do so again now, that we regard this as a case with exceptional features, such as may render it desirable, when we know to what extent the matter has grown, to come forward and make some proposal that this country should give assistance to the Indian Exchequer in the matter. On the other hand, Her Majesty's Government cannot accept the theory that in a case of this sort the Revenues of this country are to be placed—so to speak—at the disposal of the Administration of India, because we believe that such a course would lead to extravagance. With regard to the present position of the discussion, I understood that a common understanding had been arrived at last night that the debate on the main Question should be finished to-night, and that the House should then adjourn until the 13th of February, and I should regret if the House were to desire to go back from that understanding. To prolong the present discussion, however, would merely have the effect of shortening and, perhaps, crippling the debate upon the main Question. With regard to the question raised by the noble Lord (Lord Elcho) relating to the Rhodope Report, I earnestly press upon the House the fact that it is one which is connected with an important and delicate subject, which can be more conveniently discussed, if at all, at another opportunity.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON said, that if he shared the belief that appeared to be entertained below the Gangway, that Her Majesty's Government was about to give the House any additional information on this subject, he should be much disposed to agree to the course proposed by the hon. Member for Birmingham. He confessed, however, that he was rather sceptical as to the amount of information they were likely to receive from Government. He entirely agreed with the hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands), that if what had been said were correct—that Her Majesty's Government intended that any portion of the expenses of this war were to be borne by the British taxpayer—they should present an estimate to Parliament, and ask the sanction of the House to the expenditure. But that could not now be done before the adjournment. The House was now sufficiently aware that it was not the intention of Her Majesty's Government to lay such an Estimate upon the Table before the adjournment, neither did they intend to ask for a Vote of Credit on account of the war. In adopting the course they had done, Her Majesty's Government had assumed a great responsibility; and, in his opinion, they should not have deferred to a future occasion the question whether the whole cost of the war was to be borne eventually by India, or whether the burden was to be shared in this country. The expediency of the course which Her Majesty's Government had taken was one which the House would have to consider hereafter. At present they could not hope to receive from the Government any further information which might alter their views on the subject. In these circumstances, he thought that the hon. Member for Birmingham would gain nothing by persisting in his Motion for the adjournment of the debate. He must confess that he could not appreciate the object of the noble Lord (Lord Elcho) in raising the question of the Rhodope Commission. No doubt it was quite open to the noble Lord to take any action in the matter he thought fit. He thought the noble Lord's intention was to put some questions to the Government in reference to the course they took on Friday and yesterday; but that did not seem to be his object, which was rather to shake the Report in the face of hon. Members on this side, and to demand why they did not take the same course as they had taken in the case of the Bulgarian atrocities. The warm interest which had been felt by hon. Members on that side of the House in the Bulgarian atrocities was due to the fact that they felt that those atrocities, committed by the Turkish authorities, ought to have exercised a strong influence upon the policy of this country; but he did not see how that policy was to be affected by the Report in question. If the noble Lord believed that, in consequence of the Report to which he had referred, war ought to be declared against Russia, or any other course adopted, he should bring the matter before the House by a distinct

Motion. As it was, he must protest against the noble Lord introducing this subject without notice and without warning, and probably in the absence of many hon. Members who might have something to say in reference to it, and against his taunting them with having refrained from taking any action in the matter, when it was evident that Her Majesty's Government themselves did not intend to take any action in reference to it.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN said, that after the observations of the noble Marquess the Leader of the Opposition, and especially after the remark of the Chancellor of the Exchequer that he intended to state his views without giving the House any information on the question, he begged to withdraw his Amendment for the adjournment of the debate.

Motion, by leave, *withdrawn.*

Original Question put.

Resolved, That this House will, at the rising of the House this day, adjourn till Thursday the 13th day of February next.

ORDERS OF THE DAY.

ANCIENT MONUMENTS BILL.

(*Sir John Lubbock, Mr. Beresford Hope, Mr. Osborne Morgan, Sir Richard Wallace.*)

[BILL 52.] SECOND READING.

Order for Second Reading read.

Sir JOHN LUBBOCK, in moving that the Bill be now read a second time, said, that as the House had on several previous occasions affirmed the principle of the Bill, he thought hon. Members would not wish him to enter into the subject at length on the present occasion. He would only observe that the principle of the Bill was that, after proper notice had been given, an owner of one of the monuments comprised in the Bill who wished to destroy it should, at least, give the country the option of purchasing it at a fair price. As regarded the constitution of the Commission and other details, he did not ask the House to commit itself, though, for his part, he believed the Bill in its present form would work well; but he should be most ready to consider any suggestion with reference to it in Committee.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."—(*Sir John Lubbock.*)

Lord FRANCIS HERVEY asked, whether that was the same Bill as the hon. Baronet had introduced in previous Sessions? He had understood that the hon. Baronet was prepared to make considerable modifications in its provisions.

Sir JOHN LUBBOCK said, he had adopted all the recommendations of the Select Committee which sat on the measure, and also other suggestions, in order, as far as possible, to remove objections.

Motion *agreed to.*

Bill read a second time, and *committed* for *Thursday* 13th February.

AFGHANISTAN (EXPENSES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS).

ADJOURNED DEBATE RESUMED.

Order read, for resuming adjourned debate on Amendment proposed to Question [16th December],

"That, Her Majesty having directed a Military expedition of Her Forces charged upon Indian Revenues to be despatched against the Ameer of Afghanistan, this House consents that the Revenues of India shall be applied to defray the expenses of the Military operations which may be carried on beyond the external Frontiers of Her Majesty's Indian Possessions."—(*Mr. Edward Stanhope.*)

And which Amendment was

To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "this House is of opinion that it would be unjust that the Revenues of India should be chargeable with the extraordinary expenses of the Military operations now being carried on against the Ameer of Afghanistan,"—(*Mr. Fawcett,*)

instead thereof.

Question again proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

Debate *resumed.*

Mr. LYON PLAYFAIR: The Under Secretary of State for India asks power to defray the cost of the war in Afghanistan from the Revenues of India. But he has frankly and fairly explained that the £1,200,000 now foreseen form no estimate of the real cost of the war. This sum only represents that portion of the cost which is likely to occur before the 1st of April, and for which about £1,000,000 must be found by that date. The House must recollect that the Government has never given us the slightest estimate of the cost of the war. Indeed, the permanent increase of annual expenditure by the augmentation of the Army and of the rectification of our Frontier, is likely enough to be as much as is at present put down as the cost of the war. But the Government has given us no information, probably because they possess none, as to the actual and total cost of the war. All that the Secretary of State has said in "another place," and the Under Secretary of State in this House, is that £1,200,000 will be spent by the 1st of April. The war, if it extend into operations next spring, will cost an unknown quantity of money; so the Government, remembering how widely the Abyssinian Estimate differed from the actual expenditure, are prudently reticent on the subject of the costs of the war in Afghanistan. Hence the questions before us are two in number—First, is it just or politic to defray the extraordinary costs of the war from Indian Revenues? Second, can the Revenues of India, without increased taxation, pay the £1,000,000 or £1,200,000 in the present financial year, and the future unknown costs, and necessary permanent charges? At present I defer considering the question of justice, and deal with the financial considerations. The Secretary of State "elsewhere" told us that he had recently given the subject of Indian finances careful consideration, and that in consequence of the new taxation, and especially of the unexpected large increase of the tax on opium, amounting to £1,245,000, he found the clear surplus of Indian Revenue was no less than £2,156,000, so that the realized Revenue had exceeded the Estimate. Under these circumstances, Indian Revenue could readily be charged with £1,200,000, and still there would be a surplus of £500,000, which Sir John Strachey told us was the smallest balance he could do with for unexpected expenditure in ordinary years. Several of my hon. Friends, who with myself take an interest in Indian finance, heard this statement with amazement, but with gratification. It seems to have excited equal amazement in India, for the telegraphs have been busy, and already the Under Secretary of State corrects the sanguine surplus of his Chief, and cuts it down to the more modest dimensions of £1,500,000.

MR. E. STANHOPE: My noble Friend, when he stated the original surplus at £2,156,000, expressly intimated that recent information had caused considerable reductions to be made from that surplus.

MR. LYON PLAYFAIR admitted that he had not heard the speech of the noble Lord; but in the report of *The Times*, which he held in his hand, there is no such statement. Nor, indeed, was it compatible with the argument of the Secretary of State, who wished to show that not only could the war costs be met, but that there would be a surplus after that of £500,000. In any case, the total alleged surplus now is about £1,500,000. Well, that happens to be exactly the sum stated to be requisite for a Famine Insurance Fund, and is derived from the increased taxation levied this year for that specific object. It ought to be kept sacred for such a purpose. I could not understand clearly the Under Secretary of State when he spoke on this subject. But so far as I did understand him, I presume he admitted the sacredness of this Fund, for he said that £700,000 was still to be paid in respect to it. In that case his available surplus has dwindled down from £2,136,000 of the Secretary of State to £1,500,000, less £700,000, or really to an available surplus of £800,000. Well, at this rate of decrease, this surplus is likely to vanish by new and unexpected charges not yet brought into the account. Unless, then, you encroach upon the Famine Insurance Fund, and break faith with the Indian taxpayer, I deny that you have in the surplus of Indian Revenue, even for the present financial year, resources from which you can pay the expenses of the war. Now, let us remember the words of the Secretary of State uttered in "another place."

> "I am bound to say, after looking carefully into the financial condition of India, that I believe it will not be necessary, at least in the initial steps, to call on the Revenues of England."

If this means anything, it means that India is to defray the expenses of the war without the aid of England, unless the war assumes proportions beyond those then in the contemplation of the Government. It does not mean participation between England and India in the present financial year, as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the City of London (Mr. Hubbard) would fain hope that it does mean, in order that he may cast his vote with the Government. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, frightened no doubt by the rapid contraction of the alleged surplus, stated yesterday that the Resolution of the Government did not "necessarily" mean that England should not aid in defraying the costs; but the Secretary of State for India distinctly declared his opinion that, in the present condition of Indian finance, he did not think that it would be necessary "to call on the Revenues of England." We must, therefore, take the Resolution as we find it, and presume that we are placing by our vote the cost of the war on the Revenues of India. Under ordinary circumstances, I think the principle of the Government is just. As a general principle of policy, it is obvious that Imperial Revenues should not be charged wholly at least with the expenses of local wars in any Empire, Dominion, or Colony of the Crown. If local revenues are not to be charged with the costs of local wars, there will be continual aggression and annexation of weak neighbours on frivolous pretexts. We all recollect the cry of anger when the Imperial Government left New Zealand to its own defence; but now the quarrels of Colonists and Natives are few in number and far less costly than they once were. If local revenues were generally made chargeable with local wars, even our dominions in South Africa would find means of living peaceably with their savage neighbours. I would make no exception in the case of India if I felt that its taxation had a fair incidence on those classes of the population who can influence public opinion, and who are responsible in some degree for peace or war. But this is not the case in India. Our highly-paid officials in the Civil Service engaged in Indian administration and the officers of the Army pay no income tax, and feel no result of the oppressiveness of war. The rich Native merchants and bankers of India contribute nothing of their earnings by direct taxation, except in the insignificant tax recently established of a licence on trades, a miserable sort of income tax which falls mainly on the poor, and affects only infinitesimally the rich. The main sources of the taxation, excluding opium, are derived from the 200,000,000 of Natives who have no representative voice to express how heavily taxation falls on the poorest classes of the Indian people. One-third of the Revenue is derived from land, and this ultimately becomes a tax on the food of the people. One-tenth of the Revenue is got by a poll tax of the worst description—by means of salt, an impost which lowers the health and diminishes the scanty comforts of the people, and prevents the development of the manufactures and industries which might better their position. The chief tax beyond these—for the salt tax produces more than the Customs and Excise combined — is the Revenue got from opium. This, of all sources of taxation, is the most precarious; because if China takes to growing opium itself — a likely enough incident—where would be the £6,000,000 or £7,000,000 of Revenue derived from it? We have lately seen countries—such as Holland and Turkey —suddenly cut off from a staple product of their land—the crop of madder—by a sudden withdrawal of the demand for it. The Revenue from opium can scarcely be deemed a permanent source of Revenue. I confess, therefore, that I am one of those who look at the state of Indian finance with serious apprehensions. You cannot increase the tax on land or on salt without hazarding the only protest which an unrepresented people can make—namely, insurrection. You cannot impose an income tax on the richer Natives without raising a clamour and discontent which may extend itself to the masses of the population, who already feel taxation keenly. It may ultimately be right to expose ourselves to this danger, because such a tax is just and right in political economy; but we are dealing with a country which knows nothing of political economy—one which simply views taxes as property derived by Government through conquest, and which is, to a certain extent, tolerant of unjust taxes, and yet fiercely intolerant of new taxes, though they are just. No wholesome check on local wars can at present be obtained by burdening Indian Revenues with the costs of a war beyond the Indian Frontier.

Nevertheless, if this war were necessary for India, the costs should be borne by India. But it is a war avowedly undertaken for purposes of Imperial policy. One might say, in the words of Lord Lytton, that it is a war of the British Cabinet, were it not that Parliament, by a large majority, had sanctioned the war and made it one of Imperial policy. It is a war which proximately rose as the Russian answer to thrusting the Sepoy into the politics of Europe. Parliament approves of the war, and the country ought to be prepared to pay for that approval. At all events, I think it would be far better for this country to pay a large part—if not all—the extraordinary expenses of the war than to create dangers in our Indian Empire by increasing taxation in India. The costs are not known, but it is certain that the extraordinary costs must far exceed £1,200,000, while the fixed annual expenditure can scarcely be under £1,000,000, if the increase of the Army be maintained, and the scientific Frontier be secured. I have shown that unless you encroach on the Famine Insurance Fund there is no surplus available to meet this temporary or permanent expenditure, either this year or in subsequent years, with a Revenue so inelastic and unsound as that of India. India can only obtain the money either by loans, or by the increased taxation of the people. But the most able Viceroys and Finance Ministers see the dangers of increased taxation, and know not how to impose it. The taxation from which we derive our Revenue in this country is, no doubt, largely derived from the people; but it is levied on their luxuries, and not on their necessities. But the Indian people are struggling for existence in the sense that they live on a minimum of what is necessary to support existence, and have no surplus of wealth as fit subject for taxation, and yet we raise our taxes on the very necessaries of life. You cannot proceed further in this direction without creating dangers far more serious to our Indian Empire than those which are threatened by an unsubstantial Muscovite spectre looming over the Frontier mountain ranges, like the spectre in the Hartz mountains. Why is it that my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer is not more distinct in his assurances that English Revenue will be brought in aid of Indian Revenue for a war which has been brought on by Imperial policy? He knows well that if he gave such an assurance in positive terms, he is encroaching on the authority of Parliament by borrowing money from India to meet an expenditure for which no Supplies have been voted by Parliament. I am sure that he knows India too well to throw ultimately all the burdens of this Imperial war on its impoverished people. He knows, also, that this country is ill-fitted at present to bear increased taxation. He felt yesterday how sensitive it is on this subject, when he proposed to ask for a small sum in aid of distress in Turkey. There is distress at home nearly as keen, and growing in alarming proportions. Our industry is paralyzed, and our commerce is stagnant. We on this side of the House believe that the wars and rumours of war in which the Government indulge, as part of a spirited policy, prevent the revival of industry, and depress the condition of the people. It is sad, therefore, to join in a Vote which, if carried, will add to the burdens of the people of this country. But it is they who will it. The majority of their Representatives approve the policy of the Government, and the increasing Expenditure which this policy entails. Our people are still better able to pay the costs of war than the half-starved ryots of India; because, with us, all classes share in taxation, while the rich in India refuse to lighten the heavy burdens with the tips of their fingers. It is, then, because I believe it to be just that we should pay the costs of Imperial policy, and because it is dangerous to our Indian Empire to increase its taxation, that, with a sad heart, I record my vote for throwing the costs of the war on the Revenues of England.

LORD GEORGE HAMILTON wished to say a few words to the House, for the reason that the right hon. Gentleman who had last addressed it entered somewhat into detail in reference to Indian finance, upon which his hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State could not speak again. The right hon. Gentleman admitted that the principle contained in the Resolution was a sound one; but because a Conservative Government was in Office, he seemed to think that that principle must be reversed. Was it to be assumed that if a Liberal Government had been in power, and had the misfortune to become engaged in a war with Afghanistan, it would not contemplate placing any portion of the expenses of the war on the Revenues of India? The right hon. Gentleman had asked several questions—he wanted to know whether it was just and politic that India should pay the costs of the war; and, secondly, whether India could pay for it? With all deference to the right hon. Gentleman, the first question to be considered was, whether this was an Indian war? If it was an Indian war, India, as a matter of justice, ought to pay for it. He thought he could show that it was an Indian war. If he could prove that, then came a question which was quite distinct and separate—namely, was it expedient and politic that the whole cost of the war should be placed upon the Revenue of India? Upon that question many considerations would naturally arise. But was it an Indian war? Every Member of the House would, he thought, say that the Afghan War of 1837 was an Indian war. There was a Liberal Government in Office at that time; but he believed that they did not throw any portion of the cost of that war on the Revenues of England. On that occasion our Government deliberately and intentionally interfered with the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and the policy they pursued was so Indian that the whole cost of the war was defrayed by that country. Since that time we had advanced until our Frontiers touched those of Afghanistan; we had consolidated our power, and the Indian Revenues had passed more directly under the administration of the Crown; but that did not mean that India had lost all concern in the questions which had led to the present war. The hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett) said that Lord Lytton stated that the Frontier question was an indivisible part of the great Imperial question to be decided by the foreign policy of the Government; and the hon. Member, therefore, assumed that the whole cost of the war should be borne by the Imperial Exchequer. But who made it an Imperial question? It was Lord Lawrence, whose policy, which had failed, was this—that if we kept perfectly still the Afghan Ruler would incline to us, not from love of us, but from greater fear of Russia. But, unfortunately, in 1869 Lord Lawrence suggested to the English Government that they should remonstrate with Russia, and receive assurances from Russia as to what she intended doing in Central Asia; and it was then that the question of the Frontiers of India came into prominence. But no one would contend that the interest of India was less in having a secure Frontier, because the Imperial Government had exercised its moral influence in order to obtain a certain assurance from Russia. The present war was, he considered, nothing less than a purely Indian question. Did anyone suppose that we should be now at war with Afghanistan if we did not possess India? He would go further, and say that we should not have taken the interest we had done for the last 20 years in the Eastern Question if we had not possessed India. He believed that if they were to strike a balance between the expenditure England had borne for India, and that which India had borne for England, the result would be very much to the advantage of India. The Crimean War arose, to some extent, from our being a great Eastern Power; and from that time until the present we had constantly, both by expeditions and otherwise, incurred expenses which we should not have incurred if we had not possessed our Indian Empire. Well, it had been assumed that the Indian Revenue would be unfairly dealt with if it were made to bear the cost of the war, as the cost of this war ought, in some degree, to be shared by the Home Government. Those who held to this assumption ought not to forget the heavy price England paid every year for the maintenance of India. England maintained India mainly for the benefit of India. The right hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. John Bright), some time ago, described the position of India accurately, when he said it was a mistake to suppose that India was a rich country; the great majority of the people were poor; and he said that the impression to which he had referred was derived from the fact that India had always fallen an easy prey to the rapacious. Well, the task of England was to protect the weak; and for that purpose it was necessary for her to have a large force of British troops in India. In fact, if it were not thought necessary to make a play on the word

"Imperial," there was no sort of ground for saying that the present was any other than an Indian war. He was much interested as to what the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone) would say on this subject. The right hon. Gentleman had told the House that England had a great interest in India—that it was the interest which the gambler had in the gaming-table. Well, but nobody would say that because a gambler ruined himself at the gaming-table, therefore someone else should pay his debts. He had, he thought, shown that the present was an Indian question; and that, as a matter of justice, India should bear the whole expenditure of the war. But, no doubt, there were other matters to be considered. They all knew that, according to the Act of Parliament, no part of the Revenue of India could be expended for military operations beyond the Frontiers of India without the consent of Parliament; and his hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State had adopted the exact words of the Act in framing his Resolution. His hon. Friend had stated more than once in his speech—and his right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer had stated more than once in answering Questions—that the passing of the Resolution would not in any way prejudge or prejudice the ultimate apportionment of the cost of the war; but before any money could be advanced out of the Indian Treasury, it was necessary that it should be sanctioned by Parliament. What they really had to consider, therefore, was not so much what was the actual condition of Indian finance, but what was the condition of the cash balances. He believed that they were unusually high; and that if it was necessary to advance the whole sum required this year for the carrying on of the war no inconvenience would be caused by such a measure. Then as to the question of expediency. Was it expedient or politic that India should bear the whole cost of the war? That depended upon three conditions—first, the condition of Indian finance at the end of the financial year; next, the cost of the war at the end of the financial year; and, thirdly, what proportions the war was likely to assume after the end of the financial year. On these points it was absolutely necessary that the Government and the House, before arriving at a conclusion, should have full, complete, and reliable information. At the present moment, less than a month after our troops had crossed the Frontier, their information, derived chiefly from telegrams, was necessarily meagre. With respect to the condition of Indian finance, for the last few years the estimates have been extremely accurate, the surplus being usually in excess of the estimate. On this subject of Indian finance he must express his surprise at observations made in reference to the salt tax. It had been asserted, over and over again, in the course of the debate, that the Indian Government had raised the salt tax 40 per cent on a starving population. [Mr. LYON PLAYFAIR: In Madras and Bombay.] Well, that limitation was not made so clear as it might have been. Last year he explained fully what was the cause of the increase. For years past the Indian Government had been anxious to deal with the salt tax with a view to equalize it; for whereas in Bengal the salt tax was 52 annas per maund, in Madras and Bombay it was only 29 annas, and, in order to prevent the lighter taxed salt passing into the more heavily taxed districts, there existed a Customs line some thousands of miles in length, which was a great source of inconvenience and annoyance to the neighbouring population. There were two ways of dealing with the subject—to level up, or to level down. Now to level up would have been most unwise and impolitic, because it would have increased over a great part of India a very heavy tax on one of the necessaries of life. On the other hand, to level down to the Madras and Bombay rate last year was not possible; because, owing to the tremendous famine expenditure of the previous four years, it was absolutely necessary that the Indian Government should get fresh Revenue, and it would have been impossible for them to say—"We want fresh Revenue, but we will reduce the amount we derive from salt;" for, after all, notwithstanding the objections made to the salt tax in this country, there was no portion of the Indian Revenue so easily collected or so willingly paid. Sir John Strachey, therefore, said—

> "I am obliged to raise a larger income, because so much has been spent in Madras and Bombay in relieving famine; but, at the same time, I cannot exempt Madras and Bombay

from the increased taxation; it would be absolutely contrary to every principle of local financial responsibility to exempt a district which is specially benefited by the additional money raised."

So Sir John Strachey, while exempting Madras and Bombay from certain taxes imposed on other parts of India, said—

> "I will level up the salt duties in Madras and Bombay in order that I may level down elsewhere."

The result of that step, which when communicated to Parliament last year met with great support, was, that although an increase had been made in the salt duty in the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay, which numbered a population of 48,000,000, a heavy reduction had been made in other parts of India which numbered 137,000,000. Never, in his opinion, was there a more beneficial reform than that effected by Sir John Strachey; and he did not think it fair of hon. Gentlemen to be constantly carping at the Indian Government, and stating in vague terms that the salt tax had been raised 40 per cent, without mentioning that there had been a corresponding reduction in the amount of duty paid by a very large proportion of the population. Into the question of the licence tax and others it was hardly necessary to go. He admitted — and the Indian Government admitted—that there were many objections to them; but seeing that the hon. Member for Hackney had been, of all men in the world, the most instrumental in inducing the Indian Government to abolish the income tax, it was rather hard of him to complain of the tax which they had been compelled to substitute, though it might, in some respects, be more objectionable still. He now came to the question of the surplus. According to the latest information, the Indian Government estimated its surplus at £1,541,000. But, it was stated, the whole of that was pledged to the Famine Insurance Fund. Well, he could quite understand hon. Members objecting to the appropriation to one purpose of money which had been raised for another; but as regarded the Famine Insurance Fund, there were one or two peculiar circumstances to be stated. It was originally estimated that the taxes imposed would raise about £1,500,000. It so happened, however, that the taxes were not imposed so soon as the Indian Government wished; and the consequence was, that during the present financial year they would only yield £1,200,000. Moreover, £500,000 was already disbursed in relieving distress in Madras, Bombay, and elsewhere, and that deducted from the £1,200,000, reduced the total amount of the Famine Insurance Fund this year to £700,000. Against this, as he had stated, there was a surplus of £1,541,000; and assuming, as his hon. Friend (Mr. E. Stanhope) calculated, that a sum of £940,000 was advanced out of the Indian cash balances towards defraying the cost of the expedition into Afghanistan, £600,000 of surplus would still remain. In other words, the present Motion, if acted upon, would only make the amount at the disposal of the Indian Government £100,000 short of that required to carry out their intentions, as announced in their Budget. Now, the small difference between £600,000 and £700,000 was hardly sufficient, he thought, to justify the strong language used by hon. Members, who seemed to assume that the Indian Government were departing altogether from the pledges they had given; for even if every penny of the war costs were to be paid by the Indian Government, there would be almost enough left to enable them to carry out their intentions of last year.

Mr. CHILDERS: Are we to understand that the £500,000 alluded to as spent upon Famine was included in the estimated expenditure of the Budget irrespective of the £1,500,000?

Lord GEORGE HAMILTON: The £500,000, he believed, was included in the ordinary expenditure; but his right hon. Friend would obtain details of that kind from the Under Secretary of State. In placing these statements before the House he had endeavoured to show that no financial inconvenience to India would result from the adoption of the Motion before them; while the Government would be enabled at a subsequent period to arrange equitably the amount of war expenditure to be borne by India and England respectively. If the Amendment were adopted, the whole of the expenditure, except that for the increase of the Native Army, would fall upon the English Revenue exclusively. Now, what would be the result? Loans or subsidies to India for public works were clearly impolitic—and the hon. Member for Hackney admitted them to be so—because there would be no checking the fancies of Engineers in India if their schemes were to be paid for out of the English Exchequer. Could anyone doubt that the same argument applied with even more force to military operations? Were it understood that the cost of no matter what expedition undertaken by the military authorities in India would be defrayed by England, the authority of the Viceroy and his Council over the many gallant and able Generals who were burning to distinguish themselves would be greatly weakened. He hoped, therefore, that the House would assent to the proposal of his hon. Friend. At the same time, he did not mean to contend that the Indian Revenues should necessarily bear the whole cost of military expeditions. He was quite ready to admit that there had been times when it was attempted to diminish the English Estimates at the expense of the Indian Revenues; but while he was at the India Office he always set his face against anything of the kind; and since the present Government had been in Office there had been no attempt to saddle the Indian Revenue with improper charges. The adoption of the Motion of his hon. Friend would not lead to any departure from the rule. It would leave the Government completely free, and would enable them, on a future occasion, to divide, as they and as the House might think proper, the expense of the war between India and England. In view of this, and considering that the Amendment of the hon. Member for Hackney would pledge them to meet out of English Revenues any expense which might be incurred by the Indian troops in Afghan territory, he could not doubt but that the House would support, by a large majority, the Motion of his hon. Friend.

SIR HENRY JAMES said, the Attorney General had claimed, on the part of the Government, the right to expend Indian finances upon military operations beyond the Frontier of India before the consent of Parliament was obtained. If that right did not exist, the claim ought to be met with a clear denial; if it did exist, it was time for Parliament to consider whether there ought not to be further legislation on the subject; but he believed, with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone), that the present Administration had broken the statute affecting the Government of India. Notwithstanding what had fallen from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, it could not be assumed that this was another occasion, to be added to an already long list, on which the views of the hon. and learned Attorney General were to be disclaimed by the Government, and it must be inferred that the claim put forward was one which the Government meant to enforce. If the Government insisted upon this right to bring into the Dominions of the Crown other than India the forces of India without the consent of Parliament, and if it also claimed the right to expend the finances of India in relation to wars beyond the Frontier of India, and if both claims were conceded, it was clear that power would be conferred upon the Crown to carry on war without the consent of Parliament, and without any check whatever. He was not endeavouring to attack the Prerogative of the Crown to declare war if it thought proper; but, if the claim were made to employ the troops and the money of India in a war beyond the Frontier, there ought to be some check in the hands of Parliament, and such check was provided by the Act of 1858. The 54th section imposed upon the Government the duty of communicating to Parliament within three months the fact that hostilities had been carried on, and this clause referred to all hostilities, both within the Frontier and beyond the Frontier, and whether arising from sudden emergency or not. That was one check clear and distinct from any other; but the next clause imposed an entirely different check; it did not deal with wars carried on within Indian territory, but with those carried on beyond the Frontier, and not arising under circumstances of urgent necessity. The language was so plain that it did not need interpretation, though if it did it would be found in the debates of 1858. The clause said that—

> "Except for preventing or repelling actual invasion of Her Majesty's Indian possessions, or under other sudden and urgent necessity, the Revenues of India shall not, without the consent of both Houses of Parliament, be applicable to defray the expenses of any Military operations carried on beyond the external frontiers of such possessions."

The hon. and learned Attorney General said that if the consent of Parliament were obtained at any time, that would be a sufficient compliance with the statute, because the earlier section contemplated the carrying on of war before it was announced to Parliament, and the consequent expenditure of money; but it was overlooked that that section applied to wars within the Frontier as well as beyond it, however they might arise. The hon. and learned Attorney General admitted that the subject was surrounded with great difficulty, and he said it was true that if money were spent on a war beyond the Frontier, and Parliament refused to sanction its repayment, there would be no means of replacing it; but still the hon. and learned Gentleman contended that it was enough to obtain what he called the subsequent "ratification" of Parliament. But ratification was the wrong term to use; it was admissible in a case in which, for example, an agent acted for the benefit of, and on behalf of, another; but if there was an independent body whose consent had not been asked, but whose consent ought to have been obtained to a certain act, then that body could not subsequently ratify, but only condone, what had been done. Money had been spent on this war without the consent of Parliament being first obtained; and if Parliament should refuse its sanction the money could not now be replaced, and the Government would be reduced to the necessity of coming to Parliament for an Act of Indemnity, which, in fact, the present Resolution amounted to. When a certain thing was to be done with a certain consent only, what right had the Government to do it without consent, and to stand the chance of what they called its being ratified, when the case was not one of either urgency or necessity? It did not follow that India should be invaded or placed in jeopardy, and no measures taken to defend it, without the consent of Parliament, because it was distinctly provided that money might be spent in case of invasion or other sudden and urgent necessity. In the absence of such emergency there was no more right to anticipate the consent of Parliament than there was on the part of a sportsman to shoot over another man's land on the chance of obtaining his consent afterwards. Without troubling the House further with the legal question, he must say he had heard with astonishment and regret the doctrine propounded by the hon. and learned Attorney General, and he trusted it would not receive the sanction of anyone who valued the privileges of Parliament. He now wished to state briefly the reasons why he should vote for the Amendment of his hon. Friend the Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett). The first question with him was, whether this war was in every sense an Indian war, and whether it was necessary for the protection of our North-Western Frontier? They were told last night very fairly, by the hon. and gallant Baronet the Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot), that this war had arisen out of European complications. It was a war which found its origin in Europe, and, like every Afghanistan War, it sprang from the fear and action of a European Power. In 1843 there was a most interesting debate in that House in relation to a war which had arisen from circumstances very much in common with the present war. Out of 75 Members who voted against that Afghan War three only remained, and two of them stated their views so clearly and distinctly that he would take the liberty of reading some extracts from their speeches. Mr. Roebuck said they feared Russia, and therefore attacked Dost Mahomed. They were afraid of the powerful, and therefore they jealously attacked the weak. They had a great enemy, and therefore they turned on their weak ally. The noble Lord the Postmaster General (Lord John Manners) spoke of that war as disgraceful, and inflicting a stain on his conscience which he was anxious to wipe out. No doubt the noble Lord entertained similar views with reference to the present war with Afghanistan. There was another conspicuous Member of the House who spoke on that occasion, who strongly repudiated the idea that our Frontier required protection, and who gave it as his opinion that no boundary could be more perfect before the invasion of Afghanistan. That speaker was Mr. Disraeli. The question of finance also arose in 1842. The expedition was undertaken, it was said, to check Russia; and on what ground, it was asked, could the people of England refuse to pay the bill? The operations were undertaken to check a European Power, and how could the Government refuse to defray its expenses? That was the language attributed to Mr. Disraeli. There were reasons why it would be most inexpedient to give authority and power to the Government to place all this expenditure on the finances of India. It would tempt them to go to war with an almost unlimited supply of Native troops, who were, in a sense, mercenary; and though in this case the war was conducted by a mixed army, still the evil existed to a great extent. He could not conceive any time more perilous than the present for imposing additional taxation upon the people of India. Since the present Viceroy of India occupied his high office he had adopted measures which were calculated to cause extreme irritation among the Natives of India. Lord Lytton had obtained for the Executive the right of interfering with the discretion of the Judicial Bench in that country; he had also obtained sanction to a measure which was calculated to destroy the independence of the Indian vernacular Press, and to prevent, on the part of that Press, a free expression of public opinion; and there could be no doubt that taxation in India had grown to such an extent that, if ever the ordinary average production of the country failed, and famine again swept over the land, the Natives would immediately fall prostrate before it. It was upon such a people, in such a condition, that the Government asked by this Resolution that the whole burden of the war should be thrown. He knew it would be answered that the Resolution did not throw the whole of the burden upon the Natives of India. But to its uncertainty he objected. He would rather that the Natives of India should know what their real position was. It seemed to him worse for us to say, not that we were to bear the burden, or that India was to bear it, but that it was to be left to the Government to decide who should bear it. When this substantive proposition of the Under Secretary of State was put that the Government should have that discretion, he would say "No" to it. He would not now enter upon the question whether the burden should be cast upon the two countries. It might be said that by the sympathy of the two countries in this war benefit might accrue to India. That might be the case; but when he saw that the Resolution gave the Government, apart from the sanction of Parliament, the power to throw the whole burden of this contest upon India, he could not bring himself to vote for it.

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (Sir HARDINGE GIFFARD) said, before referring to the question of law, he was desirous of saying one word upon general topics. He did not purpose, however, to go 35 years back in order to do so. This only he would say—that it did not strike him as quite logical to assume that because a war 35 years ago was unjust, a war waged under entirely different circumstances now must be unjust also. His hon. and learned Friend suggested that some supposed conduct of the Viceroy of India rendered it inappropriate to charge the expenses of the war on the Indian Revenues, as it was calculated to irritate the Natives, and render them impatient of additional taxation. He had the honour to discuss with his hon. and learned Friend at the time the circumstances arose the point referred to. Lord Lytton, for the protection of the life of the Natives, had told one of the judicial authorities that he had not done his duty; but he never claimed any right over the Judicial Bench. The Judicial Bench possessed some executive functions; and the Viceroy, with regard to these, did exercise the same kind of authority over the Judicial Bench which his right hon. Friend the Home Secretary exercised over the magistracy.

SIR HENRY JAMES said, he referred to a letter which Lord Lytton despatched to the Secretary of State for India, in which he claimed authority over the Judicial Bench, and the Secretary of State for India sanctioned the claim.

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (Sir HARDINGE GIFFARD) said, the fact was that there were certain executive powers possessed by the judicial body, but not in their judicial capacity, and it was with respect to these powers that the Viceroy exercised his authority. That was the explanation which he gave his hon. and learned Friend at the time the matter was under discussion. Very naturally his hon. and learned Friend disregarded his opinion; but the hon. and learned Member for Oxford (Sir

William Harcourt) was of the same opinion, and his hon. and learned Friend disregarded that also. As to the legality of the proceedings of Her Majesty's Government and the construction to be placed upon the Statute, he did not intend to give any dogmatic opinion, as was done last night. One or two Gentlemen said they had no doubt the Government had broken the law, and the right hon. Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone) had said the same. But in Courts of Law you did not advance a question much by simply asserting it. He was going to show that it was neither "extraordinary nor surprising," as his hon. and learned Friend had said, that the Attorney General should have put on the Statute the construction which he had. Hon. Gentlemen opposite seemed to apply themselves to the language of two consecutive sections as if the Act of Parliament was contained in them. But you must take the whole purview and aim of the Statute, otherwise you could not see the bearing of any particular sections on the Act of which they formed a part. Marginal notes formed no part of the Statute; but the headings of chapters formed a part of it as much as the provisions themselves. Now, from the 41st to the 55th sections inclusive all applied to the Revenues of India. By the 54th and 55th sections, taken together, the framers of the Statute contemplated this case—that war might be made without the consent of the Council and without immediate communication to Parliament; it might be going on even during the Session of Parliament for a period of three months. But within 14 days this war was announced to Parliament; whereas, by the express language of the Statute, the communication might be kept back for three months if Parliament was sitting. No doubt the framers of the Act were not insensible to the fact that from September to February Parliament might not be sitting, so that you might have a war going on from September to March without the sanction of Parliament, and in contemplating that contingency they were, no doubt, thinking what might become of the Revenues of India under such circumstances. The 54th section would have no application whatever, unless that construction of the Act were admitted. His hon. and learned Friend had to do the most extraordinary violence to the language of the Act. He said that hostilities must be confined within Her Majesty's Possessions. But, in the first place, hostilities in India necessarily involved hostilities outside the Dominions of Her Majesty. You do not speak of rebellion as the commencement of hostilities; and the hypothesis was that hostilities were to be carried on outside the Dominions of Her Majesty. The pressure of his hon. and learned Friend's argument required him to consider these words "hostilities in India" to mean hostilities confined within the Possessions of Her Majesty in India. But that appeared to be absolutely inconsistent with the reasonable construction to be placed on the words. His hon. and learned Friend sought to introduce into the 55th section the words "without the previous consent of Parliament." But it was a bad mode of construing an Act of Parliament to put in words which were not there already. He did not see why his hon. and learned Friend should put words into the Act which Parliament had not put into it. Let them bear in mind that the House was not dealing with a case of invasion. The country had to consider a case where they had to attack a foe—where an expedition was to be sent forth. Did his hon. and learned Friend suppose that the Legislature intended these sections as a trammel on the action of the military authorities when action was, as in this case, absolutely necessary? The contention of his hon. and learned Friend, that the moment the troops crossed the Frontier their charge on the Indian Revenue became illegal without the consent of Parliament, which it was impossible to obtain, hardly required serious refutation. He was, of course, speaking of ordinary cases of warfare, conducted on the ordinary principles, according to which an enemy must not be warned of the point at which he is to be attacked. To say that, under the circumstances that had arisen, not a single soldier could be legally sent across the Frontier without the consent of Parliament, at the charge of the Indian Revenue, was to reduce the two clauses in question to such an absurdity that it would require very strong reasoning to induce him to believe that that was the intention of Parliament. He was contented to read the Act of Parliament according to the plain common-sense meaning of the words. The Act of Parliament did not say the Executive must not proceed without the consent of Parliament. It said that the House should not bind the Indian Revenue without that consent. That seemed to him to be a reasonable and just construction of both sections of the Act.

GENERAL SIR **GEORGE BALFOUR** expressed an opinion that this war ought never to have taken place. Now that it was commenced, however, one great object should be to take care that the means were sufficiently provided for bringing it to an end as speedily as possible. To this end they ought to know whether they had sufficient European forces in the country where the war was being carried on to bring it to a successful issue. They had begun this war, as in several previous wars—particularly the first Afghan War—with a peace establishment. Indeed, it was only a few months ago that the attention of the Secretary of State for War was called to the fact that the total European Infantry force for the garrison of India was below its fixed strength to the extent of numbers nearly sufficient for three battalions. Even now, though the total fixed strength was kept up, yet there were about 36 battalions considerably below their proper establishment, and about 16 so far above as to equal the deficiency in the 36 battalions. An instance of the danger from allowing the European troops to fall down in India would be apparent if they looked back to the 1st of January, 1857, only three months before the Mutiny. They would then find, by the printed Returns, that the European strength was between 5,000 and 7,000 below the number that ought to have been in India. Many of the great losses sustained might have been prevented if the proper strength had been kept up. That was a lesson which the country ought to have taken to heart before now; but it had not been attended to, for he feared it was too true that the gallant 72nd had crossed the Frontier into Afghanistan with only 640 men. To allow a regiment to fall 200 below its complement was a dangerous thing to do. That was only one regiment, and no doubt the Returns would show other regiments to be far under their strength. Another great deficiency was in the estimated expenditure for this war—about £1,000,000 sterling for the year 1878-9 had been mentioned. But the very small cost of this war for the remainder of this year was further contrasted with the flourishing state of the finances. That, as indicated by the Secretary and Under Secretary of State for India, had, indeed, taken the country by surprise. He was certainly not prepared to find that there should be no less a sum than £2,000,000 of surplus on the Revenues of India in the year 1878-9; because, in the last few years, there had been deficiencies of that amount in the ordinary income as against the ordinary expenditure; and it was difficult for him to comprehend how the surplus had sprung up, and how it would be available to carry on this war without resorting to other financial sources. The statement submitted to the House as to how this surplus arose was so arranged as to be incapable of verification; because the Budget for 1878-9, to which the figures referred, was withheld. The figures in the Memorandum merely stated the excesses and deficiencies on several items of income, without showing the total sums in the Budget on which those charges arose. The remarkable contrast between this flourishing finance and the figures of the Budget for 1877-8, the last laid before Parliament, was found in the fact that that Budget showed an excess of ordinary expenditure over income to the extent of £3,383,381, and, including the extraordinary expenditure, to the extent of £8,286,666. The change, then, from this great excess of outlay to one of excess of income over expenditure, was one of the most incomprehensible of all financial results. He had had some experience in War Estimates. The cost of the last Afghan War amounted to about £4,000,000 per annum; and while there were 18,000 men employed in it, we had now something like 34,000 men—so that the expense of the present war might be expected to be greater, instead of much less, than that of the former war. The sum estimated as the charge for this year was so small that it could only be shown in the accounts at that amount by not bringing forward the charges actually incurred, on the plea of being mere advances, or by not having the bills paid sent in within the year. Both practices were open to the gravest objection. He urged upon the House the necessity of carefully looking into the finances of India, for he believed they were in a most dangerous state. In 1842 Sir Robert Peel, when Prime Minister, with the first Afghan War still going on, said the time might come when the state of the Indian finances would require aid from this country. He thought the time was fast coming when the apprehensions of Sir Robert Peel on that subject would be realized. Those who were best acquainted with India well knew how serious was the danger from putting on additional taxes. It only remained to protest against the increased and increasing taxation in India. It was not only unfair to the people, but dangerous to our power. In the East, oppressive taxation was the main cause of dissatisfaction and the cause of risings of populations. Instead of avoiding the evil ways of Eastern Princes they were imitating and enforcing their bad courses, and with the more danger, because they backed up that practice with a powerful military force, so that the openings for risings, as under Native Rulers, was prevented. The result would be deadly hatred against their taxation and, consequently, of their rule. Those remarks were made with regard to the speech of the noble Lord the Vice President (Lord George Hamilton), who had, he regretted to hear, again made allusion to the question of the equalization of taxation in India—as if that taxation had been lessened. It had, on the contrary, been largely added to, on the pretext of providing for famines. And the first use made of the Fund raised for that object was to spend it in war. Again, when the noble Lord spoke about equalization in reference to the salt tax, he should have referred to the great inequalities in the land tax. It was a fact—partly in consideration of the salt tax at the time of the permanent settlement—that in Bengal that land tax was set at a low rate, in comparison with the area and population; while in Madras the land tax was high, at the time we took the territories from the Nabob of the Carnatic, because the salt tax was very moderate. The population of Bengal was nearly double that of Madras, and the cultivated area was believed to be nearly double; and yet Madras paid £4,500,000 for land tax, and Bengal but £3,000,000. That was not equal taxation, in his opinion. The land tax of Madras was settled in the first year of this century at a high rate, because there was no salt monopoly, such as then existed in Bengal. But in 1805 a small salt tax was converted into a close and costly monopoly. This was initiated by orders from Bengal, and since then many additions had been made to the Madras burdens under the same dictation; and so high had that salt impost been raised, that Madras alone contributed about one-fourth of the total amount collected in all India from the salt tax. He declared it was unjust to impose on the poorest classes in India the excessive salt tax, as it was imposed at the present time. Out of a net income, for all India, of £37,000,000 sterling, £6,000,000 were raised from the salt tax, and the bulk of that amount from the classes who were, above all others, most unable to spare the money. Although they were engaged in a war with Afghanistan, no person could tell in what way they intended to rectify their Frontier. They had had, with respect to Afghanistan, different proposals, which included very large operations, that might involve us in serious difficulties. So far back as 1868 Sir Henry Rawlinson—then a Member of that House—submitted to the present Chancellor of the Exchequer a proposal to occupy Herat, Candahar, and Quetta. Since then he had become a Member of the Council of the Secretary of State, and had published his former proposal, with a statement of the garrison needed for that occupation. The force named, of 10,000 men, appeared very far below the number needed. The Papers recently laid before Parliament were totally devoid of proofs in support of our proposed or our present policy. No doubt Lord Napier of Magdala had supplied a Memorandum, dated in May last, condemning the past policy; but it must be borne in mind that Lord Napier was not now in any office which involved official responsibility for Indian affairs. Nay, more; although Lord Napier had been a Member of the Governments of the last six Viceroys—from Lord Canning to Lord Lytton—and had been the Commander-in-Chief of Bombay and of all India, yet he had never before recorded disapproval of the past policy, so far as the Papers showed; but, on the contrary, had opposed, as he stated, the advance on Quetta. In 1867 the Government of India had under their consideration a proposal to advance their Forces as far as Quetta, when General Jacob urged this advance. But there must be some mistake in this; because General Jacob was dead before Lord Napier became a member of Lord Canning's Council. That proposal emanated from the Government of Bombay; and as Lord Napier of Magdala was then Commander-in-Chief of the Army of that Presidency, it might be supposed that his opinion on this military movement must have been expressed. It was to be regretted that these Papers had been kept back from Parliament; because they saw from chance passages that the proposal was fully considered by Lord Lawrence's Government. At that time Sir William Mansfield was Commander-in-Chief, and his Minute, dated October 5, 1867, was entirely against the advance to Quetta. Sir Henry Norman also stated that his Memorandum of October 5, 1867, contained strong opinions against that advance. They also learnt that other Minutes were recorded by Lord Lawrence and members of the Council entirely at variance with the proposals then made; but those Minutes had never been laid before Parliament, though repeated applications had been made for them. That was more objectionable, because the present Chancellor of the Exchequer was then Secretary of State; and it would be useful to contrast his then views with those of the present Government as to our movements in advance. It might also be inferred from the Papers that the cost of that proposal was calculated out; so that when Sir William Mansfield opposed the advance on Quetta, he probably thought that the money to be spent on that movement might be better employed, without going so far away from the base of our operations. Those Papers should be produced, not only to supply information, but to enable the House to ascertain the then views of the Bombay Commander-in-Chief. The hon. and learned Member for Taunton (Sir Henry James) having quoted the strong speeches of the noble Lord the Postmaster General in 1842 against the former Afghan War, he (Sir George Balfour) would quote from a pamphlet published by the noble Lord in 1843, in which he described the Chinese and Afghan Wars of that time as a piece of insolent dictation on our part, and he must express his regret that the noble Lord, when in Office, had now changed his opinions in favour of the justice of this war. The pamphlet of the noble Lord was worthy the perusal of hon. Members. In it would be found lamentations over the ruin and desolation which was coming on England by reason of our wars and our wasteful expenditure, public and private. This decay of England was then the fashion of a set of young men to put forward; and the noble Lord urged, as an indication of that decadence, the decrease of Maypoles. But a far more sensible statement was therein made by the noble Lord, who pointed out that the nation had recently spent

> "Untold millions in slaughtering the Afghans and the Chinese, because the former would not submit to our insolent dictation, and the latter to our invasion of their fiscal Code."

These last quoted youthful views were far more consistent with right and justice than those now held by the noble Lord as to the necessity for this war, and as to our right to occupy Quetta under Treaty rights. No doubt a Treaty made in 1854 with the Khan of Khelat did give that right; but there were two Treaties made in 1839 by Sir Alexander Burnes, and another by Sir James Outram in 1841, which distinctly recognized Khelat as owning allegiance and fealty to the Afghan Government. The Treaty of 1841 was cancelled by the Treaty of 1854, but not with the consent of the Ruler of Afghanistan; and the 1839 Treaty had never been abrogated, though they had styled it a "dead letter." On those grounds, the occupation of Quetta had always appeared to him a very doubtful matter; and he had always thought that the Ameer of Afghanistan had a fair claim to be consulted, and his objections removed, before we marched our troops to Quetta. We had entered into a Treaty, by force and violence, with the Khan of Khelat; whereas we should at that very time have arranged with Dost Mahomed, when that Ameer was our friend, for leave to occupy Quetta. The scheme had been further developed; and now the intention was, to all appearance, to occupy Candahar, and probably eventually to force us on to Herat. He warned the Government against the danger of their policy. It involved very serious complications and difficulties. Their present costly Army in India was quite insufficient for the additional strain for those new garrisons. The finances of India could not be increased, and their political responsibilities must be vastly swelled up. And he regretted that those complications had been brought about by the Government refusing to continue the negotiations with the Ameer. With regard to the Ameer's main objection to the more close alliance between the Governments—namely, the admission of British officers into his country—he might remind the House that when they were taking up the cause of Shah Soojah he had particularly requested that British officers should not be allowed to interfere with his Government—a circumstance that proved the desire of the Afghans for absolute independence. Even when Sir John Lawrence and Sir Herbert Edwardes negotiated the 1857 Treaty with Dost Mahomed, and though they then agreed to pay large subsidies, yet that Ruler insisted on conditions which so thoroughly restricted the interference of British officers as to enable the Ruler at Candahar to keep the Lumsden Mission—sent there to see to the proper application of our funds—in a virtual state of imprisonment. It was much to be regretted that the war had been begun, or had been found necessary, from the forced closing of the negotiations. He could not help thinking that if Sir Lewis Pelly, Major Cavagnari, and Dr. Bellew had been allowed to carry on their negotiations by themselves, under general instructions from the Viceroy, they would have been more successful in securing an agreement on all essentials, without entailing conditions hateful to the people and Rulers of Afghanistan. The freedom formerly given to Indian politicians to work out negotiations on broad instructions, without too close an adherence to details, was the secret of success in past years. When negotiators met with less interference, they were individually interested in securing agreement. With those remarks he would close by adding that, in all probability, the result of the war would be to reduce, rather than increase, their influence within India; and he could only regret that the position which the Government had taken up to strengthen their Frontiers would produce such evil results as to endanger the peace and security of the heart of the Empire.

Mr. BALFOUR said, that not long since the Government had been taunted by the Opposition with making arrangements which would confuse the discussion before the House; but now the Opposition had themselves inflicted this inconvenience on the House by introducing into that debate speeches with a special bearing upon the question they had been considering last week. This example he did not propose to follow. He would confine himself to two questions—namely, the legality of the Government's action with regard to the Act of 1858, which had been disputed by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich, and the question raised by the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett) as to whether this was or was not an Indian War. With regard to the first of these questions, he would not enter into any minute verbal criticisms. He relied upon the intention of the Legislature in passing the 54th clause of the Act. There could be no doubt that its object had been rightly described by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich. It had in view, as he had stated, a limitation of the power of the Crown in declaring war. But the accuracy of the right hon. Gentleman had ended there. There could be no doubt that the whole object of that clause was to put the making of war with Indian troops on exactly the same footing as the making of war with English troops. Its purpose was not to put extra restraints upon the Royal Prerogative in India, but to reduce the power of the Crown in India to the same footing on which it stood with respect to English troops in Europe—for previously to 1858 the Royal Prerogative in India had been much greater than at home. This view had the support of many high authorities. The late Lord Derby, for example, at the time of the Abyssinian War, had declared that the object of the Act of 1858 was to place the Crown in exactly the same position in India as it already occupied in Europe. During the 20 years that had elapsed since the passing of the Act the English Government had twice pursued precisely the same course as on the present occasion—in the Abyssinian War and the China War of 1859-60. The latter war was carried on by a Ministry of which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich was Chancellor of Exchequer; and on that occasion the right hon. Gentleman dealt with regard to Indian Revenues precisely as the present Government were now doing. In the debates upon the Abyssinian War the right hon. Gentleman raised the same objection as now, and he had been met by the reply that he and his Colleagues had acted similarly with regard to the China War. His answer was that that was a case of sudden and urgent necessity, and that therefore their action had been covered by the Act. But surely in the present case, as in every other, it lay with the Government to decide what was and what was not a case of urgent necessity. If that were not so the clause of the Act of 1858 was no more than waste paper. He would now pass on to the point of equity which had been raised by the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett). The hon. Member had more than once announced beforehand to the House that he could prove this war to be, on the showing of the Government themselves, a European war; and he (Mr. Balfour) had, therefore, looked forward to the speech of the hon. Member with much curiosity. But when it came to the point they found that his only argument was founded upon the use of the word "Imperialism"—a word which had been used much more often on the other side of the House than by the supporters of the Government. The hon. Member had touched upon the subject very lightly, and had soon gone off to his favourite topic—the poverty of India and the riches of England, the selfish conduct of Anglo-Indians, and the general shortcomings of Secretaries of State. The argument from Imperialism amounted to very little, because the word was used to signify a good many different things. His definition of it was this—that they recognized themselves as parts of a great Empire spread over the world which had great responsibilities and duties; and, further, that this was not a burden to be grumbled at and thrown off at the first opportunity, but one that had great privileges which no English Government would have the courage to throw off, whatever its Members might say when they were not in power. There could be no doubt but that the immediate occasion of the war was an insult offered to England; but the more profound cause of the war was the necessity which every Indian Government felt, and must feel, of keeping Afghanistan in such a position that it should be not a menace, but a cause of safety to India. That feeling lay at the root of all our Indian policy, and it was on that ground that he asserted that if ever a war could be correctly described as an Indian war, this one deserved that title. Were we to leave India to-morrow, our successors would at once find that Afghanistan was not a place which could be left to become the centre of intrigue and of military operations against that country. That was the case before we went to India; it was the case now, and it would be the case after we left there. Even if England had not been the possessor of India, the Russian movement in that direction would have been made sooner or later. In these circumstances, the House could not do better than reject the Amendment of the hon. Member for Hackney.

Sir WILFRID LAWSON: Sir, although there has been a long debate on the Amendment to the Address, the House will remember that this is the debate which we are specially summoned to carry on, for the Chancellor of the Exchequer has explained to us that Parliament was summoned for the purpose of fulfilling the statutory obligation which made it necessary to consult the House of Commons, by which the money is to be provided for carrying on the war in which we are unfortunately engaged. That is the subject which we have now to discuss; but we cannot discuss this matter simply as a matter of revenue and finance. I think when you discuss finance it necessarily involves the discussion of the policy which has rendered it necessary for you to raise the money. We met on Thursday week; and the next morning I was very much surprised to read in "the leading journal" that Parliament was opened under very "happy auspices." Why, on that very day, an hour after we had met, one of the right hon. Gentlemen who sit on the Ministerial Benches got up and told us of a battle which had taken place in Afghanistan, and read a telegram stating that a very large number of the enemy had been killed, and 50 of our own men and two well-known officers had lost their lives. That was a day of slaughter and disaster in that country, and it seems to me extraordinary that in a Christian country that should be called a Parliament meeting "under happy auspices." In Her Majesty's gracious Speech she said that we should give full deliberation to this Afghan War—and by fully deliberating I mean gravely considering whether the war in which we are engaged is a war of policy and justice, or whether it might have been avoided and put a stop to. I do not think that is a question which we can discuss at too great length. The lives of our soldiers are at stake, and that is a matter to which too much importance cannot be attached. I have heard debates in this House as to saving the life of some criminal under sentence of death, and the House did not think it unnecessary to debate at length whether the man's life should be taken or spared. Is it not equally important to consider the lives of our brave soldiers now engaged in warfare in a distant land?—

"For when the life of man is in debate,
No time can be too long, no pains too great."

But that is not the only thing that makes our meeting a disastrous one. There were other things to be considered. There is an African War looming behind; we have banks breaking, mills stopping, masters failing, and men starving; and, so far from meeting under "happy auspices," I think the House has never met under more gloomy, humiliating, depressing, and disastrous circumstances. Let us, then, discuss whether this Afghan War is calculated to brighten the state of things which I have described. I am glad this question has been brought under discussion in the House of Commons, because it seems to me we have been living for the last two years in what might be called a Reign of Terror. We have not been allowed to enjoy free discussion in this country. ["Hear, hear!"] I hear the noble Lord the Member for Haddingtonshire (Lord Elcho) cheer. I do not know whether he cheers the remark, or is delighted at the fact that free discussion has been put down. He knows, as well as I do, that if anybody dared, in London at any rate, to speak in favour of peace, he would be assailed, not only with sneers and abuse, but with sticks and threats of violence. ["Hear, hear!"] Does the noble Lord who cheered remember the meetings in Hyde Park? I do not know whether he led the brigade on that occasion, but he was very likely among them. It is not out of place to allude to this, for I see by the papers that a new patriotic association has been formed with the object of informing and enlightening public opinion. That is, they intend to inform the public of what their opinions are, and to take good care to put down everybody else who expresses different opinions. That is what is called patriotism. I think, like the noble Lord, they are very mistaken patriots. Patriotism does not consist in singing "Rule Britannia" from morning till night, in flinging dead cats, or in sitting in a snug Editor's room and writing leading articles hounding on your countrymen to the slaughter and the death you yourself dare not face. Those are the true patriots who stand up for the truth even when it is unpopular; and there was far more patriotism in my hon. Friend the Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread) bringing forward his Resolution—which he did in a masterly manner—even though he advocated an unpopular cause, than in singing "Jingo" songs and "Rule Britannia." I think that even in Her Majesty's gracious Speech from the Throne the Government did not deal frankly with the House. The Ministers make Her Majesty say—"I receive from all foreign Powers assurances of their friendly feelings." That may be the truth, but it does not express the whole truth; because I am quite sure there can be no friendly feelings entertained by them towards Russia. You call this a war with Afghanistan, but you are really fighting Russia. There can be no doubt about it. Why, the greatest panic-monger in the country would not be afraid of anything that Afghanistan could do. Even the noble Lord the Member for Haddingtonshire would not be afraid of the Afghans, and the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth (Sir Robert Peel)—the King of the Jingoes—would not be so absurd as to say that we were afraid of anything the Afghans could do. No:—and because you were afraid to attack Russia, afraid to attack the big one, you set to work to fight the little one. That appears to me to be as plain as any fact in ancient or modern history. Do you remember what you did at the Island of Tanna? It appeared that a murder had been committed, and one of Her Majesty's ships was sent to catch the murderer. They could not catch him, but they caught his brother, and found out to their satisfaction that, although the man had not committed the murder, he no doubt would have done so if his brother had not done it for him—and so they hanged him. A Correspondent of one of the newspapers, writing of this transaction, said—

> "It is too soon now to know what will be the effect of this act on the inhabitants of the Island, but all seem to acquiesce in its justice.".

That came before the House of Commons last year, and the Government had a bad quarter of an hour. They did not attempt to defend the act, and the House condemned it. I believe, in like manner, the time will come when this country will say there is nothing to be proud of in these Afghan victories, and that this war is what I do not hesitate to call it—a cowardly, a cruel, and a contemptible war. I sometimes wonder what has become of our former boasted English generosity. Are we the same nation that used to sympathize with the wrongs of Poland and the oppression of Hungary, when we are now backing up this Government of ours in fighting to put down the independence and freedom of a nation that has never done us any harm? Just suppose the case reversed. Suppose Russia had been forcing herself on Afghanistan and doing what we are doing now. What articles we should have had in *The Daily Telegraph* and *Times;* how we should be called on to succour those patriots who are defending their mountain homes! But now, the case being reversed, we being the invaders and tyrants and oppressors, nothing is too bad for these wretched people, and nothing too good for us, who are carrying on this wickedness and oppression. And this just after we had been told with such a flourish of trumpets that we had gained "peace with honour." The official Papers show that the Government have been inventing pretexts, creating opportunities, and taking advantage. This is not a very nice story for Englishmen to read. I say this is war with dishonour, and dishonour that will long adhere to the name of this country. We all remember Talleyrand saying that words were made to conceal our thoughts. This Blue Book which the Government have presented us with was given us to conceal their policy. In one of the most memorable debates of last Session the Home Secretary said there was "a lying spirit" abroad. That lying spirit was probably abroad on this side of the House, and it pervaded the other side of the House to an equal extent. But suppose the state of things into which we have unfortunately been drawn had been brought about in the most honourable manner, surely we need not have rushed into the war with such haste. An hon. Member who sits on the other side of the House, and whose observations may therefore be received with some respect by my hon. Friends opposite, discussing with me the career of the present Administration up to the close of the last Session, said—"The present Government were put into power for the purpose of doing nothing, and they had great trouble in doing it until the Obstructives came to their assistance." Now, the Obstructives are, for the time, quiet. I believe they are busy digesting the million that was given to them to keep them quiet last year; and as the Government were deprived of their assistance in doing nothing they entered into war — if it should not rather be termed massacre—with this miserable Ameer to turn attention away from their other policies and to give them another lease of power. I say that, because it is so difficult to arrive at what the war was really made for. First we had Lord Cranbrook's despatch, full of all sorts of reasons for the war. Then we had another statement from the noble Lord which amounted to this—that he had got a surplus from the Indian Revenue, and might as well spend it in fighting the Afghans. And how was this surplus obtained? By the opium monopoly; and so it has come to this—that we get money by poisoning the Chinese and spend it in killing the Afghans. I have got a new reason for the war this afternoon. If anybody turns to *The Echo* he will find a letter from the Bishop of Gloucester, and that excellent Prelate defends and supports this attack on the Afghans and the slaughter of the Ameer's subjects. He says he does so because he is interested in the blessed work of the propagation of the Gospel—and he goes on to explain that he thinks England will carry on the work much better than the Russians. So that all the Border Chiefs who have made friends with us, and all the wild hill tribes we have heard so much of, are simply one branch of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts. So much for the reasons of these statesmen and ecclesiastics. But that is not the real reason of the war. I go to the fountain head. I go to an after-dinner speech delivered at the Guildhall by the Prime Minister. I do so because the Prime Minister emphasized his statement by saying that erroneous reports had gone abroad, but that there, at the Guildhall, words of sense and truth were spoken; and in the awful presence of the Lord Mayor he declared what was the real reason of this war. He said that it was to get "a scientific Frontier"—to rectify our Frontier. I know what that means; it means robbery—neither more nor less. The Prime Minister is a master of phrases. He once said he had "concentrated" the Sultan; which meant that he had cut him in pieces—and this "rectification" which he talked about was nothing more than robbing and shooting the Afghans on purpose to get hold of their property, to which they have a right, and to which England has none. That is the policy of England, and I am ashamed at it. Lord Beaconsfield is a modern Ahab, and the wretched Ameer is Naboth the Jezreelite. But that is not the worst of it. There are in this House 328 accomplices of Ahab who support him in this policy of robbing his neighbour's vineyard. I am thankful that I was able to record my vote—and I shall ever be thankful, although in a minority—against a policy so atrocious. I should like to clear myself from being supposed to agree entirely with all that has been said by many eminent speakers on this question on my own side of the House. The noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition (the Marquess of Hartington) has spoken with a pluck and vigour which no one admires more than myself; but I did not agree with him when he said that, although he had a strong conviction that the policy of the Government which has led to this war against the Ameer was not capable of justification, yet that he had no intention of opposing any measure having for its object the refusal of means whereby to carry on the war. It has also been said that although the war may be condemned, yet those who condemn it are ready to grant the means of bringing it to an honourable conclusion. In my opinion, if you are engaged in a dishonourable enterprize there is no honour except in getting out of it as early as possible. I would not fight in any case in which I could not use the good old words, "God defend the right!" and God is never on the side of injustice and robbery. I shall therefore give no assistance in the way of providing means to carry on this wicked war. Why should the noble Lord not have gone further, and have said that he would stop the war altogether? I was delighted to hear him speak out so manfully as he did when he advised the recall of Lord Lytton, who, in my opinion, is one of the worst of the promoters of this sad business. But why not recall the troops also? There will be no more loss of prestige in the one case than in the other. You say you would lose prestige and glory; but surely the House ought to remember that honour is worth more than glory. I believe that your prestige would be increased, even among these savage tribes, by acting in a strictly honourable and honest way. The policy of the Government is one that we cannot defend; and the more we protest against it the more will be the satisfaction with which we shall go back to keep Christmas in the country, for our hands and consciences will be free of the blood of those unfortunate Indians who are being slaughtered in distant lands. But who is to pay for this war? I am inclined to adopt the hon. Member for Hackney's view of this matter. Supposing some foreign Power were to attack us, and the scene of operations was to be in Ireland, and that all the military operations were carried on there—you would not go and say—"Ireland is in danger, therefore make Ireland pay." No—you know the reason why is because Ireland has Representatives in this House to defend her interests. The hon. Members for Cavan and Meath are Members of this House, and you dare not do it. I do not believe the Government would dare propose to put this money on India, if there were an Indian Biggar and Parnell. But India is not represented, and therefore the present proposal is before us. Her Majesty's Government are responsible for this war—the people made the present Government, the people elected the Conservative Party, and the electors of this Kingdom ought to be called upon to pay for the mischief they have done. What have the Indians to do with it? They are not Christians, and therefore do not want all this bloodshed. You have had your great majority, and you have outvoted us, and you may think all things are going swimmingly. I am not so sure of that. It is 25 years since we had the Crimean War. That was a popular war—the right hon. Member for Birmingham and Mr. Cobden were almost alone in condemning it. But this is not a popular war; and I agree with the hon. Member for Morpeth (Mr. Burt) in his belief that the great mass of the working classes are against it, and at any rate that hon. Member, who comes much in contact with the masses, stated that he had not met a single working man who was in favour of it. The Nonconformists are against it, and it has been condemned in manly, outspoken language by Dr. Plumptre, who spoke as a minister of the National Church; and for his outspokenness and honesty I do not suppose that he will be appointed to the See of Durham. The policy of this war is a policy of revenge, and that appointment will probably be given to a sanguinary Christian. I have said that the war is yours and the working classes are not with you; but there was a voice heard in this House last night from Bristol—and that proclaims the change that is going on in the country. Is there any Member of this House during last Session who does not perceive the change that has come over the spirit of the Opposition? You see that we are full of energy and spirit. We are full of hope and energy, because we know the country is with us, and will soon endorse our condemnation of the flagitious policy of the Government. The more this policy is looked into the more it will be condemned. The voice which we have just heard from the West of England is only the prelude of the full volume of public opinion which, before many months are over, will condemn the Government who have thought that might is right, and who maintain the doctrine, that moral wrong can be politically justifiable and who have acted upon the mischievous pretence that British interests can be permanently maintained at the sacrifice of British honour.

MR. NEWDEGATE said, that the eloquence of the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) could not persuade him, that the war in Afghanistan was unnecessary and therefore unjust, although his belief was that, through the vacillation, not so much of the present, but of the last Administration in their negotiations with, and the treatment of, the Ameer, Shere Ali, the Ameer was induced to look elsewhere than to England for that protection which, immediately after the lamented death of Lord Mayo, he openly asked for from his successor, Lord Northbrook. The hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had quoted the Ameer's application in the course of his speech on a former night. It was made in the month of May, 1872, and his (Mr. Newdegate's) belief was that, if at that time Her Majesty's Ministers had offered to the Ameer of Afghanistan the Treaty (which had since been offered by Her Majesty's Government), before the influence of Russia had become predominant at Cabul, and before the Ameer was committed—as no doubt he was now committed—to the Russian Government, the Ameer would have seen that in the successor of Lord Mayo he had found the same friendly, the same bold spirit as he had recognized in him. But this was, properly, the subject of the recent debate, and he would now come to the matter of business before the House. The proposal on the part of the Government was that this House should grant them an unlimited credit upon the Revenues of India. Before the House entered upon the subject, the House had nothing in the shape of an Estimate submitted to them; but the pressure of the House had at length induced the Government to present them with an Estimate, and having furnished that Estimate, why had Her Majesty's Ministers not also proposed and asked for a Vote of Credit, which would correspond with their Estimate? They told the House that the proposal they were then making applied to the present financial year, and they had given an Estimate of the expenses of the war for that period. Then he said—"Why do not Her Majesty's Ministers ask the House to give them a corresponding Vote of Credit?" He, for one, most sincerely deprecated the idea of this House undertaking the Government of India in the same direct form in which the House exercised its Constitutional functions in reference to the Executive Governnent of this country; but he found that the House was being brought to the necessity of dealing with these matters touching the Army of India, the Services of India, and the Revenue of India, in the same manner that it had legitimately and for many years dealt with the Army, the Public Services, and the Revenue of the United Kingdom. And why was this? Because, unfortunately, the organization for the representation of India, which had been sanctioned by successive Acts of Parliament, and finally by the India Act of 1858, had, in the case of the Council for India, been practically invalidated by the Acts of 1869, chapters 97 and 98. The Council for India in this country had by these Acts of 1869 been deprived of its independent character, of its distinct existence as an independent body, and being reduced to this condition, that all its Members were mere nominees of the Secretary of State for India, it was, in many important matters, pushed aside by the Secretary of State. Lord Lytton appeared to have taken his cue from what Parliament had done in destroying the independence of the Council for India in England, and to have deliberately set aside the Council in India. The first instance in which this was done, that he (Mr. Newdegate) knew, was, when the Governor General undertook to change the terms of enlistment for the Indian Army. By the 56th clause of the Act of 1858—a clause which remained unrepealed by the Acts of 1869—the Government were bound to lay before Parliament the Order in Council, by which they had sanctioned the change in the terms of enlistment. He (Mr. Newdegate) knew, that this Order in Council was not laid before Parliament at the time, when it was due; and his belief was that it had never been laid before Parliament at all. If he were right, then, this was a distinct violation of the Act of 1858—he looked upon that, indeed, as the first step which was taken by the Indian Government in violation of the law. Next, he came to a subject which had been so well illustrated by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone), and on which the learning and ability of the hon. and learned Member for Taunton (Sir Henry James) had been so ably exhibited that night. The point to which he referred was this—that by the employment of the troops of India beyond the limits of the Indian Empire, without giving simultaneous information to Parliament on the subject, the Act of 1858 had been violated. The House would forgive him for calling to its recollection, that last Session he stated that he had personal knowledge of the intentions of the late Lord Derby, when he carried the 55th clause of the Act of 1858. He could speak of Lord Derby's intentions from personal knowledge, and he would read to the House what the noble Lord had said, when he moved that clause in the House of Lords in 1858. Hon. Members would find the speech of Lord Derby in the 151st volume of *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, July 19th, 1858, page 1697. Lord Derby said—

> "The Crown could not send out forces unless Parliament provided the funds to pay them, but it was necessary to introduce this clause for the protection of the revenues of India."

The first part of the sentence referred to the Queen's, the Regular, Army as well as to the Army of India. The noble Lord continued—

> "The effect of the clause would be that Indian troops, except for the purpose of repelling anticipated invasion, or of repelling actual invasion, should not quit their own territory; or if they did, the expense should be defrayed out of the revenues of this country, and not out of the revenues of India. If the troops were employed out of India, it would be for Parliament to decide whether they were employed upon Indian or Imperial objects."

Thus, Lord Derby had distinctly laid it down in public, and had stated to him (Mr. Newdegate) in private, that his intention was, if those troops were employed out of India, unless for repelling invasion or upon some sudden emergency, that they ought not to be paid out of the Revenues of India, but out of the Revenues of this country. Well, this was the case of the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett); and he did not see anything in the circumstances of the present case which could justify the inference that these troops ought not to be paid out of the Revenues of this country, but that they ought to be paid entirely out of the Revenues of India. Reference had been made that evening, by the hon. Member who spoke from the Bench below him (Mr. Hardcastle), to the war in China. Well, the war in China originated upon a sudden emergency. The Chinese had fired upon our Envoys. It was a war of long continuance, and sudden emergencies arose during it—emergencies affecting the safety of the European residents at Canton and elsewhere in China. The Government were justified in using the resources of India to meet emergencies. Then, take the case of the Persian War, in which the Indian troops were used. He himself had heard Lord Palmerston apologise in the House for having used Indian troops and applied Indian Revenue in the manner that Her Majesty's Government were now doing. That war, like the China Wars, began before or in the year 1857, at least a year before this Clause 55, in the Act of 1858, was passed; and that clause was passed, to his knowledge, in order to restrain any future Minister from using the military power of India in the manner in which Lord Palmerston had done in the case of the Persian War. He came next to the Abyssinian Expedition; and what did the late Lord Derby do in that case? He knew that he was about to use Indian troops beyond the Frontiers of India, and, if not simultaneously with the Proclamation of War, at all events simultaneously with the issue of orders for the movement of troops out of Indian territory, he convened Parliament, and in so doing he acted in compliance with the clause which had been passed by Parliament at his instance in 1858. The Abyssinian War was in 1867; and now he would come to the year 1869. In 1868 the late Lord Derby resigned the Premiership, in consequence of ill-health, and died in the autumn of 1869; and it was not till rather late in the Session of 1869 that the Indian Bills were considered in the House of Lords, which proposed to set aside the principle upon which seven out of the 15 Members of the Council for India were elected, and to render every one of that Council a nominee of the Secretary of State for India. It had been said that the late Lord Derby consented to that proposal. He (Mr. Newdegate) did not believe it, and would tell the House why. The late Lord Ellenborough was an old friend of his, and nobody believed that the late Lord Ellenborough was a friend of the East India Company. But he (Mr. Newdegate) knew that Lord Ellenborough respected the independence of the Council for India in England. In 1869 Lord Ellenborough rose in his place in the House of Lords and remonstrated against the then proposed change, by which the independence of the Indian Council would be abolished. He was, however, overpowered by his own Party, and had to give in, though he (Mr. Newdegate) believed that he had spoken the opinions of the late Lord Derby, the author of the Act of 1858, as well as his own. It might be said—"What is the importance of having any independence in the authority which governs India? Parliament is excessively jealous of any independent authority, which is not immediately subject to the Ministers of the day, over whom this House supposes that it can exercise some control." The importance of this independence was felt in 1858. He held in his hand the Resolutions on which Lord Derby's Administration proposed that Parliament then should legislate—the Resolutions upon which the Act for the better government of India was, in 1858, founded. With the permission of the House he would read two of them. The 8th Resolution, as proposed, described how seven Members of the Council were to be elected—

> "That the Members of the elected portion of the Council shall be chosen by a constituency composed of persons who have previously held military commissions or civil appointments in India, in Her Majesty's service, or in that of the Government of India, or who may possess a direct interest, to an amount to be specified, in some property charged or secured on the Revenues or territories of India."

But upon the 6th Resolution it was objected that the proposed security for the independence of the Council was unnecessary and inexpedient; so a Division was taken on the 6th Resolution—

> "That, with a view to the efficiency and independence of the Council, it is expedient that it should be partly nominated and partly elected."

This Division was taken in this House on the 14th of June, 1858, and the Question put was—

"That the words 'with a view to the efficiency and independence of the Council' stand part of the proposed Resolution."

The Committee divided—Ayes 250, Noes 185—giving a majority of 65 for retaining those words in the Resolutions which were to form the foundation of the Act of 1858. He mentioned this Division in order to show that the Parliament of that day, as well as the Parliament of 1853, which had supported the qualified but still distinct independence of the East India Company, deemed it to be essential that there should be a valid independence in the Council in this country that was to regulate the affairs of India, and the same feeling existed with respect to maintaining the qualified independence of the Council of the Governor General in India. They had now an illustration of the mischief and danger which were likely to arise from the abandonment of that system. There had lately been published a Return showing "the Opinions" recently recorded by Members of the Council of the Secretary of State for India "in reference to the expenditure for, and other matters connected with, the military expedition against Afghanistan," and, with the permission of the House, he would read an extract from a Minute of Sir Erskine Perry, whom he had formerly the pleasure of knowing as a Member of this House, and had heard speak, with great knowledge and effect, on Indian affairs in the House. This Minute was dated the 3rd of December, 1878, and contained the following passage:—

"It is the first opportunity that has been given to the Council of India to express an opinion as to the justice or expediency of the war, and I regret that it has arisen now. I should have preferred that when the Secretary of State was asked in Parliament, 'What are the views of your Council on the subject?' he should have been able to reply, 'I don't know; the law does not compel me to consult them, and I have not consulted them.' This places us, no doubt, in a rather humiliating position, and it is strange that we are the only body of men in the United Kingdom who have been precluded from expressing our opinions either to the Government or to the public on this momentous question. Still, it is the position assigned to us by law, and, at all events, it relieves us of all responsibility."

Here, then, they had positive testimony to the effect of the alteration of the position of the Council made in 1869. For it was manifest the Secretary of State for India had not until very recently consulted the Council for India at all upon such an important subject as the commencement of a war, in which India was concerned and took part, and of which Her Majesty's Ministers even now formally proposed that India should bear the entire cost. He had now stated some of his reasons for the belief he entertained; but he was not at liberty to communicate to the House all the circumstances that had come to his knowledge. It appeared that Lord Lytton had set aside his Council in India, just as the Secretary of State had set aside the Council for India in this country. It had always been held essential to the safe government of India that there should be some authority responsible for the highest functions of administration, which was independent of the Government of the day in this country. And why? Because, as a rule, the Administration of the day was only in Office for a limited period. Her Majesty's Ministers must necessarily be the Representatives of a Party; whereas it was essential to the preservation of our Indian Empire that there should be a continuity of policy and a stability of system, which it would be impossible to maintain if the uncontrolled power of Indian Administration rested in a Minister who was appointed by one Party, perhaps for a short, certainly for an indefinite, period, and might at any time be displaced by the Representative of another Party, which happened to outnumber that of Her Majesty's Ministers, in some Division in that House, and represented a different policy. This was apparent to the common sense of everyone. There was also the fact he had mentioned in the debate on the Address, that if no such independent authority existed, that House was utterly dependent for its information upon the Secretary of State. He (Mr. Newdegate) deprecated the form in which this unlimited credit, this unlimited power of drawing upon the Revenues of India had been asked from the House; he also deprecated the idea that, in addition to all its other labours, the House of Commons should be obliged to undertake the functions formerly discharged by the East India Company, then by the Council modified by the Act of 1853, slightly modified by the infusion of a small number of nominees of the Secretary of State for India—the same principle upon which the Council of 1858 was founded—he deprecated the idea of this House being compelled to assume those functions. He did not believe that the Government of India could be safely or advantageously regulated from month to month, and year to year, by continual reference to the House. He was sure the House was too fully occupied satisfactorily to discharge these additional functions; and, unless a careful review of the whole of the statutes relating to the Government of India was undertaken—unless there was a careful review of the requirements of India, and some statute correcting the Act of 1869 was introduced, and passed—what was the alternative? The alternative, really, was the continuance of a state of things in which the Secretary of State for India, the Minister for the day, would be a despot, armed with the control of a Revenue of £50,000,000, and an Army of 200,000, men, with the power, if the precedent of this expedition to Afghanistan, and the precedents of the Chinese Wars, and the Persian War, were accepted, of plunging this country into war by interfering uncontrolled in external relations affecting not only India, but England. ["Hear, hear!"] Yes; that was the alternative. He asked the House, whether it was safe to leave to the uncontrolled power of a Minister of State the disposal of a Revenue of £50,000,000 and an Army of 200,000 men—subject only to the subsequent verdict of Parliament? If that were to be so, what a farce were all their forms! The Revenue of this country was larger than that of India, but our Army was smaller; yet the House was required to go through the process of Estimates submitted to them for Supply, and of Ways and Means with respect to the English Army; and surely, if all these forms were necessary to control the Prerogative, in the case of England it would not be reasonable to leave, without the control of some authority, independent of the Administration of the day, the enormous power vested in the Secretary of State for India, for which the Act of 1869, and the abuse of it, now form a precedent? Summoned, as the House had been, for a particular purpose, the House could not then review this great subject; but, as a disciple of the late Lord Derby, as a disciple also of the late Mr. Melville, the last Secretary of the East India Company, and as an Englishman, who held the Constitution of his country in respect, he prayed the House never to rest satisfied until this much-abused power vested in the hands of the Secretary of State for India had been, to some extent, limited, and placed upon a safe and Constitutional footing.

MR. MUNDELLA said, he thought the House must have felt the value of the arguments of the hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate). He was quite sure that if the hon. Member's remarks were not appreciated by hon. Members around him, they would be fully appreciated by the country. He would not follow the hon. Member in the able Constitutional statement he had made to the House; but he did feel with him that they were placed in a position of grave doubt and ambiguity. Once again, it was the old story. What was the state of things before them? He would not attempt to enter into the causes of the war expenditure which they were now discussing; but he complained that the Government did not tell the House whether the whole of this payment was to be borne by the English Exchequer, or be thrown upon the Indian Exchequer. They simply said—"Go on with the expenditure; give us unlimited control over the whole of the funds of India, and at some future time we will come down to the House and tell you what proportion India and England ought to pay." He asked, upon what principle they were asked to divide expenses? If it was an Imperial war, as the other side contended all last week, why should they not pay for the cost of it out of the Imperial Exchequer? If it was not an Imperial war, but was purely an Indian war, why did they hold out the hope and the promise that they would place some indefinite part of the cost upon the Indian Exchequer? On what principle did they do this? Surely, if it was an Indian war, whatever the consequences might be, let them do justice and charge it on the Indian Revenues. If it was an English and Imperial war, let it be paid out of English funds. On that side of the House they were more unanimous than he had ever seen them on any other question, that this was an unjust and unnecessary war. They recorded their votes against it last Friday night, and, for his own part, he was content that that should be his protest on that part of the question. He had endeavoured, in the course of the debate, to catch the Speaker's eye; but like many others he failed, or he should have had something to say upon the question of payment. The Under Secretary of State for India had endeavoured to minimize the cost. He said it would only come to £1,200,000 up to April next, and he added that we had a surplus for once in India, and should be able to pay the probable cost up to April out of the surplus? Now, what did the surplus arise from? From the most precarious source of income conceivable. It was calculated by the Estimate of March last that there would be a surplus of £2,136,000. There was a deficiency on railways, interest, compensation, and other items amounting to nearly 200 lacs, or £2,000,000 of money; but, altogether, the Revenue would be the better by 124 lacs, or £1,250,000, from the opium Revenue alone. All he could say was he wished it might be so; but he could not believe it would, and there were very few people who knew anything at all about the Indian Revenue who believed that the Revenue from opium would realize £10,600,000, seeing that the highest figure it had ever reached was £9,300,000. If, however, they should have the good fortune in one year to have this large increase in this precarious and doubtful source of income, it must not be forgotten that they had levied a tax upon salt—the most shocking duty that could occur to the conscience of an English Minister—and had put an income tax upon traders who earned 4*s.* a-week, which was probably the meanest tax ever imposed upon the people of any country. Was it right, then, considering that these taxes were raised exceptionally with a view of providing against the Famine, that they should appropriate this surplus of £1,200,000 for the purposes of this war? When the war was first mentioned, the whole of the Conservative Press ridiculed the idea of charging it on the Revenue of India. It was asked—"What is £2,000,000. It is only a very small sum." It was, however, a large sum to India, small as it was to England. In reply to a Question which he (Mr. Mundella) had put to-night, the Under Secretary of State admitted that the Order published in *The Times* of yesterday was true—to suspend all public works, and, as far as possible, all the repairs, going on in India. [Mr. E. STANHOPE: In Bombay.] Well, in Bombay; but if it was done by one Government it would soon be done by the rest. The House would probably know what the meaning was of suspending the public works in India. They had there the whole of their engineers, the European supervisors and staff, so that the whole of the real expenditure connected with the public works would still be going on; while the only thing they would save would be the wages of the miserable labourers, who received 3*d.* a-day. He had heard an engineer say that what generally happened when works of this sort were suspended when about half finished was that a monsoon came and swept them all away. If they suspended these public works they would impose an enormous outlay upon India, and that was really what was meant by taking £1,200,000 from the Revenues of India. Let the House know how those Revenues were raised before they ventured to dream of throwing the cost upon them. For the sake of what had been described as a grand Imperial policy, but which, in reality, was the policy of one man—the Prime Minister—what they were really going to do was to diminish the handful of rice and the purchase of salt, which formed the daily meal of the Indian ryot. All this policy had been agreeable to hon. Members opposite until it came to be paid for. He held in his hand a letter written on Thursday night—the night Parliament opened—by an hon. Member to the editor of *The Berks and Hants Advertiser.* The writer said that—

> "As some of your readers may not see the papers, let me call attention to the fact that the British troops have within the last few days almost succeeded in obtaining the new Frontier considered necessary in Afghanistan. The brilliant victory of General Roberts will do much towards getting rid of all further resistance. No money will be asked for at present, as the military expenses are not very great."

So they were going to sing pæans over the victory in that House, and they were not to put their hands in their pockets, to the extent of 6*d.*, to pay for it. Surely to throw the whole cost of the Jingoism of the Government and their admirers upon the poor ryots of India was discreditable to the first Assembly of gentlemen in the world. On the other hand, there was something else that deserved consideration. Thirty-six years ago the first Afghan War occurred, and what did the present Prime Minister say about the expenditure at that time? He (Mr. Mundella) never read a speech of the right hon. Gentleman with more pleasure; he never read one which showed more power, ability, and argument; and he strongly advised hon. Gentlemen opposite to read carefully the speech delivered by Mr. Disraeli on the war in Afghanistan, when he had the courage to divide the House, although only eight or ten Members followed him into the Lobby. Mr. Disraeli, on that occasion, said—

> "He did not believe that we should be deprived of the Indian Empire either by internal insurrection or by the foreign invader. If ever we lost India, it would be from financial convulsions. It would be lost by the pressure of circumstances, which events like the war in Afghanistan were calculated to bring about by exhausting the resources of the country in military expeditions, and by our consequent inability to maintain those great establishments which were necessary to the political system that we had formed and settled in Hindostan."—[3 *Hansard*, lxiv. 450.]

The appalling distress now prevailing in our industrial centres was another subject to which he begged to direct the attention of the House. Never, he believed, since 1847 had such a state of depression in all our industries been seen, and much responsibility for its continuance and aggravation lay at the door of Her Majesty's Government. ["Oh!"] No doubt the original causes were economical; but latterly the distress had been aggravated, and the return of prosperity impeded, by diplomatic causes, which had disturbed trade, convulsed markets, and driven industry away. For instance, a Sheffield establishment was on the point of signing a large contract with the Russian Government for railway materials when the despatch of the Indian troops to Malta was announced, and on that account Russia obtained elsewhere the materials which would otherwise have furnished employment to a great number of men in Sheffield. Similar incidents had occurred in other cases, and all great financial and industrial establishments had been paralyzed by the apprehension of war. If the Chancellor of the Exchequer had had control of our affairs, we should have escaped much of the trouble and misery of the last two years. He trusted that the right hon. Gentleman would do one of two things—that he would courageously say he would place the whole cost of this war on the Indian Revenue, or that he would tell them what proportion he proposed should fall upon the Imperial Exchequer, and ask for a Vote of Credit in the regular Constitutional manner. It seemed as if England and France had changed policies during the last two years, and as if English common-sense had gone across the Channel, and the Imperialism had come to this side; and the French had certainly got the best of it. A special reason why England should bear the cost of the war was that the consequences of the war would be a great addition to the burdens of India in defending it against the Afghans, whose hostility would be embittered by the remembrance of blazing villages and of outrages said to have been committed on the field of battle by the tribes whose support we had secured.

QUEEN'S SPEECH—HER MAJESTY'S ANSWER TO THE ADDRESS.

THE VICE CHAMBERLAIN OF THE HOUSEHOLD (Viscount BARRINGTON) *reported* Her Majesty's Answer to the Address, as followeth:—

Your loyal and dutiful Address affords me much satisfaction.

I feel assured that I shall receive your cordial co-operation and support in all Measures which I may deem necessary for upholding the honor of My Crown, and for maintaining the great interests of My Empire.

AFGHANISTAN (EXPENSES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS).

Question again proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

MR. HARDCASTLE said, he was astonished at the statements made by the Opposition as to the oppressive nature of this charge upon the enormous population of India. It seemed to him absurd to say that the cost of a war with a petty kingdom of 2,000,000 or 3,000,000 of people in a poor limestone district could not be borne by the Empire of India, with its 200,000,000, whose share of the burden would average about 1½*d.* each. He was disposed to think that there would be very considerable danger, seeing this war was waged in the interest and for the defence of India, in saddling the people of this country with that expenditure. It might be a question of policy, but it certainly was not a question of principle, that this country should bear a portion of the expenditure of a war for the defence of India. Happily, there had been recent indications given that the people of India were eager to co-operate with us in our Imperial policy, and it might possibly be politic that we should be called to bear a portion of this expense; but India was both able and willing to defend herself. Frequent allusion had been made to the war with Afghanistan 40 years ago, which was stated to have thrown a burden of £20,000,000 on the people of India. That war was waged under a Liberal Administration; but nothing was said of saddling England with the cost, although, at that time, the resources of India had not been developed as they had since been; the millions of British capital thrown into the country for the construction of railways had not been introduced; the internal communications had not been opened up to the extent they now were —in short, India was not at that time in the same condition to bear the burden of a war that she now was; and it seemed unreasonable to say that that country, with her increased resources, was unable to bear the small expenditure requisite for a war to defend her own Frontier. During this debate, and that which preceded it, there appeared to be, on the other side of the House, an almost general forgetfulness of the enormous benefits which British rule had conferred on India. India, they had been told by the hon. Member for Morpeth (Mr. Burt), was "groaning under the military despotism of England;" but let them remember what the state of that country was before British rule was established. Lord Macaulay thus eloquently described it—

> "A succession of nominal Sovereigns sunk in indolence and debauchery sauntered away life in secluded palaces. A succession of ferocious invaders descended through the Western Passes to prey on the defenceless wealth of Hindostan. A Persian conqueror crossed the Indus and marched through the gates of Delhi. . . . The Afghans soon followed to complete the devastation which the Persian had begun, and every corner of the Empire learnt to tremble at the might of the Mahrattas, whose dominion stretched across the Peninsula, and though they had become great Sovereigns, did not cease to be freebooters. Wherever their kettledrums were heard, the peasant threw his bag of rice on his shoulder, hid his small savings in his girdle, and fled with his wife and children to the mountains or the jungles, to the milder neighbourhood of the hyena and the tiger."

He could not allow all that had been said against British rule in India to pass without some reference to the advantages which our rule had conferred on that once down-trodden and distracted country. We had established peace and prosperity in India, and he could not admit that the people of that country were not able to bear the cost of a war of this kind for their own protection.

Mr. CHILDERS said, he would not provoke any recurrence to the debate of last week, or touch on any topic which did not relate to the Resolution before the House; still, in passing, he must observe that no one could fail to be struck with the great change of tone which had come over the front bench opposite in the course of these discussions. Last week they were told they had to deal with an Imperial question, in which the fortunes of the country were bound up; now they were discussing "a mere Frontier war," and they were told that the Resolution moved by the Under Secretary of State for India prejudged nothing, and that if the House should hereafter decide that the whole charge for this war should be paid out of the English Exchequer, the Resolution would not be inconsistent with that decision. If that were the case—if they had been called together to discuss "a mere Frontier war" and to pass a Resolution which prejudged nothing—he could not but wonder that Parliament should have been summoned at such an unusual season to discuss such trifling matters. It had been contended that this Resolution amounted to nothing more than a permission, under the Act for the Government of India, to the Indian Exchequer to make certain advances in connection with this war, and that it concluded nothing as to the ultimate incidence of the burden — whether it should be converted into a permanent charge either upon the British or Indian Exchequer. Now, he believed that doctrine was altogether unsound. On the contrary, the Resolution was an absolute and unlimited Vote of Credit on the Indian Exchequer for the whole expense of the war, whether incurred in the present or in any future year. A Resolution of this kind was a precedent for all time, and it was necessary to be extremely cautious in framing it. The Resolution said—

> "that this House consents that the Revenues of India shall be applied to defray the expenses of the Military operations which may be carried on beyond the external Frontiers of Her Majesty's Indian Possessions."

What he wished to ask the Government was simply this—whether there was the smallest authority or precedent in any financial Resolution adopted by Parliament, either in present or past times, for the word "defray" being applicable to anything else but an absolute charge on the Revenue? It so happened that at the end of the 56th section the word "defray" occurred again. It said that the pay and expenses incident to Her Majesty's Military and Naval Forces in India should be "defrayed" out of the Revenues of India. There could be no question whatever that when authority was given to "defray" a charge the authority to defray it was absolute, and that the word was never used for a temporary charge. Therefore, as it was intended to carry out the object of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, this Resolution should be modified in its terms. A very simple explanation of this extraordinary proceeding had been suggested to him; it was that the English Exchequer was in deficit and that the Indian Exchequer, as he would show, was overdrawn, and it would be possible under this Resolution to leave it open for a year to say upon which Revenue the expenditure should be charged. He hoped that to-night the House would arrive at a definite vote as to what should be done. On this question he could not help thinking that the House was being dealt with hardly fairly. Assuredly they were competent in that House to receive a definite proposal from the Government, and the Government had had ample time to consider what proposal it would make. Though this Resolution covered, in its terms as it stood, the whole expenditure of the Afghan War, we were expressly told that it was only to apply to the present year. It was, therefore, a very simple question for the Government to say what their views were as to the division of the charge. He did not think it was reasonable, in dealing with such a body as the House of Commons, for the Government, because it had a large majority at its back, to place only a limited amount of information before the Members. Nor was Parliament alone kept in the dark. How, he would ask, had the Government dealt with the Council in London, constituted to advise with the Indian Secretary upon financial questions? ["Hear, hear!"] He submitted it was the duty of the Secretary of State to submit to his Council all proposals involving financial questions. ["No, no!"] In 1869 the present Lord Chancellor took this view of the Act, and ultimately the then Secretary of State, the Duke of Argyll, agreed with him. He complained that the Council had been passed by and over-ridden in this question, and the control of the Council of India over Indian finance, which it was the object of the statute to confer, had been rendered practically nugatory. It was shown by the Papers that in this important question, which might involve millions, and which would certainly cost more than £1,000,000 in the present financial year, the Members of the Council, who were supposed more particularly to advise with the Secretary of State on financial matters, had not even a day given them to consider the merits of the case, or even to review the calculations of the officials. They had been treated most cavalierly, and no real financial check had been exercised by them. In this way the control intended by the framers of the Statute had been evaded and set at nought. Let him now pass to the purely financial question. He was by no means satisfied with the statement made on behalf of the Indian Government of the existing state of their finance. The Secretary of State, in "another place," explained that, including the new taxes, the surplus of Indian Revenue had been calculated at £2,131,000, or, after deducting the credit to the Famine Fund, £1,500,000, at above £500,000. But, he said, the Revenue had exceeded the Estimate; in opium the increase was £1,246,000; that during the present financial year the cost of the operations would not exceed £1,100,000, so that there would still remain a substantial surplus of above £500,000, after the payment of the charges for the expedition. That was the information the Secretary of State had on Monday week given to the country. But what was the explanation given now in this House. Instead of the financial position being improved since the Indian Budget it was admitted to be worse by £600,000. Thus the whole surplus was swallowed up, and the £1,100,000 could only be obtained by trenching on the credit of the Famine Fund. Now, there was an express contract between the Government and the people of India, when the increased taxes were imposed upon them last year, that the proceeds of those new taxes should be devoted to providing what Sir John Strachey called "an insurance against famine," and to no other purpose whatsoever. If, therefore, the Government having got the additional £1,500,000 so raised, instead of placing it to the credit of the insurance fund, paid out of it the expenses of the Afghan War, they would be committing, he contended, a distinct breach of contract. That was a very serious consideration, and the House ought, in his opinion, to hesitate before it gave its sanction to such a course. The House would remember the very important Petition presented to the House of Lords last year by Lord Northbrook, who stated that faith ought to be kept with the people of India to the utmost in this matter, and this had been admitted on all hands. He would now proceed to the question whether the present war could be fairly charged in its entirety to India? It seemed to him that very strong reasons had been already given for not treating this as a purely Indian war, or entered into upon purely Indian considerations. But there was a point in connection with the war which he would like to submit to the House, and with regard to which the Chancellor of the Exchequer might possibly be able to give some information. If the war had been entered into on purely Indian considerations, it would have presented a totally different aspect on the question of time. The India Office Papers which had been laid on the Table of the House did not show when, in the view of the Government, there was a probability of the Russian forces being moved in the direction of India, or when it was known that a Russian Mission was about to be sent to Cabul. But, on looking very carefully at the Central Asia Correspondence, prepared by the Foreign Office, hon. Members would find a somewhat astonishing fact, and it was that as to which he thought some explanation was due. They would see that the movement of Russian troops commenced on the 13th of June (new style), that another column set out on the 20th of June, and that the intention to move those columns towards India was notified in *The Tashkend Gazette* of the 26th of May, in which the strength of the columns was described. Further, that the Mission left Samarcand on the 14th of June. Taking those dates into account it was somewhat extraordinary that the Government of India appeared to have done nothing until the month of August. Now it might be, perhaps, said that the news took long to travel, and, no doubt, the unwise withdrawal of the Native Agent from Cabul put us at a disadvantage. But on looking closely at the Central Asian Papers, details would be found as to the time when these proceedings became absolutely known to the Indian Government. It would be seen that on May 13 intelligence reached them as to proposals of Abdul Rahman to the Russian Government to aid in subduing Afghanistan which had very much alarmed the Ameer. It would be seen, too, that on the 7th of June Major Cavagnari reported that the Russians were road-making to the Oxus, and that the Khan of Khiva, with 800 horse, was protecting the working parties; that on the 16th of June he reported that the road-making was being pushed on with great activity, and that a large force was mobilized, part of which was to move by Khiva, and that the Russians had ascertained what supplies and means of carriage could be procured; that the Ameer was alarmed, and anxious to know how these proceedings would be met by the British Government; that he said he would make friendly advances to whatever Government was friendly to him. Further, that the Mustaufi urged him to come to terms with the British Government, as they were moderate, whereas the Russians were shameless; and that Wali Mahommed, when appealed to, concurred. It would also be see that on the 18th of June news, stated to be authentic, was reported from Peshawur to the effect that Russian Agents had laid proposals before the Ameer for permission for Russian troops to be quartered in his territories. Reports of the coming of the Mission were received on the 5th, the 11th, and the 13th of June—so that early in that month the Government had information, if not in detail, at any rate from several different sources. However, the first complaint we made at St. Petersburg as to the movement of troops was on August 14, and the first communication to the Ameer was of the same date. There was, then, the strange circumstance of the Government having information from a variety of sources—information which, though not official, was strictly correct, and some described in the Papers themselves as authentic—of the movement of Russian troops and the approach of a Russian Envoy, and yet the Government for two months did nothing. If that was so, what were they entitled to say of the Government? Had it been a question solely of India, and the Indian Government had been acting free from dictation at home, could there be any question that the Government of India would have sent at once to the Ameer and have told him that his fears seemed likely to be justified, and that we were, therefore, prepared to step forward, as he wished, and we had promised, in defence of his Frontier? But, unfortunately, it was an English and not an Indian question, and they waited two months. And why? At the end of May the Salisbury-Schouvaloff agreement was signed, which the Government believed would settle all things satisfactorily; so that, feeling that the danger reported to them from so many quarters was over, they made no representation to Russia or to the Ameer for two months. And then, on the same day, they ordered Lord Augustus Loftus to protest to the Russian Government against a movement of troops which was long over, and the Viceroy to summon the Ameer to receive the Chamberlain Mission. That was the question which, in his opinion, called for an answer from the Government; for who could doubt that, but for this delay, there would have been no war?

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: I hope to detain the House but for a very short time, and do not intend to follow the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Childers) into his examination of the statements of my noble Friend, Lord Cranbrook, nor into his financial examination of the statements of my hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State as to the Indian Budget, because I am sure that were it necessary to tell anything further on that subject my hon. Friend would be better able to tell it than I; but with regard to one or two questions raised, it is my duty to make some remarks. With reference to one of the charges, he mentioned the delay which he notices as having taken place in the communications made with Russia and to the Ameer with respect to the Russian Mission. I admit that undoubtedly it was the case that for a considerable period—even extending much further back than the month of June last year—we were continually receiving communications of more or less authority, pointing to the movement of Russian forces in Central Asia. It was, however, exceedingly difficult to get at the exact truth of these reports. Reports often reached us which at first sight appeared very formidable, but which were afterwards explained away, or reduced in their importance; and frequently we were led to the conclusion that they were spread for the purpose of causing anxiety, or accidentally magnified by the imaginations of those who had made them. Without going too minutely into details, I may say that it was not until the middle of August that we were distinctly informed by the Indian Government that a Russian Mission had actually come to Cabul; and until that Mission had actually arrived there, we had no right to say that Russia was moving in parts of Asia in which she had no right to interfere; while we might always have been met with the denial on her part, as to the intention of overstepping the limits assigned to her influence. We were in no hurry to raise a question which might have produced a quarrel; but, as far as we could, wished matters to cool down, as we hoped they would after the negotiations at Berlin; and it was not until we were absolutely certain that the Russian Mission had arrived at Cabul that we sent conditional instructions to the Viceroy to take certain steps as soon as he was able to ascertain this beyond doubt. With regard to another point raised by the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Childers)—who I see has left his place—in passing, upon which he quoted the authority of the present Lord Chancellor and of Lord Salisbury from opinions expressed some years ago in the House of Lords, he seems to have forgotten that on that very occasion the Lord Chancellor of his own Government then in power—Lord Hatherley —answered the observations of Lord Cairns, and that he laid down with authority that—

> "an order to the Governor General to declare war against a border State would not require the assent of the Council, though, of course, it would, in its consequences, involve expenditure."—[3 *Hansard*, cxcv. 1830.]

This latter view is against the contention with which we are met; but it is not my intention to pursue that subject, which is unnecessary for the purposes of this discussion. The right hon. Gentleman has made a very great part of his speech turn upon the terrible word "defray" —indeed, we have had that word so dinned into our ears by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich, as well as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Pontefract that we have come to feel uncomfortable about it. I quite agree with the right hon. Member for Pontefract, that in our proceedings, when we are setting precedents, it is desirable and incumbent on us to be cautious about the language which we use; and I must say upon that point, with reference to that particular statute, that I think the Government, drawn from the front Bench opposite, were exceedingly cautious when they had to take proceedings under that Act. For very shortly after it was passed, upon one occasion when they did use Indian troops, and allowed Indian monies to be applied for the maintenance of those troops upon an expedition beyond the borders of India—in China—they were so afraid of using this terrible word "defray," that they did not use any word at all, and never came to Parliament either, to tell them anything about the affair. That was a very curious and interesting circumstance. When I have had occasion before to refer to it, I have always been met with this observation— "Oh! that was a case which did not fall within the meaning of the statute at all; that was a case which was provided for by the exception clause, in which it is said that—"Except for the purpose of repelling or preventing invasion, or in case of some sudden or urgent necessity, the Forces of India should not be used without the consent of Parliament." The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone) told us that the Peiho affair was a case of "urgent necessity;" that what happened in that case was this—a friendly Mission was being sent by the British and French Governments to the capital of China—to Pekin—and on its way it was suddenly assaulted and stopped in its progress, and therefore the emergency was so sudden that it was absolutely necessary to take steps to redress the insult. There are, certainly, some parallels which might be suggested in the present case, and, let me add, some points of difference. Notwithstanding the suddenness of the emergency, one year and two months were allowed to elapse before the Force was dispatched; and during that time a Session of Parliament took place, but nothing was said about it; and we are driven to the conclusion that in the view of Gentlemen opposite, when an insult is offered to the British Power beyond its own Frontiers, it is such an emergency that it will justify the employment of Indian troops without Parliament being consulted. You cannot say that the case in question was in any sense one of preventing or repelling invasion. In the case of Afghanistan, it might, perhaps, have been contended, with some little plausibility, that it was a measure of precaution, used to prevent invasion; and, certainly, with regard to its suddenness, that it was one of the very greatest emergency; because we could not wait 14 months, nor even 14 days, for it was a question of the season of the year, which, if the troops had not been ordered to move, would have been lost, and this would probably have led to much greater bloodshed and suffering, as well as added to the cost of the war.

If we are to be so careful about precedents in the use of this ambiguous word "defray," our conduct is, I think, more excusable than that of right hon. Gentlemen opposite. It is said you cannot apply the word "defray" to the payment of temporary charges; and the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Childers) observed that there was a great difference between the language used in this case and that used in the Vote for the Abyssinian Expedition. Of course, there was; because in the latter it was distinctly intended that the British Government should pay for the whole, or the greater part, of the expenditure—the object being avowedly an Imperial and British object. All that was then proposed was, that we should use the Indian Army and relieve the Indian Revenue of all charges; and, therefore, anything that was put upon it was distinctly of a temporary character. But what is proposed now is something wholly different. It is proposed to apply the Indian Revenue to this expenditure; not thereby meaning to say that it is not a matter that will require serious attention as to how far the British or Imperial Exchequer is to come in aid of that expenditure. But the right hon. Gentleman is right in saying that it will fall, in the first instance, upon the Indian Revenue; and I wish to go into this matter and face it, without attempting to disguise what is my view of it. I have said that I wish to put our view of the case before the House; and I hope hon. Members on both sides will endeavour to free their minds from any feeling of prejudice, and not be guided by mere impulse, without consideration of all the consequences at which they may arrive. What I ask the House is this—are we or are we not to understand that India is to be a self-supported part of the British Empire? The hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett) says it is. Then, if India is self-supporting, is it to pay for her own self-defence? That is a question which must be answered with some little reserve. I think there is to be the greatest distinction drawn between defence against immediate neighbours and defence against distant enemies. Take, for instance, the strongest case on the one side. Suppose a quarrel to arise between the British Government in India and the Nizam or Maharajah Scindia, and a contest or war takes place between them—is it or is it not the part of the Indian Exchequer to bear the expense of that war? I apprehend that, supposing it to have arisen in ordinary circumstances, there would be no question whatever that the charge should be rightly laid on the Indian Revenues. If you were to adopt a different principle, and say that the Indian Government should be at liberty, whenever they thought right, to undertake wars against their neighbours, and that they should be held harmless, I ask, what would be the temptation of the Government of India to go into quarrels which would be of a dangerous kind, and which would bring anything but satisfaction or economy to the people of India? But knowing that if they get into complications with their neighbours they will have to bear the expense is a check which, in their interest, as well as in the interests of the people of England, ought not to be disregarded. Again, where you have to deal with immediate border neighbours—such as Nepaul, Burmah, or any other States—I apprehend the case is clear that India ought to bear the expense. And similarly, I believe, within the Indian system, in which I include Afghanistan, upon the rule I have laid down, if a quarrel arose between that country and India, the Indian Revenues should bear the expense. I now want to qualify that doctrine by another consideration. I have said it is right that India should bear the expense of hostilities against immediate neighbours; but I have drawn a distinction between them and distant enemies: and when I speak of distant enemies, I especially refer to enemies who may be moving against her, not on account of any direct quarrel with her, but on account of some quarrel with the British Empire of which she is a part. In such a case, we ought to recognize the justice and equity of the Imperial Exchequer coming in aid of that part of our dominions which is attacked, not from any special local cause but from Imperial causes. We must bear in mind, therefore, what the Imperial Power does towards the general defence of India. There is no doubt we do a great deal to keep back the tide of invasion. If anybody will look at the history of India, they will see that wave after wave of different nations came over that country and overran it, generally from the North-West and through these very Passes of which we have been speaking. Anyone will see that this would again be the natural course of events, if there were not some strong Power in India like the British Power; and that if a great Power were advancing over those regions of Asia, that advancing Power would sooner or later sweep over India also. I believe that if it were not for the presence of British Power there, the shadow which such invasion would throw before it would even now be producing alarm and disturbance in that country of a serious character. But the great Power of England, and the warning hand of England, keeps India quiet, and thereby confers great benefits upon her. But what is the real cause, extent, and meaning of the present war? This is one point upon which we require further information than we have at the present moment. As to the actual and immediate cause of the present war, it was the refusal, with insult, offered in the eyes of all India, of a Mission sent by the Indian Government. There can be no doubt that if that were submitted to the Government of India would have been fatally, or at least seriously, weakened; and the country would have been put to considerable expense and exertion in order to redress the evil suffered. If there were nothing more in this quarrel than that insult offered—perhaps from the peculiar character, the moodiness, or ill-will and obstinacy of a particular Ruler, which might be speedily avenged, and that Ruler brought to his senses—and if the expenditure is to be of a moderate character—as we are told by the authorities of India it may be expected to be—and if, as I earnestly hope and pray may be the case, we have nearly arrived at the conclusion of this business, it will be a matter of considerable doubt whether the Imperial Exchequer ought to be called upon to pay anything at all. But if, on the other hand, there should be more in the war than at first sight appears—if it should seem that this is a war—of course, not openly or avowedly, but secretly, and against the will of another Government, but, nevertheless, by unofficial means — stirred up and maintained against us by a European Power; and if it becomes necessary to put forward anything like our Imperial strength, I am sure that the people of England will be ready to bear their full share—and even more than their full share—of the burden of this war. I wish to remind the House of the position of affairs under which we are called together. Up to the time of the period allowed for the Ameer's reply to our Ultimatum we fully hoped that war might be avoided, and a peaceful settlement arrived at. From the moment when the advance began—namely, on the 21st November—until now, the interval is less than four weeks, and it is really exceedingly difficult at present to tell what is the real nature of the resistance to be offered, or the upshot or outcome of the war. In the course of another month or two we shall have learned a great deal, and be in a very much better position to make to Parliament a serious proposition appropriate to the real state of the case. At the present moment in our uncertainty as to the extent of the operations necessary to obtain the submission of the Ameer, it would be impossible for us to come forward and do what we have done in other cases—propose a definite Vote of Credit. If we are to give aid it must not be by undertaking that we should bear the expense of a war administered by others, set free from all considerations of economy, who might press it beyond the length which might be desirable, because they are exempt from all risk of having to pay for it; but what we may think it right to give should be in the shape of a Vote in aid of the expenditure of the Indian Government. The principle upon which we proceed is one which we have adopted with reference not only, and not even principally, to the interests of taxpayers in England; but with the sincere belief that it would be better for the interests of India herself that she should be made to feel the responsibility under which she carries on war, and that it would be a very bad principle to allow her Administration to believe that they might go to war and cast the expense upon the Imperial Exchequer. I admit that there is much which raises the presumption that this should be treated as an exceptional case; but all I can say at present is that the Government will be fully prepared when we meet after the Recess to give full explanations to the House as to what proposals we shall have to make.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: There is one point in the observations of the Chancellor of the Exchequer which I think ought not to be left altogether without remark. I think that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had some injustice done to him at an earlier period of the evening, inasmuch as the right hon. Gentleman has now given us some information as to what are the actual intentions of the Government. It appears that Her Majesty's Government intend the first charge of the war to be defrayed by the Indian Government; and their further intention is that according to the amount of resistance, or, in any case, according to the nature or object which they desire to gain by the war, they will come forward and ask this House to grant a subsidy in aid of the Indian Revenues. This appears to me to be a new and altogether unprecedented view of the subject. We have in former times frequently conducted wars by means of subsidies to foreign Powers; but I am not aware that we have ever subsidized one of our own Dependencies to conduct a war for us. There is this difference, I believe—that when a foreign Power has been subsidized to carry on a war in our behalf, there has been a distinct understanding and distinct stipulations as to the amount to be paid and the amount of assistance to be rendered. In this case, however, everything remains vague. It is in the power of the Government at home to issue such orders as they may think fit to the Indian Government as regards the prosecution of the war; and when the work has been performed, they can come down to the House and ask us to vote money in order to reimburse the taxpayers of India for the services rendered. In this case, what becomes of the power of this House to control questions of peace and war; and what becomes of the power of this House to protect the purse of the British nation? If Her Majesty's Government, through the agency of the Indian Government, conducts the war, the control of Parliament over the expenditure entirely vanishes. And as to the guardianship of the resources of the taxpayers, what becomes of that when, after the Indian Government has done the work, the Government comes forward to say that by our instructions and by our directions all this expenditure has been incurred? How is it possible that the House should turn round and say we decline to pay? We have been fulfilling one of our most important functions. To this House is confided, no doubt, the guardianship of our Indian subjects to a very great extent; but I think its primary duty is to guard the interests of the British taxpayer. Under the circumstances in which we have been debating this question, it has been impossible to enter into it at length; but I am anxious that the proposition of the Chancellor of the Exchequer should not pass without a protest; and I am of opinion that when we meet again, this question will be more seriously considered than the Government think it should be at the present moment.

MR. JACOB BRIGHT said, he would not detain the House more than two minutes while he alluded to a matter which he had hoped would be mentioned by the hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Hardcastle), who had been more fortunate than himself in getting a place in the debate. A great deal had been said in the course of the debate about taking a surplus which ought to be devoted to the unfortunate people of India. He wished to remind the Government that there were many poor people in this country who had some interest in that surplus. Large deputations had come up from the North of England, from time to time, to ask for the removal of the cotton duties of India; and a Minister of the Crown had more than once promised those deputations that as soon as there should be a surplus it should be devoted to the removal of those duties. The Minister who made those promises was Lord Salisbury; and it would be rather a curious coincidence if, on looking up the dates, it should be discovered that at the moment when he was making those promises to the Lancashire people he was reversing the policy of peace in India, and making it impossible to apply the surplus to any such purpose. Representing a part of Lancashire, and knowing the condition in which Lancashire was at the present moment, he felt it his duty to say a word on this subject. The mills were being closed or working short time, and a great number of poor people would look with surprise and indignation on this unfortunate mode of disposing of the Indian surplus.

Question put.

The House *divided*:—Ayes 235; Noes 125: Majority 110.

AYES.

Allcroft, J. D.
Allsopp, C.
Arbuthnot, Lt.-Col. G.
Arkwright, A. P.
Arkwright, F.
Assheton, R.
Astley, Sir J. D.
Bagge, Sir W.
Balfour, A. J.
Barne, F. St. J. N.
Barrington, Viscount
Barttelot, Sir W. B.
Beach, rt. hn. Sir M. H.
Beach, W. W. B.
Beaumont, W. B.
Bective, Earl of
Benett-Stanford, V. F.
Bentinck, rt. hn. G. C.
Bentinck, G. W. P.
Beresford, Lord C.
Beresford, G. de la Poer
Beresford, Colonel M.
Birley, H.
Blackburne, Col. J. I.
Boord, T. W.
Bourke, hon. R.
Bourne, Colonel J.
Bousfield, Col. N. G. P.
Bowen, J. B.
Bowyer, Sir G.
Brooks, W. C.
Bruce, hn. T.
Brymer, W. E.
Bulwer, J. R.
Burghley, Lord
Burrell, Sir W. W.
Buxton, Sir R. J.
Cameron, D.
Campbell, C.
Cartwright, F.
Castlereagh, Viscount
Cave, rt. hon. S.
Cecil, Lord E. H. B. G.
Charley, W. T.
Christie, W. L.
Clive, Col. hon. G. W.
Close, M. C.
Clowes, S. W.
Cobbold, T. C.
Cole, Col. hon. H. A.
Coope, O. E.
Cordes, T.
Corry, hon. H. W. L.
Cotton, W. J. R.
Crichton, Viscount
Cross, rt. hon. R. A.
Cuninghame, Sir W.
Cust, H. C.
Dalkeith, Earl of
Dalrymple, C.
Denison, C. B.
Denison, W. B.
Denison, W. E.
Dickson, Major A. G.
Digby, Col. hon. E.
Douglas, Sir G.
Dyott, Colonel R.
Eaton, H. W.
Edmonstone, Admiral Sir W.
Egerton, hon. A. F.
Egerton, hon. W.
Elcho, Lord
Elliot, G. W.
Elphinstone, Sir J. D. H.
Emlyn, Viscount
Estcourt, G. S.
Ewart, W.
Finch, G. H.
Floyer, J.
Folkestone, Viscount
Forsyth, W.
Fremantle, hon. T. F.
Galway, Viscount
Gardner, J. T. Agg-
Gardner, R. Richardson-
Garfit, T.
Garnier, J. C.
Gathorne-Hardy, hn. A.
Gibson, rt. hon. E.
Giffard, Sir H. S.
Giles, A.
Goddard, A. L.
Goldney, G.
Gordon, W.
Gore-Langton, W. S.
Gorst, J. E.
Grantham, W.
Gregory, G. B.
Hall, A. W.
Halsey, T. F.
Hamilton, rt. hn. Lord G.
Hamilton, Marquess of
Hamilton, hon. R. B.
Hamond, C. F.
Harcourt, E. W.
Hardcastle, E.
Harvey, Sir R. B.
Hay, rt. hn. Sir J. C. D.
Heath, R.
Helmsley, Viscount
Herbert, H. A.
Herbert, hon. S.
Hervey, Lord F.
Hick, J.
Hill, A. S.
Holford, J. P. G.
Holker, Sir J.
Holland, Sir H. T.
Home, Captain
Hood, Capt. hn. A. W. A. N.
Hope, A. J. B. B.
Hubbard, E.
Hubbard, rt. hon. J.
Isaac, S.
Jervis, Col. H. J. W.
Johnson, J. G.
Johnstone, Sir F.
Jolliffe, hon. S.
Kennard, Col. E. H.
King-Harman, E. R.
Knight, F. W.
Knightley, Sir R.
Lawrence, Sir T.
Learmonth, A.
Legard, Sir C.
Legh, W. J.
Leighton, Sir B.
Leighton, S.
Lennox, Lord H. G.
Lewisham, Viscount
Lindsay, Colonel R. L.
Lindsay, Lord
Lloyd, S.
Lloyd, T. E.
Lopes, Sir M.
Lowther, hon. W.
Lowther rt. hn. J.
Macartney, J. W. E.
Mac Iver, D.
M'Garel-Hogg, Sir J.
M'Kenna, Sir J. N.
Makins, Colonel
Mandeville, Viscount
Manners, rt. hn. Lord J.
March, Earl of
Marten, A. G.
Master, T. W. C.
Merewether, C. G.
Mills, A.
Mills, Sir C. H.
Montgomerie, R.
Montgomery, Sir G. G.
Moray, Col. H. D.
Mowbray, rt. hon. J. R.
Muncaster, Lord
Naghten, Lt.-Col. A. R.
Noel, rt. hon. G. J.
North, Colonel J. S.
Northcote, rt. hn. Sir S. H.
Onslow, D.
Parker, Lt.-Col. W.
Peek, Sir H.
Pell, A.
Pemberton, E. L.
Percy, Earl
Phipps, P.
Pim, Captain B.
Plunket, hon. D. R.
Polhill-Turner, Capt. F. C.
Powell, W.
Praed, H. B.
Puleston, J. H.
Raikes, H. C.
Read, C. S.
Rendlesham, Lord
Ridley, E.
Ridley, Sir M. W.
Ritchie, C. T.
Rodwell, B. B. H.
Round, J.
Russell, Sir C.
Ryder, G. R.
Salt, T.
Sandon, Viscount
Scott, Lord H.
Scott, M. D.
Selwin-Ibbetson, Sir H. J.
Shute, General C. C.
Simonds, W. B.
Sinclair, Sir J. G. T.
Smith, A.
Smith, S. G.
Smith, rt. hon. W. H.
Smollett, P. B.
Spinks, Serjeant F. L.
Stanhope, hon. E.
Stanhope, W. T. W. S.
Stanley, rt. hn. Col. F.
Steere, L.
Storer, G.
Swanston, A.
Sykes, C.
Talbot, J. G.
Taylor, rt. hn. Col. T. E.
Thornhill, T.
Tollemache, hon. W. F.
Tremayne, A.
Tremayne, J.
Turnor, E.
Wait, W. K.
Walker, O. O.
Wallace, Sir R.
Watney, J.
Watson, rt. hon. W.
Welby-Gregory, Sir W.
Wellesley, Colonel H.
Wethered, T. O.
Wilmot, Sir H.
Wilmot, Sir J. E.
Wilson, W.
Woodd, B. T.
Wynn, Sir W. W.
Wynn, C. W. W.
Yarmouth, Earl of
Yeaman, J.

TELLERS.

Dyke, Sir W. H.
Winn, R.

NOES.

Acland, Sir T. D.
Allen, W. S.
Amory, Sir J. H.
Anderson, G.
Ashley, hon. E. M.
Balfour, Sir G.
Barclay, A. C.
Bass, A.
Bass, H.
Beaumont, Colonel F.

Bell, I. L.
Blake, T.
Blennerhassett, R. P.
Brady, J.
Briggs, W. E.
Bright, Jacob
Bristowe, S. B.
Brogden, A.
Brown, J. C.
Burt, T.
Cameron, C.
Campbell, Lord C.
Campbell, Sir G.
Campbell-Bannerman, H.
Carington, hn. Col. W.
Cave, T.
Cavendish, Lord F. C.
Chadwick, D.
Chamberlain, J.
Childers, rt. hn. H. C. E.
Cole, H. T.
Colman, J. J.
Courtauld, G.
Courtney, L. H.
Cowan, J.
Davies, R.
Delahunty, J.
Dilke, Sir C. W.
Dillwyn, L. L.
Earp, T.
Edge, S. R.
Edwards, H.
Errington, G.
Evans, T. W.
Fawcett, H.
Ferguson, R.
Forster, Sir C.
Forster, rt. hon. W. E.
Fry, L.
Gladstone, rt. hon. W. E.
Gladstone, W. H.
Gordon, Sir A.
Goschen, rt. hon. G. J.
Gourley, E. T.
Grant, A.
Gray, E. D.
Grey, Earl de
Harcourt, Sir W. V.
Hartington, Marq. of
Havelock, Sir H.
Hayter, A. D.
Herschell, F.
Hill, T. R.
Holms, J.
Hopwood, C. H.
Howard, hon. C.
Hutchinson, J. D.
Ingram, W. J.
Jackson, Sir H. M.
James, Sir H.
Jenkins, D. J.
Jenkins, E.
Johnstone, Sir H.
Kay-Shuttleworth, Sir U.
Kensington, Lord
Kingscote, Col. R. N. F.
Lawson, Sir W.
Leatham, E. A.
Leeman, G.
Leith, J. F.
Macduff, Viscount
M'Arthur, A.
Maitland, J.
Middleton, Sir A. E.
Milbank, F. A.
Monk, C. J.
Morley, S.
Mundella, A. J.
Mure, Colonel W.
Newdegate, C. N.
Noel, E.
O'Beirne, Major F.
O'Brien, Sir P.
O'Gorman, P.
O'Reilly, M.
Palmer, G.
Parker, C. S.
Philips, R. N.
Playfair, rt. hon. L.
Power, J. O'C.
Ramsay, J.
Rathbone, W.
Richard, H.
Roberts, J.
Rylands, P.
Samuda, J. D'A.
Samuelson, B.
Samuelson, H.
Sheil, E.
Sheridan, H. B.
Simon, Serjeant J.
Smyth, P. J.
Stacpoole, W.
Stansfeld, rt. hon. J.
Stewart, J.
Sullivan, A. M.
Tavistock, Marq. of
Taylor, P. A.
Tracy, hon. F. S. A. Hanbury-
Trevelyan, G. O.
Waddy, S. D.
Waterlow, Sir S. H.
Whitbread, S.
Whitwell, J.
Williams, W.

TELLERS.
Laing, S.
Morgan, G. Osborne

Main Question put.

Resolved, That, Her Majesty having directed a Military expedition of Her Forces charged upon Indian Revenues to be despatched against the Ameer of Afghanistan, this House consents that the Revenues of India shall be applied to defray the expenses of the Military operations which may be carried on beyond the external Frontiers of Her Majesty's Indian possessions.

ARMY (MEDICAL DEPARTMENT).

Copy *presented*, — of Statement by Members of the Board of Examiners of Candidates with reference to the Report of the Committee on that Department, with a Rejoinder on the part of the Committee [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.

MILITIA (TRAINING ESTABLISHMENT).

Return *presented*,—for each Regiment showing the number present, absent, and wanting to complete the training for 1878 [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.

FACTORY AND WORKSHOP ACT, 1878.

Copy *presented*,—of Orders made by the Secretary of State granting special exceptions [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.

ARMY (STAFF COLLEGE).

Address for "Returns showing the number of Officers of Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers who have competed at each examination for admission to the Staff College, Sandhurst, since its formation; the number on each occasion who would have gained admission but for the limitation rules, and their places on the list; the number of and places obtained by those who did gain admission; the number of and places obtained at the final examination by those who passed out; the number who passed the final examination without going through the College; and the rules as to limitation of numbers in force at different periods:"

"And, numerical and nominal list of those who passed through the College, or passed the final examination, who have been employed on the Staff of the Army, and the appointments they have held, specifying in the numerical list the totals of those who have been employed on the General Staff, and of those who have held Regimental Staff appointments; appointments on the Staff in India not to be included in this Return."—(*Colonel Arbuthnot.*)

EGYPT (DAIRA LANDS).

Address for "any Papers showing the agreement between this Country and the Khedive of Egypt which enabled the Marquis of Salisbury, in his Letter to Lord Lyons of 24th October 1878 (Papers, Egypt, No. 2, 1878), to state that the person nominated by Her Majesty's Government as one of the Commissioners of the Daira Lands shall not be divested of his functions without their previous consent."—(*Mr. Samuelson.*)

RAILWAYS (IRELAND).

Return *ordered*, "of all Railway Companies in Ireland which have now or have ever had guarantees on the county rates; giving in each case the date of the Act authorising the guarantee; the date of the opening of the Line; the amount of authorised capital; amount of guaranteed capital; rate of interest guaranteed; character of guaranteed capital, whether a first charge on the net receipts or not; amount paid out of rates to the Company on account of the guarantee; and the number of years, if any, in which the net receipts from the Line were sufficient to dispense with a call on the rates."—(*The O'Conor Don.*)

EAST INDIAN ARMY.

Address for "Return showing rank and names of the British Officers serving with each regiment of Native Cavalry and Infantry employed in or moved for the Afghan Campaign of 1878 on the 1st day of September 1878, either in the advanced columns or in their support, with names of the Officers subsequently attached to each, and the casualties amongst them, made up to the 31st day of December 1878."—(*Sir Henry Havelock.*)

EAST INDIAN ARMY (NATIVE TROOPS).

Address for "Return showing Annual Cost of the Pay and Allowances of all Officers in the East Indian Army (Native Troops) showing each Presidency separately."—(*Sir Henry Havelock.*)

JOHN NOLAN.

Address for "Copy of Depositions taken before the Coroner at the Inquest on the body of John Nolan."—(*Mr. Mitchell Henry.*)

PRISON RULES.

Address for "Copy of Correspondence between Sir W. H. Wyatt, or any other of the Magistrates of Middlesex and Westminster, or of the City of London, or of the county of Surrey, and the Home Office, relative to the working of the new Prison Rules and the control of the Magistrates."—(*Mr. Mitchell Henry.*)

CHURCH OF SCOTLAND.

Address for "Returns with regard to the Established Church of Scotland, giving in separate columns the number of Male and the number of Female Communicants in each parish in Scotland for the year 1878 included in the Roll prepared by the Kirk Session, in conformity with the Regulations of the General Assembly; and stating the date of the Minute of the Kirk Session sanctioning the Roll as last purged of persons disqualified by removal or otherwise, and finally adjusted:"

"Of the number of Adherents, not being Communicants, and not under 21 years of age, admitted on application to the Roll of the Congregation, under the General Assembly's Regulations of the 3rd day of June 1878, in those parishes in which Ministers have been elected and appointed under the provisions of Church Patronage Act of 1874:"

"And, of the Population of each parish according to the Census of 1871, and a summary of the results (in continuation of Parliamentary Paper, No. 239, of Session 1874)."—(*Mr. M'Laren.*)

AFGHANISTAN (No. 3).

Copy *presented*,—of Correspondence respecting the relations between the British Government and that of Afghanistan [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.

TURKEY (No. 51, 1878) (REFORMS IN ASIATIC TURKEY).

Copy *presented*,—of Correspondence respecting Reforms in Asiatic Turkey [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.

TURKEY (No. 52, 1878) (RHODOPE COMMISSION).

Copy *presented*,—of Further Correspondence respecting the proceedings of the International Commission sent to the Mount Rhodope District [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.

House adjourned at a quarter before
One o'clock till Thursday
13th February

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Thursday, 13th February, 1879.

MINUTES.]—PUBLIC BILL—*First Reading*—Cathedral Statutes* (4).

HER ROYAL HIGHNESS THE GRAND DUCHESS OF HESSE (PRINCESS ALICE).

HER MAJESTY'S ANSWER TO THE ADDRESS OF CONDOLENCE (DECEMBER 17).

THE LORD STEWARD OF THE HOUSEHOLD (the Earl BEAUCHAMP) *reported* Her Majesty's Answer to the Address of the 17th December last, as follows:—

> MY LORDS,
>
> I THANK you sincerely for your loyal and dutiful Address, and for your expression of Sympathy and Condolence with me on the loss of my beloved Daughter.
>
> The assurance of your interest in all that concerns my domestic relations and your wishes for the happiness of myself and my family have given me much satisfaction.

BUSINESS OF PARLIAMENT.

MINISTERIAL STATEMENT.

THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELD: My Lords, the circumstances under which Parliament was called together, at the end of last year, rendered it impossible that your Lordships' attention should be directed, in the Speech from the Throne, to any other subject than that which was the occasion of our having been so unexpectedly assembled. It would not have been prudent—I may say it would not have been possible—at that period to have indicated the measures which Her Majesty's Government might have thought it their duty to introduce to the consideration of Parliament. Nevertheless, everyone must feel the inconvenience that would follow from the omission of that Constitutional custom which makes it the duty of the Government, at the commencement of the Session, to communicate generally to the two Houses the character of the measures which they are about to introduce, and the general course of Business. I have therefore thought, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, that it would be desirable that I should, upon this occasion, take the opportunity of indicating the measures which, under ordinary circumstances, would have been recommended to your notice in the Speech from the Throne at the opening of the present Session. But, my Lords, before doing so, it may not be considered intrusive if I make a few remarks on the general situation of affairs. At this moment, the thoughts and feelings of the country are engrossed by the terrible news just received from South Africa. My Lords, it is not wise either to depreciate the importance of such an event or to exaggerate it. It is a military disaster—a terrible military disaster—but I think we may say it is no more. It is not a military defeat arising from the failing energies or resources of the country. It is from accidental and, at this moment, not clearly understood circumstances that the calamity has arisen. I have no information to give your Lordships which is not in your possession by the usual means of intelligence; and it would, I think, be desirable that no one should hazard an opinion as to the causes of the disaster until we receive those official and authentic accounts which are, of course, now on their way. Nothing, indeed, at this moment, is certain respecting this sad occurrence except the valour of our troops. They have shown, in this difficulty—as they have ever shown—the utmost devotion and bravery. Those who have fallen will be remembered, and will be mourned; but we must not forget the exhibition of heroic valour by those who have been spared. At this moment, I am sure, the recollection of those 80 men, who, for 12 hours in a forlorn hope, kept at bay 4,000 of the enemy, and ultimately repulsed them, will prove that the stamina and valour of the English soldiery have not diminished. All I will now say, on the part of the Government, is that we shall avail ourselves of every possible means to place before your Lordships all the information that reaches us. My noble Friend the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies has given Notice that in a few days—I am in hopes on Saturday next, but certainly on Monday—you will have the Papers which will complete the history of these events. I can further assure your Lordships that we are taking measures, in conjunction with those who are intrusted with these matters, to put our troops and the Colony in a position of security. The reinforcements which we are sending to the Cape are in numbers much beyond what have been applied for by the General in command; and I think we may expect to see that affairs in South Africa assume a very different aspect from that which they bear at present. My Lords, had it not been for this melancholy incident, the slight allusion which, in deference to your Lordships, I should have had to make in my statement to-day to the state of our foreign relations would, I think, by all candid minds, have been considered satisfactory. The progress in the accomplishment of the provisions of the Berlin Treaty—which all of us, whatever may be our general opinions—must wish to be the foundation of an enduring peace in Europe, has been regular, certain, and considerable. The great majority of the provisions of that Treaty have now been carried into effect. By the Supplemental Convention which was signed between the Porte and the Emperor of Russia very recently, the last traces of the Treaty of San Stefano have been abolished; and I believe I may say that at this moment the Russian Army has commenced its retrograde movement, which will result in the complete evacuation of the Dominions of the Sultan. The provision which had been made for the exchange of territories in Asia between the belligerents has already been fully accomplished. The arrangement with regard to the boundary of Montenegro—a most difficult part of the settlement—has been carried into complete effect, and Podgoritza and Strailetz have been relinquished without bloodshed and without those incidents of horror as were anticipated by some. Again, the occupation of Bosnia has been accomplished, and tranquillity reigns in that Province. The tranquillity of Crete is complete, and I have reason to hope, and indeed to believe, that the institutions established in that island obtain the confidence of persons of all classes and creeds. The negotiations for the rectification of the boundaries of Greece have already commenced, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin. With regard to other diplomatic incidents which are, in a certain degree, connected with the Treaty of Berlin—or at least with the general settlement then devised—I think there has been some rather harsh measure dealt out to the Sultan in the insinuations—which have been rather profuse—against his sincerity or ability to carry into effect those reforms in his Asiatic Dominions upon which the prosperity of his Kingdom and his own power mainly depend. We should not forget that the Sultan has had the most difficult task in the world engaging his energies at the moment when he was called upon or expected to exercise those energies on other points. He has had to free his dominions from a conquering and invading host, and that has naturally absorbed his energies and his resources. It must not be forgotten that during all this period the Sultan has had to maintain an army of 300,000 disciplined men with an exhausted Treasury. But, notwithstanding these circumstances, the communications and arrangements that have taken place between Her Majesty's Government and the Porte have been of a satisfactory character; and I have learnt to-day that the Imperial Commission which was instituted by the Sultan himself to consider and report on the changes which should be made in the government of the various Provinces of his Dominions, has drawn up its Report and sent it in to the General Council of State. During this period, there has been more than one instance in which the Sultan has shown his anxiety to act in the spirit of those principles of reform which he had proclaimed — such as the nomination of Midhat Pacha for a period of five years to the government of Syria—this being an indication of the policy to be pursued throughout the various Provinces of the Turkish Empire. My Lords, I have little to say beyond what I have already said respecting the Island of Cyprus. Last year I made a statement on what I considered the highest authority—that of the Admiral commanding in those waters, and of the distinguished soldier now in command of the Island, and the personal experience of some of my Colleagues. I wish to enter into no controversy on the subject. Time brings truth, and I believe the opinion of the country at the present moment has been enlightened generally on the subject. There are, however, two points which I think it my duty to place before the House in connection with the subject of Cyprus. First of all, it will be satisfactory for your Lordships to learn that the question respecting the public domains, which, when the Convention was first entered into, was necessarily unsettled, has now been settled entirely to the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government; and the whole of those domains—with the exception, of course, of the private estates of the Sultan—have been placed in their hands. The other point which I hope will be considered not less satisfactory is the one of revenue. Those who anticipated that in undertaking the responsibility of occupying Cyprus for great political objects we were entailing a vast burden on this country will learn with satisfaction that the revenue of Cyprus, even in the first year, will have not only paid the whole of the expenses of its government, but will leave no inconsiderable surplus. There is every prospect that the surplus, not only in this year but in subsequent years, will furnish the means by which those public works may be carried out which are necessary to secure the prosperity of what I must look upon as a very valuable acquisition. My Lords, in giving your Lordships this slight sketch of what has occurred in the Levant, I cannot resist the temptation to call your Lordships' attention to the great services of Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople. My Lords, that gentleman belongs to a different political connection from myself; and therefore I speak with the sincerity of one who wishes to do justice to the eminent services of one who has been, and may be again, my political opponent. I do not know any man in whom there has been a rarer or more complete combination of two great qualities — energy and patience—than in Sir Henry Layard. He is a man of great resource, and I venture to call the attention of your Lordships to him on this occasion, because I know that his health has broken down under his great exertions and sacrifices, and he must—I hope only for a time—leave the scene of his exertions and efforts. My Lords, I wish I could at this moment give you an authoritative intimation that from our experience as a Government we hope and believe that the commercial depression of this country has materially abated. Still, I venture to say that I think there are some indications of improvement, and that we have seen the worst of a depression scarcely equalled for the period of its duration. I am unwilling to express myself in any phrase which might mislead; but there is one point connected with this matter upon which I may speak with confidence. I wish to express my admiration of the sincere and spontaneous spirit of benevolence which has animated the country generally in encountering this great distress. The resources of this country, both moral and material, have been employed in a surpassing manner with reference to this calamity. My Lords, it becomes me now to call your attention to those measures which it is our intention to submit for your consideration. But, my Lords, before I touch upon that point, there is one subject to which I have omitted to call your attention in what I have already said. I refer to the state of affairs in Afghanistan. Her Majesty's Government have the satisfaction of feeling that the object of their interference in that country has been completely accomplished. We are now in possession of the three great highways which connect Afghanistan with India, and I hope that this country will remain in possession of those three great highways. We have secured the object for which the expedition was undertaken; we have secured that Frontier which will, I hope and believe, render our Indian Empire invulnerable; and we have attained that object in a manner which will trench as little as possible upon the independence and self-government of Afghanistan. My Lords, I will now mention those measures which we shall ask you to consider during the course of the present Session. The first measure, which will be introduced in the other House of Parliament, will be the Mutiny Bill. Your Lordships are well aware that for many years the old Mutiny Bill has been the subject of severe, and, in my opinion, in some respects too, not unjust criticism. Some clauses are obsolete; they are not adapted to the period in which we live. The subject has been now well considered, and it is our intention to introduce a complete measure, which, while preserving the Constitutional control of Parliament over the Army, will be in its nature of the character of a Military

Code. The Bill as drawn will be in harmony with the recommendations of Parliamentary Committees, and with the views of those who have deeply studied the subject. The next measure we shall ask Parliament to consider will be a code of a different character—the Consolidation of the Criminal Law. A Bill will be brought in which will deal completely with that subject, and which has, in fact, been drawn up by a Commission of Her Majesty's Judges; and although neither this nor the other House of Parliament will for a moment lose their power of amending or criticizing its composition, still it will be a source of confidence and satisfaction to them to know by what means the Bill has been drawn up, and that there is no statement, or arrangement, or condition, or proviso contained in it, which has not been the result of the deep thought and consideration of the most learned authorities in the land. The next subject which we shall wish to have the opinion of Parliament upon, and which may probably be introduced first in this House, is one that deeply interests, at the present moment, the people of this country—that is, the Law of Bankruptcy. A measure will be brought in which will, I trust, be more successful than previous measures of the kind; it has had the greatest pains taken in its preparation, and I believe it is one which will meet the pressing requirements of the country. There will also be a Bill for amending the law as to Summary Jurisdiction. Your Lordships are aware that the Railway Commission expires this year, and therefore you will not be surprised that it is necessary to introduce a Bill on that subject. Then there is a Bill for establishing County Boards in England; and, at the same time, one to reform and amend the Grand Jury Laws of Ireland. There will be a Valuation Bill also introduced, and a Poor Law Amendment Bill for Scotland. My Lords, on the next occasion when Her Majesty shall be graciously pleased to address this House, either in person or by Her Commissioners, I shall be happy indeed if I can feel that all these Bills have been passed into law. I may say, my Lords, that these measures do not by any means include all the questions with which Her Majesty's Government are ready to deal, and in fact are, if necessary and opportunity is offered to them, prepared to deal. But experience has shown us that it is necessary to be moderate in these matters, and your Lordships are well aware that the increased spirit of criticism in "another place" renders the passage of Bills more difficult than it formerly was. My Lords, I have now fulfilled my promise of making you acquainted, in accordance with the wholesome Constitutional custom, with the general views of Her Majesty's Government, and the general proposals which they mean to submit to you; and all I ask and hope is that with the assistance of your wisdom they may be carried into law, and may prove beneficial and useful to the country.

Earl GRANVILLE: My Lords, I think the course taken by the noble Earl in making the statement he has just made to the House is a perfectly fair and convenient one; and I have to thank the noble Earl for his courtesy in communicating to me his intention to take that course. My Lords, at the opening of Parliament, remarking on the Queen's Speech, I said that I could, without any great inconvenience, wait until February to learn what Bills were to be introduced, and I am glad I have not agitated myself very much on the subject in the interval. Several of the Bills now announced by the noble Earl are useful, and I certainly agree with the noble Earl in the hope that they may be satisfactorily dealt with during the Session. Some of the Bills have been before this and the other House of Parliament on former occasions; but one—the County Boards Bill—is new to us, and I should be rather afraid, unless considerable alteration has been made in the Bill as presented to the House of Commons last year, that we could not see our way to pass it ourselves. There is one feature of the list which I heartily endorse—that dealing with Bankruptcy—which subject it is impossible, I think, not to deal with after the very remarkable Memorial which has lately been presented on the subject. With regard to the Railway Commission, I think the occasion is one of very considerable importance, not only to the railways, but to the community at large. But what I very much rejoice at is that there is no announcement of a Bill, and no indication of any attempt to meet a very natural, but I think a very unreasonable, wish on the part of a good many of the community to introduce some panacea for the general depression to which the noble Earl has alluded. Any such measure would be in violation of those principles of political economy in which I am a sincere believer. The Secretary of State for the Colonies, indeed, has talked of "the dead bones of political economy," but perhaps it was out of deference to the feelings which unfortunately exist in some of the Colonies with which he is connected; but the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the House of Commons has taken public occasion to discourage the idea that Her Majesty's Government had any intention to yield to the temptation to meet any popular cry on this subject. The noble Earl has informed us of the general state of our external affairs, and especially of that which has occupied the attention of the public so long — the Berlin Treaty. I find myself in some difficulty in approaching that subject. There was a time when the Opposition proposed to itself the duty and privilege of criticizing the acts of the Government. There has lately been a desire to take away that liberty. If we talk of what has passed, we are begged to let bygones alone, and not to waste any time in discussing historical reminiscences. If we speculate on the future we subject ourselves to ridicule, not altogether undeserved. But if we wish to speak of the present, we frequently find that it is concealed from us; and if we complain of concealment, we are immediately accused of using personal language. As to the virulence of abuse with which we are charged by Her Majesty's Government, it does not appear to me to vary very much from language which I have heard ever since I have been in public life. I think that even in this august House I have heard Lord Lyndhurst, the late Lord Derby, and Lord Ellenborough attack a Liberal Government with a great deal of energy and power. I am not quite sure I have not heard even some of my noble Friends opposite speak of the late Government in a manner not absolutely overflowing with the milk of human kindness. One Member of Her Majesty's Government has thought fit in the last few weeks —I might say in the last few days— to describe us as an ambitious, unscrupulous, and unpatriotic Opposition. There is one subject to which I must refer connected with the Eastern Question. It is the rejection of the Berlin Memorandum. I read in the newspapers that on Tuesday the First Lord of the Admiralty introduced the subject into his speech at Westminster, and is reported to have said that the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government in respect to the Berlin Memorandum was

> "not questioned by the Leader of the Liberal Party in the House of Commons, but was deliberately approved of by Lord Granville himself in the House of Lords."

I think this hardly represents the course I took in regard to the Berlin Memorandum, and I will refer your Lordships to *Hansard* for what I really did say. Your Lordships will find that on the 31st July, 1876, I am reported thus—

> "I stated in the House a month ago that I could give no opinion till I had seen the document. After reading that paper, I agree that it would not have been wise to accede to that document. . . . . As to the substance, I think that, as a whole, it was not acceptable; but, as sometimes is the case, the reasons given for objecting to everything in it do not appear to me sound, and in no case do I think it was wise to drop the matter so completely. . . . . I cannot say that the war has broken out in consequence of the refusal of the Berlin proposals, unaccompanied by any suggestion from Her Majesty's Government for any other policy. But, on the other hand, it is impossible for them to deny that this may be the case."—[3 *Hansard*, ccxxxi. 89-90.]

I find from the Papers that the objections I then made to the rejection of the Berlin Memorandum, without proposing any suggestions of our own, were exactly those which the French Government so forcibly urged. I have done with that subject, but I have thought it of sufficient importance to correct an unintentional mistake of the First Lord of the Admiralty. Well, but I find it has been very often said that we on this side of the House could have but little title to criticize the policy of the Government on the Eastern Question; because, as Mr. Smith said on the same occasion, we had no policy at all, or, if we had a policy, it was that of letting matters drift, or of joining hands with Russia and fighting Turkey. That is not an accurate statement of the case; for I find that in February, 1877, I expressed my fear that the Emperor of Russia, strengthened by the part we had taken in the Conference, might act upon his declaration at Moscow, and go to war.

I said that I, for one, should deeply deplore it—such a thing would be pregnant with inconvenience and danger. The remedy suggested—that we alone should join with Russia in the work—though it, perhaps, might a little mitigate, would go a very short way to diminish, those dangers and those inconveniences. I then quoted the principles laid down by Sir Stafford Northcote and Mr. Cross, the latter saying that the time was come when this country should refuse to be put off with paper currency; they should demand to be paid in solid coin. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said—

> "I believe it to be impossible really to secure the peace of Europe unless you take steps to improve the administration of the Provinces of Turkey. As long as you leave that door open —as long as you do nothing to remove the causes of those disturbances—any peace you may secure for the moment will be a hollow peace, no better than putting a piece of sticking-plaster upon a wound when there is festering matter beneath."

Grounding my appeal on those words, I urged upon the Government that if they would use their influence to persuade Europe as one body to come forward and insist, as they had a moral and just right to do, that Turkey shall perform her promises, they would successfully deal with the danger which remains. [3 *Hansard,* ccxxxii. 30.] This might be a good or it might be a bad policy; but it was certainly not a policy of letting things drift or of joining Russia alone against Turkey; and it was a policy of which I have as much right to assert that it would have been successful as the noble Earl the Prime Minister, then the First Lord of the Treasury, had to assert, as he did last summer, that a policy of a diametrically opposite character, which, notwithstanding his great Parliamentary strength, he did not adopt, would have succeeded. And the case is still stronger as against the policy which was adopted and which failed in preventing the war. It is said that we might not have succeeded in obtaining the co-operation of Europe. But we were considered the obstacles to that co-operation; and it appears from the Blue Books that Austria herself made a proposal to that effect; that Italy was in favour of it; that France urged it; and that the German Emperor twice stated to the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury) that without it no success would be obtained. It was said that such a policy might lead to war. I believe the risk to have been infinitesimal; but remember that what you said and what you did brought the country to the brink of war in Europe, and has indirectly led to war in Asia. The noble Earl has given us some information with regard to the execution of the Berlin Treaty; and he has said, with perfect truth, that it would be the desire of all of us that peace should ensue, and that a satisfactory settlement should be adopted by Europe. Then he gave us some facts, as considerable steps that had been taken with regard to the fulfilment of that Treaty. I do not deny that something has been done. When the Government take some credit to themselves for having strengthened Turkey by taking away from her Provinces not alluded to in the San Stefano Treaty, but which they say were really sources of weakness to her, I quite agree with the noble Earl that, so far as that strengthening process is concerned, the Berlin Treaty has been completely carried out. But as to the Greek Frontier question, it appears to me that it has been left very much in the hands of the French Government, and has not been sufficiently attended to by Her Majesty's Government. I think the Russians are likely to leave Turkish territory at the time appointed, but when that happens the difficulty will arise as to what is to be done in the territory South of the Balkans—the new Turkey in Europe with some 60,000 square miles and some 6,000,000 of inhabitants; and the question which I should like to have answered is whether there is likely to be a peaceable transfer of the country to the Turkish Government—whether that Government will take possession by the free-will of the Bulgarians, and if, not, whether they will do so by force?—or whether Her Majesty's Government have been engaged in any negotiations respecting a joint occupation which they themselves refused before the war, and which might have prevented it? The noble Earl incidentally alluded to the Anglo-Turkish Convention. There is one point in connection with that Convention, and that is the liability in the future, and in all circumstances, to do that which we might have done during the last war, with everything in our favour, but which we did not do

—namely, to defend the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey. I imagine that our liabilities remain just as they did, and therefore I come to the question of reform. I have read with interest the Correspondence on that subject which has taken place between the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury) and the Turkish Government; but the demands of the noble Marquess have been met with a *non possumus.* The despatch of the Turkish Minister is throughout an argument against doing what Her Majesty's Government proposed should be done; and what was the rejoinder? I expected to find a vigorous reply to the objections raised by the Porte; but, on the contrary, the noble Marquess labours to prove how wrong he was, and how right the Turk is. As the Turk did not require to be told this, it is difficult not to think that the despatch was not addressed to him, but was meant for home consumption, to convince us that the failure was not complete. As regards Cyprus, I would like to know why the Government of that Island is under the Foreign Office and not the Colonial Office. I cannot understand why this Island should not have been placed under that Department. The Colonial Office has had great experience in the civil administration of our military posts; men of remarkable ability at the head of that Department have had to deal with an infinite number of Crown Colonies; and I cannot understand why, with the machinery at its command, the Colonial Office should not take charge of Cyprus. The only reason that might be suggested for not adopting that course is that it was not really a Colony, and that, therefore, it could not be placed under the Colonial Office; but surely that is hardly a sufficient reason. I am aware that Cyprus is not a colony. I am aware that we hired Cyprus on an uncertain tenure. I know that there are questions with regard to the right of foreigners, and that other difficulties may arise; but be that as it may, you must, for a long or a short time, govern Cyprus as a Crown Colony; and I think it would have been wise if Sir Garnet Wolseley had had all the advantages of the additional knowlege of the Colonial Office to guide him in the civil administration of Cyprus. I have a little mistrust as to the information which the Government get about the Island of Cyprus. It was said by the Government that, before acquiring Cyprus, they had adequate information on the subject; but a gentleman who accompanied Sir Garnet Wolseley has stated that he went out without any adequate information whatever. That statement has been published, and I am not aware that it has been contradicted. At all events, I made a very earnest appeal to the Government whether, as there was a doubt in the matter, it would not be possible to delay sending the troops to Cyprus until they had adequate information as to the healthiness of the Island. My noble Friend the Lord President of the Council (the Duke of Richmond and Gordon) answered me that the opinion of Government was that the mortality and disease was three-fifths better than in Europe, and even Italy; that the Government had received information that the climate was of a healthy character. They sent out 8,000 Indian troops, who had nothing to do except to solve this most unfortunate problem in a way which we all now more or less know. The Government have not been careful in getting information. The First Lord of the Admiralty recently read a very glowing account of Cyprus from Sir Garnet Wolseley. I have heard it said that he was the only man in the Island who held such a good opinion of it. I have the greatest respect for Sir Garnet Wolseley as a soldier, but I am not so sure of his authority as a sanitary officer. The First Lord of the Admiralty was quite triumphant because he was one week on the Island without his health entirely giving way. The Prime Minister has pledged himself that before next July there will be harbour accommodation in Cyprus sufficient for British commerce. I am not sanguine as to that pledge being fulfilled. Mr. Brassey, who has gone out and written most impartially on the subject, says there is no harbour in Cyprus, although a coaling station may be established in Famagosta. We have the official authority of the First Lord of the Admiralty that it is possible to make an excellent harbour for very little money indeed at Famagosta. Information which I have received from a professional man who has resided in the Island tends to show that it is a place of a pestilential character, and that it is a most unhealthy resort; and my informant feels pretty sure that if the intention is carried out of making a coaling station there, when the Fleet arrives every man of the Fleet will be found to be down with fever. He says it would be more economical to create a new harbour in any other part of the Island. I am inclined the more to believe that this is the case because Sir Garnet Wolseley himself describes Famagosta as a most unhealthy part of the Island. We are, it seems, to have on the coast an harbour in a pestilential climate, and a *place d'armes* on the plateau of a mountain higher than the mountains of either Wales or Scotland. Let us hope that all this is to be done, as has been said, for a very small sum, and that we are not going to spend hundreds of thousands. The noble Earl asks us to wait for information. But time goes on. Some of us will not live very much longer, and, in the meantime, we should like some information. It would be satisfactory to us if the Government would present to Parliament the Report of the Committee of the Cabinet that went out to investigate the Island, the Reports of the head of the medical staff, and the medical Returns. My Lords, it is a matter of regret to me that I was not able to share in the great debate and division with regard to the Afghan War. I am not going to re-open that debate, or to refer at any length to the question again; inasmuch as after the very decisive majority which resulted on that division, it would hardly seem courteous to your Lordships to do so; but I should like to say that one thing particularly struck me—namely, that the greater part of the debate seemed to turn on the want of foresight of previous Governments of India. Now, it seems to me that when the noble Earl the last Governor General (the Earl of Northbrook) received from the Government at home instructions to carry out a new policy, he informed the Government that the adoption of this new policy would very much alter our relations with the Afghan Government; that the Ameer was perfectly sure to see through any sham pretext; and spoke of the probability of throwing him into the arms of Russia. I do not see any want of foresight there. The facts we now know —that our relations would be altered and probably a war ensue — are as predicted by the noble Earl. Then it has been said that the predictions of the Opposition in regard to the British Army in Afghanistan have not been carried out, and that in the place of disaster and defeat we have victory; but it has never been alleged that if properly handled and commanded our troops could not go through Afghanistan, but the contrary has been maintained, not only by General Durand 20 years ago, but by Lord Lawrence, in the first letter he wrote this autumn, by Lord Grey still more strongly, and also by Lord Northbrook. The result has shown, indeed, that our brave troops have earned the distinction which attaches to them in a remarkable degree; and if there has not been so much fighting as they might have wished, there has still been ample opportunity for the display of the utmost valour and skill. The noble Earl said our scientific Frontier was assured. But the question is what we are to do now, when our difficulties are really beginning? I hope he adheres to his assurance that this can be done with a diminution instead of an increase of troops required on the Frontier. He said our object was to have an independent and friendly Afghanistan.

VISCOUNT HALIFAX: Friendly and strong.

EARL GRANVILLE: Well, that is a point on which I wish to know something. Does this not entirely destroy the strength and friendliness of Afghanistan?

THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELD: Perhaps the noble Earl will allow me to give the correct words. I never used the word "strength," or the epithets "strong" and "friendly." I said that I trusted our arrangement would be consistent with an independent and self-governing Afghanistan.

EARL GRANVILLE: But will it be so? Have we not produced anarchy in the country, and set the people against us? What are the intentions of the Government? Some of the most ardent opponents of our foreign policy think it necessary to occupy the country in its entirety. I should like to know whether the Government have had any communications with the Russian Government; whether those communications have led to any result, and whether it can be communicated? My Lords, when your Lordships assembled in December last, I expressed my great surprise that so great and critical a question as the war in South Africa should have been entirely overlooked and omitted from Her Majesty's Speech, and I was still more surprised that the noble Earl the Prime Minister following and answering me did not make the slightest allusion to the subject. It really looked as if the Government were hardly alive to the gravity of one of the most anxious questions which have arisen for years connected with our Colonies. The dreadful calamity which has occurred has dispelled any apathy or indifference in any quarter. The marvellous organization of modern journalism, assisted by steam and electricity, has for one of its results that any great joy or great calamity strikes the hearts of the population as if they were one and the same man. The First Lord of the Treasury carefully and wisely abstained from treating this question controversially. I freely admit that this disaster, great as it is, does not necessarily affect the question of the justice or policy of the war; although, of course, it raises questions as to how it ought to be carried on. But it has called the attention of the public to the matter in all its bearings, and when the proper time comes I am sure that Her Majesty's Government, as much as any other, will desire that the gravest consideration should be given to all the antecedent circumstances as bearing on the present state of affairs and on our future policy. I may state, in no hostility to Her Majesty's Government—I may state generally what appears to me to have been the state of circumstances, as far as can be gathered from the Papers delivered at the end of July, from the newspapers, and from an exceedingly cursory perusal I have, through the courtesy of the Colonial Office, been enabled to have, a few hours ago, of the Papers laid this evening on the Table of the House. There is one question which is separate from this incident, but which is intimately connected with the whole subject, and that is the position of a colony as to its Government. There is the old Cape Colony, with the power of self-government and the duty of self-defence; but if it has not power to defend itself it can come to the Imperial Government, and then the Imperial Government would consider if it would give assistance, and, if so, on what terms. It so happens, however—and it is a strange anomaly—that we are now forcing troops on the Cape Colony, and a responsible Minister has remonstrated against that. This is not a satisfactory state of things. With regard to Natal, there are a very small number of White inhabitants, and an enormous number of Black subjects of the Queen, who have been attracted by the safety of your Government; and you must keep absolute power over those two bodies, and if you do that you are bound to protect them. The Queen's Government has been carried on there for some years, and I think I may venture to appeal to those noble Lords who have been Secretaries of State for the Colonies whether it is not one of the most remarkable things that the Government has been carried on—and carried on with tranquillity—with a comparatively small number of White inhabitants and something like 200,000 Blacks. But in regard to the policy we have adopted towards the Zulus, it must not be forgotten for how many years, whatever may be the adverse opinion formed as to the mode in which he annexed the Transvaal, and changed his policy towards the Zulus, the services of Sir Theophilus Shepstone in the administration of Native affairs in Natal have been invaluable. Sir Bartle Frere is a man of the highest character, of great ability, and great experience. From a Memorandum written by him in defence of the policy of the Government in Afghanistan, and which probably had a great share in determining that policy, it is quite clear what his general views are with regard to a Frontier policy for our great Dependencies. He is not disposed to be content with existing Frontiers, but is disposed to extend them. It is evident that he thinks that in the case of any possible future difficulty it is better to go at once to the most decisive measures, even if those measures involve war. He has a strong opinion that it is necessary to have a predominating influence over all neighbouring States—over all States adjoining our own. This policy with regard to India has been approved of by Her Majesty's Government, and sanctioned by this House; and this is the policy which has been adopted at the Cape.

It is a policy which would certainly find favour with the Colonists of the Cape, who like the lavish expenditure of a large British force, and would be delighted with a war carried on at the expense of the Imperial Government and with Imperial troops. In the ultimatum to Cetewayo—and no one can deny that it was nothing less than a declaration of war, for acceptance of it was impossible—the first point touched upon was the international grievance—the taking away of two women from British territory who had escaped in consequence of a charge of adultery, the forcing two surveyors to sit down but without further injury, and a raid into a disputed territory. It is impossible to imagine that such things as these should be the cause of an immediate recourse to war. If we dealt in this manner with all our Dependencies, with savages in their own immediate neighbourhood, we shall soon be at war in all quarters of the world. Then, as to the King of Zululand himself, no doubt he is a monster, and the system of government adopted by him is indefensible. But I leave it to your Lordships to say how far we ought to go to war to introduce good government in a barbarous State when there is no chance of our Army remaining there to enforce it. I can quite conceive that the presence of an enormous army of 40,000 armed—and not inefficiently armed—men, is a great danger to the Colony. It is a point on which I give no opinion at present as to the best way with which it can be dealt; but, as a measure of justice, it is questionable by what abstract right you could demand that the whole army should be disbanded in the face of the Native enemies of the King and the hostility of the Boers. Now, as to the reinforcements, there is a matter on which I have some doubt, and which requires to be hereafter explained. It is this:—In No. 83a, paragraphs 2 and 3, General Thesiger, on the 14th of September, asks for more officers, and says that an addition of two regiments would be essential, and that the presence of a cavalry regiment would be of enormous advantage; and Sir Bartle Frere, on the 23rd of September, says—

> "I find that the urgency of supporting General Thesiger's request is much greater even than I supposed. I trust there will be no delay in complying with his request to its full extent."

As I understand, the answer of Her Majesty's Government was that they did not see the necessity of sending those troops.

The Marquess of SALISBURY: Troops were sent.

Earl GRANVILLE: I think that was afterwards. The answer at the time to which I refer was in the negative. Her Majesty's Government did not see the necessity of sending the troops. But, in order that there may be no mistake on this point, I will ask Her Majesty's Government whether the two infantry regiments and the regiment of cavalry were sent out?

Earl CADOGAN: Not the cavalry.

Earl GRANVILLE: That is exactly what I understand. I could understand Her Majesty's Government saying—"We leave the matter in your hands, and we send you all you desire;" but Her Majesty's Government seem to have continued their objection to the war, and to have sent out just enough troops to enable the First Lord of the Admiralty to tell us, as he did the other night, that General Lord Chelmsford had enough troops for the purpose, and yet they deprived him of the cavalry regiment which he said was of enormous importance. This is what I cannot understand, and it certainly requires some future explanation. But this—the first day when Parliament meets after this disaster, unequalled for so many years—is not the time for squabbling whether Her Majesty's Government is to blame, or the local Government, or the military authorities are to blame. I must say that I think there is great danger in the sort of language which Members of Her Majesty's Government are in the habit of using as to the desirableness of the extension of our Empire. I was surprised when I saw within the last few weeks that the Colonial Secretary had actually boasted that the policy of the Government was annexation in all parts of the world. I think that language of that sort, backed up by language about the extension of the Empire, has a tendency to encourage our Representatives abroad to think that any go-a-head policy on their part is likely to meet with the approval of the Government. But, my Lords, what we have now especially to consider is not the past, the present, or even the future policy of the Government. The question is what can be done to deal in the best way with what the noble Earl has justly described as a sad calamity. I do not wish to take a desponding view of the state of affairs in South Africa; but it is certainly exceedingly grave. There is one point which is exceedingly satisfactory. I mean that wonderful defence of the fortified post at Rourke's Drift. I am not sure that that successful resistance has not been the means of saving both the Colonies in that part of Africa from destruction; and it is a defence which will teach the Zulus that however successful they may be in an ambuscade, or in an expedition carefully prepared, it is very dangerous for them to face British troops in the open field or in any fortified position. As regards the Black population of Natal, who are nearly related to the Zulus, it seems to me that it was a very great fault to drill and train them to the use of arms. That is, I think, a great danger in the case of an uncivilized people like them; but it is impossible not to hope that their knowledge of the numerous blessings and benefits which they have derived from being under British government, and, on the other hand, their knowledge of the cruelties, massacres, and despotism of the King in Zululand, will make them remain perfectly faithful and loyal to the Queen. That this may be the case I most heartily wish. It is unnecessary for me to add that Her Majesty's Government may rely with the greatest confidence that we on this side of the House shall give our most hearty and cordial support to the best efforts which they can make, and most quickly make, in order to secure the safety of our gallant troops, and of all Her Majesty's subjects in South Africa.

EARL CADOGAN: My Lords, I will not follow the noble Earl in his discussion of matters of policy connected with this unfortunate war, inasmuch as your Lordships have only this afternoon received Papers, a careful study of which is necessary before an accurate opinion can be formed as to the merits of the case. When the proper time comes for a review of the whole subject I shall be perfectly willing to discuss with the noble Earl all the points which he has raised. The noble Earl has told us that he has only had the opportunity of glancing at these Papers cursorily; but when he has further examined them, I think he will admit that some of his criticisms admit of easy and, I hope, satisfactory explanation. I must, however, express my regret that the noble Earl should have assisted in the dissemination of the erroneous view that the reinforcements asked for by Lord Chelmsford were not granted him by Her Majesty's Government in their entirety, or in the shape in which Lord Chelmsford asked for them. That this impression is an erroneous one will be shown by a Paper which has been laid on the Table this afternoon by my noble Friend the Under Secretary of State for War, containing a despatch from General Thesiger to the Secretary of State for War, which despatch has been inadvertently omitted from the Papers now in your Lordships' hands. The despatch, written at Pietermaritzburg, is in the following terms:—

"Sir,—I have the honour to enclose for your information a Memorandum showing the number of Imperial troops that will be necessary in the event of operations taking place against the Zulus, and how they would be probably utilized. The Memorandum also shows the manner in which the officers already sent out on special service have been employed, and the necessity in the above contingency of their number being increased, likewise of officers of Transport Service being despatched.—I have, &c., "FRED. THESIGER, L.-G.

"Memorandum.—In the event of an invasion of Zululand being decided upon, I am of opinion that it will be necessary to operate on the five following lines:—1, Durban, Fort Williamson, on Tugela River; 2, Pietermaritzburg, Grey Town, and Middle Drift, on Tugela River; 3, Ladysmith, Rourke's Drift, on Buffalo River; 4, Newcastle, Utrecht, Blood River; 5, Middleburg, Derby, Pongolo River. Each of the columns on these five lines ought to have a complete battalion of eight companies of British Infantry=five battalions. At the principal base of operations, Pietermaritzburg, there should be a reserve of one battalion *plus* one depôt company. At the intermediate bases of Durban and Fort Williamson, Grey Town, and Middle Drift, on Tugela River, Ladysmith and Rourke's Drift, Newcastle, Utrecht, and Blood River, Middleburg, Derby, and Pongolo River, it will be necessary to leave a company for protection of stores and of our lines of communication. For this duty, therefore, 12 companies will be required. With each column there should be a detachment of Royal Engineers. Two complete companies (or 240 men) will not be in the least too large a reinforcement, as there will necessarily be a very large amount of engineering work to be done with each of the five columns. It is most important that companies should not be denuded of their officers by their being taken away for Staff employ. It is absolutely certain that the number of Zulus opposed to us will be at least in the proportion of 10 to 1 of our total regular force; and if a concentrated attack were made upon one of the columns before it had effected a junction with any of the others, this proportion might possibly rise to 30 or 40 to 1. The personal influence of company officers would under such circumstances be very valuable.”

The General then goes on to state his requirements as to special service and other officers, and he concludes by giving a detailed list of the troops required, which is as follows:—

	Companies.
“Five columns	40
Pietermaritzburg	9
Durban and Fort Williamson	2
Grey Town and Middle Drift	2
Ladismith and Rorke's Drift	2
Newcastle, Utrecht, and Blood River	3
Middleberg, Derby, and Pongolo River	3
Pretoria	3
Lydenburg	2
Total	66

Eight battalions and two companies.

Troops available.

	Battalions.
Transvaal, 13th and 80th	2
Cisvaal, 1-3rd, 1-24th, 2-24th, and 90th	4

Required.	Complete companies.
Royal Engineers	2

Available.

Field Officers	2
Captains	0
Subalterns	2
N.-C. Officers and Men	19.”

Your Lordships will perceive that in this despatch there is no request for cavalry, and the only mention of it in the Papers is to be found in the passage quoted by the noble Earl opposite, in which Sir Bartle Frere records a statement of General Thesiger that cavalry would prove “of enormous advantage.” I think that when the Papers—which will be issued on Saturday, or on Monday at the latest—are examined, it will be found that whatever may have been the shortcomings on the part of the Government in reference to this matter, there is one thing of which they cannot be accused—namely, of refusing to furnish the reinforcements which were asked for either by Sir Bartle Frere or by Lord Chelmsford. Although we have not yet received any official despatch from Sir Bartle Frere or Lord Chelmsford on the subject since the notification of the despatch of troops, the Secretary of State for the Colonies has received private information to the effect that they are both entirely satisfied not only with the character of the reinforcements, but also with the completeness of the arrangements made for the troops.

The Earl of CARNARVON: My Lords, had I spoken on this subject a few days ago, I should have expressed my great regret at the outbreak of the war in Zululand. I should have expressed my regret on account of the expense which the war must involve, and still more the necessity it will impose on the Colonial Office of administering the affairs of Zululand. I regret that the result of the war must be to transfer to our hands an entire territory which it is exceedingly difficult to manage under ordinary circumstances, which it will be still more difficult to govern under the extraordinary circumstances that have occurred, and before we are prepared to receive this new and weighty burden. The condition of Zululand is like a ball of sand—as soon as it is touched it will fall to pieces. I cannot, therefore, but feel that had it been possible to tide over the present difficulties it would have been very judicious on the part of Her Majesty's Government to have done so, as I believe the problem would have solved itself in the course of a very few years. But this unfortunate affair has greatly changed matters. We have now, in addition to our previous difficulties, to deplore a very great reverse and a very heavy loss of life; and, what is worse in its political consequences, a great unsettlement of the Native mind throughout the whole of South Africa, and we might at any moment be the witnesses of all the horrors of a rising of the population of any part of the Colony. There is there an European community of some 18,000 or 20,000, in the face of a Native population of not less than 300,000; and in the Transvaal we have an European population of about 40,000, in the midst of a Native population little short of 1,000,000. These are highly dangerous conditions, and one reverse may endanger the whole of our future policy in South Africa and render it impossible to carry out the changes which are contemplated, and in which all parties are, I believe, agreed. But in the present position of affairs everything must be merged in one single consideration—that the war must be pushed to the utmost, not only for the honour of our arms, but for the safety of the White communities in South Africa. There are, of course, two considerations involved in this as in every war. One, of course, is its prudence, and the other its justice. I think we should do wisely to wait for the Papers that are promised by the Government as to the prudence of this war, and I think that in fairness we ought to be slow to suppose that there has been any imprudent action in this matter. I have therefore heard with great satisfaction the statement of my noble Friend the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies (Earl Cadogan), that no troops have been withheld that were demanded by the General in command. But as regards the second question—the justice of the war—knowing as much as I do of South Africa, I am bound in fairness to say at once that taking into account the antecedents of the case, and the engagements which have been entered into, I cannot consider that this war is unjust. I listened to the statement of my noble Friend on the other side of the House (Earl Granville) with respect to an ultimatum alleged to have been sent by Sir Bartle Frere; I hope we shall find in the Papers, when published, a fuller statement than we have at present. I have also seen in the daily papers a very severe attack made upon a recent Memorandum of Sir Bartle Frere. But my own feeling with respect to Sir Bartle Frere is that, considering his past career, it is not too much to say that he has always shown tact, foresight, and sense of justice. It was my duty, when Secretary of State for the Colonies, to ask Sir Bartle Frere to undertake the difficult task of the administration of South Africa; and so far as I was cognisant of that administration, it was exercised with a tact, judgment, wisdom, and moderation worthy of any Governor ever sent out by this country to govern a British Colony. There are at this moment in South Africa no less than three very distinguished and experienced Governors—one at the Cape, another at Natal, and a third in the Transvaal—namely, Sir Bartle Frere, Sir Henry Bulwer, and Sir Theophilus Shepstone; and I venture to say that it would be difficult to find three persons so competent, from their general knowledge of administration, from temper, and from an intimate acquaintance with the customs and habits of the Natives of South Africa, to deal with the class of questions now rising in South Africa. If, then, the Government are satisfied that these three men, whose opportunities of observation were so good, and whose judgment I believe to be the best in South Africa, concurred in the wisdom and justice of this war, I, as not longer in Office and with access to official knowledge, should certainly withhold any disapproval; I should, on the contrary, be inclined to believe that they were right in their judgment under the circumstances. There is one other point to which I wish to refer. When I was in Office a year ago, I am bound to say that the position of affairs in South Africa as regarded Zululand was precarious in the extreme. It was gradually growing worse and worse, and it was evident to all that a storm was in preparation. The question then seemed how long that storm could be properly averted. The conduct of Cetewayo had become insolent and aggressive. It was the result, no doubt, partly of old grievances and misapprehensions; for there was much genuine misapprehension and irritation on his part, and I believe that he had some cause of grievance against the Dutch population; it was also partly the result of the cunning of a barbarian who had, for many years, played off the Government of Natal against that of the Transvaal, and who now found that the Government of the Transvaal, when it passed into English hands, no longer afforded him the same scope for his craft. It was, also, partly the result of that agitation among the younger and turbulent part of his tribe to which every nation, civilized or uncivilized, is more or less subject. I am bound to say that, a year and a-half ago, the attitude of Cetewayo was such that the Government were more than once compelled to consider the responsibilities which fell upon them from the possibility of war, and what preparations should be made to meet it; and it was only the threatening state of European affairs that made it undesirable to send out further reinforcements; and it was in consequence of the very threatening aspect of affairs that I determined, as far as in me lay, that war should not take place on that occasion. It is perfectly true that the terms which had been offered, and which have been alluded to by my noble Friend on the other side of the House, were terms that Cetewayo could not accept without altering the characteristic feature of his whole rule—they changed a bloody, oppressive, arbitrary tyranny into a government with some semblance, at least, of law; but the justification for this lies in the fact that for years Zululand had been a standing menace to the Colony of Natal; that it was a tyranny built upon bloodshed and cruelty; and, lastly, that Cetewayo, having deliberately entered into certain engagements for reforming the administration of his kingdom, and consequently for our better security, either could not or would not redeem the promises he had given to us. Speaking broadly, these seem to me, as far as I now can understand the case, the justification of the present war. Of course, there are other questions of policy with which they are connected; but these will be discussed hereafter. They will involve serious questions. I will now only say one word as to the prosecution of the war. A very important step has been taken by securing from the Portuguese Government a promise to repress the gun traffic. This is a question I earnestly pressed for a long time, and I trust that it will ultimately result in the total suppression of that traffic, and thus put an end to the possibility of the Zulus obtaining the supplies of arms and ammunition for which they, in great measure, depend for the carrying on of the war. Another point under the consideration of the Government well deserves their consideration — the extension of telegraphic communication between this country and the Cape. The want of this communication has been one of the greatest evils both on this and former occasions. A line of telegraphic wire to the Cape would have been worth to us three or four additional regiments; and we have, by the want of it, been left for weeks in darkness. During my tenure of Office I urged it, in season and out of season, on the Home Government; but the Treasury were unable to spare money for it. The unfortunate part of it is, that, when disaster such as this occurs, these matters are acknowledged and rectified; but too late. But even now, at this, the eleventh hour, after this serious disaster, I would still urge upon the Government the necessity of laying a wire, even at a greater expense, and in a more imperfect manner than would be done under ordinary circumstances, in order that we may no longer be kept for weeks in ignorance of what is passing in the South African Colonies. With regard to reinforcements, I have long been of opinion that they may most expeditiously and most economically be sent from India. About two years ago there was a very serious outbreak in the Malay Peninsula, which is a very difficult country. That outbreak was crushed in the course of a few weeks—and why? Because immediate telegraphic communication was received, and we were able to send troops from India, and one regiment, I think, from China; and so the conflagration was extinguished before it had time to become general. If the Government should be able to send reinforcements from India, so much the better, even at the last moment—unless this unfortunate Afghan War has so crippled the strength of the Indian Forces that none can be spared. Certainly, it must be three or four weeks before the troops sent from England can reach their destination, and the loss of time may be productive of very serious results. I can only join very heartily in the hope which has been expressed on the other side of the House, that the Government will deal with the matter with all possible speed and vigour; for we may depend upon it that half-hearted measures would not only protract the war and involve a great deal more expense and bloodshed, but the contest would probably degenerate into one of those wars between civilized and Native races, which, of all warfares, is most productive of brutality and degradation.

THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY said, he cordially shared in the sentiment which had been expressed, that whatever view might be entertained of the very difficult question of policy which was raised by the conditions of affairs in South Africa, there could be no difference of opinion whatever as to the absolute necessity of at once re-establishing our military position in that country and the honour of Her Majesty's arms, and of supporting our troops there with full vigour and energy. Nor was there any difference in universal sympathy felt for our gallant troops who were involved in this disaster. Not having had the advantage of even a cursory perusal of the Blue Books presented that night, he felt great difficulty in approaching the question; but he hoped it might not be thought egotistical in one who had held the post of Secretary of State for the Colonies if he warned those who had to administer South African affairs that there were no affairs which were more complicated or difficult. At the same time, he could not help doubting whether there was a real necessity for this Zulu War. The threatening attitude of the Zulus was nothing new. While he held the Office of Colonial Secretary he was always hearing of the threatening position of the Zulus, and no doubt it was a fact. But by judicious management, especially by the very judicious conduct of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, a collision was avoided. It had been his opinion that though we might come into conflict with the Zulus, it was better that that conflict should be later rather than sooner, since we were always growing stronger and they were growing weaker. Above all, he considered that we should consolidate our power upon our Frontiers before we got into an arduous struggle with a warlike people. But he was bound to admit that the position of affairs had been considerably changed by the annexation of the Transvaal. We took over a dispute with Cetewayo; and it might possibly be found that our position in the Transvaal was such that the quarrel was unavoidable. But nothing had been yet published or was yet known to convince him that by careful management, and not treating border raids—which were really inevitable with savage tribes on our Frontiers—as of too much importance, the Government could not have avoided the war. He saw in the manifesto, with some regret, that the ultimatum which was sent to this barbarian Chieftain was one which, in his (the Earl of Kimberley's) opinion, he could not agree to. It was plain to anyone who knew the character and position of the Chief that his acceptance of that ultimatum would mean the total destruction of his power, and the entire change of his relations with his tribe. If he had wished to avoid a collision with us, it was exceedingly doubtful if his position towards his tribe was such that he could have carried his wish into effect—at all events within 30 days. But all the Papers must be looked at together, and all the difficulties fully considered, and it might turn out that the war was unavoidable. He noticed that there was a disposition at home to be somewhat hard upon the Colonists, and he had seen some remarks upon their unwillingness to take up arms in the conflict. He thought that such remarks were made from an insufficient consideration of the circumstances of the case. The Kaffir War was carried on on the immediate Frontier of the old Cape Colony; and it was perfectly reasonable that, under such circumstances, the Cape Colonists should fight in their own defence. On the other hand, Zululand was at so great a distance from the Cape Colony that they could not be expected to render any considerable assistance to us in dealing with the Zulus. It was beyond their power to do so, and it was not reasonable to expect it. It would take all their energy and courage to defend themselves against the immense Black population upon their own borders; and we ought not to expect them to help us in the Transvaal or in Zululand. For the defence of Natal and the Transvaal, with their scanty White population, they must look to the Imperial Government; and he feared that for many years to come it would be impossible that assistance from home in money and arms could be dispensed with. Whether or not it was desirable to maintain our present relations with South Africa was a question into which he would not now enter. He earnestly hoped that the next intelligence might be of a more re-assuring character, and that it might be found that Her Majesty's Black subjects in Natal had not joined the Zulus in an attack upon the Colonists. His own view was rather in favour of their remaining quiet, for the Black residents in Natal were principally composed of those who had fled from the tyranny of the Zulu King, and they could not be desirous to come again under his power. If an incursion were made into Natal the tribes in Natal might be compelled, whether they would or not, to join the main force; and he thought that under that compulsion they would do so; but he hoped that there would be no spontaneous movement, and that if the borders of Natal could be defended by our troops there would be peace and tranquillity in their rear.

CATHEDRAL STATUTES BILL [H.L.]

A Bill to amend an Act passed in the sixth year of Queen Anne and intituled "An Act for the avoiding of doubts and questions touching the Statutes of divers Cathedral and Collegiate Churches"—Was *presented* by The Lord Bishop of CARLISLE; read 1ª. (No. 4.)

House adjourned at a quarter past Seven o'clock, till To-morrow, a quarter before Five o'clock.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Thursday, 13*th February*, 1879.

MINUTES.]—NEW WRITS ISSUED—*For* Norfolk County (Northern Division), *v.* Colonel James Duff, deceased; *for* Cambridge County, *v.* Hon. Eliot Constantine Yorke, deceased; *for* Cork County, *v.* Timothy M'Carthy Downing, esquire, deceased; *for* South Warwickshire, *v.* Earl of Yarmouth, Controller of Her Majesty's Household; *for* Haddington District of Burghs, *v.* Lord William Hay, now Marquess of Tweeddale.

NEW MEMBERS SWORN—Edward Birkbeck, esquire, *for* Norfolk County (Northern Division); Edward Hicks, esquire, *for* Cambridge County.

PUBLIC BILLS—*Second Reading*—Bankers' Books (Evidence) [65]; Habitual Drunkards [47], [House counted out].

Withdrawn—Licensing Boards (Scotland) * [15]; Borough Franchise (Ireland) * [49].

QUESTIONS.

BOARD OF WORKS (IRELAND)—COLONEL M'KERLIE.—QUESTIONS.

MAJOR O'BEIRNE asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland, If Colonel M'Kerlie, the present Chairman of the Irish Board of Works, is about to resign that appointment, or will be recommended to take that step by the Government?

SIR HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON, in reply, said, that if the hon. and gallant Gentleman would allow him, he would answer the Question. Colonel M'Kerlie had not tendered his resignation, nor had the Government considered it necessary to call upon a valuable public servant to resign.

The Earl of Kimberley

MAJOR O'BEIRNE asked the Secretary of State for War, If it is contemplated transferring Colonel M'Kerlie to the command of the Royal Hibernian Military School on his resignation of the Chairmanship of the Irish Board of Works?

COLONEL STANLEY: Sir, in answer to the Question of the hon. and gallant Member, I have to say that the appointment in connection with the Hibernian Military School has been filled by Colonel Cotton. I do not believe it was contemplated to offer it to Colonel M'Kerlie; and, indeed, I have no ground for supposing it would have been accepted by him had it been so offered.

JOINT STOCK BANKS—LEGISLATION. QUESTION.

MR. COOPE asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether the Government is prepared to introduce any measure, which, by means of public audit or otherwise, may prevent the evils to which depositors as well as proprietors of Joint Stock Banks are at present exposed through the defective state of existing legislation affecting them?

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, in reply, said, it was difficult to answer a Question put in terms so wide without entering into a lengthened statement beyond the limits of an answer. He might, however, inform his hon. Friend that the Government did not intend to introduce any extensive measure such as he, perhaps, had in his mind when he referred to the public audit of joint-stock banks; but, at the same time, they did contemplate the probability of their having to introduce a measure with regard to banks which he would take an opportunity to explain to the House in order to meet certain difficulties which had arisen in the constitution of such banks.

SOUTH AFRICA—THE ZULU WAR—THE REINFORCEMENTS.—QUESTIONS.

COLONEL MURE asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether the Colonial and Imperial civil and military authorities in South Africa had, previous to the declaration of war, represented to Her Majesty's Government the formidable character of the Zulu Army; and, whether, previous to the declaration of war, the same authorities had urged the Government to despatch larger reinforcements of British troops?

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: Sir, I observe by the terms in which the hon. and gallant Gentleman has put his Question that he has seen the Blue Book in which these matters will be found set out; and probably other hon. Members will have seen it also. He will perceive, and hon. Members will also see, by reference to that Blue Book, that on September 14th Sir Bartle Frere wrote, in a despatch that will be found on page 254 of the Blue Book, that Lord Chelmsford had telegraphed to him that, in the event of hostilities breaking out with the Zulus, he should require several more special service officers, that an addition of two more regiments of infantry would be essential, and that the presence of a cavalry regiment would be of enormous advantage. On the same day, the 14th September, Lord Chelmsford himself wrote to the War Office. The despatch is not in the Blue Book; but if it has not already, it will shortly be laid, on the Table of the House. In it he specified precisely the same reinforcements and the special service officers that would be required, but made no mention of cavalry in his communication. Subsequently, a full Memorandum of a fortnight later, September 28th, was received from Lord Chelmsford, which will be found at page 284 of the Blue Book, setting forth what he would require; and he again confined his request to two battalions of infantry, saying nothing about cavalry. These are the only applications for reinforcements, so far as I am aware, that have been made from the Cape until the other day, after the unfortunate loss which was then sustained. Her Majesty's Government, as will be seen by reference to page 273 of the Blue Book, in a despatch dated October 17, expressed their hesitation at complying with that request; but, on receiving the further and fuller communication a fortnight later, they acceded to it, and the two regiments desired were sent out early in December. Those reinforcements, as the hon. and gallant Gentleman is probably aware, arrived in time to take part in the military operations first undertaken. No request of cavalry was made, I am informed, subsequent to Sir Bartle Frere's despatch of September 14, nor when Lord Chelmsford and Sir Bartle Frere were informed what reinforcements had been sent out did they express any dissatisfaction that cavalry was not included—on the contrary, I have every reason to believe both of them were satisfied with the completeness with which their request was granted.

Colonel MURE said, he might, perhaps, be permitted, in consideration of the great importance of the matter, to ask a further Question. There was a despatch in the Blue Book issued this morning in which the Secretary of State for the Colonies said that the Forces at present at the Cape, including reinforcements, were not with the view of attacking the Zulus, but with the view of defending the Colony. They were there in order to put the Colony in a state of defence, showing that at the time the despatch was written the invasion of Zululand was not contemplated. ["Oh, oh!"] He thought, under the painful circumstances in which they were met, hon. Members opposite might listen to a very few words even in the form of a Question. He wished to know, Whether the Force at the disposal of Lord Chelmsford was really for the purpose only of defending the Colony, or for the purpose of invasion?

Sir MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: Sir, perhaps I may be allowed to answer the Question. I must refer the hon. and gallant Member to the despatch of Lord Chelmsford of September 14, which will be laid on the Table. It includes a Memorandum stating that, in the event of the invasion of Zululand being decided on, it would be necessary to operate on so many lines, &c.; and it concludes with a request for the two battalions of infantry to which my right hon. Friend has referred.

HIGHWAYS AND LOCOMOTIVES (AMENDMENT) ACT, 1878.

QUESTION.

Mr. PELL asked the President of the Local Government Board, Whether his attention has been directed to a doubt whether the Highways and Locomotives (Amendment) Act, 1878, gives county authorities power to pay out of the county rate half the expenses incurred in the maintenance of any main roads other than disturnpiked roads;

and, whether he will cause the opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown to be taken on the point?

MR. SCLATER-BOOTH: Sir, my attention has been drawn to the doubt referred to by my hon. Friend, and which has in some few instances been expressed, and my answer has been that I am quite unable to concur in the doubt. The question has arisen, I think, from looking exclusively to Section 13 of the Act; but, if the contention were tenable, not only would Section 15—one of the most important provisions of the Act—be altogether inoperative, but effect could not be given to Section 18, which requires highway authorities to keep an account of the cost of maintaining main roads without any exception, and enables the county authority to withhold their contributions, not in the case of disturnpiked roads only, but of main roads generally. As regards the opinion of the Law Officers, it is the practice to resort to them for advice only in cases where the Department entertain doubt, or the matter concerns their own administration, both of which conditions are absent in the present case; and as the matter concerns the powers and duties of the magistrates, it would rather seem to be for my hon. Friend, or for Justices, if they entertain any doubts, than for me, to submit a case to the Law Officers.

ELECTIONS.

MR. SPEAKER acquainted the House that, in pursuance of the directions of the Acts passed in the 24th year of the reign of His Majesty King George the Third, c. 26, and in the 21st and 22nd years of the reign of Her Majesty Queen Victoria, c. 110, and in the 26th year of the reign of Her Majesty Queen Victoria, c. 20, he has issued Warrants to the Clerk of the Crown to make out New Writs for the Election of Members to serve in this present Parliament—*For* Norfolk County (Northern Division), *v.* Colonel James Duff, deceased; *for* Cambridge County, *v.* Honble. Eliot Constantine Yorke, deceased.

And also a Warrant to the Clerk of the Crown in Ireland to make out a New Writ for the Election of a Member to serve in this present Parliament—*For* Cork County, *v.* Timothy M'Carthy Downing, esquire, deceased.

ORDERS OF THE DAY.

SUPPLY.—COMMITTEE.

Order for Committee read.

BUSINESS OF PARLIAMENT.

MINISTERIAL STATEMENT.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Mr. Speaker, I rise to move, Sir, that you do now leave the Chair; not, of course, for the purpose of making any progress with the business of Supply, there being no Notice down; but I think it may be for the convenience of the House that I should take this opportunity to offer a few observations upon the position of Business, and upon other matters such as are usually referred to at the beginning of a Session. The circumstances of the present Session have been exceptional. At the time that we met in December it was not thought necessary, or, at all events, desirable, if it was even possible, to introduce many measures to the notice of the House, the House being met for one object alone, and the observations which usually are made at the commencement of the Session were then deferred to the present time. I will, therefore, take the opportunity of moving that you leave the Chair to state what the Business is which we propose to call the attention of the House to during the present Session. But before I do so, there are necessarily one or two matters of exceptional and external interest on which I ought to say a few words; and the House will, I am sure, anticipate that the first subject upon which I must touch is one of a melancholy character, which has already been before our notice this evening, and which engages at this moment the first attention of the country—I mean the serious military misfortune which we have met with in South Africa. Sir, I am quite sure it is far from the wish of anyone either unduly to exaggerate, or unduly to depreciate, what has there occurred; but we cannot help feeling the great sorrow which has been caused, the great blow which we have received, and above all things we cannot avoid feeling and expressing our sorrow at the severe loss we have sustained in the death of those men who have so gallantly maintained the honour of the Army. I am quite sure that there is but one feeling throughout the country of admiration for the gallantry with which those men and officers behaved, so far as we are able to know, in the closing scene of their lives, for the manner in which they sustained the honour of the Army to which they were proud to belong, and that there is but one universal feeling of sympathy for those who have been sufferers by the bereavement. But, Sir, I also feel that there is in the British character a readiness, upon all occasions such as this, to rise with all the more spirit from any calamity that has been sustained, and that the impulse of which we are conscious is a resolution to repair and wipe out any blow of this kind that seems to have been received. No time has been lost in taking the first measures that are necessary for that end. A very considerable force has already been ordered to sail for South Africa. That force is being rapidly brought together. The transports which are to take it out have been already engaged, and in the course of next week, probably before this day week, the first of them will have sailed. No time will be lost in hastening forward the detachments which are to be sent. Having said so much, I hope that I may appeal to the House to abstain for the moment from making any conjectural comments upon circumstances as to which we are as yet very imperfectly informed. We have received a telegraphic communication of the bare fact only, and it must be several days—it cannot be till next week—before we can receive any detailed account of what has happened. I think we must all be aware that justice and every other consideration requires that we should suspend our judgment upon what has happened until we have a full and complete account of it. With regard to the general policy of the war I would say much the same thing. Papers have already been laid upon the Table which bring the account of what has taken place up to the 30th or 31st of December, and further Papers are now in the printers' hands, and will be distributed on Saturday or at latest on Monday, which will bring the Correspondence down to the end of January. Of course, still further Papers will be given as soon as possible. I think that when we receive the full accounts of what has taken place, and those Papers are in the hands of Members, we shall be better placed than at the present moment to consider our position, and to decide as to what steps it will be necessary to take. But I may say, Sir, even beforehand, that I am perfectly conscious that it will be necessary for me to make some proposal to the House with reference to the expenses which these necessary measures have occasioned. I only desire that I may be in a position to give a full account, and to take a complete view of, the circumstances before I am called upon to go into details on that subject. Turning from this darker page of what we have to state to the House, I am happy to be able to congratulate the House and the country upon the more satisfactory state of affairs in other parts of the world. If we look especially to our foreign relations, and consider how the arrangements consequent upon the Treaty of Berlin are proceeding, we see that there is every reason to be satisfied with the progress that is being made. There is, no doubt, a natural impatience in the minds of all men to see things proceed with an almost impossible rapidity; but when we consider how many interests have been involved, and how much there has been to arrange—how many have been the difficulties to be overcome—I think, when we look back and take stock of what has passed in the six months or whatever may be the time since the conclusion of the Treaty, we have no reason at all to be dissatisfied with the real and satisfactory progress that has been made. The exchanges of territory which were provided for in Asia have been accomplished. The exchanges on the Frontier of Montenegro have also been accomplished. Both those were matters which were subjects at one time of anxiety. The occupation of Bosnia by the Austrian forces has also been accomplished. The supplementary Treaty which the Porte and Russia had been engaged in negotiating has been signed, and the Russian Army has now begun to withdraw from Turkish territory; and we have no doubt that the evacuation of Turkish territory will be very speedily and peaceably completed. I think we may, without going into disputed questions, fairly take this opportunity of expressing the sense which certainly Her Majesty's Government feel, and I hope the House and the public will feel, of the very great energy, the very great skill, the very great temper and patience with which Sir Henry Layard has fulfilled his duty in these difficult and critical circumstances. The House, I am sure, will hear with regret, though hardly with surprise, that Sir Henry Layard's health has suffered not a little from the long strain and the great anxiety which have been put upon him for the past few months, and that he will be obliged to take a short respite from work to improve his health. We hope, however, that matters have now arrived at that point that he can be spared from his post for a short time without any inconvenience to the Public Service. Other matters besides those which I have already mentioned have also been satisfactorily in progress. A scheme of pacification has been adopted in Crete, which appears to have given satisfaction to all parties; and negotiations in pursuance of the stipulations and Protocols of the Treaty of Berlin have been set on foot between the Porte and the Kingdom of Greece. With regard to Asia, there has not been any slackness in pursuing the Correspondence which was opened, as was mentioned, some time ago, on the subject of Asiatic reform. I believe that there has been some unreasonable impatience on the part of some persons in this country with regard to the reforms in Asia; but then it must be considered that those reforms have had to be entertained and begun by a Government whose territory is occupied by a large foreign army of some 200,000 or 300,000 men, and whose attention has naturally been attracted by matters of a very different character. I doubt whether there have ever been any instances of a country having effected reforms under such pressure as that. But, at the same time, I may say that there has been manifested on the part of the Porte a sincere desire to proceed with reforms. Some of the appointments which have been made—notably that of Midhat Pasha—have indicated the earnestness with which the Porte is proceeding; and arrangements for carrying out the objects in view are now under discussion which I believe will be found adequate and satisfactory. Then there is another matter which has excited attention, and that is the position of the Island of Cyprus. In regard to the Island of Cyprus, I need not at the present time, I hope, enter into any long discussion, as I have Friends on these Benches who will be able to speak from personal knowledge of what they have seen and what they know of the Island; but I think it may be of interest to the House to know that the question which has given some trouble, as to the effect of the reservation of the land rights of the Porte under the 4th Article of the Treaty, has been settled. All the land rights and claims of the Porte, including claims on waste lands, and all questions affecting the land, have been settled and commuted for a payment of £5,000 a-year. That payment is in addition to what has been ascertained to be the surplus due to the Porte on the basis of the excess of revenue over expenditure. I am unable to say what precisely that surplus may be found to be; but we are in a position to say that the sums which have been named—£120,000 or £130,000 a-year—are exaggerated, and that the amount will be much lower—£100,000, or a few thousands more. I believe, when the Budget of Cyprus comes to be considered, it will show this to be a satisfactory and hopeful settlement. With regard to another question which was under consideration when the House met in December, I hope we are now in a position to deserve congratulation. The objects of the expedition which was then under consideration appear now to have been accomplished, and a satisfactory arrangement may now be made for the future protection and tranquillity of the North-West Frontier of India without destroying the independence of Afghanistan. Turning from these matters to the condition of the country, I do not think it necessary to enter into any details; but it would be improper and indecent, on such an occasion as this, not to express the sincere regret which we all feel for the serious distress which has prevailed in some parts of the country; and I hope that the time has come for improvement, as the change in the weather and other circumstances may serve to mitigate the distress. [*Opposition cheers.*] I think you will admit that the winter has been exceedingly severe—[*Laughter from the Opposition*]—by which it has been rendered difficult for many persons to obtain employment. This may be a subject for the laughter of hon. Gentlemen on the other side of the House, but it is not so regarded by us, and especially by the people of those towns in which the distress has prevailed. In many of the communications which we have received stress has been laid upon the additional suffering caused by the severity of the weather, which has rendered it impossible for many people to obtain employment. I can only again express my hope that matters will tend to improvement. Before leaving this subject, however, I think it would hardly be graceful not to acknowledge the very great liberality and self-sacrifice with which so many persons during the distress in their districts came forward in order to relieve the sufferings of those among whom they lived. I am happy to say that the benevolence of the people of England has never yet been appealed to in vain. Not only has the relief been liberal, but, so far as we have been able to judge, the relief given has been very wisely and judiciously distributed. I have nothing more that I need trouble the House with, except to mention the subjects which will be brought forward in the present Session. The subjects which appear to be of the highest importance are these—There will, in the first place, be a necessity for proceeding with the Mutiny Bill, which, as the House is aware, is in a peculiar position. The Mutiny Bills of past years have been frequently altered and patched; nevertheless, considerable portions of the legislation have been of an obsolete character of a very early date, and it has been found desirable that it should be revised. I need not go back upon what has occurred in past Sessions, but I think it only right that we should give some expression of acknowledgment to the Committee—and especially to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt)—which sat last Session upon this subject, and under whose guidance great progress has been made in the work of reform, for their labours upon it. Their recommendations have led us to substitute what will practically be a new Military Code—for that is what our suggestion will really amount to—and that Military Code will be submitted to the House, and will require careful consideration. And here I may take the opportunity of correcting a mistake that has got wind in some quarters in reference to this question. It has been assumed that we intend to alter the whole system of our Mutiny Legislation, and to withdraw from Parliament the annual supervision and control of the Army. Such an insane idea has never entered into our minds. Even hon. Gentlemen opposite could never have imagined that we intended to introduce so sweeping a change. The next measure which we wish to mention is the Criminal Code, which has also been the subject of very careful revision by very competent and high authorities; and we hope that it will be presented this Session in a form which will enable the House to deal with it and pass it immediately. There will be a measure for the amendment of the Bankruptcy Laws, which I think will be introduced in the other House of Parliament. My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary will re-introduce a measure, of which he has had charge, for amending the Summary Jurisdiction of Magistrates. Then there is another subject which urgently requires attention in this House, because the powers of the Railway Commissioners will expire during this Session; and it is, therefore, necessary to introduce some measure which will deal with those powers. We propose to introduce a measure for establishing County Boards in England, and for amending the Grand Jury Law in Ireland. There is also to be a Valuation Bill, and there will be a Bill for the amendment of the Poor Law of Scotland. In mentioning these measures in detail, I wish, at the same time, to say that there are many other measures we have in hand, some of which will demand special attention. I gave a pledge last Session, which I have not forgotten, that the Corrupt Practices Act should be dealt with early in this Session, and I have stated to my hon. Friend behind me (Mr. Coope) that we should have to introduce some measure with regard to Banks. There is a measure upon the relations of Employers and Workmen which will also be introduced when ready; and amongst others I may mention one measure of a financial character, in which I myself am interested, for dealing with the question of Public Works Loans. There are also other measures which, as time goes on, we propose to introduce; but I need not trouble the House with them now, and will only say what is the order of Business which we at present contemplate. To-night I will give Notice of certain Bills which it is proposed to introduce to-morrow evening, which probably will not give rise to much discussion. On Monday I propose to invite the House to consider some Resolutions with regard to the Public Business of the House, and I propose to move certain Resolutions which were recommended by the Committee of last Session, although not the whole of them. I will place the Resolutions upon the Table in the course of the evening. We may also have some other Bills to introduce on Monday. On Thursday I hope my right hon. and gallant Friend the Secretary of State for War will be able to introduce the Mutiny Bill, which will require some little time to explain. Possibly I may be able also to do the second reading of the Public Works Loan Bill; but I think it will be more convenient to keep it in abeyance. The Army and Navy Estimates are, I hope, in a position to be proceeded with on the following Monday—if possible with the Army, but it may be that the Navy Estimates will be taken on the following day; but, whichever is taken first, the other Estimates will be taken on the following Monday. On Thursday, the 27th, we shall take the second reading of the Mutiny Bill. I need not go further into the details; but, of course, Notice will be given of the introduction and progress of those measures I have referred to. I now move that you, Sir, do leave the Chair.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr Speaker do now leave the Chair."—(*Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer.*)

Sir CHARLES W. DILKE said, he could recollect no precedent for the most unusual course which had been adopted by the right hon. Gentleman on the present occasion. In 1867, when there was an Autumn Session, the whole of the Bills were brought forward in the Queen's Speech; and, as regarded 1868, there was a Queen's Speech made on the re-assembling of the House in February 1869. Perhaps it would be convenient that the most responsible Members of the Opposition should refrain from addressing the House until towards the close of the debate to which it was likely the speech of the right hon. Gentleman would give rise. Next to the unfortunate event which had occurred in South Africa, the subject that was the uppermost in the public mind, and which he (Sir Charles W. Dilke) chiefly rose to address the House upon, was the distress that prevailed throughout the country. The language of the right hon. Gentleman in referring to the latter question was, perhaps, scarcely adequate to the occasion. The right hon. Gentleman had stated that that distress had been occasioned by the late frost. ["Oh!"]

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER explained that he had remarked that the distress had probably been aggravated by the frost.

Sir CHARLES W. DILKE feared that the distress was more widely spread in the Northern centres of industry than the right hon. Gentleman appeared to think; and he could not share in the sanguine view taken by the right hon. Gentleman that it was decreasing. He would only tell the right hon. Gentleman that those who represented the great centres of industry were not of the opinion which he understood the right hon. Gentleman to express. They thought that not only was the present distress more generally spread over the country than had been the case for many years, but that it was rather increasing than diminishing. He could not understand the principle upon which the right hon. Gentleman had constructed the list of Bills which he had mentioned; for after reading out a catalogue of nine measures he went on to refer to others which were more important than those which he had first mentioned. He (Sir Charles W. Dilke) supposed that it was intended that these nine Bills should be those to which the attention of the House should first be directed. With regard to these measures, he would only say that Scotland and Ireland came out somewhat badly. There was only one measure relating to each country, and neither of them was of first-class importance. He had not been in the secret of the negotiations of which they had heard with regard to Irish University Education; but he supposed that these negotiations had broken down, as no result had come from them. It was possible, however, that a surprise might be sprung upon them at the last moment. The Bills relating to Corrupt Practices and to the Liability of Employers for Injuries to their Workmen ought to have taken a prominent place in the programme of the Government Business for the Session, seeing that Her Majesty's Government had pledged themselves to introduce them at the earliest opportunity, and to give them precedence. With reference to the first they had great reason to complain of the course pursued, for a Dissolution could not long be delayed; it would be welcome to a large number of hon. Members on that side of the House, and it was therefore of importance that the grave questions which the Bill raised should be settled as soon as possible. With regard to the other Bills which had been named by the right hon. Gentleman, all of them were old friends. Hon. Members had seen them before, and if the Government did not press them forward with more vigour than in former years they would probably see most of them again. In reference to one of them—the County Government Board Bill—the Chancellor of the Exchequer had not said whether the measure which it was proposed to introduce was the same as that which was brought in last year. If it were the same Bill, he could tell the right hon. Gentleman that it would certainly be opposed on the second reading by a large number of those who sat on his (Sir Charles W. Dilke's) side of the House. If they were to deal with the subject of County Government in this country at all, they ought to deal with it on the basis of principle. There was no principle in the Bill of last year, and he knew there were many hon. Members who were determined to do all they could to prevent the passing of any such measure unless it were founded on the principle of representation, in which they all believed. Passing to the subject of South Africa, the right hon. Gentleman had asked them to abstain from conjectural comments; and he was, of course, perfectly right in making that appeal to the House. It would be monstrous to raise a debate to-night on the military questions involved in the recent disaster, because they had not the facts before them on which to found an opinion; but if the right hon. Gentleman wished them altogether to avoid discussion as to the causes of the war, he did not go the right way to work, because he had spoken of the measures which had been taken—whether of invasion or of defence was a matter depending upon what the real intentions of the Government had been—as having been necessary measures. Now, some of them on his side of the House, as far as they could judge from the information in their possession, were disposed to deny that there was any proof before them that those were necessary measures. At the same time, he must confirm what had fallen from the right hon. Gentleman as to the feelings with which they had all heard the painful news received that week of the reverse and calamity which had been recently sustained; and they could not but entertain a determination, as Englishmen, that every sacrifice should be made which was necessary in order to retrieve our military situation. He could not refer to that subject without paying a tribute of admiration to the heroism displayed by the men engaged, and of deep sorrow for the sad loss which had befallen the country. He hoped he should be allowed to make special allusion to the death of Colonel Durnford, an officer who, as all who knew him were aware, was the very soul of chivalry. Colonel Durnford was, curiously enough, the Commissioner by whose vote the disputed boundary question was lately settled in favour of the Zulus, and it was a remarkable fact that the Commission held its meetings at Rourke's Drift, so that that gallant officer was killed at the very place where, eight months before, he had performed a great act of justice. The House would ask for more proof than had yet been afforded whether those brave men had died for a just cause. Whether the responsibility rested on Her Majesty's Government or on the Government of the Cape was a question which must depend on information yet to be produced; but the Papers now before them showed that there was no sufficient cause of war as far as regarded its first inception. The war appeared to have been resolved upon before its cause was found. We who had before blamed the Boers for their aggression upon the Zulus, when we stepped into the shoes of the Boers pressed against the Zulus the very territorial claims we had thus condemned. Those claims related to a disputed territory, and they were likely to be a cause of war. The Natal Government had seemed to be opposed to war and in favour of arbitration. Arbitration was adopted, and the award was given in favour of the Zulus. Then another cause of war was found, and he and others doubted whether that cause was sufficient. The war was a matter upon which the House ought to express its views, because for 20 years they had had profound peace at the Cape, and now suddenly war arose against tribes which seemed to have no knowledge of, or communication with, each other; and they could not but draw the inference that it must have been an aggressive policy, such as had marked the reign of the present Government in other parts of the globe, which had caused all that disturbance. The annexation of the Transvaal had been advocated on the ground that it would give us peace and secure tranquillity at the Cape; but, instead of that being its result, it had brought us war. Those who sat on his side of the House must have different evidence from that before them to make them think that the war was just and necessary. The House, however, would have an opportunity shortly of discussing those necessary measures to which the Chancellor of the Exchequer had alluded——

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER explained that when he spoke of necessary measures, it was in reference, not to the general question, but to the measures to be taken at the present moment in consequence of what had now occurred.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE had not understood the right hon. Gentleman in that sense. Of course, he accepted that explanation. He would now turn to affairs in Afghanistan, and upon that subject he desired to make but a single observation. Looking to the fact that all military operations had been suspended, they must all be much gratified to know that the Government had succeeded, at not a large loss of life, in occupying those positions and that territory which they intended to hold. But he thought the time had arrived when some distinct statement should be made respecting our intentions towards that country. The explanation made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer had been singularly vague, and had not conveyed any accurate impression to the minds of those who heard it; nor would it to those who would read it. One thing was certain. We had the military position in our hands. We could take as much territory as we liked. There had been a talk of a scientific Frontier. Well, what they wanted to know and what they had a right to demand was—what was that so-called scientific Frontier to consist of? With whom, moreover, were the Government to treat; and had they not themselves destroyed all chance of finding that independent Afghanistan which they were so anxious to see on our Indian Frontier? He asked whether they would not be forced to take the advice of General Kaufmann, as reported by the correspondent of *The New York Herald?* Whether they wished it or not, might they not find themselves compelled to go forward until they reached Herat—a long and troublesome journey? The Government would strengthen themselves and prevent their hand from being forced if they would frankly tell the House what Afghan territory they were to keep. The Chancellor of the Exchequer would have acted more discreetly if he had not mentioned Cyprus. It was treading on delicate ground. He (Sir Charles W. Dilke) would ask whether the total revenue of that Island was more than £160,000 or £170,000, of which £115,000 had to be paid as rent to Turkey, and whether it was possible to do more than make the two ends meet? Nothing would, he feared, be left for carrying out such improvements as constructing harbours, establishing sanatariums, and making roads. The right hon. Gentleman had mentioned that some of his Colleagues had visited Cyprus, and they had the advantage of reading in *The Times* of yesterday column after column of the utterances of the First Lord of the Admiralty. [*Cheering from the Government Benches.*] He was glad to hear that cheer, because it showed that hon. Members opposite were prepared to defend the right hon. Gentleman's views, which hon. Members on the Opposition side were equally prepared to attack whenever an opportunity arose for thoroughly thrashing out the subject. If the Returns moved for by the hon. Member for Frome (Mr. H. Samuelson) were granted, they would show who were right and who were wrong with regard to the unhealthiness of Cyprus. The right hon. Gentleman said he had been at Cyprus for a week, and had not found the climate pestiferous; but he might, perhaps, have been able to make a similar remark if he had spent a week at Sierra Leone. In the opinion of the First Lord of the Admiralty, a grand harbour might be constructed at Cyprus at a ridiculously small cost—probably for £150,000. The right hon. Gentleman's authority for his statement was the hon. Baronet the Member for North Durham (Sir George Elliot), who, he believed, built the harbour at Alexandria, which, according to other authorities, was in a much worse condition now than it was before it was touched. However this might be, he should like to know what was the expenditure at Alexandria, and what was the difference between that expenditure and the original estimate? If there should be a similar difference in the cost of the construction of a harbour at Cyprus, he pitied the poor taxpayer of this country. Again, in December last, he put a Question to the Government as to the jurisdiction to be established in Cyprus, which was a very serious matter, as it was likely to bring every civilized Power in Europe into collision with this country. He asked what would be the position of the citizens of other countries in that Island? According to the Capitulations, the subjects of all the Frankish Powers were to be judged by their own officials. The Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs admitted last December that a Correspondence had been commenced with foreign Governments respecting these Capitulations, and the Government ought now to have told them how the negotiations stood. Was it not a fact that Italy and the United States had made very strong representations to us upon this subject? With regard to the Berlin arrangements, the right hon. Gentleman spoke very pleasantly, saying they would be carried into effect on every side, and adding that negotiations had been set on foot with reference to the claims of Greece. What was the history of the Greek question? Last year the House carefully debated the question whether Her Majesty's Government had done much or anything for Greece. The Government maintained that they had done a great deal for that "interesting Power;" but he thought the Opposition were successful in exposing the falsity of that view, and that they had shown that the Government had not only done a great deal less than they ought to have done, but that it was owing to the conduct of Her Majesty's Government at Berlin that Greece did not obtain more territory and did not get it by an express stipulation of the Treaty, instead of having to rely upon a mere recommendation to the Turks. Even now it was doubtful whether effect would be given by Turkey to the recommendation; and this was a point on which the Government had left the House wholly without information. They were, therefore, entitled to ask when the time would come for the publication of Papers connected with the Greek question. It would be observed that it was not until the 21st or 22nd of January that the Turkish Government appointed a Commissioner under the Treaty of Berlin. The Turkish Commissioner had met the Greek Commissioner; but negotiations of a most unsatisfactory nature were reported to have taken place. Yesterday it was said that the Commission had been broken up; and though it was rumoured to-night that negotiations had begun again, he believed there was little hope of a satisfactory issue—or, indeed, of any issue—being reached in the course of these transactions. Not only did those who sat on his side of the House desire further information on this subject; but, as matters stood, they could not but think that what had taken place was discreditable to Her Majesty's Government. From the Papers which had been published by foreign Governments it would seem that the conduct of Her Majesty's Government had been calculated to alienate from England the sympathy of that rising nation; and just as the Government had driven all the other Powers of the Peninsula into the arms of Russia, so, he believed, they would be found to have driven the Greeks into the arms of France. It was to be feared that in future Greece would regard France as her sole benefactor in Europe, instead of looking as she would otherwise have done, to this country as her saviour.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT: Sir, I rise to re-enforce what my hon. Friend the Member for Chelsea has urged—that we should have a little more accurate information with respect to the Island of Cyprus than could be gathered from the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Westminster. I am sure I hope that the First Lord of the Admiralty—although he considers his first duty is to his constituents—will also think that he owes something to the House of Commons. I want, then, first to ask for something distinct with respect to this naval station at Cyprus. I understand, as far as we have the statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty, that he admits at present there is nothing which can properly be called a harbour at Cyprus; but his phrase, as I took it down, is that there is the making of a harbour at Cyprus. He said—"We have the opinion of the Hydrographer of the Navy." It is not presented to Parliament—for we have very little information on that subject; but the Hydrographer to the Navy has given that information to the Geographical Society. There was a Paper read at a meeting of the Geographical Society, at which the Hydrographer to the Navy took part in the discussion—and this is what he says on the possible harbour of Cyprus. He says there was a long spit or reef which ran out for a mile into shallow water, and between this and the mainland there was a deep gulley of seven or eight fathoms, which gradually shallowed up to the old port. It would require a very small amount of stone and labour, compared with the harbour works in this country and in the Mediterranean, to make this area a port that would be suitable for a small fleet of large ships. It strikes me as rather remarkable that after the Hydrographer to the Navy has said when you have made this harbour of Cyprus it will accommodate a small fleet of large ships, the First Lord of the Admiralty should tell his constituents it would hold the largest fleet in the Mediterranean. Now, the fleet we have in the Mediterranean is not a small fleet; and, if Cyprus is to be used as a place of arms, a large fleet will have to be stationed there. The Hydrographer went on further to say even at the present time some six or eight steam vessels of moderate size—by which I understand him to exclude large iron-clads—could lie in shelter under the shores and shallowest parts of the reef. Now, the value of this paper that I have seen is that it is accompanied by a chart which makes a landsman capable of understanding the whole thing. The greater portion of the reef, as I understand, is under water, and it is not continuous, but broken up. According to the account given by the gentleman who read the paper there is spit of a mile in length covered by from two to four fathoms of water. Well, but a reef covered by from two to four fathoms of water wants a good deal doing to it before it becomes a breakwater. To say, therefore, that there is no harbour in Cyprus is perfectly correct. To say you may make a harbour in Cyprus, I dare say is perfectly true; but, as my hon. Friend the Member for Chelsea has said, the First Lord of the Admiralty is too shrewd a man of business to rely on an estimate for making it like that at Dover for £150,000. If he would inquire into the cost of the harbour at Dover or Plymouth Breakwater, and see what it came to, he would not lead people to suppose that upon a reef you could make a breakwater for £150,000; and it is a thing which I am sure the hon. Member for North Durham (Sir George Elliot) would not take a contract for. Indeed, I should be sorry if he took it from the Government, because he would forfeit his seat in this House, which I should greatly regret. Then I ask, first of all, are the Government really going, and when are they going, to begin the harbour at Famagosta? I ask it because, in a recently published letter from Sir Garnet Wolseley to the First Lord of the Admiralty, there is nothing said about the harbour, but there is about Famagosta. And what does he say about Famagosta? He says it is the unhealthiest spot in the whole of Cyprus. I therefore ask the First Lord of the Admiralty—Are they going to commence the breakwater on this reef to hold a small fleet of ships at that which Sir Garnet Wolseley declares to be the unhealthiest spot in Cyprus? To form a naval station, you must have something on land as well as on sea; you must have naval stores, munition, a certain amount of workshops for repairs, a population to look after these shops, and therefore I ask the First Lord of the Admiralty—Is he going to propose to run the country into expense for establishing a naval station for Cyprus at Famagosta? If he is, it will certainly be a most unwise proceeding after the description given of it by Sir Garnet Wolseley. Then, I ask him, if the object of this fleet is to support an army in a strong place of arms, where is the camp going to be? How far is it going to be from the port of Famagosta? I will show you that the place where it is proposed to put the camp is, as far as I can judge, about 50 miles from Famagosta. Therefore, you are going to make your station to embark and disembark in the unhealthiest part of the Island, and you are going to remove your camp to a plateau 5,500 feet high. I want to see the combination of these two great officers of the Army and Navy who have been to Cyprus. Will the First Lord tell us exactly what the plan is which the Government is going to propose for Her Majesty's Army and Navy? My first question is—Is he going to begin a harbour at Famagosta? Our complications with Armenia may arise to-morrow or next month. Who can state or determine when Armenia is to be invaded. When it is is invaded we shall want this harbour, which will not very well accommodate the fleet. Then I would ask the First Lord of the Admiralty, where is the money to come from? Is it to be supplied from Cyprus or from England? You are not to have this kind of work begun without money. I understood the First Lord of the Admiralty to say money had been advanced for works in Cyprus. I read it from a report, but surely it must have been a misreport; for, from the First Lord's knowledge of the Treasury, he would have told us that he could not give money which had not been voted by Parliament. If not a misreport, I should like to know when the Estimates will be laid before Parliament, and the Votes taken for the amounts. I will address myself to another question, but I approach it with less alarm, because the Secretary of State for War belongs to a class of people whom the First Lord of the Admiralty affects to hold in such great contempt. He thinks that the good opinions that I and others entertain are due to our being younger sons. Addressing myself, then, to the Secretary of State for War, I want to ask him some questions about the Army; and I will ask him, first of all, why 10,000 men were sent to Cyprus in the month of July. That is a thing Parliament has never been told. A statement was made by the Prime Minister—and we all know his careful accuracy in those matters—that the Government, before they took Cyprus, had carefully examined all the islands of the Ægean. What we should like to have would be the Reports, especially the Reports made to him on the Island of Cyprus, and its capacity as a strong place of arms and for the entertainment of troops. He would not have sent 10,000 men—no Government would do that—to a place where they had not ascertained that its climate was fit for them at that time of year. And why, at the present time, do they only want 900 men there, and what has been the change of the circumstances which make 900 men sufficient now and made them send something like 10,000 men in the month of July? Now, the general public had none of the Reports which the Prime Minister referred to. We only had those cyclopædias to which Lord Salisbury refers, and those cyclopædias told us it was a very unhealthy climate in the summer months. However, the First Lord of the Admiralty says it is not more unhealthy than Gibraltar or Malta, and we want an explanation of that. If it is the fact, I think the Government should have given us some reliable statistics on the matter. I do not think the course the First Lord of the Admiralty took is exactly the most regular or Parliamentary. He has not had the Report made to Parliament or the Government by the Governor of the Island of Cyprus with reference to the health or climate of Cyprus. He seems to have sent a speech which I addressed to my constituents to Sir Garnet Wolseley, with a request that he would send him information which he could give to a Conservative Constitutional Association at Westminster. I am, of course, very proud that the First Lord of the Admiralty should think that anything coming from me was worthy of exportation to Cyprus; but what I must complain of is that he sent a perfectly inaccurate version of my speech, so that Sir Garnet Wolseley has been under a misapprehension that I made a statement of facts with respect to Cyprus. I made no statement of facts at all. Gentlemen opposite must have read an incorrect version. I read a statement of facts not of my own, but from a newspaper; and the First Lord of the Admiralty, in a very good-natured way, said he was a person who had no objection to newspapers. He said there were newspapers and newspapers. I should have thought the First Lord the Admiralty would have said the newspaper of newspapers was *The Daily Telegraph.* I read from a letter of the correspondent of *The Daily Telegraph,* who said he went with the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Secretary of State for War, and I did not vouch for a single fact. The First Lord of the Admiralty did not write to Sir Garnet Wolseley to contradict me, but *The Daily Telegraph;* but I must leave the First Lord of the Admiralty and Sir Garnet Wolseley to settle the matter with *The Daily Telegraph.* It is not my business at all to defend *The Daily Telegraph* and its correspondent. I am sure *The Daily Telegraph* would not defend me; but having read the letter, I see there is no contradiction of it. I would ask him first, with regard to the 101st Regiment to which the correspondent refers, will he tell us that the 101st Regiment did not suffer in health from the climate of Cyprus? Is it entirely untrue, what is there stated by the correspondent, that the medical Report on that regiment was of a character which implied that it was unfit to go to its destination, and was to be sent to Halifax for change of climate? I go on to ask a second question. He did not see the 101st Regiment, but he did see the 42nd Regiment. The writer in *The Daily Telegraph* says that that regiment was in a deplorable condition, 99 men sick of fever out of 500, and the regiment was shortly afterwards removed, and it was stated that it was removed in consequence of suffering from fever. Will the Secretary of State for War say it did not suffer from fever and was not removed because of fever, but that the health of the regiment was the average health of troops in the Mediterranean? If he does, then, of course, the whole statement that I have quoted falls to the ground. I hope, therefore, the right hon. and gallant Gentleman will say whether it is true or untrue. We should have returns week by week of the state of their health, and we should then see how the matter stands. That would be the most satisfactory way in which to settle the matter. But there is a very remarkable statement in the letter which the First Lord of the Admiralty obtained from Sir Garnet Wolseley. What does he propose to do with the troops in Cyprus for the future? Why, he is going to put them on the plateau 5,500 feet high, and that is an island which is as healthy as any part in the Mediterranean. Why is he going to put his army in the summer on the top of the plateau 5,500 feet high, if the troops can be perfectly well accommodated in an island 140 miles long and 100 broad? Why is he going to perch the camp on this place of arms in a place twice as high as Snowdon? Where is this plateau? I have made a measurement, and I believe it is something like 40 or 50 miles from Famagosta. But even supposing it is only 30 miles away from the port where troops and ammunition are to be landed to defend Armenia when the time arrives, you are going to take these men and land them at the first place—Famagosta. Then they are to go up to a plateau 35 miles distant, 5,500 feet above the level of the sea. Are the Government going to make a railway up to the top of it for the *corps d' armée?* It is perfectly plain, according to Sir Garnet Wolseley's own project, that he is going to have two camps—a winter camp, because the plateau is covered with snow in winter. There is to be a summer camp on the plateau, and a winter camp down below—rather an expensive way of working your army. You do not want to have a winter camp and a summer camp at Gibraltar; you do not want it at Malta or at Aldershot. What are you going to do with these camps? Are they going to be under canvas, or are they not? Are you going to have another Aldershot in Cyprus on the top of the plateau? How are you going to handle your troops? I do not mean the handful you have got there now. Are the troops to be thrown, as in July last, into bell-tents, dependent, as my hon. Friend the Member for Hastings (Mr. T. Brassey) has shown, upon a commissariat which has broken down, or, are the men to be accommodated in barracks; and, if so, at whose expense is that to be done, and when are hon. Members to see the plans and Estimates? The Government were quite entitled to say, at the end of last Session, that they had not examined the place; but they have examined it now, for the Secretary of State for War and the First Lord of the Admiralty have been there, and I am justified in asking what kind of provision they are going to make. I will now leave the Army and Navy, and come to a civil subject. I do not see the hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney General here; but when I asked him last Session what law was to prevail there, he said it was as easy as possible, and that the English law was to be administered to English subjects there. I would like to ask if it is a fact that the English law has been administered there within the last six months? I am told there has been an Ordinance drawn up on the subject. That I should like to see, and we ought to have the Papers laid before Parliament. My information is that for six months there has been no attempt to administer the English law, but that there has been a mixture of Turkish Kadi and drumhead court martial on the basis of the Turkish jurisprudence; and I have read of an instance in which a gentleman was asked to represent a client on some question of a right of way, and that he was told by the authorities that he could not practise before a tribunal in Cyprus, unless he had got a licence from the Turkish Minister of Justice. I suppose you want English people to embark their capital in Cyprus? But I am told that even the ginger-beer sellers are leaving the Island, and you cannot expect anything else until you furnish traders with some security in regard to the administration of the law. We ought to have some fuller explanation in reference to the nature of the law. As regards the financial question, we are told we are to have a Cyprus Budget. When, and in what form, will the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer bring it forward? We are much interested in the Imperial Budget; but as we are to have, it is said, a great surplus in both, it is very comforting. The First Lord of the Admiralty told his constituents that Cyprus was a steping-stone to India. My notion of a stepping-stone is a step in the direction in which you wish to go; but that is not the case with Cyprus, for I observe in the map that the great future port of Famagosta is more distant from Malta than Port Said or Alexandria. It is desirable that we should hear more on all these points.

COLONEL STANLEY: I gathered with great regret from the speech of my hon. and learned Friend that I am not to have the honour of having him among my audience when it is my duty to lay the Army Estimates before the House, because there are many questions which could be much more conveniently answered then, and many points I could more satisfactorily explain to the House and the Committee then, by means of figures I should be prepared to lay before them, than I can do now, when I am obliged to endeavour, from the best of my recollection, to answer points which very much turn upon small matters of detail. But this I should like expressly to emphasize—that those wrong impressions which my hon. and learned Friend retracted in answer to the challenge of my right hon. Friend near me (Mr. W. H. Smith) seem also to run through those portions of his remarks which refer to the military importance of Cyprus at this moment. In the discussion last year I endeavoured to make clear the fact that it was not in contemplation by the Government to place Cyprus at all in the same position as regards military forces as either Malta or Gibraltar. What I said then I repeat now. We, in the first instance, in taking over a country from a Power whose subjects in various parts of its Dominions had been exposed to a good deal of disturbance, had to take it over with such force as to render it impossible for those unquiet spirits which exist in the best of communities to take the opportunity of a transfer of the Government to commit outrages which happen even in very civilized communities. We determined, therefore, especially as there was a large force at hand at Malta, to send such a force to Cyprus as would show unmistakably that we had both the power and the determination to maintain peace and order. But I expressly said at that time in the House that I anticipated the moment would come, and that before long, when we would be able to withdraw almost all the troops we had there, and be able to hold the Island with a small British garrison, perhaps even a single battalion. I am anxious to point out to my hon. and learned Friend that there is a considerable difference between a fortress such as Malta or Gibraltar and a place where you may form a base of operations, should operations become necessary, in the East. You require different conditions altogether. Malta and Gibraltar, as all the world knows, are almost bare rocks; but if we relied upon them as bases of operations in the East, we should find ourselves in a difficulty from the want of some place where transport animals, forage, and all those numerous stores which constitute the well-being of an army could be collected, prepared, brought together, and constituted. Now, to our mind, Cyprus very fairly fulfilled those conditions. You must, in making comparisons, compare what are like, and not what are unlike. I do not for a moment profess to compare the climate of Cyprus with that of this country; but I say without hesitation that, so far as I have been able personally to ascertain, the Island of Cyprus is certainly as healthy as, and probably more healthy than, that of any other place in the Levant where troops are likely to be sent under similar conditions. I am sorry I have no means of stating these facts as accurately as I could wish to the House; but I recollect distinctly to have been informed that when our troops first went to the Ionian Islands it was stated that disease was especially rife amongst them. Complying, however, with the conditions suitable for troops in such a climate, and also with the conditions of ordinary sanitary arrangements, we find that so far from Corfu, Cephalonia, and the other Ionian Islands, being unhealthy, they became amongst the most healthy of our possessions. My hon. and learned Friend asked what was the use of having 30,000 troops perched 5,000 feet above the level of the sea. Has he never heard of places where troops are specially stationed for the preservation of their health during the summer months? Has he never heard of the Hill Stations in India, Ceylon, and Jamaica? Where sanitary conditions exist which render it necessary to place the British soldier in a more elevated and healthier atmosphere during the summer, it would be simply wrong from every point of view to keep him upon the plains, where he would be subject in an unusual degree to disease. When we received the most gloomy telegrams in regard to the health of the troops, I directed that these telegrams—and for this I incurred some blame—should be put before the public exactly as they came, and that other people should have exactly the information that I myself possessed. With regard to the information asked for by the hon. Member for Frome (Mr. H. Samuelson), I do not know whether it is technically in my hands to give it; but I may say that, in the course of a very interesting conversation which I had with Sir Anthony Home, principal medical officer in that district, whom everybody will recognize as being competent to deal with most matters respecting these diseases, he told me that he was daily gaining information, and he was anxious, at as early a date as possible, to collate all the information he possessed. I think that by placing before the House the Report of Sir Anthony Home they will be possessed of better information than they could obtain in any other form. With regard to the 101st Regiment, no doubt they did suffer very severely from fever; and it is perfectly true that, although they were originally intended for service in the Straits Settlement, they were ordered to a colder climate, inasmuch as it was not thought right to send troops to that Settlement unless they were in a thoroughly healthy state. All the Reports, however, which have reached us up to the present time tend to show that no permanent harm has been done to the constitution of the men. Speaking from recollection, I think that their loss from fever and other causes has only amounted up to the present time to something like six men. No doubt, also, the 42nd did suffer severely from fever, and the general appearance of the men, and the general state of their health, were such as caused me to recommend that they should be transferred to another station in the Mediterranean. The hon. and learned Member referred to the condition of the 71st as deplorable; but their "deplorable" condition when I saw them was exemplified by a hardy set of men, working with heart and goodwill under a very hot sun, and having a sick rate of something about 4·8 per cent. The commanding officer of the regiment assured us that he considered Cyprus as healthy as any other station in the Mediterranean known to him. In regard to the erection of barracks, it behoves us, as I have said before, to proceed very tentatively until we have all the information we can get. Sir Anthony Home said until he got to Cyprus he really did not know how completely science could be disappointed. Where the best sanitary conditions apparently existed fever had been extremely rife; on the other hand, some of those places where it was feared the men would suffer most had been almost entirely free from fever. I hope that much may be done in regard to the Island in the course of next year; meanwhile, let it not be supposed that we have changed our minds as to the value of Cyprus for the purposes for which we intended, or that we are to be discouraged by the circumstances of a singularly unhealthy year throughout the East from enabling our troops to perform those military duties which, I am sure, they are ready to perform in any climate. With regard to harbours, my right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty is more competent to speak of those matters, and I have no doubt he will deal with them.

MR. MITCHELL HENRY: I hope I may be permitted to recall the attention of the House to some matters nearer home than the interesting Island of Cyprus. I gathered from the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer that it is the intention of the Government to propose certain new Rules for the conduct of the Business of the House. Everybody must admit that there are new Rules with respect to the Business of the House which might be adopted with great advantage. The best of all Rules would be that of removing from the cognizance of the House the vast local legislation with which it is powerless to contend. But if, as I imagine, the Chancellor of the Exchequer implied in his statement, it is the intention of the Government to introduce Rules into this House which will tend to fetter the freedom of a weak minority in debate, I think the right hon. Gentleman will find that he cannot altogether accomplish his object. I am not surprised that the Government should give a first place to this intention of theirs; because if ever there was a time when a minority would have a right to push its privileges to the utmost point I think it is after a statement by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. We have been amused during the Recess with divers rumours — put out evidently by the Government, and supported by the Press which is supposed to represent the Government—that it is their intention to deal with some very weighty matters which concern Ireland. We have been left in doubt up to this moment as to whether we were or were not to be gratified in this respect. Only a week ago I had the honour of being present at a dinner given by the Lord Mayor of Dublin—an historical dinner in that City—at which the Lord Lieutenant was present, and the Chief Secretary for Ireland. The Chief Secretary, whom I do not now see in his place—he seldom is in his place when we are discussing Irish questions, except for the purpose of opposing some Bill which the Irish people desire—said on that occasion, in reference to those rumours, that the best answer he could make would be to refer us to the forthcoming speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. We now hear that all the Government contemplates in the way of legislation for Ireland is the introduction of a Grand Jury Bill; and of what nature that Grand Jury Bill will be we may form a very complete idea from the kind of Bills which they have previously given us on that subject. We are on the eve of a General Election, and one of the subjects which I did expect to hear would have been dealt with this Session is the Franchise in Ireland. We have been told over and over again during the last five years that it is the desire of the Government to extend to Ireland exactly the same laws and privileges as you have in this country, and in Scotland. We who represent Irish constituencies, and who sit on the Liberal side of the House have introduced Bill after Bill to show the Government in what respect our privileges are different from and inferior to yours. This Bill for the Equalization of the Borough Franchise in Ireland with that in England has been defeated on every occasion, generally by small majorities. In my opinion, the Government is playing with the subject. It has never put forth its strength in opposition to the demand of the Irish people that they should have the ordinary privileges of other subjects of Her Majesty in the United Kingdom. But now that the question is going to be debated on the eve of an Election the Government has issued a Whip for the purpose of voting down, by a larger majority than ever before, this demand of the Irish people not for extra privileges, but for similar privileges to the rest of the United Kingdom. However, I will not anticipate any observations that may be made on that subject to-morrow; but I ask hon. Gentlemen to calmly weigh this fact—that there is not in all the boroughs in the whole of Ireland an electorate equal to the electorate of several of your largest towns in England. There is not in the whole of Ireland an equal number of people entitled to the borough franchise as exist in Manchester, Bristol, Liverpool, or Leeds. I say that the Irish people will not remain content until another Election under such a franchise as this. With respect to Education, the hon. and learned Member for Limerick (Mr. Butt), whose absence I so much regret, had reason to believe that the Government were going to deal with that great subject. The belief, I have no doubt, was well founded on his part. But for some reason or other the Government have changed their minds, and are not going to do anything for the equalization of Irish privileges with those which exist in other parts of the Kingdom with regard to University Education. Under these circumstances, the Government need not expect that any facilities will be given by Irish Members for the progress of Public Business. I, for my part, have never taken any course in this House which could be called obstructive; but I say that the Government is putting to a severe test the forbearance, not of the Irish Members alone, but of the Irish people. I note also in regard to legislation in Ireland, from an answer given in a previous part of the evening, that even as regards the important inquiry into, perhaps, the most important Department in Ireland—the Board of Works—the Government again does not intend to comply with the demands of the people. This will cause deep disappointment in Ireland. I notice also that the Chancellor of the Exchequer congratulated the hon. and learned Member for Oxford—whose amusing badinage at the expense of the First Lord of the Admiralty we have all so exceedingly enjoyed—on his exertions in reforming the Mutiny Act. I could not help thinking that the Chancellor of the Exchequer might in his generosity have remembered other Members of the House to whom the country is really indebted for the reform of the Mutiny Act. The hon. member for Meath (Mr. Parnell), has done many things in this House distasteful to Members on that side and on this side of the House; but there is one service which he, and he alone, has rendered. He called the attention of Parliament and of the United Kingdom to the Mutiny Act; and if it had not been for his exertions and his persistence nothing would ever have been done in the way of reforming those Acts. I think, under those circumstances, the Chancellor of the Exchequer might have remembered his services. I am not desirous of entering into other questions respecting foreign politics or the formation of a harbour in Cyprus. I can only say that much of the discussion on this subject has been trifling and of an unworthy character. We have begun the Session badly, and it will end badly, unless the Government rise to an appreciation of the feelings of disappointment and rising anger in Ireland at the total neglect of the people's demands. Unless the Government is prepared to give us the same electoral franchise and the same facilities for exercising that franchise that a reform of the registration laws will secure, and unless it is also prepared to give the Irish people the same facilities for education which are lavishly conferred on the people of this country, the House of Commons need not expect by any reform of Regulations to bring Irish Members to such a course of conduct as will facilitate the progress of Public Business.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: Sir, although the statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer was not of any great length, it yet touched upon several very important matters. Being ignorant of how far the House might wish to enter upon a discussion of those subjects, I thought it might perhaps be for the convenience of the House that I should abstain from making any remarks until I had seen what was the feeling of the House upon it. From what has passed I think it is not the desire of hon. Members to enter with any fulness into the important questions that have been raised and alluded to by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Therefore, it may not be inconvenient, although some are desirous of speaking, if I make such remarks as I feel called upon in connection with the Minister's statement to which we have listened. It is not necessary that I should take up the time of the House with any prolonged criticism on the Bills proposed to be introduced by the Government. Two of these Bills have been prepared either by a Committee or a Commission, and, although relating to very important matters, they can hardly be said to be Bills of the Government, unless it be the intention of the Government to depart to a very considerable extent from the line laid down for them. With the County Boards Bill, if it is the same as that which has been introduced before, the Valuation Bill, and the Grand Jury Law Amendment Bill we are familiar, and our opinions on this side of the House with regard to them are known. It is not necessary, therefore, that I should take up the time of the House upon these matters. There is one subject which has been a good deal discussed during the Recess upon which the Government have not seen their way to legislate. It has been currently reported that the Government intended to legislate upon the subject of Irish University Education. Knowing as we do by experience the difficulties connected with this subject, I cannot say I am surprised that the Government have not succeeded in framing a measure which they thought would be satisfactory. I cannot say I can impute any blame to them if they shrink from dealing with this matter. At the same time, I must say it is a circumstance to be regretted, because I thought there was a hope the Government might have been able to deal more successfully than we were able to do with this important question. There are some subjects, of which this would have been one, which it is easier for one Government to deal with than another, upon which the division of opinion does not entirely coincide with the ordinary Party feeling. The House will remember the circumstances in which the last Government was defeated upon this question by a combination of the whole of the then Opposition with many Members of Scotland, Ireland, and England who generally supported the Government. The Government made an attempt last Session to deal with the subject, and brought in a Bill upon the subject of Intermediate Education; and I think the reception that the measure met with from this side of the House was such as to warrant us in saying that any proposal made on this important question would be met in a very fair spirit. The right hon. Gentleman referred to the depression of trade. I did not expect that either he or the Government would pay attention to those panaceas which in some quarters have been proposed as remedies; but still, I am glad that the right hon. Gentleman who addressed his constituents the other day, and other Members of the Government, have taken up so firm a position on this subject and have lent no encouragement to the doctrine of reciprocity or some such panacea. There is only one boon which the Government can give to trade or industry. It is in their power to maintain peace, and to inspire confidence in the minds of men at home and abroad that it is their intention to maintain peace. Whether they have been or are now taking the best means to inspire that confidence is a question of so wide a character that I will not deal with it on the present occasion. The right hon. Gentleman has referred to the progress of events in Afghanistan. I am happy to be able to congratulate the Government and the Indian Army upon the rapid and successful progress of the campaign. I am specially glad that these results have been accomplished with such comparatively small loss of life. I am not sure that I can so completely congratulate the Government upon the results which have been attained. They are now in possession of the Frontier which was the object of the war; but they have accomplished more than the acquisition of certain strategic points. They have not only defeated, but they have annihilated the enemy with whom they engaged. It has been the policy of all former Governments to establish a strong and friendly Afghanistan, and the circumstances which led to this change of policy were discussed at the last meeting of Parliament. It may be said that recent events have shown that Afghanistan could not in any circumstances be a strong country, because it has collapsed so completely under our attack. But I do not think it has been proved that because Afghanistan has collapsed under the attack of a great military Empire when left entirely to its own resources, it might not have been a very powerful and useful Ally if we had been engaged with some other Power and Afghanistan could have relied on our support. It is satisfactory—as far as anything connected with this matter can be satisfactory—to hear that the Government do not intend to go any further. I have on a former occasion expressed my own opinion that it is a mistake from a military and political point of view to extend our Frontier at all, and I do not wish to say more upon the subject at the present moment. I will, therefore, only repeat the Question asked by the hon. Member for Chelsea, whether any information can be given as to the time when the Government will be able to announce to the House definitely what their intentions are and what they propose to do in regard to Afghanistan? The right hon. Gentleman has also referred with satisfaction to the Treaty of Berlin, and the progress made in its execution. There appears to be in some quarters an idea that the Opposition regret this progress. I am not aware of any such expression of opinion. On the contrary, the Resolution which I had the hononr of moving last year, and which was rejected by a large majority in this House, expressed in general terms an approval on that subject, and there is no conceivable reason why the Opposition should view with dissatisfaction the progress that is made towards its execution. But I must remind the Government, when they speak of this rapid progress, that what has been done as yet has reference, for the most part, to the easiest portions of the Treaty. Those portions which are more difficult of execution, and which are in principle more open to question, are by no means accomplished, or, as far as we can see, in the way of being accomplished. It is true that Batoum and other parts of Turkish territory have been evacuated; but it was not the Opposition which prophesied that any difficulty would arise on that score. It was those who believed in the unconquerable spirit of the Turks who predicted that Batoum would never be evacuated without trouble. It is true that considerable progress has been made in the rectification of the Frontiers of Turkey, Montenegro, and Roumelia, that the arrangements of the Treaty of Berlin in these respects are in course of execution without more friction than was expected; but two provisions of the Treaty which were specially and unfavourably canvassed do not appear to be in course of so rapid an execution. My hon. Friend has referred to the case of Greece. He has spoken on that subject with very great knowledge, and referred to sources of information which have not been laid before the House. I cannot add anything to the statement of my hon. Friend on that point; but I think it cannot be asserted that any progress has been made in settling the relations between Turkey and Greece, and we on this side of the House feel certain that tranquillity will never be restored in the East so long as the claims of Greece, although not put forward in the shape of warlike measures, remain disregarded. Well, Sir, a provision of the Treaty to which the Government last year attached much importance — an importance greater, perhaps, than was indicated by the Protocols—was that which referred to the division of Bulgaria and to the creation of the Province of Eastern Roumelia. We pointed out the anomalous state of things established by that Treaty. If Lord Salisbury's original proposal had been accepted, the difficulties might possibly have been avoided which now appear to be impending, although it is probable that difficulties of another kind might have had to be encountered. Lord Salisbury's original proposal was that the Turkish power, civil and military, should be replaced, and that, at all events, was a simple proposition. But it was not the arrangement which was accepted by the Congress. The arrangement agreed to by the Congress was that while the civil power of the Sultan should, under certain limitations which were prescribed, be restored in the Province of Eastern Roumelia, the military power of the Sultan within the limits of the Province should be utterly destroyed; and the ultimate force upon which the civil power is to rely for the preservation of order is not the military power of the Sultan, but a Militia, which will be composed of the Christian inhabitants of the Province. All we hear points to a probability that when the Russians evacuate this Province the Bulgarians will not consent, without great compulsion, to be placed under the rule, direct or indirect, of the Sultan. What is to happen in these circumstances? There is a provision of the Treaty, no doubt, which may be held to apply to it. The Governor may, in certain circumstances, call in the assistance of the Turkish troops. But his power is restricted by many qualifications. This decision of the Governor is to be communicated to the Powers, and I suppose with the intention of their expressing an opinion upon it. If Turkish troops are to be called in to assist in the inauguration of the new Government and Constitution of the recently-erected Provinces, the Turkish military occupation of them will be permanent, and not merely temporary. It is, undoubtedly, considerations of this kind which have given rise to the rumour that has been so extensively circulated that some proposition has been made, either by this or some other Government, for a joint occupation of those Provinces. I should wish, therefore, to ask Her Majesty's Government, whether there is any foundation for that rumour; whether any negotiations have been made, or are in progress, for a joint occupation; and, if such an idea has been entertained, whether some opportunity will not be given to us to discuss the matter, and whether Parliament will not be consulted before the country is pledged to such a measure? I have been accused—my Friends and myself have been accused—of having said things which indicated a wish to undo what has been done; and that if we should find ourselves in Office, we should not consider ourselves bound by the stipulations entered into by the Government. I am not aware that anything of the sort has been said by anyone; and I am quite certain that nothing of the sort has been said by me. What we have said, however, is that if a state of things should arise which was not contemplated by the Treaty—such, for instance, as a proposal for the joint occupation of Eastern Roumelia—we should feel ourselves at liberty to form our own opinion in reference to it, and to canvass and dispute the propriety of such a course of proceeding. The right hon. Gentleman has touched upon the question of Turkish reform, and has contended that we have expressed undue impatience with the Turks in their delay to introduce the promised reforms. The right hon. Gentleman, however, must not regard that impatience as being unreasonable, inasmuch as Sir Henry Layard has stated in his despatches that his patience in the matter was nearly exhausted, and that he assumed that that of Her Majesty's Government was nearly exhausted also. I think these Papers show a very remarkable thing. One of the first observations they suggest is the extraordinary confidence with which Lord Salisbury proposed, in the first instance, the reforms which Turkey ought to undertake. Why should there have been any doubt in his mind? Was he not armed with the Anglo-Turkish Convention? Had he not the promise of the Sultan and the Turkish Government, in return for which the Sultan had received valuable consideration in the shape of an unconditional guarantee? Why, then, should Lord Salisbury doubt? But his confidence must have been a little shaken when he found that Sir Henry Layard did not consider it necessary or expedient to present the whole of Lord Salisbury's proposals for reform in the first instance. One proposition to which Lord Salisbury attached great importance was the irremovability of the Valies, but that was not obtained. None of the suggestions for that object were even made. Lord Salisbury made four proposals. One of these was as to the institution of certain tribunals in a certain number of Asiatic towns, and the answer to that was, that the Sultan informed Lord Salisbury that the proposal he made was one contrary to the first principles of judicial administration. This appears to have been the opinion which was finally acquiesced in by Lord Salisbury. That proposal is rejected altogether; but the Sultan says there are different Inspectors whose duties are to inspect prisons, who will, in the exercise of that duty, superintend the administration of justice. It certainly is an original idea that the administration of justice of the higher Courts should be superintended by a set of Inspectors of Prisons. The third proposal was as to the appointment of collectors, and to that the Sultan said he highly approved the plan, but he would only introduce it in one or two Provinces. There was also a modified response to the fourth proposition. This, then, was the consideration that we had got for the guarantee to which this country is pledged for the protection, in all and every circumstance, of Turkey. An infinitesimal portion of reform is to be carried into execution at some future day, and that is what we have got from the Sultan in return for our guarantee. I think the Chancellor of the Exchequer or some other Member of the Government, I recollect very well last year, said that it might become a question to re-consider our position and to re-consider the measures which might be necessary for the protection of our interests in Asia. I wish to ask the Government whether it is too soon now to inquire of the Government whether they are satisfied with the instalments which they have obtained of their reforms from the Porte; whether they are satisfied with the temper which has been displayed; and whether they consider that this country is bound in honour or in policy to maintain that most onerous obligation which has been imposed upon us? The right hon. Gentleman referred, of course, to the lamentable event which has taken place in South Africa. I entirely agree with him that exaggeration ought to be avoided in this matter quite as much as the other extreme. I think that the right hon. Gentleman, in speaking of it as a great blow to our Army, and as a military disaster, used terms as serious as the situation demanded. How serious it is, is proved by the fact that, great as is our grief at the loss of the gallant lives which had been sacrificed, great as is the pain with which this military reverse has been heard of, those sentiments are almost for the moment over-reached by the feeling of anxiety which exists—a feeling which I fear must exist for some time—as to the consequences the event may have had on the safety of the remainder of our Army, and even on the safety of the Colony itself. I shall follow the advice of the right hon. Gentleman, and not attempt to discuss, on this occasion, the causes which led to the war. The Papers which have been issued gave some information; but I think the right hon. Gentleman made a slight mistake in speaking of the date.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: I said they brought the Correspondence down to the end of last December, and that there were other Papers which would be distributed on Saturday or Monday giving additional information.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: If the information were brought down to the end of December, that would be the latest; but the last despatch in these Papers from South Africa is dated the 4th of November. The date of the latest despatch in this Book, no doubt, is November 28; but the latest despatch from the Cape bears date November 4. No doubt the Papers which have been promised may throw some light upon the matter; but at present I can only say that there appears to have been an inexplicable change of policy between the date to which the Papers before the House bring the matter down and the declaration of war. The Colonial Government were extremely anxious about the state of Zululand; and the requisitions for troops appear to be framed upon the idea that they were asking for the very smallest number which were required for the safety and defence of the Colony. At the same time, the Home Government appeared to have been giving very judicious advice to the Colonial Government, pointing out that there could be no pressing cause for alarm, and very strongly deprecating offensive movements. But two months beyond the period to which the despatches bring the events down everything appeared to have been changed. The reinforcements were received, offensive instead of defensive movements were undertaken, and the objections formerly entertained by the Government to a Zulu campaign seem to have vanished. I will not enter further into the matter at this moment; but I hope that some explanations will be given, and that the further Papers will enable the House to understand the cause of this extraordinary change. The right hon. Gentleman stated that the requisitions of the Commander-in-Chief had been complied with to the fullest extent. But there, again, is another inexplicable matter. In one month the Colonial Government asked, as a matter of very great importance, that a cavalry regiment should be sent. The next month that demand appears to be altogether dropped, in a manner which seems altogether unaccountable. I have not the slightest intention of entering further into a discussion of the matter at this time. It is one so serious both in its military and political aspect that it requires, and I hope it will receive, as soon as we have the material, the most careful and thorough consideration on the part of the House. I do not think any premature discussion of it now would be calculated to improve the spirit or the temper of that discussion which at some later period must take place.

MR. W. H. SMITH: As the hon. and learned Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt) has asked me some questions I am bound to reply to them, and I shall do so briefly. But before doing so I wish to express my regret at the fact that any observations which fell from me when I addressed my constituents the other night should have caused the hon. and learned Member annoyance.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT: Not at all.

MR. W. H. SMITH: The hon. and learned Gentleman, when he addresses his constituents, is in the habit of using strong language. When I spoke to mine it did not occur to me that the plain and good-humoured language I employed should have caused annoyance to the hon. and learned Gentleman.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT: I beg pardon—surprise, but not annoyance.

MR. W. H. SMITH: Well, all I can say is that if there was any annoyance I did not intend to occasion it. But to pass from that. The hon. and learned Gentleman asks me to explain an opinion expressed by the Hydrographer of the Admiralty with reference to Cyprus and Famagosta. Having received no intimation from the hon. and learned Gentleman of his intention to refer to the statement of the Hydrographer, I cannot, of course, just now quote his precise words. He is, however, an officer of such extremely high merit that I have the utmost reliance in the opinion he has expressed in the report referred to. I feel confident that the information he has given to the Admiralty and to the Geographical Society is correct, and can be justified. But we are told that there can be no harbour at Famagosta. All I can say is that, when I was there, the *Himalaya* troop ship went into the place, and was perfectly protected from any water coming over the reef. Then as to the cost of constructing a harbour there, I assert that the information I have received justifies me in saying that an expenditure of £150,000 would secure perfectly smooth water for as many line-of-battle ships as we are likely to have in the Mediterranean in ordinary times. Perfectly smooth water could, in fact, be secured in all weathers for such an expenditure. A larger expenditure would give us a secure harbour within the breakwater for a greater number of ships than can be sheltered at Malta. That is a statement I am prepared to justify on a future occasion, if it should become necessary to do so. But the hon. and learned Gentleman asks me whether we are going to make a harbour. Well, it is one thing to know there is a roadstead there which affords the material, so to speak, of making a good harbour—that there is at present shelter for ships drawing 20 feet of water; but it is another thing to say we are about to enter into an enterprize of considerable importance and magnitude. We have, if we want it, the opportunity of doing so. There we have such natural facilities that, at any time we desire to avail ourselves of them, they can be advantageously used. Then the hon. and learned Gentleman asks me if I sent a copy of *The Daily Telegragh* to Sir Garnet Wolseley.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT: No, no. My speech.

MR. W. H. SMITH: All I can say with reference to the hon. and learned Gentleman's speech is that it did not occur to me to send the hon. and learned Member's speech to Sir Garnet Wolseley. I had occasion to communicate with his Excellency, and naturally having a great interest in the progress of his government I asked him to tell me how affairs were progressing in Cyprus. Well, it happened that, at the time I asked this question, the gallant Governor of Cyprus received his newspapers from England. In writing back to me he referred to the hon. and learned Gentleman's speech in the terms of the letter I read on Wednesday last. That surely was a very natural thing for the Governor of Cyprus to do under the circumstances. I therefore give the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite all the credit he deserves when he admits that the statements contained in his Oxford speech about Cyprus were based entirely on the authority of *The Daily Telegraph*, and that they had no other foundation. I am anxious that the public should know that such is the case.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT: They seem to be true.

MR. W. H. SMITH: I prefer my own version of the truth—or, I should rather say, the fact—under the circumstances of the case, and I feel no doubt whatever that the result will fully bear out the statements I have made. I am asked whether it can possibly be true that advances have been made to Cyprus without the authority of Parliament.

The House of Commons has sanctioned advances to Cyprus. £8,000 were voted last year. That being so, it may be satisfactory to know that the resources of Cyprus will in time enable the Exchequer to receive back that £8,000, and that is the statement which I made. I think, Sir, I have answered all the questions that have been put to me.

Sir WILLIAM HARCOURT: I have asked whether you intend, or do not intend, to construct a harbour at Famagosta?

Mr. W. H. SMITH: I think I have answered that. If we think it necessary for the interests of the country that a large or small expenditure should be incurred for a harbour at Famagosta, we shall come down to the House and make our statement, and I have no doubt we shall be supported. As the hon. and learned Gentleman wishes for Papers on Cyprus, we shall be prepared to lay them on the Table of the House.

Mr. H. SAMUELSON observed that the right hon. Gentleman had told them about the so-called harbour of Famagosta, that there was a possibility of making it; but he had not told them that the Government intended to make it. Now, if there was no harbour, he was at a loss to see of what possible use the Island could be to us. He had been at Cyprus, but without the advantages possessed by the right hon. Gentleman when he visited the Island. The town of Famagosta was an absolute ruin—a kind of mediæval Pompeii, and he did not believe it would be possible on the shores of the Mediterranean to find a more unhealthy spot than the so-called port of Famagosta. As a coaling station quays would be wanted, or at least a foreshore, on which to build them; but Famagosta possessed neither. It had been stated to him on credible authority that the contract for the harbour of Alexandria was something like £3,000,000 sterling, but that the real cost was about £2,000,000, and that the harbour was very little better afterwards than it was before. The law which was to be administered in Cyprus appeared to be a matter of the greatest uncertainty. One officer had told him that it was purely Turkish, or the law of the Koran; another that it was a mixture of Turkish and English law; and a third that it was the Code Napoleon. With respect to healthiness, Cyprus was a fever-stricken Island. He did not believe that last season was, as had been alleged, a peculiarly unhealthy one in the Levant, or that there had been more fever in Cyprus last July, August, and September than usual. The Colonial Secretary had attributed the sickness which had occurred among the troops to the careless way in which Englishmen lived when they went to other climates. The way in which Englishmen lived had nothing to do with the epidemic fever from which they suffered. The troops lived in bell-tents and had only what was given to them. The fever attacked the Natives, who did not live in bell-tents, as much as it did Englishmen; and it prevailed every year. The great majority of the houses in which he stayed had an inmate suffering from fever. It was absurd to send soldiers to receive the seeds of fever in Cyprus before they went to fight in some other country. With respect to the proposal to establish a camp on a certain plateau some 5,000 feet above the sea level, it seemed an extraordinary thing that it should have taken so many months to discover that plateau in an Island not larger that Yorkshire; and now that it had been discovered, it was difficult to see how the troops were to be got up to it, and the commissariat arrangements were to be carried out without great expense. The Chancellor of the Exchequer told them the Cyprus Budget was likely to be a very hopeful one. When was it to be laid before the House? Had the Government tried to buy the Sultan's rights out and out? The rent they were to pay for the privilege of making improvements, without any claim to compensation for unexhausted improvements when they left the Island, was, as he was informed, 50 per cent above what they might have bought those rights for. He also wished to know what was to be the official language of the Island. It was said that it was to be Turkish and English. Greek was not recognized in the tribunals, and the Greek population thereby suffered detriment. In conclusion, he wished to know if the Returns with respect to Cyprus for which he had given Notice to move would be granted by the Government?

Sir GEORGE ELLIOT said, he had been informed that during his absence from the House the hon. and learned Member for Oxford had made some references to him in connection with the contract for the harbour of Alexandria.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT explained that all the reference he had made to the hon. Member for North Durham was that he was happy to think the hon. Baronet could not take a certain contract because it would forfeit his seat in that House.

MR. W. H. SMITH said, he had never referred to the hon. Baronet.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE observed that he had been the first to refer to the subject in this debate, and that his authority was the report of the right hon. Gentleman's speech in *The Times*, where the name was given at full length—Sir George Elliot.

MR. H. SAMUELSON said, he had also derived his information from *The Times*.

SIR GEORGE ELLIOT wished to say he had never made any estimate in connection with the works of the port of Alexandria. Therefore, it followed that his estimate could not have been exceeded, and that there could not have been a great many extras. So much, then, for that part of the subject. He should not be surprised, however, if, in conversation, he had given an opinion about Famagosta. He took the area of the harbour and the depth of the water and the mud in it and made a mental calculation, multiplying by two the cost of similar works in the Rivers Tyne and Wear. In this manner, he arrived at the conclusion that the expense of constructing a harbour at Famagosta would be considerably under £150,000. He did not believe that the collective wisdom and experience of the Institution of Civil Engineers could select a place better suited than Famagosta for the formation of a harbour. An inner harbour might be constructed there which would be as secure as the harbour at Liverpool or at any other port in the world. He had had the inner harbour within the Mole sounded at Famagosta and found a depth of 27 feet which was sufficient to receive any of our iron-clads. In his judgment, a harbour was indispensable to the success of the enterprize in which we had embarked by acquiring the Island of Cyprus. At present, Cyprus was unhealthy because it had been so long neglected. The Island was so small that a sufficient rainfall could not be got to create a river of so large a volume that it would find its way to the sea. Consequently, the plain behind the coast became a swamp and required to be drained. This might be done by means of small engines at Famagosta, Larnaca, Limasole, and other places. The drainage could be thus collected from the swamps and run back again in a channel or pipes and it would re-irrigate the land. Thus the towns would be made healthy, while what was now a great mischief would become a real benefit. Of course, if anyone visited Cyprus with a desire to make things appear as black as possible, it would be easy enough for him to do so. At all events, it was a most fertile country. The vines were most prolific, and he had seen grapes offered for sale at a halfpenny a pound in the streets of Nicosia. Only patience and capital were required to develop the resources of the Island. If he was on the Treasury Bench, and was asked, as the First Lord of the Admiralty had been, if he intended to make a harbour, he should reply in the affirmative, and he was sure they would get full value for their money. A railway might also be constructed at a cost of about £3,000 a-mile, and persons would, he believed, be found ready to make the railway if land were ceded with it.

MR. MACDONALD complained that the Employers' and Workmen's Bill had not been promised this Session, and he reminded the House that it had been promised more than once before; but the Attorney General and the Home Secretary had failed in their pledges. With reference to the Attorney General, he said he had a fair reputation for saying that which he meant to do, and his promise was as good as an order at 90 days' date. He, however, attributed his failure to fulfil his pledges in this particular as the effect of his being bound to those whom he served. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had in his statement to the House almost trifled with the subject; but he hoped the right hon. Gentleman would re-consider the question, and, having re-considered it, deal with it as the Government had already dealt with several other important questions affecting the people. If the Ministry would take the subject up and place it in a first position, they would gain gratitude in quarters where gratitude was least to be expected. He begged to assure the House it was not his intention to argue the principle of compensation now. One thing he felt bound to say—that during the two lengthened discussions that had taken place on the subject they had been told again and again, that the employers of labour, if they continued to harass them with laws of this kind, would take their capital and proceed to other countries with it, where they could develop it without any trouble or difficulty. He, however, had been making more extended inquiries into the matter, and felt bound to tell them that the law of France was exactly what his Bill desired to make the law, and that the law of Germany was very much akin to that. In almost every State of the American Union modifications were taking place on the subject, and he felt convinced that before long in other countries the law which was based on such illogical assumptions as that which was the law of this country would soon be swept away.

The ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir John Holker) said, that the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down had taken him to task somewhat severely for having made a promise last Session and not performing it. He had said, in a complimentary tone, that the promises made by him (the Attorney General) had generally been trusted in, and that he had obtained a reputation, that he was not aware of, of performing his undertakings. He was happy to hear this, and he hoped he should not lose his good character. What the hon. Gentleman had said, however, was perfectly true, that he (the Attorney General) promised last Session, on behalf of the Government, to introduce a Bill relating to the liability of employers for accidents to such of their workmen as might sustain injuries in consequence of the negligence of their fellow-workmen. He should have been quite as much pleased as the hon. Gentleman if he had been able to perform that promise; and if he had thought for a moment at the time he made the promise that he should not have been able to perform it, he certainly would never have made it. He was more disappointed, perhaps, than any other Member of the House of Commons to find that the pledge he had given it was not in his power to redeem; but he was not alone in this matter. Other people that entertained somewhat different views to himself had to be consulted, and towards the close of the Session the Government found they had embarked on a measure which involved a question of a most difficult nature. He did not say that the Bill was one of first-class importance; but certainly the question, as dealt with by the Bill, would have shown it was one of the very greatest difficulty. It was easy, of course, to frame a measure which would take away the inequalities, or supposed inequalities, of the law of which the workmen of this country and those by whom they were represented complained; but the difficulty was to make that alteration without unduly or improperly affecting interests of the greatest possible importance to the workmen themselves. He could, of course, very easily frame a Bill which would saddle the employers of labour with a much greater responsibility for accidents which might happen, not through their own fault, but through the fault of their servants, than the responsibility under which they were at present suffering; but they must consider, before they attached such an increased measure of responsibility, what would be the consequences to the trade and commerce of the country by so attaching it—whether they would not unfairly handicap the employers of labour; and if they unfairly handicapped the employers of labour the results might be disastrous to the workmen themselves. When the matter came to be discussed it was found that it was one of the greatest difficulty, and obstacles presented themselves to the Members of the Government which had not been present at the outset to his mind. Though he did all in his power to redeem the pledge which he had made, and though he had himself prepared some measures and submitted them for consideration, he owned that those measures were not satisfactory, and he was not surprised at all that the Government, after carefully considering the matter, could not accept any of them. It was, therefore, his misfortune and not his fault that he was not able to redeem his promise, and he had suffered great disappointment in consequence. He did not mean to say that he had an overwhelming interest in this subject, or that he was so fully convinced of the inequalities of the law; but what he did feel very acutely was that having engaged himself to introduce a certain measure he was not able to do so. Having made this short explanation of his own position, he pleaded guilty, and threw himself upon the mercy of the House. But the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer had that evening stated that the Government were prepared to deal with this question, and would do so. That being so, he (the Attorney General) made no pledge. The right hon. Gentleman had much more power than he; indeed, he was all-powerful, and when he made a pledge no doubt he intended to redeem it. The Bill might, therefore, be expected to be introduced. He did not think it would be a measure of vital importance, and he looked upon the agitation with respect to it as somewhat of a sentimental character. Other hon. Members might take a different view. In reference to the Bill for amending the law in regard to corrupt practices at elections, he would remind the House that it was introduced last Session, but that it had not the fortune to be proceeded with, and it accordingly met, in company with other measures, a disastrous fate. He had, however, done his best this Session to atone for the last, and he had already given Notice of the re-introduction of the Bill for Monday next.

MR. O'DONNELL said, that the Government proposed to deceive the expectations of the people of Ireland in regard to beneficial legislation, and contemplated a coercive code for Irish Members. That was about the summary of the Ministerial Message as regarded Ireland. He supposed it was the memory of counsels which were thrown away upon the Government when they entered on their disastrous campaign in South Africa a couple of years ago which now induced them to introduce measures of coercion, in order to prevent similar good advice being offered to them on some future occasion. No one felt more than he did for the gallant lives that had been lost in the performance of duty, though upon an errand of which he could not approve; but the disaster on the Tugela could not blind them to the nature of the policy in the prosecution of which it had occurred. The Government were fully aware that the objections which would be raised to their policy this Session would be precisely those which were raised two Sessions ago, and which they overcame by the sheer weight of an obedient majority. He was not going to refer to foreign politics or complications. He had already in that House spoken and voted upon these questions with independence, and was prepared to do so again. But when he heard this Message delivered to the House, barren of every promise of real benefit to Ireland, coupled with the challenge which had been thrown down at the very outset of Public Business, he begged to tell the Government that he took up the challenge, not as an Irishman only, not as one of those Members specially aimed at, but as a plain citizen of the Empire. He took it up because he knew that the sympathies of the English people would be against a Government which proposed to suppress freedom of opinion while offering every inducement to disaffection, and setting a premium on the expression of discontent. He said that the Government—or at least persons who might be taken to represent them—had spared no pains to induce the Irish people to believe that grievances moderately and temperately represented to that House and to the Government would be treated fairly, and, as far as possible, redressed. The Government did not, however, propose to remedy the grievances of the Irish tenants; but they proposed to saddle disabilities on the defenders of Irish tenant-right. The Government did not propose to grant even electoral equality with England to the Irish people; but they did propose to render the Representatives of Ireland in Parliament still more inefficient and ineffectual than hitherto. In a word, the Government were carrying out a policy of coercing Ireland, and he could assure the Government that he had sufficient confidence in the people of Great Britain to be satisfied that this policy would meet with a disastrous repulse at the hands of the electorate. Whatever measures might be introduced into Parliament this Session, the Government might be perfectly assured that they would be debated on their merits by Irish Members with as full freedom as was permitted to any English Member, and for every infraction of the liberties of Irish Members it was not they who would suffer most. He had never yet, either by words or action, conduced to the maintenance of any hostility between the English and the Irish peoples. He was ready to compete for the applause of an English meeting with most of the hon. Gentlemen on the opposite side of the House. He had addressed thousands of Englishmen in all parts of the country, and he did not find the policy of the Government reflected in the wishes of the English people. After so many Sessions barren of beneficial legislation for Ireland, with one exception, they were to have another Session barren of beneficial legislation for that country. Well, the end of the Session would enable the Government to judge more accurately than they could at present of the utility of that policy. He did not know whether it was the example of an eminent statesman in a Continental State not remarkable for the freedom of its institutions which had spurred on Her Majesty's Government to the proposed step; but he thought that he knew quite enough of the English people as well as of the Irish people to assure the Government that Liliputian Bismarckism was not going to succeed in this country.

Mr. SHAW LEFEVRE congratulated the Government upon having fully realized the promise recently made by the right hon. Baronet the Secretary of State for the Colonies—namely, that legislation during the present Session would be of an unostentatious character. [Sir Michael Hicks-Beach dissented.] Well, at all events, the Bills mentioned by the Chancellor of the Exchequer deserved that title. They were asked to deal with a Criminal Code, with a Bankruptcy Law, and with pauperism in Scotland. The list was an appropriate one now that pauperism and crime were increasing and bankruptcies very numerous. He wished, however, to ask the Government their intention with reference to two subjects. A Committee appointed last year to inquire whether increased facilities should be given for purchase of land by the occupying tenant in Ireland came to the unanimous conclusion that it was very desirable increased facilities should be given. There was difference as to how this should be effected, but there was unanimity that a change was necessary. Therefore, it appeared incumbent on the part of the Government that something should be done. He was surprised to find no allusion to it made by the Government. The Chief Secretary for Ireland told him before Christmas that the Government was considering the question, and he would like to know what they intended doing in the matter. Then, again, a Bill was introduced two years ago by the then President of the Board of Trade to afford to seamen facilities such as were given to workmen by the Act of 1875. That Bill met the approval of a Select Committee, and, not having passed, a pledge was given that it would be re-introduced. No mention, however, had been made of it by the right hon. Gentleman; and he therefore begged to inquire whether it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government to re-introduce the measure. He would not go into the general question which had been debated. It was clear from the speech of the First Lord of the Admiralty that they would not that year be asked for any Vote for the formation of a harbour at Famagosta; but he would remind the Government of the case of the harbour at Alderney. That harbour was to have cost £200,000, and it cost £1,250,000, and was now abandoned as totally useless. He believed that a harbour at Famagosta would cost as much and be as useless.

Mr. COGAN said, he could not allow the debate to close without expressing the deep disappointment which he felt, and which he believed would be shared by a large portion of the people of Ireland, when they learned that it was not proposed by the Government to deal with the question of University Education in Ireland. Hopes had been excited on this question in the minds of the people of that country. From various things which had transpired, and from the tone of the public Press of late, they had, he thought, every reason to believe that Her Majesty's Government were prepared to deal with this question. He regretted that this expectation had been disappointed, not only for the sake of education in Ireland. He regretted it for political reasons. He believed that it would have a very bad political effect in the present state of public opinion in Ireland, if the people should come to the conclusion that a question which to them was of so great importance, and which both parties in the House had admitted was a question that deserved and required to be dealt with, was postponed indefinitely. He believed that there never was a Government in power who could have dealt with the question so effectually as the present Administration; and it was much to be lamented that they had omitted to take advantage of the opportunity which presented itself to them. He did not abandon all hope, however; because, although the question of University Education in Ireland did not figure amongst the measures which the Chancellor of the Exchequer spoke of as those to be first dealt with by the Government, yet the right hon. Gentleman stated that other questions might arise which circumstances might enable them to deal with, and he (Mr. Cogan) should not abandon the hope that they would refuse to deal with a question which would be fertile of good to their common country. He had only further to express his entire concurrence with what had been stated by his hon. Friend the Member for Reading (Mr. Shaw Lefevre), and his hope that the Government would introduce a well-considered measure for giving increased facilities to tenants for the purchase of the fee-simple of their farms.

MR. GREGORY said, he thought that the Government would have done well to have legislated on the subject of the extradition of criminals. At present, the Convention—if any now existed at all—with the United States was left in a most unsatisfactory condition. Before any practical solution of the difficulty with the United States could be reached legislation would be necessary.

GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOUR asked the attention of the House to a country called Scotland. This was necessary, because, except the few words uttered by the Chancellor of the Exchequer about an Amendment to one Bill affecting Scotland, no allusion was otherwise made to that part of the Kingdom. He complained that this Scotch Poor Law Bill had been so prominently mentioned, because, as usual, it had hitherto received no attention from the House except the mention made of it by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and it would probably drop. It was a plain and simple question, which could be settled in a short time if a small amount of attention were given to it. Indeed, a Committee of the humble but useful Inspectors of the poor would dispose of all the questions requiring settlement. He agreed with the complaint that the Government had not acted towards Ireland quite so well as they might have done; but the peace-loving people of Scotland were even more neglected than the unfortunate and misgoverned people of Ireland. Had they Home Rule in Scotland, with the Scotch Members sitting in Edinburgh, the Poor Law Question would have been considered and settled satisfactorily long ago. This one measure was not by any means the most important of the other claims which Scotland had so frequently and persistently urged on the attention of the Government. He instanced the Law of Hypothec, the "vile gun tax," the Game Laws, and the functions of the Commissioners of Supply, as subjects well worthy the attention of the right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary, whom he thought he might with propriety style the Secretary of State for Scotland. He fully expected, after the two recent visits to Scotland by the Home Secretary, that the conclusions formed after those visits would have been mentioned. For instance, the decision of the Government about the Lord Clerk Register, the arrangements for facilitating the Scotch Business, and the changes in the offices at Edinburgh should have been spoken of; above all, the state of the land tenures might have been noticed. There could be no doubt that, what with the restrictions by the Law of Hypothec, and the stringent leases of owners, the Scotch landlords and farmers, owing to the two bad seasons, were not in a satisfactory condition as to payment of rents. He could also have wished that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had given some indication of the intentions of the Government in regard to the Church Question, and the extent to which they proposed to interfere with the Banking System of Scotland. Not a word had been said about the Revenues of India. Last year it was stated they would have, in 1878-9, a surplus of £2,000,000. Since then telegraphic intelligence had largely cut down the amount. Now there were ominous warnings that that surplus had disappeared, and that the It had also been suggested that the expenditure was exceeding the revenue. might carry on the war in Afghanistan with the normal forces of India; but now it was said that the expense was being augmented by an increase of

European troops. Already a considerable addition had been made to the Native Regular Army, and the troops of Native Chiefs were called out in considerable numbers. This addition, with the cost of the large army in the field, must require several millions, and consequently largely drain the cash balances.

Mr. ASSHETON CROSS: It was not my intention to have troubled the House with any remarks to-night, but for the observations which have just fallen from the hon. and gallant Member opposite (Sir George Balfour). I can assure him that before the Session is over he will find that Scotland has not been so entirely neglected as he now appears to think likely to be the case. I do not suppose it was ever the intention of my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer to detail to the House every measure which may be brought forward in the course of our proceedings, or to enter into particulars as to the way in which we may meet the various questions which may be introduced by hon. Members, and which at the present moment stand on the Notice Paper of the House. That would be quite foreign to such a debate as generally occurs at the opening of a Session like the present. I know that Scotland is interested—and naturally interested—in many of the measures which the Chancellor of the Exchequer has named —measures, however, which are not confined to Scotland, but which apply to the whole of the United Kingdom. We have, however, named one in which Scotland is especially interested—namely, the question of the Poor Law. That is a subject which certainly needs the immediate attention of Parliament. It is not mentioned as a new topic; but as one with which we have not had time in other Sessions to deal—one, however, with which we mean, so far as lies in our power, to take in hand during the present Session. The hon. and gallant Member has referred to other matters. He has spoken on the question of game. I thought that that subject had already been discussed at considerable length, and that a Bill had been passed with reference to it, which, I believe, is working thoroughly well North of the Tweed. That being so, I think that, so far as game is concerned, we may be quite content to leave matters alone for the present. As to the way in which Scotch Business is managed, I made the proposition last year that I should have the assistance of an Under Secretary for Scotland. That proposition at first received a great deal of support from many hon. Members who represented different Northern constituencies; but they objected, not unnaturally, to the source from which I thought the emoluments of that officer might be derived. I was very much surprised to find afterwards that there was a very serious difference of opinion among the Scotch Members as to whether any such officer ought to exist at all. [General Sir George Balfour: Hear, hear!] That was a *bonâ fide* attempt, however, to remedy what I considered to be a grievance; and it was alone owing to the opposition which came from Scotland that the Bill on the subject was not passed during the last Session of Parliament. I hope in the course of the present Session to be able to present to Parliament some scheme by which, at all events, considerable facilities may be given to Scotch Members for having all their grievances fully discussed, and by which scheme we may hope to arrive at some satisfactory conclusion. The hon. and gallant Gentleman has also alluded to the question of hypothec. I would remind him that a Bill on that subject is to be introduced by the hon. Member for Wigtownshire (Mr. Vans Agnew), and when that measure is brought forward I shall be prepared to state the intentions of the Government with regard to it. The hon. and gallant Gentleman has likewise touched upon the question of the Church. That is undoubtedly a very serious and important question. It is one which no Government could—unless they saw ample time for its discussion, and unless they also saw a reasonable prospect of carrying a measure—have brought forward; and I doubt very much whether, considering all the Business before the House, it would be possible, even if the Government wanted it, to introduce such a measure upon such a subject with a reasonable prospect of success at present. That being the case, it is much better that the Government should not approach it, but should leave it to be taken up by any private Member who may think it necessary to raise it. I shall have other opportunities of speaking more fully on the subjects referred to by the hon. and gallant Member; and I will content myself at present by repeating my assurance that Scotch Business will receive due attention from the Government.

SIR HENRY JAMES said, that although the statement that there were measures which would command the attention of legal Members of the House was not favourably received he trusted there would not be much difference of opinion between the two sides of the House upon those measures. The chief object of the Mutiny Bill would be to introduce the Articles of War into the Mutiny Bill and to make them a Parliamentary measure; and in this matter the Government would receive assistance as loyal from the legal Members of the Opposition as from those on their own side of the House. As to the Criminal Code Bill, it would be almost impossible to present it as a whole for the consideration of the House in Committee. No doubt it had been referred to a Commission, including the most distinguished Judges on the Bench, well able to determine matters of definition and procedure; but the Code contained other matters which it was the duty of Members to determine for themselves. No Member ought to delegate it to a Judge to determine the law relating, for instance, to Sunday observance and to public meetings; and there were other social and political questions which could not be disposed of as matters of technicality and drafting. The difficulty of codification could not be known until it was encountered, and they realized the difference between the elasticity of the Common Law and the rigidity of definitions intended to cover every crime without committing injustice to any person accused. It was one thing to allow existing laws to continue and another to re-enact them. They had borne with the Sunday Observance Act of Charles II. because it was old, and, though partially obsolete, was not quite so; being in existence, it had been endorsed; but would they take the responsibility of re-enacting it merely as a piece of codification by a draftsman? A Bill of 480 clauses could not be carried as one measure; it was not one, but 50; but some progress might be made if it were divided into sections. However valuable might be the technical provisions formulated by Lord Blackburn, Mr. Justice Lush, and Mr. Justice Stephen, the Government would not find the House disposed to accept *en bloc* the provisions of the Bill embodying the law as it affected every citizen. He asked the Goverment whether it would not be well to draw a line between what was merely technical and what was political and social. The House would no doubt accept the former on the recommendation of the much respected Members of the Commission; but to the other sections the fullest consideration must be given. He felt sure that if the Bill should be submitted to the House as a whole there would not be time to pass it into law in one Session. With respect to the two other legal measures which had been announced—the Bankruptcy Bill and the Summary Jurisdiction Bill—not knowing on what lines they were drawn he should not offer any opinion which could only be hypothetical. He would only say if the latter Bill was similar to that which the Secretary of State had formerly introduced he should agree with the principle, but the details would be matter for examination. There was one other matter to which he wished to refer, and was it to ask what had been the administration of justice in Cyprus up to this time. The Attorney General had told them when the House last met that the law of Cyprus was clear and distinct—the Colony had been ceded to us, and therefore the law which existed there was valid till some other law was introduced, but time had passed, and the prophecies of the hon. and learned Gentleman had not been fulfilled; therefore he wished to know what was the state of the law in that Island, and how it was administered. He was told an Ordinance had been sent out to Cyprus, but was not yet published. The people of this country had a right to know what the law of Cyprus was as well as the people of that Island. He understood that at the present moment there was perfect chaos in the Island, and that British subjects had been denied justice. He had been informed that an English barrister of the Middle Temple had not been permitted to practise in the Courts of Larnaca because he had not obtained the permission of the Turkish Minister, and that that had been supported by Sir Garnet Wolseley. Was that so? Surely he was not pressing the Government too strongly to say whether they were aware of that fact. Did the Foreign Office know of these things; and, if so, had any objection been taken to the course which had been pursued towards British subjects? He hoped the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in his reply, would give some answer to this complaint.

Mr. BOURKE said, that as the hon. and learned Gentleman (Sir Henry James) had pointedly alluded to him he must say that the matter referred to had not been brought officially before him at the Foreign Office, and therefore it was impossible for him to give an answer at that moment; but if the hon. and learned Gentleman would put a Question on the Notice Paper there would be the necessary inquiry into the matter.

Mr. O'SHAUGHNESSY said, that before he alluded to the Irish questions which had been brought forward he would first of all refer to the administration of Cyprus. As he understood the matter this country was not mistress of the Island, and they merely held a tenancy, and whether they were to be masters there or not remained to be determined. He objected to the building of harbours, or the outlaying of any expenditure in regard to Cyprus, unless the money could be provided from the Revenue. In regard to the Merchant Shipping Acts, the Committee, after due consideration, arrived at certain conclusions in which were shown the necessity for legislation, so that it would be a great breach of duty on the part of Her Majesty's Government if they were not acted up to, and he trusted that an Act of Parliament would be passed embodying the Resolutions of the Committee. He now turned to what he looked upon as a very meagre programme, which they had set forth for Ireland, and which would cause very great disappointment amongst all classes in that country. He listened with profound respect to the warnings given by the right hon. Member for Kildare (Mr. Cogan), a Gentleman of moderate opinions, who did not hesitate to express the bad effects which would be produced on the minds of all classes in Ireland by the neglect of the greatest interests on the part of the Government with reference to that country. An hon. and gallant Member from Scotland (General Sir George Balfour) had received the assurance of the Home Secretary that Bills would be introduced in reference to Scotland; but he would recommend that hon. and gallant Member not to place too much reliance upon that assurance, for he (Mr. O'Shaughnessy) in December last complained that no Irish measures had been mentioned in the Queen's Speech, and he and the Irish Members were told to be full of hope as they did not know what good things were in store for them. He would not be surprised if Scotland did not agitate for Home Rule as well as Ireland, considering that they had similar complaints to make of the neglect of their interests. The only Irish question alluded to in the programme was the Grand Jury Question, and at the end there was a general allusion to some other topics which might fairly form subjects of legislation. He looked forward with great interest to the Grand Jury Law Amendment Act that it should be properly framed; but the conduct of the Government during the last Session did not encourage them to hope for much. He thought that they might not have expected to be put to the trouble of discussing the extension of the franchise of Irish towns, for upon every occasion the Press of this country had almost unanimously said that they deserved to be victorious in this respect. He would now pass from that question to one which was of the most importance to Ireland at this moment, and that was the question of University Education, and on that subject he thought they were entitled to expect that the Government would tell them what were their real intentions. Even at that stage of the debate, and at that hour of the evening, they ought to be informed whether the Government did or did not intend during the present Session to fulfil the promises which had been made. The Lord Chancellor, when dealing with the Intermediate Education Bill, said he looked forward to crowning the edifice in Ireland by passing such legislation with regard to University Education as would meet the requirements of the country. Now, he would not rely too much upon a promise which might be out of date, or upon the negotiations which were alleged—perhaps truly and perhaps falsely—to have taken place between the Government and those who had the confidence of the people of

Ireland on this subject; but he would come to a speech which was made a few days ago at the Mansion House in Dublin by the Duke of Marlborough, the Lord Lieutenant, in which he distinctly admitted this question of University Education was one in the first rank of importance, and he said that this year or some other it must be dealt with. He further expressed the anxiety of his Party to deal with it. The speech of the Lord Lieutenant was followed by one from the right hon. Gentleman the Chief Secretary for Ireland, whom he rejoiced to see at his post. That was a mysterious speech, because, as the right hon. Gentleman said, it was addressed to the common sense and moderation of the Irish people. He wanted Irishmen to reduce their demands to moderate dimensions so that some settlement might be arrived at, and this question be no longer made a business of battledore and shuttlecock. Of course, the Chief Secretary did not bind himself to anything by that expression, but he did admit the necessity of dealing with the question; and he would now ask him—and he thought he was quite within his right in so doing—whether it was the intention of the Government to do anything during the present Session on the subject? Her Majesty's Government had considerable encouragement to give a favourable answer to the question. The noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition, speaking on this delicate and interesting subject, announced, as he was informed—for he was not present in the House at the moment—that difficulties lay in the way of dealing with it by one Party which did not stand in the way of its settlement by the other. In fact, he believed the noble Marquess had said that he expected the question would be dealt with by Her Majesty's Government. Under these circumstances, let the Government state what they really intended to do, and let them not be afraid to put forward their programme in this matter. They could not complain that any topic upon which they had hitherto legislated for the Irish people, even including the Coercion Bill, had not been fairly and frankly discussed, and whenever Irish matters had been introduced they had been properly discussed. Therefore, if the Government would introduce a measure on Irish University Education it would be fairly discussed; and if the Bill was rejected it would not inflict upon them any very wonderful defeat, because Bills of their own had been thrown out on previous occasions and the Government still existed. At all events, he thought the Irish people had a right to know what the intentions of the Government were. He now desired to refer to the question of the Land Laws, which was one which could not be allowed to remain in its present condition. It was not merely a matter which concerned the comfort and existence of the farming classes in Ireland, but it concerned the consumer in England. In the present state of the relations between the landlords and tenants in Ireland, the people of England who purchased from the people of Ireland did not get one-half out of the produce of the land which the land could give them; and this was directly traceable to the existing law. Ireland could not, perhaps, expect that any broad and liberal view would be taken of this subject by Her Majesty's Government; but with regard to the purchases by tenants through the medium of the Landed Estates Court, there was a perfect and necessary case made out for legislation. Certain clauses of the Act of Parliament were a complete failure as far as the object for which they were framed was concerned, and a Committee of this House had reported in favour of the alteration. Could any case be stronger? There were other branches of the Land Act besides the Bright clauses which had been a failure; and even Irish Northern landlords in this House had been forced to admit an alteration. They had heard something to-night about a Valuation Bill for England. He hoped they were not threatened with a valuation for Ireland. Practically the present valuation of the country meant that the landlord was entitled to demand a rent something like a third over the present valuation. An alteration of the law would give landlords another argument for increasing rents, and that, with the fall in the value of land in Ireland, would be a great injustice. These were matters which it was a duty on the part of Irish Members to bring prominently, and even pressingly, under the notice of the House, and it was their intention to do so. If they did not, he thought they had no business there.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, I am perfectly aware I have no right to address the House a second time; but under the present peculiar circumstances, I think I may claim the indulgence of the House to offer a few observations upon some remarks that have been made in the course of the evening. I will say, in the first place, that I have not been surprised at the observations which have been made upon the omission from the list of measures which I mentioned to the House of a good many Bills on subjects which are interesting both to hon. Members and the House at large. But I must point out to the House that, as to the list which I mentioned, the Government, in deciding upon the course that should be taken, felt that there was a danger to be guarded against—namely, the danger of smothering legislation by proposing too large a number of subjects at once. And, undoubtedly, the error which we sometimes fall into of announcing a very large number of measures, all more or less important and interesting, has the effect of rendering it very difficult to proceed with and pass any measure at all. The other day, when we were considering what should be the statement to be made to Parliament, I wrote a line to the Government draftsman, and requested him to send me a note stating the preparation of the different Government Bills that had been intrusted to him for preparation, and in reply he sent me back a list of 18 Bills, all of considerable interest. Four of the principal Bills which I have mentioned were not included in that list, because they had been prepared in other Departments. It was, therefore, perfectly obvious that if we had proposed to introduce a very large number of Bills, and had stated that that was the programme of the Session, we should have been not only exposed to considerable ridicule, but justly reprobated for making an impracticable proposal. We should have been told that we were making a great show, and would accomplish nothing. We thought it wiser and better, and more convenient for the House, that we should make a selection of a smaller number of measures; but I admit that that selection was a matter of difficulty, and that there are measures of importance that have been referred to which we must consider as included in the programme of the Session. We shall do the best we can to fulfil that programme, and in addition to the Bills I have mentioned, I hope that a few others not unimportant or uninteresting will be brought forward and considered before the end of the Session. I can well understand the remarks that have been made by hon. Members, and especially by hon. Gentlemen who represent Irish constituencies, as to what they seem to look upon as the inadequacy of our proposals with respect to Ireland. I trust, however, they will find that we are not inattentive to Irish wants; while we, at the same time, do the best we can in the way of legislating for the whole of the country, and undoubtedly for Ireland as a part of the country. Our sins, I think, have been made to appear a little worse than they are by the remarks of some hon. Gentlemen. The hon. Member for Galway (Mr. Mitchell Henry), for instance, went to the extent of saying that we were abstaining from introducing any measure of importance with respect to Irish matters, and not only were we going to introduce coercive regulations for restricting the rights of minorities—which I hope he will see by the Resolutions is not the case—but that we even declined to take notice of so important, but comparatively minute, a matter as the recommendations of the Committee which inquired into the condition and management of the Public Works Department in Ireland. He made an observation in reference to what was said at an earlier stage of the evening as to its not being our intention to call upon the Chairman of that Board to tender his resignation. I do not wish it to be understood that we undervalue the Report of that Committee upon which the hon. Members for Galway and Wexford gave their assistance. To a certain extent it may throw light on some of the questions which are brought before us with regard to Ireland. At the present time, there is no doubt that the Board of Works in Ireland is very much over-weighted with business. We are seriously considering whether, even for the performance of its present functions, it may not be necessary to strengthen it, and it is possible that proposals may be made which would add to its functions. Hon. Members for Ireland will remember that we are now approaching the time when the

Commission on the Irish Church Temporalities has nearly completed the 10 years for which it was originally appointed, and it will very soon become a matter of importance that we should consider what is to be done, both as to the future administration of that large fund, and as to the mode in which it is to be applied. A portion was taken out of that fund last year and was applied to purposes connected with Intermediate Education in Ireland; and, so far as we have yet had an opportunity of watching that experiment, it appears to be working successfully. But it is one of very recent growth, and it requires some little time to watch carefully, and to see how the experiment is likely to succeed. Even after that sum has been taken from the Church surplus a very considerable amount remains to be disposed of, and the mode in which that amount is to be disposed of is a question requiring very deep consideration. I think there is no doubt that there is one object to which a portion of it may be very properly applied; and although I am not at this moment in a position to state exactly how it can be done, I have no doubt that a portion of that fund could be made use of in settling a question of great interest and some difficulty—with regard to the pensions which are to be granted to the teachers in Irish elementary schools. I hope we may be able to make a proposal on that subject which may be of advantage in helping towards a settlement of the question. It is one of great importance to Irish Members, and one to which we have had our attention directed for several years. Whether beyond that any arrangement can be made for the application of the surplus to public objects in Ireland is a matter requiring great consideration; and it is also a matter for consideration how far the strengthening of the Irish Board of Works may be made to bear on any arrangements that may be introduced for dealing with the funds arising from the surplus of the Church temporalities. These are matters which I hope the hon. Member for Galway and others will understand that we are not forgetting, or passing over without consideration. I am not, at the present moment, in a position to make any proposals on the subject; but the matter is receiving our attentive consideration. There are other measures besides those relating to Ireland, which have been adverted to, and with some of which we hope to be able to deal; but I will not at present say more with reference to measures relating to that country. The hon. Member for Reading (Mr. Shaw Lefevre) has put to me a question with regard to legislation affecting merchant seamen, a subject to which he has always paid great attention. There is a measure bearing upon that subject among those to which I have referred, and I hope it may be possible to make a proposal dealing with it. It is a subject of great difficulty, and it has not been placed in front because I am not able to say how far we may be able to get on with other measures. I confess I have heard something to-night from another hon. Member which has a little alarmed me, even as to getting through with the measures we have mentioned—I allude to the hon. and learned Member for Taunton (Sir Henry James)—who has told us that a number of questions may be raised on the Criminal Code Bill. His warnings, however, have been given in a most courteous manner, and, I am sure, in a very friendly spirit. I will not take note now of what has been said about Scotch measures, although the hon. and gallant Member for Kincardineshire (Sir George Balfour) seems to think it rather hard on Scotland that, because she is a well-governed and peaceful country, she should not have her share of legislation. No doubt we are anxious that that should not be the case; but I may suggest to him that it is, perhaps, because the Scotch are a peaceful and well-governed population that they need legislation rather less than any other part of the country. Be that, however, as it may, I hope it will be found that Scotch interests have not been omitted from our consideration. I now pass from domestic questions, merely observing that I disclaim the extraordinary construction which has been put by the hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke) on some words which fell from me when he said I attributed the distress to the frost. The observation which I really made was to the effect that the cessation of the frost might have led to a certain diminution of the suffering which unhappily prevailed. I pass from these domestic matters, and wish to notice one or two questions which bear on matters of foreign policy. The hon. Member for East Sussex (Mr. Gregory) asked a question about extradition. There is no difficulty about the United States; but the question is one which is under the serious consideration of the Government. A good many questions have been asked about Cyprus. Amongst others, it has been asked when the Cyprus Budget was to be brought forward. I used the phrase "Cyprus Budget," not in the sense of a Budget that we were to bring forward and submit to special discussion in this House. What I said was that when the statement of the revenue and expenditure of Cyprus was laid before the House hon. Members would see, I hope, a satisfactory result. I hope we shall soon be in a position to lay a good deal of information before the House with respect to Cyprus; and most assuredly there will be no indisposition to lay all the information that can properly be laid before it. The hon. Member for Frome (Mr. H. Samuelson) has given Notice of a number of Motions for Returns respecting Cyprus, and I think there will be no difficulty in giving a part of what he asks for. But with regard to the Motion as to the Commissioner, and the state of government in the Island, I think it better that we should be allowed to present that information in as convenient a way as we can. We have heard a great deal about legal questions, and, as a layman, I must confess I have been a good deal puzzled by the observations that have been made. So far as I can recollect, there was a complaint made by an hon. and learned Gentleman that barristers and lawyers were not allowed to practise in the Courts in Cyprus. Now, I may observe, as a matter of fact, that the administration of justice in Cyprus, though a little irregular, is remarkably satisfactory in its results. There is very little crime, while there is no great difficulty in procuring justice in civil cases. I do not know that the difficulties of the lawyers are so very serious; but, at any rate, we are anxious to remove whatever irregularities may exist. Certainly, it is satisfactory to think that in an Island where there has been a great deal of corruption so great a reform has been instituted in so short a time, that crime has much decreased, and that, so far as corruption among high authorities goes, it is almost unknown. We may be tolerably satisfied with the general progress of the Island. With regard to the Capitulations, I think a great deal more is made of that point than is needed, and difficulties have been somewhat conjured up on the subject. No doubt there are inconveniences and questions which have to be considered; but there have been no difficulties between us and foreign Governments. There have been communications with these Governments; but the real point is, the Capitulations were introduced because of the extremely bad administration of justice under the Turkish system, and it was found necessary for foreign Powers to guard themselves against the consequences of the bad administration of justice. But the bad administration of justice having ceased, the Capitulations will naturally fall to the ground. I have no doubt that the difficulties conjured up will prove to be much of the same shadowy character as the difficulty mentioned just now, arising from the fact that English subjects have no appeal to the Turkish Court at Rhodes from the English Court at Cyprus. The noble Lord opposite (the Marquess of Hartington) put a question to me with regard to a subject upon which reports have appeared — the proposal, namely, for a joint occupation of Roumelia after the Russian troops have been withdrawn. The state of the case is this — that during the Congress of Berlin the idea was put forward that in case any disaster should arise after the Russian occupation it should be remedied by a joint occupation. Austria and England approved of it, but Russia opposed it, and the other Powers expressed no opinion, and no decision was arrived at. The subject was mentioned in confidential communications between the other Powers; but it has not advanced beyond the point at which it was left in Berlin. We have not heard much of it lately; and it is believed that it is a subject which the Porte does not look with any favour upon; and the other Powers look with indifference upon it. With regard to Greece, I do not know if there is much to be said at the present moment. The proceedings with regard to Greece are founded on the recommendations of the Congress, and negotiations are proceeding. I think there has been some misapprehension in stating that they were broken off. They are still going on, but I am not in a position to say anything about their progress. With regard to the remaining question of India and Afghanistan, the noble Lord asked when we should be in a position to make a statement as to the views of the Government with regard to the final settlement of that question. I had hoped that we should by now have been in a position to make a statement, but we must wait for a short time. I hope we shall soon be in a position to make that statement. We have obtained the point we wished to obtain; but the disappearance of Shere Ali has rendered it difficult to find the means of treating with any authority in Afghanistan. Still, I do not think that that will prevent us from making a satisfactory settlement. The House must not run away with the idea that there are great advances and annexations in contemplation. The hon. and gallant General (Sir George Balfour) asks for some information with regard to the Revenues of India and the effect that this expenditure will have on them. That is a very natural question for him to ask. At present I cannot give anything like an Indian Budget; but in the course of a few weeks—indeed, in less than a fortnight—I think we may expect to have a Financial Statement made by the Finance Minister of India, and we shall then know in what precise condition the Revenues of India stand. But a communication has been made to us of a general character with regard to the expense which has been occasioned by the military operations, and also with regard to the degree in which the financial position of India is likely to be affected by that very remarkable circumstance, the depreciation of the silver currency, which, by affecting the rate of exchange, does add £3,000,000 or £4,000,000 a-year to the cost of the Administration. And under these circumstances, the Government of India have intimated to us that they are desirous of making a proposal that the Imperial Treasury should come to the assistance of India by advancing a loan not exceeding £2,000,000 for a certain number of years without interest. I may mention, in anticipation of the statement to be made by the Finance Minister of India in the course of a week or two, that the loan will not be made in the present financial year, but in 1879-80; and that measure is one which, if it can be taken in a manner beneficial to India, Her Majesty's Government will submit with great confidence to the House of Commons. There is a general expression of opinion among Indian authorities that India ought to bear, and can bear ultimately, all the expenses of these hostilities; and there is no desire on the part of India to ask for or accept aid, except in the way I have mentioned, which will be of very considerable advantage and assistance to her. I have taken this opportunity of stating informally the proposal I shall, in due time, make to the House. I will only add that I hope the spirit which has prevailed in the House during this discussion is to be taken as an indication of the spirit in which we shall be able to conduct the Business of the Session. It is perfectly inevitable that there should be great differences of opinion as to the course we propose to take, and we cannot expect our measures not to be warmly and fully debated; but I feel perfectly convinced that hon. Members will best do their duty to those whom they represent by fair, and open, and reasonable discussion, and by meeting in a corresponding spirit the efforts we shall make to promote the convenience of the House. We, on our part, will do our best to bring forward our measures in such a way as to give the House the best opportunity for discussing them.

MR. SHAW LEFEVRE said, he wished to remind the right hon. Gentleman that he not answered his question about the purchase clauses of the Irish Land Act.

MR. W. E. FORSTER remarked that the question of the hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke) had not been answered, as to taking possession of the Khurrum Valley.

MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY also reminded the right hon. Gentleman of the Catholic University Question.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER remarked that there were many cases in which it was understood that when communications and requests were made and no answer was given, the matter could not at the present time be answered. He was not prepared to make any proposition, or to intimate, on the part of the Government, that they had any proposal to make in regard to two of the subjects mentioned. They deserved the most serious consideration; but he thought he had sufficiently intimated that the Government had no proposals to make at the present time. They had no proposals to make as to the Irish Land Clauses. They did not undervalue the recommendations of the Committee; but although he might say, speaking for himself, that there were recommendations which he could not accept or agree to, he was not prepared to say that there were not clauses to which the attention of the Government had been directed, but they had not at present any proposal to make. With respect to the Khurrum district, he hoped, before long, to be able to state what were the proposals of the Government and the contemplated arrangements in regard to the Afghan Frontier.

Major NOLAN said, that Irish Members were placed in the most difficult possible position, for the reason that the right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary, in the most pleasant manner, last December, promised that there were many messages of peace for Ireland in preparation. However, the only mention of Ireland in the speech was the Grand Jury Question. There was not only no reference to the University Question, but no reference to the great Question in which the Irish people were deeply interested—the Land Question. As to the University Question, they were told that many Bills were in the hands of the draftsman; and that such difficulties were found with them that no University Bill could be entertained. The leading papers of England had been led to believe that the Government were doing something, and yet it came on hon. Members by surprise that no reference whatsoever was made to the subject. There had been little time for consultation, but short as the time was, he had written out an Amendment which he would offer as a protest against nothing being done in the matter. He would move an Amendment to the Motion that the Speaker leave the Chair the following words:—

"That the omission of all reference to legislation on the questions of Reform in the Land Laws and of the University Education of Ireland, both in the Queen's Speech and in the Statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer this evening, is calculated to produce great discontent in Ireland, and is an ill return for the increased burthens which the warlike policy of the Government is calculated to entail on the Irish as well as on the British people."

Mr. O'CONNOR POWER seconded the Amendment. Until the question of University Education was dealt with to the satisfaction of the Catholics of Ireland, there could be no religious equality in that country similar to that enjoyed by their Protestant fellow-countrymen. He had indulged the hope that when the question of religious education was disposed of they would be able to take up the larger question of Primary Education in Ireland, and deal with the whole subject without taking note of religious differences, and in that way doing a great benefit to the country. What the Government proposed in the shape of legislation for Ireland was simply to take away a Grand Jury system distasteful to the people of Ireland, and give them one in all respects equally objectionable. Such tinkering legislation could not be accepted. That was the whole sum and substance of what Ministers proposed to do with regard to Ireland. The Irish people would ask themselves whether it was worth while to send 103 Irish Members over to London year after year for so small a boon. He denied the Constitutional right of that House to legislate for Ireland. He maintained that the English Parliament was neither willing nor able to legislate for Ireland, and that he was justified in repudiating the control which that House exercised over Irish affairs.

Amendment proposed,

To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "the omission of all reference to legislation on the questions of Reform in the Land Laws and of the University Education of Ireland, both in the Queen's Speech and in the Statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer this evening, is calculated to produce great discontent in Ireland, and is an ill return for the increased burthens which the warlike policy of the Government is calculated to entail on the Irish as well as on the British people,"—(*Major Nolan*,)—instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

MR. P. MARTIN said, the people of Ireland were dissatisfied at the manner in which they were treated. Hopes were continually being held out, to be followed by disappointment. University Education had been for years the primary grievance of Ireland. He charged the Government with having, through the newspapers under their control, circulated the report that they intended dealing in a satisfactory manner with the Irish University Question, and then withdrawing from what they had professed their anxiety to carry through Parliament. Lately the Law Adviser of the Government, attending a meeting of an Orange Lodge, to celebrate the return of Conservative Members, heard it stated that it was a gross calumny and slander on the Government to suppose for one moment that they had any intention of dealing with this University Question. It might be said that the Roman Catholic Prelates of Ireland had made demands which the Government could not concede; but those Prelates represented not merely the feelings and wishes of their flocks in that matter, but also those of all the educated and fair-minded Protestants in every part of that country. When the English Conservatives had adopted denominational education for England, why were they not to have it for Ireland? If Ireland had been a dependent Colony of the Crown, she would, like our other Colonies, have had endowed Catholic Colleges. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had enumerated some 15 Bills which the Government were to bring forward, and out of the whole number there was only one for Ireland, and that was a Bill which they had indignantly rejected last year. The people of Ireland asked for bread; but they found that they only received in response stones. He believed that the course the Government was pursuing would, day by day, render them more unpopular with all classes in Ireland. Anxious though he was to facilitate Business, he would tell the Government that they would hear more of this question of University Education in Ireland, as the Irish Members, in justice to their constituents, would take care that it should on every possible opportunity be continuously, steadily, and persistently pressed upon the attention of the House. The Land Code, too, was a subject which the Irish people demanded to have considered, and he maintained that at a time of great distress in Ireland, when the pressure of taxation was so severe, it was the duty of Conservative statesmen to speak some consoling words to people who experienced so much suffering. It was, also, a great mistake on the part of Her Majesty's Government to suppose that the question of the Board of Works was a mere Departmental one. On the contrary, it was one of the greatest possible importance, as all works of public improvement were rendered impossible on account of the confused and complicated character of the code which that Board had to administer. He warned the Government that they were trifling with the Irish people by dealing as they had done with these questions of University Education and Land Reform. If the Government fancied they could get rid of the Irish Members by mere mocking phrases they would find they were entirely mistaken. If such conduct were persevered in, they would find the people rise at the back of the Irish Members, and show the Government the necessity of being as alert in remedial measures for Ireland as they were upon the Bills promised by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

SIR PATRICK O'BRIEN said, he differed with his hon. Friends who thought the Government wanted to hoodwink the Irish people on the question of University Education. For his own part, he viewed the matter in a very different light, and he believed that the right hon. Gentleman who led that House and a large majority of the Members of the Government were actuated by a sincere desire to give them such a measure as would be acceptable to the Irish people, and, at the same time, confer upon themselves a great amount of popularity. He believed that under the circumstances the *mot d'ordre* had been given to the different papers in the interest of the Government, and that the leading journal had accordingly written those inspired articles which, no doubt, every hon. Gentleman in that House had read within the past fortnight. The change of tone on the part of that journal was unusually sudden. From holding out the greatest possible hopes upon the question of Education for Ireland, *The Times* had suddenly turned round, and then every man at all conversant with public affairs asked himself what had created this *bouleversement.* He himself did not profess to very acute political knowledge; but he had asked several persons in town, and they had told him that in this proud England there was an *Imperium in Imperio.* At present Lancashire ruled the British Empire in the Cabinet as well as outside it—it was considered a little Principality, beautiful in its political construction, which enabled the Tories to rule in England as well as elsewhere. As a consequence, the wishes of the right hon. Gentleman opposite and of the noble and learned Lord who introduced the Intermediate Education Act last year were set aside, because certain Lancastrians said to the Government—"Ye shall not concede to these Irish Catholics what we Evangelicals of Lancashire tell ye ye shall not give." They represented that if such a concession were made, it would be all up with Conservatives in Lancashire at the coming Election. This was the reason why the wishes of 4,000,000 Catholics in Ireland had been disregarded. He considered such a result, arising from such a cause, pitiable; and it was sad to see the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, contrary to his own inclinations, rendered dumb upon this question. Were this Governmental change of front owing to the action of the Irish Orangemen, which he did not believe, he could understand the situation. The Government might say—"They supported us in our time of deep despondency, and we shall not forget them now." This he could understand. The ancient opponents of Irish rights had triumphed.

"Our tyrants then,
Were still at least our countrymen."

But he felt it a degradation that Ireland should be sacrificed to the intolerance of a single English county. He supposed his hon. and gallant Friend, not having given Notice of his Motion, had merely proposed it to create that most necessary discussion.

Mr. O'CLERY said, the idea which had prevailed during the last 10 days that the measure on University Education had collapsed because of the impracticable pretensions of the Irish Catholic Bishops was a fallacy. On the contrary, they earnestly desired a settlement of the question. He believed the Ministry were really deterred from bringing forward a measure by the representations of a section of the Irish Conservative Members. In his judgment, this was a mistake on the part of the Government, who ought to remember the support they received from the Irish National Representatives last year on the Intermediate Education Question. Beyond that, so far as the Irish Roman Catholic Members were concerned, he could appeal to the Government to say if they had not, during the five years the Government was in power, supported them in every proposition for denominational education, even against the English Liberals.

Mr. J. LOWTHER said, he was sure that the hon. and gallant Gentleman who had moved the Amendment (Major Nolan), did so merely as a means of raising a discussion, and could not seriously mean in that attenuated state of the House to anticipate any decision which the House would have other opportunities of coming to on various Irish questions. The Government had been charged with entirely neglecting the interests of Ireland, and the hon. and gallant Member had by anticipation denounced one important measure which the Government intended to introduce—namely, that relating to Grand Juries; and it had been alleged that the measure brought in last year had been rejected by the Representatives of Ireland. He failed to remember any occasion on which it was so rejected. The fact was that many hon. Members expressed a preference for going on with another measure which it was known the Government had prepared. That other measure—the Intermediate Education Bill—was in due course introduced and carried, and it was admitted that it deserved the thanks of the people of Ireland. He would not place himself out of Order by attempting to give any outline of the Grand Jury Bill. If they were to discuss at that early period every one of the nine measures forshadowed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, as well as the other measures which might be brought in, a great deal of time would be wasted. But it was not so much sins of commission as sins of omission that the Government were charged with. They were told that they were trifling with the most cherished opinions of the

Irish nation. ["Hear, hear!" *from Irish Members.*] One hon. and learned Gentleman had charged the Government with having suborned the Press and having inspired articles in the newspapers——

MAJOR O'GORMAN: Hear, hear! so they have.

MR. P. MARTIN said, he had never stated that the Government had suborned the Press. What he did say was that the gentlemen of the Press seemed to anticipate what the Government were about to do from time to time, and it was not met by any denial from the Government.

Mr. J. LOWTHER most distinctly begged to say that no article in any newspaper had been in any way inspired by Her Majesty's Government, nor did they accept the slightest responsibility for any opinions expressed by the Fourth Estate of the Realm. While freely alluding to the English Press, no reference had been made by hon. Gentlemen to any organs of opinion in the Sister Island. He did not wish to follow up the matter by asking the reasons for that omission, which, however, was very marked, and seemed to call for some explanation. If that subject was to be further dwelt upon, the House would consider that before approaching a question of gravity like University Education in Ireland the Government should have some assurance that measures likely to commend themselves to the judgment of Parliament would also command the confidence of the people for whom they were intended. Some remarks had been made on certain observations of his own on a recent occasion at the Mansion House in Dublin to the effect that the days had gone by when this question should be tossed from Party to Party like a mere shuttlecock. What he had said was that the question of Intermediate Education had proved one thing sufficiently—namely, that such a subject as Education would never be adequately dealt with until Party spirit was laid aside. That Act was no Party measure, but was carried with the general concurrence of all Parties, with the exception of a very small minority; and he intimated that if ever a time came when the other branches of the Education Question could be satisfactorily settled it would be in some similar lull of Party strife. To that opinion he adhered. He knew certain hon. Members regretted that Ministers had come to that decision, and that some people would perhaps like to see the fortunes of an Administration commanding a large majority in the House shipwrecked on this Question; but they could hardly complain if those responsible for the conduct and policy of the Government did not see matters precisely in the same light. Then it was said that the great Land Question of Ireland had been wholly excluded. The views of the Government might not commend themselves to all parties interested; but it was the duty of the Government to consider carefully the line which they should adopt with regard to every question. The hon. Gentleman who had alluded to the subject of land had only touched one portion of the question—a question which in its breadth might be described as consisting of proposals for removing a certain commodity called land from the persons to whom it belonged to other persons to whom it did not belong. The suggestions made by the Committee over which the hon. Member for Reading (Mr. Shaw Lefevre) had presided, and which dealt only with a distinct and very limited portion of what was known generally as the Land Question, had not escaped attention; but while there were, no doubt, matters to be commended to the attention of Parliament, he could hold out no hopes that the Government would be prepared to deal with the subject in the comprehensive manner which the hon. Member for Reading urged upon the Committee. At the same time, he was not without hope that on that subject they would be able to make some reasonable suggestions which would meet with the approval of Parliament. Reference had been made to the question of the re-construction of the Board of Works. That Board was entirely under the control of the Treasury, and he was informed by his hon. Friend the Secretary to the Treasury that a scheme relating to that body had been under the consideration of his Department, and that in due time it would be submitted to the House. He hoped that the hon. and gallant Member who had brought the Amendment forward would not attempt by pressing it to a division to obtain a snap vote, after the statement which had been made showing that the interests of Ireland were not being neglected.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: I do not intend, Sir, on this occasion to discuss the views which have just been expressed by the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. J. Lowther) upon what he calls the great Irish Land Question, or I should be inclined to doubt whether, holding the position he does, it is altogether a judicious observation on his part to describe in a mass all the schemes which have been proposed for dealing with the Land Question as schemes for depriving one set of people of their property for the purpose of transferring it to another set of people. When the right hon. Gentleman recollects that some of these proposals to which he is, I believe, opposed, are approved by many of the Members from the North of Ireland—Gentlemen who generally support the Government—I think he may find reason to doubt whether he has used an altogether judicious expression. At all events, the principal measure to which this statement refers is that which has been under the consideration of a Committee of this House. No doubt, the principle of that measure is the transfer of property from one set of holders to another; but still I do not think there is any objection to the recommendation of the Committee, because the transfer will only take place upon just and equitable principles, as fair and advantageous to one party as another. I do not, however, rise to reply to the remarks of the right hon. Gentleman. My object is to explain the reasons which will influence me in the vote I am about to give, if the Amendment is pressed to a division. I am very far from denying that the Members for Ireland may not have very considerable reason to complain of the statement made by the Government. Still, I think there are very grave objections to the passing of any Amendment such as has been proposed by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Galway (Major Nolan). My hon. Friend the Member for King's County (Sir Patrick O'Brien) has stated, as one of these reasons, that it is inconvenient that we should be called upon at a moment's notice to vote a Resolution of this kind. I quite admit the force of the argument that has been used—that until the statement of the right hon. Gentleman had been made it was impossible to know what Irish subjects were going to be dealt with. But when the right hon. Gentleman read a list of measures to be dealt with it was perfectly well known that neither the Irish University Question nor the Land Question were intended to be handled by the Government in the present Session. I think, therefore, it was due to the House that the earliest possible Notice should have been given of this Amendment, and that when the House was more full than at present. Hon. Members should have been informed that there would be this opposition and division. But besides this objection, there are others which have not yet been referred to. I think this House ought to be very careful in assenting to Resolutions of this kind, and ought to be sure that they are in conformity with the general spirit of its proceedings. Now, I believe it would be a proceeding nearly, if not altogether, unprecedented to vote a Resolution which is founded not upon a Bill, nor upon Papers before the House, but merely upon a verbal statement made by a Minister. As far as I could catch the words of the Resolution read from the Chair, it also appears to me to be open to objection of another kind. I do not think it is usual, and I think it would be hardly dignified for the House to state that a certain thing is an ill return for the services and sacrifices which the Irish people are called upon to make. In fact, in my opinion, Resolutions of this kind ought to be much more carefully prepared and much more fully considered than there has been any opportunity for doing upon this occasion. However, as I have said, I do not wish to deny that Irish Members have some considerable ground for complaint. I have already referred to the matter of Irish University Education, so that I need not say any more on that subject. It certainly is unfortunate that among all the subjects for legislation at their disposal the Government should only have a Grand Jury Bill to offer to Ireland. The right hon. Gentleman the Chief Secretary for Ireland said he had no reason to know that the measure would be rejected by the majority of the Irish Members because they had not had the opportunity of considering it; but there was a feeling showing that the lines upon which it was formed were not such as were calculated to give satisfaction to a very large number of Irish

Members. Besides, there is something in the past history of these Bills which is not calculated to inspire confidence. An Irish Grand Jury Bill has been promised, and generally introduced, in almost every Session of Parliament since I can recollect, but they have very seldom made much progress; and I cannot very much wonder that Irish Members should consider that the Bill is introduced very much as a matter of form, and is intended to share the fate of all its predecessors. Another part of the statement of the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer is also, I think, open to objection. I understood him to say that though there was only this legislation to be offered to Ireland this year the Government had it in contemplation, at some future time, to devote some part of the Irish Church surplus to the payment of the pensions of the Irish School Teachers. I do not think that is a very judicious proceeding on the part of the Government. If the Government has measures to propose, by all means let them bring them forward; but I hardly think it is fair to treat the Irish people in this way. To hold out these promises as bribes for good conduct on their part, and to tell the Irish Members that if they behave well they will, at some indefinite period, be indulged with another slice of the Irish Church surplus. That does not appear to me to be a dignified mode of treating the question, and I regret that the sop should have been held out by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. At the same time, while I sympathize with the complaints of the Members from Ireland, it is quite impossible for me, for the reasons I have stated, to support the Resolution.

Mr. MELDON said, he wished to make but one observation with reference to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Chief Secretary that night, and the one with which he favoured them at Dublin recently. Upon the good taste of the latter speech he did not intend to comment. It had, however, made a great impression upon large numbers of the people of Ireland. The right hon. Gentleman told them that the Government, while admitting the importance of the University Question, did not think it right and proper to introduce any measure on the subject, because it would be made a Party question. He had also read a speech of the noble Lord who had just sat down (the Marquess of Hartington) at Liverpool, and it had given him intense satisfaction. That feeling he knew was shared by a great many people in Ireland, and it was due to the fact that the noble Lord declared he did not disapprove of the Government introducing a measure on this question of Irish Education, and that he, for one, would not offer any factious opposition to it, or oppose it in any Party spirit, if the measure were such as had been suggested. He read that speech with great satisfaction, and he hoped that he had interpreted its meaning fairly. If the Chief Secretary for Ireland had also read that speech, he (Mr. Meldon) did not understand how he could have made the announcement that he had done. He must say, however—and he said it with deep pain—that there was an impression abroad in Ireland that since the right hon. Gentleman had been appointed a policy of exasperation had been initiated and carried out, and that he was the adviser of it. His predecessor did not do much for them; but he showed his desire for conciliation, as far as his Party would let him do so. ["No, no!"] He was speaking his own opinion. But, on the other hand, it could not be denied that for some months past there had been a policy of exasperation tried in Ireland. It should be clearly understood, also, that they had not taken action in this matter without notice. They had not raised a debate on the principle of Land Reform, or of the establishment of a University; but they did say that it was the duty of the Government, after the speech of the noble Lord at Liverpool, to have made some proposal to the House on these two subjects.

Mr. GRAY said, the noble Lord (the Marquess of Hartington) opposed the Amendment because sufficient Notice of it had not been given, and because it was unusual to base an Amendment upon a mere verbal statement. But he would remind the House that his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Galway (Major Nolan) gave Notice of his Amendment immediately after it had been elicited from the Chancellor of the Exchequer that the Government were not going to deal with the question of University Education. As to the second point; because the Government had taken the unusual course of not making their statement of domestic policy in the form of an Address from the Crown, they were to be debarred from their Constitutional right to move an Amendment. For his part, he thought the responsibility for this Amendment should be fairly put on the right shoulders, and those shoulders were not on his side of the House. His hon. Friend gave as early a Notice as was practicable, and, therefore, the fault that it was not earlier and more formally before the House was not his; and, in his opinion, his Party was justified in proceeding to a division. There might, of course, be a difference of opinion as to the wisdom of moving such an Amendment, with so many Irish Members absent; but now that it had been moved it would be puerile to withdraw it, and therefore he hoped it would be pressed to a division. As to the general question, he thought the Irish Party were punished in a way that they deserved for their conduct at the opening of the Session. The Irish Party was a small one, and it could only make itself respected, and its influence felt, by strict organization. They appeared, on the contrary, to be utterly disorganized. The Government and the Government organs were now studiously formulating the idea that the Irish Party, which at one time was formidable, was now broken up, and no longer formidable to anybody. The Government assumed that statement to be true, and treated Irish Members according to the strength which they now imagined them to possess. He and his Friends would take that lesson to heart. They would remember the contemptuous manner in which the Irish nation had been treated, and Her Majesty's Government would by-and-bye find that the Irish Party was not so weak and powerless as they thought. They were promised a Grand Jury Bill, which the majority of the Irish Members had already rejected, for they were told that the measure was not materially changed from that of last year, and they were also to be treated to a series of Resolutions calculated to curtail the rights and powers of minorities. That was the Ministerial programme as regarded Ireland. It would create considerable exasperation in that country, and he was certain the Irish Members were only expressing that feeling in the Resolution which had just been moved. He thought the Government would have done far better if it had attempted to settle the question upon which the hearts of the Irish people were bent, instead of proposing a series of gagging Resolutions; but he, for one, was not afraid to face the issue, and they would soon see which would get the better of it.

Mr. PARNELL said, if he spoke candidly he hoped it would not be thought he spoke unwisely, at any rate from his own point of view. It was now almost a matter of history with the Irish Party that concessions were not to be won from any English Government by a policy of conciliation. At the beginning of the Session, when a question of the utmost importance was occupying the attention of Parliament and the Empire, many of the people of Ireland desired that their Representatives should bring before the House this question of Irish Education, and other kindred subjects. That desire was over-ruled, for it was represented to them that such a course would excite exasperation, and that the feelings of Members would be so influenced by it that a settlement of the University Question would be postponed, or perhaps prevented altogether. Under these circumstances, the Irish Members forebore to press their grievances. He was one of those who thought that that time was a fitting time for them to explain their grievances, and by showing their own belief in them to impress the House with their reality. They were overborne, however, and when the attention of the Government was directed to the omission of all reference to Irish affairs, the Home Secretary held out hopes that there might be some measures in store for Ireland. His hopes were not unduly excited; but some hon. Members did think that at last there was some hope of an English Government being honest, and doing justice to Ireland. But again the stern lesson had been taught them; again they had believed in the honour and justice of an English Government, and again they, once more, found themselves deceived. ["Order!"] He said, in beginning, that he meant to be candid, and he hoped his candour would not injure any great principle or any great cause. If the Government had deliberately chosen to play into his hands, and to advance the designs that they had chosen from time to time to attribute to him, they could not have chosen a better way. He must not be told that the articles in *The Times* were not inspired, and were not put out as feelers to ascertain how far the Government might go. It had now come to this—that the Irish Representatives must make up their minds how they were going to deal with Irish questions, and how they were going to show that great Assembly that they felt the importance of these questions from the bottom of their hearts. When they had done that, and not till then, the first step would have been taken in the settlement of these questions.

MAJOR O'GORMAN said, he was sincerely glad at everything that had taken place that night. He was delighted beyond anything he could express that the Government had treated these great Irish questions in the way they had done. Nothing more rejoiced his heart than to find that the English Government were still doing as they had done for centuries, and still continued to trample on the Irish people. Nothing, also, more rejoiced his heart than to feel for the Government—as he was sure every Irishman should, and did feel—the utmost hatred and contempt.

Question put.

The House *divided:*—Ayes 72; Noes 25: Majority 47.—(Div. List, No. 3.)

Main Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

MR. DILLWYN said, before the Speaker left the Chair, he thought they ought to have some further information on the Corrupt Practices Bill. It was an important measure, which had been before the House a great many years, and in view of the coming Election it should certainly be dealt with this year. The Government had distinctly pledged themselves to bring forward the Bill early in the Session. [The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: Notice of the question has not been given.] Then he would bring the matter forward again on Monday. There was one other matter. He understood that the Chancellor of the Exchequer was about to propose a loan of £2,000,000 to the Indian Government without interest for two years. He did not propose to discuss the matter now; but the Government would be misleading the House and the country, as they had often done before, and would be misleading the people of India also, if they were to say that they ever expected this money to be repaid. They had much better propose to give the money to India at once, for he knew it would be useless to expect that it would ever be repaid.

Motion, by leave, *withdrawn.*

Committee *deferred* till *To-morrow.*

BANKERS' BOOKS (EVIDENCE) BILL.

(*Sir John Lubbock, Mr. Herschell, Sir Charles Mills, Mr. Rodwell.*)

[BILL 65.] SECOND READING.

Order for Second Reading read.

SIR JOHN LUBBOCK, in moving that the Bill be now read a second time, said, its object was to amend and extend an Act passed a few Sessions ago, which had been found to work well as far as it went. By that measure, solicitors were allowed to use copies of bankers' books in certain cases instead of the books themselves. In the present measure, it was proposed to allow bankers to send certified copies instead of the actual books, unless the bank was itself interested, or a Judge considered that the case was one in which the books themselves should be produced. Of course, this would be a convenience to bankers; but bankers only required their books for the convenience of their customers, and if the books were taken away it was really the public who were the sufferers. Again, it saved time and trouble in Court to have a handy account which could be passed easily about, instead of a ponderous folio. He believed, therefore, that the Bill would be found to be for the general convenience. The hon. Baronet concluded by moving the second reading.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."—(*Sir John Lubbock.*)

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir JOHN HOLKER) said, he approved of the principle of this Bill, and as the former Act had not been found to work well he thought the best way was, as proposed, to repeal it, and substitute another. Generally speaking, bankers and bankers' clerks were called to prove the receipt and payment of certain sums of money, and as they could only do so by referring to their books it seemed to him very reasonable that they should be saved the inconvenience of having their books brought into Court. There was an omission in the Bill, however, which required rectification. There was no provision for giving notice to the other side that a party intended to avail himself of the Act, and that was only fair, in order that the other side might, if they chose, call the witness themselves. There was an indication in the 8th clause that some such proposal was intended, and if the hon. Baronet approved the suggestion the alteration could easily be made in Committee.

Question put, and *agreed to.*

Bill read a second time, and *committed* for *Monday* next.

HABITUAL DRUNKARDS BILL.

(*Dr. Cameron, Mr. Clare Read, Mr. Ashley, Sir Henry Jackson, Mr. Edward Jenkins, Mr. William Holms, Mr. O'Shaughnessy.*)

[BILL 47.] SECOND READING.

Order for Second Reading read.

DR. CAMERON, in moving that the Bill be now read a second time, said, that as first introduced it would be remembered that it was of a much wider scope; but it had afterwards been decided to cut it down, and limit its operation to the persons who were prepared voluntarily to submit themselves to its provisions. It had been proved to the Committee on the subject that on this basis a vast number of cases could be treated, and a great deal of good might result. In that modified form he had last year secured for the Bill the support of the House on the second reading, and in the course of the debate some 20 Members took part, every single speech being in support of the Bill in its present shape, and the second reading of the Bill being passed *nem. con.* On the present occasion, his hon. Friend the Member for Swansea (Mr. Dillwyn) had given Notice of his intention to oppose the Bill. He understood that he would not object to the Bill if it applied to public institutions only. If his hon. Friend thought the matter was so important as to demand the expenditure of public funds on public institutions, he went further than the Bill now proposed. He understood that his hon. Friend entertained a strong dislike to private lunatic asylums, and thought that this Bill would establish a number of institutions of a somewhat analogous character. In his opinion, there was not the slightest analogy between the two. A lunatic was committed to an asylum on the certificate of two medical men. He was sent there for an indefinite period, and while there any complaint made by him was treated as the raving of a lunatic, and any witnesses he might bring would be considered in the same way. The principle of the Bill was entirely different to this. A person could be liberated by order of the Inspector appointed under the Bill, or by order of any County Court, and at the very worst he was bound to be liberated at the end of 12 months. Then, if he felt himself aggrieved, the patient would be entitled to an action for damages. He thought his hon. Friend was, therefore, altogether mistaking in imagining that there was any real analogy between the institutions suggested in his Bill and private lunatic asylums. The hon. Member concluded by moving the second reading.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."—(*Dr. Cameron.*)

MR. DILLWYN: The only reason I have for objecting to the Bill is that it appears to contemplate a violation of the liberty of the subject.

Notice taken, that 40 Members were not present; House counted, and 40 Members not being present, .

House adjourned at half after Twelve o'clock.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Friday, 14*th February,* 1879.

MINUTES.]—SELECT COMMITTEE—Intemperance, *appointed* and *nominated,*

AFGHANISTAN—THE RUSSIAN MISSION AT CABUL.

OBSERVATIONS. QUESTION.

EARL GRANVILLE: Your Lordships must have thought me, during the observations with which I troubled you last night, of a somewhat inquiring turn of mind. I asked many Questions of Her Majesty's Government, none of which—as sometimes happens to me—were answered. I remember that Lord Lansdowne (the third Marquess) was much amused by an Irish Peer, after asking a witness a question in a Committee, telling him that he asked the question because he knew what the answer would be. I have no idea how some of the Questions which I asked yesterday might be answered, and probably Her Majesty's Government are in the same predicament; but there is one Question which related to a matter of fact, which I take the liberty to repeat. Your Lordships will remember that in the despatch of the Secretary of State for India describing the policy of the war in Afghanistan the objects were stated to be that that country should be "strong, friendly, and independent." Yesterday, the First Lord of the Treasury described the results of the war, and he interrupted me while I was speaking—as he had a perfect right to do—and said he had not used the words "strong" and "friendly"—which I admit it would have been impossible for him to say—but "independent" and "self-governed." I asked for further information as to how this desirable end was to be obtained, and also asked whether there had been any communications with the Russian Government on the subject; and, if so, whether with any result, and if that result could be communicated to Parliament without inconvenience to the Public Service? It will not be thought unreasonable if I now repeat the Question.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: There are some communications which are now in the hands of the printer; but which, I hope, will be in your Lordships' hands before long. I am afraid I did not hear all the Questions which the noble Earl put; but perhaps he had better wait before discussing the question of communications with Russia on the subject until the Papers have been produced.

EARL GRANVILLE: I am afraid the noble Marquess only entered the House as I was finishing my Question. It is, whether there has been any result to the communications with Russia on the subject of Afghanistan; and, if so, whether he has any objection to communicate it to Parliament? If the noble Marquess thinks there is any objection, I am the last person to press him for an answer.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: There were some communications with Russia just about the time Parliament separated for the short Recess. The result of those communications was the withdrawal of the Mission from Cabul. The nature of those communications will be explained by the Papers, which, I hope, will be in the hands of the noble Earl in a day or two.

THE VOLUNTEER FORCE — FINANCE AND ORGANIZATION—REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE.

OBSERVATIONS.

VISCOUNT BURY: My Lords, I have the honour of laying on the Table the Report of the Committee appointed some time ago by my noble Friend (Viscount Cranbrook), when he was Secretary of State for War; and it is thought desirable that in doing so I should, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, give some short explanation of the circumstances which led to the appointment of the Committee, the course of its procedure, the recommendations they have made, and also the course Her Majesty's Government are prepared to take with regard to those recommendations. I make no apology for troubling your Lordships with these details, because anything which relates to the Volunteer Force of Great Britain is of enormous importance to the country, and of great interest not only to many Members of this House, but to a large body of our countrymen. The Volunteer Force has very much changed its character in the last 20 years, during which it has flourished. Its history, briefly—although I hardly need remind your Lordships of it—is that in 1859, under circumstances which we all remember, the Volunteer Force was established by the authority of the Lords Lieutenant of the counties under the old Act of 1804. In 1862, two or three years after, a Royal Commission was appointed, which advocated the payment of a certain sum to Volunteers by way of assisting them in their expenses. It was not, at that time, thought that the whole of the expenses of the Volunteer Force ought to be borne by the State. The Capitation Grant originated in 1862, and in 1863 the present Volunteer Act was passed. There was a Departmental Committee in 1869-70, in consequence of the recommendations of which certain additions were made to the sum which had been laid down as necessary to be given as a Capitation Grant by the Royal Commission of 1862. In 1871, there was another and a very considerable change in the constitution of the Force. In that year, the Regulation of the Forces Act removed the controlling power from the Lords Lieutenants of counties, in whom it had resided before, leaving only to them the power of recommending for first commissions in the Volunteer Force, and transferring the control to the Crown. In 1873 another, and, perhaps, in its effects a still larger, change took place. The Force had increased greatly in numbers, strength, and efficiency; and the Mobilization Committee appointed to inquire into various military matters, recommended that the Volunteer Force should be amalgamated into the body of the Army. From that time they were considered practically as soldiers, differing only from other soldiers in their terms and conditions of service, which were strictly defined and extremely limited. Those are the principal legislative changes made in the Volunteer system during the 20 years of their existence; but during that time there were also great changes in their *personnel*, organization, and degree of efficiency. At first, it was not contemplated that the State should pay the whole of the expense. At first—it was not, perhaps, unnatural — the expense of the Force was met partly by local subscriptions, aided by the Capitation Grant. In course of time these local subscriptions, if they did not disappear, have become so diminished that it is obvious if the Capitation Grant, or aid from the State in some form or another be not fixed at a sum sufficient to meet the requirements of the Force, that Force could hardly be held together. Again, under the peculiar circumstances of the Force, at its commencement a great deal of power was left in the hands of individual commanding officers. I will not say that every man did that which was right in his own eyes; but every commanding officer throughout the country had to overcome local difficulties, and to meet local requirements by his own personal influence, and with such means as were available. It was not to be supposed that there could result from that system anything like sufficient homogeneity, if I may so call it, to enable it to dovetail into our other Forces, when, in 1873, the great change was made which converted it into an integral portion of the Army. Under those circumstances, there arose a general belief that the constitution and organization of the Force required revision, and revision outside the Force itself. There was an absence of supervision which, however inevitable, and, perhaps, salutary in the early days of the Force, was no longer desirable; and it became a matter of serious reflection when considered in connection with the future position the Force was to occupy. It is a curious fact that almost every commanding officer I have talked with considers himself to have been placed in an exceptional position. If I asked any commanding officer—and I appeal to the knowledge of all those noble Lords who have at all associated themselves with the Volunteer movement—how he met any particular difficulty, he invariably answered — "My position was exceptional, but this is the way I dealt with it." Such being the circumstances, it is evident that some alteration was necessary, and that it should be effected by the Government. The then Secretary of State for War, in the beginning of last year, appointed a Committee to look into the condition of the Force. The orders which he gave to that Committee were—

> "(1) To inquire into the necessary requirements of the Volunteer Force, and whether they were met by the grant; (2) whether if the grant was not sufficient for the purpose, in what form assistance should be given; (3) whether any alteration in the organization of the Force was necessary; (4) whether increased efficiency was desirable, and, if so, in what direction it should be attempted; (5) whether, if the present system of Capitation Grant was extended, it would, or would not, tend to economical administration."

Your Lordships will see from these items the full and extensive character of the inquiry; but there were other subjects referred to by the same Committee, relating to important matters, but to which I do not intend even cursorily to direct your Lordships' attention this evening. I will therefore state what the Committee did in carrying out this inquiry. In the first place, they made a most minute investigation into the way in which the money was expended throughout the whole Force. For that purpose they drew up a series of questions addressed to all the officers commanding Volunteer corps, 293 in number. They were required to send in a tabulated statement of every item of expenditure, and they were to do this without reference to whether or not that expenditure was wholly covered by the Capitation Grant. If it were in excess of that grant, they were to state from what source they obtained the difference; at the same time, the Committee sent to each commanding officer a series of questions calculated to elicit from them their opinion as to the requirements of the Force, and the various changes they suggested should be carried out. The answers which came to this demand for information were very full in detail, and the consequence was that, at an early period of their proceedings, the Committee were placed in possession of the most minute details as to every item of expenditure, and also the opinion of every commanding officer as to what changes should be made and their nature. Fortified by these expressions of opinion, the Committee felt itself in a position with advantage to examine witnesses and elicit further information for themselves. They called before them a great many witnesses, some of them Members of this House and of the other House of Parliament. To all of these witnesses they addressed questions extending over a very wide scope, and having for their object the eliciting of opinion as to any great change which was thought to be necessary in the organization of the Force. After these they called before them as witnesses many prominent Volunteers throughout the country—from the Metropolis and from the great towns, from the country districts and also from Scotland. The evidence they obtained has been laid upon your Lordships' Table to-night, and I think it will be said that the evidence is most valuable in its character, and that the inquiry was most searching. Whether the Committee has been successful in framing, upon the information which they then obtained, a scheme at all commensurate with the importance of the subject will be for your Lordships to judge. At any rate, if I may speak in my official capacity, and not for the moment, as a Member of the Committee, I should say that they have taken great pains, that they have been successful in collecting information, and that they have devoted great attention to it. The first point which they thought it right to recommend was that the establishment of the Volunteer Force should be defined. Hitherto there had been no fixed limit, and as many Volunteers were taken as offered themselves; in fact, the Government was only too glad to have them. Now, it has been thought that as there is a tendency in the Force to increase both in numbers and in expense, and as the Force has become part of the Military Forces of the Crown, it was necessary to follow the precedent of all other branches of the Naval and Military Services, and present annually to Parliament a detail of the numbers to be voted in that year. In technical language, to fix the annual Establishment of the Force. The proposition that we made was that the Establishment should be fixed at 250,000; but when that matter came before the consideration of my right hon. and gallant Friend at the head of the War Office, the illustrious Duke (the Duke of Cambridge), and others, it was thought that it was too high, and it was eventually determined that the Establishment should be fixed at 200,000 men. The present Establishment is somewhat above that number; but without going into details, I may say that the number of efficient Volunteers this year is 193,000; and thus, in fixing the ultimate Establishment at 200,000, we shall not necessarily diminish the number of efficient Volunteers, though we may alter the distribution of those Volunteers in the regiments, perhaps in the companies. The manner in which that must be carried out must, of course, be left to Departmental regulation. It is not a thing that can be done at once, and it will take a considerable time. There are several points in this Report on which I will not stay to comment now, and I will go straight to that part of it which deals with the constitution and organization of the Force. It is an essential characteristic of volunteering that a man should be allowed to leave on giving 14 days' notice. That is a condition which all Volunteers have hitherto enjoyed; and, as it has been found to work well in practice, the Committee decided that it would not be well to interfere with that regulation. They, however, felt that it would be advisable that some voluntary agreement should be entered into by Volunteers, which should bind them to remain for a certain time and serve for a certain number of years, if the Government would supply them with their clothing. It is obvious, if a considerable sum of money is expended in clothing a man, and he is to be permitted to leave at 14 days' notice, the Government would be at a disadvantage. We found in the evidence that, in many corps, an agreement was entered into between the men and the commanding officer, which was enforceable in the Courts of Law, by which the Volunteer bound himself, in return for his clothing, to serve for a definite number of years, and to keep himself efficient during that time; but that if, during that time, he should exercise his legal option of retiring at 14 days' notice, he should pay a proportionate sum to the cost of his uniform for the benefit of the corps. The Committee did not think it right to recommend to the Government the initiation of such an agreement; but they thought that this matter might be easily dealt with by the regulations of each corps, and that it might be left to the commanding officers. I now pass to the question of the organization and constitution of the Force. Your Lordships will remember that the scheme for the localization of the Army provides for the division of the whole country into a certain number of sub-districts, and that to each sub-district there are attached two regiments of the Line and a regiment of Militia. The localization scheme also provides that the Volunteers shall be an integral portion of the Army; and that, in case of invasion, they should be called up and attached to these sub-districts. The Committee thought a great many advantages would accrue if the Volunteers were at once permanently attached to their sub-district brigade, which would then consist of two linked battalions of Regulars, two of Militia, and two or more of Volunteers, according to their strength. And at this part of my remarks I may anticipate what I shall have to say presently in regard to the clothing, and mention that we propose that the Volunteer Force shall be clothed like the Regular Army. This, coupled with the association with the Regular Army, we consider will have the best effect upon the Volunteer Service. It will also have another effect—it will, I think, add to the social value of a Volunteer commission, when the Volunteer officers find themselves associated in this way with the officers of the Regular Army. It is a very complicated subject, and we found many difficulties in our way. There are a great number of small battalions and small corps scattered throughout the country; and while these exist in an independent and isolated form, due economy is hardly possible. The expense of volunteering (other than that of clothing and arming the Force) is mainly due to the charge for drill-sheds, head-quarters, and head-quarter staff; and unless some means are devised of diminishing that expenditure, a great addition would have to be made to the Capitation Grant, which the Committee have not thought fit to recommend. It would be impossible to obtain due economy of administration in the face of these arrangements; and we therefore propose that, so far as is possible, the recommendation which was made by the Committee of 1869-70 for the consolidation of administrative regiments should be carried into effect; and we do not propose to stop even there, for we further propose that in towns where a large number of small regiments exist — of course, with due respect to, and regard for, existing arrangements—that those regiments should be gradually joined together, and be made into larger ones. This would facilitate the organization with regard to the sub-district, and it would also meet another requirement in the Report of the Localization Committee—namely, that for the formation of provisional battalions. The suggestion is that, in case of necessity, provisional battalions should be formed out of the Volunteers, taking 25 per cent out of each regiment in the district. The Committee felt that, under the present circumstances, that arrangement would hardly be possible. To take 25 out of every 100 men dressed differently, organized differently, and unaccustomed to work together, and who are really and practically dissociated from one another, was a proceeding which the Committee thought would not work well in practice. But if this recommendation that the small battalions shall be consolidated into large battalions is carried out, and if these were to be joined with the sub-district brigades, then it would be quite easy, considering that they were accustomed to work together, to take 25 per cent for the formation of provisional battalions. My Lords, I now turn to the question of discipline, instruction, and efficiency, a branch of the inquiry to which I need not say the Committee devoted a great deal of attention; but on which, as it refers mainly to detail, I will not detain your Lordships at any length. With regard, however, to efficiency, those who have watched the Force will observe the great improvement which has taken place since the Volunteer movement began, when small companies were established which were little more than rifle clubs, and which were controlled by no military regulations. I am bound to say that every application for increased stringency and efficiency has been most cheerfully obeyed. Every time conditions have been imposed as the stipulation on which Government aid should be granted they have been complied with by the Force; and, as in the past, we have found every additional concession was made the occasion for demand of increased efficiency. The Committee thought they could not err by working on the same lines, and when they proposed that some additional Government aid should be granted in a particular direction, that they should demand in return for it increased efficiency. From the whole body of the evidence which I have laid on your Lordship's Table to-night, I think it will be seen that everything which has hitherto been given to the Volunteers has been given with a condition attached to it, and that, in all instances, the condition has been cheerfully fulfilled. While on this branch of the subject, there is one small point to which I may refer, and which, though a matter of detail, is a matter of some importance. We propose a small change in the interest of efficiency in regard to the number of drills required from a recruit on joining the ranks. At present, 30 are required before a man can become efficient; but in the following year he is only required to perform nine, the ordinary number of drills for a Volunteer. Taking into consideration the large number of matters in which a recruit has to be trained, and the short time at his disposal, we were of opinion that to become a fully-trained Volunteer in 30 drills was hardly to be expected. We therefore propose that the obligation to perform 30 drills in the first year should remain as at present, but that the recruit should be called upon to perform a like number in the second year, instead of nine as now. I believe that that requirement will be met with acquiescence, and I can only say, from the evidence which was laid before us, that I do not think this will in many cases entail more service than is given now in practice by Volunteers who join the ranks of some regiments where more stringent regulations are enforced. I now pass to Artillery Volunteers. Among a large body of that Force there is an idea that it would be easy to make a considerable increase in the formation of Field Artillery. We investigated that point, and the Committee came to the conclusion that it was not easy to form Field Artillery with the materials at our command. It is not that the men would find it difficult to learn the drill, the riding, or any individual thing; but Artillery is such a highly-polished arm, and involves such a multiplicity of duties, that it is impossible to suppose that Volunteers, having limited time only at their disposal, could become proficient as flying Artillery, or form a corps like the Army Field Artillery. The Committee, however, came to the conclusion that it would be possible to form Field Artillery with heavy draught horses, on some such basis as has already been seen in operation at Volunteer reviews, and that some extension of the Artillery corps in that direction would serve a useful purpose. With regard, also, to Artillery Volunteers, we find that they had very great difficulties to contend with. They ask for more instruction, which is, of all others, the kind of request least easy to refuse. They said—"We give our time and attention, and we are willing to find everything except money." The same thing applies to the Engineers; and here I should like to say that, in my opinion, the Artillery and Engineer corps have devoted fully as much time and attention as any other branch of the Volunteer Force to the duties imposed upon them, and that they are in every way worthy of encouragement. The Committee have recommended the Government to give some consideration to the claims which they have advanced for increased facilities for instruction, and my right hon. and gallant Friend is inclined to adopt the suggestion all the more willingly that it will not be much additional expense. I come now to "Clothing and Equipment." The Committee went very thoroughly into this matter. The records of our investigation in this direction are very voluminous, and I need not trouble your Lordships with them. It will be sufficient for me to say that we propose that the different regiments of Volunteers shall be clothed, like the corresponding arm in the Regular Service, in the national colour of scarlet; that the clothing shall be supplied out of the Capitation Grant, so as to involve no additional expense to the country. It is true that, theoretically, the Force can now be supplied with clothing out of the Capitation Grant; but in practice that is not so. The Volunteer earns his Capitation Grant in one year, and it is paid in the next—it is, therefore, always in arrear. Articles supplied out of the Government stores must be paid for on application. It is therefore impossible, unless he obtains an advance from his banker, or pays for it himself, that a commanding officer can obtain the clothing from the Government stores. We felt that it was quite impossible that our recommendation should be carried into effect, and the Capitation Grant be made to bear the charge, unless some facilities were given to a corps to avoid their running into debt. We propose, therefore, that the clothing should be supplied on application from the Government Clothing Department, not on the principle of immediate payment, but on the principle of taking 10*s*. per man per annum till the whole of the debt is paid. The consequence is that in between three and four years a suit of clothing made to wear four years would be paid for by the corps; and if the alteration we have suggested in regard to the four years' service agreement should be carried out, on the one hand, the Government would not suffer, and, on the other hand, the Volunteers will be supplied with clothing on easy terms, and the corps will be very much less liable than hitherto to run into debt. We have found that the present method of clothing the Volunteers is most expensive. The men have been obliged to go to local contractors, who could not hope to be paid for a very considerable time, and who, of course, in consequence added something to their price. We found it to be one of the great reasons for the corps running into debt that they were under the necessity of providing the clothing for their men on such unfortunate terms. I think I have sufficiently indicated the direction of the Committee's recommendations in regard to clothing, and I now pass on to another matter. The main point, my Lords, to which the attention of the Committee was naturally directed, was whether the Capitation Grant was sufficient for the service. Your Lordships will allow me to read a few of the items in which the money of the Volunteers is spent. "Expenses at head-quarters, including the ordinary drills, the care and maintenance of arms, marches out, reviews, repairs of arms, gun and drill practices, payment of the permanent staff, band, refreshments, interest on loans, prizes, and expenses of Artillery training, expenses for national and county associations, payment for loss of time in camp, reading, gymnasium and recreation rooms, allowance for treasurers, quartermasters, &c., &c." I have just named a few of the items to show how vastly divergent are the claims which come on the Volunteers for their money, and how difficult it must be on the comparatively small sum of 30*s*., or a little over 30*s*. per annum per head, to keep a regiment quite clear of debt. Generally we found, in the great majority of corps, that the total military expense was in excess of the amount received from the War Office—it was only in a few instances that a corps was supported on what was received from the War Office. It would not be safe to assume that because a few corps kept within the amount of the Capitation Grant that the Capitation Grant was sufficient; nor was it safe to assume the converse of the proposition, and say that because only a few corps kept within the grant, the grant was necessarily insufficient. The Committee, therefore, came to the conclusion that the point could only be decided by a very detailed analysis of the Returns. They, therefore, first proceeded to determine, as a standard for their own guidance, what items of expense were in reality necessary for the efficient maintenance of the corps, and which would, therefore, be properly chargeable against the public; and, secondly, whether the Capitation Grant was sufficient to cover the expenses which thus had been laid down as, in the opinion of the Committee, necessary. This the Committee thought it necessary to do, in order to establish which I may call a standard of comparison; and, keeping that standard in their own minds for their own guidance, they proceeded afresh to analyze the Returns of the expenses before them. When they came to that, they found that a very curious state of things was disclosed. They found that out of 278 corps that sent in the Returns, only 38 of these corps kept their total expenses within the amount of the Capitation Grant; while 240 exceeded the grant. But then a close examination of the figures in the Returns showed that, in a great majority of instances, the excess occurred in items not properly chargeable against the public; only 83 of the corps had exceeded the Capitation Grant in items which could be properly charged against the public; and upon that ground the Committee felt themselves bound to answer the question put to them, as to whether the Capitation Grant was not sufficient for legitimate purposes, and to say that they could not recommend any addition to the Capitation Grant. My Lords, I am perfectly well aware that to a great number of people the decision of the Committee will be a very great disappointment, and I can only thank your Lordships for having allowed me to enter into the details on the matter, because I felt that it was not only your Lordships I was addressing. And I wish to convey to the general body of Volunteers, as well as the public, the fact that the Committee which has been investigating their affairs was not appointed to register a foregone conclusion; but honestly to inquire whether or not the Capitation Grant was sufficient for its purpose, and to decide upon the evidence alone.. The War Office felt that they were not in possession of the information which would enable them to satisfactorily settle that point, and the Committee which for 11 months has been sitting inquiring into this matter, has, in the most single-minded way, been directing its attention not to support a foregone conclusion, but to form their own conclusion on evidence brought before them; and therefore, though it may be a disappointment, and probably will be a disappointment, to a large number of Volunteers, to find that the Capitation Grant is not to be increased, and that the Committee have not been able to see their way to recommend that increase—they must remember that there were on that Committee more than one officer of 20 years' Volunteer experience—men who would be much more likely to err in the direction of leniency towards the Volunteer Force than in the way of stringency in refusing the increase which was possibly expected. But though the Committee recommend no increase in the money grant, they find that in practice the Capitation Grant will not be sufficient to keep up a corps, unless great economy is practised in the administration of the various corps. That economy must be attempted in clothing, in head-quarters, in rifle-ranges, and in various other matters. In respect to the matters of clothing and rifle ranges, the real panacea for existing evils, and the real way to reduce the expense and thus help in the due administration of the Capitation Grant with economy, is, I believe, consolidation. There were one or two items of expense—I think there were three items—which the Committee were of opinion could not be well borne out of the present Capitation Grant. But the Committee thought it would be better, as these items were necessary to keep up increased efficiency—to give a separate allowance for those items on condition of increased efficiency on the part of the Volunteers, rather than to add the money on to the Capitation Grant. One of these items was in the matter of camps. The Committee were of opinion —founded on evidence brought before them—the Committee arrived at the opinion that a week in camp was equal to nearly the drill of a year in forming the Volunteers. The men in camp are associated in considerable numbers; they are subjected during a period of some days to military regulation; they are under what practically amounts to military law; in fact, they perform all the duties of soldiers in camp, and learn to do soldiers' work. They are on the spot, and are available for drill at any time, and there is a sort of military atmosphere about the whole proceeding which is extremely essential to their military well-being; and, therefore, taking all these matters into consideration, the Committee are of opinion that if any additional amount was to be given to the Volunteers it ought to be given in the way of encouraging camps among them. The Committee have therefore recommended that view to the Government—subject, of course, to what may be done in the matter in "another place" when the Estimates are presented; and I think I may say that my right hon. and gallant Friend the Secretary of State for War is prepared to recommend the adoptino of the proposal of the Committee in that respect. The proposal is that for every man going into camp 2*s.* a-day shall be allowed, besides certain small travelling allowances. What the aggregate cost of this proposal will be it is impossible to tell until it actually comes into operation; for we cannot tell how many men will take advantage of the concession, and of what size and what number the camps will be. It is, however, a very substantial addition to the present allowance of the Volunteers in camp; and I have reason to believe, by the experience we have gained in the sittings of the Committee, that it will be a very satisfactory one to the Volunteers themselves. There were two other items—namely, "bands" and "interest on loans." With regard to the first subject, we thought it impossible directly to sanction bands, which are not recognized in any of the other Auxiliary Forces. But it is proposed to excuse bandsmen from musketry drill, which I believe will give considerable facility to the formation of bands. With regard to the interest on loans, under the new arrangement by which the uniform will be paid for out of the Capitation Grant, it is anticipated that the necessity for borrowing money for clothes will disappear, and consequently the "interest on loans" will disappear with it. I will not weary your Lordships by recapitulating all the recommendations of the Committee; there were several other points which were inquired into—one was the condition of the old adjutants—that is, officers appointed previous to the new system, under which Volunteer adjutants are officers on full pay of the Army. These officers had a grievance, and those grievances were fully inquired into and investigated. I will not detain your Lordships with further detail; all further information will be found in the Papers which are laid on the Table of your Lordships' House. There was one point in regard to the medical officers, and the formation of a new medical department, on which the Committee have made certain recommendations. I will conclude by saying that it is only right that the Committee should bear their willing testimony to the general sound and efficient condition in which they found the Volunteers. It is a Force which has increased from year to year, and has always answered cheerfully every call made upon it. Some of the proposals of the Committee involve an expenditure of public money; and therefore, of course, these proposals will have to be discussed in "another place" before they can be looked upon as finally agreed to. In conclusion, I wish to remark that the recommendations of this Committee have been approved in principle by my right hon. and gallant Friend the Secretary of State for War, who, however, wishes to reserve to himself, as regards the details, a wide liberty of action if it should be necessary to exercise it. Within the limits I have mentioned he has generally approved of the principle of the recommendations of the Committee. I have now only to apologize to your Lordships for having detained you so long, and to thank you for the patient and courteous hearing which you have given me.

VISCOUNT CARDWELL said, he had listened with great pleasure to the greater part of the statement just made by the noble Viscount, and during almost the whole of it he thought he could agree with everything that had been said. In his concluding remarks, however, the House was told by the noble Viscount that the Secretary of State reserved to himself perfect latitude in regard both to principles and details; and, if that were the case, he did not understand what had been the use or advantage of making the statement at all. He did not see that their Lordships had much to thank the Government for; for all the questions that had been glanced at were questions exclusively for the other House of Parliament, which alone had jurisdiction in matters of finance. He understood, however, that, in so far as they had any power, their opinions would be asked. He would assume that the Committee had very carefully considered the question—that their recommendations would be communicated to their Lordships, and the grounds on which they were made; and, assuming that the opinions of their Lordships were to have some force, he was happy to agree with almost everything that the Committee appeared to have approved. As regarded the Force itself, he was happy to say that, in proportion as the Volunteers had had demands made upon them, they had most cheerfully responded. He had said more than once, in "another place," that when Englishmen undertook a duty they wished it to be a reality; that the Volunteers did not want to play at soldiers; and that to make their service substantial would be, not to diminish the inducement, but to increase it. They were a growing Force, and one of which the country had reason to be proud. He rejoiced extremely that the noble Viscount was proceeding on the lines of the localization system which he found before him. He did not think that a limit should be fixed to the Establishment of the Volunteers. What would have happened if they had placed a limit to the number of of the Force 20 years ago? It was still a growing institution, and it would be wise not to place a limit. He could not avoid referring to the death of General Peel, of which they had just heard, of which he might, in some sense, be considered the originator. Twenty years ago, General Peel wrote to the bench of magistrates, of which he (Viscount Cardwell) was a member, asking their support in the first formation of Volunteers. Who could have imagined, 20 years ago, that from the beginning, then so small, they would have seen in the first 20 years the present noble Force? He regretted General Peel had not lived to hear the approval given by Her Majesty's Government to the continuance of the Force. So far as he had collected from the statement of the noble Viscount what the Report was, he agreed with all the other recommendations of it; and he trusted that whoever might live another 20 years would see as favourable a result from their proposals as they now saw from those adopted 20 years ago from the Circular of General Peel.

EARL COWPER quite concurred with the noble Viscount that it would be a mistake to fix a limit to the numbers of the Volunteers. They had gone on steadily increasing, and it would be a damper now to tell the Force that no more of it was wanted—for that would be the practical effect of the recommendation. He regretted that it was decided the Volunteers should go into scarlet. They had worn gray for 20 years, and had become attached to it; and, at the same time, it should be remembered that the Regulars might not be well pleased to see the Volunteers presenting themselves in the professional colours of regularly trained soldiers. Moreover, there were many men who looked very well in gray who would not look well set up in scarlet. He was of opinion it would be better to proceed cautiously in the consolidation of administrative battalions. Some of them were composed of companies very far apart, and the internal arrangements, particularly the finances, were better managed by the captain on the spot than by the colonel at a distance. He was sorry to hear there was to be no increase in the grant, as officers at present had to be chosen for their pecuniary rather than for their military qualifications; but he was pleased that the position of Volunteers as a part of the defensive Force of the country was now regularly recognized, not only by the public, but by the Government.

LORD TRURO said, there were several points in the Report of the Committee which had been referred to that did not give anything like universal satisfaction to the friends of the Volunteer Force. One of those was the question of uniforms. Again, he thought the recommendation of the Committee on the subject of drills was not satisfactory. He thought many would be deterred from joining the Force if they were compelled to undergo 30 drills in two successive years; for it would be too great an interruption to their regular occupations. From all that he had heard from the noble Viscount that evening, he could come to no other conclusion than that the recommendations made would not, on the whole, be advantageous to the numerical force or to the military efficiency of the Volunteer Force.

VISCOUNT BURY replied briefly, and, in so doing, reminded the House that he had brought the matter forward in an unofficial manner, believing that that would be the best mode of bringing the subject under the public attention.

EARL GRANVILLE pointed out, as a matter of procedure, that the noble Viscount who had just addressed the House had made two speeches based on a Paper not yet before their Lordships; while, earlier in the evening, the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had deprecated any discussion upon another matter until Papers were laid before their Lordships. He thought the old Rules had better be adhered to.

SOUTH AFRICA—THE ZULU WAR—THE REINFORCEMENTS.

QUESTION. OBSERVATIONS.

LORD TRURO rose to ask Her Majesty's Government, Whether application was at any time made by the Civil or Military Authorities at the Cape of Good Hope for additional military forces; and, if so, on what date it was received; whether the same was entertained; and, if so, the date on which the reinforcements were despatched; also the number and description of the forces applied for, the strength of each battery and regiment when embarked, and the number of volunteers taken to complete their complement respectively? The noble Lord said, he trusted the Question would not be considered premature, seeing that at present they had received no details of the disastrous affair, the announcement of which had been communicated to them, or to the various steps which had been taken by the Government. He had put the Question on the Paper with a view of obtaining information which would satisfy the public mind whether the steps taken by the Government antecedent to the present crisis were sufficient, or whether, on the other hand, there had been any omission which would in any way render the Government responsible for what had happened. He desired, also, that the public might have the means of judging whether the steps which had been taken were taken in such a manner as to be effective and in consonance with the soundest judgment which had been given them. A part of the Correspondence relating to the subject of his Question had already been referred to. That Correspondence showed that no less than three applications were made to the Imperial Government at various times for assistance in the shape of officers, troops, and regiments. He knew it was stated that the Papers would be laid on the Table of the House on Saturday or Monday—they would show, beyond doubt, that the requests made by Sir Bartle Frere and Lord Chelmsford had not been fully complied with—but what was the real position of things with regard to their applications? The first application was made at the desire of Lord Chelmsford through Sir Bartle Frere. It was an application for two special classes of officers, for two regiments of infantry and one of cavalry. ["No!"] The words of the despatch were that the presence of "one regiment of cavalry would be of enormous importance." At first there was a distinct refusal to give any additional support whatever, with the exception of certain officers. He could not see the advantage of sending those officers to drill Native troops, seeing how impossible it was to train them to order within a short space of time, and he looked on their services in that respect as valueless. Then, after having refused all those troops, the Government subsequently, upon a third application, sent two regiments of infantry.

THE EARL OF LONGFORD said, he had to apologize for interrupting the noble Lord; but he wished to know whether he was asking his Question or answering it?

LORD TRURO said, he was making some observations with a view to elicit a reply to his Questions from the noble Earl the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, who, speaking last night, appeared to be under some misconception. His (Lord Truro's) desire was to show that the first intention and policy of the Government was that there should be no attack made on Zululand. They refused, in the first instance, to give any assistance to the Colony of Natal; but they subsequently complied, and gave two regiments for its protection. But what had they done now? Although they gave a limited amount of troops as compared with the number demanded for the purpose of defending Natal, they changed their policy and waged war against the Zulus, and that without waiting for additional reinforcements. It was said by the noble Earl that they had now sent a more than ample force, probably excessive reinforcements; but that they did after the disaster had occurred—in the first instance, they refused to send any troops whatever. As to the regiments going out, their Lordships knew the condition in which regiments were sometimes sent, and that to make up their full strength they were obliged to have 200 or 300 volunteers from other regiments; who, therefore, would have to fight under officers to whom they were not accustomed. They were, therefore, inefficient for immediate active service, however excellent as soldiers the volunteers might be, as they ought to be known by their officers, and know and have reliance in their officers. He hoped that the noble Earl would give their Lordships some information as to the calibre of the guns which had been and were about to be sent out to South Africa. For his part, he could not help thinking that the public mind would not be satisfied that it was not until repeated applications had been made and pressure had been put upon the Government by able, prudent, and cautious men, that they complied with the demand for reinforcements, and then sent fewer than had been demanded, and that at a time of great emergency, and when there was a possibility of the dire calamity happening which had since taken place.

EARL CADOGAN said, that the noble Lord (Lord Truro), in putting and answering his Questions, had endeavoured to draw him into a discussion on the general merits of the war which was now raging in South Africa. He most respectfully declined to be drawn into any such discussion. He would do his best to answer the noble Lord, although he could not promise that his answer would differ very much from that which he had given on the same subject last night. The noble Lord seemed to think that he was under a misconception with respect to the Correspondence. Well, he did not like to return the compliment; but the noble Lord had failed to show in what respect he had misconceived it. It was true that in Sir Bartle Frere's despatch, dated the 14th of September, stating that General Thesiger thought two regiments of infantry "necessary," he added that one regiment of cavalry would be of "enormous advantage;" but in a despatch written on the same day by General Thesiger—namely, the 14th of September—and which was not included in the Blue Book, being a despatch to the War Office, which would be in their Lordships' hands immediately, the General detailed the forces he would require, and requested that two regiments of infantry might be sent; but he made no mention of cavalry. It was true that the Government did not at first see fit to send out the reinforcements, but did send the special officers demanded. A further request was made in a Memorandum written by Lord Chelmsford, and dated the 28th of September, which concluded by stating that—

> "For offensive purposes alone the Natal and Transvaal Colonies require three battalions of infantry in addition to the forces we have already got,"

and he added that a battalion of the 24th Regiment was already available, and requested that the remaining two should be sent from England. No request was then made for a regiment of cavalry, and the two regiments of infantry were sent out. The noble Lord asked the date at which they were despatched. He was sorry he did not know the exact date, but he thought they were sent the first week in December. The Papers, however, to be furnished by the War Office would answer the noble Lord's Question. With regard to the last part of the Question, he had only to state that if the noble Lord moved for a Return of the nature of one which had already been moved for on the same subject in "another place," there would be no objection to its being granted.

LORD TRURO, referring to the question of reinforcements, said, he should have thought that the desire for a cavalry regiment so distinctly and energetically expressed by Sir Bartle Frere in one of his earlier communications would have been sufficient to have induced the Government to have supplied the want without hesitation.

THE MINISTERIAL STATEMENT.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION.

Earl CADOGAN proceeded to say that he wished, on behalf of his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies, to make a statement of a personal character. The noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville), in his speech last night, was said—and in his (Earl Cadogan's) recollection correctly — to have attributed to the Secretary of State for the Colonies a statement that the policy of the Government was "annexation in all parts of the world." His right hon. Friend had requested him to state to their Lordships that he must repudiate altogether the use of the words attributed to him. Everyone who knew the noble Earl must be aware that he would not willingly impute to another language he had not used; but as his right hon. Friend had no power of addressing their Lordships, he had requested him to say that he did not know from what report the noble Earl had quoted, but that he certainly did not use the words ascribed to him, and he was confident that those he did use could not have conveyed such a meaning to the audience he addressed.

Earl GRANVILLE said, he was extremely sorry if he had misquoted the right hon. Baronet. He had not brought down the report from which he had quoted, because he was not aware that the subject was going to be brought up. He had been struck by a passage in which, adopting a sentence which was not quite new, after talking of the competition to which this country was subject in Europe and America, he was reported to have said—"We have been subject to competition in Europe and America—cannot we then call in a new Continent to redress the balance of the old." Whether this applied to the annexation of Zululand he could not say. He further was reported to have said, referring to what he called the bold and necessary step of annexation in South Africa taken by Lord Carnarvon, that he regretted that Lord Carnarvon did not join in the same policy in other parts of the globe. As, however, the right hon. Gentleman disavowed the language thus imputed to him, he entirely accepted the disavowal.

THE PLAGUE IN RUSSIA—SANITARY PRECAUTIONS.

QUESTION. MOTION FOR A PAPER.

The Earl of CARNARVON asked Her Majesty's Government, What measures they have taken, either separately or in conjunction with other Governments, to ascertain the nature and most effective treatment of the pestilence now raging in parts of Russia? and to move for copies of any sanitary regulations issued as regards English ports and of quarantine regulations in force in Malta and Gibraltar. The importance of the subject could hardly be over-estimated, for although there was some uncertainty as to the nature and the best mode of treating the disease, there could be no doubt that it was of a contagious and deadly character, bearing a strong resemblance, in the majority of its external symptoms, to the worst class of Asiatic plague that had raged in former years. Perhaps there was no one of their Lordships who was more entitled than himself to call attention to this matter, because he had not only seen Asiatic plague raging, but had himself suffered from it so severely that, although the attack occurred many years ago, he still entertained a lively impression of its horrors and danger. Most of the Governments of Eastern Europe had already adopted precautionary measures against the introduction of the plague within their borders; and he thought it desirable to ascertain what steps Her Majesty's Government, for their part, had taken in regard to it. He would specially ask the noble Duke what measures had been taken by the authorities at Malta and Gibraltar. He was glad to see that the College of Physicians had already moved in the matter. So far as the existing evidence went, there was reason to believe that the most effective means of preventing the importation of the disease was quarantine; and although perfectly aware of the great inconvenience of this remedy, he trusted that, in view of the terrible interests at stake, no merely theoretical objection to it would be allowed to prevail.

The Duke of RICHMOND and GORDON: In reply to the last part of the Question, I can assure the noble

Earl that the subject of the plague has occupied the very serious and earnest attention of Her Majesty's Government, and they are already taking such measures as have seemed to them advisable in dealing with the plague, with the view of preventing its reaching this country. Germany and Austria, if I am not mistaken, have already received permission from the Russian Government each to send a competent physician to assist in an inquiry as to the origin of the plague and the best means of treating and dealing with it when it arises. Her Majesty's Government have also made a proposal to the Russian Government to be allowed to send a physician to take part in the same inquiry; and I have been in communication with the College of Physicians, and have requested that they would be good enough to recommend to Her Majesty's Government some gentleman whom they would think to be a fit and proper person to take part in such an inquiry, provided always that we receive the permission of the Russian Government to do so. I have also instructed the officers of Customs to inspect very narrowly the bills of health of all passengers and crews of ships coming from the Black Sea and the Sea of Azof; and I have been in communication with the medical advisers of the Government, requesting them to point out what goods they consider most calculated to carry infection. I have also been in communication with the quarantine officer of the Privy Council, a very eminent gentleman, and I have asked him whether anything can be suggested in the mode of disinfection employed that may be advantageously used, should, unhappily, this dreadful scourge visit this country, which I do not myself anticipate. I will read an extract from a letter I have received from Dr. Wiblin, the resident Medical Superintendent of Quarantine at Southampton. He says—

> "With reference to your inquiries on the subject of disinfection, I can very safely and satisfactorily inform you, after a very long experience, that every possible security from infection of persons and goods may be relied upon by the free employment of nitrous acid fumes, produced by pouring fuming nitric acid upon copper filings. This is very easily done, and the results are most satisfactory. No living atom or molecule or man himself can exist in these fumes for more than a few seconds, as Dr. Seaton can testify from his personal experience at the Motherbank."

Whether that is satisfactory or not, it shows the strength of this disinfectant. He continues—

> "Any given number of plates or other convenient vessels are arranged with given quantities of copper filings, and then the acid is poured into the plates. The portholes and other openings are then closed for 12 hours or longer, and the goods subsequently exposed to the purifying influence of the atmosphere for days."

So far as this disinfectant goes, I think my noble Friend will admit we have sufficient practical knowledge of what can be done in case the necessity should arise. I have also put myself in communication with the College of Physicians upon this subject; and I have had an interview with the eminent President of that body, Dr. Bennett, who informed me that the College are to hold a meeting upon this subject, and promised to communicate to me the result of the discussion, and any suggestion which might occur to him or his colleagues after they had gone thoroughly into the matter. As regards the regulations on the subject, I feel that under the quarantine laws we have ample power to take any measures that may be necessary should the plague reach this country; and we are prepared to act at a moment's notice. I have instructed the Customs to detain any vessel from any part of the world if there are any suspicious circumstances connected with that vessel when it reaches this country, and that they are at once to telegraph to the Privy Council Office, when I shall take the requisite means for dealing with it. At the Motherbank there is an ample quarantine establishment of three vessels; and upon an emergency we could easily obtain, in different parts of the country, other vessels for the purpose of separating healthy passengers from those who may be sick, and preventing communication with persons on shore. It has not been thought advisable to keep up permanently a very large establishment of quarantine vessels. That would, of course, be very expensive, and it would be a useless expenditure of publi money if we thought, as we do, that we had the means of acquiring these vessels at any time, should the plague visit this country. I am informed by the Colonial Office that Gibraltar has not reported having imposed any quarantine against the plague. Malta has provisionally, and subject to rectification, imposed quarantine of 20 days on arrivals from Greece, Montenegro, the Turkish Empire, including Egypt (except ships passing through the Suez Canal), Tripoli, Tunis, Black Sea, and Sea of Azof —which, in case of ships of war, is reduced to nine days. The propriety of ratifying these arrangements is being considered by the Colonial Office, Admiralty, and Board of Trade. Malta has imposed this quarantine because Italy has taken a similar course, and would have imposed quarantine on arrivals from Malta if the Island had not taken this course. With regard to the regulations issued, and which my noble Friend proposes to move for, I hope he will be satisfied with having elicited this answer from me. The regulations are numerous and bulky, and it would not be convenient for any purpose that they should be laid on the Table. I can assure him that the matter has had the very earnest attention of the Government, and will not be lost sight of, though we have no ground for believing that there need be any alarm or apprehension of the arrival of the plague in this country.

THE EARL OF CARNARVON said, he was satisfied with the answer of the noble Duke, and would not move for Papers.

INTEMPERANCE.

MOTION FOR A SELECT COMMITTEE.

Moved that a Select Committee be appointed for the purpose of inquiring into the prevalence of habits of intemperance, and into the manner in which those habits have been affected by recent legislation and other causes.—(*The Lord Aberdare.*)

Motion *agreed to.*

The Lords following were named of the Committee:—

L. Abp. Canterbury.
L. Abp. York.
D. Westminster.
E. Belmore.
E. Onslow.
E. Minto.
E. Morley.
E. Dudley.
E. Kimberley.
V. Gordon.
V. Hutchinson.
L. Bp. Peterborough.
L. Bp. Exeter.
L. Bp. Carlisle.
L. Hartismere.
L. Penrhyn.
L. Aberdare.
L. Cottesloe.

The Committee to meet on *Tuesday* the 25*th of February*, at Twelve o'clock, and to appoint their own Chairman.

House adjourned at half past Seven o'clock, to Monday next, a quarter before Five o'clock.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Friday, 14*th February*, 1879.

MINUTES.]—NEW MEMBERS SWORN—Lieutenant Colonel Charles George Tottenham, *for* New Ross Borough; Sir Thomas M'Clure, baronet, *for* Londonderry County.

SELECT COMMITTEE — Standing Orders, *nominated;* Selection, *nominated;* Inclosures, *appointed.*

PUBLIC BILLS—*Resolution in Committee—Ordered —First Reading*—Banking Laws Amendment* [73].

Ordered — First Reading — Election Petitions (Costs) * [72]; Valuation of Property * [71]; Municipal Franchise (Ireland) * [74]; Employers' Liability for Injuries to Servants * [75]; Summary Jurisdiction * [69]; Prosecution of Offences * [68]; Coroners * [67]; Public Works Loans * [70].

Second Reading—Racecourses (Metropolis) [48].

Second Reading—Referred to Select Committee—Sale of Food and Drugs Act (1875) Amendment [56].

Committee—Ancient Monuments [52]—R.P.

Third Reading — Disqualification by Medical Relief [22], and *passed.*

QUESTIONS.

AFGHANISTAN—DECLARATION OF GENERAL ROBERTS.—QUESTION.

SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL asked the Under Secretary of State for India, If it is true that on the 26th December last General Roberts held a Durbar at Hagarpir, in the Khurum Valley, and made a speech to the Khans and headmen of the tribes, impressing on them emphatically that the Ameer's rule had for ever passed away, and that they must henceforth look to England as their sovereign power and to the Government of the Empress; and, whether the Indian Government had the authority of Her Majesty's Government to cause that declaration to be made, or Her Majesty's Government has since accepted and adopted that declaration?

MR. E. STANHOPE: Sir, with the permission of the House, I will answer at the same time a similar Question which stands in the name of the hon. and gallant Member for Longford County (Mr. O'Reilly). We have not as yet received, either in official despatches or in private letters, any information on this subject. I have read the statements in the newspapers as to General Roberts to which the hon. Members refer; but the House will see that I am not yet in a position to say whether those statements are accurate or not.

CONTAGIOUS DISEASES (ANIMALS) ACT, 1878 — CATTLE FROM THE UNITED STATES.—QUESTIONS.

MR. RATHBONE asked the Vice President of the Council, Upon what grounds the Government have ordered the slaughter at the port of landing of cattle arriving in this Country from the United States of America; whether any cases of pleuro-pneumonia have occurred among any cattle arriving from the United States except those brought over by the "Ontario;" how many cargoes of cattle from the United States have arrived since that of the "Ontario"; whether there has been any correspondence with the Government of the United States, or its representatives, or with our representatives in that country, on the subject, and whether there are any minutes relating thereto; and, if so, whether he will lay Copies thereof upon the Table of the House; and, whether the Government have any, and, if so, what proof that the animals in the "Ontario's" cargo which were affected were American and not Canadian cattle?

MR. CHAPLIN asked the Vice President of the Council, If he can state to the House, whether Her Majesty's Government have received any information as to the outbreak of disease among cattle in the United States of America; how far and to what extent it is true as reported that contagious pleuro-pneumonia is prevalent at the present time in that country; whether Her Majesty's Government are satisfied that the general sanitary condition of cattle therein is such as to afford reasonable security against the importation of diseased animals therefrom into this Country; and, if not, if he would explain why the Order in Council exempting American cattle from the operation of the provisions of the fifth Schedule of the Contagious Diseases Animals Act relating to foreign animals —viz.: "They are not to be moved alive out of the wharf," is not suspended immediately, instead of remaining in force till the 3rd of March?

MR. MUNDELLA asked the Vice President of the Council, If he will state the number of live cattle, sheep, and pigs imported from Canada and the United States respectively in the first and second half-years of 1878, with the number found suffering from contagious disease; if he will also state the circumstances under which the recent Order in Council was issued requiring the slaughter of all American cattle at the port of debarkation, and whether there is any probability of such Order being speedily withdrawn; and, if he will lay all the Correspondence relating thereto upon the Table of the House?

LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: Sir, the facts upon which the Order in Council was made are very simple. For some time past the Privy Council have from different quarters received intimations that there was in the United States a considerable amount of disease among cattle and other domestic animals. I have in my hand a Report, or rather a Message from the President of the United States communicating to the Senate in February, 1878, information in relation to the diseases prevailing amongst swine and other domestic animals. In the Appendix, page 144, of this Report, are the opinions of the different men of authority and experience upon the subject. I need not trouble the House with their Reports; but I will read a few lines from Professor James Law, one of the most eminent of those consulted. He says, page 144—

> "Lung Fever.—This is the most insidious of all plagues, and this malady we harbour on our eastern seaboard, where it is gradually but almost imperceptibly invading new territory . . . . There is abundant evidence of the existence of this affection in Eastern New York, in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, Virginia, and the district of Columbia. (See Government Report on Diseases of Cattle, 1871, and many instances in current agricultural journals). Within the last year I have been advised in the case of three outbreaks,—one in Eastern New York, one on Staten Island, and one in New Jersey. At present it excites little apprehension, but we are asleep over a smouldering volcano. Spreading from the port of New York, it has already gained a substantial hold upon different States, including the district of Columbia, and has invaded and been repeatedly expelled from two more, and it is only requisite that it should reach the sources of our stock supplies in the West to

infect our railway cars and Eastern States generally. . . England has lost over 10,000,000 dollars from rinderpest in the present century, but she has lost hundreds of millions from the less-dreaded lung fever."

He concludes by imploring the Government to eradicate this plague at once. Well, Sir, the Lord President did not feel justified in excluding, upon the information before him, the import of live cattle except for slaughter from the United States until he had conclusive proof of what the nature of this lung disease was, and that there was a real danger of pleuro-pneumonia being brought into the country from the States—there being no single case of that disease being brought from the United States up to 26th of January, 1879. During the last three weeks pleuro-pneumonia of a contagious character has been detected in three cargoes of live cattle, brought over in the steamships *Dominion* and *Ontario*, from Portland, and the *Istrian*, from Boston. An Order was therefore issued, prohibiting import of live cattle from the United States after the 3rd of March, except for immediate slaughter, but not from Canada, which is not only quite free from disease, but has recently issued an Order prohibiting the import of live cattle from the United States. Twelve cargoes have arrived since that of the *Ontario*, all healthy, except in the case of the *Istrian*. The date of the 3rd of March was fixed, as it was considered only fair to allow cargoes shipped at the time of the Order to be landed, if healthy. If any disease exists among them, all will be slaughtered. It is hoped that by the 3rd March a foreign animals wharf will be opened at Birkenhead, with every accommodation for the slaughter of animals coming from the United States. On the Liverpool side ample accommodation will be provided by the same date for the lairage; and, if necessary, the slaughter of animals from unscheduled countries, and the present inconvenient landing-place be abandoned. I will lay the Correspondence asked for, together with the Report I have alluded to, upon the Table of the House.

Mr. W. E. FORSTER asked, Whether the information referred to was known to the Government in time to be utilized in the preparation of the measure of last year?

Lord GEORGE HAMILTON said, he was not quite certain on that point, although he knew it was in the possession of the Lord President when he issued the Orders in Council in November last.

ARMY—BREECH-LOADING ORDNANCE.

QUESTION.

Major NOLAN asked the Surveyor General of the Ordnance, If reports have been recently received from the Heavy Gun Committee, containing reference to the advantages of breech-loading ordnance; and, if so, is he prepared to lay such Reports or extracts therefrom upon the Table; and, if he will state what experiments on breech-loading guns have been determined on for the coming year?

Lord EUSTACE CECIL: Sir, there will be no objection to placing the Reports mentioned by the hon. and gallant Gentleman upon the Table as soon as the experiments are decided upon. At present no decision as to experiments has been arrived at; but designs for heavy breech-loading guns are under consideration, and have been for some months.

HIGHWAYS AND LOCOMOTIVES ACT, 1878.—QUESTION.

Mr. ESTCOURT asked the President of the Local Government Board, Whether the Highway and Locomotives Act, 1878, may be considered an optional, or whether it is a compulsory measure?

Mr. SCLATER-BOOTH: Sir, I hardly know whether my opinion is worth more than that of my hon. Friend. I should say that "compulsory" is a hard word, but that the Act is of the same obligation as other Acts of Parliament, though, no doubt, there is reserved to local authorities a good deal of discretion as to the extent to which the powers contained in the Act should be put into operation.

SOUTH AFRICA—THE ZULU WAR—THE REINFORCEMENTS.—QUESTION.

Colonel MURE asked the Secretary of State for War, Whether he will grant a Return of the ages and lengths of service of the non-commissioned officers and rank and file, exclusive of band and drummers, of the infantry regiments at present under orders, or that would be despatched to reinforce Her Majesty's Forces at the Cape of Good Hope and Zululand?

COLONEL STANLEY: There would be no objection to giving the Return which my hon. and gallant Friend asks for, could it be given without any interference with the actual duties which these regiments are engaged in prior to their embarking.

COLONEL MURE said, these Returns could be made up after the regiments had been embarked.

COLONEL STANLEY: That is the only reservation I want to make.

SOUTH AFRICA—CAPE COLONY—THE MOUNTED POLICE.

QUESTION.

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether it is true that persons who had contracted to serve the Cape Government in a civil capacity in the "Mounted Police" have been by a Colonial Law compelled, without the option of discharge, to serve in a military capacity in a force called the "Mounted Rifles"; whether those who respectfully refused to submit to this arrangement were not tried by court martial and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and hard labour, which involves their working on the roads of the Colony with common convicts; and, whether Her Majesty's Government propose to take any action in the matter?

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH, in reply, said, he was unable within reasonable limits to give an answer to the Question. If the noble Lord would wait for two or three days until the next volume of the Cape Papers was issued, he would find all the facts in the Correspondence that had taken place on the subject.

POST OFFICE SAVINGS BANKS.

QUESTION.

MR. WAIT asked the Postmaster General, Whether he will consent to alter the regulations of the Post Office Savings Banks made under the authority of the Act 24 Vic. c. 14, so as to allow depositors to deposit to the extent of £100 per year, instead of £30 as at present, and to extend the total amount which may stand in each depositor's name to £300, instead of £150 as at present?

LORD JOHN MANNERS, in reply, said, that it was the intention of the Government to introduce a measure respecting Postal Savings Banks, and that it would contain new provisions on the subject referred to by the hon. Member.

THE TREATY OF BERLIN — THE GREEK FRONTIER.—QUESTIONS.

MR. WAIT asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, If Her Majesty's Government have taken action in support of the Despatch dated 21st October 1878, addressed by the Minister of France for Foreign Affairs to the Turkish Government, in reference to a rectification of the Greek frontier; and, whether he is in a position to inform the House that this important object, recommended by the Treaty of Berlin, is in a fair way of being carried out?

MR. BOURKE: Sir, there is no despatch at the Foreign Office as to the Greek Frontier such as that described in the Question of my hon. Friend—namely, a despatch of October 21 from the French Government to the Turkish Government. With regard to the second Question, I have to state that negotiations in conformity with the Treaty of Berlin are now being carried on.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE: I hope the hon. Gentleman will allow me to put a Question arising out of his answer. Do I understand him to say there is no French despatch of October 21 in regard to the Greek claims, or merely that there is no French despatch to Turkey?

MR. BOURKE: I answered the Question as it was put down, and any other course would have misled the House. My answer to the hon. Gentleman is strictly correct. The Question of the hon. Baronet is totally different. The despatch mentioned is a Circular addressed to the Powers, which will be found in the Papers. To show how wrong I should be to give a different answer, I will remind the House that the Turkish Government, which, according to my hon. Friend, was addressed by the French Government, is, in fact, the only Power concerned which has not been so addressed.

THE MEDICAL ACTS—THE MEDICAL COUNCIL.—QUESTION.

Mr. WADDY asked the Vice President of the Council, Whether the Government has received from the General Medical Council the Report on the working and constitution of the Council promised in July last; if not, whether the Government has any hope of soon receiving it, and will consent (in deference to the wish for a change in the constitution of the General Medical Council) to postpone legislation for amending the Medical Acts till this part of the subject can be included?

Lord GEORGE HAMILTON: Sir, the Government have not received at present any communication from the Medical Council on the subject of the working of the Council. The Medical Council referred the subject to its Executive Council, and since that time there has been no meeting of the Council. The amendment of the Medical Acts as regards education, foreign diplomas, education of midwives, and other important matters contained in the Government Bill of last year, can proceed without prejudicing the subject of the Medical Council; but, as before stated, the Government desire to obtain further information before coming to a decision, and propose to constitute an inquiry into the subject of the constitution of the Medical Council.

THE PLAGUE IN RUSSIA—MEDICAL REPORTS.—QUESTION.

Mr. WADDY asked the President of the Local Government Board, in view of the recent appearance of plague in Europe, Whether the several Reports presented to the Local Government Board since the reappearance of the disease in Eastern Countries, and printed in successive Reports of its medical officers, could be brought together and printed as one paper for the information of Members?

Mr. SCLATER-BOOTH, in reply, said, he had given directions that the medical Reports relating to the reappearance of the disease should be collated and presented to the House.

SOUTH AFRICA—THE ZULU WAR—THE REINFORCEMENTS.—QUESTION.

Colonel MURE asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether he will lay upon the Table in their absolute entirety, every line of the Correspondence which has taken place between the authorities, Civil and Military, Imperial, or Colonial, in regard to the question of reinforcements of every arm for the Army in South Africa?

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: Sir, there has been every disposition, on the part of my right hon. Friends the Secretaries of State for the Colonies and for War, to give the whole of the information in the possession of the Government with regard to this subject. My right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary, in the Papers which he has already laid upon the Table, has not only given the usual official Correspondence, but has, in several instances, given personal and private and confidential telegrams such as are not usually laid before the House. He tells me he will look again, to be sure that he has not omitted anything; and my right hon. and gallant Friend the Secretary of State for War will do the same.

Colonel MURE: I beg to say that I referred not only to the past, but also to the future.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: Of course I intend my answer to apply, not only to what has been presented, but to the Correspondence that has since taken place and will take place.

POOR LAW (IRELAND)—REMOVAL OF IRISH POOR.—QUESTION.

Mr. O'REILLY asked the President of the Local Government Board, Whether he intends to introduce any measure this Session to remove the evils attending the removal of Irish poor, which this House resolved required redress?

Mr. SCLATER-BOOTH: Sir, I cannot answer this Question without expressing my sense of the loss which the

House has sustained by the death of the hon. Member for Cork (Mr. M'Carthy Downing), who took so much interest in it. On the last occasion, when I made proposals in the form of a Bill intended to deal with the particular question of removals to Ireland, the House considered that the proposal ought to be extended to England and Scotland. Considering the recent alterations in the general law with regard to removal and settlement, I am not in a position, at this moment, to make further proposals, except this—that I think it would be useful to refer the subject to a Select Committee, with special reference to the case of removals in Ireland. My hon. Friend the Secretary to the Local Government Board will, in a few days, move for such a Committee.

INDIA—REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE—THE INDIAN BUDGET.

QUESTION.

GENERAL SIR **GEORGE BALFOUR** asked the Under Secretary of State for India, To lay upon the Table Summaries of the Revenues and Expenditure, showing those of the actuals for 1877-8, of the regular Estimate for 1878-9, and of the Budget for 1879-80?

MR. **E. STANHOPE**: We have not yet received the figures to which the hon. and gallant Gentleman refers; but he will have observed from what was stated yesterday that the Budget is likely to be published in India about the end of this month.

CONTAGIOUS DISEASES (ANIMALS) ACT, 1878—SECTION 34 — FARM DAIRIES.—QUESTION.

MR. **PAGET** asked the Vice President of the Council, Whether the registration of dairymen and all other provisions of the Order of Council of the 4th instant, which every local authority in Great Britain is ordered to enforce, are to apply to all ordinary farm dairies in rural districts? He also wished to know who was to decide whether the ventilation and water supply referred to in the sub-section were all that they should be? He also asked the noble Lord to state his definition of "persons carrying on trade;" would it apply to private dairies?——

MR. **O'REILLY** rose to Order, and protested against the hon. Gentleman putting a series of Questions of which he had given no Notice.

LORD **GEORGE HAMILTON**: Sir, as regards the first part of the Question, the registration is intended to apply to all those who sell dairy produce, except, of course, private farms and private dairies.

HIGHWAYS AND LOCOMOTIVES (AMENDMENT) ACT, 1878.—QUESTION.

SIR **HENRY JACKSON** asked the President of the Local Government Board, Whether the Local Government Board have prepared any model bye-laws for the guidance of county authorities in framing bye-laws in accordance with Clause 26 of "The Highways and Locomotives (Amendment) Act, 1878;" and, if not, whether it is intended to prepare any such model bye-laws?

MR. **SCLATER-BOOTH**, in reply, said, it was the intention of the Local Government Board to frame model bye-laws for the guidance of the county authorities as soon as sufficient experience of the suggestions of those authorities had been gained.

NATIONAL EDUCATION (IRELAND)—NATIONAL SCHOOL TEACHERS.

QUESTION.

MR. **MELDON** asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Whether the subject of the grievances and claims of the Irish National Teachers has received the consideration of the Government; and, if so, what means the Government propose to adopt to remove such grievances and to satisfy the claims of the teachers?

MR. **J. LOWTHER**: Yes, Sir; the matter has been under the consideration of the Government, and we propose to introduce a Bill on the subject?

FLOODS AND CONSERVANCY BOARDS —LEGISLATION.—QUESTION.

MR. **CHAPLIN** asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, If the Government intend during this Session to introduce any measure dealing with the question of floods and conservancy boards?

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, in reply, said, that the President of the Local Government Board and the Lord President of the Council had been in communication on the subject, and a Bill had been prepared which would be introduced shortly.

ORDERS OF THE DAY.

SUPPLY.—COMMITTEE.

Order for Committee read.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

BOROUGH FRANCHISE (IRELAND).

RESOLUTION.

MR. MELDON, in rising to call attention to the restricted nature of the Borough Franchise in Ireland; and to move—

> "That the restricted nature of the Borough Franchise in Ireland as compared with that existing in England and Scotland is a subject deserving the immediate attention of Parliament, with the view of establishing a fair and just equality of the Franchise in the three Countries,"

said, that this was the sixth time, during the present Parliament, he had risen to ask the House to do a simple act of justice to Ireland. He appealed to Her Majesty's Government to extend to Ireland a privilege which had been extended to England and Scotland in 1867. Was it consistent with truth and honour for them to deny this privilege to Ireland, and yet, at the same time, to lay it down as one of their principles that they extended to Ireland the same rights that were possessed by England and Scotland? When Irish questions were brought forward they were usually met by the reply that claims were being made for Ireland which had not been granted to the people of England; but, in this case, the facts he desired to lay before the House would show that it was totally inconsistent with those declarations to maintain the present law of borough franchise. The present time was very opportune for a settlement of this question. When the matter was brought forward at the commencement of the present Parliament, its supporters were told that its settlement would necessarily lead to a Dissolution. This objection was at that time not without force; but it was one that was no longer valid, because at present they were on the eve of a General Election. It was not a Party question, for it had been introduced by the Conservative Party themselves, under the leadership of the present Prime Minister in 1867. The issue before the House was this, whether Ireland was or was not to be governed by equal laws with England? Since the Resolution was last before the House there had been an expression of opinion throughout this country in the Conservative Press that the Government had not the slightest excuse for further delaying a settlement, and up to the present moment the Conservative Press in England had advocated the assimilation of the borough franchise of the three countries, and hopes had been held out to the Irish people, either through the Press or otherwise, that the Government would take the question up. They had very recently heard it stated that the people of Ireland were not inclined to look with favour upon the action of the Government with respect to this matter. But this was not the case. There had been a very strong feeling in Ireland that the intentions of the Government on this question were honourable. It was only now that they learned to their great disappointment that, instead of the policy of conciliation which was introduced last Session, they were to have a policy of exasperation. It had been stated to him by hon. Gentlemen that whilst they thoroughly approved of his Motion, they should abstain from voting for it, because of the pressure put upon them by the Government. He, however, appealed to the independent Members of the House not to allow themselves to be influenced on this question by the opinion of one Cabinet Minister, but to determine the case on its merits. Last Session they thought themselves entitled, from the tone of the hon. Member's gracious speech, to conclude that a policy of conciliation would then be adopted when the Intermediate Education Bill was indicated. But a change took place in the councils of the Ministry, and it was only under great pressure, and under exceptional circumstances, that the Bill was introduced after all. In the present Session, however, they found that nothing was being done for Ireland, and under those circumstances he was justified in saying that a policy of exasperation had been adopted, and that the principle of conciliation had been thrown to the winds. The present Prime Minister, when introducing the borough franchise for England, laid it down that the franchise was the political right of every citizen who was able to keep a house above his head and to assist in the support of his poorer brethren? What was there in that principle which did not apply equally to Ireland? He challenged anyone to find anything in the circumstances of the two countries that could justify the difference in the application of the principle. The qualification for the borough franchise in Ireland was the occupation of a house rated at not less than £4; but, owing to the mode of valuation, a house rated at £4 in Ireland would be worth £6 in England, so that there was even a greater difference between the two systems than at first appeared. The difference between the electoral condition of England and Scotland and Ireland was very striking. Thus the 31 boroughs in Ireland, having a population of 866,356, had only 54,218 electors, between them returning 39 Members; while Glasgow, with a population of 470,456, had 60,582 electors; Liverpool, with a population of 493,405, had 61,143 electors; and Manchester, with a population of 379,374, had 62,813 voters. The boroughs of England, having a population of 10,600,000, returned 297 Members by 1,539,000 votes; and those of Scotland, with a population of 479,391, returned 26 Members by 203,364 votes. Further, though the number of electors had been trebled in England between 1868 and the present time, the entire increase in Ireland during the same period was something less than 20,000. All this spoke volumes in favour of the claim which he put before the House, and made the strength of his case overwhelming. What distinction was there between the three countries to justify this difference between the proportion of electors to population? The Irish people were quite—and, indeed, in matters of politics, even more intelligent than similar classes in this country. What reason, then, was there that the citizen in one portion of the United Kingdom should be deprived of the political rights held by citizens in other portions? Again, by what process of reasoning could it be made just that an Irishman enjoying a vote at Liverpool should be disfranchised by the simple act of removing to the other side of the Channel? The number of county and borough electors in England and Scotland bore an entirely different proportion to that of Ireland. In England and Scotland the large majority of the electors were in the boroughs, while in Ireland the number of borough electors was insignificant as compared with those in the counties. He did not know any reason why this should be so. It had been said that to introduce household suffrage into the Irish boroughs would bring about a change in that country which might become dangerous; but no danger had resulted in this country from the change effected by the Reform Act of 1867, under which the number of the borough electors had been tripled. He was at a loss to conceive what there was to be said on the other side of that question. The question had been discussed five times in that House; but he could not discover any arguments which he had to answer. It might be urged that his proposal would necessitate a re-distribution of seats. Well, he was not terrified by that suggestion. He was perfectly prepared to meet a re-distribution of seats. He was for giving political power to the great mass of the people irrespective of whether they would support Members on one side of the House or on the other. The present Conservative Government said they were returned by the votes of the English working classes. If so, the extension of the franchise in England had operated for their advantage. He did not, however, agree in the necessity of a re-distribution of seats, because at present they had appointed a Commission for extending the boundaries of boroughs in Ireland. It might be said that they should delay the extension of the franchise until the boundaries of boroughs had been extended; but he maintained that the two things were quite distinct from, and independent of, each other. Let them extend the boundaries of boroughs as much as they pleased; but that was no reason for putting off the extension of the franchise. In England they did not wait for the extension of the boundaries of boroughs before extending the franchise, and he now said they should assimilate the law of the two countries. It had been stated that the people of Ireland had no great feeling on that subject; but he asserted that it had been much discussed throughout Ireland by public bodies, who had shown great interest in the proposal, and were uniformly in favour of it. Petitions had been sent in, but the question was too serious to be decided by Petitions. The feelings of the people of Ireland on the question would have been perfectly well known if not a single Petition had been presented. The rejection of his Motion would, he was convinced, produce great disappointment, and even exasperation, among the Irish people. In addition to the restricted nature of the franchise in Ireland, the enjoyment of that privilege was further circumscribed through the operation of the rating laws. He would appeal to the independent Members of the great Conservative Party not to allow the influence of the Government on that occasion to deprive Ireland of the redress which she now sought. In the interest of the Constitutional Party in Ireland, as represented in that House, he appealed to them as Englishmen desirous of maintaining the union between the two countries to do what was fair, just, and honourable in that matter, and not to throw out his Motion. If that union was to be continued, he asked them not to permit Party considerations to interfere with the vote they were about to give. Early in the present Parliament the House had refused to yield to the great pressure of the Government, and had virtually affirmed that the borough franchise of Ireland ought to be extended, because the Motion was defeated only by a majority of 13, which he regarded as a practical expression of the opinion of the House that the advocates of the proposal had reason and justice on their side. Last Session, again, there was only a majority of 8 against them; and he thought the time had now come when that question ought to be settled. The hon. and learned Gentleman concluded by moving the Resolution of which he had given Notice.

Mr. GRAY said, he rose to second the Motion for the third time since he had been a Member of the House. He did so with very little hope of the Motion leading to a successful result, for he understood that a more than usually urgent summons had been issued by the Government to their supporters to attend in force and crush this demand of the Irish Representatives. He was informed, moreover, that individual Members of the Government had exercised personal pressure on hon. Members opposite, who were really in favour of the Motion, to induce them to vote against it on this occasion. Yet when they considered that the Government usually commanded a majority of 60, and that this measure, proposed by a private Member on the Liberal side, had only been defeated by majorities of 5, 13, and 8, it must be admitted that they had virtually gained the victory. There had not been a shred of argument against the proposition. It was said that an assimilation of the Irish borough franchise with the English would swamp the existing constituencies and revolutionize the representation. Had the change made in England in 1867, and completed in 1869, had any such effect? Why should that be bad in Ireland which was thought good in England? By the legislation of 1867 and 1869 the English borough constituencies were trebled, and the Government deemed the change beneficial because it had brought them into power. The present proposal, on the other hand, would not even double the Irish borough constituencies, and yet it was held up as a revolutionary measure, which would destroy property by the force of numbers. That argument exemplified the saying that any stick was good enough to beat a dog with. What had puzzled him most in considering the attitude which Ministers had taken on this question was—what was the real motive which was actuating them? This Session had no doubt been initiated by a policy of exasperation towards Irish Members; but there must be some motive underlying that. A desire to irritate and insult could not account for it. There must be some motive underlying the determination of the Government to delay this measure, which must be granted sooner or later. Could it be that Ireland had been so tranquil that, as the Coercion Act was about to expire by lapse of time, the Government hoped, by exasperating the people, to drive them to some act which would furnish an excuse for the continuance of the Coercion Act? [*A laugh.*] The right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. J. Lowther) smiled; but the idea was not so far-fetched. When the English people desired a reform of the franchise they took determined measures, in order to show that their wishes should not be resisted, and hon. Members had not yet forgotten the disturbances in Hyde Park. If, however, similar riots occurred in the Phœnix Park at Dublin, the Government, instead of appointing one of the promoters of the movement to a Judgeship, would probably violate the law, as they had done on previous occasions, and instead of granting to the Irish people a Reform Act, which was their right, would give them a Coercion Act. Every expression of public opinion in Ireland was treated as sedition. As to the allegation that the Irish people had not sent up Petitions in favour of reform, he might remark that they might naturally feel disinclined to petition Parliament, inasmuch as their opinion, when expressed constitutionally through their Representatives, was not received in the House of Commons with the slightest regard or respect. The action of the Government had taught the Irish people that they were regarded as being outside the Constitution, and that any concession that was given to them was given for the policy and convenience of the Government, not for the benefit of the people, and it was never given in the manner nor at the time that the people required it. In point of fact, however, there had not been during the Recess a single public meeting in Ireland at which a Resolution was not passed in favour of assimilating the Irish to the English franchise. The popular Press of Ireland was also unanimous on the question, and had written warmly in support of the Motion. What further expression of public opinion could they have? If the motive he had suggested with respect to the Coercion Act was not the real spring of the action of the Government, he could suggest one even more ignoble though perhaps less criminal. They might, perhaps, have thought it desirable to exasperate some of the Irish Representatives in that House, and thereby to obtain an excuse for applying to them some exceptional measure. So many Irishmen had been enfranchised in England that in Manchester alone there were more Irish voters than in Dublin. These men had commenced to make their power felt by means of organization. Now, if by the refusal of the present demand and of other claims, the Government could obtain an excuse for applying to the Irish Party exceptional legislation, they might be able to excite such a prejudice against the Irish in England that the fact of the Irish vote being cast in favour of a candidate would rather injure than serve him. Or it might be that they had a still more pettifogging motive. It might be that they were merely postponing a settlement until after the General Election, in the hope of keeping a seat or two for a few years longer. These motives might be natural enough; but were they such as ought to actuate statesmen? He seconded the Motion without the slightest hope of its being carried. But in spite of the present majority of the Government, in spite of the Whips, in spite of the pressure on individual Members, who, if left free, would vote for the Motion, the time must come when this question would be settled; and all that the Government would gain by their attitude in exasperating the Irish people would be to make them feel that what otherwise they might be grateful for as a measure of peace, conciliation, and justice to the country, had been obtained in spite of them and not by their help.

Amendment proposed,

To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "the restricted nature of the Borough Franchise in Ireland as compared with that existing in England and Scotland is a subject deserving the immediate attention of Parliament, with a view of establishing a fair and just equality of the Franchise in the three Countries." — (*Mr. Meldon,*)

—instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

MR. CHARLES LEWIS, in opposing the Motion, said, that if he had to trouble the House with arguments and figures that had been previously used there, it arose from the necessity of the case in the Mover of the Motion not having given the House a scintilla of fact, and only laying before them one part of the case. He had carefully confined his remarks to considering population only, and a reference to what he called a policy of exasperation. Such a policy was not inaugurated on the Government Benches, but by those below the Gangway on his own side of the House. It had commenced in that House, and had been reiterated over and over again, with every sort of extravagant threats, out of the House, both with regard to the Ministry and hon. Members; but they would certainly have no effect on the Ministerial side of the House. For if he knew anything of the spirit or sense of honour which inspired hon. Members on the Government side of the House, it would certainly not be by threats such as had been used that their conduct on that or upon any other question would be influenced. The Mover of this Resolution had said that the whole of the Conservative Press of England were in favour of this measure; but he (Mr. Charles Lewis) ventured to doubt that statement. The hon. and learned Member had evidently been misled on that point. The subject of the extension of the Irish borough franchise, no doubt, appeared to many to be an easy one; but until people took the trouble to study it, they were misled by the fine phrase "assimilation of the franchise in England and Ireland." The House was told that all his hon. and learned Friend modestly asked for was that a Conservative Government should do now for Ireland what they did for England in 1867. But there was one thing which they did not do, and that was to hand over the electoral power in one part of the United Kingdom to persons rated below £4, and that was what was now proposed. So long as they excluded women from the franchise and required a man to pay rent and occupy a house, and so long as there were endless barriers to the introduction of that which he hoped he should never see in England — universal manhood suffrage — they would have to fall back on the principle from which the Legislature of England had never departed—that the franchise was not a mere right without conditions. One of the conditions necessary to annex to any lowering of the franchise in Ireland beyond the present point would be to show that the class which came in was qualified to exercise, as a body, the franchise conferred on them—that by doing so the House would not be enfranchising ignorance, bigotry, and superstition, and a class subject to those particular faults; and, above all, would not be handing over that electoral power to persons utterly unable to hold the status of citizens in any ordinary sense. The Seconder of the Amendment had said that the House and the Government never showed any respect to Irish opinion or Irish Petitions. Well, he knew something about the Sunday Closing Bill, and he believed that the House and the Government had submitted to it against their will in deference to Irish opinion. Again, was the Irish Church Act and the Irish Land Act passed by Parliament because they liked those measures? He believed he was correct in saying that there was not even a division on the second reading of the Irish Land Act, though many in the House thought it an infringement of one of the great safeguards of property—the right of free contract. With regard to the Resolution, he observed that it did not deal with the question of re-distribution; because the worst thing for the borough Members would be to touch the representation of boroughs in Ireland. ["No, no!"] How was it that the eager exponents of Irish opinion were found, not in borough, but in county Members, and that, on every such occasion as this, the curricle was harnessed with the hon. and learned Member for the county Kildare and the hon. Member for the county of Tipperary? And then the settlement the House was asked to deal with had been made in a Liberal House of Commons. No division was taken on the question of going below £4. The Liberal Party agreed to it because it was a far more liberal proposition than that which had been made by Lord Carlingford the year before, when he proposed £6. It was said they ought to assimilate the law between England and Ireland; but that argument proved too much, because, in that case, they ought not to have disturbed the balance between the two countries in the case of the Land and the Church. The fact was, the House of Commons had frequently treated Ireland more favourably than England in the matter of the franchise. Ireland had a £12 county franchise for some years; while, in the English counties, the franchise was £50. It was said that this Government would give Ireland nothing but Coercion Acts; but the fact was it cut down by two-thirds the Coercion Acts it had found in existence—it had made them a humane instead of an inhumane code. It had done away with the midnight searchings and other parts of the law which had been found harsh in operation. He often wondered why his hon. Friends opposite were so fretful about the borough franchise. Surely they had got a pretty good share of borough Members! There were 37 borough Members. Twenty of them rejoiced in the name of Home Rulers. What that meant they had not yet settled. They had had recent congresses and conferences and leagues; but, as far as the result was concerned, they had only squabbled over £300, and had not yet decided whether they should go on with three or two Leaders or with none at all. That was the condition of the Home Rulers; but they were strong in Parliament. He admitted that there were 10 Conservative Members out of the 37 borough Members; they were not particularly strong, and several of them were threatened with extinction. What was the class that was proposed to be introduced by this measure? Were they intelligent shopkeepers, or the best part of the working class — artizans, artificers, mechanics, &c., occupying a respectable position? No; they were men who lived in hovels, with members of the animal creation mixing with them. They were men who were rated at 10*s*. per annum; men who did not occupy among the working class that position of solidity and respectability which was the ordinary character of the working class in all our great towns, and which they would find, no doubt, in the great towns in Ireland. They used to hear great speeches about what was intended and what would be done by every series of reform measures; that they would enfranchise intelligence; that they would enfranchise those who had been educated, those who were educating themselves, and who were a credit to the country to which they belonged. He had no right to lay too great a stress on rent; but it was one test. Living in a respectable tenement was a great social test. The vast majority of the persons who were proposed to be brought in were rated below £2. To extend the franchise to such people would be to degrade it. Would the class proposed to be brought in be men who read newspapers, who gave attention to the discussion of great public events, home and foreign? Would they be free from improper influence, or, on the other hand, would they be amenable to clerical influence? Would they go to the poll to express their own convictions, or the wishes of the Church to which they belonged? He did not wish to say anything against any particular religious community, but when the whole of Europe was trying to resist priestly influence—when it was being resisted in England, whether on the part of one Church or another, he asked the House not to do anything to extend the priestly influence of any Church. In all the boroughs of Ireland, except the large boroughs of Belfast, Cork, and Dublin, there were only 24,463 male occupiers rated over £4. There were in those boroughs no less than 34,806 male occupiers rated at £4 and under. So that this proposal would bring in 10,000 more than the total number of existing voters. The English Reform Act of 1867 did nothing approaching that. He would include the three large boroughs of Belfast, Cork, and Dublin. In the whole borough constituency of Ireland there were 73,623 occupiers rated above £4; at and under £4 there were 56,902, or about 45 per cent of the whole were rated at and under £4. Now, he asked the House to consider whether they ought not to give a little weight to property and valuation. What was the valuation of the property of the two classes? The valuation of those rated above £4 was £1,226,000, while that of the class rated at and under £4 was £116,000, or an average valuation of £2 per head. In Galway, out of 3,554 houses, 1,896 were rated at and under £2. Galway returned two Members. There were 2,173 out of the 3,564 houses in Drogheda that were rated under 40*s*. In Waterford, out of 4,544 houses, there were 1,878 rated under 40*s*. In 1866 there were in the whole of the Parliamentary boroughs of England only 130,256 male occupiers under £4, while there were 1,222,300 above that amount; or, in words, one-tenth under and nine-tenths above it. Let the House compare these figures with those which he had given with respect to Ireland, which showed that more than one-half the male occupiers were under £4. The Government was threatened with all sorts of pains and penalties if they did not do for Irish borough constituencies what they did for the English constituencies in 1867; but he denied that the Government had done in 1867 what they were called upon to do now for Ireland. They gave a wide and liberal extension of the borough franchise; but they did not do for England what they were asked to do for Ireland by its so-called friends, but real enemies—namely, to transfer the electoral power to the lowest, the most ignorant, and the most debased of the population. One of the great arguments in favour of the Reform Act of 1866 was that the people demanded it, and that demand was backed up by the intelligence of the country. But had there been any demand by the Irish people for this measure? He did not allude to professional agitators, whether they were found upon the Benches of the House of Commons, in Town Councils, or other public bodies in Ireland. He asked what public opinion in Ireland had been manifested in favour of this Motion? He had again investigated the Report on Public Petitions for 1876, 1877, and 1878, to see if he could discover a scintilla of evidence that the people of Ireland, even under the tutelage of professional agitators, clerical and lay, had presented a single Petition; and the result was not a single Petition from any one of those Parliamentary boroughs that were so ill-treated, because they had not a more popular franchise. It was said, however, that the proposal was supported by the Town Councils of both the North and South of Ireland. Well, in reply to that assertion, he would merely observe that in the Town Council of Derry, whose members were equally divided so far as politics were concerned, not a single resolution on the subject of the borough franchise had been brought forward for the last three or four years, and that it was only at some Home Rule meeting that it had been discussed. But, at the same time, he was prepared to admit that the state of the representation of the boroughs of Ireland was simply scandalous. The whole of the constituencies of Manchester and Liverpool contained a population larger than the entire borough population of Ireland, and the former returned only six, while the latter returned 37 Members. There were no less than 10 boroughs in Ireland with a population of only 7,000; and how were large constituencies, he would ask, to be formed out of the materials which hon. Gentlemen opposite had at their disposal? The fact was that they seemed to be prepared to endow four-footed constituencies, if they could not get any other; and if they could not do that, they would, as the next best thing, endow those who lived with four-footed constituents. But to compare the position of the Irish boroughs and counties together, he would just point out that, while the former, with a population of 866,000, had 39 Members, including two which had been disfranchised, the counties, with a population of 4,548,713, had only 64 Members. The counties, therefore, had twice the population, but not twice the representation, of the boroughs. The adoption of the change proposed would be no real remedy for the existing scandalous state of the borough representation. No more serious question in connection with Ireland could be submitted to the judgment of the House. They would soon have before them that hardy annual, the Motion of the hon. Member for the Border Boroughs (Mr. Trevelyan) for the assimilation of the county and borough franchise, and, of course, it would be argued that what was good for England was good also for Ireland, so that the practical result of a departure from the settlement of 1867 would be recklessly to enfranchise every miserable cotter and hut owner from the Giant's Causeway to Cape Clear; and among its further results, though he was unwilling to say anything against any denomination, he was bound to mention the effect that the measure would have in sweeping away from the field of electoral power many of the most loyal and most respectable of the electors. Moreover, it would, in the end, wholly exclude from Parliament all the representatives of the Protestant religion. ["No, no!"] He was not speaking without his book, as he held in his hand a quotation from a Liberal Irish newspaper, published in his own city, in which, at a Liberal registration meeting held two months ago, the chairman of the meeting had said—

> "The equalization of the county and borough franchise will place in the hands of the Catholics of the cities, and probably also in the hands of the Catholics of the counties, the whole burden of political power, or, at least, by far the most important proportion of it.

He entirely concurred in the belief that such would be the effect of the proposed change, and that if the whole electoral power were placed in the hands of persons whose rating was under £4, the best and most respectable class of electors would be obliterated. There were stronger reasons even than those connected with religion—reasons in reference to good order and public tranquillity—for keeping political power in the hands of those who would exercise it wisely, and would not make it an instrument for insulting and degrading the country. Within the last four-and-twenty hours a public meeting was held at Mitchelstown in connection with the approaching Election for the county of Cork. There was a great disturbance, and the only one who could get a hearing was a man known as the "Galtee Boy." This person was loudly cheered when he applied the most cruel and insulting epithets to Mr. Bridge. ["Hear, hear!"] Would anyone say "Hear, hear!" to the next passage he would read? "His (the Galtee Boy's) admirers further displayed their feelings by giving cheers for the Zulus." [*Laughter.*] Was it a matter to be laughed at by Members of that House that at a time when they were mourning the loss of many brave men who had died in the service of their country, there could be found one in the form of a man to lift up his voice and cry—"Three cheers for the Zulus!" He envied not the man who could cheer even ironically such a sentiment as that. The incident to which he had referred gave point and force to his objection to extend the franchise to classes amongst whom such things were possible; and when the Liberal Members were appealed to on this subject, he asked them to look at what had been done by men who were the prey of agitators and demagogues, and to refuse their assent to a measure which would have the effect of swamping the wealth, the intelligence, and the respectability of the country.

MR. W. E. FORSTER said, he should detain the House only a very short time. The question had been so often debated that it was not necessary to go at any great length over the arguments which had been urged for and against the proposal. His hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kildare (Mr. Meldon) had brought forward the Motion with the same moderation and ability which characterized his speech of last year. Taking an interest in the question, he desired to refresh his memory as to the arguments which would probably be used against the Motion on the present occasion. With that view, he had read the speech of the hon. Member for Londonderry (Mr. Charles Lewis) delivered last year, and he found that though it was not quite as impassioned as that which he had just made, it yet contained very much the same arguments. The only fresh arguments adduced were that the results of the measure would be the loss of 10 Conservative Members, and that very few Town Councils had petitioned in favour of it. He should be surprised if they had, seeing that the municipal franchise in Ireland was very high indeed. The question was a very narrow one to his mind. It was simply this—whether household suffrage, which already existed in English and Scotch boroughs, should not also be established in Ireland? The burden of proof lay with their opponents, as the treatment of Ireland was exceptional and needed explanation. For his part, he would be equally ready to apply the same argument to the case of the county franchise, if they were dealing with that question, and to show that an uniform suffrage should exist throughout the Kingdom. The hon. Member for Londonderry (Mr. Charles Lewis) had maintained that there were totally different conditions in England and in Ireland. The hon. Member took his artificial line of £4, and said that there was a vastly larger number of householders below that rental in Ireland than in England. But was that the principle of the English Reform Bill? The hon. and learned Member for Kildare had dwelt on the fact that a £4 rent was higher in Ireland than the same rent would be in England, and it was true that the whole of the circumstances in regard to the payment of rent was different in the two countries. It happened that rents were considerably cheaper in Ireland than in England; but surely that furnished no reason why a man should be enfranchised in the one case and not in the other! When household suffrage was granted to England, it was granted in order to get rid of the money qualification for the franchise, and to substitute for it the qualification of being the head of a household. That was household suffrage. Every man occupying the position of a householder was to get a vote. If the hon. Member for Londonderry could show that the Irishmen to whom he had given all these bad names had not the hearthstones for which the qualification was given, then he would have a strong argument. The hon. Member had also repeated an argument they had heard over and over again 10 years ago—that the large number of fresh voters that would be introduced were not fit to have the franchise. But in England they had encountered this danger with their eyes open, and it had not come to much. Then, again, there would not be a greater increase in the Irish constituencies than there had been in the English; but he recollected that when the last Reform Bill was passed it was contended that the boroughs would be swamped. Well, his constituency, under that Bill, increased from a little over 5,000 to 26,000; yet he had not been swamped. He was in just the same position now as before; and what was more—and from this hon. Members should take heart of courage—there was the same respect to integrity, education, and ability, and the same legitimate influence of property as there was before the franchise was lowered. He was greatly surprised at the language used by the hon. Member for Londonderry, coming, as it did, from the Member for an Irish constituency. If such words had been used by an English Member, he would not soon have heard the end of it. The hon. Member said if the greatly increased number of voters were brought in, "ignorance, bigotry, and superstition would have influence over them;" and he designated this portion of the population as the "lowest, most ignorant, and the most debased." That was the strongest charge he (Mr. W. E. Forster) had ever heard made by a Member of Parliament against his fellow-citizens. It was not for him to vindicate the Irish people, but he would say this—that he did not believe the new voters in Ireland would be less fitted for the franchise than the new voters in England after the passing of the Bill in 1867. It was only necessary to show that there was no such difference between English and Irish voters as to warrant an exceptional treatment. He feared that an analysis of crime in the two countries would show nothing in favour of the class that was enfranchised by the Act of 1867 in England as compared with the class that would be enfranchised in Ireland. Then, again, let them look atthe question of extravagance. The hon. Member had been exceedingly emphatic about the position of the Irishman in his hovel. He seemed to think that no man ought to be allowed to vote who had an animal living in his house. For his (Mr. W. E. Forster's) part, though he was sorry there should be so low a standard of home comfort in Ireland, he thought much of it arose from a saving economy, a care for the provision of the family, and a desire to keep clear of the poor rates. Again, as to the question of drunkenness, he did not believe the working classes yielded to that temptation more in Ireland than in England. Whatever might be thought of the Sunday Closing Bill, he was of opinion that the way in which it had been received at least proved this—that in Ireland the vice of drinking was less intertwined with all the social habits of the people than it was in England. He was led to this conclusion by what he had seen himself in Galway when the Sunday Closing Bill came into operation. His hon. Friend had also urged that the lowering of the franchise in Ireland would subject the new constituencies to bigotry and superstition, and the influence of the priests. Well, there might be difficulties in ruling Ireland; but Ireland would be not less difficult to rule if the priests had no influence. In his belief, however, the extent of the influence of the Irish Roman Catholic priesthood in elections had been greatly exaggerated, as many of its members had acknowledged with mortification. That influence, however, whatever its extent might be, was generally used in favour of good order, of morality, and of self-denial — three things which went far to make a man a good citizen. In considering this question, the House must not be too much impressed by the notion that if this Resolution were carried the seats of the 10 Irish Conservative Members would be endangered. Upon the whole, would the Irish constituencies be rendered worse if the borough franchise were lowered?

He thought not. After all, the duty of an elector was somewhat analogous to that of the head of a family, and in no part of the United Kingdom were family ties more respected than in Ireland. Without instituting invidious comparisons, he might say that all classes in this country might learn much from the self-denial and self-sacrifice which the head of a poor Irish family showed in bearing great privation. The great thing that made a man a good citizen was his domestic affection, and that feeling was as strong in the breasts of the Irish labourers and artizans as in those of Englishmen. What a number of arguments had been adduced 10 years ago against giving the poor English householder a vote! He advocated giving the Irish householder in boroughs a vote in the hope that those in counties would also receive it in due course. One of the strongest reasons why he had been so earnest in advocating household suffrage in this country was that he had believed that when it was granted people would see the tremendous necessity there was for educating themselves in order to avoid the national danger that would arise from leaving the right of voting to be exercised by ignorant men; and he hoped that by giving the suffrage to the boroughs of Ireland the same necessity would be felt in that country. There would be no great difficulty in persuading the Irish people to avail themselves of means of education — for instance, it was very noteworthy how the very children who came out of hovels to run by the side of the cars carried their books and slates under their arms. He could not understand why they should not act with the same generosity towards their Irish fellow-subjects as they had towards themselves. He could not help thinking that some hon. Members opposite entertained the idea that Ireland was not fit for representative institutions; but that was an argument in favour rather of taking away all right to be represented from that country than for refusing to extend the franchise. Then it was urged that the whole system of the distribution of seats in Ireland was a bad one, and that they should remove that blot upon Irish representation before they attempted to meddle with the franchise. But in England, when the same cry had been raised, they had refused to be led away by it; and he now said—"Let us have household suffrage in Ireland first, and then let us demand a re-distribution of seats afterwards." There were several strong arguments in favour of granting this extension of suffrage to the Irish boroughs. In the first place, what had happened in 1868 in reference to this question afforded just ground for disappointment and complaint to the Irish people. Lord Mayo—whose name he could never mention without feeling the loss that the House and the country had sustained in losing him—had at the time expressed a hope that the House would, with regard to the borough franchise of Ireland, adopt the same principle that had been followed in respect of that franchise in this country. That hope, however, was not fulfilled, inasmuch as the English compound householder whose rates were paid by his landlord obtained the franchise which was withheld from his brother Irishman. Without following the hon. and learned Member for Kildare (Mr. Meldon) in his figures, he might remark that it appeared that the percentage of voters to population in England and Wales was 14 per cent, while it was little more than 6 per cent in Ireland. Another argument in favour of this Resolution was to be found in the strong opinion which Irishmen themselves entertained on the subject. It was extremely difficult to understand how Her Majesty's Government, in the face of the divisions on this question in that House, could refuse to accept the principle of this Resolution; although, of course, they might not be prepared to introduce a Bill on the subject during the present Session. There was one other ground —the strongest of all, on which he would support this Motion—he believed that in itself, in its meaning, and it might be also in its consequences on the Government, the equality of treatment of Irishmen and Irish voters with Englishmen and English voters would do much to promote real union and to stay and silence the cry for disunion. There were three modes in which they might treat the Irish. The old mode, which left much bitterness behind, was to treat Ireland as a conquered country, a subject dependency, making laws for her people with no great consideration for their interests, but a very strict and careful consideration of our own. Then there was the comparatively new mode, although he had heard of it from his boyhood—the plan of separating as much as possible Ireland and Irish legislation from the English Parliament —saying to the Irish people—"Govern yourselves as much as you possibly can; at any rate, let us in England have as little to do with it as possible—as little as Austria has with Hungary." That view was held by some of his hon. Friends; but the majority of the House did not entertain it. They advocated another view, and that was perfect union and agreement between the two countries; that they sitting there should provide for the interests of both Islands; that England, Scotland, and Ireland should consult together to protect the rights and promote the interests of Ireland in every part as much as the rights and interests of Scotland and England. That was the idea generally believed and adopted in that House; it was founded on the strong opinion and conviction of the English and Scotch people, and it had more supporters in Ireland than some of his Friends supposed. No one, he thought, would be anxious to adopt the first or conquest theory. To carry out the second theory in practice would do harm to both countries, and he honestly believed more harm to Ireland than to Great Britain. But he presumed the great majority did believe in union. If they did, they must accept its conditions. And first and foremost, unless the Irish people were treated in the same manner as the English and Scotch people, there could not be a real union between the two nations; and it was because he believed that this Motion would do much to make that union complete that he ventured urgently to press on the House its acceptance. He believed if hon. Members could get rid of every trace and remnant of the old ascendancy theory, there would be an unanimous vote in favour of his hon. and learned Friend's Amendment.

Sir JOHN LESLIE said, the right hon. Gentleman who had just sat down was a great traveller; but, judging from his speech to-night, it appeared there was one country at least which he had not visited, and that was Ireland, or he could not have been so ignorant as he had shown himself in dealing with this subject. His proposal was called one for the assimilation of the franchise of the two countries; but that was a fallacy. There could be no such thing as an assimilation between the classes whom the right hon. Gentleman would introduce to the franchise in Ireland and the same class in England. There was no middle class in Ireland such as existed in England. There were some people—and he was one of them—who thought to entitle any man to the franchise he ought at least to be able to write his name; but were such a qualification required in this case, it would wipe out the whole of this great constituency the right hon. Gentleman wished to foist upon Ireland. He regarded the speech of the right hon. Gentleman as another attempt to catch the fish that had so often been angled for by Liberal statesmen—the Irish vote. The fact was, as was well known to those who resided in Ireland, that this was not a real demand from the people of the country. Petitions had been spoken of; but they were non-existent, because the people who wanted the franchise had not got the power to write their names. The hon. Member for Tipperary (Mr. Gray) had spoken of exasperating Ireland, and that reminded him that great patriots inherited proud titles. O'Connell was baptised by the nation "The Liberator;" but it had required time for one of his successors—the hon. Member for Meath (Mr. Parnell)—to be called "The Exasperator" by a grateful Irish people, in recognition of his patriotic acts. His principal claim to the title consisted in his having opposed and rejected the wise counsels of his great natural Leader, and having brought into the ranks of his own Party the quality of exasperation. He was happy to see that the "Exasperator" was not present at the moment. In conclusion, he begged to say that he was glad that this subject was to-night to be met with more interest than it had been in previous Sessions. To-night the real feeling of the Government side of the House would be shown; because there had been occasions, such as that of last year, when little interest was manifested, and a wrong impression resulted from the vote.

Mr. BLENNERHASSETT said, it was the old story of "No case, abuse the plaintiff's attorney," with the hon. Baronet and his Friends, as the question was one above Party politics. The question before the House was a very plain and simple one, and it seemed to him almost a waste of time to go over the same ground again; but they were driven to do so once more in order to make it clear why they asked that the principles which had been applied to the English borough franchise should be applied to the Irish borough franchise, and that there should be equal treatment between the two countries on that matter. Nobody could look upon the present state of the borough constituencies of Ireland with any feeling of satisfaction. They had been told to-night, and they had often heard it before, that in the whole of Ireland there were little more than 50,000 borough electors, of whom about 28,000 were in Dublin and Belfast; the remainder, or only about 22,000, being distributed in all the other towns and cities of that country. That was not a state of things which either the House ought, or the Irish people could, look upon with anything like satisfaction. It was, at all events, desirable that those who sat in that House as Members for Ireland should represent some actual political force or electoral strength behind them; but it could hardly be supposed that the Gentlemen returned by the 22,000 voters scattered over all the towns and cities in Ireland except Dublin and Belfast were entitled to speak on behalf of the whole urban population of that country. The injustice to Ireland was made still graver when they remembered that in England and Scotland the great majority of Members were returned by borough electors, while in Ireland the great majority were elected on the more restricted county franchise. Down to the time of the Union there was no substantial difference between the electoral privileges of the two countries. In 1867 a great change was made in the English representative system. The constituencies were then re-invigorated; they took what was called "a leap in the dark," yet a leap after which they found themselves landed perfectly safe. But for Ireland they adopted a much narrower and more restricted suffrage. Their reason for doing that might have been that Ireland at the time was very much disturbed. If so, that reason no longer existed, and they could not fairly or wisely now refuse to bring a greater number of the householders in Irish boroughs within the pale of the Constitution. By maintaining the present restricted franchise in Ireland they maintained, without any sufficient justification, a humiliating difference between the people of that country and their English fellow-subjects. The red herring of redistribution of seats had been drawn across their path; but the present question had no more connection with re-distribution than with any other matter pertaining to the representative system. The question of the franchise stood by itself; it had been and might be dealt with entirely by itself. The real issue now before them was whether they were prepared, at the General Election which must soon arrive, to say that the inhabitants of Irish boroughs should exercise in proportion the same amount of political power as the inhabitants of English boroughs? In 1867 the English borough constituency was increased from 500,000 to something like 1,500,000; while, by the present proposal, the Irish borough constituency would only be increased from something like 50,000 to 100,000. It was impossible in any representative system that the poorer class should not be the most numerous; and no doubt it was desirable that every class, opinion, and party in the country should be represented. They needed all the elements of national life. But the present proposal would not create an exclusion, as the hon. Member for Londonderry (Mr. Charles Lewis) seemed to suppose. The exclusion existed already, and the hon. Member ought to devise some method of securing the representation of minorities, instead of endeavouring to maintain an illogical and unreasonable restriction. There was no principle in a rental of £4, or of any other amount. Such a line was purely arbitrary, whereas household suffrage rested on a broad and intelligible principle. He did not know what effect this measure would have on Party interests; but on general considerations of public policy nothing could be more unfortunate, nothing a greater cause of regret and sorrow to every person who wished to see peace and tranquillity in the country than that the Irish people should be allowed to think for a moment that the question of their electoral privileges was decided by considerations of Party interest in the House. If this impression were allowed to prevail it would undo a great deal of the good work in recent years, and do more harm in destroying the good-feeling that ought to exist between the two countries than could be remedied by any measure the Government might devise. Another objection to the opposition to this measure was that it evinced a distrust of Ireland;

and as long as the Government showed that they had no confidence in the Irish people it would be a hopeless task to attempt to conciliate them. There was only one valid ground on which the Motion might be resisted, and that was if the Government could see in it a danger to the security of public order. How could anyone imagine that the establishment of household suffrage in the boroughs of Ireland could be a danger to the security of public order? By admitting these men to the franchise they would admit them to the Constitution, ask them to take part in public life, make them feel they were citizens and not outcasts. The day could not be far distant when this measure must be carried; then why disturb public feeling and cause dissatisfaction by refusing it? Later on it must pass into law. It would be granted by Parliament in a reluctant manner, and they would get no thanks for it. A General Election was not far away. When it came, and stirred up feelings of interest in public life in the country, let it find the Irish towns in possession of their privileges of citizenship. He would, then, ask the House to remove this odious distinction, and do what they said they had so often wished to do—show equal and impartial justice to every portion of the United Kingdom.

Mr. SMOLLETT said, he had listened during the last three or four years with great attention to the annual Motion on the subject of the Irish franchise made by the hon. and learned Member for Kildare (Mr. Meldon). The Resolutions he had moved implied a desire for a new Reform Bill for Ireland, and the hon. and learned Member himself brought forward a very small Reform Bill last year. The contention of the hon. and learned Member was that the inhabitants of the Parliamentary boroughs in Ireland lived under a sense of great degradation in consequence of the present extent of the franchise in that country. The miseries from which they suffered were inflicted by a Bill passed in 1868—the Irish Reform Bill—and the system then introduced, they had been told, had been continued solely for the purpose of placing a stamp of inferiority on the Celtic race, in order that the brutal Saxon should trample on the rights of the Irish people. [Major O'Gorman: Hear, hear!] That was a sample of Irish rhodomontade which was employed in describing one of the smallest possible grievances—a grievance, in fact, which consisted of the simple circumstance that the inhabitants of borough towns in Ireland who did not pay the Poor Law rates were not entitled to enjoy the franchise. He admitted most freely that when the Reform Bills for Great Britain were under consideration in 1867 and 1868 the franchise was conferred upon occupiers in borough towns on the conditions only that they lived in the tenements a certain number of months, and were subject to the payment of the poor rate; whereas, in Ireland, in 1868, a hard-and-fast line was drawn at a £4 rating—a valuation which excluded a considerable number of men who would otherwise be admitted to the franchise. But the reasons which induced the Government at the time to draw this hard-and-fast line were declared, announced, and fully discussed, and the reasons then given were recognized by the Leaders of the great Parties in the House to be perfectly valid. Nevertheless, he was ready to admit that the Irish Reform Bill of 1868 was very incomplete and very unacceptable; and if the hon. and learned Member for Kildare would alter the terms of his Resolution and bring forward a Motion declaring that the entire representation of Ireland—which, in his (Mr. Smollett's) opinion, was as bad as well could be—required consideration and amendment, he would certainly vote for it. For the discussions of the last two or three years in that House had abundantly shown that in the small Irish towns, and in the county towns of Ireland, there was not the smallest vitality, nor any political life whatever. In very many of them, even under a very low valuation and a low rate of rating, the constituency was lamentably small. In eight borough towns—Downpatrick, Dungannon, Ennis, Kinsale, New Ross, Mallow, Portarlington, and Youghal, the aggregate population slightly exceeded 40,000, souls, and the average number of the constituency did not amount to more than 230 voters in each borough. It had been asserted that in many Irish boroughs one-half of the rated houses were valued at 40*s.* of yearly rent and under. It was admitted that there were some 17,000 tenements in Irish towns rated at 20*s.* of annual value and under that. That was a state of things which hon. Members of that House were practically unacquainted with. The towns that he had indicated ought to be at once swept out of the electoral map as centres of direct Parliamentary representation. If Irish reform were taken in hand, the question must be treated boldly. The incidence of the Poor Law rating would possibly require alteration; but certainly, so long as electoral right largely depended on rating and upon valuation, common sense suggested that a real and not a sham valuation should be enforced both in boroughs and in counties throughout Ireland. He had said that the Irish Reform Act of 1868 was a very insufficient and defective Bill. It was so. When first introduced, the Bill professed to deal with three distinct matters—it proposed to reduce the borough franchise; next, it dealt with the disfranchisement of some small towns; and, lastly, it dealt with the distribution of these seats taken from these towns. These two latter proposals were, in the end, abandoned—most politicians admitted that these small towns were nuisances; but, strange to say, nuisances were always dear to Irishmen. In this instance Protestants and Catholics, Orangemen and Liberals, Conservatives and men with Fenian proclivities, united in declaring that the Representatives of these borough towns were the best Members Ireland possessed—and that no diminution in their numbers would be tolerated. The Cabinet in 1868, living from hand to mouth, unable to withstand this combination and anxious to make an appeal to the country, early in the autumn gave way, and struck the most valuable portion of the Bill out of it. The Ministry proceeded with the franchise clauses only, because they were practically unopposed. Lord Mayo had charge of the Bill. The second reading came off upon the 7th May, 1868, and I shall read a few sentences spoken by Lord Mayo, extracted from *Hansard's Debates*. He said—

> "The Act was based on principles which were identical with those of the English Act. The county franchise was put at precisely the same figure, and the borough franchise was also the same, being given to every tenant who paid poor rates. It was quite true that circumstances had arisen in Ireland that, at an early period, would render an alteration in the principle of valuation necessary, but that was a question of valuation, not of the franchise. There was no substantial reason why the county franchise should be lower in Ireland than in England. With regard to the borough franchise, the point at which an occupier became liable to pay rates was £4, below that amount the occupier was exempt from the payment of rates; therefore adopting residence, and personal payment of rates as the qualification, they could not take any other amount."—[3 *Hansard*, cxci. 1960.]

Mr. Chichester Fortescue, then Member for Louth, sitting upon the front Opposition Bench, for himself and Party at once gave his adhesion to this proposal. He admitted there was much to be said in favour of the course which the Government had adopted in availing themselves of the line drawn by the existing law of rating under the Irish Poor Law system, and fixing the electoral franchise at a £4 rating. Mr. Reardon, who represented Athlone, demanded manhood suffrage and 169 Members as the Irish contingent to Parliament; but this proposal was unnoticed, and the Bill was read without a division. The franchise, it would be observed, was fixed at its present limits in Ireland, on the assurance that it was based, as in England, upon occupation and rating. Now, the right of voting was proposed to be given promiscuously to all occupiers, although these were by law exempt from the payment of rates. That was certainly not proceeding to an assimilation of the law. If the system was changed, it ought to proceed upon a change in the laws of rating by enforcing the personal payment of rates, and by excluding the occupiers in default of payment. The hon. and learned Member for Kildare (Mr. Meldon) had often spoken of the injustice felt by Irishmen through the present state of the franchise. An Irishman who, when employed at Liverpool or Glasgow, was an occupier and a voter, when he returned to Ireland and lived in Belfast or Dublin, though occupying a house of value equal to that in Glasgow, found himself degraded and no longer a freeman. It was not unlikely that such cases did occasionally occur; but if they were common, the disfranchisement was occasioned by the mischief of the present system of Irish valuation, and by nothing else. That must be so, for practically the borough franchise in Scotland was a franchise based upon a £4 rating. That was more particularly the case in the West of Scotland, where Irish workmen mostly congregated. The hon. and learned Member for Kildare had often alluded to the vast constituencies found in Edinburgh and in Glasgow, in contrast with those in populous Irish towns. He seemed to think that the large Scotch constituencies were swelled because every occupier was placed upon the register, and that thousands of them lived in houses of small value. That was not the case. He had in his hand a pamphlet showing the social and vital statistics of Glasgow, compiled by Mr. West Watson, the Chamberlain of the city. The great number of voters was caused by the vast number of houses rated, and rated at their true rental. Mr. Watson showed that, in round numbers, the tenements within the Parliamentary boundary amounted to 112,000—the annual value being £1,223,000. Of these, 40,000 houses were valued at £10 and upwards, 67,000 at from £4 to £10; and thus there were 107,000 tenements, with a valued rental of £4 and upwards in the city of Glasgow. The occupiers of these composed 49 out of 50 of all the registered electors of the city. There were about 5,500 occupied tenements in Glasgow, valued at an annual rental of £18,000. But in that section of the population not more than one in four of the tenements gave a qualification, because the population of the rookeries was migratory, and because many men did not occupy their dwellings for a year, and because many did not personally pay their rates. Possibly there might be 1,250 registered electors on the list of voters occupying houses under £4 valuation. But, practically, the voting power in Glasgow was vested in male occupiers of £4 valuation and upwards—the franchise which in Ireland was held to be a degradation to the Celtic race. The same observations applied to the city of Edinburgh, with a population of 170,000 inhabitants, and with 26,000 electors. It was needless to go into the statistics of that city in detail; but last year the senior Member for Edinburgh told him (Mr. Smollett) that virtually that great constituency was composed of occupiers in the city at a £4 rating and upwards. It might be asked—What was the state of affairs in provincial towns? Well, he lived in the vicinity of a borough town—namely, Dumbarton; and during the present winter he had inquired into the electoral position of that town. Dumbarton had a resident population of 11,000 or 12,000 souls. On the electoral roll there were about 1,800 names, mostly workmen, and some hundreds were Irishmen. There were only 37 tenements in Dumbarton rated at less than £4 of annual rental, and not one in four of those conferred the right of voting on the occupier. Many of those Irish workmen lived in houses rated at £6 annually, and every one of them would be entitled to a vote if they occupied a similar dwelling-house in Belfast or in Dublin. If they were disfranchised, their exclusion must arise from the mischievous working of the Irish Valuation Act, which called for immediate amendment and reform. In the principal cities of Ireland, he believed that one-third of the occupiers were excluded from the franchise because their tenements were improperly valued. How was the valuation in Scotland made? The machinery was very simple. In every borough there was a functionary called an assessor. That official was appointed by the municipality. There was no restriction in the choice of the man, but 19 times out of 20 the choice fell upon the Government surveyor of taxes in the locality. That gentleman was selected because he understood his work, and because the valuation being needed for Imperial uses, if the Government official was appointed by the municipality, the work was done without a charge upon the town. The assessor was invested with large powers. It was his duty to make a rigid inquiry into the annual value of the town. He required from every proprietor a schedule, showing the particulars of his holding, the name of the occupier, the amount of rent paid, and the nature of the tenure. Any person making a false return was subject to a fine of £50. When parties owned and occupied their own tenements, the rent was fixed by the assessor, on his own judgment. An appeal was permitted to the magistrates of the town. In that way a perfectly correct account was got at of the real rental of the borough. The rate was levied on the rental, and from the valuation based on rent no abatement was made to the occupier. The Valuation Roll, framed each year, was the basis of the electoral roll which was compiled by the assessor. If any errors were committed, the matters were subject to revision in the registration courts. In that way, and under that system, it was seen that, in Scotland, household franchise subject to the payment of rates resolved itself into a £4 rental and rating, and that satisfied the ambition of Scotland. But how did they manage things in Ireland? Why, there was no system in that country at all. In Ireland there was a valuation made by a central authority some 40 years ago, and known as "Griffiths's Valuation." That valuation was purposely made in town and country upon very insufficient data, and upon the lowest possible estimate when there was depression in the land. At the present time, and after such a lapse of years, that valuation was obsolete and worthless. Yet it had never been revised, and he was credibly informed no alteration of the valuation in hereditaments could be made without the sanction of an Act of Parliament. Yet no efforts were ever made to get that Irish nuisance abated, although the electoral rights and electoral privileges of the people depended largely on an honest valuation. In Ireland that valuation was no test of value or of rent, which any honest valuation ought to be. The fact was universally confessed. Last year, when the present question was discussed, the hon. Member for Londonderry (Mr. Charles Lewis) stated that one-half of the people of Limerick lived in dwellings rated agreeably to this Irish valuation of 40*s.* of annual rent, and a great number of them in dwellings valued at 20*s.* a-year. On that, the junior Member for the city asserted that the lowest tenements in Limerick were let at not less than £2 12*s.* of annual rent. That was possibly quite true, and that was, no doubt, the reason why many hundreds of the citizens of Limerick were excluded from the franchise, to which, under a £4 valuation, they were entitled. They lived under a rascally and abominable Valuation Act. Well, he would not detain the House longer. He would not support the Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Kildare, which involved a small change in a matter which ought to be dealt with in a broad and comprehensive manner. If they were to believe what they read in public journals, a Dissolution was not far off. They were told a Liberal Ministry would soon be in Office, and they knew the Party opposite was pledged to huge measures of electoral change. They knew the Liberal Party would propose household suffrage throughout the Empire, coupled with, to a great extent, equal electoral districts. With these happy prospects looming in the immediate future, he would advise the hon. and learned Member for Kildare not to divide upon this small matter of the Irish borough franchise; for the whole subject would be dealt with in a bold, although, perhaps, in a revolutionary, fashion by the next Parliament.

SIR JOSEPH M'KENNA said, that his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kildare (Mr. Meldon) had so fully set out the arguments in favour of the Resolution that he would not re-enter upon them, but would confine himself to replying to the opponents of the Resolution, and would not detain the House long. He was of opinion that a glaring anomaly had been clearly established, which imperatively demanded a remedy. The hon. Member for Londonderry (Mr. Charles Lewis) would deny them any remedy, and had stated that the new Irish constituency would be wholly dissimilar to that which was created by the English Reform Bill of 1867; and, further, that the contemplated measure would not be acceptable to Irish borough Members. Well, his answer was that he, as a borough Member, was prepared to support it. The hon. Member had, as usual, called up the hobgoblin of re-distribution of seats; and, indeed, appeared to apprehend that he would himself be got rid of if the measure were carried out. But the hon. Member appeared to forget that when the Liberal Government fell with their Reform Bill of 1866, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire, then, and now Premier, introduced and passed a Reform Bill going to a lower level than Lord Russell's Bill, and that he and his Party had reaped, and were reaping, the reward of it. The hon. Member for Londonderry need not, therefore, he thought, if he helped to pass this measure, shake in his shoes in respect of his fate in the time-honoured city he represented. Another hobgoblin the hon. Gentleman conjured up was priestly influence. The hon. Gentleman asked, was Parliament now to set up priestly influence in Ireland when every other country in Europe was setting it at nought? Well, he did not himself admire priestly influence as a predominant feature in politics, nor the undue influence of clergymen of any denomination; but they should remember that the clergy were an educated class, and that even in politics they had a right to more or less influence, and it was, in his mind, an influence of which they had no reason to be afraid. This hobgoblin was a penny-farthing rushlight in a scooped out turnip with which the hon. Member wished to frighten the House. And now, he would ask, had things gone on so well in Europe since priestly influence was set at naught, in North Germany, in Spain, and in other countries? Was there ever a more unfortunate time to refer to the priestly influence in Ireland on politics? It would not be too great; it was too little. In respect to the observations of the last speaker (Mr. Smollett) with regard to the valuation of Ireland, that question was simply trotted out, and in his views with regard to it he was altogether wrong. It was true the valuation was not based —as he should like it to be—upon rental; but the valuation was not open to all the objections which had been taken to it. It had been approached on purely scientific principles; and if it were carried out in detail upon the principle on which it was framed, very little fault, he believed, could be found with the result. As there were many other speakers to follow he would not detain the House longer.

Lord RANDOLPH CHURCHILL said, as it was possible that was the last occasion on which the question before the House would be discussed in the present Parliament, he was not willing to give a silent vote on the Motion. There were, he thought, several points of view from which the question might be considered. Was it right or just that the Irish should possess the same privileges as their English and Scotch brothers? Was it desirable that distinctions and differences, so far as political rights were concerned, should exist between them? It seemed to him that many of the arguments of hon. Members on his side of the House were inapplicable to the question, because they appeared to him to be directed against all reform and against all popular extension of the franchise as a general principle. Coming to the argument *ad hominem*, he thought it was possible to discuss this question by considerations of whether the lower class of the Irish were as intelligent, as well educated, and as fully entitled to the franchise as the same class in England. He did not think these were comparisons which that House ought to draw in discussing such a question as the present. He should not go into the question as to whether the class in Ireland who possessed the franchise were practically the same as the class who possessed it in England; or whether the same class who in Ireland were deprived of the right to vote would, under similar circumstances, be deprived of it in England. He admitted that if the House were to go into the consideration of the abstract questions he had mentioned it would be difficult to refuse assent to the Resolution of the hon. and learned Member. Turning, however, to the practical point of view of the subject two questions appeared to him to arise—first, whether it was expedient to effect, at the present moment, an extensive measure of electoral reform with regard to Ireland; and, secondly, whether such a step, if adopted, would prove to be beneficial to the country? Having voted in favour of the principle of this Resolution on a former occasion, he was anxious now to state the reasons that had induced him to change his opinion on the subject. He was very doubtful as to whether it was the province of the State to force the franchise upon a population which did not manifest any desire for it. A residence of three years in Ireland had satisfied him that there was not any popular demand such as would warrant the House in passing the Resolution, unless it was, at the same time, convinced that the change proposed was for the benefit of Ireland, and that the exercise of the rights so granted would be for the general good of the community. He did not think anyone who had a knowledge of Ireland could say there was such a demand for the extension of the borough franchise. Where were the signs that one generally looked for as the indication of popular opinion? Where were the Petitions in favour of this Resolution? Where were the mass meetings? and to go further, he would ask, where were the popular tumults in favour of this measure? He might remind hon. Members opposite that it was not very difficult to get up a little popular excitement in Ireland on any subject of general interest. Hon. Members, however, might go to any town in that country, and, putting aside the Land Question, they would find it extremely difficult to get up any excitement in favour of pure electoral reform. There was so utter an absence of popular feeling on this subject that the House would not be justified in accepting the Resolution now before it, unless it had evidence that it would be for the benefit of Ireland. Would it be for the benefit of that country? There was a marked difference between the class in England which was enfranchised by the last Reform Bill and the class which it was now proposed to enfranchise in Ireland. In the case of the former, they were not under the conviction that they were a conquered and persecuted race, who had been held in subjection for centuries by masters who were alien in origin and religion, and who had wrongfully possessed themselves of the land which ought to belong to the people; and there was scarcely any appreciable danger that ideas or objects subversive of the Constitution or of the laws of the Realm would make any headway amongst the new constituencies. Such ideas were not prevalent in Ireland at the present time—certainly not amongst the classes who enjoyed the franchise. The abolition of a hated Established Church, the alteration in the Land Laws, the more liberal and friendly spirit which existed on the subject of education, had entirely banished such ideas from their minds. But if they descended amongst the masses of the Irish people they would come upon distinct traces of such a feeling, upon an inborn suspicion, which governed and accounted for many of their actions, that the Saxon was an hereditary foe, and that the connection with England was the ruin of Ireland. Traces of these ideas did remain and were sedulously fostered by *The Nation*, and other organs of the so-called national Press. A danger, therefore, did exist with regard to this measure which did not exist in England or Scotland. The first instinct of the newly-enfranchised classes, with their defective means of information, would be to attempt to pay off old scores, and to return men to Parliament pledged to the Repeal of the Union, the disintegration of the Empire, the arrest and confusion of Public Business, and the most revolutionary ideas as to the possession of the land. Hon. Members were aware that there had been a serious difference of opinion in the Home Rule Party as to the manner in which its Members should act. The hon. and learned Member for Limerick (Mr. Butt) had the almost unanimous support of those voters in Ireland who were neither Liberal nor Conservative; while the hon. Member for Meath and his Friends drew what support they got from the unenfranchised classes. He did not wish to say anything to annoy the hon. Member for Meath; but he must say that he drew his support from the mob. ["Oh, oh!"] He would put it in another way. The hon. and learned Member for Limerick, in the policy which he was seeking to establish, had the support of the educated, the industrious, and the loyal classes who had the franchise; while the enthusiastic audience that they were constantly reading of in the Irish newspapers rallied round that interesting quartet, the Members for Meath, Cavan, Mayo, and Dungarvan, and were composed, as every impartial Irishman would admit, almost entirely of the ignorant, idle, and drunken. ["Oh!"] He would put it in this way, then—that the most mad and scatter-brained policy which had ever been conceived by any man or party of men found its sole adherents, not in the Irish who had votes, but in those who had no votes, and to whom it was now proposed to give votes. ["No!"] Hon. Gentlemen were interrupting one who had the fortune to reside a good deal in Ireland, and who knew what he was saying. There had been two Elections in Ireland lately, and he would ask why was not Mr. George Delaney returned for the borough of New Ross? [Major NOLAN: Because the franchise has not been lowered.] It was because the hon. Member for Meath went down and spoke for him.

MR. SPEAKER desired the noble Lord to address himself to the Chair.

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL said, he was endeavouring to establish the incapacity of the unenfranchised classes for deciding political problems; but he would not pursue that point. If the House carried this Motion, it would give to the hon. Member for Meath that superiority to the hon. and learned Member for Limerick which up to now he had striven fruitlessly to obtain; and the hon. and learned Member for Kildare (Mr. Meldon) did not shake his head at that. What would be the consequence if the hon. Member for Meath found himself at the head of a considerable following obliged to support him, he having arrived at the conclusion that no concessions were to be obtained by conciliating any English Ministry? Would it not be likely to exasperate English feeling, and to prejudice the fair consideration of Irish measures, if the hon. Member and his Friends were to find a numerous and enthusiastic support among the newly-enfranchised classes? The hon. and learned Member for Kildare and his Friends advocated this measure because they were honestly convinced that it remedied an Irish grievance; but the hon. Member for Meath and his supporters, knowing that Home Rule was dead amongst the existing constituencies, advocated it on different grounds, and in order to obtain popular support amongst the classes whom it was proposed to enfranchise. He (Lord Randolph Churchill) hoped the House would not make itself the accomplice and the victim of the scheme. In Ireland they had to deal with a phenomenon which did not exist in this country; there were secret societies, the traces of whose influence was constantly seen in vacant farms that nobody would take, in assaults, and in murders of men of a certain class, like the murder of Lord Leitrim. They could not convince a peasant that if he voted against the bidding of a secret society the fact would not be ascertained and retribution fall upon him. The peasant did not want the vote, because it would be to him a fresh source of anxiety and vexation. [Major NOLAN: Not under the Ballot.] He would be pulled different ways by the landlord, the employer, the priest, and the secret society; and he had not yet learnt the value of the Ballot. The absence of any popularity or enthusiasm in support of this demand, the extreme doubtfulness as to the benefit that would result from granting it, and the want of capacity on the part of the lower classes to decide political questions ought to make the House pause before it assented to the Motion. A knowledge of Ireland, of its history, of its circumstances, and of the aspirations of some of its people, ought to convince Members of the Opposition that there were forces in existence that should modify the extension of the franchise in that country. The most influential and, perhaps, the best written paper of Ireland—*The Freeman's Journal*—admitted that if the franchise were extended a "clean sweep" would be made not only of the avowed enemies, but of the insincere friends of the popular cause, and the Irish Party in Parliament—which meant that of the hon. Member for Meath—would be greatly augmented. If the House rejected the Motion, it would act in accordance with the views of many intelligent Irish people and with the secret wishes of the most influential and wisest of the Catholic clergy — not bad judges — and not against the wishes of the great majority of those whom it was proposed to enfranchise. He should be asked—"Must these distinctions always prevail, and shall the time never come when there may be perfect political equality?" He believed the time was not far distant; if he thought otherwise, he should despair of Ireland and be alarmed for the permanence of peaceful union. But he believed there was a most favourable change in the feelings of the population—a change which it was in the power of Her Majesty's Government to assist and accelerate if they would be more anxious to legislate on certain subjects than they seemed to be. When a wider diffusion of knowledge and experience should have taught the Irish peasant to take a more reasonable view of the past and a wiser hope of the future; when a different spirit should pervade the popular Press and animate the utterances of the priest; when agrarian crime and secret societies should disappear, and assassins should not only be arrested but convicted; then, but not till then, would be the time when it would be safe to extend the borough franchise in Ireland. He should give his vote to-night from no leaning to obstinate prejudice, from no desire to perpetuate distinctions which he admitted were, to a certain extent, anomalous and invidious; but after a most careful consideration of the question he had come to the conclusion that, under present circumstances, the extension of the borough franchise in Ireland would be productive of most mischievous and deplorable results; not so much to England as to Ireland itself, and, therefore, he felt bound to vote against the Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Kildare.

MR. LAW said, he had listened with great attention to the speech of the noble Lord so as, if possible, to learn the reasons which had induced him to change the views he had formerly expressed on this subject; but all he could discover was that the noble Lord ascribed every insurrectionary and disloyal person in

Ireland to the class that would be enfranchised by this proposal, and that he dreaded lest the hon. Member for Meath (Mr. Parnell) should, in some mysterious way, be magnified as against the hon. and learned Member for Limerick (Mr. Butt) by the adoption of such a measure as the Resolution indicated. He (Mr. Law), however, submitted that these could not be gravely alleged as sufficient grounds for withholding from Ireland a right which the noble Lord had frankly admitted on former occasions by his vote in that House. And yet he must say no better reasons had yet been given for this policy of resistance. Of course, all the venerable arguments urged by Sir Charles Wetherell and the old Tories of some 50 years ago against any extension of the constituencies had been reproduced now once more, as they were in 1867, when the present Prime Minister proposed a household suffrage for the English boroughs. Lord Beaconsfield then truly said it was impossible that the franchise could ever be finally based on any mere money value; there being no principle or reason in a £4, or £5, or £6 franchise. He gave figures to show that the result of the extension proposed would be ultimately to double the borough voters in England. This calculation, indeed, fell far short of the reality. As already stated in the present debate, many of the English borough constituencies had been not merely doubled, but increased three, four, five, and sixfold, and even more—and that without any evil results—nay, on the contrary, with advantage to the country. Yet, what did those who there acted the part of Cassandra prophesy? Did not the present Foreign Minister angrily exclaim that all the capital, wealth, and intelligence of the country would be submerged under a flood of numbers? Well, then, as all such gloomy prophecies had been falsified in England, what rational fears could be entertained as to the consequences of a much lesser extension of the borough franchise in Ireland? The principle he (Mr. Law) contended for was that the headship of a family was the best security that could be given by a voter for the faithful discharge of his duty to the State. To use Lord Beaconsfield's words, "All the State had a right to ask was that a voter should not be a migratory pauper." And as household suffrage pure and simple was established, and, like all previous extensions of the franchise, had done immense good in England, why should they not deal with Ireland in the same way? It was, he (Mr. Law) ventured earnestly to say, unworthy of the House to consider the question whether the equalization of the English and Irish borough franchise would have a favourable effect on Catholics or Protestants. Some of the figures quoted by his right hon. Friend the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) were very significant. The percentage of voting power in England and Scotland was, it appeared, 14 per cent. In Ireland it was only 6 per cent. In England, according to other authorities, at the lowest, one man in 15 had a vote; whereas, in Ireland, only one man in 30 had a vote. And yet there was nothing to justify that difference. But, again, hon. Members should bear in mind that in Ireland a £4 rating, under the General Tenement Valuation Acts, was, in reality, a £6 rental; and, having regard to the date at which the valuation of tenements was made—namely, just after the Famine—it was not far from representing what was now an £8 rental in most of the towns. But, further, considering the difference in the demand for houses in Ireland and in England, a house rented in Ireland at £6 would probably bring double that amount in an English town; and, therefore, hon. Members, whilst they insisted on having the Irish borough franchise based on the possession of a house rated at £4, were really requiring for the Irish voter a qualification equal to what would be a £10 or £12 rental qualification in England. One argument against this Resolution was that the present was an improper time for the reform it proposed. But they never knew any measure of reform that was not met with an argument of that kind. There never could be a proper time for a measure of reform which hon. Gentlemen did not like. Again, it was objected that this was a fragmentary measure, inasmuch as it was not accompanied by a proposal for a re-distribution of seats. But how would this Resolution bind the House against a re-distribution of seats? The Resolution merely affirmed that the franchise in England and Ireland should be assimilated. If this involved re-distribution of seats, let it be so. Those at his (Mr. Law's) side of the House were quite prepared to accept it. The only other argument he (Mr. Law) had heard was that of the hon. Member for Londonderry (Mr. Charles Lewis), who opposed the Resolution on the ground that the assimilation of the Irish to the English borough franchise would endanger some Conservative seats in Ulster. It was, however, he (Mr. Law) submitted, somewhat unpatriotic to oppose an extension of the franchise for any such narrow Party reasons, or because the change might give a preponderating amount of electoral influence to voters of one religious persuasion or another. Indeed, the argument seemed to answer itself, for it involved the admission that the existing constituencies did not fairly represent the real opinion of the Irish boroughs. These opinions he (Mr. Law) assumed it was the object of our Parliamentary system to ascertain and provide with proper means of expression in that House. If, then, that was the principle, he would say, let the just rights of the Irish people be conceded, and no fear need be entertained as the result. A great deal had been said about the franchise being a privilege, a trust, for the benefit of all, and so forth. Well, be it so. Those on his (Mr. Law's) side of the House thought it was an advantage to the country to enlist the greatest possible number of men in Constitutional action;—to bring, as many as safely might be, within the pale of the Constitution. Why should Ireland what it had given to the people of England? It was idle to expect the Irish people to be contented unless you conceded that equality of political rights which they were fairly entitled to demand. It seemed to him that the only way of bringing about that harmony, which was so much desired by all, that real consolidation and union of the Kingdom, was by doing precisely to Ireland what they did to England; and he hoped the time would yet come when, in such matters as they were now discussing, there would be no separate Act for England, Ireland, or Scotland, but one measure for all parts of a really United Kingdom. The urgent Whip issued on this occasion by the Government was, he (Mr. Law) feared, the most unwise thing they could have done, for it showed they were determined roughly to override the wishes of the Irish people by the strongest majority they could get. In conclusion, he gave a hearty support to the Resolution, and would rejoice if he could believe that Her Majesty's Government would even, at the last moment, assent to the principle, and hold out some hopes that, if not this Session, at least in the next, they would introduce a measure to give effect to it.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN said, that, as one of the Representatives of a very large English borough, he desired to express his cordial sympathy with the Resolution—sympathy which he believed was shared by almost the whole of his constituents. They were not alarmed by the terrible prediction of evil which had been made that night and on previous occasions. They had had experience of the result of a very great extension of the franchise in England, and they had not yet found that their institutions had been at all endangered, or that their lives and property had been jeopardized—on the contrary, they believed that it had been established that, just in proportion as they brought within the pale of the Constitution the great bulk of the people, so did they secure their loyalty, and they found that the people endeavoured to secure their ends only by Constitutional means. He was surprised at some of the arguments which had been advanced from the other side of the House, and he recollected that similar arguments were used in reference to late extensions of the franchise in this country. Then it was declared that many of the artizans who were claiming their share in the representation were disaffected Republicans and Chartists, and that to hand over to them the power which they desired would be very seriously to endanger life and property. It appeared to him that the best way of securing the loyalty of the Irish people was to yield with a good grace to their legitimate demands, and not to wait until there was a popular tumult, in consequence of which they would have to yield to their fears what they refused to the justice of the case. The hon. Member for Londonderry (Mr. Charles Lewis) used most extraordinary arguments. He gave as one reason why they should not now concede this last claim of the Irish people that in times past another Government had conceded to their wishes in respect to the Irish Church and the Irish Land, by which they abolished what seemed to many of them monstrous injustices which ought not to have continued so long. These concessions were only made after one of the Fenian risings, which caused so much anxiety and trouble at the time. It was a much easier and more Conservative course for the Government to take, having recognized the justice of the case, to yield to it, and not wait for such pressure as the noble Lord opposite suggested would be put forth. It was said the Irish people were apathetic on this question. In what way was the popular opinion of Ireland to be expressed? He remembered that exactly the same thing was said in reference to the English people. When his right hon. Friend and Colleague was addressing large public meetings in different parts of the country, it was said he was flogging a dead horse; and it was only when the Government found the irritation of the country taking a practical form in the shape of pulling down Hyde Park railings that it was convinced of its error, and that there was a real desire for reform. In regard to Ireland, they had this proof—that two-thirds of the Irish Members supported their claim. Even if the Irish people were apathetic —which he denied—on this question, it was the duty of the English people to concede to them the rights which Englishmen now enjoyed. At the present time, when the hon. Member for Dungarvan (Mr. O'Donnell) said that he represented the people of Ireland, he did not personally doubt him; but it would be more satisfactory if the hon. Gentleman were returned by a larger constituency than the 200 or 300 who voted for him at the last Election. The last Reform Bill had increased the constituency of Belfast from 4,000 to 20,000; but nobody said that Belfast voters were less respectable since the change. Why suppose a further change in the same direction would do greater harm? What their opponents had to prove was that there was such a marked difference between England and Ireland as would justify them in refusing to grant to Ireland what was enjoyed by England and Scotland. The measure would enfranchise the same class of voters as in England, though in Ireland they lived in a different class of houses. In Ireland the people were undoubtedly poorer; but after all that had been done of late years it was not to be said that a man was to be deprived of the franchise because of his poverty. The hon. Member for Londonderry (Mr. Charles Lewis) said the people were afflicted with ignorance, bigotry, and superstition, and the noble Lord (Lord Randolph Churchill) that they were debased, drunken, and disloyal. Those were very extraordinary charges, considering against whom they were brought. There were 900,000 persons in the existing boroughs in Ireland, of whom 150,000 were heads of families. Only one-third of these had the franchise, and the remaining two-thirds were the persons of whom the hon. Member for Londonderry and the noble Lord spoke. The hon. Member for Londonderry did not content himself even here. He said the people mixed with the animal creation. A good many people did that. A Conservative member of the Birmingham Town Council once declared that the pig was "a particularly companionable animal," and his views were supported by the Conservative Press in the town. Bye-laws were required in all the big towns to prevent the people keeping pigs in close proximity to their dwellings; but he had never heard that the tens of thousands of people in England and Scotland who committed breaches of those bye-laws should be struck off the voters' register. He was struck with the argument used by the hon. Member for Tipperary (Mr. Gray), and he would give a practical illustration of that argument. In Birmingham there were 2,000 Irish voters. They lived in houses none of which were rated at anything lower than £5. But if these men went over to Ireland and lived in houses below £4 they were deprived of the vote. Would not some of those men feel the injustice of such a state of things, which seemed to put a disqualification on Irish soil? He thought it was incumbent on those who sat on both sides of the House, who could not see their way to vote for Home Rule, or for an inquiry whether the people of Ireland wanted it, to show that the English Parliament was capable of doing equal justice between the two peoples.

MR. O'REILLY remarked that all the arguments which had been used against the Motion that night had been urged before, and retracted, and it was certain that they would be retracted again. The noble Lord opposite (Lord Randolph Churchill) had argued that the proposed electors had views antagonistic to his own, and that their support was largely given to the opinions of the hon. Members for Cavan (Mr. Biggar) and County Mayo (Mr. O'Connor Power). He himself had lived for some considerable time in Ireland, and would not by any means confidently predict the political creed of the class whom it was sought to introduce to the electorate; on that point the noble Lord might or might not be correct; but he could not seriously ask the House to refuse to enfranchise a body of men simply because of his own personal dislike of their political leanings. Next came the speech of the hon. Member for Londonderry (Mr. Charles Lewis) which might be said to be the speech of the evening. There was much in that speech to which he took exception. The hon. Member had talked dramatically of his principle and independence; but that which shook his noble soul was really his fear of some change in the constituency of Londonderry. The hon. Member had spoken in unjustifiable language of the Irishmen who had sent him to Parliament. It was unworthy of him to speak of the Irish people as degraded, besotted, ignorant, corrupt, and superstitious, and as living in hovels, with, forsooth, garrets in them. It was stated that the franchise was not a right, but a privilege. There was a time in Ireland when certainly it was the privilege of a sect; but he hoped they were not going to return to the principles of those days. The glowing speech of the hon. Member for Londonderry must have come back upon the ears of many hon. Members as a faint and inadequate echo of the speeches of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Lowe) against the extension of the suffrage in England. On the whole, they had had to confront old arguments and old bugbears. The difficult question of the re-distribution of seats had been mentioned as part and parcel of the controversy respecting the franchise; but the common-sense view of the matter was that the extension of the suffrage should precede schemes of re-distribution, to which, if they were moderate and reasonable, he should not be opposed. Then, again, they had been told that little or no interest was taken in the subject in Ireland. That he ventured to deny, though he could not call it a burning question. The Irish constituencies and their Representatives were not blind adherents of any Party. They were ready to accept with gratitude good measures from either side of the House; but at the next Election they would remember what the Chief Secretary told them last year, that he had not been responsible for any of the electoral reforms that had been carried; and that if they were free now at the polling places from any influence that might seek to control their votes, they owed it not to those who opposed it as long as they could, and who now in turn opposed the extension of the franchise which was demanded by the Motion before the House. The Irish Members might be beaten that night; but the cause they advocated was bound to triumph, and it would sweep away the barriers like the tide, the barriers raised against it, together with those who upheld such barriers.

Sir CHARLES W. DILKE said, there had been a sort of conspiracy of silence on the other side, which was very remarkable, the more so because there was reason to believe that a large number of hon. Gentlemen opposite had suddenly changed their opinions on this question. Some of them were going to vote against the Resolution, while others would abstain from voting. One of those Gentlemen (Lord Randolph Churchill) had had the pluck to come forward and make his public confession. It was evidently much against the grain that he did so. On the 15th of last May he voted in favour of the extension of the Irish borough franchise; so that all the alarming things he now saw in the measure must have been absent from his mind less than a year ago. The hon. Member for Londonderry (Mr. Charles Lewis) had made a violent speech, of a character more suited to a meeting in the North of Ireland than to the House of Commons. He had, in fact, made an Orange speech, and had spoken of the Catholics of Ireland in terms which he had never before heard in that House. The best answer to the hon. Member was that the Catholics of Ireland now returned 20 Protestant Members; and it was not open to anyone to declare that the addition of any large number of voters of that class to the present constituencies would be attended with danger to the Constitution. The hon. Member was a great authority upon electoral statistics; the term "wire-puller" might almost be applied to him; but he had quoted facts and figures which might easily be turned against him. His figures were based on the number of male-rated occupiers, and he had made no allowance for the important points of length of residence, duplicates,

&c. Whenever the question of the redistribution of seats had been under discussion in the House the small Irish boroughs had always been held up as what teetotal lecturers would call "dreadful examples" and "awful warnings;" but even if that were so, it made it incumbent upon them to support their Friends from Ireland when they came there, to take steps to place the representation on the footing which it should take. Hon. Members who had spoken on the other side, in dealing with figures, had picked and chosen their places. His right hon. Friend the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) had alluded in general terms to the difference of proportion between the two countries in the matter of the franchise. He was in a position to give the figures in detail. There were not nearly twice as many people living in the Scotch boroughs as there were in the Irish boroughs; but there were more than four times as many electors. There were 2,000,000 fewer people in Scotland than in Ireland, and 70,000 more electors. In England, Scotland, and Wales about 14 per cent of the population were electors in the boroughs. In Ireland the proportion was almost exactly 6 per cent. In many English boroughs the percentage was as high as 20, and in some cases 30; while in such Irish boroughs as Clonmel, Ennis, Limerick, New Ross, Wexford, and Tralee the percentage was less than 4, and in Kinsale less than 3. This was sufficient to show that the figures which had been picked and chosen by the hon. Member for Londonderry were not worthy of the attention of the House.

MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY said, that the arguments used by the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill) were unworthy of his well-known ability. The noble Lord had admitted that on abstract principles the Resolution was justified; but argued that the persons whom the proposed measure would bring within the franchise were disloyal in feeling, and would be likely to fall under the influence of secret societies. But if there were any truth in this, it afforded the strongest argument in favour of the proposal of the hon. and learned Member for Kildare (Mr. Meldon), for the best remedy against the evil would be to bring these persons within the pale of the British Constitution, and that was the platform of the Home Rule Party that evening. The same arguments that were now used against admitting the lower classes in Ireland to the franchise were used on a former occasion against the classes of highest social standing in Ireland, and by men whose intellect—like that of the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock—was corrupted by the red tape of Dublin Castle; but events had shown it to be without foundation. If the people of Ireland were driven in to forming secret societies, it would be through the action of those who would exclude them from the franchise. He regretted very much that the noble Lord had seen fit to change his opinion on this question. There were men who now being outside the Constitution were the victims of secret societies and dangerous to the State; and he asked the noble Lord if he was prepared to keep them so, rather than bring them within the pale of the Constitution. What was asked for Ireland was founded on the broadest principle of justice. It was a part of the English Constitution, and he asked that the people of Ireland should be put on the same equality. They were now at the commencement of a Session which was to be devoted to domestic questions, and here was the most domestic of domestic questions. When the Irish Members came forward with larger demands than this—such as Home Rule—they were told that it could not be granted, but that English Members were willing to place the people of the two countries on a footing of equality. When, however, they asked for a measure of equality on the subject of the franchise, their demand was refused. Their request was very small, and was founded on the broad principle of justice. Five times had they asked for that equality, and five times had that measure of justice been refused them. It was said, by way of threat, that the extension of the franchise would involve a re-distribution of seats; but the supporters of the Motion were quite prepared for that contingency, although some of them might themselves be unseated. Indeed, it was a reflection on the political morality of Irish Members representing small Irish boroughs to argue that they would alter the vote they were about to give from any such consideration. They never pretended that the distribution of seats in Ireland was final or immutable, and the Irish people would not shrink from re-distribution whenever it should become necessary. He believed that the reason why hon. Members on the other side of the House opposed the Motion was that they were afraid of the result of that re-distribution; for they knew very well that if the Irish were admitted to equal electoral rights with the English, they would lose their monopoly in the representation of Belfast, Londonderry, and other large towns in the North of Ireland. Compared with those of England, Irish constituencies were certainly small, owing to the fact that the number of voters was kept down by restricting the franchise, and further reduced by unjust rating and registration laws; and yet they were told that the constituencies were too small and must be disfranchised, in whole or in part, in certain cases. It was like the old case of knocking a man down and then kicking him for falling. But the fact remained that Irish towns did not enjoy equality with English towns of the same or even a smaller population; and when, in 1867, the franchise was extended in England, the principle of disfranchising the smaller boroughs was not carried out. Why this principle should be carried out in Ireland in connection with a similar extension of the franchise there he was at a loss to conceive. The borough of Galway had a population of 19,000, and the city of Waterford had one of 29,000. If the franchise were lowered, the constituencies of those towns would be greatly enlarged; but in England they had many towns of much smaller population who returned two Members to Parliament, and yet there were hon. Members ready to maintain that the two Irish towns he had named ought only to return one Member each. The influence of the clergy in Irish elections had, of course, been referred to; indeed, it would scarcely have been a franchise debate if such had not been the case; but the reference came from one who he rejoiced to say was not an Irishman, and who had shown himself to be completely ignorant of Irish life. The remark showed a moral courage amounting to recklessness, for there was no foundation for the theory that they had exercised it in an improper manner. They, no doubt, possessed very considerable influence over the people; but it was quite as legitimate an influence as that exercised by other classes in political affairs, and their use of it contrasted very favourably with the manner in which the influences of the landlords and other classes was exercised before the voter obtained the protection of the Ballot. If such undue influence did exist, the best way to defeat it was to enfranchise these humbler classes of the people, and teach them to exercise their own opinions upon political matters free from the dictation of any man. Another argument that had been used against a liberal electoral law in Ireland was that the Irish people were a violent people, whom it would not be safe to trust with large political powers. He denied altogether that the Irish people were a violent people. As a rule, they were a quiet and inoffensive people, though sometimes they had certainly yielded to the influence of agitators. It was well known that the feeling of England and of Scotland was in favour of this measure of reform, and its defeat would be mainly due to the determination of the Irish Conservative Members to oppose it. He therefore asked them whether they had anything to gain by their resistance? Was it of any use for them to defend that fortress any longer? If they gave in, the people would become more reconciled to them than they were now. If they held out, they would create a feeling of hostility towards them in the minds of the people, which would tend to their almost total exclusion from political influence when at length it was granted in spite of their opposition, for the Irish people were growing more educated and enlightened, and the time was coming when the power of the Irish Conservative gentlemen, who could do so much for their country if they chose, would become extinct. He hoped that the day was not far distant when the English and Scotch Members would join in teaching the Irish people that all races and all creeds in Ireland were equal before the Constitution with their brethren in the rest of the United Kingdom.

Mr. O'CONNOR POWER thought that before the right hon. Gentleman the Chief Secretary for Ireland closed the debate, it was desirable and just that the hon. and learned Member for Kildare (Mr. Meldon) should reply to the arguments which had been put forward. It appeared to him that the opponents of the measure had already broken down in their arguments. His hon. Friend the Member for Tipperary (Mr. Gray) supplied by argument that which the hon. Member for Londonderry (Mr. Charles Lewis) was skilful enough to evade. In fact, he evaded the whole subject, and it was to be hoped that his violent Orange speech would not pass for logic. His speech was simply a performance in fireworks; for he went up like a rocket, and came down like a stick, leaving the subject as he found it. The arguments of the hon. and learned Member for Kildare had not by any means been falsified, and it had been shown clearly that the Irish people were suffering grave injustice from the fact that a borough franchise prevailed in England and Scotland which was not existing in Ireland. The strongest reason advanced by the opponents of the Resolution was that in Ireland the mass of the people were poor. Ireland was undoubtedly a poorer country than Great Britain, and consequently there must be greater difficulty in regard to the rental value. The hon. Member for Londonderry and the noble Lord who represented Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill) represented what might be called the threatened boroughs, and therefore they shrank from the question of franchise. The Parliamentary occupation of Woodstock by the noble Lord would come to an end whenever there was a re-distribution of seats; and the hon. Member for Londonderry candidly admitted last year that if a measure based on the present Resolution were passed he should no longer represent the city of Londonderry. The latter fact explained the enthusiasm displayed by the hon. Gentleman in opposing the Resolution. It was almost like flogging a dead horse to reply to the speech of the hon. Gentleman after what had been said by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster), for his harangue—it could not be called a speech—was of the most illogical kind. In the course of his observations, he said that if they passed this Resolution they would enfranchise ignorance, superstition, and bigotry. The hon. Gentleman jumped from one point to the other. If the Irish people were ignorant and not an educated people, who was to blame but the Tory Party, who had for 200 years made compulsory ignorance the law of the land? After putting a price on the head of the schoolmaster and making education penal, they now turned round and denounced the people on account of their ignorance. Of course, the House was amazed when he stated, in tones of mock solemnity, that he was not actuated in the course he had taken by prejudice or bigotry. As to the charge of superstition, was that a compliment to the religious convictions of the Irish people? Was it a fair recognition of their firm attachment to their faith, for which they had made countless sacrifices? When he spoke on this matter, was he not actuated by prejudice and bigotry? It was like "Satan reproving sin" to hear the hon. Gentleman talk in this way, and a Representative of the city of Londonderry ought to be the last to speak of it. The hon. Member for Londonderry suggested that the Irish people ought to be contented with what had been done for them, and stated that there was no necessity to call into political activity a new class of voters. Of course, from him such arguments might be expected. He also claimed credit for the Conservative Government for having mitigated the severity of the Coercion Code. No doubt that Code had been passed by a Liberal Government; but it should be remembered that it was at a time when there was insurrection in Ireland. On the other hand, if the Conservative Government had modified the Code, they had extended its duration for five years; they had tried to renew it with severe restrictions, and if those restrictions had been afterwards mitigated, it was owing to a policy they would rely upon in the future—the policy of Parliamentary opposition, which some hon. Gentlemen found it convenient to call the policy of Parliamentary obstruction. He was told they were to be beaten to-night; but to have a majority against them was a matter about which he did not care one jackstraw, because he felt they were right, and they would again return to the attack, and force the Conservative Party to surrender those positions which it now defended.

MR. J. LOWTHER said, notwithstanding the somewhat discursive range which the debate—especially of late—had assumed, he would try to confine himself to the four corners of the Amendment of the hon. and learned

Gentleman opposite (Mr. Meldon). It was hardly a period of the evening for following the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down (Mr. O'Connor Power) into the policy of the Coercion Acts, or other hon. Gentlemen into the policy of the Education Bill, the Land Bill, and other measures which had been referred to in the course of the debate; and it might save time if he was at once to say that, according to his opinions, there was no great principle at stake between them. On former occasions, when the question of the extension of the franchise and matters affecting the representation had been under discussion, the two Parties had usually entertained very widely different views; but, on this occasion, no such difference as a matter of principle could be said to prevail. Reference had been made to the legislation of 1867-8, which settled the question of reform as far as England was concerned. The right hon. and learned Gentleman opposite (Mr. Law) intimated that he (Mr. Lowther) could not claim any personal share in that settlement. That was true, and he approached this subject with superior impartiality, as he was not in any way responsible for the measure. Acting from the impartial point of view, therefore, he did not say that the settlements of 1867 and 1868 could lay claim to the character of finality. He did not say those settlements could not in any shape or form at any time be departed from; but he would remind the House that in 1868 the question of the franchise in Ireland was settled, not by a Party vote, nor by a majority obtained from one side, but by the general consent of the two great Parties in the State. It was a settlement proposed by the Party now intrusted with the management of public affairs; but reference to the debates would show that the limit then fixed at a £4 rating was cordially accepted and endorsed by the Gentlemen who then sat on the Opposition Benches. It would be as well for the House to recollect that without attempting to establish any position of finality in the settlement then arrived at, it was generally understood that piecemeal legislation on the subject of Parliamentary reform was to be deprecated. They had heard a good deal at different times about single-barrelled Reform Bills. Early recollections were the most vivid, and his early Parliamentary recollections were connected with that period. He, therefore, could well remember that if one thing more than another was distinctly laid down by hon. Members on both sides, it was that any dealing with the question of reform was one which must be comprehensive in its character, and there was scarcely any refutation of the doctrine which was then laid down that these attempts of private Members to tinker the Constitution of the country did not deserve the sanction of Parliament. Hon. Members had referred to the distribution of seats. Whenever the question of reform was taken in hand, it would be the duty of the Legislature to face, not only that, but every aspect of the question. Some thought that to speak of distribution of seats involved a threat coming from that side of the House. [Sir JOSEPH M'KENNA: Hear, hear!] He thought he recognized in that cheer the voice of one who worthily represented, not certainly one of the largest constituencies in Ireland; and it was not for him to say whether the constituency which the hon. Gentleman so efficiently represented would long survive any effectual re-distribution of seats. But, at the same time, he would remind the House that this question was settled 10 years ago—so far as any question could be settled. But by the Amendment before the House, not only would the question of the franchise be re-opened, but they would be landed in an Irish Reform Bill; and, moreover, it would be impossible any longer to defend the existing arrangements with regard to England. He would like to know with what logical consistency it could be urged, if an Irish Reform Bill should be ventured on, that the settlement arrived at for England the year before the Irish settlement should not be departed from? The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford had admitted that at once, and that he looked upon this as a stepping-stone to county suffrage; and he (Mr. Lowther) had no doubt that the right hon. Gentleman would be only too glad that Parliament should once more embark in the occupation of re-casting the institutions of the country and unsettling what it had been confidently hoped all round would have lasted at any rate for a generation. The right hon. Gentleman talked of the justice of according to Ireland what had been already accorded to England, and other hon. Members had used the same language. Now, it appeared to him that the Government did propose to accord to Ireland the same privileges as had been accorded to England, and one of those was the great privilege of freedom from agitation; while the right hon. Gentleman and others proposed to inflict upon her the very doubtful blessing of a period of agitation and unrest. Now, it appeared that a system of frequent changes in the institutions of the country was neither desirable nor acceptable to the people at large, and he should probably not have had to trespass on the time of the House from the place in which he now stood had not that for some time past been the general opinion of the country. Something had been said about the absence of any sign of a real demand on the part of the Irish people for the change which was now proposed; and the hon. Gentleman who seconded the Motion before the House (Mr. Gray) asked whether it was the wish of the Government that they should follow the example of the people of England by pulling down the railings of the official residence where he (Mr. Lowther) had recently been privileged to reside, as had been done in the case of Hyde Park? and he also made some reference to the appointment of a County Court Judge. Now, he was the last person to say a word in defence of such proceedings as those to which the hon. Gentleman had referred, with respect to pulling down the railings, and especially with reference to the judicial appointments to which allusion had been made; but however much he might deprecate what had then occurred, it at all events furnished some evidence of the existence of a certain amount of popular feeling. But hon. Gentlemen who had taken pains to make themselves acquainted with the opinions of the populace in Ireland did not pretend that there prevailed among them any excitement on the subject before the House. Petitions might represent very little, but it was notorious that none had been presented to Parliament from the general public with respect to it; and he was therefore, he thought, justified in arriving at the conclusion that no real demand for a change existed. He had already referred to the undesirable nature of constant demands for alterations in the Constitution; but if it were deemed expedient, both by the country and by Parliament, that not only one, but several, Sessions should be spent in re-opening such controversies, he saw, from a Party point of view, no reason why the Government should put themselves forward as objectors to such a course of proceeding. Speaking, however, from the point of view, not of Party, but of the interests of the country, he hoped the House would discourage it.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: Sir, I have no wish or intention to reply on the whole of this debate, or to interpose between the House and those Irish Members who may still wish to answer the right hon. Gentleman the Chief Secretary for Ireland. There are, however, one or two observations which fell from the right hon. Gentleman with regard to which I desire to say a few words. The right hon. Gentleman told us that the Government were quite prepared to give Ireland the boon of freedom from agitation; but, as I understand it, that boon is to be conferred by entirely refraining from the proposal of any legislation which would be likely to cause or create any popular feeling in that country. That, however, appears to me not to be exactly the best mode of securing to Ireland freedom from agitation. If the Government, as I understand the right hon. Gentleman, will listen to no popular demand from Ireland, and will bring forward no measures which have any probability of interesting the Irish people, I think that course is far more likely to excite than to prevent popular agitation. The right hon. Gentleman also said that not only would this measure lead to the discussion of the larger question of the extension of the franchise in counties, but that it would also re-open the question of the extension of the franchise in England. Now, I see no reason to suppose that it will have that effect. It is true that we were told in 1868 that the Irish Reform Bill would be a settlement in Ireland such as that which was made in England; but the passage which my right hon. Friend the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) referred to, from the speech of Lord Mayo, who introduced the Bill, showed that it was brought in under an entirely mistaken conception. Lord Mayo said that it would place the Irish franchise substantially in the same position as it was in England. No doubt, it would have been in the same position if the original proposal of Mr. Disraeli had been accepted; but everyone knows that alterations were made in that Bill which greatly modified and extended the original proposals of the Conservative Government of that day. The Reform Act of Lord Mayo has not placed Ireland on the same footing, or anything approaching the same footing, as England, for the fact is that in the English boroughs every male householder substantially has a vote; while, as has been proved, a large proportion of the householders in Irish boroughs have not a vote. How, therefore, can it be said that the Irish and English franchises have been placed on the same footing? A speech, I may add, has been made in the course of this debate of which I cannot take exactly the same view as has been taken of it by the hon. Member for Mayo (Mr. O'Connor Power). He has spoken in terms of disparagement of the speech of the hon. Member for Londonderry (Mr. Charles Lewis). I thought that was a remarkable, and I must add, to some extent, a violent speech, which was calculated to produce a remarkable impression upon those who heard and might read it. The hon. Member brought forward, with great eloquence, and apparently with great satisfaction to himself, certain statements, in making which he seemed to think that he was saying something new. But there are many hon. Members in this House who remember the protracted debates which preceded the passing of the Reform Bill of 1867, and they have heard the hon. Member speak in disparaging terms of the class of voters who would be included in the electoral list if the value of the qualifications of voters was lowered. The hon. Member appeared to think he had knocked the case for assimilation completely on the head when he said the English Reform Act did not admit a large number of voters under the £4 voting. But he does not seem to know that the £4 line was not the only line that was discussed in this House in the reform debates in the last Parliament, and that even more terrible denunciations had been levelled against the class of voters who would be admitted by giving the franchise to £6 householders. It is always easy to prove that many more poor people would be admitted than rich people; and that rich people are a much more intelligent class of people, and much more qualified to govern the country than poor. It has always been proved that when large numbers of people received the franchise they would swamp existing and intelligent voters, and bring all sorts of calamities on the country at large. The hon. Gentleman spoke with great pride of the constituency which he represents; Londonderry is, I believe, a prosperous and industrious community, and I am sure that the select portion of the citizens of Londonderry, who return the hon. Member, are a very estimable body of persons; but, as he has said, they possess this fault—that they do not represent Ireland. They may, it is true, be a great deal wiser than the rest of the inhabitants of Ireland, and it may be regretted that all the constituencies of Ireland do not resemble Londonderry; but it is certainly true that they do not represent Ireland, or the feelings and wishes of the people of the whole country, and what we now want is not a voting class who shall be judged by the value of their holdings, but one which shall, in truth and fact, represent the country generally. The old idea of a select body of voters who shall elect the best possible House of Commons, which the hon. Member clings to, has been long abandoned; and what we desire, as I have said, is an elective body which shall secure a fair representation of the country as a whole. The present qualification for Irish voters in boroughs, we are told, does not secure such a representation; and it is sought to repair the defect by the means suggested by the hon. and learned Member for Kildare. There seems to be a very great fear among the opponents of the proposal that it is only a part of a much greater scheme — a stepping-stone, in fact, to some proposal of almost revolutionary tendency; but if the figures come to be examined it will be seen that the proposal is not a great one. The whole population of the boroughs of the United Kingdom is 13,000,000, producing an electorate of 1,600,000, and returning 350 Members. The population with which we are dealing in this proposal is

867,000. They return 37 Members, and the electorate is 54,000; and the whole question, which has assumed, in the minds of some, such gigantic proportions, is whether we are to add to these 1,600,000 a number of voters not much over 100,000. It cannot, therefore, be said to be a very alarming proposal. The hon. Member for Londonderry says that the demand made for the extension of the franchise to the counties in England will be made in Ireland. But that demand will be made whether you agree to this measure or not, and will have to be discussed on its own merits. Though this question is not a large one, it is not a small question from a general and political point of view. Though it refers only to the enfranchisement of 100,000, it concerns the satisfaction of 5,000,000. I do not admit that by accepting the proposal before the House hon. Members would be committing themselves to the much larger questions involved in the supposed electoral rights of the dwellers in counties or even in any other of the divisions of the Three Kingdoms, because it must be generally admitted that as far as the social conditions of Great Britain and Ireland are concerned it is necessary to adopt different modes of treatment, and that each separate proposal will, when it comes to be made, be discussed on its merits. A great deal has been said about exceptional legislation, and we are asked why we should provide exceptional legislation for Ireland in some respects, and equality of treatment in others? It is necessary, no doubt, that in matters relating to the social condition of the Kingdom, the three countries should not be dealt with in precisely the same way. No one has ever contended that the same ecclesiastical regulations are suitable for Scotland, Ireland, and England. In everything relating to the religious condition of the people there must be diversity of treatment. But does the House for one moment suppose that the people of Scotland would be contented if any alteration were made in the religious rights enjoyed by them? If you could not for a moment suppose that they would be, on what ground, then, do you suppose that the Irish people can be content so long as existing differences and distinctions are observed? Reference has been made to the disaffection which pervades a certain number of the class who would be enfranchised in respect of these questions. I am afraid it must be admitted that such disaffection does prevail. But what is the danger of that disaffection? It is not that it may find occasional expression in this House, but that it exists amongst the people. I believe it is far better that if disaffection does exist it should find its expression in every legitimate way, and should not be concealed and repressed, as it is at present, into channels and modes of unconstitutional action. I do not pretend for one moment to say that the passing of this measure would make Ireland a contented or well-affected country; but I believe it is one of a series of measures for the removal of obstacles which exist to the contentment and pacification of Ireland; and it is useless to hope that the country will ever be reconciled to the Constitution under which it is governed so long as this remnant of inequality and remnants of political jealousy with regard to this country are permitted to exist.

DR. O'LEARY said, he rose, with some hesitation, to reply to the observations of the Chief Secretary for Ireland. He would not have attempted to do so had he thought that the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition represented all Parties in that House; for although he was entitled to represent the Liberal Party, there was another—the Irish—Party in the House, and as one of them he (Dr. O'Leary) now claimed to be heard. Above all other questions he considered this to be a vital one. The people of Ireland looked upon this question, which had been brought before the House from 1874 up to the present time, as one of the highest importance. On each occasion when it had been brought forward, the Government had pronounced themselves unfavourable to the proposal. Personally, he felt extremely aggrieved at the course taken by the Government on this as well as on other Irish questions, especially as strong hopes were entertained, from the announcements made at the opening of the Session, as to the measures to be brought forward. With reference to the arguments that had been adduced in favour of this question, it was noticeable that the Chief Secretary for Ireland had not answered one of them. What did he state? He commenced by an assertion that he was actuated by supreme impartiality. He (Dr. O'Leary) was prepared to admit that, if an impartial view could be taken of a whole case from a particular point of view; but he must say that he did not believe there was one word of truth in the Chief Secretary's assertion of impartiality.

Mr. SPEAKER trusted that the hon. Member did not intend to impute a want of truth to the right hon. Gentleman the Chief Secretary for Ireland, and that he would see the necessity of withdrawing the observation.

Dr. O'LEARY said, he had no hesitation in doing so. He did not mean to imply that the right hon. Gentleman was untruthful, but only that his views were most fallacious. He commenced by stating his impartiality; and in his earnest desire that the House should hear the truth endeavoured to show that other questions were involved in this. But this question was not one involving any distribution of seats; it was simply whether certain classes of people in Ireland, in towns or municipal boroughs, should enjoy the same individual privileges as the people of towns in England enjoyed. That was the question, and the only question, before the House. The people of Ireland did not ask for a re-distribution of seats—they only sought to be placed on an equality with people of a like social standing in England. It had been urged by hon. Members that the persons sought to be included in the franchise were not capable of appreciating political freedom. But were the people who were benefited by the last extension of the franchise in England capable of exercising political freedom? He had been returned for Drogheda—the honour was thrust upon him, and he undertook it as a public duty. He gave his voice to the Conservative Government upon the Slave Question; and when he went back to Drogheda and told the people that he had supported the Conservative Government upon that point they approved what he had done. It was his opinion that the more the franchise was extended the more Conservative would be found the vote given: such was his experience. The Chief Secretary for Ireland had told them that the question was one of the re-distribution of seats. If that question were involved, then it was a fair matter for discussion; and, if not, why was that topic introduced at all, except but to prejudice the views of the House? The question simply was, whether the electors of Ireland were to have a like electoral privilege with those in England? The noble Lord the Member for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill) had referred to the smallness of the Irish constituencies; but he would tell him that the borough he represented contained only one-third of the number of constituents in the borough of Drogheda. The hon. Member for Galway held in his hand a paper which showed the enormous and ridiculous discrepancy that existed between the political representation of England and Ireland. The Chief Secretary for Ireland had also spoken of the advantages of freedom from agitation. What was freedom from agitation? Was it secured by preventing a man in Ireland from having political freedom, when it was allowed to a man with the same wages and an equal social position in England? What arguments had the Chief Secretary for Ireland advanced to show that freedom from agitation existed at present on this question? He gave none, nor had he advanced a single reason why one man should exercise the franchise and the other not. He paused for a reply. In all that the right hon. Gentleman had said, did he give any reason why the Liverpool artizan and Dublin artizan, who were on an equality in all other respects, were not to be put on an equality in point of political rights? Speaking more than three months ago from that Bench, he had replied to the hon. and learned Member for Louth (Mr. Sullivan), who had defended the right hon. Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone) in an attack upon Mr. Layard. Therefore, he hoped credit would be given him for no factious opposition to the Government. There was a certain number of hon. Members in that House who had adopted, for the last few years, a policy the wisdom of which he would not attempt to decide; but this he would say—that, in his opinion, if the Government persisted in their effort to resist the passing of that Bill, the cry that had been raised in Ireland would justify those Gentlemen in an active opposition. So long as the Government refused to place Ireland and England on the same level, so long would the voice of Ireland, so long would all her sympathy and all her love follow the hon. and learned Member for Louth in his struggles to place both countries on an equality. If the people of Ireland were continually exasperated by her just demands not being granted when the most obvious arguments were brought forward and not a single reply in favour, or justification or explanation of, the existing state of things was advanced from the front Treasury Benches, in that case he proclaimed that all the opposition of Irish Members was necessary; and, for his part, he should join them, and declare open war with the English Government for their neglect and disregard of the interests of Ireland.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: The hon. Member who has just sat down, and who represents what I may call a small Irish borough, has told us that he has heard, happily not in this House, that an opinion has been expressed to the effect that no political vitality remained in the small Irish boroughs. I venture to think that the hon. Member's presence proves the contrary. I was gratified to hear from the hon. Gentleman that, although he complains that a large number of the inhabitants of Drogheda are not qualified to use the franchise, yet if that boon were conferred upon them the decision of the constituents would not deprive him of the honour of representing them. That is a matter of some congratulation, and I feel sure that we are all very glad to listen to the hon. Member when he stands up to address us. But I am bound to say that he has not, in his remarks to-night, done much to clear up a difficulty which I have felt throughout this debate. We are called upon, on this occasion, to do that which is never very convenient—not to discuss or express an opinion upon a measure presented in the form of a Bill, but to express our approval of the principle contained in an abstract Resolution. I am far from saying that that is a matter we ought never to entertain; but when that abstract Resolution is presented to us, and we are asked to affirm a principle of great importance, we ought to be told what the principle is upon which we are asked to decide. My right hon. Friend the Chief Secretary for Ireland said there was no difference, he thought, among us upon that point. I thought him a little too sanguine at the moment; but immediately afterwards rose the noble Lord, and after he had spoken I could not help thinking that there were three opinions wholly irreconcileable entertained upon the matter. In the first place, we had early in the evening a speech from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster), very much in accord with what has been said by the hon. Member for Drogheda. He said, with regard to the principle involved, we had simply to ask ourselves whether there is any reason why a privilege or right enjoyed by a householder in England should not be equally enjoyed by a householder in Ireland? But in that view the question naturally arises as to what is meant to be implied by the possession of the suffrage. Is the right one which belongs to every man worthy of it? If so, the subject is a difficult one, for the question of the hon. Member for Drogheda then becomes important—"Why a man in Drogheda is not to be allowed to vote when a man in a precisely similar position in Liverpool is permitted to exercise the privilege?" To that I answer, why should a man who is living in Torquay, in a more expensive house and who occupies a higher position in the social scale than a man in Liverpool, not be allowed to vote like the man in Liverpool? I was prepared to hear hon. Gentlemen opposite cheer that observation. But there we have a certain principle to be affirmed. Let us know whether that is really the principle involved in the Resolution we are asked to adopt. If that is the principle we are asked to sanction, it must be remembered that this is not a simple question of justice between England and Ireland, but a question of political representation throughout the United Kingdom. That was one question put before the House. Then the right hon. and learned Member for the county of Londonderry (Mr. Law) said—"There have been discussions this evening as to whether the franchise is a right or whether it is a trust. I give the go-by to all such refinements as these, and I put the matter on this ground—I say it is for the good of the State and the community that as many people as possible should be admitted within the pale of the Constitution—that is to say, should be admitted to the right of voting." Well, that principle the right hon. and learned Gentleman knows well is the principle of universal suffrage, qualified, of course, by the exclusion of some persons who may be personally unfit to exercise it. That principle may be offered for our confirmation. But then comes the noble Lord, who is a prime authority upon the other side of the House, and puts forward a wholly different principle from the others, and one which I am bound to say, for my own part, I entirely accept as the true principle. The noble Lord said the question is, how are we to obtain a fair representation of Ireland as a whole? That is the question which we have always on this side of the House—which I, at all events, have been in the habit of putting in all electoral discussions—namely, what is the best way of obtaining a fair representation of the whole country? That question ought, no doubt, to be approached in a fair and thoughtful spirit, and you will find that it is one that carries you very far. It carries you to the question of the distribution of power, and to the mode in which minorities are to be represented; for you cannot get a fair representation of the country as a whole, unless you have some means by which the representation of minorities is secured. It also raises other questions, which, if you deal with the franchise, you ought to consider. The principle involved in the Resolution we are asked to pass is by no means one that has been elaborated in the way in which a proposition of reform of this kind ought to be. I say that we take a right view of our position in holding that changes in the representation—which must necessarily be a source of disturbance to the public mind—must be of such a character as to embrace a proper settlement of all parts of the question. I agree with those who have said that there are anomalies in our present system of representation, not only in Ireland, but in other parts of the United Kingdom; but I say that, upon the whole, we have a fairly working representative system. At present, it is one which enables us to obtain a very reasonable and fair expression of the opinion of the country, and I may say particularly that of Ireland. Hon. Gentlemen opposite say that the present system does not secure the return of Members who represent the feeling of the people of Ireland; but those same hon. Gentlemen always claim to speak in the name of Ireland; and I think we may fairly assume that, however imperfect the system may be in its details, yet we do contrive, by our present arrangements, to obtain a perfectly fair and reliable expression of the voice and opinions of their own country. No doubt the time may come when it may be desirable to review again the working of our representative system; but I do not think that we should act wisely in undertaking that review at the present time. It is not so very long since the last settlement was made, and we remember that, not only in 1867, but in the years that preceded it, and for some time before, the country was agitated, and it is not desirable to revive again that question until we can deal with it as a whole. An Act for Ireland was passed about the same time, and the noble Lord and the right hon. Member for Bradford have stated that that was passed under a misapprehension on the part of the Minister who was responsible for its introduction. I have not considered the speech of my noble Friend Lord Mayo on that occasion; but it was, I apprehend, made in 1867. [Mr. W. E. FORSTER: 1868.] Then it was made after the passing of the English Reform Bill, and therefore with a full knowledge on the part of the House of the legislation for England. But the main question we now have to consider is whether we shall pass a Resolution which really settles nothing whatever, and which will affirm a principle of which there are at least three different versions entirely inconsistent with one another. I hope, under the circumstances, that the House will vote in favour of the Motion that Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair.

MAJOR O'GORMAN was not quite sure whether the Government laboured under the impression that if the franchise in Ireland were extended in the same manner as in England, none but Home Rule Members would be returned by Irish constituencies to that House. In his opinion, that impression, if it existed, was entirely erroneous. The Irish people were essentially Conservative, and the lower one descended into the social structure, the more Conservative would Irishmen be found. If hon. Members doubted his statement, he would bring illustrations in support of his argument. The noble Lord, who was now Prime Minister of this country, defeated and turned out of Office the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich because the latter introduced a £7 Franchise Bill, which was too revolutionary for the noble Lord; but the moment the noble Lord himself came into power he introduced household suffrage, apparently a much more revolutionary measure, and what had been the result? The noble Lord had found Conservatives in the lowest ranks of Englishmen. The opening of the Constitution had placed the hon. Gentlemen, whom he had now the pleasure of seeing opposite, on Conservative Benches. Let them make in Ireland a similar experiment. The £7 franchise never would have returned a Conservative majority. Household suffrage had done it. "*Si monumentum requiris circumspice.*"

Question put.

The House *divided*:—Ayes 256; Noes 187: Majority 69.—(Div. List, No. 4.)

Main Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

Motion, by leave, *withdrawn.*

Committee *deferred* till *Monday* next.

RACECOURSES (METROPOLIS) BILL.

(*Mr. Anderson, Sir Thomas Chambers, Sir James Lawrence.*)

[BILL 48.] SECOND READING.

Order for Second Reading read.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."—(*Mr. Anderson.*)

MR. ONSLOW observed that the Bill was before the House last Session, when the second reading was passed by the narrow majority of 2. If it had been supposed that the Bill would be discussed that night, he thought more hon. Members would have stayed in their places to have voted against it. He believed that last Session but for the Bill being overshadowed by the discussions of the Dunkeld Tolls Bill, the narrow majority of 2 in favour of the second reading would have been turned into a large majority against. In the Preamble of the Bill it was stated that racing in the vicinity of the Metropolis was inconvenient and prejudicial to the interests of the public. That assertion he denied, in the belief that the grievance was entirely sentimental. It appeared to him that if racing were to be suppressed in the Metropolis it must also be suppressed in every other part of the Empire. If that were to be done, and the hon. Member would bring in a Bill to that effect, the question could be discussed on its merits. But he failed to see what earthly good could possibly be effected by putting a stop to racing within a certain number of miles round the Metropolis. They would thereby put an end to the amusement of a great number of people, and that without any practical benefit whatever. He failed to see how the Metropolis would be benefited by this Bill, nor why such a provision as the suppression of races within 10 miles from Charing Cross should not be equally applied to Birmingham, Manchester, and Liverpool. Why should London alone be deprived of its race-meetings? At the present time, they had only a very few racecourses within 10 miles of the Metropolis; there were Kingsbury, Streatham, the Alexandra Palace, and, perhaps, Croydon. By the suppression of those meetings they would deprive the people of the Metropolis of a legitimate amusement, which so many thousands of them were in the habit of enjoying, simply because a small number had misbehaved themselves. He felt confident of this—that if the police did their duty there would be no disorderly conduct, and it was only where the police had been conspicuous by their absence that any "scenes" had taken place. The hon. Member had said that he did not wish to do away with race-meetings, but only to bring them under the jurisdiction of the magistrates. He apprehended that if brought under the jurisdiction of the magistrates for the purpose of being licensed, in a very short time all the meetings would be done away with. If there were abuses in those race-meetings, there were also abuses on the racecourses in other parts of the country. It was invidious to single out London alone and suppress race-meetings in its vicinity, and yet permit them to go on in every other part of England. Why had that Bill been brought in? There had been an agitation got up by certain Metropolitan builders, who found that they could not let their houses well nor sell their land; and they thought if these race-meetings were abolished it would much improve their property. In his opinion, the agitation against these race-meetings had been got up solely by these building speculators. These men had been over-speculating in the purchase of land and in the building of houses, and they imagined that there was just a chance of letting these houses if these races were done away with. At all events, they thought that whatever happened they could not be worse off than they were at present. If the hon. Gentleman would bring forward some measure to prevent fraudulent transactions on the part of Directors of public Companies in this country, he would give him his hearty support; but he hoped the second reading of this Bill would not be passed, as he believed it one that would do no good whatever, while it would put restrictions upon a legitimate amusement of the people of this country, and was an egregious example of piecemeal legislation. He moved that the Bill be read a second time that day six months.

Sir JOHN ASTLEY cordially seconded the Motion. He was at a loss to know why the hon. Member for Glasgow should have put this Notice upon the Paper. He had never seen the hon. Gentleman at a racecourse, and he had very frequently attended race-meetings; and he rather fancied that the hon. Gentleman had never been at a race-meeting in his life. Under these circumstances, in his opinion, he was not the sort of man to point out to the House how race-meetings should be conducted. The population of London was very large, and needed a good many outlets for enjoyment; and he could not understand why they should not be permitted to have races within a 10 miles' radius, when it only interfered with the enjoyment of one or two cantankerous individuals. If the hon. Member understood more of the matter, he would see that magistrates, although a very intelligent sort of men, were not exactly fit persons to judge as to whether race-meetings should be held. The Jockey Club, of which he was a member, was, in his opinion, much better qualified to order race-meetings than the magistrates. He hoped the House would not pass the second reading of the Bill.

Amendment proposed, to leave out the word "now," and at the end of the Question to add the words "upon this day six months."—(*Mr. Onslow.*)

Question proposed, "That the word 'now' stand part of the Question."

Sir HENRY JAMES supported the second reading of Bill, which he considered was an attempt not to interfere with legitimate racing, but to put a stop to the ruffianism of suburban meetings. Last year they had had speeches from the hon. Member for Mid-Lincolnshire (Mr. Chaplin) and from the Chief Secretary for Ireland, in which they stated that this was a legitimate matter for the Jockey Club to deal with, and if left to that body they said the evil would be met. But had anything been done? The hon. Member for Mid-Lincolnshire, in speaking against the Bill, said that if the Jockey Club did not interfere then he would assist in putting down these meetings. He could not help thinking that the absence of the hon. Member was not quite accidental; but if he were there they would probably hear that the Jockey Club had done nothing. If the Jockey Club would, by any indirect rule, show the House that they were putting down these meetings perhaps that would be sufficient. Hon. Gentlemen who opposed the Bill had said that this was a sentimental grievance; but the fact was that persons attending these meetings in the neighbourhood of the Metropolis took to destroying the peace of the district, and these meetings were held six or eight times a year. It had also been asked why the magistrates should interfere in these matters? It was a principle well known to the Common Law that if persons wished to meet in any great numbers, even for the purpose of a fair, they could not do so without the sanction of the Justices. All they sought by this Bill was to put that law into effect, and stop meetings which were only held to bring together people not for fair racing, but for the collection of gate money, and to increase the trade of public-houses.

Mr. J. LOWTHER said, that the hon. and learned Gentleman had made some reflections on his observations last year. It was true that he had told the House that the races of England were more properly left in the hands of the Jockey Club than in those of the magistrates; and he still entertained the opinion that while the licensing of refreshment-booths and so forth was under the existing law very properly confided to the magistrates, the other arrangements relating to race-meetings should be intrusted rather to the Jockey Club than to the magistracy. The hon. and learned Gentleman had further asked what had been done by the Jockey Club since the last year? He seemed to answer that question to his own satisfaction by saying that nothing had been done. Of course, he (Mr. J. Lowther) was only speaking his own opinion on this subject, and not that of Her Majesty's Government, and he would therefore venture to answer the question. He would affirm that the Jockey Club had done a great deal. First of all they had, by a notice issued last year, requested that no gentleman should act as a steward of any of these race-meetings unless satisfied, upon proper inquiry, that such meetings would be well conducted. It was pointed out that such a notice as that would be scarcely sufficient to answer the object. He had been twitted with the inadequacy of that notice, and the attention of the Jockey Club had been called to the subject. The noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition, who he was sorry to see had left the House, acting as steward of the Jockey Club, had caused notice to be issued with regard to race-meetings to the effect that the stake-holders should be prohibited from inserting advertisements until the persons conducting the meeting had made every arrangement for the due maintenance of order. The Jockey Club had thus taken all steps in their power to place matters upon a proper footing, and he would ask, what more could the Jockey Club do? What more could they do to redeem the undertaking made by him on their behalf last year? The effect of the notice to which he had referred prohibited the publication of the advertisements in the official calendar, which acted in this way—that if a horse, in defiance of the refusal of the Jockey Club to advertise, was run, it was from henceforth debarred from ever taking part in any races held under the auspices of the Jockey Club.

SIR HENRY JAMES: Has one meeting been discontinued in consequence?

MR. J. LOWTHER: The meeting of West Drayton has been discontinued.

SIR HENRY JAMES: That was before the notice.

MR. J. LOWTHER said, he had also reason to believe that the meeting had been discontinued at Kingsbury; that was to say, would be discontinued for the future. Perhaps some hon. Members were not aware that flat racing did not take place at this period of the year; and therefore he was perfectly correct, from a grammatical point of view, notwithstanding the criticisms of one or two hon. Members opposite, in saying that the meeting at Kingsbury would for the future be discontinued. The hon. and learned Gentleman had also referred to another meeting—that at Streatham; and he might say it was more than probable, from what he had heard, that no meeting would henceforth take place there. The result was this—that the existing state of the law was fully sufficient to put down any nuisance that prevailed, and what was asked by the promoters of the Bill was that they should force an open door, and that a law should be passed to effect a purpose already accomplished without it.

SIR THOMAS CHAMBERS thought the object of the Bill should be fully before the House. They were asked to put down an universally admitted unmitigated nuisance. The best authorities in the House on matters of racing did not venture to utter one syllable in favour of the meetings sought to be suppressed. There must be some good arguments in favour of the great race-meetings of this country. But all they wanted to do by the present Bill was to put down an unmitigated nuisance. The mischief produced by these suburban meetings was absolutely indescribable, and by passing the Bill the Jockey Club would be saved the trouble of suppressing them. It must also be admitted that up to the present time the Jockey Club had not made much progress in their suppression.

SIR HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON could not allow what had fallen from the right hon. Gentleman the Chief Secretary for Ireland to pass without some observation. He ventured to think, notwithstanding the strong assertions that had been made as to the active part taken by the Jockey Club, and the results which had happened in consequence of their action, that that action had had no practical effect. It was from the lips of the right hon. Gentleman himself that they would find one of the strongest arguments for the passing of this Bill. He had admitted to the House that in the neighbourhood where these races were held it was impossible to let houses. [MR. J. LOWTHER: I never said anything of the sort.] He took down the words which he was under the impression were uttered by the right hon. Gentleman; but they must have fallen, as the right hon. Gentleman repudiated them, from the hon. Member for Guildford (Mr. Onslow), to the effect that builders in the districts where these meetings were held could not let their houses or sell their land, and that they had got up the Bill in consequence. That proved that there was an injury caused by these race-meetings, and he could not divest himself of the recollection of the truth of the nuisance as brought before him when he occupied another Office. Whilst Under Secretary at the Home Office he received constant reports of the objectionable nature of these meetings; and it was from information furnished by the police, and from other sources that came into his hands, that he became, and still was, an earnest supporter of this Bill. He believed that the nuisance as described by the hon. and learned Member (Sir Henry James) was a substantial one, and that the Jockey Club, however willing to put it down, were not able to do so. They had no power by means of restrictions to insist upon order, and it was for the interests of everyone and in the cause of order that the Bill should be passed.

Sir CHARLES LEGARD said, that as one of the members of the Jockey Club he had attended most of the race-meetings within the vicinity of London, and he had never seen more disorderly conduct there than at the meetings held 200 or 300 miles away from the Metropolis. He objected to piecemeal legislation, and considered that if race-meetings within 10 miles of London were done away with the House ought also to deal with the races at York, Liverpool, Shrewsbury and elsewhere. Why were not the races near those places as detrimental to those towns as those held in the neighbourhood of the Metropolis were said to be to it? He could not understand that public morals were less likely to be corrupted from suburban race-meetings than from those held near other towns; and he might add that he failed to see that there was very much more rowdyism at the surburban meetings than there was at Shrewsbury last autumn, when a lot of people from Birmingham broke into the Grand Stand. For this reason, he objected to such a ridiculous piece of legislation.

Mr. ANDERSON observed, that last year the Bill not only passed a second reading, but went through Committee, and certain Amendments were then made which had now been introduced into the Bill. In his opinion, the Jockey Club were powerless to meet this evil. Even if they tried to do so they would be unable. The Drayton meeting was not stopped by the Jockey Club, but chiefly because the grand stand had been burnt down. There were two bodies exercising some influence in racing matters—they were the Jockey Club and the Grand National Hunt Committee. Immediately after the passing of the rules of the Grand National Hunt Committee two of the members, actually of the Committee itself, became the stewards of a prohibited meeting. He had no doubt the Jockey Club would do something similar. The subject had been so well discussed by other hon. Members that he would not trouble the House with any further observations on the Bill.

Sir MATTHEW WHITE RIDLEY said, that during the short time he had been in Office he had become aware of the objectionable character of these meetings in the neighbourhood of the Metropolis. The Jockey Club having failed to apply any remedy, he should individually support this Bill.

Mr. BENETT-STANFORD said, that if the Jockey Club had really done their duty by these meetings there would have been no chance of this Bill being brought before the House. But the Jockey Club, while looking well after the great race-meetings, had ignored its duties as regarded the smaller ones. No one would suffer more from the passing of this Bill than himself. The racecourse at Streatham was his property, and the passing of the Bill would probably abolish the meeting. Within his knowledge numerous complaints had been made as to the property damaged by persons visiting the Streatham racecourse. Last year 13,000 people went to the Streatham races; one-third of these paid for their admission, but the rest broke in to the course and trampled down neighbouring property, without caring in the slightest degree for anyone. No one could appreciate honest racing more than himself, and he should always support it; but the suburban meetings were got up by publicans for their own benefit, and were supported by the lowest riff-raff of the Metropolis. In his opinion, it was time they were put down, and he warmly supported the Bill.

Mr. STACPOOLE remarked that Her Majesty's Ministers were not so unanimous upon this measure as they were upon the last question before the House. He did not see why, if race-meetings should be suppressed near London, they should not be suppressed everywhere. He was opposed to the Bill, which had been got up by a few Sabbatarians and bucolic magistrates.

Question put.

The House *divided:*—Ayes 102; Noes 53: Majority 49.—(Div. List, No. 5.)

Main Question put, and *agreed to.*

Bill read a second time, and *committed* for *Monday* next.

SALE OF FOOD AND DRUGS ACT (1875) AMENDMENT BILL.—[BILL 56.]

(*Mr. Anderson, Mr. P. A. Taylor, Mr. Whitwell.*)

SECOND READING.

Order for Second Reading read.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."—(*Mr. Anderson.*)

MR. SCLATER-BOOTH said, there was a clause in the Bill which he could not agree to at present.

MR. ANDERSON hoped the right hon. Gentleman would allow the Bill to be read a second time, and then referred to a Select Committee.

Motion *agreed to.*

Bill read a second time, and *committed* to a Select Committee.

ANCIENT MONUMENTS BILL.—[BILL 52.]

(*Sir John Lubbock, Mr. Beresford Hope, Mr. Osborne Morgan, Sir Richard Wallace.*)

COMMITTEE.

Order for Committee read.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."—(*Sir John Lubbock.*)

EARL PERCY said, that it could not surely be the intention of the hon. Baronet who introduced this Bill to ask the House to go into Committee upon it at that late hour. The second reading of the Bill was taken on the 17th December—the very last day that the House sat — and it had been put on the Paper on the present occasion contrary to the usual rule. He trusted some little time would be given to hon. Members to consider what Amendments they should propose. It would also be necessary to have time to put the Amendments on the Paper. He begged to move the adjournment of the debate.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Debate be now adjourned." —(*Earl Percy.*)

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER appealed to the hon. Baronet the Member for Maidstone not to proceed with the Bill at that late hour.

SIR JOHN LUBBOCK agreed that it would be unreasonable to ask the House to discuss anything on which there was a difference of opinion at that hour. If the House would allow the Bill to go into Committee he would not take anything which was disputed.

LORD FRANCIS HERVEY reminded the hon. Baronet of the good fortune which he had met with in the progress of the Bill during the present Session; and he hoped that, under the circumstances, he would be satisfied with the success that had already attended him.

MR. DILLWYN thought the hon. Member was right in pressing the Bill on at the present time, having regard to the difficulties which private Members experienced in the conduct of their Bills.

MR. BERESFORD HOPE must remind the House that this was no new Bill, but one with which it was well acquainted. His hon. Friend the Member for Maidstone asked that the Bill should be allowed to go into Committee, and not that the Amendments might be considered that night. As there was nothing in the general scope of the Bill which was not well known to those opposing it, he thought the request reasonable; and he was sure his hon. Friend did not propose to go further, after getting into Committee.

MR. RAIKES observed, that the Amendments by the Secretary to the Treasury opened a very large question. He must also point out to the House that the Amendments which had been brought forward then might very well have been put down in December, when there would not have been the reason now urged for the postponement of the Bill. The hon. Baronet could not complain of that reason for postponement being offered. It was rather unreasonable, it appeared to him, that the Bill, which had undergone important changes, should be pushed forward in this way. He thought that those who had already shown the hon. Baronet a good deal of consideration might fairly ask him to give them some consideration in return, and consent to the postponement of the Committee.

Mr. MONK, on behalf of the hon. Baronet the Member for Maidstone, stated that he merely wished now to be allowed to take the Bill formally into Committee, and that he would at once postpone the further consideration of it. Under these circumstances, he thought that the House would only be acting fairly towards his hon. Friend, whose Bill had been read a second time on four previous occasions, by allowing it to go into Committee.

Mr. MACARTNEY said, that the hon. Member for Cambridge University (Mr. Beresford Hope) had reminded them that the Bill was one which was well known to the House; but it should not be forgotten that they had also been informed that the hon. Member for Maidstone had made very great alterations in it, which practically made it a new Bill. What the nature of the Amendments was the House did not know; they were only aware that certain alterations had been effected, and that certain arrangements had taken place between the hon. Baronet and the Government. Was it fair, under these circumstances, to ask the House to go into Committee at that time?

Sir JOHN LUBBOCK stated that he had not introduced Amendments, but that they had been suggested, and that he had consented to adopt them, and they appeared in the Bill as it was printed. He did not desire to enter into debate at that hour; but, as his hon. Friend the Chairman of the Committees knew, he would have little chance of going on unless he pressed the Bill then.

Question put.

The House *divided:*—Ayes 33; Noes 81: Majority 48.—(Div. List, No. 6.)

Question again proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

Mr. ONSLOW moved the adjournment of the House.

Earl PERCY hoped the hon. Baronet would not press the matter on at that time, considering that the second reading had been passed by a mistake, and that there had been no discussion. He thought that he should be content with the progress already made.

Mr. HEYGATE, in seconding the Motion, said, that he only did so because of the lateness of the hour; but he hoped the measure would be passed into law in good time.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—(*Mr. Onslow.*)

Sir JOHN LUBBOCK said, that if the House would consent to go into Committee, then he would be perfectly willing to carry out his undertaking. If there had been any misapprehension by the noble Lord he regretted it, and if the noble Lord wished to put down any Amendments, he should be glad to give him every opportunity of doing so.

Mr. ONSLOW said, he would withdraw his Motion after what had fallen from the hon. Baronet. His object was only to obtain that explanation.

Motion, by leave, *withdrawn.*

Original Question put, and *agreed to.*

Bill *considered* in Committee.

Committee report Progress; to sit again upon *Friday* next.

DISQUALIFICATION BY MEDICAL RELIEF BILL.—[Bill 22.]

(*Mr. Rathbone, Sir John Kennaway, Sir Charles W. Dilke, Mr. Ritchie.*)

THIRD READING.

Order for Third Reading read.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read the third time."—(*Mr. Rathbone.*)

Mr. PELL objected to the provisions of the Bill. It might be asked why he did not oppose the Bill in an earlier stage? His reason for not doing so was his unwillingness to appear in the light of obstructing the Bill during the whole Session. It ought to have been opposed by the Government, for he would ask, what was the use of a Government if it permitted so mischievous a Bill as this to arrive at the stage which this had reached? This Bill was mischievous, inasmuch as it removed from one class of persons a disqualification which everyone underwent who permitted himself to become a pauper. The general idea was that the unhappy persons who were suffering from infectious diseases were thrust into asylums. As a member of the Metropolitan Asylums Board, his experience was that, so far from that being the case, they were embarrassed by the eagerness of persons who were only too ready, instead of isolating their children and keeping them at their own cost, to avail themselves of the accommodation provided for paupers. He would relate his own experience in other ways. A few years ago inquiry was formally made among the small-pox patients in the Metropolitan Asylums District Hospital at Hampstead. Certain questions were put. Amongst them were these —"What is your profession or calling?" "Have you ever, in your life, applied for relief?" Only 11 per cent of the persons seeking admission had ever applied for relief—that was, 11 per cent only of the inmates belonged to the class for whom the asylums were built. And there was something more than that. A number of the patients did not consist of artizans or ordinary labourers, and such as would naturally be expected to be found in the class of paupers; but included, he thought, a commercial traveller, clerks, and a number of domestic servants. Now, this hospital was for the use of paupers only. Why should persons be exonerated from the duty of having their servants properly isolated and treated at their own or the servants' cost? This was one of the not infrequent attempts during the last year or two to nibble away the fringe of the Poor Law of 1834. They should be very jealous of any attempt at reform or amendment of that code of laws. The Bill spoke of persons who were receiving medical relief as in-patients in dispensaries. He had never heard of dispensaries giving medical relief to in-patients. Before sitting down, he must again express his regret that his right hon. Friend who had charge of these matters had not thought it right to oppose this Bill. He did seriously ask him, in the performance of his duty, not to allow such a Bill as this to pass. He begged to move, as an Amendment, that the Bill be re-committed.

Amendment proposed, to leave out the words "now read the third time," in order to add the word "re-committed," —(*Mr. Pell,*)—instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words 'now read the third time' stand part of the Question."

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE said, that the hon. Member for South Leicestershire had given his experience in connection with a Metropolitan Board. On Tuesday last, at a meeting of one of the Boards in London, of which he (Sir Charles W. Dilke) was a member, the medical officer reported 17 cases of small-pox which had occurred in a single parish, and that not a large one, in the Metropolis. The outbreak was traced conclusively in 14 cases, and was suspected to have arisen in the remainder from one single case. It was noticeable, also, that all the cases occurred within a period of five days. The medical officer concluded his Report by strongly advocating the principle of this Bill; and he believed that the whole of the medical officers in the Metropolis were likewise in favour of the measure, which had, in fact, been introduced at their instigation and by their wish. The hon. Member had treated this matter entirely as one relating to the Poor Law, and had left out of sight the scientific aspect of the question. Viewed as a matter of public health an entirely different light was thrown on the question; and he, for one, would not have allowed his name to be placed on the back of the Bill unless he was satisfied that the medical officers thought its provisions would be a great gain to the public health of the Metropolis. The hon. Member was also incorrect in stating that the Bill contained an allusion to in-patients in dispensaries; there was nothing of that kind in the Bill.

MR. PELL referred to the passage in which the words were found.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE admitted they might have occurred in the connection pointed out; but certainly the hon. Member had not conveyed to his mind the idea that he was going to introduce any Amendment touching the principle of this Bill. If he only wished to re-commit the Bill with a view to altering its phraseology, there could have been no possible objection to that course. As to the principle of the Bill, he would maintain that it did not in the least infringe the spirit of the Poor Law. The hon. Member for Meath (Mr. Parnell) was the first to raise any question on the point; but he thought that it had been shown that the Bill was no infringement of the Poor Law.

Mr. SCLATER-BOOTH could not support the Bill as it stood. It was laid down by the Bill that the receipt of medical relief out of the rates was no longer to be an electoral disqualification. That was an objectionable proposal. In Ireland the Poor Law contained a provision to the effect that if a person who had received medical relief afterwards repaid the cost of it he should cease to be disqualified, and that seemed a proper principle. Some confusion existed in the minds of the promoters of the Bill between medical relief under the Poor Law and medical attendance under the Public Health Act. The Bill provided that a person was not to be disfranchised by receiving medical relief at the hands of a sanitary authority; but, in truth, there was no such condition of disfranchisement, and the Bill in that respect pretended to deal with what did not exist. It was well known that hospitals set up by the sanitary authority under the Public Health Act pauperized no one. This and other objections constituted, he thought, sufficient grounds for his refusal to accept the Bill in its present shape.

Mr. RATHBONE said, that when the Bill was before the House on a previous occasion it had been discussed fairly and fully. The House was so much in favour of it that the Government, very wisely, did not push their opposition. The right hon. Gentleman the President of the Local Government Board had told them that a man was not allowed to vote who had received relief out of the rates in the hospital built by the guardians; but that there was no objection to his doing so if the hospital was paid for out of the sanitary rate. The meaning of that was that the great expense which had been incurred in building hospitals for small-pox and fever under the guardians of the poor would have to be doubled to provide another set of hospitals for a sanitary authority. In his opinion, the ratepayers would thereby be placed under very great additional burdens. The hon. Member for South Leicestershire (Mr. Pell) had said that people were crowding into the hospitals. As a guardian he (Mr. Rathbone) had taken an active part in these matters, in what he believed was one of the largest parishes in England. They had many cases of small-pox and fever, but were so far from finding people ready and willing to crowd into the hospitals, that it was with the greatest difficulty they could be got into them when it was absolutely essential for the benefit of the crowded districts in which they lived that they should be isolated. He had never known an instance of a person seeking to go into these hospitals without being pressed. The hon. Member for South Leicestershire had also informed them that there were a great mass of domestic servants entering the hospitals. To that he would answer that the Bill did not touch them as they had no votes. Under the present system people were made to pay for these hospitals, and were afterwards compelled to go into them; and it was not right that they should be made paupers because they had been compelled to enter the hospitals.

Dr. BRADY remarked that the object of the Poor Law regulations with regard to infectious diseases was to prevent the spread of contagion. A man might be taken into one of the leading hospitals suffering from disease, and he might come out of that institution perfectly well; but if he did not pay for the assistance he had received he was disfranchised, and precluded from giving a vote at any Election. He did not think that that was right or just. The clause of the Act had only this one effect—to deprive a man of a privilege he ought to enjoy, because by accident he had happened to get into the power of a Poor Law medical officer. He hoped this Bill would pass, and that they would have no more restrictions put upon people in such circumstances.

Question put.

The House *divided*:—Ayes 65; Noes 40: Majority 25.—(Div. List, No. 7.)

Main Question put, and *agreed to*.

Bill read the third time, and *passed*, with an amended Title.

MOTIONS.

STANDING ORDERS.

Select Committee on Standing Orders *nominated*:—Mr. MOWBRAY, Mr. BRUEN, Sir EDWARD COLEBROOKE, Mr. CUBITT, Mr. FLOYER, Mr. THOMSON HANKEY, Mr. HOWARD, Sir GRAHAM MONTGOMERY, The O'CONOR DON, Mr. RODWELL, and Mr. WHITBREAD.

SELECTION.

Committee of Selection *nominated*: — Mr. FLOYER, Mr. THOMSON HANKEY, Sir GRAHAM MONTGOMERY. The O'CONOR DON, Mr. WHITBREAD, and the Chairman of the Select Committee on Standing Orders.

INCLOSURES.

Ordered, That a Select Committee be appointed, Six Members to be nominated by the House and Five by the Committee of Selection, to consider every Report made by the Inclosure Commissioners certifying the expediency of any Provisional Order for the inclosure or regulation of a Common, and presented to the House during the present Session, before a Bill be brought in for the confirmation of such Order:—That it be an Instruction to the Committee, That they have power with respect to each such Provisional Order to inquire and report to the House whether the same should be confirmed by Parliament, and, if so, whether with or without modification; and in the event of their being of opinion that the same should not be confirmed, except subject to modifications, to report such modifications accordingly with a view to such Provisional Order being remitted to the Inclosure Commissioners.—(*Sir Matthew Ridley.*)

ELECTION PETITIONS (COSTS) BILL.

On Motion of Major NOLAN, Bill to limit the amount of the Costs recoverable in Election Petitions, *ordered* to be brought in by Major NOLAN, Mr. GRAY, Mr. MACDONALD, and Mr. PATRICK MARTIN.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 72.]

VALUATION OF PROPERTY BILL.

On Motion of Mr. SCLATER-BOOTH, Bill to consolidate and amend the Laws relating to the Valuation of Property for the purposes of Rates and Taxes, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. SCLATER-BOOTH, Mr. CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER, and Mr. SALT.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 71.]

BANKING LAWS AMENDMENT BILL.

Considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

Resolved, That the Chairman be directed to move the House, that leave be given to bring in a Bill to amend the Laws relating to Banking.

Resolution *reported*: — Bill *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. JAMES BARCLAY, Mr. BAXTER, Mr. JAMES COWAN, and Mr. COURTNEY.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 73.]

MUNICIPAL FRANCHISE (IRELAND) BILL.

On Motion of Major O'GORMAN, Bill for the assimilation of the Irish Municipal Franchise to that of England, *ordered* to be brought in by Major O'GORMAN, Sir JOSEPH M'KENNA, Mr. RICHARD POWER, and Mr. BLENNERHASSETT.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 74.]

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY FOR INJURIES TO SERVANTS BILL.

On Motion of Mr. BRASSEY, Bill to extend and regulate the Liability of Employers to make compensation for personal Injuries suffered by persons in their service, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. BRASSEY, Mr. MORLEY, Mr. M. BASS, and Mr. SULLIVAN.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 75.]

SUMMARY JURISDICTION BILL.

On Motion of Mr. Secretary CROSS, Bill to amend the Law relating to the Summary Jurisdiction of Magistrates, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. Secretary CROSS, Mr. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Mr. SOLICITOR GENERAL, and Sir MATTHEW RIDLEY.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 69.]

PROSECUTION OF OFFENCES BILL.

On Motion of Mr. Secretary CROSS, Bill for more effectually providing for the Prosecution of Offences in England; and for other purposes, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. Secretary CROSS, Mr. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Mr. SOLICITOR GENERAL, and Sir MATTHEW RIDLEY.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 68.]

CORONERS BILL.

On Motion of Mr. Secretary CROSS, Bill to consolidate and amend the Law relating to Coroners, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. Secretary CROSS, Mr. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Mr. SOLICITOR GENERAL, and Sir MATTHEW RIDLEY.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 67.]

PUBLIC WORKS LOANS BILL.

On Motion of Mr. CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER, Bill to amend the Acts relating to the Public Works Loan Commissioners and the Commissioners of Public Works in Ireland, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER and Sir HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 70.]

House adjourned at Three o'clock till Monday next.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Monday, 17*th February*, 1879.

MINUTES.]—Public Bills—*First Reading*—Disqualification by Medical Relief * (6); Workman's Compensation (7); Bankruptcy Law Amendment (8); Debtors Act, 1869, Amendment * (9).

MASTERS AND WORKMEN — WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION BILL.

BILL PRESENTED. FIRST READING.

Earl DE LA WARR, in rising to call attention to the state of the law with regard to the liability of employers to make compensation for injuries to persons in their service, and to lay upon the Table of the House a Bill to amend the law on that subject, said, that before asking their Lordships to give a first reading to the Bill of which he had given Notice, he must beg the indulgence of the House if he very briefly referred to the state of the law in respect of the liability of employers to make compensation for injuries to persons in their service. The question was one which very materially affected a large portion of the industrial classes of this country, and he thought it could be shown that the difficulties which surrounded the operation of the law, as it now existed in this respect, had in a great measure arisen from the altered circumstances affecting industrial enterprize. The measure, therefore, which he proposed to introduce would not materially alter the existing law; but was intended to adapt that law to the changed conditions of things. He believed that the law, as now interpreted and acted upon, made a master or employer of labour personally liable for injuries which might occur to persons in his employ when it could be traced to any negligence or want of due precaution on his part. The Bill did not propose to alter that — it commended itself as fair and reasonable. But as matters now stood in regard to large undertakings—such as mines, collieries, factories, railways, workshops, or other industrial occupations — the employer rarely had anything or very little to do with the management of business himself, but generally delegated his authority to other persons. What the Bill proposed to do was this—that when any work was carried on, be it a mine, a factory, a workshop, a railway, a building trade, or any such like industrial undertaking, by a company or by persons who did not themselves superintend the management, but delegated their authority and superintendence to managers or others acting in their stead, the employers or company should be responsible for the acts of those persons whom they had, in fact, put into their places and invested with their authority. It was only comparatively of recent occurrence that large industrial undertakings had grown up which made it, in many instances, impossible for the owners and employers personally to superintend the management; and the consequence, owing to the extent of the work, was this—that a considerable number of persons were appointed, with various responsible duties assigned to them, in superintending the work which the employers were carrying on. The Bill proposed to make the employers liable for the negligence or want of precaution of those persons, the same as if it were the negligence and carelessness of the employers themselves. That seemed to be really only an adaptation of the principle of the liability of the employer for injuries to his servants when it arose from his own want of proper care or precaution; and it might have been supposed that such would have been the natural development of the law when circumstances which he had described became altered. But not so. The law had been interpreted differently—and he might add that there was by no means unanimity between Her Majesty's Judges on the subject—for the law, as at present administered, removed all liability from the employer or master, and gave the workman no redress beyond what he could obtain from the manager or person exercising superintendence. A new difficulty in the administration of the law had arisen in the doctrine of "common employment." This doctrine had been developed to such an extent that the manager or other person in authority in the case of a mine, a railway, a factory, or other industrial undertaking was now considered to be in what was called "common employment" with all workmen or servants engaged in the same work. The consequence was that the company or real employer escaped all liability, as the manager or person in authority was considered to be a fellow-workman with all those whom he was appointed to superintend. The Bill he now submitted proposed to afford some remedy, while it would not, as he had said, materially affect the principle of the existing law. It proposed to alter the law of "common employment" so far as to exclude managers or persons exercising superintendence from being in common employment with those placed under them. But it was not proposed to alter the law with regard to those engaged in actual labour, and the employer would not be liable for injuries caused by one workman to his fellow-workman in the ordinary course of his occupation. It was further provided in the Bill that no compensation should be given if the workman himself had contributed to the accident; and whatever might be the nature of the accident, if there had been exercised by those in charge for the time being necessary care and competency, neither the owner nor anyone else was intended to be made responsible for such accident. The main object of the Bill was to render an employer responsible, when it was shown in evidence that the accident might have been prevented by the exercise of care and ability on the part of those in charge to whom the master or employer had delegated his authority. Such were the chief features of the Bill, and he thought it might be affirmed that it did not alter the principle of the existing law; but proposed, rather, to adapt it to the change of circumstances affecting industrial employments. He could assure their Lordships that the greatest moderation had been shown by those who were interested in this question, and that they desired only what was fair and just.

Bill to amend the law relative to the liability of employers to make compensation for injuries caused by accidents to persons in their service—*Presented* (The Earl DE LA WARR).

THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The noble Earl has brought before your Lordships a subject of great importance and of very considerable difficulty. It has been under consideration and debate in the other House of Parliament during the last Session, and, if I mistake not, it was considered in that House before a Select Committee. After the Report of that Committee, Her Majesty's Government, in the other House, stated that they proposed to introduce a measure on the subject; but owing to the state of Business during last Session, it became impossible to do so. Her Majesty's Government are perfectly prepared now to redeem the pledge which they gave. They have prepared a Bill upon the subject, and that Bill will be introduced forthwith into the House of Commons. In these circumstances, I hope the noble Earl will understand that it is not through any want of courtesy or respect to him that I do not pursue the subject any further at present; and although I am sure we should be glad to see the Bill which he proposes to lay upon the Table, I do not doubt he will think it right, after laying it on the Table, to await the progress of the measure which will be introduced "elsewhere."

Bill read 1^a; and to be *printed.* (No. 7.)

BANKRUPTCY LAW AMENDMENT BILL.

BILL PRESENTED. FIRST READING.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR, in rising to call the attention of the House to the General Report of the Comptroller in Bankruptcy for the year 1877, and to present a Bill, said: My Lords, some years ago—in the Session of 1876—it was my duty to call your Lordships' attention to the subject of the Law of Bankruptcy as it now stands. At that time the question did not attract a great deal of public attention, and the urgency of other measures before Parliament made it impossible to carry through the Bill which, on the part of the Government, I had proposed. Since that Session, various occurrences have attracted a much greater amount of public attention to the law of insolvency in this country. I own that I am not sorry that has been the case. I cannot help thinking that very considerable changes in that law are required, and I feel persuaded that those changes would be much better made under the vigilance of a large and interested body than at a time when attention would have been divided by other subjects. I have placed upon the Notice Paper a reference to a Report of great interest and importance —I mean the Report which the Comptroller in Bankruptcy presents annually as to the subjects over which he has control. Several copies of that Report are on your Lordships' Table. It is not very long, and it is a Report to some parts of which I shall ask your Lordships' particular attention. There are two other documents to which it is my intention to refer at the same time, although they are not included in my Notice. One of these is a Report made in the year 1876 by a small Committee of gentlemen whom I asked to favour me with their views upon the working of the Bankruptcy Law as it then stood. That Committee consisted of Mr. Kettle, a most experienced County Court Judge; Mr. Parkyns, one of the Comptrollers in Bankruptcy; Mr. Brougham, one of the Registrars; Mr. Nicol, an official of experience in connection with the County Courts; and Mr. Hackwood, a solicitor in the City of London, who has had much experience in the administration of the Bankruptcy Law.. In 1876 I referred to some parts of the Report made by these gentlemen, and I ventured to recommend the document to your Lordships. The third document is one which I propose to lay upon the Table of your Lordships' House to-night—I allude to the Memorial recently addressed to the Prime Minister, and signed by twenty-three of the principal bankers and an equal number of leading commercial houses in the City of London. It will be satisfactory that I should say that in all of these three documents there is a substantial agreement as to the nature of the evils which exist in the present Law of Bankruptcy; and that they go far in agreement as to the mode in which it will be desirable to cure those evils. Avoiding as far as possible all technicalities, I will state as shortly as I can what I myself understand to be the defects of the existing system, and then I will lay before your Lordships the proposals of Her Majesty's Government. The legislation in regard to bankruptcy in this country during the last 40 or 50 years, has—if I may so describe it —oscillated very violently between two extremes. At one time, the theory has been to leave the administration of bankrupt estates to the creditors, and to constitute them the sole judges as to the manner in which the proceedings should be conducted. At another time, the favourite idea has been to take everything out of the hands of the creditors and to hand the estate over to Courts and officials. The first of these theories —that of administering the law through delegates of the creditors—prevailed up to the year 1832. In that year there was a violent move in the opposite direction, the plan not having been found to work satisfactorily. In that year a Court was consequently instituted, with numerous officials, and from that time to 1860 almost everything connected with bankruptcy was done through the medium of the Courts and officials. In 1860 there came a very strong demand to do away, as much as possible, with the control of the Courts, and to place as much as possible in the hands of creditors. The two great Acts of 1861 and 1869 yielded to the demand which had been very clearly expressed throughout the country. The dominion of the Court was reduced to a very great degree, and the administration of bankrupts' property was handed over to creditors to an extent that had never been the case before. There are two broad distinctions as to the manner in which those who cannot pay their debts are dealt with in this country. Sometimes they are made bankrupt in name, and at others they proceed through a course of what is called "liquidation." In the case of a man who is formally adjudicated a bankrupt in name, the law provides that a meeting of his creditors shall be called, who shall appoint a trustee, whose duty it shall be to take possession of his property, if he have any, and to wind up the estate in the best possible way for the benefit of the whole body of the creditors. In doing this the trustee is to be assisted by a committee of inspection, also chosen by the creditors. In theory nothing could be better than this; because one would naturally suppose that the creditors would be the persons most anxious to make the best of an estate in which they were interested; but the practice has turned out very different from the theory. It was very soon discovered that it was a source of profit to become a trustee under bankruptcy proceedings, and there immediately arose a number of persons who laid themselves out to be appointed trustees and to reap the profits that were to be derived from the proceedings. Therefore, when a man became bankrupt, one of these persons found out who his creditors were, and as the creditors were, as a rule, supine and indifferent as to estates out of which they expected to get little or nothing, they did not make much difficulty about giving proxies to these would-be trustees for use at the meeting of creditors, the result being that these meetings became mere matters of form, some person appearing with his pocket full of proxies, which enabled him to propose and carry the appointment as trustee of some friend of his own; and, further, these proxies were drawn in such a way as that they could be used by the trustee at each and every subsequent stage of the bankruptcy proceedings. One result of this in practice has been that there has existed no means of bringing bankruptcies to an end; and as it sometimes happens that the same person is trustee under 20 or 30 bankruptcies, and has control of the balances belonging to each estate, your Lordships will see that, if he wishes to do it, the same trustee can retain in his hands the control and use of all these balances for years. The Committee of 1876—to whose Report I have referred—describe this state of things in their Report. They say—

> "We are informed that in a certain class of cases it is the common practice for proxies to be held by persons who at the meeting apparently represent the views of independent creditors, but who are in reality paid or retained by the debtor or the candidate for the trusteeship; and that wherever there are assets, out of which heavy costs may be paid, there is much canvassing, and what has been commonly called touting, for proxies. Proxies are, it is also said, often bought and sold, where required to turn the scale in favour of some resolution. It happens, not occasionally, but so frequently as almost to form the rule, that a stranger, so far as appears upon the face of the proceedings, is enabled, by the proxies he has obtained, to vote himself trustee, to fix his own remuneration, to nominate the committee of inspection, to order the payment of his costs, and finally to vote, in liquidation cases, the debtor's discharge.

Such is the way in which the system which was designed to be so beneficial has been worked. And, as showing what I have said as to bankruptcies never coming to an end, I may say that during the eight years which followed the passing of the Act of 1869 only 1,843 out of 7,126 bankruptcies were ever closed with the payment of a dividend; the remainder were kept open and floating for the benefit of the trustees, who had the use of the balances as long as there was any money remaining. So much for cases in which persons are actually adjudicated. I will now turn to the other and much larger class of cases, where the debtor who cannot pay his creditors is not adjudicated bankrupt, but has his affairs wound up "by liquidation by arrangement" as it is termed —which in practice, appears to me even worse than the cases in bankruptcy. Now, my Lords, these liquidations by arrangement came about in this way—The Bankruptcy Statute of 1869 provided a code for the administration of the Bankruptcy Law; but then it was naturally supposed that there might be cases where a debtor might arrange with his creditors without bankruptcy, and two sections were put into the Statute to meet those cases. One of these sections provided for the case where a debtor could agree with his creditors to hand over his property to them without going to the Bankruptcy Court at all, so that they might make the most they could of it. The other related to the case where the debtor offered his creditors a composition, by himself or by some of his friends, of so much in the pound on his debts. These two processes were what was called "liquidation by arrangement." There is no doubt that nothing could be better in theory. Clearly nothing could be more desirable than that a man should meet his creditors face to face, tell them the whole truth about his affairs, and make the best proposal he could in the circumstances; but, as in the former case, the practice has worked very differently from the theory. What has been the fact? In these cases, a man who cannot pay his debts is able to fix his own time and place for calling a meeting of his creditors—and, I am sorry to say, the debtor takes care to fix a time and place which are not the most convenient for his creditors to meet him. And, moreover, there is nothing whatever with regard to the principal class of those cases which insures the necessity of his giving notice to all his creditors of the meeting. And then, having proceeded in this way, all he has to do is to have the arrangement confirmed, not by a majority of the whole of his creditors, but of those who are present at the meeting; and, therefore, if he can only contrive to have the meeting so arranged that the greater number of his creditors cannot come to it, or that those at the meeting should be friendly creditors, your Lordships may imagine he will obtain a majority of his creditors who were present at the meeting. Well, my Lords, when he gets the resolution passed accepting his proposition—or in the case of a composition, when he has had it confirmed by another meeting of a similar kind—small as is the control where the debtor is a bankrupt, in these other cases there is absolutely no control at all. There is no security to be given by the trustees, there is no audit whatever of the accounts, and there is no provision that the liquidation shall be completed within any given time. My Lords, as I have described, in words not my own, what happened in bankruptcy—I will now take the liberty of describing, also in words not my own—what occurs in these liquidation arrangements. The statement I refer to is made by the Secretary of the Mercantile Law Amendment Society—

> "A debtor can now file a petition for liquidation by arrangement, and convene a meeting of his creditors at any time within a month, and almost at any place he pleases, and if at such meeting a majority in number, representing three-fourths in value of the creditors there present, or represented by proxy, pass a resolution agreeing to a composition, and such resolution is afterwards confirmed at a second meeting by a bare majority in number and value of the creditors present or represented, such arrangement is binding on all the creditors. As a rule, the chief creditors rarely attend such meetings, and the result is that the debtor, by the aid of proxies of friendly, bribed, oftentimes of fully-secured, and sometimes of fictitious creditors, can get released from his debts upon almost any terms he thinks fit."

My Lords, it appears by the statistics given in the Report that actually 75 per cent of the several thousands of compositions which have been made in the year have been under 5*s*. in the pound, and a very large proportion were even of 1*s*. or 2*s*.

Now, that being the working of the present arrangement of bankruptcy and liquidation, I think I have shown the substantial nature of the complaints made by those who object to the existing system. The first, which is strongly dwelt upon in the Memorial from the City, complains—and I am not surprised at it—of the vicious facilities, as they term it, for making private arrangements and escaping the control of the Court; and they complain of the encouragement thus given to reckless and fraudulent trading. My Lords, you will find a most interesting table on this subject in the first page of the Comptroller General's Report made last year for the year 1877. In that year there had been eight years' experience of the working of the Act of 1869, and the Report shows the manner in which those liquidations by arrangement have swelled in number, and how they have completely distanced all the proceedings in bankruptcy. Your Lordships will find, if you turn to the year 1870, that there were in that year 1,351 bankruptcies, while there were of liquidations by arrangement 2,035, and of liquidations by composition 1,616; making together 3,651. There were, therefore, of insolvencies brought to the notice of the Court 5,002. Well, my Lords, eight years afterwards the bankruptcies, which in 1870 numbered 1,351, had fallen in 1877 to 967, while the liquidations by arrangement, altogether free from the control of the Court, had risen to the enormous number of 5,239, and those by composition to 3,327, or 8,566, as compared with 3,651; while the insolvencies brought to the notice of the Court had risen from 5,002 to 9,500, or nearly double, as compared with the year 1870. Now, my Lords, I know it has been said sometimes that this enormous increase was owing to the condition of trade in 1877, and was the result of the depression of the mercantile world at that time. But that cannot be the case; because if your Lordships will take the four years which are generally referred to as the most prosperous years we have had of late—namely, 1871, 1872, 1873, and 1874—you will find that at the end of 1874 these liquidations had risen to 6,924—and therefore the rate of increase cannot be attributed to the depression of trade, but must be traced to the enormous facilities which are given to debtors who wish to be released from their debts on these easy terms. There has, my Lords, been no Return presented to Parliament for the year 1878, because it takes a considerable time to make it out; but I have been supplied with the number of liquidations by arrangement and composition for that year. For 1877 they were 8,566, while in 1878 they had swelled to the enormous figure of 10,332 — in 1870 they were 3,651.

I will now ask your Lordships to go a little beyond those numbers and look to the amount of money which has been sacrificed in these proceedings. Your Lordships will find at the 29th page of the Report some startling figures. For the year 1877 the total liabilities which were presented under bankruptcy and liquidation by arrangement amounted, in round numbers, to £20,000,000. Now, what are the assets to meet those liabilities? They amount to within a few pounds of £6,000,000; but from this a very large sum must be deducted, because, your Lordships must understand, the figures in the shape of assets are merely the estimate made by the trustees at the time of the commencement of the liquidation, and, generally speaking, the experience of the Comptroller has been that these Estimates are much too favourable. From what comes under his notice, he says that at least 25 per cent must be struck off for over-sanguine estimates. We will, therefore, take off 25 per cent from the £6,000,000 of assets. For the expenses of winding-up we must also take off a very large percentage. I am sorry to say that 30 per cent of reduction under this head is too moderate. But we will take it at 30 per cent, which, with the 25 per cent previously mentioned, reduces the £6,000,000 of assets to less than £3,000,000, against liabilities amounting, in round numbers, to £20,000,000. My Lords, that is not a pleasant state of things to contemplate, and I am sorry to say that there is another unpleasant feature still to be described. The Comptroller tells us that he has made an Estimate for the three years ending 1877 of the amount by bad debts arising from bankruptcy in this country. I question whether any of your Lordships have ever considered what the amount annually lost by bad debts in this country is as a whole—by this country I mean England alone—I am not speaking of Scotland or Ireland; and, moreover, I am only dealing with those cases which come to light either before a Court or through the medium of an arrangement between the bankrupt and the creditors. Of course, therefore, I only deal with a fractional part of the whole of the bad debts which are made. There are an enormous number which have little or no assets to meet them, and we have no exact material to work upon; but where we have those materials to work upon in the case of England alone, and taking only those cases in which there is some property to meet liabilities, the Comptroller says he finds the bad debts occurring during the three years ending 1877 amount to £18,000,000 a-year. And he says very truly that these £18,000,000 represent a very considerable tax which the country must pay, because the price of articles is necessarily regulated in such a manner as to cover the bad debts, which consequently fall upon the consumers. My Lords, if a tax of £18,000,000 a-year were levied in another shape, I fancy there would be a considerable outcry against it; and yet at present, though falling every year upon some person or another, it passes unnoticed. The words of the Comptroller on this subject are certainly worthy of your Lordships' attention. He says—

> "Individual trade creditors make less or more than average profits as they make more or less than an average amount of bad debts; the average amount being covered by prices, the whole falls in the end on the public as consumers. The loss by bad debts under the Bankruptcy Act alone may be small compared with the aggregate of such losses; but it represents on the average of the last three years a tax on the public of £18,000,000 per annum, which must at least help to increase the cost of living and therefore the cost of production, and so engender a further element of continually increasing prices."

These, my Lords, are very significant facts. The Comptroller also gives his opinion upon the result of liquidations and the way in which they are usually carried into effect; and I should, before passing to another subject, like to refer your Lordships to what he says on this point. It is as follows:—

> "The increase in compositions has been entirely in the worst rates, and I have no doubt it has been the same in arrangements. If there have been in liquidation generally so many as 1,500 fair cases in each year, there were 2,000 bad ones in the year 1870, and 7,000 bad ones in the year 1877. It is not, therefore, a question

> of the creditors preferring liquidation to bankruptcy, as has been commonly represented, but of an enormous annual increase in the number of insolvencies; the number suddenly falling, as in 1869 and 1870, by several thousands when any measure is passed tending to prevent dishonest insolvency, and rising again year by year as the debtors, or those who advise them, discover means of evading the restrictions of the law."

Further, the Comptroller says—

> "The point to which I have especially desired to call attention is the enormous amount of fradulent insolvency which appears to have been encouraged by the trust deeds of the Act of 1861, and the liquidations of the Act of 1869, judging by its seemingly unparalleled annual increase under these arrangements, but chiefly by the sudden disappearance of several thousands of them immediately following legislation which could not have prevented any but arrangements of a grossly fraudulent character. I cannot doubt that a large majority of the 8,566 debtors who liquidated in the year 1877 did so greatly to their advantage, or that a general appreciation that debtors can liquidate their debts with but little personal or pecuniary inconvenience tends to greatly and continually increase the amount of commercial immorality, insolvency, and loss to the public by bad debts."

Now, I think your Lordships will see that the complaint which has been made in the Memorial referred to, and in these other Papers, of the "undue and vicious" facilities given for arrangements under the present law, is not unfounded, and that some check upon the evil is required. The second complaint of this Memorial is this—that in bankruptcy proceedings there is not sufficient control over the realization of the assets and the investigation of the conduct of the bankrupt; and I am bound to say I think there is very considerable ground for that complaint also. I have shown your Lordships the way in which trustees are appointed—that the trustee is not appointed by a vigilant body of creditors to represent their interests, but is appointed in his own interest as a person who is to obtain a lucrative office in winding up the concern of the debtor. The control which is exercised over him is entirely general, and some additional check on his action appears to me to be required. Before stating the proposal which Her Majesty's Government have to make, let me briefly explain the existing arrangements in regard to jurisdiction in regard to bankruptcy. In the country districts bankruptcy at present is administered in the County Courts. The Metropolis and a certain surrounding area is under the jurisdiction of what is called the London Court of Bankruptcy. Now, in the London Court of Bankruptcy there is a Judge called the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy. The Judge is at present Vice-Chancellor Bacon—and I cannot mention Vice-Chancellor Bacon's name without saying that there is, perhaps, no person in this country who has had greater experience or who is possessed of greater learning on the subject of bankruptcy than he. But it was found at the time of Vice-Chancellor Bacon's appointment that inasmuch as he was charged with the conduct of one of the Courts in one of the divisions of the Court of Chancery, where he had a great deal of business to transact, it was quite impossible for him to attend to the routine business of the London Court of Bankruptcy; and therefore an arrangement was made by which the primary jurisdiction for the London district was delegated by him to the Registrars of the London Court of Bankruptcy. These Registrars at that time were six in number; but two vacancies which occurred not having been filled up, they have now been reduced to four. I am bound to say for them also that they have performed with great energy and ability the work committed to their care. At the same time, it is stated, with, I believe, some truth, that it is impossible that Registrars, in administering the system of bankruptcy in London, can carry the weight which a Judge of the first rank would do sitting as a primary Judge in the Court of First Instance. Vice-Chancellor Bacon, as Judge in Bankruptcy, sits, I believe, about one day a week, but only for the purpose of hearing appeals from County Courts in bankruptcy. He does not, as a rule, perform any primary duties as Judge of the London Court of Bankruptcy. That, my Lords, is the state of the judicature in regard to bankruptcy. I mention it now in order that your Lordships may appreciate afterwards the changes which, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, I shall have to propose. The third ground of dissatisfaction is that we have no proper security for the very large funds which come into the hands of trustees under the liquidations by arrangement. Of assets amounting to something like £6,000,000, only £500,000 was in the hands of trustees actually amenable to the Court; while, with regard to trustees holding £5,500,000, there is absolutely no jurisdiction whatever to call for any audit. The trustees are expressly exempted from audit, and they hold the money responsible to no persons except the somewhat careless body of creditors who appoint them trustees. All the unclaimed dividends remain in the hands of the trustees without being in any way secured as they ought to be. In old times, before the recent changes in the Bankruptcy Law, the accumulation of unclaimed dividends in the hands of the Court represented £2,000,000, £3,000,000, or £4,000,000; and there is at present a large amount outstanding and unsecured with regard to which some provision ought to be made. With that explanation I will state the proposals of Her Majesty's Government.

First, with regard to bankruptcy proper—still preserving the distinction between bankruptcy and liquidation—we propose that provision shall be made to meet what has been found to be a source of very considerable unfairness, and that a check shall be placed upon the selection of a Court by a debtor who desires to be made a bankrupt or to arrange with his creditors. At present creditors complain very much that debtors select Courts least convenient for the creditors—a debtor resorting to a part of the country where he has obtained, perhaps, a colourable excuse for presenting a petition by having traded there a short time. Next we propose that the adjudication in bankruptcy is not, as at present, to be made in the first instance by the Court. Very often it happens that a perfectly honest trader is brought into Court and is immediately, by reason of his insolvency, adjudicated a bankrupt; whereas, if this had not been done, all his creditors, being well satisfied with his conduct, would have been glad to have relieved him from the stigma and the odium of bankruptcy. On the other hand, what happens in these arrangements to which I have referred is that a debtor whose conduct has been anything but exemplary suddenly calls a meeting of his creditors and gets his discharge before there has been any investigation of his conduct. We propose to meet that in this way:—In the first instance an order shall be made by the Court which shall be called a provisional order, the property of the debtor shall be secured, and a meeting of the creditors shall be immediately convened. That meeting of creditors is to consider the conduct of the debtor, and what course ought to be pursued with regard to it; and that meeting may do one of three things. It may resolve either that the debtor shall immediately be made bankrupt; or that some further investigation into his conduct shall be made, and that the meeting shall be adjourned for that purpose; or that his affairs shall be wound up under a deed. The bankrupt is to be bound to attend the meeting, and to submit himself for examination. In order to prevent the improper use of proxies, the Court has power to determine whether they shall be admitted or not—or whether the creditors live within such distances that they may attend themselves instead of giving proxies. There is a provision that if any person is found to be soliciting or using proxies in order to obtain an appointment for a trustee, the Court may deprive the trustee of any remuneration. If the majority of the creditors resolve upon bankruptcy, they are to appoint a committee of inspection, and they, and not the creditors at large, are to appoint the trustee, who is to be their officer and servant, with the right reserved to them to dismiss him if they think fit. The discharge of the debtor is to take place in this way—Within the first two years there is to be the consent of a certain proportion of the creditors—a greater number in the first year, and a lesser number in the second year; and after the second year it is to be in the discretion of the Court if the application is made. If it is shown that the debtor has not kept such books and accounts as are usually kept, or a sufficient record of his transactions, or has increased his liabilities by trading at a loss when insolvent, or has contracted debts without a reasonable expectation of being able to pay them, or that the bankruptcy has been produced by rash and hazardous speculations or unjustifiable extravagance, or that he has put the creditors to any unnecessary expense by the frivolous and vexatious defence of an action, or that he has committed any misdemeanour for which he has not been prosecuted—in any of these events the order of discharge is to be suspended for such time as the Court may think fit, or the discharge may be granted subject to conditions with regard to salary, pay, emoluments, wages, or earnings, which may afterwards become due. There is a provision that the trustee shall give security, and that the remuneration shall be limited by a certain maximum being assigned—which is very much wanted. There is a provision that the trustee shall not only pay all monies into the bank, but that he shall pay it to the account of each bankruptcy. It has been found in practice that where a trustee was the trustee of a great number of debtors it was quite impossible to ascertain in any particular case whether the balance which ought to have been forthcoming was actually available. There is a provision which I hope, more than any other, will expedite the winding-up of estates, and it is that at the end of one year after the appointment of a trustee he shall be obliged to hand over all the money and property in his possession to the Court, unless the Court shall find that, under the special circumstances of the case, a greater length of time shall be allowed for the winding-up. I hope that provision will bring about greater rapidity of administration than has hitherto prevailed. A year will be allowed for winding-up an estate, except under special circumstances, which will have to be proved to the satisfaction of the Court. We propose to ask Parliament to authorize the creation of an additional Judge of the High Court of Justice, and in that way to secure the services of a Judge experienced in Commercial Law, who will be able to consider the administration of the Court of Bankruptcy to have the first claim on his time and attention. We propose that the London Court of Bankruptcy shall be a part of the High Court of Justice; reserving still its own peculiar name, it shall be joined to the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice; and, as I have said, a Judge in the High Court should be Judge of the Bankruptcy Court. We propose that the jurisdiction of the London District Bankruptcy Court shall be somewhat enlarged. The details appear in the schedules of the Bill. We propose that there should be a power, when the parties desire it, or when the Court thinks it desirable, to transfer any particular case or any question in bankruptcy from any County Court for decision in the London Court in the first instance. With regard to offences under the Bankrupt Law which are punishable as misdemeanours, we propose that there should be power to try any of these before the Judge in the Court of Bankruptcy. As to liquidation by arrangement, we propose that it shall no longer be done, as at present, by resolution, but that it shall be done by deed; and, in order to do away with the abuses arising from proxies, we propose that the assent of the majority of creditors shall be obtained by their signatures either to the deed or to a paper stating the effect of the deed, so that every creditor shall know what it is that he is assenting to. We propose that the deed shall not be valid unless the composition for which it provides shall amount to 5*s.* in the pound at least. We propose, further, that even after the deed has been registered the creditors may, if they think fit, call a meeting and pass a resolution by a certain majority that the deed is not to be proceeded with, but to be superseded by proceedings in bankruptcy; and if the Court find that there has been any fraud in obtaining the deed, or that it has been vexatiously or frivolously obtained, the Court will have power to declare it to be void. The Court will also have the power to remove the trustee of the deed for any failure in the performance of his duty. The trustee in every one of these deeds shall be bound to account to the Comptroller in Bankruptcy; his accounts shall be audited; and at the end of one year, as in the case of bankruptcy, he shall be obliged to pay over all funds in his hands, unless the Court shall consider that further time should be allowed to wind up the estate.

These, my Lords, are the main provisions of the Bill which I ask your Lordships to read a first time. There are several minor points of importance which will be found in the Bill, but I have not thought it necessary to delay your Lordships by going at length into them. I have only referred to the leading features of the measure. With regard to the mode in which the Bill has been prepared, I may state that the Bill will be found to contain within its four corners the whole Code of Bankruptcy Law; but for the convenience of those who take an interest in the matter, the Bill as printed will show in the margin the different clauses which are simply re-enactments, and those which contain the new provisions. Before I sit down, I may say that among the matters urged in the Memorial from the City it was proposed that the same Court which administers the law of bankruptcy should also be charged with the administration of the estates of deceased persons who die insolvent, and with the winding-up of joint-stock companies. One of our proposals is that the London Court of Bankruptcy shall form part of the Court of Chancery Division of the Supreme Court of Judicature, which is at present charged with those duties, and I shall be prepared at the proper time to state the reasons why, after full consideration, we have decided not to include provisions of that kind. Such, my Lords, are the objects of the two Bills which I propose to lay on the Table—the one the Bankruptcy Law Amendment Bill, and the other the Debtors Act Amendment Bill—which contain the criminal provisions with regard to the Law of Bankruptcy. I move your Lordships to give a first reading to those Bills, and I propose to take the second reading this day fortnight.

Bill to consolidate and amend the law of Bankruptcy, and for other purposes relating thereto—*Presented* (The LORD CHANCELLOR).

LORD PENZANCE was understood to express his approval of the Bills, and especially of those provisions which required that debtors should keep honest books, and desired that exemplary punishment should be awarded in all cases of over-trading after insolvency.

Bill read 1ª; and to be *printed.* (No. 8.)

Then—

DEBTORS ACT, 1869, AMENDMENT BILL [H.L.]

A Bill to amend the Debtors Act, 1869, and for the better punishment of fraudulent Debtors—Was *presented* by The LORD CHANCELLOR; read 1ª. (No. 9.)

CONSERVANCY OF RIVERS—LEGISLATION.—QUESTION.

THE MARQUESS OF RIPON asked, Whether the report was correct that it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government to introduce a measure relating to the Conservancy of Rivers in the present Session; and, if so, whether it would be brought in in that or the other House of Parliament. It was exceedingly necessary for the interests of those concerned that the subject should be fully discussed; he therefore hoped it would be introduced at as early a date as possible.

THE DUKE OF RICHMOND AND GORDON: The report to which the noble Marquess alludes is quite correct. The Government have in course of preparation a Bill to deal with this important subject, which, as the noble Marquess is aware, is a very difficult one. I hope, at no distant period, to have the honour of introducing that Bill to your Lordships' notice.

House adjourned at a quarter before Seven o'clock, till To-morrow, half-past Ten o'clock.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Monday, 17th February, 1879.

MINUTES.] — PUBLIC BILLS — *Ordered—First Reading—*Oyster and Mussel Fisheries Order (Blackwater, Essex) * [76]; Patents for Inventions * [77]; Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices [78]; District Auditors * [79]; Employers' Liability for Injuries to Servants * [80].
*Second Reading—*Habitual Drunkards [47].
*Committee—*Bankers' Books (Evidence) * [65]—R.P.; Racecourses (Metropolis) [48]—R.P.

QUESTIONS.

PRISONS ACT—KIRKDALE GAOL.
QUESTION.

MR. HOPWOOD gave Notice that on Friday he would ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether he was aware that printed rules were recently sent to the county gaol at Kirkdale, purporting to come from the Commissioners of Prisons, which contained, among other things, that women prisoners should be put on the treadmill, and whether such hard labour had not been for many years held to be unfit for women?

MR. ASSHETON CROSS hoped the House would permit him to answer the Question at once. He understood that in preparing the Papers referred to, which were abstracts of the Prison Rules, orders had been issued to keep the male and female prisoners distinct. And in the copy that was sent to be printed the rules were word for word the same, except the portion relating to females. This was a mistake, and their being circulated to Kirkdale and other prisons arose, as he understood, by one of the clerks sending them out before they had been revised by the Commissioners. He need not say that the error had been immediately corrected.

RUSSIA AND TURKEY—THE DEFINITIVE TREATY.—QUESTION.

Mr. OTWAY asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether the so-called Definitive Treaty between Russia and Turkey has been or will be officially communicated by the contracting Powers to Her Majesty's Government; and, as to an alleged stipulation concerning an indemnity of eight hundred and two and a half million francs, claimed by Russia, whether Her Majesty's Government adhered to the statements of Lord Salisbury in his Despatch inclosing copy of the Treaty of Berlin, viz.:

> "That it results from these declarations, that Turkey is not internationally bound, and cannot be compelled to pay any portion of the indemnity until the claims of all the creditors of loans anterior to the war have been paid in full?"

Mr. BOURKE: Sir, I have to state that no official copy of the Treaty between Turkey and Russia has been communicated to Her Majesty's Government. [Mr. Otway: Or will be?] I am not able to state whether any copy will be communicated. With regard to the second Question, the best answer that I can give is to quote the formal declaration of Prince Gortchakoff, recorded in the Protocols of Berlin. In the 11th Protocol, when the subject of the indemnity was under consideration, there is the following entry:—

> "Prince Gortchakoff repeats that the indemnity of war will not affect the interests of the creditors of the Porte."

CLERGY CO-OPERATIVE ASSOCIATION.
QUESTION.

Mr. BLAKE asked Mr. Attorney General, If his attention has been called to the prospectus of the newly-formed "Clergy Co-operative Association (Limited)," which provides for the carrying on by the clergy of various trades, including grocery, tobacco, wines, spirits, hosiery, tailoring, church furniture, &c., and if the Law Officers of the Crown are of opinion that such trading for profit on the part of the clergy is legal?

The ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir John Holker): Sir, my attention has been called to the prospectus of the newly-formed "Clergy Co-operative Association (Limited)," and I have made inquiries with a view to ascertain the constitution of the association and the object it is designed to accomplish. I find that the association is, in fact, a company with limited liability, established under the Joint-Stock Companies' Act, and in this company there are, or are intended to be, a large number of shareholders, some clergymen and others laymen. The objects which the association is designed to carry out are, I am informed, to procure a supply of necessary commodities, such as tobacco, church furniture, and the other articles referred to in the Question, of good quality, and at a fair and reasonable price; to establish a refreshment room; and generally to provide temporal comforts for the members of the society. Now, Sir, such being the constitution of the association and the objects intended to be carried out by it, I cannot regard it as in any way a combination organized for the purpose of effecting any unlawful purpose, or any lawful purpose by unlawful means. It is, therefore, not illegal by the Common Law. There remains, however, the question whether these reverend and very reverend gentlemen who are or may be members of the association will render themselves liable to punishment by the Ecclesiastical Courts for the offence of illegally trading. This is a question upon which I do not feel myself very competent to give an opinion; but my belief is that the gentlemen to whom I have referred will place themselves in a position of safety if they do not act as directors or managers of the business, or personally officiate in the store. On this point, however, I would ask leave to refer the hon. Gentleman the Member for Leominster to an Act of 1838—viz., 1 & 2 *Vict.*, c. 106, ss. 29 and 31.

COAL MINES—THE ABERCARNE EXPLOSION.—QUESTION.

MR. MACDONALD asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, If he can give any information as to whether the Ebbw Vale Colliery Company intend to make any further effort at present for the recovery of the two hundred and sixty bodies or thereby that yet lie in the Abercarne mine; whether it be correct that there is no law existing at present to compel owners of mines or public works of any description to make an outlay for the recovery of bodies, the lives of which may have been violently destroyed on their premises; and, whether the Government intend to take any action which would compel employers to restore, if possible, the bodies of those that may have been killed in their works, to their relatives?

MR. ASSHETON CROSS: Sir, I was informed by the Inspector, on the 25th of December, that the Chairman of the Company had stated that they could not afford to carry on further the work of recovering the bodies. I at once wrote to the Company expressing my regret at their decision, and saying I was quite sure it would cause great dissatisfaction in the district, and be very painful to the relatives of those who had been lost in the accident, and urging them to do what they could to recover the bodies. They replied that they had already spent £10,000, at great risk to the colliers employed; that to recover the bodies would take 12 or 18 months at £500 a-week; and that in justice to their constituents they could not incur the expense. The Inspector says that, in his opinion, it would require about 12 months, at an expense of £25,000 or £30,000. I have written to the Inspector again to press the Company to see what more they can do; but I have no power by law to compel them to proceed, or to furnish them with funds. All I can do is to press them, as I have done.

MR. MACDONALD asked if the Government, considering that there was no law on the subject, would take some action to compel the restoration of the bodies to the relatives?

MR. ASSHETON CROSS: I cannot bring in a Bill to compel any Company to spend money which they have not got.

ISLAND OF CYPRUS—CHART OF SURVEYS.—QUESTION.

MR. DODSON asked the First Lord of the Admiralty, Whether he will cause to be placed in the Library or Reading Room of the House a chart showing the results of any surveys of Cyprus, and more particularly of the harbour and road of Famagusta, made since the occupation of the island by the British?

MR. A. F. EGERTON, in reply, said, that a chart of Cyprus would shortly be hung up in the Library, and Papers would be produced giving the results of the surveys.

JOINT STOCK BANKS—LEGISLATION. QUESTION.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether, as he has announced the intention on the part of the Government to legislate on the subject of Joint Stock Banks, he will, in consideration of the great anxiety of those interested in those Banks, take the earliest possible opportunity of introducing the Bill, or at least of making public the main features of the proposed legislation?

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, I am quite aware of the interest on this subject. I am sorry I cannot at this moment answer the hon. Gentleman's Question; but I hope to be in a position to do so next week if he will put it again.

RIVERS CONSERVANCY AND PREVENTION OF FLOODS.—QUESTION.

MR. ARTHUR PEEL asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether it is the intention of the Government to deal this Session with the question of River Conservancy and the Prevention of Floods; and, if so, whether by a separate measure distinct from the County Boards Bill?

MR. ASSHETON CROSS, in reply, said, that the Lord President would before long introduce in the other House a measure dealing with the question referred to by the hon. Gentleman. It would be quite distinct from any measure relating to County Boards.

PRINCE VICEROY OF IRELAND.

QUESTION.

Mr. STACPOOLE asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether there is any, and, if so, what foundation for the report put forward in several English and Irish newspapers, supporters of the Government policy, that Her Majesty's Ministers have resolved upon establishing a Royal residence in Ireland, and that His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught is to succeed the Duke of Marlborough as permanent Prince Viceroy of Ireland?

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: Sir, I am not aware of any foundation for the report to which the hon. Gentleman refers. I may add that I am not in the confidence of the English and Irish newspapers which he mentions.

IRISH UNIVERSITY EDUCATION—LEGISLATION.—QUESTION.

The O'DONOGHUE asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, If the House is to consider it as finally settled that the Government will not deal this Session with the question of University Education in Ireland?

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: Yes, Sir; the Government have decided not to deal with the question this Session.

TURKEY—FINANCIAL REFORM—M. DE TOCQUEVILLE.—QUESTION.

Mr. E. JENKINS asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether the Government has any information regarding a project propounded to the Porte by the Marquis de Tocqueville and others, for the reform of the finances of Turkey, with large powers over the Turkish revenues; how far such project would, if adopted, interfere with the provisions of the Anglo-Turkish Convention; and, whether Papers on the subject will be promptly laid upon the Table?

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: Sir, I understand from my noble Friend the Foreign Secretary that he has this morning received communication of the project to which the hon. Gentleman refers. But it has been received in a confidential despatch, and he is not aware that he has authority to publish it.

COPYRIGHT BILL—LEGISLATION.

QUESTION.

Mr. E. JENKINS asked the Postmaster General, Whether the Government intend to introduce a Copyright Bill this Session; and, whether it will embrace all the subjects of Copyright?

Lord JOHN MANNERS, in reply, said, the Government intended to introduce a Copyright Bill this Session dealing with all the subjects defined as subjects of Copyright in the Report of the Royal Commissioners.

Mr. E. JENKINS stated that he should ask leave to withdraw his own Bill, in order that the passage of the Government Bill might not be in any way obstructed.

THIBET—CHUNG-KING.—QUESTION.

Sir CHARLES W. DILKE asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether he can lay upon the Table of the House any Report made by the Consular Officer sent, in accordance with a separate article to the Chefoo Convention, on a mission of exploration to Thibet; also the Reports made by Mr. Vice Consul Baber on the capabilities of Chung-King for trade; and, whether it is intended to open Chung-King as a place of general trade.

Mr. BOURKE: Sir, no Mission has yet been sent to Thibet, and Mr. Baber has up to the present sent in no Report upon trade at Chung-King, though one may be expected before long. Nothing has therefore as yet been decided as to the opening of Chung-King to general trade.

THE LUNACY LAW—LEGISLATION.

QUESTION.

Mr. DILLWYN asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, If he can now state whether it is the intention of Government to introduce a Bill to amend the Lunacy Law during the present Session of Parliament?

Mr. ASSHETON CROSS, in reply, said, that the subject of the consolidation of the Lunacy Law was one which, in the opinion of the Government, ought to be taken up. There were other points of law requiring careful consideration, and probably they might be dealt with at the same time. He would put himself in communication with the Commissioners on the subject.

SOUTH AFRICA—THE ZULU WAR—ARTILLERY REINFORCEMENTS.

QUESTION.

GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOUR (for Sir HENRY HAVELOCK) asked the Secretary of State for War, Whether he will consider the advisability of providing the batteries of Royal Artillery now proceeding to the Cape for service with a heavier gun than the light steel seven-pounder?

COLONEL STANLEY: Sir, the heaviest gun at present in use at the Cape is a 7-pounder, with a Colonial carriage. As a matter of fact, the only demand I can trace for any other kind of gun has been for one of even less weight. But, in order to be on the safe side, one of the batteries under orders for the Cape will take out the 9-pounders with which it is armed; and, if these are not wanted, they will be left in store on their arrival.

ARMY (INDIA)—SERVICE IN INDIA.

QUESTION.

SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL asked the Secretary of State for War, If he can be so good as to explain what arrangements have been made for maintaining a sufficient supply of seasoned soldiers in India now that long service recruitment for the Infantry has been discontinued?

COLONEL STANLEY: Sir, this question has been a subject of discussion for a long time. In October last I was enabled to cause an Army Circular to be issued to this effect—that men who have enlisted for six years' service with the Colours who are now under orders, or may hereafter be required for service in India, and who have completed no less than three years of their first term of service, may extend their period with the Colours to nine years on the understanding that, in the event of their battalions being ordered home, they may be transferred to another corps or battalion to complete the term. Of course, they are not to be transferred without their own consent.

SOUTH AFRICA—THE ZULU WAR—THE NATIVE INDIAN ARMY.

QUESTION.

SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL asked the Secretary of State for War, Whether Her Majesty's Government contemplate employing any portion of the Native Indian Army in Africa?

COLONEL STANLEY: No, Sir; it is at present not intended to employ any portion of the Native Indian Army in South Africa?

TURKEY—TREATY OF BERLIN.

QUESTION.

MR. W. CARTWRIGHT asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether the text of a French Circular Despatch, bearing date October 21, and relating to the carrying out of the suggestions adopted by the Berlin Congress for settlement of the Greek-Turkish differences is correctly given in "The Times" of January 10; whether, in the event of such Despatch having been received, he will lay it without delay upon the Table; and, whether he will at the same time communicate the reply of Her Majesty's Government to that French Despatch?

MR. BOURKE: Yes, Sir; the text of the French despatch given by *The Times* is correct in all material points. As negotiations are still in progress, it is not possible, at any rate at present, to lay Papers on the Table.

THE RAILWAY COMMISSION—EXPENSES.—QUESTION.

MR. HERMON asked the President of the Board of Trade, If he will inform the House what has been the total cost of the Railway Commission during the four years it has been in existence, including salaries of Commissioners, clerks, offices, stationery, and any other expenses incurred by such Commission, and the number of cases submitted to their decision?

VISCOUNT SANDON: Sir, we have been in communication with the Railway Commission on the subject of my hon. Friend's Question, and I shall be happy to give him a Return, stating the facts which he desires to know, if he will move for it.

CHINA—THE CHEFOO CONVENTION. QUESTION.

Mr. RICHARD asked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether he has any objection to lay upon the Table a Copy of the Minutes of the Council of the Secretary of State for India which refer to the Chefoo Convention, and a Copy of the opinions of Members of the Council on the subject, if any such were put on record?

Mr. E. STANHOPE: The negotiations with the Chinese Government with respect to the Chefoo Convention are still going on; and, therefore, it will be impossible at present to lay upon the Table the Papers asked for by the hon. Member.

AFGHANISTAN—EXPENSES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS.—QUESTION.

Mr. FAWCETT asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether a Bill will be introduced to give effect to the proposal to advance £2,000,000, free of interest, from the English Exchequer to the Indian Government towards the expenses of the Afghan war; and, if so, when the Bill will be brought in?

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: Sir, I think it is possible that some little misapprehension may exist on this subject. It is not intended to make any advance to the Indian Government at the present moment on account of the expenses of the Afghan War. I merely intimated to the House, on a previous occasion, that it is possible that some such proposal may be made. Such a proposal, however, if made at all, will not be brought before the House until after the statement in reference to the Indian Budget has been made, and that statement will not be made until towards the close of the present month. The proposal, if made, will not have reference to the service of the current financial year, but to the service of the next financial year. I shall, therefore, probably not have occasion to bring it before the House until the Budget time. Of course, it will take the form of a Bill, and be subject to discussion in this House.

Mr. FAWCETT gave Notice that he would call attention to the injurious effect likely to be produced both on the finances of England and India if such a form of contribution was carried out.

AFGHANISTAN—THE WAR—ALLEGED MASSACRE IN KHOST.—QUESTION.

Mr. ANDERSON asked the Under Secretary of State for India, If he has seen in the "Standard" of the 10th a letter from its correspondent giving a detailed account of the way in which General Roberts is carrying fire and sword into Khost, the substance of which is that after one day of fighting, in which our loss was, besides three camel drivers, only two men killed and four wounded, after the fighting was over, and apparently without any attempt to learn whether the enemy belonged to the neighbourhood or came from a distance, General Roberts issued an order that the numerous villages should be "looted," and "when the time for looting had expired, the order for burning was given," and "in ten minutes as many villages were in a blaze;" that during the day the Dragoons were ordered, in charging, to take no prisoners; that, after the fighting, some ninety prisoners were taken into camp from one of the villages, not by the Dragoons, and tied together with ropes, and on their making some attempt to escape they were set upon, and many of them were slaughtered in their bonds, the letter saying,

> "The scene of this tragedy was appalling. The dead, the living, the dying, and the wounded, were still tied together, and all were lying huddled up in one confused mass of bodies;"

if Government have any information as to the truth of this account; and, if General Roberts was sent to Khost with orders consistent with the statement in the Viceroy's Proclamation that we had no quarrel with the Sirdars or people of Afghanistan, and would not willingly injure or interfere with them?

Mr. E. STANHOPE: Sir, I have read the Report in *The Standard* of the operations in the Khost Valley. We have not yet received any official Report from General Roberts on the subject; but in a telegram to the Viceroy of India, on the 8th of January, he says—

> "Enemy collected in considerable strength yesterday, almost surrounding the camp. Night attack was evidently intended, so I thought it advisable to take the initiative, and about noon marched out in three small columns. Result was most successful."

And then he describes the operations very briefly. On the 10th of January he telegraphed:—

"Your Excellency may rest assured that every care is taken to secure safety of camp followers, and that no undue severity has been or will be exercised in our dealings with the people. The result of our short sojourn in Kuram is more satisfactory than I could have hoped, and the punishment inflicted here on the 7th inst. was not more than the occasion deserved, and the safety of the force necessitated. Everything is quieting down now, and I hope we shall have no more trouble. Had I been less prompt it might have been different."

And on the 13th he adds—

"The people have had a severe lesson. But as they are being treated with the greatest kindness and consideration, they are rapidly becoming reassured."

As to the details mentioned by the correspondent of *The Standard*, I must ask the House to suspend its judgment until we receive General Robert's Report; but, although our forces have been much exposed to marauding attacks, I have reason to think that General Roberts is as anxious as anyone could be to inflict as little punishment for such outrages as is consistent with justice and with security.

ISLAND OF CYPRUS—THE LAW OF ENGLAND.—QUESTION.

SIR HENRY JAMES asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, If he would state to the House, whether any Ordinance has been published in Cyprus by virtue of which the Law of England will be administered to hybrid subjects in that island; and, if so, the date of such Ordinance; if such Ordinance has been published, what Law was administered in Cyprus prior to its publication and since its occupation by English troops; to what law are the Christian people of other nations residing in Cyprus now subjected; do Her Majesty's Government claim to exclude the jurisdiction of other States over their own subjects in Cyprus; and, whether an English barrister was by the High Commissioner refused permission to appear on behalf of an English subject in a Court of Justice in Cyprus without the permission of the Turkish Minister of Justice; and, if so, whether such refusal meets with the approval of Her Majesty's Government?

MR. BOURKE: Yes, Sir, a temporary Ordinance has been passed by the Legislative Council of Cyprus establishing a High Court. In that High Court justice will be administered in accordance with the law of England, as far as circumstances will admit, and this Court will exercise jurisdiction over British subjects and foreigners. The Ordinance was made on December 21 last, and will be laid upon the Table of the House. With regard to the next Question, the law administered in Cyprus prior to the publication of this Ordinance was that embodied in the Ottoman Codes; but provision has been made for the attendance of the British Commissioners at the trial of all civil and criminal cases to see that justice is done. As to the third and fourth Questions, the answer I have given to the first Question will answer generally both of them; but I must also say that it would be unsatisfactory to give a summary of the exact state of things under the new law in answer to a Question. As to the last Question, an English barrister was refused permission to appear in a Court of Justice on the ground that, according to the Turkish law, it is necessary that the advocates practising in these Courts should submit themselves to the regulations of the Ministry of Justice. That decision was arrived at by Sir Garnet Wolseley, and under the circumstances his conduct has been approved of by Her Majesty's Government. But I may add that before the High Court, now established under a temporary law, barristers will be able to practise provided always they are duly qualified. I may also mention that the measures which have hitherto been taken to secure the proper administration of justice in the Island are of a temporary character, and a comprehensive scheme of judicial reform and re-organization is now receiving the careful consideration of Her Majesty's Government.

SIR HENRY JAMES asked, Whether the hon. Gentleman would answer more explicitly the fourth Question, with reference to the jurisdiction of other States?

MR. BOURKE: Sir, the Ordinance which has just been passed has not yet come into operation, nor am I aware that it has been published. All I can say is that it has been passed by the Legislative Assembly simply. At present Her Majesty's Government have not seen it in the form in which it has been passed. I am sorry that I cannot answer the Question more definitely, and I must refer the hon. and learned Member to the Ordinance itself, which will be in the hands of hon. Members shortly.

INDIAN COINAGE ACT—THE CURRENCY.—QUESTION.

MR. GOSCHEN asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether he will undertake that no changes shall be made in the regulations affecting the Currency of India without Parliament having the opportunity of discussing them prior to their coming into force?

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, the right hon. Gentleman is no doubt aware that under the Indian Coinage Acts the Governor General in Council has the power of regulating the details of the currency without fresh legislation; and, therefore, I cannot give so large an undertaking as the right hon. Gentleman desires. I have communicated with the Secretary of State for India, who has authorized me to state that should any radical change be adopted while Parliament is sitting, he will take care that Parliament shall have the opportunity of expressing its opinion on the matter before it finally comes into force.

GAS COMPANIES—THE ELECTRIC LIGHT—LEGISLATION.—QUESTION.

SIR WILFRID LAWSON (for Sir JOHN LUBBOCK) asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether Her Majesty's Government intend to bring in any general measure with reference to the Gas Companies in case the electric light should be perfected for general use?

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, Her Majesty's Government have no general measure in contemplation of that character. I understand from the Chairman of Ways and Means that he proposes to refer various Private Bills that have been introduced this Session to one strong Committee, who shall consider the whole question.

ARMY (INDIA)—INCREASED EXPENSES. QUESTION.

GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOUR asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether the application for the considerable additions to the garrison of India in the form of extra batteries, regiments, and battalions, in excess of the numbers in the Estimates of the current year, was concurred in by the Council of India; and, whether India is to bear the cost of this increase in the European force, as also for the cost of the Native troops specially raised for the frontier operations?

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, I understand that telegrams passed in October last between the Viceroy and the Secretary of State for India on the subject of retaining in India certain batteries of Royal Artillery which would in the ordinary course have come home in the winter. It was decided that two batteries should be so detained, and that three garrison batteries be sent out instead of two horse batteries which otherwise would have gone. These telegrams, I am informed, were submitted in the usual course for the information of the Council; but the proposals were not formally laid before the Council for approval. I am not aware whether any distinction will be made between one class of expenditure and another.

SPAIN—THE "LARK" AND THE "OCTAVIA."—QUESTION.

MR. SERJEANT SIMON asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether there is any likelihood of a settlement of the claims against the Spanish Government arising out of the seizure of the "Lark" and the "Octavia"; and, whether there is any objection to laying the Correspondence in both cases upon the Table of the House?

MR. BOURKE: The Spanish Government has adhered to its refusal to give compensation in the case of the *Lark;* and, in view of the conflicting nature of the evidence in the case, Her Majesty's Government do not feel justified in pressing the claim any further. I have no objection to lay the Papers on the Table, except that they are very voluminous. If any hon. Members wish to see them they are quite at their disposal. With regard to the *Octavia*, Her Majesty's Government have reason to hope that a satisfactory solution will be arrived at between the two Governments; but, as the matter is still under discussion, I do not think it would be desirable to present Papers to Parliament at present upon this subject.

DIVINITY SCHOOL, DUBLIN UNIVERSITY.—QUESTION.

MR. PLUNKET asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Whether, having regard to the Report of the Dublin University Commission (1878), Her Majesty's Government is prepared to make any proposals with a view to the future management and support of the Divinity School, connected with Trinity College, and the University of Dublin?

MR. J. LOWTHER, in reply, said, that the subject referred to was now engaging the attention of the Government, and if his hon. Friend will kindly repeat his Question in a week's time he hoped to be able to answer it.

HER ROYAL HIGHNESS THE GRAND DUCHESS OF HESSE (PRINCESS ALICE).

HER MAJESTY'S ANSWER TO THE ADDRESS OF 16TH DECEMBER, 1878.

THE VICE CHAMBERLAIN OF HER MAJESTY'S HOUSEHOLD (Viscount BARRINGTON) *reported* Her Majesty's Answer to the Address [16th December 1878], as followeth:—

I thank you sincerely for your loyal and dutiful Address, and especially for the affectionate expression of your condolence with me on the loss of My beloved Daughter.

It is highly gratifying to Me to feel assured of the interest which you take in everything that concerns Me and My Family, and of your loyalty to My Throne, as well as your attachment to My Person.

SOUTH AFRICA—THE PAPERS.

QUESTION.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether care would be taken that the Papers on the South African Question should be presented to Members of Parliament as soon as possible? In explanation, he might state that he understood the Papers which had been presented to most hon. Members that (Monday) morning were in possession of the Press on Saturday morning, and not only so, but copies of them were seen in some of the clubs. There might be some convenience in the Papers being sent to the Press; but he thought care should be taken that they should be in the hands of Members of Parliament as soon. It was only fair that such information should be communicated to hon. Members at the earliest possible date.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, in reply, said, that matter should be attended to. He was not aware that what the noble Marquess described had occurred, and he hardly supposed that his right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary, who was not then in his place, could have known of it. But the Government would do what they could to put such Papers as soon as possible in the hands of Members. He understood that another batch of Papers were to be laid on the Table in the course of a week or so, and they would, no doubt, be printed and distributed as quickly as possible.

MOTIONS.

ORDERS OF THE DAY.

Motion made, and Question proposed,

"That the Orders of the Day be postponed until after the Notice of Motion relating to the Business of the House."—(*Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer.*)

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE said, that sufficient Notice had not been given of the Resolutions which the Chancellor of the Exchequer proposed to submit to the House with reference to the Business of the House to enable hon. Members to deal satisfactorily with the subject that night. An opportunity had not been given for placing Amendments on the Paper; and, therefore, if they went on with the debate that evening, they would have to discuss proposals of the greatest importance which they had not seen until they were suddenly sprung upon them. It was desirable that more time should be given for their consideration. On Committees of this kind the Government of the day was always very largely represented. There were originally five right hon. Gentlemen on a Committee of 15; and when the Committee was increased to 17, it included only three independent Members of the Opposition sitting below the Gangway.

All of these latter differed from the Report, which, therefore, did not come before the House with the weight which it would possess had it been unanimously adopted. There were other reasons for postponing the consideration of these Resolutions of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Many hon. Members were of opinion that they ought to be discussed in a Committee of the Whole House rather than in the House itself, with the Speaker in the Chair. No doubt the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who was Chairman of the Select Committee, and whose own Resolutions many of these were, must take the leading part in the discussions; and the right hon. Gentleman would be able to speak as often as he pleased in Committee of the Whole House. Besides, it would be more in accordance with precedent that Notice should be given of Amendments; and for this reason, also, it was desirable that the consideration of the question should be postponed. The original proposals laid before the Select Committee had not been published with the evidence, and were not in the possession of the House. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition, and the Members for Chester, Sandwich, North Warwickshire, Glasgow, and Cambridge University all submitted schemes, which, if the Resolutions were proceeded with to-night, would probably be proposed in the shape of Amendments. Sufficient time ought, therefore, to be given to enable those Gentlemen to place their Amendments on the Paper.

Mr. BERESFORD HOPE: I must second the appeal made by the hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke). A discussion of this sort is a delicate and difficult one; it is far more wide-reaching than, perhaps, any of us imagine. Therefore, it ought to be entered upon not only with calmness, but without any possible feeling of grievance. This first proposal of the Chancellor of the Exchequer goes much further than those who have not studied this subject can have any idea of, for it indirectly affects our proceedings on all days. There were various proposals submitted to the Select Committee for altering our Rule of Monday Supply. Some restricted the liberties of hon. Members more than others. For reasons that may be perfectly right, the Chancellor of the Exchequer selected, and induced the Committee to adopt, an extreme proposal — that one which limited the independence of hon. Members the most. This extreme proposal the right hon. Gentleman has embodied in his first Resolution. I think, therefore, we have a claim for ample time. I was one of the few Members present before Christmas, when an interlocutory debate on the question was unexpectedly started by the hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate). On that occasion, the Chancellor of the Exchequer gave the ordinary stereotyped intimation that Resolutions upon the Business of the House would be brought forward during the Session; but certainly it did not occur to me, or to anyone else, that that promise would be redeemed by taking the very earliest possible opportunity of doing so. As my hon. Friend (Sir Charles W. Dilke) says, the Notice of these Resolutions is so short that hon. Members have not had a fair chance of placing Amendments on the Paper, for they had only Friday. Three or four hon. Members, myself amongst the number, have put Amendments down; but the House generally has not had an opportunity of studying these Resolutions and considering Amendments. For my own part, I confess that, instead of reading more pious books on Sunday, my attention during much of yesterday was bestowed upon the Blue Book. It is idle to say that that Blue Book appeared before the close of last Session. Practically, Members are not expected to take up a past Session's Blue Book till the consideration of the matters contained in it approaches; while our duty has lately led us rather to study those relating to Afghanistan, to Turkey, and, unhappily, to South Africa. Under these circumstances, would it not be only fair, as a matter of equity, to give us a little more than from Friday morning to Monday evening to study these Resolutions, and not so long as that for the Amendments upon them? I trust that the Chancellor of the Exchequer will assent to the suggestion of my hon. Friend (Sir Charles W. Dilke), and not send us into the discussion with a sense of something like irritation.

Mr. MITCHELL HENRY said, he was very anxious to support his hon. Friend the Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke). They were now in probably the last Session of the present Parliament; at any rate, it could be hardly denied that they were approaching the period when the present Parliament would expire by lapse of time. It must be remembered that this Committee was appointed chiefly in consequence of some occurrences which took place during the last Session, and in which some of his hon. Colleagues were supposed to be concerned. The changes which had been made of late years in the procedure of the House had been all in one direction—that of curtailing the rights of discussion. One by one the opportunities for free discussion had been cut away. It was not many years ago that hon. Members in presenting a Petition had an opportunity of debate upon that Petition. That was one of their most valuable privileges. It was, however, abolished in consequence of the pressure of time. Of course, it was natural that the Government in power and those who were on the front Opposition Bench should support the present proposal; but if there were sufficient reasons why the Rules should be altered, he submitted that those reasons ought to be laid before the Members of the House. What was the case? The Chancellor of the Exchequer made his statement on Thursday last, and he prefaced it by saying that he was going to lay on the Table some Resolutions in regard to the Business of the House. He believed most hon. Members were disappointed in the statement of the legislative measures proposed, and on the Friday another statement—most important to the people of Ireland, whose liberties were at stake—was made; but these Resolutions did not appear before the House until last Friday. Was it fair to expect hon. Members to have posted themselves on this subject in that short time? It was not like an ordinary Blue Book placed on the Table of the House. The whole of the evidence and the whole of this Report was of an entirely technical character, to form an opinion upon which required a thorough acquaintance with the Rules of the House and the Rules which formerly governed the House. He had no hesitation in saying that if these Resolutions were passed they would strike a blow at the liberties of the people of this country, and that therefore they ought to have a discussion on the general principles governing the case. The Resolutions ought to be taken as a whole, and read in connection with the other Resolutions submitted to the Committee, and the kind of questions which had been asked in Committee, and they ought to be considered carefully in order to know what was the direction of the mind of those who asked questions in the Committee. He did not understand, also, why evidence given before the Committee should be struck out. It was occasionally done, he believed; but not in matters of this kind. He strongly objected to the postponement of the Orders of the Day in order that the Government might get an advantage in Supply. Everybody must know that these Resolutions would take a very long time to consider; that they would be opposed by some hon. Members; and that additional Amendments to those on the Paper would be added to by others; and he therefore suggested that it would be better for the Government to give a week's Notice of what they desired to do. It would be conducive to the good feeling existing between the Government and the House if they would agree to a postponement. If these Resolutions were carried as they stood, hon. Members would be more and more deprived of the opportunities of vindicating the privileges of the people—the chief object for which they were sent there. The principal Business of that House was not to pass Bills and to vote money to the Government; but that they should speak out what was in their minds as the Representatives of the people. He hoped these attempts to fetter discussion and to restrict the liberties of private Members would not receive the sanction of the House.

MR. MOWBRAY said, however specious and plausible the reasons for delay urged by hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway on both sides, he hoped the Government would not be prevailed upon to set aside the Business which the House was called upon to discuss. For two or three years past, the hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate) had repeatedly pressed on the Government that the time had come for appointing a Committee to sit on the Business of the House. In 1877 the Chancellor of the Exchequer said the time had come for the appointment of a Committee, and last year it was appointed. On the 24th of January last year his right hon. Friend moved for the appointment of a Committee, and the House agreed to it without a dissentient voice. A good deal of consideration was given as to the Gentlemen who should be selected, and on the 25th of February his right hon. Friend nominated the Members of the Committee. They sat from the 5th of April to the 5th of July, on the 6th they agreed to their Report, and the Report was presented to the House on the 8th of July. Seven months had since then elapsed, during which hon. Members had had plenty of opportunities for considering the Report; and if they were not now prepared to make up their minds with reference to the subject, he would be glad to know when they would be ready to give an opinion upon it? It appeared to him one of the most unreasonable requests that could be made to ask for further time for consideration. He urged the House, if it intended to do any Business this Session, to consider the Resolutions which the Chancellor of the Exchequer called on them to take in hand. It was not now the first week of February, but the third. On Thursday next the Government would introduce the new Military Code, which must be passed by the 25th of April. He would ask, therefore, whether there was any time to be lost?

Mr. BENTINCK said, the hon. Member for Chelsea had attributed to him the remark that when both front Benches above the Gangway agreed upon anything they were sure to be wrong. That was a somewhat sweeping remark, and he did not recollect having made it. But if, on the present occasion, the two front Benches concurred in approving the Resolutions that were about to be submitted to the House by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, he was quite prepared to accept the responsibility of the observation which the hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea had attributed to him. The objections to proceeding with the discussion of the Resolutions were so strong that he hoped the Chancellor of the Exchequer would yield to the appeal which had been made to him.

Mr. ANDERSON said, there was no complaint against the Chancellor of the Exchequer for putting his Resolutions on the Paper at the very beginning of the Session. The complaint was that so extremely brief an interval was allowed between their appearance on the Paper and their proposed discussion, and that so little time was given for the preparation of Amendments. If they were driven to discuss the Chancellor of the Exchequer's propositions now, many Amendments would have to be considered which were not in print, and the scope of which they could not, therefore, fairly appreciate. What the Chancellor of the Exchequer had done had the appearance of taking the House by surprise, although he acquitted him of the intention of doing so. To allow time for Amendments, he urged there should be delay.

Mr. NEWDEGATE: Sir, I would humbly represent to hon. Members that there is no real foundation for the allegation that the proposals made by the Government have taken the House by surprise. At the commencement of the Session before Christmas, I immediately put it to the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer that if the House believed with its Committee that it had not the time for its Business, that it lacked means for facilitating the Business of the House, it was most desirable that the alteration of its Rules should be considered, and, if approved, adopted at the commencement of the Session. This is no new subject. Having heard from the then Leader of the House, in 1875, that he was unwilling to sanction the appointment of a Committee on the Public Business of the House, I proposed a Resolution upon this subject, on the 19th of February, 1875, now four years ago. Hon. Members will admit that this subject has been before them ever since. The circumstances, the history of the Sessions of 1876 and 1877, or of that of the early part of last Session, cannot have passed from their recollection; and though I admit, with the hon. Member for Galway (Mr. Mitchell Henry), that one duty of the House is to represent the feelings of the people, I ask the House to remember that the progress of Public Business has been impeded during the last three Sessions. By proposing these Resolutions, the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer is only redeeming the pledge he gave when the House met before Christmas; and he has fulfilled his promise at a time when it must be obvious to every hon. Member—who can recollect, as I do, former discussions and the adoption of Amendments in the Rules of the House—that it is essential to discuss and, if approved of, to adopt the Amendments of these Rules, for the proper conduct of Public Business, early in the Session. I am perfectly aware that some of these proposals appear to fetter the action of the non-official Members of the House. There is no hon. Member of the House who has shown greater dislike to coercion of this kind than I have; but I cannot conceal from myself that the course of legislation has been to centralize local administration largely in the hands of Her Majesty's Ministers. The control of almost every branch of that which was formerly considered local administration—such as that of Prisons and Education — has been placed in the hands of the Government. Upon this Her Majesty's Ministers found a claim for more of the time of this House. I think it is politic to give Her Majesty's Ministers more of our time, because otherwise the House could exercise no control over these spheres of administration which have been recently placed in the hands of the Government. No one would regret more than I do that any hon. Member should be taken by surprise; but I do humbly submit that there are strong grounds for proceeding in this matter early in the Session.

MR. WALTER suggested that the Chancellor of the Exchequer might meet many of the difficulties which were felt by several hon. Members on both sides of the House if he would consent to have the Resolutions considered in Committee of the Whole House. It would otherwise, he believed, be impossible to discuss them with that freedom which was necessary in dealing with proposals of such a nature. He made the suggestion, he might add, with less hesitation, because his experience in that House led him to arrive at a conclusion somewhat different from some of his hon. Friends who sat on the Benches opposite with regard to the merits of the Resolutions. He was one of those who was disposed to think that the facilities which at present existed for occasioning delay and obstructing the passing not only of Government measures, but Bills of every description, were greater than was at all expedient. He was, therefore, inclined to look favourably, on the whole, on proposals which would impose some restrictions on those facilities; although when the Resolutions were brought forward he might have occasion to say a few words as to one or two points in which, in his opinion, they stood in need of amendment. But he, at all events, thought that in discussing Resolutions of such importance the utmost latitude and freedom should be allowed to every hon. Member; while the object which the Chancellor of the Exchequer had in view would, he believed, be facilitated by bringing them forward in Committee of the Whole House.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said, that if the object of the hon. Member for Chelsea and those by whom he was supported was to put off altogether the discussion of the Resolutions, the course which they had taken was perfectly intelligible, and one upon which it would be desirable to test the feeling of the House. If, however, they and the great majority of the House were of opinion that some alteration was required in the mode of conducting its Business, then the only question was whether the present was a convenient time for taking the discussion? Now, for his own part, he ventured to think that the House would lose all chance of being able definitely to discuss the Resolutions if it allowed the opportunity which offered itself that evening to pass. The House had hardly begun—had hardly yet got into the full play of its legislative work; and there was, therefore, an opportunity that evening of discussing a question which was of great interest and of importance in relation to the transaction of the whole Business of the House. He ventured to say that Members were quite as competent to proceed with the consideration of the question at the present time as they would be a fortnight hence. The Resolutions were not of a startling character. If they had not been considered before there would have been some reason in saying that time was required for the purpose of studying and mastering them; but when Members observed what the Resolutions really were, they would find that there was only one that could be said to be at all of a novel character. And with regard to that particular Resolution, there would be no wish on the part of the Government to press it forward unduly; but with respect to the first, second, and third Resolutions, if they had not been before them in precisely the same words, they had, at all events, been several times before them in an analogous form. They had, therefore, not only had a knowledge of their character and bearing, but they had had a certain amount of experience of how proposals of the kind before them were worked. The question had been considered time after time; so that it was inconsistent with the recollection of the House for any Member to say that the House was taken by surprise by their introduction now. He altogether disclaimed the sort of idea which seemed to be entertained by several Members to the effect that there was an antagonism between the Government and the House in the matter, and that the Government were the natural enemies of the Opposition and wished to gain an advantage over them. That was not a fair suggestion to make against the Government. They were interested—as the whole House were interested—in getting the Business of the House properly conducted with economy of time, and in a manner most convenient to the Members. It was with the view of getting the Business so conducted that the Resolutions before them had been brought forward, containing, as they did, the best suggestions they could think of with that view; but, of course, it was open to any Member to make suggestions by way of Amendment upon them. They were perfectly able to discuss them as they stood; and he could see no advantage in going into Committee of the Whole House upon them.

The Marquess of HARTINGTON said, he was not sure, after the opinion which had been expressed as to the result of the concurrence of those who sat on the two front Benches, that he would do much service in rising to support the course proposed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He must, however, say that, ingenious though the arguments of the hon. Member for Chelsea and others might be, they seemed to him to be outweighed by one or two practical considerations. The first was that the House had absolutely nothing else to do that evening, and a large number of Members were prepared to enter into the discussion of the subject; and the second that if hon. Members were prepared to take into consideration any alteration in the Rules and Forms of procedure it was desirable that that should be done at the earliest possible moment, so that the Resolutions might be dealt with on their own merits, and should not be introduced in the middle of the Session, when it might be urged that they had been brought forward with reference to some particular circumstances. The first, he might add, and the most important of the Resolutions, related to Committee of Supply, and as Notice had been given that Committee of Supply would be taken on Monday next—and it was impossible to blame the Government for seeking to enter on that important portion of the Business before them as soon as possible —it was, in his opinion, most desirable that any alteration made in that respect should be made before next week. These practical considerations appeared to him to be of greater importance than the arguments which had been urged in favour of delay.

Sir JOSEPH M'KENNA urged the advantages of having the Resolutions discussed in Committee, since it was determined to proceed at once with the consideration of them. In a discussion such as that which now engaged the House, where verbal Amendments constituted the chief Business, it would be almost impossible to understand the reasons for using particular words, if one were not to have the latitude of inquiry and explanation consistent with the Rules of a Committee, but not so with the Rules of Debate in the House.

Mr. GORST urged the same point, as otherwise it would be a case of Hobson's choice. The House must either accept the new Rules or rest content with those already in force.

Mr. SYNAN complained that the course taken by the Government would deprive the House of the opportunity of considering Amendments on these Resolutions, and hoped the Government would yet agree to consider them in Committee. In a week's time they would be better able to give their opinion on the points raised by them.

Mr. ONSLOW reminded the House that the Report of the Select Committee on Public Business was dated July 8, and that the Resolutions now before the House were a portion of those recommended by the Committee. He was not himself in favour of the Resolutions; but he could not contend that the House had been taken by surprise. He should oppose every one of them except the 5th and 6th. For himself, he thought that they required no further facilities for legislation; and that if the Government passed a Mutiny Bill and a Criminal Code Bill, besides the discussions that would take place on financial subjects, they would have done very well. He thought the Resolutions should be considered in Committee.

MR. RYLANDS said, he must confess he was somewhat disappointed at the remarks of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He could quite understand that the Government was determined to pass these Resolutions in their entirety; but if the Government were inclined to give the House a full and sufficient opportunity of considering the Resolutions—not with the alternative of accepting or rejecting them, but with the opportunity, it might be, of making improvements in them—then he must say he was disappointed that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had not fallen in with the suggestion of his hon. Friend the Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke), that the House should resolve itself into a Committee upon the Resolutions. He rose for the purpose of submitting a formal Notice to the House, as an Amendment to the proposition of the Chancellor of the Exchequer—

> "That this House will forthwith resolve itself into a Committee to consider the Resolutions of Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer on the Business of the House."

He even yet entertained the hope that the right hon. Gentleman would favourably consider the Amendment. Of course, it was quite true that the hon. Member for Chelsea would be willing to throw the Resolutions over entirely, and he dared say there were other hon. Gentlemen who were of the same opinion. He hoped that those hon. Gentlemen would not hesitate to vote for going into Committee; because it would be quite open to them—or to others who thought that due time had not been given for the consideration of the Resolutions—to move at once to report Progress. But the point which struck him as one of considerable difficulty in reading the Blue Book, which they all seemed to have been doing yesterday, was this—He found himself placed in considerable difficulty from the fact that throughout the Blue Book references were made to important suggestions which were put before the Committee, but with which he was entirely unfamiliar. The hon. Member for Cambridge University (Mr. Beresford Hope) was fully alive to the whole question, having sat upon the Committee; and he (Mr. Rylands) was quite sure that no man could sit upon a Committee of that kind with greater advantage. Well, that hon. Gentleman was, of course, fully acquainted with the recommendations which were made by the noble Lord (the Marquess of Hartington) and other influential Members of the Committee, and which were printed for the use of Members, and which were referred to continually in the examination of witnesses, but which were not in the possession of the House. Now, he ventured to submit to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the other Members of the Committee that it would hardly be fair to ask those outside the Committee, who were anxious to come to a deliberate and reasonable conclusion upon these recommendations, to decide without placing them in the position of having the full information which was in the hands of the Committee. He said, further, that he believed it would be most unfortunate if the House were to proceed with this Business to-night, unless they went into Committee, because otherwise they would not have a full opportunity of discussing the points which might be brought before them. He was not very sure whether the Chancellor of the Exchequer, having moved the postponement of the Orders of the Day, might not be called to Order for subsequently making a speech, on the technical objection that he ought not to speak twice. [*Cries of* "No!"] He observed that the right hon. Gentleman shook his head, intimating that he was not out of Order; but, nevertheless, there was no Amendment before the House when he made his speech. Of course, they would none of them object to a speech from the right hon. Gentleman. They were only too happy to hear him on the question, and the very arguments in favour of a Committee was that, while first one suggestion and then another might be made, the Chancellor of the Exchequer would be able to guide the House, by speaking as often as might be found necessary. He hoped the Chancellor of the Exchequer would not further oppose the Amendment. He would certainly carry it to a division; because he thought it only right that the House, by resolving itself into Committee, should deal with the Resolutions in a manner which was likely to secure their full and proper discussion. The hon. Member concluded by formally moving his Amendment.

MR. DILLWYN seconded the Amendment. He observed that the House should be very careful how it voted these proposals of the Government, which tampered with the rights of private Members, and which they had had no time to consider.

Amendment proposed,

To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "this House will forthwith resolve itself into a Committee to consider the Resolutions of Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer on the Business of the House,"—(*Mr. Rylands,*)

—instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

MR. A. MILLS pointed out that they would be merely wasting time by proceeding with the discussion of the preliminary question. The very fact that four Amendments to the Resolutions had been put upon the Notice Paper was a proof that the matter was no surprise, but had been well considered by the Members of the House.

MR. DODSON observed, that Notice had been given of these Resolutions on Thursday. The Notice appeared on the Paper on Friday, and there had been ample time for considering what Amendments should be proposed. The proposals of the Government, moreover, were not absolutely new. The principal one had been discussed several times before. During more than one Session they had had actual experience of the operation of this Rule, or of one closely resembling it. The difficulty of so proposing the first Amendment as not to exclude others was imaginary. As to the question whether the matter should be considered in the House or in Committee, he pointed out that if it were considered in Committee there would be this advantage—that hon. Members could speak more than once to the same question, and that the Mover could speak in defence of his own Resolution as often as he pleased. On the other hand, there would be no great difficulty in conducting the discussion in the House; because it would be open to every hon. Member to speak upon each proposition and upon each Amendment to each proposition. At the same time, if it would be more agreeable to hon. Members to take the discussion in Committee, he thought it would be worth while for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to make this concession.

MR. GORST thought that owing to the form of the Resolutions it would be better to postpone the discussion upon them.

MR. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN remarked that there was no real difficulty in the form of the Resolution, and it was a mistake to suppose that no Amendments could be introduced if the Amendment of his hon. Friend (Mr. Rylands) was negatived. The Speaker could put the Question that the word "whenever" in the Chancellor of the Exchequer's Resolutions stand part of the Question, and if that was carried, any Amendments could be subsequently moved. If the House would only now consent to discuss the Amendment actually before it, it would at least be decided whether or not the House was willing to make any alteration at all. That would be at least one step gained.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE explained that the Amendment was not so inconsistent as it might seem, because his hon. Friend was obliged by the Forms of the House to insert in it the word "forthwith." That, however, could be remedied by the mode of putting the Question, and on that ground he should support the Amendment; but he gave Notice that he should move to report Progress, not in any factious sense, but with a view to testing the opinion of the House as to whether they should go on with the matter to-night or not.

MR. BERESFORD HOPE asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer to explain what the law of the matter was, because many hon. Members were puzzled by the conflicting explanations they had heard.

MR. ASSHETON thought it would be a great waste of time to discuss the

Resolutions in Committee of the Whole House, if they had afterwards to discuss them over again on the Report. The hon. Member for Exeter (Mr. A. Mills) observed that the fact that Notice of four Amendments had been given was proof that there had been time for putting Amendments on the Paper; but those Amendments related entirely to negative points.

MR. O'CONNOR POWER said, it appeared to him, from the discussion which had taken place, that nobody was prepared to deal satisfactorily with these Resolutions who had not had the advantage of sitting on the Select Committee. Even two Members of the Committee had pleaded for more time. What, then, was to be said for those who had not sat on the Committee at all? The hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke) had pleaded for more time, and so had the hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Cambridge (Mr. Beresford Hope), who was a gentleman of undoubted piety, and he had told them that he had been obliged to put aside his piety yesterday, in order to have a little time to read the Blue Book on this subject. These were features of the discussion which had impressed themselves very much upon him. If he looked down the list of those who wanted immediate discussion, he found that it contained such Members as the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Leader of the Opposition—no doubt two most distinguished Members of the House; but it should be remembered that they were Members of the Select Committee, and knew all that had taken place there, while other Members had not yet had an opportunity to master what took place before that Committee. The Resolutions which the Chancellor of the Exchequer intended to move were said to be for the purpose of facilitating Public Business; but, in his opinion, they ought to be called Resolutions for the purpose of fettering public discussion. If their object was to get rid of Public Business and simply shelve and evade it, then he, for one, must say these Resolutions would accomplish the object. If an adjournment took place, there would be an opportunity for hon. Members to put other Amendments on the Paper; and when the discussion took place on some future day, they would have an opportunity of ascertaining what was the collective wisdom of the House in reference to the subject.

MR. O'DONNELL said, he should have been in favour, under ordinary circumstances, of taking the discussion on these Resolutions in Committee of the Whole House, but there would be no use in doing that to-night; because, as already had been pointed out, many hon. Gentlemen had not yet had an opportunity of considering the details of the subject, and therefore would not be prepared to go into those minute particulars which would be raised in Committee. If they went into Committee now, there would, in his humble opinion, be a waste of time of the most stupendous character. He by no means wished to impute to the Government any deliberate intention to surprise the House. No doubt it was perfectly true that they had been generally acquainted with this neglect for a long time past; but they were not acquainted with these particular Rules which the Government were to propose, and it was a surprise that they should be taken on this particular day. It was said the House had had sufficient time to consider the proposals of the Government because they were put on the Paper on Friday. But, as far as Friday was concerned, the Irish Members had to consider a matter of the weightiest importance to their own country, and they had not time on that day to consider these Resolutions; and, therefore, he thought these were the strongest reasons for not going on with the discussion to-night.

SIR ANDREW LUSK thought that the subject-matter of the Resolutions was so old that they might proceed to the discussion of them at once, and he should invite the House to endeavour to do something to amend its procedure.

MR. COURTNEY said, that the Resolutions could not be considered in Committee without a great waste of time. He concurred, also, in urging on the House the fact that there had really been no time for giving Notice of Amendments.

MR. MITCHELL HENRY said, the course proposed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer was an attempt to curtail the opportunities of discussing grievances before going into Committee of Supply. The right hon. Gentleman had taken care not to suggest anything in lieu of lost opportunities.

Mr. O'CLERY said, he did not fear to state that the hurried discussion of the proposed Resolutions would excite feelings of indignation in the public mind throughout Ireland. It could not be disguised that those Resolutions were aimed directly at the curtailment of the privileges of the Irish Representatives. In taking this course, the Government was following out the policy of hostility to Ireland with which it initiated the present Session. On the first night the Government contemptuously abandoned the measure of University Education, with which it had excited the hopes of the Irish people for months previously. The Borough Franchise Bill—a measure of vast importance to Ireland—was overwhelmed by the sheer force of numbers summoned from all parts of the country by the Conservative Whips. But not content with this, that very occasion, while the Irish Members were engaged in supporting the Franchise Bill, and were, in consequence, practically precluded from giving Notice of Amendments, the Chancellor of the Exchequer seized to fix to-night for his first attempt to stifle free speech in that House. And, accordingly, in pursuance of this policy of hostility, these Resolutions were to be forced upon them. He was sure every Irish Representative present would deem it his duty to give the proposals of the Government the most determined and sustained resistance.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said, he would advert to one or two points which had been raised by hon. Members. He would not say anything about the point as to whether he was out of Order in speaking a second time, for he had not spoken a first time. He would assume that it was the usual practice on making a Motion for the Mover to refrain from making a speech at the beginning, and to reserve any observations he wished to make until afterwards. But, setting aside that, he wished to point out that two or three of his hon. Friends had been under a false impression as to the mode in which it would be necessary that the decision of the House should be taken upon the Resolutions as they were presented. His hon. and learned Friend the Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst) thought it would be necessary for the Speaker to put the Amendment of the hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands) in such a form that if that Amendment should be rejected the first Resolution that he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) had put upon the Paper must be accepted without any alteration; and he suggested that that difficulty could be got over if that question were raised in Committee instead of the Whole House. He (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) apprehended it could be raised either in Committee or in the Whole House. He apprehended it would be in the power of the Speaker or of the Chairman of Committees to put a Question in such a way as to leave it open to any Member to move an Amendment upon it. If he was wrong in that opinion, the Speaker could correct him. It must be borne in mind, as pointed out by the hon. Member for Clitheroe (Mr. Assheton), that Resolutions of this kind had to be reported; that there must be a second discussion on the Report; and that any number of Amendments could be moved over again on the Report. There was only one observation more which he wished to make, and that was that on the present occasion they were proceeding in the ordinary way, or at least in the spirit of the ordinary way of conducting the Business of the House. Monday was a day on which the Government had precedence for their Business. The particular Business which the Government proposed to-day was the discussion of these Orders; and he thought it was rather hard that a question should be raised as to the propriety of their putting down Business in the order which seemed to them most convenient to the House. If these Resolutions were not taken into consideration, of course he had done his duty in bringing them forward, and he must leave the responsibility of such a proceeding on the House itself. He must ask the House to pass judgment on the Resolutions in the form which he had submitted them.

Mr. SPEAKER: As there seems to be some doubt as to the course to be taken in putting this Question, perhaps the House will allow me to explain. As the matter stands at present, there is one Amendment only on the Paper to the first Resolution of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to be moved by the hon. Member for Burnley. If that was the only Amendment before the House, it would be my duty, according to the ordinary practice, to put the Question, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question." But should it come to my knowledge that other Amendments are about to be proposed, and that the House desires that these other Amendments should be entertained, it would become my duty so to put the Question that those Amendments should be open to discussion.

MR. BIGGAR urged that there had not been sufficient opportunity for considering these Resolutions, and that the discussion should be adjourned till Thursday.

Question put.

The House *divided:* — Ayes 192; Noes 75: Majority 117.—(Div. List, No. 8.)

Main Question put.

The House *divided:* — Ayes 185; Noes 53: Majority 132.—(Div. List, No. 9.)

Resolved, That the Orders of the Day be postponed until after the Notice of Motion relating to the Business of the House.

PARLIAMENT—BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.—RESOLUTIONS.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, on rising to move the first of the Resolutions which stood in his name, said, he thought he should consult the convenience of the House by making his remarks as short as possible. Hon. Members were aware that for some years past the subject of carrying on the Business of the House had been repeatedly under consideration. One question which had been discussed was whether any arrangement could be made to secure certainty in bringing forward the Estimates. No one, he supposed, doubted that the careful consideration of the Estimates presented by the Government of the day for the acceptance of Parliament was one of the most important functions of the House. Hon. Members doubtless cherished, and would on no account infringe upon, the good old Rule that the consideration of grievances must precede the granting of Supplies, and that ample opportunities ought to be given for bringing forward matters of importance before grants were made of the Supplies asked for by the Crown. But, according to the mode in which the Business of the House was now conducted, there really was not the smallest difficulty in bringing forward any subject that was of importance enough to deserve consideration. It was frequently found, however, that in order to obtain discussions on matters of a very minor character they made for themselves the greatest grievances by putting off the discussion of large Estimates of expenditure until it was impossible to discuss them properly, and there was so much uncertainty as to the time at which such discussions would be taken that the House was not able to perform its proper duty of watching and checking the Estimates. The Government might put down the Estimates for Monday, and the whole evening might be spent in discussing matters wholly foreign to the subject before them, and the same might happen on Thursday and the following Monday, and Members who had studied the Estimates and wished to speak upon them, attending at some inconvenience, perhaps, had not the opportunity which they ought to have. At last the Estimates were brought forward at an hour when those who had charge of them could not get a proper hearing. He would put it to the economists of the House, and especially to those Gentlemen who sat below the Gangway on the Opposition side of the House, who exercised very useful functions in criticizing the Estimates, whether it was not more in their interest than even in the interest of the Government that a plan should be devised of bringing forward the Estimates with something like certainty as to the time? That was the ground on which he moved the first of these Resolutions, which was in the following terms:—

> "That, whenever the Committee of Supply or the Committee of Ways and Means stands as the first Order of the Day on a Monday, Mr. Speaker shall leave the Chair without putting any Question."

That was to say, that there would be no facilities on those days for moving Amendments before going into Committee of Supply. He would point out that this was not altogether a novel proposition. In the course of the discussion they had already had the House had been reminded that something of the kind had not only been several times proposed, but it had actually been adopted for two or three Sessions. He would call the attention of some of the Irish Members who seemed to think that this Resolution was aimed in some way at them to the fact that the following Resolution was passed in 1872 :—

> "Whenever Notice has been given that Estimates will be moved in Committee of Supply, and the Committee stands as the first Order of the Day upon any day, except Thursday and Friday, on which Government Orders have precedence, the Speaker shall, when the Order for the Committee has been read, forthwith leave the Chair without putting any Question, and the House shall thereupon resolve itself into such Committee."

That was what was now proposed, with this exception—

> "Unless on first going into Committee on the Army, Navy, or Civil Service Estimates respectively, an Amendment be moved relating to the division of Estimates proposed to be considered on that day."

That, of course, was a considerable modification of the proposal, and it was one which, in the course of the discussion this evening, might be carefully considered. The Resolution in that qualified form was passed in 1872, and again in 1873. It was not renewed in the first two Sessions of the present Parliament; but, in 1876, it was revived with a modification—the word "first" was left out, and then the words ran "unless on going into Committee," &c., "Amendments be moved relating to the division of the Estimates proposed to be considered that day." There was, of course, a good deal to be said in favour of retaining the power of raising questions relating to the Estimates to be proposed; on the other hand, there was something to be said against it. It led to a great waste of time, and perhaps there was less excuse for it than for introducing wholly extraneous topics. Let them take, for example, the Army Estimates. He had noticed several times that the Minister who had to introduce them was kept for hours waiting in consequence of a great many questions of a miscellaneous character relating to the Estimates being raised; and the Minister was precluded from giving, in a concise and convenient form, explanations of his Estimates, which, to a great extent, might have answered by anticipation many of those questions. He had often seen the Secretary of State for War and the First Lord of the Admiralty kept waiting hour after hour; and, in some cases, he was obliged to defer his statement to another day. That was not for the convenience of the House, and it would be far better that the statement of the Minister should be first made, not for his convenience or the convenience of the Government, but that the House might have before it a fair explanation of what was about to be proposed. One of the objections to the House giving up this power was that if it did no convenient opportunity would be given for raising great questions of principle which could not easily be raised on details of the Estimates. He did not think an experience of Parliamentary Business confirmed the idea that the power of raising such questions depended on the exercise of this privilege of speaking before the House went into Committee. If any such question were to be raised—if, for example, any hon. Gentleman wished to challenge, as a whole, the system of our Army administration or the expenditure in any great branch of the Civil Service—there was no doubt whatever, if it was a matter of real and great importance, he would be perfectly able, by giving Notice of Motion, to obtain a day for the discussion of such Notice. But if it was a small matter which affected only some detail of expenditure, he would be perfectly able, when they came to that detail, to raise the question upon it. Of course, it could not be denied that in any great change there would be a sacrifice of something; but the question was, would not the House gain a great deal more, and would not the slight sacrifice that would be made be compensated by the advantages that would be obtained by having a fair and more certain discussion of the Estimates? He really thought it was unnecessary for him to say anything more in favour of the proposal he had made, and he would therefore venture to move the Motion.

Motion made, and Question proposed,

> "That, whenever the Committee of Supply or the Committee of Ways and Means stands as the first Order of the Day on a Monday, Mr. Speaker shall leave the Chair without putting any question."—(*Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer.*)

Mr. RYLANDS: Sir, the statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer has certainly been in every respect a fair statement; but he has admitted that the Resolution which we are about to discuss is not even an old friend with a new face, but is a new Resolution of a more stringent character than any under which the House has been previously placed. It is more stringent than the Resolution of 1872; it is much more stringent than that of 1876; and if this Resolution is adopted by the House, the effect will be that every Monday when Supply is put down as the first Order of the Day, Mr. Speaker will forthwith leave the Chair, and there will be no opportunity of taking a discussion on going into Committee of Supply on the Estimates. The right hon. Gentleman did indeed bring forward one argument of considerable force. He said that when a Minister in charge of a Department has to make a statement on the Army or Navy Estimates, he is often placed in an inconvenient position owing to the number of Motions that have to be previously disposed of. But admitting the public inconvenience of that state of things, it might be met by a much less sweeping measure than that now proposed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. In fact, it might be met without a Resolution at all; if it were understood to be the wish of the House on making the Motion to go into Committee of Supply on the Army and Navy Estimates, the Minister might make a statement. But I believe you, Sir, would consider that, unless it were the wish of the House that that change should be made, the practice is one that you would not encourage or perhaps permit. But, certainly, if it were thought desirable, the difficulty put in the front by the Chancellor of the Exchequer might be removed without any Resolution. This Resolution as it stands applies not only to Committees of Supply, but of Ways and Means. It would prevent any discussion on a Monday on going into either Committee. I recollect, on one occasion, that I and other hon. Members raised some question on a Budget on going into Committee of Ways and Means, and we did so with so much effect that the Budget was altered, although the Government had a great majority at the time. I admit that there are plausible reasons in favour of there being a greater attention paid to the Estimates, and, indeed, those were the reasons which, in 1872, led me to support the Resolution brought forward by the then Government. When I did so, however, I was young in the House of Commons, and my confidence in the occupants of the Treasury Bench had not been tempered by experience in the ways of the House. But from what I have seen of the operation of that Resolution, I have some reason to doubt whether the reasons brought forward in favour of it are sanctioned by experience. I am sorry to see few Conservative Members present. I should like them to oppose this Resolution, because it was the practice of Conservative Members in former Sessions to oppose such Resolutions. Mr. Disraeli, in opposition to a similar Motion in 1862, said—

> "If you tamper with, and trench upon, the privileges which the House of Commons has hitherto enjoyed with so much advantage to the nation, you may ultimately find that you have raised throughout the country a spirit of discontent and dissatisfaction which you will have much cause to regret and much difficulty in allaying. What practical advantage, I ask, do you think can flow from priggish, pedantic, and petty attempts to deal with the Rules of this House?"—[3 *Hansard*, clxv. 157.]

In subsequent years the Conservative Party had no difficulty in opposing Resolutions of this kind. In 1872, in opposition to a less stringent Resolution than the present proposal, no fewer than 20 Conservative Members—afterwards Members of the Administration—voted against it. The present Judge Advocate General took a very distinguished part in opposition to the Resolution. He positively boiled over with eloquent indignation in denouncing that attempt on the part of the Government to rob Parliament of its rights. If he takes part in this debate, I hope he will defer his speech until after dinner, when there is a greater number of hon. Members present, so that the Members of the present Parliament may have an opportunity of hearing an eloquence familiar to the Members of the last Parliament. Then there was another hon. Gentleman, the present Secretary for the Treasury, who took a most important part in opposition to the Resolution of 1872. In fact, he and the Judge Advocate General, *par nobile fratrum*, were the Tellers against the Resolution of 1872. They had in support of their views the voice and arguments of the right hon. Gentleman the late First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Hunt), whose loss we all deplore. They had the support of the right hon. Gentleman the late Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Henley), then the Nestor of the House of Commons, who implored the House not to support the Government in proposing a muzzling measure. Then there was the right hon. Member for the University of Cambridge (Mr. Walpole), who made a valuable speech on the same side. Of course, the other Member for Cambridge University (Mr. Beresford Hope) was there then, and I am glad to see that he is here now. Then there was the hon. Gentleman the Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate), whom ever since I have been in the House I have been accustomed to rely upon to defend the rights of independent Members; but whom, I am afraid, is somewhat falling away, and is becoming somewhat weak-kneed. Then there was the Member for West Norfolk (Mr. Bentinck), who was then opposed to the Resolution, and will oppose it now. In opposing this Resolution of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, we are, then, only taking the course taken by so many eminent Conservatives in 1872, in opposing a Resolution which was not so stringent or so violent an attack on the Privileges of the House as that which the Chancellor of the Exchequer is now proposing. I will now deal with the reasons which the Chancellor of the Exchequer has given in favour of the Resolution. In 1872 there was no practical experience of a Resolution of this kind. Since then we have had experience, and we have seen that every reason which was brought forward in 1872 as justifying this restriction on the privileges of private Members has proved delusive. In 1872 I was influenced by the expectation that if we could pass some Resolution of this kind the greater certainty of Supply coming on would secure a larger attendance and better discussions in Committee of Supply. But experience has shown that the attendance in Committee of Supply has not been increased by the operation of the Resolution of 1872. No doubt it has tended to the convenience of myself and other hon. Members who desired to discuss the Estimates; but we have found that we have had to conduct our discussions in the presence of empty benches. Indeed, the very fact that hon. Members knew that Supply was coming on has led them to stay away. I and others have discussed the Votes, have challenged divisions, and then, when the division bell rung, a number of hon. Members who had not heard the discussion have rushed in, and we have been overruled. Besides this, if we are to choose between having the opportunity of checking some small items in Committee of Supply, or of having the opportunity on going into Committee of Supply of challenging the policy of the Government, which may entail the expenditure of millions, I must say I would myself rather give up the opportunity of challenging the Votes in Committee of Supply than of challenging the policy of a Ministry. But it is said that if we agree to this Resolution Votes will be taken early in the Session, and that we should be saved the scandalous exhibition which often takes place when in the Dog-days we are hurrying through Supply, and the Votes are taken one after the other, often after midnight. But there is no proof that the restriction introduced by the Resolution of 1872 prevented Votes being taken late in the Session. On June 24, 1872, I find that there were 93 Votes remaining to be voted, and they were scrambled through afterwards. In 1877, when a less stringent Resolution was passed, there were, on June 28, 128 Votes still remaining to be voted. But in 1878, when there was no Resolution at all, on June 29, there were only 72 Votes remaining to be voted. Therefore, the advantage contemplated is not shown to have been gained by the operation of the Rule. There is another abuse to which I must refer. There has grown up a most objectionable practice by the Government for the time being to take Votes on Account. I know the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer agrees with me in my objection to this course, and I am not bringing the charge against the present Government in any way more than former Governments; but I think there has been a growing tendency on the part of Governments to take Votes on Account, and then, the Departments being quieted, Supply is put off. In 1872, when this Resolution was in operation, and which was intended to prevent the necessity of taking Votes on Account, up to May 27, the Government had come down to the House for £2,734,000 on account. Up to May 10, 1874, when there was no such Resolution in force, the Government came down for rather more on account—£3,142,000 — and on June 26, 1876, under a much less stringent Resolution than that now proposed, the Government had obtained £3,061,000. But in 1877, when the less stringent Rule was still in existence, the Government came down for no less than £5,337,000 up to June 22. So that, so far as Votes on Account are concerned, it does not appear that, on a comparison of the years 1872, 1876, and 1877 with 1874, when there was no Rule, the operation of the Resolution interferes with the tendency of the Government to come for Votes on Account. There was another reason urged in 1876 by Mr. Disraeli to induce the House to agree to this further infringement on their privileges. He said —"The effect will be, to a considerable extent, to prevent the necessity of holding Morning Sittings." Now, has that been so? Has there been any such reduction in the number of Morning Sittings? Under the Resolution in 1876 and 1877, we had an increasing number of Morning Sittings; and, in fact, we have no right to suppose from the experience we have had that the reasons given are sufficient to pass these Resolutions. But, let it not be supposed for a moment that I charge upon the Government that they are not sincere, or that I charge the Chancellor of the Exchequer with putting forward reasons which do not operate to a conviction upon his own mind; but I wish to show that experience indicates these reasons to be delusive. The Government really want more time for legislation. I know, when this Resolution was in operation before, that for the first two or three Mondays Government took Supply, and got the first Votes in the Army and Navy Estimates and some considerable sums for the Civil Service. Then they let the Mondays slip away as far as Estimates were concerned, and for weeks not more than one or two Mondays were taken for Supply. The Votes being left over, what did Government do with these Mondays? They devoted them to legislation. They got rid of the opportunity private Members had of making Motions on the question for going into Committee of Supply, and, instead of getting Supply, they used the time for legislation. Now, I consider we have too much legislation; and if we are to sacrifice our privilege to enable the Government for the time being to bring in Bills, which they continually do, having the effect, when passed, of interfering with everybody and everything, and which do no good, then I say we do not want a plethora of legislation, and I am not prepared to give up an important privilege of Parliament. I venture to say, admitting that you must have a certain amount of legislation, which nobody denies, the amount of time wasted by the Government is far beyond the time they want to gain by taking it from private Members. Wasted, I mean, by their introduction of crude undigested measures leading to loss of time in controversy and Amendment in Committee. I need only refer to the Cattle Plague Bill of last Session, and the crude form in which it was brought in, and the form in which it left the hands of the Committee, transferred, I may say, into another measure, and changed in its most important particulars. I say, also, Government waste time by bringing in measures which seem only to be brought in to be withdrawn—measures debated and read a second time, and, perhaps, they pass into Committee; then, more time is lost until they are thrown over until next Session, at the annual "Massacre of the Innocents." Then, I object, also, to legislation being brought forward to make changes, to unsettle everything, and which, in fact, does not settle anything, and only leads to a crop of future Bills. In addition to this, Government too often bring in Bills which are not improperly described as Bills without bottom, which destroy a good deal of time — the "Agricultural Holdings Bill," for instance—and become dead letters. Government go in for legislation of this character, and ask us to give up what is of far greater consequence. There are, as I understand, two functions of the House. The one is to sift the Estimates and vote Supplies, and the other, no doubt, is to attend to the necessary legislation of the country, by passing laws. But I must now quote a very important authority on this subject. Lord Palmerston, in 1861, when, in reference to a Resolution of this description, after referring to the function of passing laws, examining Estimates, and voting Supplies, said—

> "This House has another function to discharge, and one highly conducive to the public interests—namely, that of being the mouthpiece of the nation—the organ by which all opinions, all complaints, all notions of grievances, all hopes and expectations, all wishes and suggestions, which may arise among the people at large may be brought to an expression here, may be discussed, examined, answered, rejected, or redressed. That I hold to be as important a function as either of the other two."—[3 *Hansard*, clxii. 1491.]

Well, the Chancellor of the Exchequer now asks us to materially abridge that function. We have often heard the ancient Constitutional doctrine that redress of grievance should come before the granting of Supplies, and I am quite aware that some there are who make light of this old doctrine, and say it is but a poor representation of the grievances of old times when we come down here and raise a petty question affecting some small community, or narrow circle of interests, and that the grievances our forefathers brought before the House, by virtue of the right, were matters of far more importance, and of far more essential interest, than our grievances now are. I recollect quite well, in the discussions of 1872, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Lowe), who took the same view the Chancellor of the Exchequer is taking now, indicated what he called the sentimental talk about the redress of grievances. He said—

> "Gentlemen talked about its being the main business and duty of the House to check and control the Government, to cross-examine them, and have an opportunity of bringing grievances forward; but they must know as well as he did that they were using the language of a past age, and applying it to a state of things that no longer existed. There was a time, no doubt, when it was the business of the House to curb the encroachments of the Crown. . . . But nobody, he apprehended, surmised that those were now the leading functions of the House of Commons."—[3 *Hansard*, ccix. 1093.]

I am sorry to see the empty state of the front Opposition Benches, for I think the matter demands the serious consideration of the House, and especially the Leaders on this side. I regret that the noble Lord (the Marquess of Hartington) is not in his place, and that the right hon. Member for Greenwich is not in town, because I wish to say that if there is any truth—and I believe there is great truth—in the charges made against the Government of pushing the Prerogative to an extreme unknown in these latter days, if there is any truth in the charge that Government have effected changes in policy without consulting the House, committing the House blindfold to measures entailing large expenditure and great responsibility—if these charges are true, then I appeal to them not to give way one jot at a time like this, in relinquishing the privileges of the House of Commons. If there are these encroachments, then the more important it is that the checks the Representatives of the people have should not be thrown aside. I venture to say that, not only the action of the Government, but the tendency in influential quarters and in certain organs of public opinion points in the direction of restraining the functions of Parliament, and extending the power of the Executive Government. Looking back at the past Session of Parliament and the last few months, on several occasions most important changes of policy by the Government were sprung upon us without the slightest notice. I refer to the bringing of the Indian troops to Malta, the Anglo-Turkish Convention, and again to the Afghan War—three measures the most important conceivable, taken by the Executive Government; taken not only without consulting Parliament, but intentionally so; and where is our remedy? It may be we may have another great stroke of policy—and what power have we to check it, if we give up the power of controlling the Executive? For my part, I decline to give up our weapons in the present state of affairs. I remember those on that side of the House speaking strongly in 1872 against giving up control by means of Motions on going into Committee of Supply in the then state of alarm of threatened war and disturbance in Europe. It would never do, it was said, for the House of Commons to give up its control over the Government by relinquishing their privileges. If that was so in 1872-3, how much more so is it the case now? We have a new departure entirely on the part of the Government. They have again and again taken a course the effect of which was, in a great degree, to diminish the control of Parliament over the Administration. They have put forward, as far as possible, the personal rule of the Monarch under the advice of the Minister of the Crown. It may be said I talk Radical doctrines; but I believe they are truly Conservative. I believe it conservation of our interests to keep the privileges we enjoy, and I believe they take a dangerous course, and one likely to unsettle the Constitution of the country who seek to diminish the importance and deny to Parliament the exercise of its privilege—a course far from Conservative, and dangerous to all interests. I oppose this Resolution, because experience of such Resolutions has not confirmed the expectations of the advantages to be gained. I object also, because I think the effect will be that it will prevent the House having legitimate influence on questions of great importance and interest. While I am prepared to meet the Resolution with every opposition in my power, I think it will not be desirable for me to put the Amendment in the terms in which it appears on the Paper. I think it will be rather better not to propose an Amendment and leave the Paper free. I content myself with opposing the Resolution, and shall vote "No" when the division is called.

MR. BENTINCK said, that without endorsing all the opinions expressed by the hon. Member opposite (Mr. Rylands), he would support the Amendment which appeared on the Paper in the hon. Gentleman's name. The professed object of the first Resolution was to facilitate the progress of Business in the House. He questioned, in the first place, whether it was always desirable to facilitate the progress of Business. For many years past the legislation in that House had often been clumsy in its construction or mischievous in its results, and in not a few instances it had been open to both charges. They wanted well-considered legislation; therefore, the less they hurried, and the more they dealt with details, the better for the progress of Public Business. Without mincing the matter, the real object of these Resolutions was to deal summarily with factious opposition; but it was extremely difficult to draw a clear distinction between factious and legitimate opposition. They ought, therefore, to be extremely careful in dealing with a proposition that might infringe on the rights and liberties of the House. The only result of any attempt to frame Rules for restraining discussion would be that those Rules would be found to act as a stimulus to opposition, and thereby to defeat their own object. Hon. Members would lay their heads together to see in what manner they could best evade the Rules of the House. Nor was this all. Another and much more important question was involved. The Resolution appeared to be a direct attack on the most cherished rights and privileges of the House, and he, for one, deprecated any interference with the oldest axiom, or corner-stone of the Temple of the liberties of the House — namely, "grievances before Supply," the claim of which had always been respected. Attempts had frequently been made on former occasions by successive Governments to curtail the privileges of independent Members; but hitherto, with the exception of the abolition of the right of speaking at the presentation of Petitions, they had met with small success. These attempts had been made persistently for many years, and the time was now come to offer them a firm resistance. Whatever Government was in Office, the House of Commons ought to have the fullest power of discussing any question. On general grounds he was opposed to these Resolutions, and especially to the first. The House was bound, not only for the sake of its own credit and character, but also in duty to those whom it represented, to maintain its own privileges as a part of the privileges of the country. He trusted there was still independence enough left in the House to reject this and all other Resolutions which might trench upon the rights of private Members.

MR. SERJEANT SIMON rose to move an Amendment of which he had given Notice—namely, at the end of the proposed Resolution, to add—

> "Unless on first going into Committee on the Army, Navy, or Civil Service Estimates respectively, an Amendment be moved relating to the division of Estimates proposed to be considered on that day."

Those were the terms of the Rule of 1872, which had been found to work well, and he thought they would meet the exigencies of the case.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE rose to Order, saying that there were hon. Members who desired to move Amendments which would come earlier.

Mr. BERESFORD HOPE suggested that the Resolutions should be considered, like the clauses of a Bill, in Committee.

Mr. DILLWYN (for Mr. Dodson) moved, as an Amendment, the omission of the words "or the Committee of Ways and Means."

Sir CHARLES W. DILKE seconded the Amendment as one which would be a slight improvement, although it would not make the Resolution acceptable. While there was a weight of authority from the elder Members of the House in favour of some change, there was none in favour of that proposed by this Resolution, which almost in the same terms was rejected in 1854 and 1861. The evidence of the Speaker was that, in order to avoid the inconvenient postponement of Ministerial statements, it would be better that a Minister should make his statement, instead of merely touching his hat, when he moved that the Speaker do leave the Chair; and he pointed out that while the Resolution would introduce certainty, it was open to the objection that Supply might be fixed for every Monday night and taken without the opportunity of opposing it by an Amendment. It should be remembered that the Speaker, in his evidence, suggested that the proposal might be accompanied by some compensatory arrangement giving greater facilities on other nights for bringing forward Motions. But no such compensatory arrangement was now offered by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The evidence of the Speaker before that Committee was distinctly against the proposal, as interfering with the old Parliamentary maxim of discussing grievances before granting Supplies, and strongly in favour of Amendments which were relevant being discussed. The Chancellor of the Exchequer would exclude all Amendments whatever. In the case of Supplemental Estimates, and even on the £6,000,000 Vote of last year, the discussion of Amendments would, under this Order, have been altogether excluded. It would merely be open to the House to say "Aye" or "No," without giving any reasons. Such was the opinion of the highest authority in the House. The evidence against the Chancellor of the Exchequer's proposal was overwhelming. The Chairman of Committees had also given evidence wholly opposed to it, and had stated that he would allow Motions affecting the administration of the Departments of the State to be brought forward on the Motion to go into Committee of Supply. He (Sir Charles W. Dilke) thought it essential to the privileges of the House that the ancient theory of discussing grievances before granting Supply should be preserved. It was one of the most valuable parts of our Parliamentary Constitution. He contended that a majority of the Members of the Committee were opposed to the Resolution now proposed.

Amendment proposed, to leave out the words "or the Committee of Ways and Means."—(*Mr. Dillwyn.*)

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER admitted that the reasons for proposing that there should be no Amendments on going into Committee of Supply did not apply with equal force to Committees of Ways and Means. He had taken the Resolution in the form in which it was ultimately adopted by the Committee; but he would admit the hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke) was correct in saying that if the matter had been proposed to the Committee on the subject as it was now proposed to the House, the majority of the Committee would have been in favour of omitting Ways and Means. He, therefore, was prepared to accept the Amendment. He observed that the hon. Baronet, in quoting from the evidence which the Speaker was good enough to give to the Committee, had omitted to notice that much of the evidence turned upon the suggestion which the Speaker had been prepared to make to the Committee, which would have given to the Government Thursdays and Fridays, with an absence of Amendment on going into Committee, as well as Mondays.

Mr. NEWDEGATE thanked the right hon. Gentleman for his concession. The power of moving the Amendment in Supply might be used so as to lame the Services; but it was clear that a Motion to go into Committee of Ways and Means, which dealt with taxation, could not have equal urgency.

MR. E. JENKINS suggested that it would be an improvement if the Chancellor of the Exchequer would go further in the direction of Amendment, and secure to hon. Members opportunities for discussion in case of Supplemental Estimates, Votes of Credit, and Votes on Account being brought before the House.

MR. BERESFORD HOPE: I must thank my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer for the way in which he has given in upon this point, and I trust his concession may be the prelude to many other improvements in the Resolution. It may be so changed as to be made acceptable; but it will certainly require very considerable alterations. I must thank the hon. Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke) for having saved me the trouble of referring at length to the evidence of Mr. Speaker and of the Chairman of Committees. I was prepared to have brought before the House this most valuable and weighty evidence, from the first and the second authority in the House; but it has been so well and amply done by my hon. Friend as to make repetition unnecessary. I must ask the House to weigh and digest it. No one would wish or expect us to give up our independent opinion; all must own that the highest respect is due to these authorities. I wish to discuss the Resolution from a point of view which has not hitherto been brought before the House. It has hitherto been dealt with on the supposition that it would be successful in its operation. I wish to consider it in the aspect of its being a failure—not, of course, a formal failure, but only an innovation which will not work as its proposers meant it to do. Let us suppose that the Resolution were agreed to on the hard and absolute words of my right hon. Friend, words more absolute than were ever moved before. My right hon. Friend, with great ingenuity and ability, tried to persuade us that his proposal of this evening is our old familiar friend of 1872, only in a rather different attire. But he did not point out how far it differed from that venerable suggestion. In that case it was provided that one Amendment might be moved on each of the three great branches of the Estimates, provided that branch were first brought forward on a Monday, while he put an absolute gag on all Mondays. But my right hon. Friend, in his concern to represent the creation of 1872 in such roseate language, passed over the very animated opposition with which the proposal was met. So much for the Rule of 1872, due to the Government of the right hon. Member for Greenwich. I do not remember whether the Chancellor of the Exchequer said anything about his own arrangement of 1876; but if he did, it was uttered in such dulcet tones as to fail in arresting the attention of the House. The proposal of 1876 was that there might be one Amendment on a cognate subject to the night's Estimates upon every Monday. That was taken as an all round compromise, and, after what I remember as a full discussion, acquiesced in with much unanimity. Now, when I remind the House that that compromise was moved by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, I think I have said enough to show that it deserves very great respect. But suppose this Resolution is carried as it is proposed, what will be the result?

"Naturam expellas furcâ, tamen usque recurret."

Hon. Members who are cut off from bringing forward their grievances in the legitimate manner before going into Supply will still have one and every item of Supply to talk upon. At present, if there is any steam to blow off, there can be one discussion, and then an end of it. But when a body is in a state of fever the unhealthy stuff is repressed; then, by all medical rules, it works internally in a much more virulent manner. The question which presses will probably be traversed by some three or four separate Votes, and as sure as possible you will have three or four separate debates upon it, raised by hon. Members who find themselves aggrieved by being cut off from bringing on their Motions on going into Supply. But even then you will not have stopped all the earths; there is the Report on Supply, and you may depend upon it hon. Members will take their revenge. And then, again, this Rule applies only to Mondays. On all other days this Draconian law does not exist. But what Government which is ever likely to get upon the Treasury Bench will not use this Rule to its own advantage. Of course, every Government makes use of the weapons at its command, and with the more zest if forged by its opponents. It is not the present Government that I fear, but a possible Government which might come, in some far-off Session, from those Benches below the opposite Gangway, when my right hon. Friend would sit disconsolate upon the front Opposition Bench, and I should be mournful below the Gangway. I never would pay such a Government the bad compliment of supposing that they would be such bad managers that if, when they had Monday to themselves and could get their Supply through, they would put it down on Thursday when the Opposition could still do their little something to stop them? Of course, they would not; no people fit to sit on the Treasury Bench could possibly so mismanage their business. And thus their Supply would be carried through on Mondays. I dare say it would be bad Supply, and that it would do a great deal of mischief; perhaps by its savings and its caprices we should lose half our Colonies and Cyprus into the bargain; but we should take our revenge by being nasty, thoroughly nasty, on the Report the day after. We have read to-day in the newspapers about Captain Cook; and I would appeal to my right hon. Friend whether it is worth while risking all these disasters for the barren honour of becoming a Captain Cook of Parliamentary Forms. I do not know, Sir, if I should be in Order, and I tremble before the learned Serjeant on the other side; but if I could only suggest in a hypothetical manner a certain Amendment which I shall be prepared to move later on, I think we might arrive at a satisfactory compromise. In regard to the suggestion of the Minister making his statement with the Speaker in the Chair, you, Sir, have expressed your opinion that the scheme was one which might work well, and the Chairman of Committees, did the same, although it is fair to the House to say that an authority whom we all greatly respect, Sir Thomas May, saw a difficulty in the way. I think, however, his difficulty was rather on a matter of form than of an absolutely practical nature. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, at the beginning of Mr. Speaker's examination, asked whether the Minister might not make his statement before the Speaker left the Chair; in short, whether he might not move the Speaker out of the Chair?—upon which a general debate would follow; then after that stage one Amendment might be considered according to the terms of the Chancellor of the Exchequer's Resolution of 1876. Of course, the first debate on Mr. Speaker leaving the Chair would travel over the ground of all the Amendments, and half of them would virtually be swept away by a dexterous Minister, though probably one or two would remain behind to be dealt with on the days when the particular Supply to which they referred came on. I also ventured to urge this before the Committee. It seems to me that the Estimates might be divided into more chapters than at present. At present we have the three great divisions of Army, Navy, and Civil Service Estimates; but the latter comprise, not to name other topics, charges for Public Works, the judicial arrangement of the country, Education and Fine Arts, and the Diplomatic Service, each of which, speaking roughly, has its own mouthpiece in the Government. Would it not be a common-sense arrangement that there should be as many chapters in the Estimates as there are definite Members to move them? The Home Secretary, for instance, could move his batch, the First Commissioner of Works his, and the Vice President of the Council would move the Education and South Kensington Votes and so on; and thus you would get the Estimates divided into seven or eight distinct chapters, which would bring forth the same number of Ministerial statements before you, Sir, left the Chair. We should in that way regulate grievances, and only take those directly referring to the Estimates, or those particular Estimates, while Tuesday and Friday would remain for the many miscellaneous subjects which we are apt to discuss on going into Committee of Supply, and which sometimes puzzle people out-of-doors. I should like to know, Sir, whether I should be in Order in reading an Amendment?

Mr. SPEAKER: The hon. Member certainly would not be in Order in moving an Amendment, for at the present time there is an Amendment before the House which has not been disposed of.

MR. BERESFORD HOPE: Then, Sir, I will read a supposed Resolution. I will suppose, Sir, that in some future Parliament, some ideal Chancellor of the Exchequer proposed a Resolution which embodied the principles of the Resolution of 1876, and of the provision that the Minister should make his statements on moving the Speaker out of the Chair. Whoever does this will, I believe, offer the best solution of the difficulty.

MR. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN said, that the hon. Member for Cambridge University (Mr. Beresford Hope) had compared the Chancellor of the Exchequer to Captain Cook, and he (Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen) supposed that the House was to imply that the hon. Gentleman compared himself to the estimable savage who, according to that morning's newspapers, claimed to have destroyed that unfortunate discoverer. The hon. Member's speech tended to destroy all the Chancellor of the Exchequer's Resolutions. Now, nothing was more popular with a large section of the House of Commons than to tell them that an attempt was being made to tamper with its privileges. A number of Gentlemen were always ready to believe such a statement, just as a certain number were always ready to believe paragraphs which appeared in the newspapers and to found upon them serious questions in that House, although they had, in reality, no foundation at all. But let the House take a practical view of the question and ask what was the true reason for these Resolutions. Now, what was the complaint of the country? Was it that grievances were not sufficiently considered, or that hon. Members were debarred from making speeches? Certainly not; the complaint was that the Business of the House was constantly brought to a standstill by the vast number of speeches delivered, and that the House failed as a legislative body, if not as a debating society. That being the case, the Government had taken the right course in making proposals that had been endorsed by a large majority of an impartial Select Committee, and in moving that on one day of the week the House should at once go into Committee of Supply without debate. What they wanted was the certainty that the House would attend to the Estimates, and that the expenditure of the country's money should be fully criticized, which was one of the special duties of the House of Commons. The hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands), though he had touched the real point at issue, had not put it quite fairly before the House. He had enlarged upon the importance of being able to discuss before going into Committee the whole policy of the Government, as it involved more serious sums of money than almost any Estimates, and had put the matter as if it were a question between the discussion of such policy and the discussion of the details of Estimates. If that was really the case, the argument of the hon. Member would be irrefutable; but he put it to everyone whether there had been any question connected with the policy of the Government upon which, if really objected to, even by a small minority, there had not been ample opportunities of raising debate? The hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke) had quoted the evidence of the Speaker and other eminent personages given before the Select Committee, but had strangely omitted another material part of the evidence of the Speaker of the House, who, on being categorically asked three questions, had replied—first, that he had never known a real grievance which had been prevented from being brought before the House, inasmuch as it was to the interests of Ministers that it should be so brought and openly dealt with, rather than be made the subject of comment in the Press; next, that the chief object of the Minister must be to obtain facilities for the transaction of the business of the country, and that this was of more importance than that every Member should have the opportunity of airing his particular crochet; and, lastly, that in his opinion a small restriction of the rights of individual Members was necessary for the conduct of Public Business. The real question was whether the House wanted to expedite its Business or to retain Rules which had no other considerable merit than antiquity, which he (Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen) should have thought would rather have recommended them to the other, and not to the Liberal, side of the House. They had been well suited to the old times in which they were drawn; but now, if not absolutely obsolete, were inapplicable to an Assembly in which so many more Members took part in the debates than was formerly the case. The time of the House had been year after year occupied, not by grievances, but by questions which the vast majority would have put on one side, if the forms of procedure had not stood in the way. The cry of privilege had been raised upon mistaken grounds. He regretted that an attempt should be made to represent those who were or had been officials of the House as acting in opposition to the independent Members when they really desired and ought to be rowing in the same boat, and uniting in an honest endeavour to promote the due transaction of the business of the country.

Mr. GREGORY trusted there would be no further opposition to the adoption of the Resolution after the statements that had been made on both sides. He had over and over again come down to the House with the view of getting on with Supply; but instead of that had sat listening to Motions which had very little to do with Supply till nearly 1 o'clock in the morning, when very little attention could be paid to the real questions before them. He believed that to the constituencies this was a serious grievance, and his constituents felt that matters of Supply ought not to be discussed in the desultory manner in which they must be discussed at that time in the morning. He, therefore, approved of the Resolution, and pointed out that it would facilitate the progress of Business without interfering with the Privileges of the House. It appeared to him that hon. Members had ample opportunities of bringing forward their grievances; they had at all events two days in the week, and they were also to have the opportunity when Committee of Ways and Means stood upon the Paper. He would ask whether the grievances spoken of were very crying ones, and whether they were such as should interpose between the House and its going thoroughly into the discharge of one of its most important functions. He spoke with some feeling, because it was to him and others actively engaged in business a great sacrifice to attend the Sittings of the House. He trusted the House would in every way facilitate Committee of Supply.

Mr. Serjeant SIMON said, there was not a single instance of a real grievance which hon. Members had not had an opportunity of bringing forward; but there were some so-called grievances, such as the question of a road across the Park, which were more fit for a local vestry, over which the time of the House had been frequently wasted. He had come down night after night, as stated by the hon. Member for East Sussex (Mr. Gregory), and found the House still talking about these matters instead of proceeding with the proper Business of the evening. Session after Session had been wasted in mere empty speeches, and nothing had been done; and the end of this had been to defeat the very object of the Rules for which hon. Members below the Gangway were contending. The consideration of the Estimates had been deferred till a late period of the Session when the House was weary and many of the Members had gone out of town, and the Government had been able to carry whatever Estimates it pleased. Many important measures also had been withdrawn in consequence of this waste of time. He thought that some compromise might be arrived at which, while it gave effective force to the old and important principle of "grievances before Supply," would yet prevent their spending so much time, not in passing great measures, but in listening to speeches which led to nothing. When the right time came, he intended to move that words be added to the Motion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer which would enable a Question to be put before the Speaker left the Chair.

Sir WALTER B. BARTTELOT remarked, that the great complaint which had been made by both sides of the House was that fair opportunities were not afforded for the discussion of the Estimates; and he could not see that, under the Resolution which was now being considered, there was any guarantee that Ministers would bring forward their financial proposals in proper or reasonable time, or that they would not throw them over until the end of the Session, thus necessitating large and repeated Votes on Account. Ministers were always more inclined to give to Bills on which they relied for popularity the preference over Supply, which only interested a comparatively small section of the House, and hon. Members around him would remember the difficulties they had had to encounter in this respect when in Opposition. As a *via media*, and with the view of inducing Ministers to bring on Supply at a period when it could be freely and advantageously discussed, he would suggest to his right hon. Friend that the Resolution should be made to extend only to the 1st of June in each year. Should the Chancellor of the Exchequer, however, not see his way to do that, the Rule which had worked so well in 1872-3 might be again adopted.

Mr. W. E. FORSTER said, while it was impossible to overrate the importance of the Question before the House, it was equally important that it should have some Question before it; but at the present moment the Main Question was overlaid by three several Amendments; and as he understood the Chancellor of the Exchequer was ready to accept that one proposed by the hon. Member for Swansea (Mr. Dillwyn) for the omission of the words "or Ways and Means," he would therefore suggest that it should be disposed of before any new suggestions were considered.

Mr. DODSON took a similar view.

Mr. GORST said, he was utterly bewildered at the course which the proceedings had taken, and at the various Amendments and suggestions—some of the former not yet reduced to writing—which had been thrown out.

Question put, and *negatived.*

The Marquess of HARTINGTON, in moving, as an Amendment, to insert after the word "Supply," the words "appointed for the consideration of the ordinary Army, Navy, and Civil Service Estimates," said, that before doing so, he might be allowed to say a few words upon the Resolution itself. It had appeared to him for some time that the real difficulty which the House had to meet was one which would never be met, or very imperfectly met, by any Resolution such as that which hon. Members were now debating. The difficulty was that the House had a great deal more Business to deal with—some of it of a very important and some of it of an extremely unimportant character—than it was able thoroughly to discuss; and, under these circumstances, it was left almost entirely to chance, or to the pertinacity of certain hon. Members, what Business should be considered and what neglected. That was the case both with regard to projects of legislation and with regard to various other subjects which were brought before the House; and he did not believe that any effectual remedy could ever be applied to this state of things until the House was prepared to classify its Business in a far more scientific way than it did at present. Some day or other the House might see that it was necessary to attempt such a classification, and to commit to some authority —he did not say what that authority might be, whether certain officers of the House, or a Committee of its Members—the duty of examining into its Business and of proposing for consideration, and, if thought fit, adoption, some scheme for the proper conduct and management of its work. He was quite aware that at the present time the House was not disposed to proceed with any such considerable change in its procedure as that which he had just indicated; but he was strongly of opinion that, until it took up the question in that sense, it would never be able to cope with the real evil with which it had to contend. With regard to the Resolution before them, there was no doubt that the practice of moving Amendments on the Question that the Speaker do now leave the Chair for the purpose of going into Supply, had increased to a very inconvenient extent. It was quite of modern growth, as appeared from the evidence taken before a recent Committee. For many years in the early part of this century it was unknown; but about 1811 it was permitted on very urgent occasions. In recent years, however, the practice had extended to very insignificant questions, and had developed into considerable abuse, for which the House suffered. On the other hand, it was of extreme importance that opportunities should be given of raising at short notice discussions on really important matters, whether foreign, colonial, or domestic. In his evidence before the Committee last year, the Speaker admitted that such facilities for the discussion of urgent matters would be considerably curtailed by the Resolution before them as it now stood. The Speaker's evidence also showed that, in his opinion, the operation of the Rule of

1872 was intended to be confined, and had been confined by him in practice, to those cases in which the House was going into Committee of Supply on the ordinary Army, Navy, or Civil Service Estimates. The Resolution of 1872 would not, in the Speaker's opinion, have applied to Votes of the nature of the Credit of £6,000,000 proposed last year, or to any Estimates of an extraordinary character. He had no doubt that the Speaker exercised a very wise discretion in interpreting the Resolution of 1872; but its terms admitted of that interpretation, whereas the Resolution as now moved by the Chancellor of the Exchequer would not. Under its plain and precise terms, he (the Marquess of Hartington) presumed that the House would be obliged to go into Supply without any Question being put, on any Estimate whatever, including the Vote of Credit of last year. He did not think the House would on consideration be willing to give the Resolution so great a latitude; and therefore he would propose, as an Amendment, to insert after the words "Committee of Supply" the words "for the consideration of the ordinary Army, Navy, or Civil Service Estimates." That would give the Government the certainty they desired in regard to the ordinary Estimates, while it would exclude extraordinary Estimates from the Rule. He hoped that Amendment would be favourably considered by the Government. He had a further suggestion to make, although it might not be regular for him to put it in the form of an Amendment. Supply was not confined to discussions in Committee. It involved two stages—first, the consideration of the Estimates in Committee, and next, the adoption by the House of the Resolution which had been agreed to in Committee. It was in Committee that the details of the Estimates were discussed, and that the evil of uncertainty was felt; and it appeared to him that the principle of considering grievances before Supply might be conveniently maintained by taking Amendments on the Report of Supply, instead of on going into Committee. It was seldom that the question of the details of an Estimate was reserved for the Report. It was perfectly competent now for a Member to move Amendments on the consideration of the Resolutions agreed to in Supply. There was no Rule of the House to that effect; but it had been frequently ruled by the Chair that an Amendment moved on the Report of Supply must appertain to the subject of the Resolution passed in Committee. He thought that some relaxation of that ruling might be provided for. It was of the utmost importance that facilities should be given for the discussion of urgent foreign, colonial, and other questions which might from time to time arise; and he did not see how, under the Resolution as it stood, such facilities would be afforded. He did not think it would be practicable to shut out the discussion of questions at short notice which it was desirable to discuss; and if they adopted too stringent a rule of that kind, he had no doubt the Government would lose a considerable part of the advantage which they hoped to gain by the Resolution, and probably more recourse would be had to what the House felt to be the most inconvenient practice of moving the adjournment for the purpose of raising a discussion. It was to be regretted that such discursive discussions should be raised on the Motion that the Speaker do now leave the Chair. As things now stood, it was often perfectly useless for the Government to put down Supply for a Monday night, because they knew they would not get it, owing to the whole evening being occupied by other questions of greater or less importance. He thought it might be possible to give the Speaker some authority by which urgent questions might be raised on that occasion, and that would afford the House all the practical security it required that matters of urgent necessity should be fully discussed. He did not share the apprehension of the hon. and gallant Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) that the Government would not bring forward Supply early enough. As far as his experience went, one of the main objects of all Governments was to bring forward Supply as early as possible; because as soon as they had made considerable progress in Supply, they had the Session under their control. If the House granted them the opportunity of going into Supply, he had not the smallest doubt that of whatever Party the Government might be composed, they would not lose time in pushing forward the Estimates and making progress with

Public Business. If the Government would accept his Amendment and consider his suggestion, he thought the House might then safely agree to the Resolution. The noble Lord concluded by moving the Amendment.

Amendment proposed,

After the word "Supply," to insert the words "appointed for the consideration of the ordinary Army, Navy, and Civil Service Estimates." —(*The Marquess of Hartington.*)

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted."

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said, he had no objection to the proposal of the noble Lord opposite (the Marquess of Hartington); on the contrary, he thought it a decided improvement on the recommendations of the Committee embodied in the Resolution. He agreed with the hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands) that it was of the highest importance they should consider questions of policy which might involve large expenditure, and should not allow themselves to be diverted from these by discussions of mere matters of detail. At the same time, the hon. Member would admit there were some of these small matters of detail which deserved consideration, and which ought to be considered in a business-like manner. It was not surprising that only a few Members attended to discuss them; but their doing so was, at all events, indirectly useful, for it caused the Government to be doubly and trebly careful how they drew up the Estimates, knowing that they would be criticized and severely examined. What had been found to be inconvenient and difficult to overcome was the multiplication of Notices of Motion on going into Committee of Supply, which not only made it uncertain whether they should get into Committee of Supply at all, but also what Notices would be proceeded with. The number of Notices might vary from, say, 5 to 20; they would embrace all kinds of subjects; they might come down to find it on one day a question of foreign policy, on another the state of Rotten Row, on another a question of fine arts, and on another a personal grievance; and there was no certainty as to which would come on and which would not. The noble Lord said occasions might arise suddenly when there might be reason to challenge the policy of the Government without having to give Notice and wait three or four weeks to bring on the subject. But that applied to the Committee of Supply at present, when the books were choked with a number of Amendments to the Motion to go into Committee. If the matter was of sufficient importance, no doubt private Members having Notices gave way, and they would be as likely to do so in future on a Tuesday or Friday which they had obtained. Therefore, the House would do well to clear the Paper of Notices of Motion on going into Committee of Supply on a particular day. But when any exceptional proposal was made—such, for instance, as the credit of £6,000,000—it would be wrong of the House to part with its privilege of calling in question the conduct and policy of the Government. The Government, as well as the House at large, would feel that it would be improper that there should be any difficulty in the way of raising a discussion upon general policy at such a time. The proposal of the noble Lord met that case, and he did not see the slightest objection to it. Even in such a case he did not quite see how the Amendment would meet any disinclination to yield on the part of hon. Members having precedence with Notices on other subjects; but in practice, perhaps, the difficulty would not arise. As to the other suggestion of the noble Lord, he saw no reason for departing from the Rule that an Amendment to the Report of Supply must relate to a Vote included in the Report. If, however, it was to be adopted at all, it must be the subject of a separate Resolution, as it would involve a change in the Rules of Procedure bearing on the Report of Supply.

GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOUR suggested that time would be saved if Ministers, instead of introducing Estimates in long speeches full of details, would have the technical and professional information printed and distributed beforehand. Nearly nine-tenths of the speeches of the First Lord of the Admiralty and Secretary of State for War related to details, and a small portion only to important points relating to policy or to matters which might with some propriety be announced to the House in a set speech. On his own knowledge, he could state that every branch of the War Office was called on to supply the Minister with full information relating to the details of the past as well as the current Estimates. A compilation of the Departmental statements made during the past few years would be most valuable to Members in aid of their deliberations as well as beneficial to the Public Service. Indeed, he believed that a compilation of information was already made for the special use of the Secretary of State. Then, again, the Business of the House in discussing the several Votes of Supply would be greatly aided by having uniformity in drawing out the Estimates strictly adhered to, so that the transactions of one year might be contrasted with those of former years. So far from that being the case, not a year passed without some changes being made in the arrangement of the Estimates, so that the connecting links between the demands of the current year with those of former years were entirely destroyed. The orders of the Treasury to aid hon. Members by an adherence to this uniformity were entirely disregarded. Then they found the information at present supplied excessively meagre, indeed obscure, so that Members were constrained to put questions and to obtain explanations, instead of at once voting the sums which the House should grant, if they were made in a clear and intelligible form. The fact could not be too frequently urged that a large portion of the money annually required in all branches of the Civil, Naval, and Army Estimates was year by year alike, and the exceptional demands so few, that they alone needed consideration. If these ordinary and uniform demands were so clearly shown as to lay open the new requirements, then the discussions could be restricted to the latter. He could not avoid stating that the short experience he had had in that House fully confirmed the words which his relative, the late Mr. Hume, used often in that House, as well as to him (General Sir George Balfour), that the House of Commons was a generous body, readily yielding to the requests of Ministers, when their requests were put forward in a clear and honest form. The greatest obstruction that could be offered was in having obscurity, and consequently mystery, for where there was mystery the House always assumed there was something to conceal. The other and serious defects were to be found in the wrong practice of permitting monies voted for one purpose to be used for other and often very different purposes; in also not requiring the Appropriation Accounts to set forth the expenditure to the exact form in which it was shown in the Estimates. In his (General Sir George Balfour's) opinion, these were the hindrances to Business. Then, again, the Civil Estimates, now amounting to more than the amounts formerly voted for the Army and Navy, were the cause of much delay in the transaction of Business, merely because of the obscurity in which large amounts were put forward. An attempt was made by the First Lord of the Admiralty, when Secretary to the Treasury, to explain the details of the Estimates; but though this was a praiseworthy attempt, yet it failed, because it was impossible for one officer to make a speech on £23,000,000 of Expenditure of every form and kind of outlay, relating to the civil administration of the whole Kingdom at home and abroad. Here, again, the printing of information prior to the Estimates being brought on would be most useful. It would supply that want, which Members so often delayed the Business by asking for in the course of the Sittings. Even then, it often happened that the replies were very vague, sometimes not even noticed, and at other times incorrect. The obvious course was to throw on the responsible officers of the several branches of the Civil Service the duty of furnishing the details relating to their respective Estimates, and also require a few of the political heads in the House, such as the Chief Commissioner of Works, Board of Trade, Local Government Board, and others, to speak on the policy or principle of those Estimates. In that way, the Secretary to the Treasury, already overburdened with his proper duties, would be released from the charge of nearly all the Civil Estimates, and able to aid the House with that important kind of information which the great controlling body—the Treasury—ought to be able to furnish on those few but great questions connected with their vast Expenditure in the Civil, Military, and Naval Departments.

Mr. RAIKES said, it would be well not to expect too much from the operation of the proposed new Rule, for the evil at which it was aimed was rather too deep-seated in the present constitution of Parliament to be completely dealt with in that way. He was glad that the noble Lord the Member for the Radnor Boroughs (the Marquess of Hartington) had pointed out to the House, while dealing with this Motion, the great propriety of classifying the Amendments upon Supply before they were brought forward. If they were classified, and more especially if abstract Resolutions were excluded, undoubtedly they would consume much less time than at present. He considered the Amendment of the hon. Member for Swansea (Mr. Dillwyn) was worthy of much consideration, taken in conjunction with the present proposal. It was, however, much more important to ascertain, in the first place, whether more latitude should not be given to the discussion on the Report of Supply, in lieu of the existing practice of raising questions before the Speaker was allowed to leave the Chair, as the noble Lord had suggested. But if that course were adopted, the House might justly insist on a day being named on which precedence would be given to Report of Supply over all other Orders of the Day. Moreover, it was to be considered whether questions might not be raised on such an occasion which would be shut out by the new Rule relating to Monday, that the Speaker leave the Chair. Upon one point he supposed they were nearly agreed — namely, that there should be some method adopted to reduce the uncertainty now prevailing as to the discussions about going into Committee of Supply. Inasmuch as the Amendment proposed to limit the Rule to ordinary Estimates, and to exclude all supplementary ones, the House would have an opportunity, if they thought proper to do so, to enter into discussion on questions relating to the latter. In that case, although a certain classification might be arrived at, still the great mass of Amendments, if the Speaker left the Chair, would remain, untouched, to encumber the Notice Paper with matter unimportant compared with that of Supply. He felt bound to say that the discussion on these matters would appear to persons out-of-doors altogether technical, and that those questions were so complicated that it would be difficult to render them intelligible to the ordinary public. He was glad that he had not remained in his seat during that debate without endeavouring, so far as he was able, to give his support to the suggestion thrown out by the noble Marquess, as though he did not think that the Motion itself would have any marked effect on the solution of the question, the policy of which it was a precursor might bear fruit hereafter, when the House would find itself forced to discuss it thoroughly. He thought, further, that such questions could not be examined into too much, or ventilated too thoroughly, so as to bring about, if possible, a change of practice suited not only to a particular emergency, but resulting in such a classification of subjects as might give some real system to the conduct of Public Business. For this reason, he considered that the suggestions which had fallen from the noble Lord opposite were more likely to render permanent service to the Business of the House than those that now appeared on the Notice Paper.

MR. WHITBREAD said, he did not think the proposals of the noble Lord (the Marquess of Hartington) could be separated, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer desired. They formed parts of one plan. Two rival schemes were before the House to make certain the discussion of Supply when it was set down. The Government scheme would, if carried alone, have the effect of shutting out Members from an ancient privilege which they valued very highly—the privilege of stating grievances before money was voted. They ought, therefore, to have the opportunity of doing so on the Report, and the noble Lord's scheme gave greater certainty for getting into Supply and discussing the Estimates on the days they were set down; but it would also give advantage to hon. Members to state any grievance to the House before the money was voted. That was a privilege he was sure that the House would not willingly surrender. Those who had been long in the House often had occasion to feel surprise at the very loose way in which money had been voted. Some years ago every item of Supply was questioned; but now supplies of money were obtained so easily that he could not help thinking that part of the growth of the expenditure arose from the very great chance there was of any item whatever passing without remark.

Sir HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON said, he could not agree with the hon. Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread), that the two proposals of the noble Marquess were inseparable. When the hon. Member for Bedford stated that the House would not part with its ancient right of stating grievances on Supply, he forgot that the practice was not of such very ancient date, and that within the last few years, on the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of London (Mr. Lowe), this very practice had been given up by the House. In 1872 and 1873 the House agreed to give it up, and neither the House nor the Government of the day had any cause to regret it. The hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands) had said that he (Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson) ought to be the last person to speak in favour of the Resolution, because he moved an Amendment on previous occasions when a similar Resolution was proposed. It was true that he had moved an Amendment on that occasion; but then he had done so solely upon the ground that the question ought to be re-considered, owing to the way in which previous Committees had been conducted. He was, however, very much surprised to find the hon. Member for Bedford opposing now that which he on a former occasion supported; and he was still more astonished at the course taken by the hon. Member for Burnley, because that hon. Member had complained of the inconvenience to which he was frequently put on Friday nights, when a great number of small Questions were set down on the Notice Paper on the Motion for going into Supply, and had protested against Members being, as he called it, driven into a corner and compelled to vote large sums of money at a late hour in a scrambling and unsatisfactory manner. Those views were, he could not help thinking, better worthy of consideration than the diametrically opposite opinions which the hon. Gentleman at present appeared to hold. He would merely add the expression of a hope that, seeing the enormous amount of Business the House had to get through in the course of a Session, the Resolution as amended would be accepted, not only in the interest of the Government, but of hon. Members generally.

Mr. O'SHAUGHNESSY observed, that having had the advantage of a Report of a Committee which had investigated the subject, the Government had come down that Session prepared with certain proposals for the remedying of certain abuses. He should have something to say presently about the nature of these proposals, and how inapplicable they were to remedy the abuses that were complained of. But taking them as they were, they had an Amendment of great importance from the hon. Member for Swansea (Mr. Dillwyn). They had also an Amendment from the noble Lord (the Marquess of Hartington), which had been accepted, and a suggestion from the same noble Lord as to which there were considerable differences of opinion. The hon. Gentleman the Chairman of Ways and Means was of opinion that the proposal should be considered at the present juncture, and he added that he did not quite understand the full bearing of the Amendment of the noble Lord. Now, how should he? It was not on the Paper, and therefore the House had no opportunity of considering it. The first thing which they had to complain of was that the Government had given them no opportunity of putting down Amendments on the Paper. The hon. Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread) considered that the suggestion of the noble Lord was worthy of acceptance, and the Chairman of Ways and Means thought it ought to be considered at the present juncture. But the Chancellor of the Exchequer had said he would not accept it. What ought the great body of the House to do under these circumstances? Had they not, when they were now asked to abandon a great privilege, a right to demand a fair opportunity of considering, not merely the half-abandoned proposals of the Government, but the proposals to be substituted for them. All that had happened in the course of the evening pointed to the necessity of some further opportunity to consider the subject. There was one thing that must strike the House very strongly. The practical emergency referred to by the Chairman of Ways and Means was the alleged misconduct of three or four hon. Members. Surely, the hon. Gentleman would not say that what the House was now asked to do, whether in the form of amendment or otherwise, was in any way directed against this practical emergency? Perhaps the only important one of these Resolutions was directed against the Privileges of the House, which these hon. Members never attempted to impugn. If there were abuses in this matter, they were such as the Speaker and the Chairman of Ways and Means did not consider strong or violent enough to warrant the proposed changes. They had heard of men cutting their noses off to spite their faces Here was a case of the Government cutting their head off to spite their noses. He thought it was too much to ask Irish Members to give up a right which they had never abused, and which they valued as enabling them to demand the redress of abuses before going into Committee of Supply.

MR. DILLWYN considered the Amendment of the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) an improvement on the Resolution as it stood on the Paper; but desired to have some information as to how far the change would extend, not only to Supplementary Estimates, but to Votes on Account.

MR. GOURLEY said, he objected both to the Resolution and the Amendment of the noble Marquess, being unable to see how the rights of private Members would be secure under either.

MR. W. H. SMITH, in reply to the hon. Member for Swansea (Mr. Dillwyn), said, that "Votes on Account," being Votes on Account of Estimates already before the House, the Rule precluding discussion before entering upon their consideration in Committee would apply to them on Monday Sittings. Supplementary Estimates, which came under a different category, would be open to discussion before the House resolved itself into Committee. In reply to the hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Gourley), he would add that the proposals before the House were intended only to enable the House to discuss the Estimates. If Ministers wished to pass the Estimates without discussion, they would accept the present condition of affairs, and leave the Estimates day by day to the end of the Session, when it was notorious they would be passed. It was really with the hope and desire of getting a full and free discussion of the Estimates at the proper time that these proposals were now made to the House.

MR. E. JENKINS said, the explanation of the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty was very unsatisfactory. He (Mr. Jenkins) certainly understood the Chancellor of the Exchequer at an earlier period of the evening to assent, if not by word of mouth at least by gesture, to the proposal that Votes on Account should be excepted from the operation of the proposed Rule. If the House accepted the Amendment of the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington), he would move the insertion of words to give effect to that understanding.

MR. PARNELL said, that perhaps he might be permitted to say a few words as a Member of the late Committee. He did not think the Chancellor of the Exchequer had treated the House as handsomely as he had promised; for certainly when the hon. Member for Dundee (Mr. Jenkins) drew his attention to Votes on Account, his (Mr. Parnell's) impression was that the right hon. Gentleman virtually agreed to their exclusion from the Resolution. He would next ask the House if they were going to gain by the proposed Resolution the object which they wished? They had heard a good deal of the desirability of bringing forward the Estimates early in the Session, and the Members of the Government had professed the greatest possible anxiety to assist in this exceedingly good end; but he himself was much inclined to doubt that their good intentions would last as long as would be supposed. They should recollect that this Rule was an entire innovation on the practice of Parliament. In 1872 a Resolution was agreed to which introduced for the first time the principle of progress, which was explained as being the same procedure with regard to the Supply as with regard to the stages of the Bill; but the principle of 1872 was entirely different from the present proposal. In the last few Sessions hon. Members were allowed to put as many Amendments as they wished on the Paper against going into Supply. The consequence was that there was not any very great obstruction to Progress, and it would astonish hon. Members if they knew how few hours were taken up with Motions against Supply in 1877; for, owing to the number of Notices down that were not germane to the subject, hon. Members would not remain in the House to support their Motions. He (Mr. Parnell) had watched the course of events last year more closely than had the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and he could say that in no Session of Parliament in recent years had Notices of Motion proved of less inconvenience or obstruction to Supply early in the evening. He thought the privilege sought to be removed was of much more value to English than to Irish Members. For himself, he had never used it in the past, and did not intend to use it in the future; but he considered the Chancellor of the Exchequer was not acting rightly or fairly in bringing forward such an important Motion after the small Notice he had given the House. If they had considered this question in Committee instead of in the Whole House, they would have been much more likely to dispose of it quickly. His firm belief was that the Public Business would not be materially facilitated by the adoption of one or of all these Resolutions, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer must not complain if, during the present Session, he found his new Rules entirely useless.

Question put, and *agreed to.*

Mr. E. JENKINS moved, as an Amendment, the insertion of the words "excepting Votes on Account." It was very clear what would take place if they were to permit the Government immediately to enter Votes on Account without any previous explanation of grievances by Members in a Constitutional manner. He thought, as they were really proposing to vote away a very important Constitutional check, they ought to endeavour, as far as possible, to minimize what they were about to do.

Sir JOSEPH M'KENNA seconded the Amendment. He scarcely considered it to be necessary to raise the question, as he considered that Votes on Account should never be treated as ordinary Estimates; but he now feared that if the present proposal were not adopted, the Government would get rid of the objection, and treat them as ordinary Estimates. He thought it was one of the most important privileges they possessed, that money should not be voted without previous consideration of grievances; and, with regard to these Votes on Account, how could a Vote on Account be dealt with as an ordinary Estimate, or as anything but an extraordinary event?

Amendment proposed, to insert, at the end of the last Amendment, the words "excepting Votes on Account." —(*Mr. Edward Jenkins.*)

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted."

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER regretted that any hon. Member should have imagined that he had given his assent to the innovation here proposed. He had never intended doing so. What he had assented to was the exclusion of special or peculiar Votes like that of the £6,000,000, involving questions on which the House might wish to challenge the Government. Votes on Account were of a very different character, and the position of the question as regarded them was this. They did not involve any new principle; nobody was satisfied with them, and no Government ever proposed them if they could go on without them. Hon. Gentlemen should recollect that by modern Rules the Estimates were usually voted to a certain date—say, for instance, the 31st of March—but how was the service of the country to be carried beyond that date, if the Estimates for the year were not voted, and when Votes on Account were proposed they were met by Motions on extraneous subjects. If the Resolutions proposed by the Government were carried, Votes on Account would, he trusted, disappear; but they could not be done without altogether. They were wholly different to Supplementary or Special Votes, which seemed to imply something for which Parliament was not prepared. Votes on Account were for the ordinary Services, and involved nothing new. He must therefore oppose the Motion.

Mr. DILLWYN thought they ought to limit the facility of granting Votes on Account in every way in their power; and in considering this question they should remember that year by year there seemed to be an increasing desire to take Votes on Account without any real criticism. He denied that there was not ample time to fully discuss these questions, except in the case of a year where the time up to the middle of the Session had been wasted in the discussion of Bills which had never been intended to pass.

Mr. WHITWELL said, he thought it his duty to support the Motion of his hon. Friend the Member for Dundee (Mr. E. Jenkins). He did not see for a moment the reason for the proposed change, and the Resolution of the Government seemed to deal with Parliament as if its discussions were of no importance. The other day they had charged Indian finances with a heavy charge on account. That was a question which, if it had been brought forward without discussion, would have been a serious invasion of the rights of Parliament. He should therefore vote with the hon. Member for Dundee on this question, as Votes on Account, he believed, were used most mischievously.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN really thought the Amendment an extremely important one, and that the Government would see how critical a point was raised in the discussion. The position of the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer was totally inconsistent with what the right hon. Gentleman said in his opening, for he then said that they would have in their turn a reasonable compensation in the fact that they would have every opportunity for discussing the details of the Estimates; but they had no such opportunity for discussing a Vote on Account. The right hon. Gentleman had pointed out that it might be possible to raise all sorts of discussions on extraneous questions; but if he really thought the opportunity would be made use of, the better way would be to lay down that the discussion should be only on matters germane to the class for which a Vote on Account was asked. Instead of this, they were asked to sacrifice all their privileges; for it was pretty clear that Government could bring on Votes on Account so as to practically provide themselves with any amount of Supply sufficient to last them to the end of the Session.

MAJOR NOLAN said, he did not look at this question from a point of high importance; but he looked at it from the position of an independent private Member, who might have some grievance or opinion to bring forward. He, for instance, might have a proposition to make on the bringing forward of the Estimates. The first two nights were generally taken up with a grand debate. Then the Minister for War made his Statement, and most Ministers for War occupied some five hours. The debate would be continued by the Leaders of the House, and, in the meantime, a Vote on Account would be taken. The adjourned discussion would not be taken probably till after July, when an opportunity might, perhaps, offer for his Motion, at a time when it would be practically of no avail. It seemed to him that the older the House grew the greater difficulty there was in keeping it. He thought hon. Members would have still greater difficulty in retaining a House under the new proposition than they had ever had before, for, under the old Rule, Government had some interest in getting a House on Friday; but with this taking of Votes on Account, they would get their money on Monday, and would, therefore, have no interest to keep a House on Friday. They would get the votes of the Members who did not want to do work. The House of Commons would be a very much easier place under the new Rules; but the interests of constituents would be neglected, because hon. Members would no longer be able to compel attention to local grievances. The Government would get their money more easily, but money questions would not be so easily ventilated. If this new Rule were to be made at all, it ought to be made in a fresh Parliament, which would be very keen about work, and not in a Parliament like the present, jaded and wearied out after a prolonged existence.

MR. H. SAMUELSON said, it seemed to him that no objection to the introduction of this Resolution would stamp these Votes on Account as ordinary Estimates, which would be strong affirmation in the future that they were of that character. It appeared to him that the Amendment of the hon. Member for Dundee went to the root of the matter. He thought that the matter should therefore be pressed; but as the Government had not evidently entirely considered the full weight of the Resolution, he begged to move the adjournment of the debate.

MR. PARNELL seconded the Motion. He really did think there was a want of sincerity on the part of the Government in making this proposition. Either they had the Estimates brought forward in the regular way, and facility given in discussing the items of Supply, or they had not. If they had not, then he could understand the opposition of the Government to this Amendment; but if they were to have the Estimates brought forward in the ordinary way, he could understand it. He believed that if the Irish Estimates were fully discussed the subject of many annual Motions would be abolished, and many of them would be dealt with by the Government. The conduct of the Government, however, was directed to prevent them from having this Constitutional privilege; and the only remedy for Members who desired to discuss particular items in the Estimates would be to insist upon having a discussion of those items when the Government brought forward their Votes on Account. If the Government did really desire discussion, he ventured to think that instead of facilitating the progress of Business, or of getting Supplies, it would be entirely different. He hoped the Government would show their sincerity in this matter; and he appealed to the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer to accept the Amendment as an illustration of their *bona fides.*

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Debate be now adjourned."—(*Mr. Henry Samuelson.*)

MR. GORST asked if the Government had weighed the words proposed, and he suggested that an adjournment would give the Government the opportunity of considering the precise legal meaning of the words of the Amendment; for it seemed to him very doubtful if the words suggested would include the Votes intended by the hon. Member for Dundee. The questions for the Government was the real import of the words suggested, and whether those words should be adopted by them, or that words of their own should be substituted.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON hoped they might bring the question to a conclusion that night. The question raised by his hon. Friend the Member for Dundee (Mr. E. Jenkins) did not seem to him to be a very large one. It hardly appeared to him that there could be much doubt as to the policy of the Government as referred to by the hon. and learned Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst). A Vote on Account was merely a Vote on a portion of the Estimates; and therefore, as it appeared to him, was excluded from the objection raised by the hon. Member. He entirely understood the Amendment in the sense it was understood by the Government.

MR. E. JENKINS said, the difficulty under which he laboured was that no answer had been made to the arguments brought forward from that side. The Chancellor of the Exchequer certainly said there was no objection to accept his (Mr. E. Jenkins's) Amendment; but he had failed to answer those really strong arguments against giving the Government almost unlimited power for asking for Votes of Supply without giving the House a compensating right of opposition. He could conceive that the day might come when it would be of infinite importance, on a Vote on Account being taken, for the Opposition to be able to put down some Resolution. He agreed with his hon. Friend (Mr. Parnell) that the Government were taking from the House a great advantage. Seeing, also, how seldom they would be called upon to limit this Resolution by his proposition, he thought the Government might very well give way upon it.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said, in consequence of remarks which had been made in the course of the debate, he should like to hear the construction which the Speaker put upon the words which had been inserted on the Motion of the noble Lord. He should like to know whether the Speaker considered they did or did not apply to Votes on Account for the ordinary Services?

MR. SPEAKER: I should say that the words inserted on the Motion of the noble Lord would cover Votes on Account applying to the Army, Navy, and Civil Services.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said, that was his opinion, and he further thought that they were in a position to come to a decision on this subject, and that it would be a waste of time to adjourn now, after having carried the discussion so far. The hon. Member for Dundee (Mr. E. Jenkins) said he had had no answer or reason given why Votes on Account should be included amongst the ordinary Services which we proposed should be taken on Monday without previous Notice. The object of this Resolution was to enable the House and the Government to proceed as rapidly as was consistent with the business of Supply. The object of the Government in making the proposition was that one day in the week they might be allowed to go into the Estimates without being obliged to take up the whole or the best part of the night in discussing matters entirely of a foreign nature. But with regard to Votes on Account, that argument did not apply, as it was admitted, under the present system, Votes on Account must necessarily be given after due Notice. He believed that they ought to be asked for seldom; but they were always liable to a Vote being necessary. The hon. Member for Meath (Mr. Parnell) had spoken strongly against them; but the hon. Member, in visiting Dublin, perhaps, would not wish to find the soldiers there starving for want of their pay, in consequence of delay in voting Supply in that House. It might be said that Votes on Account would be asked for for objectionable purposes; but he would remind hon. Members that they always had the power to reduce it, and to raise those questions in Committee in a form which would render it more than ever difficult to pass.

Motion, by leave, *withdrawn.*

Original Question put.

The House *divided*:—Ayes 69; Noes 143: Majority 74.—(Div. List, No. 10.)

MR. BERESFORD HOPE: I rise now to move an Amendment the drift of which is, I may say, to carry out, as far as may be, in the words of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the proposal he made in 1876, and which was then accepted as a satisfactory compromise—namely, that one division, and that relative to the Estimates of the day, shall be brought forward. On the Monday question, too, I pressed in the Committee the suggestion to which several hon. Members, as well as Mr. Speaker and the Chairman of Committees, were favourable, though it was not embodied in any Resolution—namely, that each Minister should make his statement in the House in moving the Speaker out of the Chair. This suggestion, also, I embody in my Amendment, and thereby I import a slight change into the method of procedure as proposed by the Resolution of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. By the latter, Mr. Speaker leaves the Chair without being moved out of it. By my Amendment it is necessary that he should be so. That will make no real difference as to facilitating Business, except so far as debate is interposed. But this debate will be limited and governed by the conditions which we shall prescribe. With this explanation, I move to add at the end of the second line, after the word "Monday," "and a Motion be made that Mr. Speaker do leave the Chair." If I am successful, I shall move to add at the end of the second Resolution—

"Unless an Amendment be moved on the division for the Estimates to be moved on that day; and the Member of Her Majesty's Government who proposes to move such Estimate may make his statement in moving 'That the Speaker do leave the Chair.'"

At this late hour of the night I will not detain the House further, but will simply move my Amendment.

Amendment proposed,

After the word "Monday," to insert the words "and the Motion being made, That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."—(*Mr. Beresford Hope.*)

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted."

MR. JACOB BRIGHT moved the adjournment of the debate. He said it was apparent that a number of hon. Members on that side of the House were anxious to put Amendments on the Paper.

MR. MITCHELL HENRY, in seconding the Motion, said, that they had got through six words after an eight hours' discussion. He considered the Government were too anxious to get on with their Business, regardless of the duties of private Members.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Debate be now adjourned."—(*Mr. Jacob Bright.*)

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER appealed to hon. Members to proceed. The House had been engaged the whole evening in discussing one proposition not of a very complex character. They were now pretty well familiar with the arguments urged on the one side and the other, and he felt that they were perfectly competent to deal with the question in a very short time. It was to be hoped that the hon. Gentleman would allow this Resolution to be passed.

Mr. RYLANDS hoped that the right hon. Gentleman would accept the Motion for adjournment. In addition to the Amendment proposed, he did know that other hon. Members had intended to propose certain Amendments upon this Resolution, and he was quite sure the right hon. Gentleman would see that it was utterly impossible to go on advancing that question at that time of night. He must say that if they were asked to change the procedure of the House, it was at least reasonable that the House should proceed with very great deliberation, and that it should not be considered unreasonable that they should ask for more than one night for the consideration of the question.

Mr. NEWDEGATE hoped the House would go on with the discussion.

Mr. BIGGAR said, he was not generally in favour of adjournments; but on this particular occasion, as regarded the Amendment then before the House, he could candidly say that he had no idea of what the Resolution was to be. If the hon. Member who proposed it had the opportunity to put it upon the Paper, they would know what it referred to; but really, as it then stood, the whole House was in the dark as to what its purport was. The Government were not acting as business men in asking them to sit there longer on that occasion, and he might say that he had had considerable experience of the right hon. Gentleman's endeavours to save time, the result being that he generally spent it. He did not believe that hon. Gentlemen would allow themselves to be forced into accepting the Resolution.

The Marquess of HARTINGTON said, he was inclined to agree with the Motion for the adjournment of the debate. He thought it would not be impossible to agree to the Resolution that night; but he could not help recognizing that there were a considerable number of hon. Gentlemen who would not, at that time of the night, apply themselves to the task; and he was therefore afraid it would be quite hopeless for them to expect to get through the Resolution that night. He therefore put it to his right hon. Friend whether the further discussion of the Resolution had not better be adjourned?

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said, he agreed with the suggestion of his noble Friend that there would be that sort of opposition, which he did not wish in any way to oppose. He would therefore consent to the adjournment of the debate.

Question put, and *agreed to.*

Debate *adjourned* till *To-morrow.*

ORDERS OF THE DAY.

HABITUAL DRUNKARDS BILL.

(*Dr. Cameron, Mr. Clare Read, Mr. Ashley, Sir Henry Jackson, Mr. Edward Jenkins, Mr. William Holms, Mr. O'Shaughnessy.*)

[BILL 47.] SECOND READING.

Order for Second Reading read.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."—(*Dr. Cameron.*)

Mr. DILLWYN moved that the Bill be read a second time that day six months. He thought that where persons were deprived of their liberty they should be in the custody of State officials. In this case his hon. Friend had said there was no analogy between the institutions suggested by the Bill and lunatic asylums, and that in the one case it was a compulsory act, and in the other a voluntary one. But they all knew that the habitual drunkard got into a decrepid state of mind and body, and that while he might go into such an institution readily enough he was practically very glad to get out again. In both cases the persons having custody of them had a direct pecuniary interest in retaining them in those places during the whole of the time specified. The object of such people only ought to be to discharge their patients as soon as possible; whereas in this case it would be exactly the opposite. He would not trespass on the House further, but would move that the Bill be read a second time that day six months.

Mr. P. A. TAYLOR, in seconding the Motion, said, he did not for one moment wish by so doing to suggest that the intention of the promoters was not of the most charitable design. Though the persons intended to be benefited formed a very sad spectacle, it was at the same time quite impossible for him to give his support to the Bill, as he looked upon it as one of the waves of the last great wave of paternal government, or rather grand-maternal government. He was of opinion that they could not enforce morality upon any class of the community, nor could they interfere with what they eat or what they drink, or wherewithal they should be clothed. The habit of gambling was one which frequently led to ruinous results, and it was impossible, perhaps, to break a person of it. He was sorry to say that the habit had been increasing of late of endeavouring to get the State to interfere with the liberty of the subject. His hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) was strongly endeavouring, amongst others, to make the people sober by shutting up the public-houses. He thought that was an impossibility, and that the people ought to be dealt with by more philosophical means, by the spread of education, the influence of friends, and such genuine influences. A right rev. Bishop had said that he would rather see a people free than sober. That might be rather extreme; but, at any rate, with regard to such legislation as was now proposed there was an element of truth; with freedom there was everything to be hoped for; but when they stopped an individual from some disastrous vice by shutting him up, they did not cure him; they left him to exercise his brutal tastes in some other direction—perhaps in a more evil way. Beyond this, there was the much greater evil that they were dealing with the liberty of the subject; they were taking away the freedom of which every man was possessed. He believed that it was not a principle of law for a man to sell his freedom. A man had no right to sell his freedom, even for 12 months. There was no doubt at this time the Lunacy Laws had immensely improved; yet, nevertheless, at this time he believed that there were grave abuses of it, and that there were at that moment people confined in lunatic asylums who ought not to be there. The present proposition was a very serious one, and one could imagine many instances where a Justice of the Peace would sign a certificate to the best of his belief when a maudlin drunkard was signing his liberty away for 12 months. He did not believe that this was a safe condition of things, and he believed that there would be cases in which persons having an interest in putting people away for 12 months would succeed in doing so. Even more, the state of the law might tempt people to give way to drink; and as they were aware there were unprincipled men in every profession, there would not be much difficulty in surmounting the medical certificates.

Amendment proposed, to leave out the word "now," and at the end of the Question to add the words "upon this day six months."—(*Mr. Dillwyn.*)

Question proposed, "That the word 'now' stand part of the Question."

Dr. CAMERON said, he was glad now to learn the exact grounds upon which this Bill was opposed. As to the objection that there existed an analogy between the institutions suggested by the Bill and private lunatic asylums, there was not the remotest resemblance. A private lunatic asylum was a place where a person was committed for an indefinite period against his own will—perhaps by some unprincipled member of the Medical Profession. If he were ill-treated, his complaint was treated as that of a lunatic — the only witnesses he could bring forward would be lunatics. Therefore, to compare such a man with an habitual drunkard under this Bill was unfair. The hon. Gentleman characterised this Bill as "grandmotherly legislation;" but, he asked, would they allow a man to permit himself to be held down and mutilated by a surgical operation in order to obtain a cure, and yet refuse to allow another man the permission to get cured, by a brief surrender of his liberty, which the Bill would give him? When he introduced the Bill last year, he adduced evidence to show that there were a number of habitual drunkards incarcerated in lunatic asylums, and that there were a number of lunatics incarcerated in private institutions, called "Inebriates' Homes." As to the practical support he had received, it came from men who had no interest in the matter. He had a Petition in favour of the Bill from 80 medical superintendents of as many public asylums for the insane in all parts of the United Kingdom—men who thoroughly understood the whole subject, and who were fully alive to the evils complained of, in the case of private lunatic asylums.

Earl PERCY said, that the principal objection to the Bill appeared to be on the ground that it was proposed to punish vice by legislation. That was entirely a misapprehension of the intention of the Bill. It was not a Bill to prevent drunkenness, but to provide a means for those who wished to do so to reform. Those who supported the Bill believed that drunkenness after a time had such an influence—for practical purposes—as to cause the loss of that healthy control which sane people were supposed to possess. It was supposed that at the time of his signing away his liberty for 12 months, the habitual drunkard was in sufficient possession of his faculties to know what he was doing. The question was, which was the greater of the two evils—that he should perhaps be incarcerated in one of those houses for a limited space of time, or that he should be reduced to the state in which he was now?—and those who had studied the question knew which was the greater evil very well. There were hundreds in this country who would be glad to reform if they had the opportunity to do so. He had some experience on this subject, and the great difficulty met with was the absence of any power of restraint over those who were willing in the first instance to enter these retreats.

Question put, and *agreed to.*

Main Question put, and *agreed to.*

Bill read a second time, and *committed* for *Monday* next.

RACECOURSES (METROPOLIS) BILL.

(*Mr. Anderson, Sir Thomas Chambers, Sir James Lawrence.*)

[BILL 48.] COMMITTEE.

Order for Committee read.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."—(*Mr. Anderson.*)

Mr. ONSLOW said, this was a very important Bill, and it affected most materially the liberties of the subject. He should oppose this Bill, and all such others, which had for their object putting a stop to the legitimate amusements of the people on the plea that they could by legislation improve the morals of the public. He hoped the hon. Gentleman would consent that it should not go into Committee at this hour. He believed that since the hon. Member for Glasgow carried this Bill certain facts had come out which his hon. Friend the Member for Scarborough (Sir Charles Legard) would tell the House; but to be asked to pass a Bill through Committee at that hour, it could hardly be expected that many Members would not oppose it in every way. He opposed the Bill last time, and was instrumental in stopping it. It was somewhat a long Bill, and at the present time he did not think they had had time to consider it properly, even though it was said to be the same Bill that did not pass last Session. He begged to move that the consideration of the Bill be taken that day six months.

Mr. STACPOOLE seconded the Motion.

Amendment proposed,

To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words, "this House will, upon this day six months, resolve itself into the said Committee,"—(*Mr. Onslow,*)

—instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

Sir CHARLES LEGARD said, notwithstanding the decision which the House arrived at on Saturday morning, he should again oppose the Bill. He stated, on the last occasion, that he had been present at the meetings to which the Bill was to be applied; and he had not seen anything which ought to cause the measure to become law. He had taken some little trouble to ascertain whether those few meetings were really of the description that it was necessary for the House of Commons to legislate for. He believed the House ought not to indulge in any mere sentimental legislation. He thought there never was a case in which there was greater reason to pause than there was now, before they legislated to do away with two small suburban meetings. He need not say he was not personally interested, directly or indirectly; but, as far as he understood it, the House was asked to legislate expressly to do away with the race-meetings at Kingsbury and Streatham, because he understood the Bill would not apply to the Alexandra Palace meeting owing to the more amiable disposition of the magistrates of that district. Therefore, it came to this—Kingsbury and Streatham had offended the dignity of a few people who lived in their vicinity, and they wished to get them stopped. Well, he had obtained from the proprietor of Kingsbury racecourse that he had canvassed the whole of the ratepayers of Kingsbury upon the question. There were 55 ratepayers, and out of that number eight were neutral, eight were from home, and three only were opposed to the races—consequently, giving all as against, there were still 36 in favour of the races. He knew nothing about Streatham; but, with regard to Kingsbury, he was informed that not a single police case occurred, not a robbery was reported in the neighbourhood, until the magistrates withdrew the licence for refreshments, and then the police were withdrawn. Up to that time, not a single case of rowdyism had occurred. Consequently, if the magistrates had not withdrawn the police from attending the race-meetings, no disturbance would probably have occurred. Well, then his hon. and learned Friend (Sir Henry James) had said that he objected to Kingsbury races because no good horses ever ran there. Now he (Sir Charles Legard) had ascertained that three Grand National winners had run at Kingsbury; and although he did not bring forward that as an argument, the argument of his hon. and learned Friend was done away with. He read part of a letter from the Vicar of Kingsbury in support of the respectable manner Kingsbury races were conducted. And, in conclusion, he contended that the House of Commons should not be asked to legislate simply to do away with two small race-meetings.

Question put.

The House *divided*:—Ayes 64; Noes 30: Majority 34.—(Div. List, No. 11.)

Question again proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

MR. STACPOOLE moved the adjournment of the debate.

MR. ERRINGTON seconded the Motion.

Motion made, and Question put, "That the Debate be now adjourned."—(*Mr. Stacpoole.*)

The House *divided*:—Ayes 24; Noes 61: Majority 37.—(Div. List, No. 12.)

Question again proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

MAJOR O'GORMAN: Sir, I move the adjournment of the House. Nothing is so disgusting to me as sanctimonious hypocrisy. If hon. Members wish to be very virtuous, why do they not move that the Derby shall be abolished, or the St. Leger, or the Chester Cup, and all the rest of the races in England? Why do they not move that we shall have no more racing at the Curragh? They oppose two miserable races near London. I have been informed that the Directors of the Glasgow Bank were gentlemen who were extremely sanctimonious, and that they subscribed large sums of money — which, I believe, they never paid—to the Irish Church Missions, and others, for sanctimonious purposes. And what became of them, Sir? We know what became of them. They utterly impoverished and destroyed thousands of the poorest families in this country. It is perfectly well known that they were the most sanctimonious hyprocrites in the whole Kingdom. I move the adjournment of the House.

THE O'CONOR DON seconded the Motion.

Motion made, and Question put, "That this House do now adjourn."—(*Major O'Gorman.*)

The House *divided*:—Ayes 18; Noes 64: Majority 46.—(Div. List, No. 13.)

Original Question put, and *agreed to.*

Bill *considered* in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

MR. ERRINGTON thought hon. Gentlemen ought to have further opportunity for discussing the Bill.

MR. ANDERSON said, all the Amendments on the Bill were debated last year; and therefore, as there was no time later on in the Session, and the sense of the House had been so decidedly pronounced on the matter, he hoped he might be allowed to go on.

MR. ONSLOW said, he believed that Her Majesty's Government had almost in a body supported the Bill, while some of the strongest supporters of the Government would vote against them in reporting Progress. There was a very strong feeling against this Bill; and he felt that, considering all that had happened — that many Bills had been stopped on account of the lateness of the hour—it was not inconsistent to ask that further consideration of the Bill should be postponed till a more suitable opportunity.

SIR JOSEPH M'KENNA agreed with the hon. Member that it was absurd to think of the House being asked to go into Committee on a Bill at 2 o'clock in the morning. There was something preposterous in the Motion. The hon. Member for Glasgow (Mr. Anderson) had, no doubt, a high moral standing on this question; but he did join with hon. Gentlemen on the other side in asking the hon. Member to allow the Bill to be put down for another day.

SIR HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON said, the hon. Member would not expect him to agree that they had not made substantial Progress that night; and having regard to the progress of the Bill last Session, he thought they might now report Progress.

MR. ANDERSON consented.

Committee report Progress; to sit again *To-morrow.*

MOTIONS.

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS AND CORRUPT PRACTICES BILL.

LEAVE. FIRST READING.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir JOHN HOLKER) moved for leave to bring in a Bill to amend and continue the Acts relating to the prevention of Corrupt Practices at Parliamentary Elections.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE asked whether it was the intention to change the law with regard to the employment of vehicles at elections?

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir JOHN HOLKER) said, it was not proposed to alter the law in that respect in Parliamentary boroughs. He might anticipate, however, that when the Bill was brought into Committee some alterations might be made, and he should wish that the question might be thoroughly discussed; but, at present, it was not contemplated to change the law in respect of the employment of vehicles at elections.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE gave Notice that the introduction of a new Bill which did not alter the present state of the law in regard to that question would be unsatisfactory.

Motion *agreed to.*

Bill to amend and continue the Acts relating to Election Petitions, and to the prevention of Corrupt Practices at Parliamentary Elections, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Mr. Secretary CROSS, and Mr. SOLICITOR GENERAL.

Bill *presented,* and read the first time. [Bill 78.]

OYSTER AND MUSSEL FISHERIES ORDER (BLACKWATER, ESSEX) BILL.

On Motion of Mr. J. G. TALBOT, Bill to confirm an Order made by the Board of Trade under "The Sea Fisheries Act, 1868," relating to Tollesbury and Mersea in the River Blackwater (Essex), *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. J. G. TALBOT and Viscount SANDON.

Bill *presented,* and read the first time. [Bill 76.]

PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS BILL.

On Motion of Mr. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Bill to consolidate, with amendments, the Acts relating to Letters Patent for Inventions, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Mr. Secretary CROSS, and Mr. SOLICITOR GENERAL.

Bill *presented,* and read the first time. [Bill 77.]

DISTRICT AUDITORS BILL.

On Motion of Mr. SCLATER-BOOTH, Bill to amend the Law with respect to District Auditors, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. SCLATER-BOOTH, Sir HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON, and Mr. SALT.

Bill *presented,* and read the first time. [Bill 79.]

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY FOR INJURIES TO SERVANTS BILL.

On Motion of Mr. MACDONALD, Bill to amend the Law as to Employers' Liability for Injuries to their Servants, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. MACDONALD, Dr. CAMERON, Mr. MELDON, Mr. EARP, and Mr. BURT.

Bill *presented,* and read the first time. [Bill 80.]

House adjourned at a quarter after Two o'clock.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Tuesday, 18*th* *February,* 1879.

MINUTES.]—PUBLIC BILLS—*First Reading*—Supreme Court of Judicature Acts Amendment (11); County Courts (12).

AFGHANISTAN—THE WAR—DECLARATION OF GENERAL ROBERTS.

QUESTION.

THE MARQUESS OF RIPON: I wish to ask the noble Viscount the Secretary of State for India a Question of which I have given him private Notice. In the course of last month reports reached this country that General Roberts had issued a Proclamation annexing the territory of the Khurum Valley to India. I understand it has been stated on behalf of the Government in "another place" that they are not in possession of any information on the subject. I am anxious to ask if that is the case; and, if so, whether Her Majesty's Government have caused inquiries to be made as to what grounds there are for the report?

VISCOUNT CRANBROOK: We have no information on the subject. A great many telegrams have been received; but there is nothing in them to indicate that such a transaction has taken place as that attributed to General Roberts. Of course, if such a thing had occurred, we should have taken the earliest opportunity of letting Parliament know.

PARLIAMENT—PUBLIC BUSINESS.

QUESTION.

EARL GRANVILLE: I should be glad to hear, for the convenience of your Lordships, what the course of Public Business is to be. I observe that the noble Earl the Prime Minister is not in his place; but if it is convenient for the noble Duke the Lord President to give the House some information on the subject I should be glad.

THE DUKE of RICHMOND AND GORDON: I have not had an opportunity of consulting the Prime Minister, but I shall reply to the Question of the noble Earl opposite to the extent of my knowledge. In addition to the Bill on the subject of Bankruptcy which was introduced last night the Lord Chancellor will introduce this evening a Bill dealing with County Courts in England. I hope at an early day next week to introduce a Bill for amending the Medical Acts; and shortly after that, though not next week, I hope to introduce a Bill for the Conservancy of Rivers and on the question of Floods generally.

SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE ACTS AMENDMENT BILL.

BILL PRESENTED. FIRST READING.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR, in presenting a Bill for amending the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts, said, the Bill was supplementary to the Bill which he laid upon their Lordships' Table the previous night. Its object was the creation of an additional Judge of the High Court of Justice and to incorporate the London Bankruptcy Court with the High Court of Justice. It was thought better to deal with these matters apart from the Bankruptcy Bill. He now begged to move that the Bill be read a first time.

Bill for amending the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts — *Presented* (The LORD CHANCELLOR); read 1^a; and to be *printed.* (No 11.)

JURISDICTION OF COUNTY COURTS (ENGLAND) — COUNTY COURTS BILL.

BILL PRESENTED. FIRST READING.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am about to lay upon the Table, and to ask your Lordships to give a first reading to a Bill to extend the jurisdiction of the County Courts in England. My Lords, the extension of the jurisdiction of the County Courts has been long under consideration. Various recommendations upon that subject were made by the Judicature Commission; and in the course of last Session three Bills were introduced into the House of Commons by private Members proposing extensions in different forms of the jurisdiction of County Courts. Those three Bills were referred to a Select Committee, and in course of the proceedings alterations were suggested in them and made on the part of the Government; but, owing to the state of Business, the one measure which sprung out of the three could not be proceeded with last Session. We have thought it desirable that the measure should be introduced this Session as a Government measure, and therefore I propose now to lay it on your Lordships' Table. I will not enter in any detail into the arguments as to the extension of jurisdiction, because I propose to move for the evidence taken before the Select Committee. Your Lordships will find that in the whole of this question, without any exception, there is a general recommendation in favour of the extension of jurisdiction. The extension which I propose is this:—To increase the jurisdiction of the County Courts from the sum of £50, at which it now stands, to the sum of £200; and we propose further that the plaintiff shall have the power of commencing actions in the County Courts for still larger amounts; but in that case there would be an absolute right on the part of the defendant, if he does not wish to have his cause disposed of by the County Court, to remove the case to the higher Courts. The Committee to which I have referred made some recommendations last year with regard to the increase of the salaries of the County Court Judges. Her Majesty's Government do not make any proposal on that subject in this Bill, because it remains to be seen what the effect of this change will be on the business of the County Courts. If it should have the effect—as it is very likely it will—of considerably increasing the amount of business to be transacted, it will be then for Parliament to consider whether some additional strength will not be necessary on the County Court Bench—whether it will not be necessary to increase the number of Judges. That would seem to be the more natural way to meet the difficulty than by an increase of the salaries of the present Judges.

As I have referred to this subject, I have thought it right to put down on the Notice Paper to call your Lordships' attention to the state of business in the higher Courts, which is closely connected with the subject. Your Lordships have possibly seen statements made as to the state of the legal business at the present time, and I am anxious to put your Lordships in possession of some accurate information on the subject, which may tend to remove misconceptions which have arisen about it. I will take the different Courts, from the highest to the lower Courts, in order to inform your Lordships how the business stands in those Courts. Commencing with your Lordships' House, the appellate business is certainly in a most satisfactory condition. At the beginning of the present Session of Parliament, which, for legal business, was in November last, there were only nine cases left for hearing. Some more were set down in November and December; but in the November sittings 12 appeals were heard; therefore, there were no arrears at the close of the winter sitting. The state of the appellate business, therefore, is such that I am happy to say it would be in the power of the House, with regard to a certain number of appeals presented from Scotland, connected with the lamentable failure of a bank in that country, to advance those appeals and hear them without delay. Turning to the Judicial Committee, at the commencement of the sittings of the present year there were in that Committee only nine cases put down for hearing. I go to the Court of Appeal. At the commencement of the year 1878 there were 175 cases for hearing—that is, both causes and motions; and at the commencement of the present year there were 224 cases. Of course, the cases which were ready for hearing were all heard, and there were new cases which will be heard in the course of the present year. It cannot be said that there is an arrear of cases there which have been standing for any length of time. As to the Court of Chancery, the number of cases ready for hearing at the commencement of the present year was somewhat less than at the commencement of the preceding one. In January, 1878, there were 528 cases for hearing; in January, 1879, there were only 512; and I have the authority of the Master of the Rolls for saying that already a great number of these have been heard, and that, although new cases are being set down, there are no arrears in the Court of Chancery. With regard to the Probate Court, at the beginning of 1878 there were 33 cases for hearing of probates, and at the beginning of 1879 there were 34 cases. As to the matrimonial cases, there were 141 at the beginning of 1878, and 104 at the beginning of 1879. In the Admiralty Court at the beginning of 1878 there were 11 cases, and at the beginning of 1879 there were 12 cases. That is the state of business in all of the Courts excepting those Divisions generally called Common Law Divisions—Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, and the Exchequer. With regard to these Divisions, the first matter to which I wish to refer is the subject of Circuits, on which a good deal of observation has lately been made. Some time ago an opinion was expressed in the House of Commons in favour of having four gaol deliveries throughout the country in the course of the year; and there are at present, under recent arrangements, four Criminal Assizes. As to the expediency of that measure there has been a good deal of difference of opinion throughout the country. There is no doubt it entails much additional labour on the Judges, the jurymen, High Sheriffs, and others connected with the Assizes. On the other hand, it is certainly very difficult to say that the state of things which formerly prevailed was satisfactory—that prisoners should remain untried, and perhaps afterwards acquitted, for four or five, or sometimes six months together, and this at a time when, in one part of the country—at the Central Criminal Court—there is a gaol delivery every month. The additional tax upon the judicial time of an additional Criminal Circuit was not very great. The great argument against this Criminal Circuit is this:—It is said that criminal cases are so sifted before prisoners are committed for trial that, in almost all cases, the prisoners are convicted; that it is rare there is an acquittal; and that, inasmuch as the form of imprisonment before trial is less severe than after conviction, and as the length of time the person is in prison is always taken into account in the sentence, it is no hardship to remain in gaol a certain number of months before trial. That had considerable weight with me; but I have looked into the statistics of those who are tried and acquitted, and the result turns out to be something different from what I expected. I have taken the Return for the Criminal Assizes in last October and November, and I find that none of the prisoners then tried were out on bail—they were all in prison. I find 484 persons were tried, and of these 353 only were convicted, and 125 were acquitted. The proportion is one in four acquitted; and it cannot be said that the state of things would be satisfactory which would lead to the detention of these 125 for a great number of months without trial. This does not include those offenders who are out on bail; although, no doubt, it is hard for any persons charged with the commission of offences, even though such persons may have been admitted to bail, to be kept without trial for several months. The result, therefore, is that I think we shall never return to a system of having less than four gaol deliveries in the course of each year. This is a state of things to which we must make up our minds, and I cannot think that it will be so great an additional tax upon judicial time as that we shall not be able to meet it. Let me now pass to the question of the times at which the Circuits of the Judges should take place. We have, at present, four gaol deliveries in the course of the year; and along with them there are two Circuits upon which civil business is tried in all the counties of England, with the exception of some parts of Yorkshire and Lancashire, where civil business is taken at a third Assize in each year. With regard to the most convenient periods of the year for the trying of civil actions at Assizes, I have seen some complaints as to the times which have been adopted; but I cannot think that there was any choice in the matter, inasmuch as it would have been altogether unadvisable to have two Civil Assizes in the counties occurring within three months of each other; and they have therefore been placed in June and July, and January and February. It has been urged against this that the result of the practice in the present year has been that nearly all the Judges have been absent from London from the middle of January until far on in February. This is quite true, and that thereby three Divisions in London have been weakened. But it must be remembered that if the learned Judges were not absent during the period to which I have alluded, they would have had to leave London about the middle of February and to have remained away until well on into March. The result of the present arrangement will be that the Judges, instead of returning to London at the end of March, will be back in their Courts near the close of February, and will sit there continuously until July, with the exception of the Criminal Assizes about Easter, which will not withdraw more than about six Judges from town. Although, therefore, there has been for a short time a dislocation of the usual arrangements in the London Courts, the result will in the end be the same as it has been hitherto. I must not forget to add that there have been special circumstances which have added to the inconvenience, and the circumstances of Justices Lush and Stephen being withdrawn from judicial work by their labours as members of the Commission appointed to consider the Criminal Code —labours from which the country will, I believe, reap very great advantage, but the performance of which has, as I have said, withdrawn those two learned Judges for a time from the performance of their judicial functions. This, I hope and believe, is a circumstance not likely to occur again. With regard to the amount of civil business remaining to be disposed of in London and Middlesex, I find that on the 11th of January, 1878, there were 1,164 causes ready for trial as against 957 on the corresponding day of the present year. There were on Monday last 843 causes ready for trial; and I have the best authority for saying there is every reason to believe that between this time and the month of July all these causes will have been tried, in addition to any new ones which may arise in the meantime. Having said thus much, I should like merely to add—and I hope your Lordships will agree with me—that I think the statement I have made affords no ground for the demand that additional Judges should be appointed, or the statement which is sometimes made that the present judicial strength of the country is not equal to all the work that has to be done. In addition to the reasons which I have stated as accounting for the temporary delay in the transaction of legal business which has recently occurred, there has been the practice—a practice which, I hope, is now disappearing—of two or more Judges sitting in Courts where one only was necessary. This will effect a saving of judicial time; and I hope that the Bill which I have this evening laid on the Table with reference to County Courts will be the means of providing some further assistance, inasmuch as it will have the effect of withdrawing some of the more trifling—I might, perhaps, say frivolous —causes from the Superior Courts. And if the proposal of Her Majesty's Government, which I explained to your Lordships last night, is accepted, the additional Judge appointed would, being a Judge of the High Court, be available to assist in discharging the work which devolves upon the Judges of the Superior Courts. In these circumstances, it is not the intention of Her Majesty's Government to propose any addition to the number of Judges in the High Court of Justice. They would not shrink from such a duty if they thought there was any occasion for it; but they do not think that any such occasion has at present arisen.

The only other observation which I have to make is that I think the transaction of business in the Courts would be much facilitated if steps were taken to inform the Profession and suitors at the earliest possible period as to the times and places at which the various Judges in the Common Law Divisions would sit, and as far as practicable, as to the cases likely to come before each Divisional Court. I trust that in some way this object will be attained, and if it is I think your Lordships will have reason to think that in all respects the working of the Judicature Acts has been satisfactory. With this explanation, I will now only ask your Lordships to read this Bill a first time, and, in conclusion, say that if the Bill passes into law it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to introduce, before the Session has advanced very far, a measure for consolidating the whole of the Acts of Parliament now in force relating to County Courts.

Bill to extend the jurisdiction of the County Courts, and to amend the Acts relating or giving jurisdiction thereto —*Presented* (The LORD CHANCELLOR); read 1ª; and to be *printed.* (No. 12.)

SOUTH AFRICA — THE REINFORCEMENTS—CONDITION OF THE REGIMENTS.

ADDRESS FOR A RETURN.

LORD TRURO moved—

"That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for a Return in a tabular form showing (1) ages, (2) length of service, (3) number of privates who have not completed their drill and musketry instruction, of the non-commissioned officers, corporals, and privates of 2nd-21st, 58th, 3rd-60th, Rifles, 91st, and 94th, at present under orders for the Cape of Good Hope, as they embark for active service; also the number of men from each regiment left at home on account of physical unfitness, and the number drawn from other regiments to complete the battalions."

VISCOUNT BURY said, that a Return in the form suggested by the Motion of the noble Lord would involve a large amount of labour upon the officers of regiments under orders for the Cape, and that, therefore, the Return would be prepared in the same form, or very nearly, as that which had been ordered in the other House of Parliament.

Motion *agreed to.*

SOUTH AFRICA — THE REINFORCEMENTS—DISEMBARKATION.

QUESTION. OBSERVATIONS.

VISCOUNT SIDMOUTH asked Her Majesty's Government, Whether any special preparations have been made for the disembarkation of the reinforcements of troops and stores on their arrival at Port Natal? The noble Viscount said, he believed the existing harbour to be one of the most dangerous in the world for an operation of the kind. There had been many cases in which lives and stores had been lost in the attempt to cross the bar, and the mouth of the harbour was so narrow that two boats could not enter abreast. He trusted the Admiralty and the military authorities would make all possible arrangements beforehand for the reception and landing of the troops about to be sent out. On a future evening he would inquire, if it were inconvenient to answer the Question now, whether any measures had been adopted to prevent the importation of arms into Zululand? In former wars it was found that the weapons which destroyed our own troops had been once in English arsenals, and on one occasion all the muskets taken from the enemy were marked "Tower." It was only through Portuguese traders and our own countrymen that the warlike stores in such abundance in the hands of the Zulus could be obtained. Other European Powers adopted stringent measures on this subject, and he trusted that like measures would be adopted by us to prevent the supply of arms to our enemy.

LORD ELPHINSTONE said, that, in answer to the first Question of the noble Viscount, a captain and staff of naval officers would leave London on Monday in the steamer *Pretoria*, charged with duties connected with the disembarkation of the troops and stores. Other steamers would start in a day or two with stores and a portion of the Army Hospital Corps with their equipment; and vessels of light draught would be provided capable of crossing the bar when the bar was in a fit state to be crossed—namely, when the water was at a depth of 12¼ feet. Arrangements had also been made with the different steamship companies trading to Natal for the use of their light craft — steamers, tugs, and lighters. These were on the spot and were constantly being used for the carriage of merchandize across the bar. They would be placed at the disposal of the military authorities, and would, no doubt, prove of the greatest value. In addition to this, transports were about to take out light draught boats for the conveyance of horses and stores. The steam pinnaces and cutters belonging to the men-of-war on the spot would also be available, and a steam pinnace was also being sent out from this country. In short, every available vessel had been already taken up and every possible precaution adopted. There was, no doubt, great difficulty in landing troops there. It was a very dangerous and exposed part of the coast, and frequently a heavy swell set in over the bar; but he might mention that the present was the most favourable time in the year for operations of that sort, and that the favourable season was likely to continue until the middle of April.

VISCOUNT SIDMOUTH intimated that he would put his Question as to the importation of arms into Zululand on Monday.

House adjourned at Six o'clock, to Thursday next, half past Ten o'clock.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Tuesday, 18*th February,* 1879.

MINUTES.]—Select Committee—Public Petitions, *appointed* and *nominated;* Public Accounts, *nominated.*

QUESTIONS.

MINES REGULATION ACT, 1872—THE DINAS MINE.—QUESTION.

Mr. MACDONALD asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, If it be correct that the Dinas Mine, Rhondda Valley, county Glamorgan, at the time of the explosion whereby over sixty persons lost their lives, was being carried on without a properly certified manager in terms of the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1873; whether such a state of things was known to the inspector for the district, and if he had taken any action to enforce compliance with the section of the Clause which leaves it in the hands of the magistrates to impose a penalty of £50 sterling for neglecting to have a certified manager, and the liability to a further penalty of £10 sterling for every day until the Act be complied with, or whether he intimated he would take the advantage of the provision that permits an owner not to appoint a certified manager for two months; further, if there was any Correspondence between the inspector and the owner of the colliery; and, if he will object to lay such Correspondence upon the Table of the House?

Mr. ASSHETON CROSS, in reply, said, that the manager of the Dinas Mine at the time of the explosion did not hold a certificate, having been appointed by the owners after the suspension of his predecessor, under the provisions of sub-section B of the 26th clause of the Mines (Coal) Regulation Act, 1872, which provided that the owners of a mine might appoint any competent person not holding a certificate for a period of two months, or for such longer period as might elapse until the manager had an opportunity by examination of obtaining such certificate. In the case in question, the proper notice had been given to the inspector. There was not the slightest foundation for the suspicion that the owners of the colliery intended to close the mine. On the contrary, they were doing all in their power to recover the bodies of those that were unfortunately lost.

THE NEW LAW COURTS.

QUESTION.

Mr. OSBORNE MORGAN asked the First Commissioner of Works, If he can state when the new Law Courts, now in course of erection in Carey Street, will be sufficiently advanced to admit of judicial and other business being transacted therein?

Mr. GERARD NOEL: Sir, there were originally two contracts for the new Courts of Justice; according to one the eastern wing ought to have been completed during the year 1877, but, unfortunately, owing to frosts, strikes, and other unforeseen circumstances, the work was delayed; but I am happy to state that it is now ready for occupation, with the exception of some minor details connected with furniture and fittings. The legal authorities are now considering the question of the apportionment of accommodation, and of removal, which will take place at their convenience. The main building should, according to contract, be completed during 1880; but it is impossible at this moment to fix any precise date at which it will be finished, but every exertion shall be made to hurry on the work.

INDIA—THE MAHARAJAH OF CASHMERE.—QUESTION.

Mr. GRANT DUFF asked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether it is true that the Maharajah of Cashmere is carrying out or is about to carry out operations in the direction of Chitral and the Hindoo Koosh; and, if so, whether those operations are undertaken at the instance of the Government of India, and what is the object which it is proposed to attain by them?

Mr. E. STANHOPE: Sir, we have received no information that the Maharajah of Cashmere is carrying out, or is about to carry out, any operations in the direction of Chitral or the Hindoo Koosh.

BAR EDUCATION AND DISCIPLINE BILL—LEGISLATION.

QUESTION.

DR. KENEALY asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether it is intended to re-introduce the Bar Education and Discipline Bill this Session?

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, in reply, said, that having regard to the prospects of Public Business, the Government were not able at present to say whether they would be able to re-introduce the Bill referred to this Session.

METROPOLITAN IMPROVEMENTS ACT — ARTIZANS' DWELLINGS — GRAY'S INN ROAD.—QUESTION.

MR. HOPWOOD asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether he is aware that since he declined as "Confirming Authority" to approve the scheme promoted by the Metropolitan Board of Works under "The Artizans Dwellings Act, 1875," in respect of an unhealthy area in Gray's Inn Road, no other has been substituted for it; whether he is also aware that the official representation of the unhealthiness of the place in question was made by the Holborn District Board of Works as far back as the 19th July, 1875; and, whether he has taken or can take any means to induce the Metropolitan Board to remedy the state of things which exists?

MR. J. G. HUBBARD stated that he had received information that the distress arising from the insufficiency of accommodation in Gray's Inn Lane was of a most disheartening character.

MR. ASSHETON CROSS: Sir, the scheme referred to by the hon. and learned Member came before me in 1876. It appeared that the Board of Works had originally a very good scheme; but it was cut down so much that I thought it was one that ought not to be passed, and I therefore rejected it. In the autumn of 1876 the Board gave Notice of their intention to apply to Parliament for its sanction to a scheme for the widening of Gray's Inn Road, prepared, not under the Artizans Dwellings Act, but under the Metropolitan Improvement Act. Under the Bill so brought forward by them and approved by Parliament, the greater portion of the area affected by the original scheme was destroyed. The building of the artizans' dwellings as substitutes for those pulled down has not been proceeded with in accordance with the terms of the Act, and I am sorry to say that I have no power to compel the provisions of the Statute to be carried out. I trust, however, that before long a smaller scheme will be introduced which will remedy the evils complained of.

SCOTLAND — AGRICULTURAL HYPOTHEC AND OFFICE OF LORD CLERK REGISTER.—QUESTION.

MR. J. W. BARCLAY asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether it is the intention of the Government to introduce this Session a Bill to abolish Agricultural Hypothec in Scotland; and, whether he is prepared to state the conclusions at which he has arrived in regard to the appointment of an Under Secretary of State for Scotland and the office of Lord Clerk Register?

MR. ASSHETON CROSS, in reply, said, with regard to the first part of the Question, I think the better course for the Government to adopt would be to explain their views on the 19th of March, when the Bill on that subject is to be read a second time, and when the Lord Advocate will discuss the Bill on the subject. With regard to the office of Lord Clerk Register, the details of the arrangement are not yet finally settled; but I hope, in the course of a few days, to answer the Question of which my hon. Friend has given Notice. Meanwhile, I may state that the Government do not intend to abolish the office of Lord Clerk Register. In their opinion, there ought to be one person to undertake the whole Register Office, and that person ought to be a man, as he is decribed in the words of the Report of 1866—

> "Learned in the law, of great classical ability, and resident, so as to be able to devote his whole time to the duties of the office."

As the hon. Gentleman is aware, the office of Lord Clerk Register is one of the chief Offices of State in Scotland. Therefore, it is not the intention that he should occupy this office, but that it should be given to a person of very high standing, who would not receive any salary. As to the other part of the Question, I must reserve my remarks till after I have perused the Bill on the subject.

CATTLE DISEASE—THE AMERICAN CATTLE TRADE.—QUESTION.

Mr. BRUEN asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Whether it has come to the knowledge of the Irish Government that several carcases of fat cattle have been washed on shore on the coast of Ireland, and have been found to show symptoms of disease; whether there is any evidence to show that cattle were thrown overboard from the steamers engaged in the American cattle trade; and, what steps have been taken to bury these carcases, or otherwise to prevent the propagation of disease from them?

Mr. J. LOWTHER: Sir, a representation was recently made to the Irish Government to the effect that some carcases had been washed ashore on the coast of the county Cork; but it has not been ascertained how they came there, or that they showed any symptoms of being diseased. Circulars, however, have been addressed by the Lord Lieutenant to the local authorities, and by the Board of Trade to the Receivers of Wrecks, suggesting precautionary measures in the event of any more carcases being found.

GRENADA — ILL-TREATMENT OF COOLIES — THE PAPERS. — QUESTION.

Mr. ERRINGTON asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies, When the Papers relating to the ill-treatment of Coolies in Grenada will be laid upon the Table?

Sir MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH, in reply, said, he hoped to be able to lay the Papers in question upon the Table of the House in a few days.

SOUTH AFRICA—MASSACRE OF KAFFIRS IN GRIQUALAND.

QUESTION.

Dr. CAMERON asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether his attention has been called to statements in the Cape papers regarding a massacre of natives by Boer volunteers near Kuegas in Griqualand West; whether it is true that out of a party of eighty natives, possessing among them only two guns, upwards of forty, including thirteen women and children, were killed, and twenty-four women and children wounded; whether it is a fact that after the whole party of natives had been killed, wounded, or captured, orders were given by the commandant of the Burgher volunteers to kill such of the wounded as could not walk; and whether, as stated, these orders were carried out on men and women alike; whether it is a fact that all the wounded women and children were deported into Cape Colony to be placed at service there as soon as they were sufficiently recovered from their wounds; and, if so, under what law did the deportation take place; and, if he has not already ordered an investigation into the truth of the statements referred to, whether he will take steps to have them thoroughly investigated?

Sir MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: Sir, when my attention was called to these statements by the Notice of the hon. Member's Question, I thought they referred to some reports which reached this country last Summer, of occurrences which were alleged to have taken place in the suppression of the outbreak in Griqualand West. At that time I inquired into the truth of these reports, and on page 325 of the Cape Blue Book presented in December, and on page 116 of that last issued, will be found despatches from Colonel Lanyon denying the charges, and inclosing statements from the missionaries in support of his denial, forming in the whole, I think, quite a satisfactory answer to the charges that were made. The hon. Member has, however, been kind enough to forward me the newspaper extracts to which his Question alludes, in which the date of the events referred to is given as October 30; but I have no information as to anything of the kind which occurred at that date which would enable me to answer his Question. I will therefore cause inquiry to be made; but it is only fair to Colonel Lanyon, and those who fought under him in Griqualand West, to bear in mind the fact that previous statements very similar to these have been made and satisfactorily replied to,

SOUTH AFRICA—THE ZULU WAR—THE NATIVE CONTINGENT.

QUESTION.

Sir ALEXANDER GORDON asked the Surveyor General of the Ordnance, If his attention has been drawn to the Despatch of Lord Chelmsford to the Secretary of State for War, dated 25th November 1878, reporting that he was unable to mobilise the Natal Native Contingent owing to his demands for camp equipment not having been complied with; and if he will state the reason of the delay in complying with such demands?

Lord EUSTACE CECIL: Yes, Sir, my attention has been drawn to the matter in question, and with the permission of the House I will state what actually occurred. A telegram was received from Lord Chelmsford on 4th August as follows:—"No more supplies are required at present to be sent to Cape Colony or Natal." Acting upon this telegram, the outstanding orders for camp equipment were not executed; but the precaution was taken at the same time to so inform Lord Chelmsford. He telegraphed back on October 26 that his previous telegram referred to commissariat supplies only. The demands for camp equipment, which had been previously cancelled, were immediately ordered to be complied with, and the supplies were despatched to Natal with as little delay as possible.

MOTIONS.

CIVIL SERVICE ESTIMATES.

MOTION FOR A SELECT COMMITTEE.

Mr. DILLWYN, in moving that a Select Committee be appointed to consider and report upon the Civil Service Estimates in the order in which they appear, observed that the discussion of the Estimates in Committee of Supply was not such a revision of them as business men would require of their own affairs. It was, in fact, little better than a farce. He admitted that the Estimates were generally brought before the House in a form which left little to be desired; but they took no further steps in their corporate capacity to criticize them and ascertain if they were right and proper, although that was one of the main functions of the House, and a duty which its Members owed to their constituents. He, however, made no charge against any particular Government. The Estimates were not proposed in their regular order; some hon. Gentlemen, perhaps, gave Notice of Amendments in regard to particular items, and Supply was repeatedly put off. As a consequence the Government ran short of money, and once or twice in the Session had to ask for Votes on Account. The discussion, it was said, could not be conveniently taken until the regular Estimate was brought forward, and the Vote on Account was granted. Thus the Session wore on, until about the last week of its existence, when hon. Members were anxious to get to the country and the moors and escape the heat of London; the Estimates were then brought forward in earnest, and hustled through the Committee, because hon. Members were too anxious and impatient to discuss them. The practical result was that private Members interested in the matter could seldom effect any reduction of Expenditure, even where such a reduction was shown to be practicable and right, the Government, by their numbers, being always able to win the day. He had, therefore, to propose, as a tentative measure, that a Committee should be appointed to go through the Estimates in order. They need not make any elaborate Report, but they might make their rough notes and bring up their Report on each Estimate before it was discussed in the House. Then the Estimates should be considered by the House in their regular order, unless some special reason was shown why that order should be departed from. He was not in favour of a large Committee, but the House would decide of what number it should consist. He made that Motion in no Party spirit, nor did he wish the Committee to be a political one in any sense; but upon it there should, he thought, be the Secretary of the Treasury or some other officer of the Government, and also a Member from the front Opposition Bench who had been connected with the Treasury. Without touching the policy of an Estimate, the Committee would see whether it had been sanctioned by the House, whether the money asked for by the Government was excessive, whether the service for which it was intended was required, or whether economy might be effected by a consolidation of offices, and so forth. It was said that such a Committee as he suggested would impair or destroy the responsibility of the Government. He believed that, on the contrary, it would tend to increase their sense of responsibility, because they would be subject to the criticism of an able Committee. Moreover, the Government did not seem to have felt their responsibility very keenly, for the Expenditure of the country was increasing at a fearful rate. In 1857-8 the Civil Service Estimates amounted to £14,340,000; whereas, last year, they reached £23,400,000, showing in the interval an increase of £9,000,000 per annum. The Civil Expenditure was now nearly equal to that for both the Army and Navy—namely, £26,586,000. He could not help thinking that if the Government had attacked those Estimates as they ought to have done, they would have kept them down to a much smaller amount. Another objection was that such a Committee as he asked for would diminish the responsibility of the Committee of Supply. On the contrary, he believed it would strengthen the hands of the Committee of Supply. He asked the Government to do what any Member of the House in his private capacity, or any master of a public establishment would do—namely, take some steps for the purpose of examining the items of expenditure which his manager or agent might present to him. He believed that if a Committee were appointed, the effect would be a reduction of Expenditure; but if that was not the result, then the House and the country would know that no reduction could be made. The hon. Gentleman concluded by moving the Resolution which stood in his name.

MR. BAXTER said, that since he entered the House he had been asked by his hon. Friend the Member for Swansea to second the Motion, and he at once acceded to the request. He had been 24 years a Member of that House, and during the greater part of that time he had devoted his attention to a criticism of the Civil Service Estimates. He had also filled the Office of Secretary to the Treasury. It was perfectly obvious to every candid mind that the House had entirely lost its control, if it ever had any, over this branch of the Expenditure of the country. It was perfectly true that some paltry sum for a picture or a door-keeper's salary might occasionally be disallowed; but there had been no serious diminution in any particular Vote, or any sensible lessening of the Civil Service Estimates, in consequence of any debate in that House. He was not going so far as to say that discussions in Committee of the Whole House on the Civil Service Estimates were altogether useless, because he thought they had a certain deterrent effect on the official mind; and although they might not get rid of certain Votes which it was proposed to put upon the Estimates, the probability was that some others were not brought forward at all in consequence of the discussions. Still, his experience was that the deterrent effect was of an infinitesimally small nature, and he had been driven with reluctance to the conclusion that the House must adopt some new plan in order to render the present farcical revision of the Estimates by the Representatives of the people something more than a mere sham. What had struck him in the course of these discussions during the last 20 years was this—that hon. Gentlemen assembled in Committee of Supply had no means of finding out where the blot lay in particular Votes. When he was in Office, he used to be amused seeing hon. Gentlemen beating all about the bush. Sometimes they were hot, sometimes cold, sometimes very near the mark, sometimes very far from it. How often did he see them taking a division on a Vote which was perfectly right, when the item above or below it was absolutely indefensible. In such a state of things it often occurred to him that what the House could not by any possibility, except by chance, discover, might be found out without much difficulty by a strong Committee which should have power to take evidence. It had been said that this proposal, if adopted, would diminish the responsibility of the Secretary to the Treasury. But, after all, the Secretary to the Treasury was only a subordinate officer, and sometimes he was sat upon by the other Departments. He often thought that if those hon. Gentlemen who insisted upon expenditure which the Secretary to the Treasury disapproved had the fear of a Select Committee of the House before their eyes, the Treasury would be greatly strengthened in resisting the demand for increased expenditure. For his own part, he was not ashamed to stand there and say that often when in Office he would have been extremely pleased to know that the expenditure of which he did not approve, but which had been forced upon him by other Departments of the Government, had to undergo revision and to pass through the ordeal of a Select Committee of the House of Commons. The best mode of obtaining economical Estimates, no doubt, was to put on the Treasury Bench men who were themselves advocates of economy and who desired to see the Estimates reduced. But there were practical difficulties in the way of a Minister, however conscientious in his desire to reduce particular Votes. The present system had notoriously failed, and he saw no reason why they should not try another, such as that which was proposed by his hon. Friend the Member for Swansea. As far as the control of the House of Commons over the Civil Service Expenditure was concerned, it could not be in a worse position than it was now. Therefore, he had no hesitation in supporting, as an experiment, the proposal of his hon. Friend. Unlike many hon. Members, he thought the Committee on Public Accounts had done a great deal of good, and probably the Committee proposed by his hon. Friend would have a similar effect.

Motion made, and Question proposed,

"That a Select Committee be appointed to consider and report upon the Civil Service Estimates in the order in which they appear."—(*Mr. Dillwyn.*)

MR. HERMON also supported the Motion, although he was unable to agree with the assertion that the Government had frequently deferred these Estimates intentionally until a late period of the Session. Certainly the struggle of the Government last year was to bring them on earlier than they had ever been submitted before. Looking at what occurred last night, he did not see there was any great hope that the Civil Service Estimates, even if the proposed new Rule were passed, would obtain that full and candid examination to which they ought to be subjected. He thought the Motion which the hon. Gentleman had brought forward to-night was a practical and business-like proposition. If it were adopted, hon. Members would be able to ascertain whether the Estimates were presented in the right form. He had often noticed that when an explanation was asked of a Vote, Ministers retired in order to consult with their officials. If these Estimates were sent to a Committee upstairs, the Members of such Committee would themselves have an opportunity of interrogating the officials who actually prepared the Accounts. The enormous increase of Estimates was, in a great degree, due to the action of the Party opposite. One means of reducing them was to place a check upon expensive legislation, such as that relating to what he might term the educational craze, under which an extravagant expenditure was incurred in the construction of costly establishments and in the teaching of extra subjects. He believed the Ancient Monuments Bill, if passed, would cause more expense than appeared at present to be contemplated. There was a weekly journal in which from time to time had appeared the confessions of financiers and Premiers; but to-night they had the confessions of an ex-Secretary to the Treasury, and his revelations had, indeed, been somewhat startling. The appointment of the proposed Committee would not impair the authority or responsibility of Ministers. On the contrary, he thought it would strengthen the hands of his hon. Friend the Secretary to the Treasury. He supported the proposal, because he believed it would enable the House to fulfil its most important functions with more regularity and more success than heretofore.

MR. THOMSON HANKEY said, he differed from all the last speaker had said in support of the proposal. It seemed to him to be a move in the wrong direction. The greater part of the increase of Expenditure in the Civil Service was owing to the policy of the House of Commons, and he did not believe any Committee could give to that House an opinion that would be useful to hon. Members in guiding them as to the mode in which the public money should be expended. A great deal of good had been done by the Public Accounts Committee; but that was a totally different question. The Members of that Committee did not enter at all into a question of policy, but merely satisfied themselves as to whether the money had been expended in the manner contemplated by the House. His hon. Friend the Member for Swansea (Mr. Dillwyn) proposed that a Committee should be appointed to examine into the Estimates and to report to the House their opinion as to whether those Estimates had been properly framed and were proper Estimates of the Expenditure of the country for the year. He believed it was impossible for any Committee to undertake that duty, and if they did they would undertake, on behalf of the House of Commons, a part of the duty which absolutely devolved on the Government. It was the duty of the House of Commons to see that the Government presented full Estimates before they asked for Votes, and to criticize those Votes; but the House would be misled if it appointed a Committee to examine into all these matters of detail. The hon. Member for Swansea said he confined his remarks to the Civil Service Estimates. Well, one large item in those Estimates had reference to Education, others to the salaries of the Civil Servants, to Public Buildings, and to the three Revenue Departments—namely, the Post Office, the Customs, and the Inland Revenue. Were these subjects which a Select Committee could possibly examine into and on which it could present a Report that would be of the smallest value in guiding the Committee of Supply? He maintained that such a Select Committee would mislead them. Nine-tenths of the increase of expenditure to which the hon. Member had alluded were due to the policy of the House itself, and a Committee would be incompetent to decide whether that policy was right or wrong. If, for example, it was right that money should be expended for Education, the Committee of Council must be left, with the check of the Treasury, to determine what Estimates they would submit. The real fault arose from the fact that the House did not take proper time to examine the Estimates. The Estimates were put down day after day and week after week, and nobody knew when they would be discussed. Such a state of things was, he thought, a discredit to the management of Public Business; but when the remedy for it came to be discussed the House seemed to be all at sea, for there were, he perceived, no less than 15 new Amendments on the Paper to the Resolutions which the Chancellor of the Exchequer had proposed, so that all further discussion of them was rendered almost hopeless. When he first had the honour of a seat in the House the Estimates were discussed. The late Mr. Hume spoke on them at what some hon. Members might regard as foolish length; but, be that as it might, it was evident they were not discussed at present. He trusted, therefore, the Government would exercise their power—and no Government within his recollection possessed greater—to persuade the House to adopt some Rule which would place matters in a more satisfactory position; but the proposal now made would have a very injurious effect by retarding the progress of Public Business, without the smallest chance of any public benefit.

Sir HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON said, he felt somewhat alarmed when he heard the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Montrose (Mr. Baxter), for he had begun by stating that it must be obvious to every candid mind that the House of Commons had lost its control over the Estimates and that its supervision was a mere sham. The right hon. Gentleman went on to speak of the amusement with which, when in Office, he had watched the discussion of the Estimates from time to time, and stated that it frequently happened that in cases in which the House had passed one Vote after much discussion, which required no defence, they had left unnoticed another which was entirely indefensible. Now, he himself had not long occupied the post which he now had the honour to fill; but he must altogether deny that the present Government regarded the Votes which they laid before the House as being indefensible, either in whole or in part. As to the functions performed by the Committee on Public Accounts to which the right hon. Gentleman had referred, they were entirely different from any which were likely to devolve on such a Committee as that which was now proposed. The Committee on Public Accounts criticized matters after the money had been spent, and dealt with abstract questions of Account. But what would the proposed Committee have to do? They would have to deal with proposals of the Government, many of them involving questions of future policy.

Now, a Government responsible for its future policy would, he fancied, look with considerable jealousy on a Committee by which that policy might be picked to pieces, and on which they would be represented, perhaps, by only one Member; whereas their policy ought to be judged by the Whole House. No Government, he ventured to say, would so far abdicate its functions as to intrust to a Committee of the House, composed of Members of different Parties, and not representing the opinion of the House at large, the Estimates which it deemed to be necessary to be discussed. But, to turn from what had been said by the right hon. Gentleman to what had fallen from the hon. Member for Swansea (Mr. Dillwyn), he would point out the real remedy, for the evil of which the hon. Gentleman complained was not that which he proposed, but that which had been suggested by the hon. Member for Peterborough (Mr. Hankey), and which had before been submitted to the consideration of the House — namely, to secure, as far as possible, the certainty of Supply being taken on the evenings for which it was fixed without the danger of it being delayed day after day because of Notices of Motion. He recollected pretty distinctly the discussions on Supply last year, and he might state to the House that the Government had proposed on 34 occasions to consider the Estimates in Supply, and that on 15 occasions the subject was never approached; while there were only three occasions during the whole Session on which no discussion took place before Supply could be obtained. On all the remaining occasions Supply was reached not until after considerable discussion; and he would further observe that the objection which had been urged by the hon. Member for Swansea against the House being so often called upon to take Votes on Account would be greatly obviated if Supply could be fixed with such certainty that it might be taken earlier in the year. The hon. Gentleman had also referred to what he appeared to think the alarming increase in the amount of the Estimates; but he took no account of the increase in the population and the wealth of the country, nor of the fact that the amount of the Estimates depended in a great degree on the legislation for which the House was responsible. The Vote for Education, he would remind him, and one or two other Votes formed so large a portion of the increases on the Civil Service Estimates as to leave very little room for any substantial reduction under other heads. The hon. Gentleman last year laid great stress upon the interest which he said the permanent officials of the Government must have in increasing the Estimates; but that increase would more properly be ascribed to the causes which he had just mentioned. The real point to consider was whether the proposal would facilitate Business. Now, he had always found that discussions by a Committee, so far from diminishing subsequent discussions in the House, had tended to enlarge them by furnishing new material; and he believed that that would be the result if the hon. Member for Swansea's views were carried out. Besides, the House could never be too careful of delegating its authority over the Estimates to any Committee, however vigilant, or of decreasing in any way the responsibility of the Government. The Secretary to the Treasury would probably be very glad indeed to share his responsibility with a Committee; but it was very doubtful whether the public interest would benefit. The Government, in all probability, would by degrees get to believe that the preparation of the Estimates was not so important a matter as their consideration, and that the responsibility of framing them rested really with the Committee, whose views might not always be economically sound or calculated to promote the efficiency of the Public Service.

MR. LOWE: Sir, the brilliant imagination of my hon. Friend the Member for Swansea (Mr. Dillwyn) has made out a state of things which, I apprehend, has little counterpart in reality. He represents to us a Treasury anxious above all things to increase Expenditure, and a House of Commons anxious above all things to diminish it. Starting from that point, my hon. Friend naturally wishes that the good principle in matters of economy, represented by himself and other hon. Members, should have the upper hand, and that the evil principle, represented by the Treasury, should be trampled under foot. But, alas! these things are not to be decided by the hallucinations of even the most brilliant imagination. We have to deal with matters of hard fact, which stand, it seems to me, in the most diametrical opposition to the hon. Member's theories. If there is a man in the world anxious for economy, depend upon it that man is the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and that not from any superior virtue he may happen to possess, but because his character, his position, his very existence is involved in his being able to keep the Expenditure of the country within bounds. Others may be sincere in their professions of economy; you may always thoroughly believe him. On the other hand, as to the House of Commons, can any hon. Gentleman who has had experience in this House really believe that the Business of this House is mainly, or, indeed, in any perceptible degree, the promotion of economy in any way whatever? The Chancellor of the Exchequer is exposed to the most urgent importunities. What for? Does my hon. Friend suppose that people go to Downing Street and say to the Chancellor of the Exchequer—"For Heaven's sake, retrench this expenditure, do away with that job, alter or cut down this office!" Nothing of the kind. I venture to say that in the course of the five years I held the Office no such application was made to me. I had frequently 50, 60, or 100 gentlemen calling upon me to urge their views—gentlemen whose support was most valuable to the Government, and who knew it and felt it, and desired that I should feel it too; but who went away little less than furious, because the things they wanted done—things very good and proper, perhaps, in themselves—could not be done by the Government simply because the expense would have been too much for the public purse. If it were once understood that the Treasury was facile in these matters, and that you had only to make a good case in order to have it dealt with, the Government would be overwhelmed with projects, not one-hundredth part of the expense of which it could bear. That being the case, what is the remedy my hon. Friend proposes? That this man, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who above all others is bound to practise economy, shall be, in fact, placed under the control of a Committee of this House. Now, let hon. Members just think how the arrangement would work. At present a number of Gentlemen holding the destiny of the Government in their hands come to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and ask for a particular thing. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, if he knows his duty and is fit for his Office, and does not think the Revenue will bear the expenditure demanded, says "No." But in the case my hon. Friend proposes, what would he do? He would say—"Well, this sort of thing ought not to be done; but, after all, there is the Committee. If the Committee passes it nobody can blame me." And so you would have a quantity of things done which no Chancellor of the Exchequer would have dared to sanction had they not been brought forward by the Committee. Then there comes the question of responsibility. At present the Treasury exercises a control over the whole Departments of the Administration; but to appoint such a Committee as my hon. Friend proposes would be to place the Treasury in an inferior position, and the Committee in a superior position; and the officials of that Department, instead of attending to their proper duties, would have a great deal of their time taken up during the Session in appearing before the Committee. In a word, it appears to me that if you wanted the greatest possible facility for increased Public Expenditure, coupled with the least possibility of retrenchment, you could not do better than appoint this Committee. I will not trouble the House by going into details. I have never myself been accused of being too anxious to spend public money. Of all the charges brought against me that was not one; and if there was the least probability of economy resulting from it I would not hesitate to advise the adoption of this proposal. But I am quite certain that, well meant as it no doubt is, it would break down the responsibility of the only safeguard which you have, which is the Treasury, and would inevitably tend to increase the Expenditure.

SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOT said, he believed the admirable speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for London University (Mr. Lowe) was one which could not be answered. He would not attempt, therefore, to follow the right hon. Gentleman in again demonstrating the weakness of the proposal before the House in that direction which the right hon. Gentleman had taken; but there were one or two points connected with the question on which the right hon. Gentleman had not touched, and which seemed to call for remark. One was economy of time. As things were, hon. Members complained of the Estimates being late; but if the Committee had to examine them before they were presented to the House, they would not be in the hands of hon. Members till close upon the end of the Session. The officials of the Treasury would be so much worried by having to attend before the Committee that they would be unable to do their work properly, and the multitude of questions suggested by the investigations of the Committee would give rise to endless discussions in the House when the Estimates were at length presented. The result would be that Public Business would be much delayed, and that the Government would be obliged to ask for Votes of Credit, as to the objectionable character of which all parties were agreed. With regard to the question of responsibility, the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Treasury seemed to speak of the House of Commons as being responsible for the Estimates. Now that was a mistake. [Sir HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON said, he certainly did not mean that.] He was glad to hear the hon. Baronet's explanation, for it would be a bad day for this country if the Government wished to shift its responsibility for the Estimates upon the shoulders of the House of Commons. He would never vote for relieving the Government of any responsibility; and the Government would be utterly irresponsible if the House handed the Army and Navy Estimates and the Civil Service Estimates over to a Committee. It was the Members of the House, individually and collectively, who were responsible for the great increase of Expenditure under the Civil Service Estimates; and it was only by resisting the proposals that were made by Members that the Estimates could be curtailed. He was surprised to hear the remarks of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Montrose (Mr. Baxter), who had been a Member of a Liberal Government professing economy, because if indefensible proposals were made when he was Secretary to the Treasury it was his bounden duty to have resisted them. It was all very well, when he was out of Office, to come down and tell the House what he had done; but what they wanted to know was what he did when he was in Office, and he admitted that the Liberal Government placed before the House indefensible items. If so, it was his bounden duty to have warned the House, which would have taken care that they were expunged from the Estimates. If the Motion had done nothing else, it had elicited a reply from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of London, and also from the hon. Member for Peterborough (Mr. Hankey), who had always expressed himself frankly and plainly, and he thoroughly understood this question. He believed no greater mistake could be made than to place these Estimates in the hands of a Committee, and therefore he should vote against the proposal.

LORD ROBERT MONTAGU: Sir, when, in the year 1861, I submitted to the House a Motion for the appointment of a Committee of Public Accounts, the terms of the Motion, as they first stood, contained a clause to the effect that the Estimates also should be investigated by the Committee. In consequence, however, of what the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone), and others, said to me in private, I struck out that clause before submitting the Motion to the House. It was, therefore, with a peculiar interest that I listened to the speech of the hon. Member for Swansea (Mr. Dillwyn), to see if it contained any arguments to cause me to revert to my original view, which he now advances. His speech has, however, failed to convince me. He has said that "at least his proposal can do no harm." If I thought so, I would certainly vote for it, and give his "experiment," as he termed it, a fair trial; but I feel sure that it will be productive of the greatest harm, and that, too, in both the ways in which he pointed out his aims in making the proposal. The first of these two principles of the hon. Member was this—"We must bear in mind that this House is responsible for the Expenditure, and yet makes no provision for a consideration of the Estimates." It seems to me, in passing, a very droll thing to propose, if it is the House which is responsible, to shift that responsibility on to a Committee of the House—or, rather, as I will show, to get rid of it altogether—while laying it down as the fundamental principle of the plan, that the House alone is responsible, and stating the aim of that plan to be the perfecting of that responsibility. The second aim of the hon. Member is the economy of time. "The Estimates are now," he said, "unduly delayed in the first place, and then they are hustled through without consideration." His two aims are, then, responsibility and saving of time. What would be the effect of his Motion in regard to time? When the Session opened, there would first be the debates on the Address, and then the hon. Member's Committee would be appointed. After a time it would meet, and taking the Army Estimates, it would send for the officials of the War Office and cross-examine them on every item and on the general policy. All this while the hands of the Government would be tied. They could not proceed with Supply until the Committee's Report on the Army Estimates had been for a due time in the hands of hon. Members. The same may be said of the Navy Estimates, the Revenue Estimates, and each class of the Civil Service. This Committee will therefore commence by causing a great delay. But a greater delay will be occasioned when each Report has been made, unless he intends to preclude the House altogether from a consideration of the Estimates; for each Report will be a perfect arsenal of arms and ammunition for hon. Members to fire off at the Government, night after night, on each Vote. Certainly, the effect of this Committee would be to prevent "the Estimates being hustled through at the end of the Session," for the end of the Session would never come. We should have to sit *en permanence*. So much in regard to time. Now let us consider how it will affect the responsibility of the House. Whenever an item should have been objected to, and all the ammunition had been fired off, the Secretary to the Treasury would rise and say—"You have appointed a Committee to consider the Estimates, and the Committee have had the advantage of examining all the officials on the subject; surely the Committee must know more about it than the rest of the House; why cannot you trust to your own Committee?" Thus the responsibility of the House would be undermined. At the same time, the responsibility of the Government would be obliterated, for the Government is now responsible for every item of Expenditure which they ask the House to grant. The plea of the Secretary would shift that responsibility from the Government on to the shoulders of the Committee. There is another evil which would not be long in showing itself—an evil which the Secretary to the Treasury did not see, when he said—"The Government will be represented on the Committee by only one Member." For, consider what is the Government, under our present system of Party Government? It consists of those persons who are pleasing to the majority of the House—persons who represent that majority. The Committee would be appointed by the Government, in that it would be appointed by the majority at their beck and call. The Government would, therefore, take care not only to have a clear majority on the Committee, but, also, it would see that all the other Members of the Committee should be "safe men"—that is, men who would not be inconvenient to the Government; pliable men or ignoramusses; at all events, persons who had not too much independence. Thus the Committee would be a mere creature of the Government, and a screen for the Government to ward off attacks and to shield it from being called to account. The country would then say that the Committee was packed, and would put no faith in it; while both the Government and the House would have got rid of their responsibilities, without any responsibility being incurred by the Committee, as the House would not call its own Committee to account. Thus all responsibility for Expenditure would be destroyed. The late Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Baxter) said—"It is always useless to try to reduce any Vote, as the Government will always beat you." He meant that the Government have a phalanx, which is the majority of the House, to support them; and that when this ceases to be so they cease to be the Government. That is Party Government. That is an evil of the Representative system. In former days our forefathers devised a tripartite check on Expenditure. First, the Treasury check. Everyone who has been in Office knows that his own Department aims at perfection and extension of power, and this cannot be done without expenditure. Yet not an item of Expenditure can be incurred without the leave of the Treasury; and it is ruthless in its economical cruelty, as every head of a Department has bitterly experienced. The second check is the House of Commons; and the third is the Appropriation Audit, the object of which is to see that no money is expended except in the way, and within the measure, indicated by Resolution of the House of Commons. The Treasury check and the Audit are nearly as perfect as they can be. If there is too great an Expenditure, the House of Commons alone is to blame. It is in that part of the State machine that the screw is loose. The late Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Baxter) told us that when he was in Office he observed that the House would take two divisions against some Vote which was quite right and necessary, while it would leave unnoticed some indefensible or profligate expenditure. This means that the House of Commons is not informed, not intelligent, and ignorant of its chief duty—its chief duty, I say—for the House is certainly not a good legislative machine. No one would look to a meeting of 600 men to make laws. In effect, the House of Commons, as Mr. Thring has remarked in his evidence, makes cumbrous, unintelligible, or contradictory laws, and throws the Statute Book into confusion. Legislation is not the proper duty of a Representative Assembly. Its functions are the control of the purse; and, subsidiary to that, the representation of grievances. By the latter, the wishes and opinions of the country are made known. These opinions are not made known by newspapers; but are, to a very great extent, manufactured by newspapers. But newspapers are under an editor, and subject to his prejudices, and idiosyncracies, and interests, and private aims; and they are carried on partly as a commercial speculation, and partly—as in the case of newspapers belonging to hon. Members and to Ministers—as a stepping-stone to power. Well then, the result of this debate is this—The House of Commons does not exercise its proper functions, while it busies itself about that which it cannot do. In other words, the House has made itself useless, and worse than useless. The late Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Lowe) has said that it is the Chancellor of the Exchequer who is always the most eager and anxious to restrain expenditure and promote economy. Economy, Sir, is a good thing, when it is the effect of wisdom. But there is such a thing as economy without wisdom or knowledge. As the House of Commons fails to perform its functions, so a Chancellor of the Exchequer may fail in the duties of a statesman. We have a Zulu War, which might have been avoided if a telegraphic wire had extended from Ceylon or St. Vincent to the Cape. The expenditure of that war will be enormous; that waste would have been saved if we had telegraphic communication with the Cape. Yet I believe that a Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Lowe) refused a comparatively small sum to promote or assist such an enterprize. That was economy without wisdom, and there was a Chancellor of the Exchequer without statesmanlike intelligence and prudence.

MR. NEWDEGATE said, that nothing was more evident from the proceedings of the previous night—and, indeed, from those of that night also—than that that House was devoted to discussion rather than to Business. In the proposal that was made by the hon. Member for Swansea (Mr. Dillwyn), they had a practical illustration of a system that had been suggested before Committees of the House on Public Business over and over again. This system had been recommended by an authority whose knowledge of the House was inferior to that of no man living. The system was that the House should appoint grand Committees upon subjects of great importance; and he (Mr. Newdegate) could conceive no circumstance upon which the appointment of a Select Committee—selected with the greatest care by the House—would be more useful than one appointed upon the production of the Civil Service Estimates, to consider and report upon them. One reason for the negligence shown in the consideration of these Estimates was, in his opinion, that under the recent centralizing legislation these Estimates had increased in volume, had been enlarged page by page, and chapter upon chapter, until the Members of the House became appalled at their extent and volume—in fact, felt individually unable to deal with them. The hon. and gallant Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B.

Barttelot) had urged the House not to appoint the Committee now proposed, because the House generally would get thereby an "inkling" of the detail of these Estimates upon which it might be disposed to take action. It was this very "inkling," as the hon. Member described it, which was so much needed. The volume of these Civil Service Estimates had been enlarged until, if an individual Member took up one point, he was treated as if he was dealing with something either insignificant, or with a subject of which he did not understand the bearings; and, indeed, it was almost impossible, at all events very difficult, for an individual Member to compass the relation of any one item to the vast mass of items among which it was involved. This must be patent to every Member of the House. In former years, when the Legislature was content that county expenditure should be managed by the county authorities, and municipal expenditure by municipalities, the Estimates submitted to the House were comparatively simple. It was quite possible that, aided by knowledge acquired in local administration, the Members of the House should be individually competent to deal with those Estimates. The Civil Service Estimates in former days were limited to the expenditure, salaries, and conduct of a limited number of officers; but the Civil Service had grown up to such vast dimensions under recent legislation that it had become a great trading corporation—it had become an army—with which the House was almost unable to cope. He could not see the force, or rather the value, of the argument that the House would diminish the responsibility of Her Majesty's Ministers by the appointment of this Committee; while it was admitted that, as matters now stood, the House itself was incompetent to exact that responsibility. In answer to that observation, he need only appeal to the recollection of the Members of that House in saying that when the Estimates were considered, instead of the House having of late years been very decently full, it was always disgracefully empty. The real fact was that those who opposed the Motion did not make allowance for the change of circumstances. He had heard it argued that Her Majesty's Ministers formed for financial purposes a delegation, if not a Committee, of that House; while some seemed to imagine that Her Majesty's Ministers were solely responsible for the Public Expenditure. Who was to exact the responsibility of the Administration? The truth was that the House itself was responsible for the aggregate Public Expenditure, and if the House intended to discharge its responsibility, it would adopt some such method as that which had been suggested—to furnish it with those inklings which were necessary for its understanding the aggregate details of, and thus the aggregate Estimates. That applied particularly to the Civil Service Estimates, because the Civil Service had become so powerful that they were capable of refusing information to the House, and practically did so. Under the changed circumstances and form of the Government of this country, if the House intended to discharge its duty by enforcing a wise economy, after having deprived the local authorities to a great extent of their control over a large part of the Public Expenditure, this House would replace that control by some organization within itself, which should furnish it with information, without which the House, when it went into Committee of Supply, felt itself incompetent. He had considered the matter for some time, and he was convinced that the House ought to accommodate its action to the new position it had itself shared in creating. The House ought to abandon old-fashioned notions as to dealing with the Estimates in their new and enlarged volume and form. His belief was that if the House meant to discharge its primary duty of controlling the Expenditure of the country, it would act in the sense of, and support the Motion of, the hon. Member for Swansea.

Mr. LAING thought an unfair attack had been made on his right hon. Friend the Member for Montrose (Mr. Baxter), because he said that, as Secretary to the Treasury, he had passed Votes in which he saw blots, but could not avoid passing them. When the House considered that a Secretary of the Treasury was a very subordinate official, that there were more than 200 Votes in the Civil Service Estimates, and that it was not a remarkable thing that out of such a number the opinion of the Secretary to the Treasury might be overruled by the Cabinet, they would see that it would be nonsense to expect the Secretary to the Treasury to think of resignation every time such divergence of view occurred, or to set him down as a pattern of insincerity in Liberal Governments. In the case of Alderney Harbour, for instance, when he (Mr. Laing) was Secretary to the Treasury, a great deal of money had been expended, or rather thrown away; but Lord Palmerston took a strong political view of the importance of Alderney to watch the French Establishment of Cherbourg, and it would have been of no use for him to oppose such an item against the opinion of the Prime Minister, backed by the *dictum* of the Duke of Wellington. He perfectly agreed that at present the House exercised no efficient control over the Estimates. That arose, not from the fault of the House, but from the nature of the case. The time had been when the Estimates had been criticized with much thoroughness. Mr. Hume, when in the House, devoted nearly his entire time to the object; but there were not then a fifth of the Votes there were now. It would be perfectly impossible for the House now to go over all the details of the Estimates. They had not the time. He could not, however, think that the appointment of a Select Committee on the Estimates generally would be sufficient to meet the evil complained of. It was true that a week-kneed Chancellor of the Exchequer might be able, by referring the matter to a Select Committee, to say "no" where he would otherwise have said "yes;" but this argument might also tell the other way, for the Chancellor of the Exchequer might say "yes" to a proposed increase of expenditure, trusting to the Committee to throw it out. Practically, the Estimates in these cases were very much the result of a compromise between the Treasury, fighting the battle of economy, and the other Departments which gained the popularity of expenditure. The control possessed by the House was very much what had been referred to by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of London—namely this, that if the Expenditure got ahead, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and eventually the whole Government, lost popularity. This was in itself a great security. He thought the House of Commons might exercise a more efficient control over the Expenditure if it would abstain from looking too much into mere matters of detail, and look broadly at the whole Estimates. By taking upon themselves the work of subordinates, and criticizing details in a meddling, petty way, they lost sight of the broad facts on the face of the Estimates. They might take up the Civil Service Estimates, for instance, and if they found there had been in any one head an undue increase, and found large Votes for which they could see no sufficient reason, and of which Ministers could give no satisfactory explanation, they might properly send these to a Select Committee for investigation. In this way they would exercise a more efficient control than by appointing a Select Committee to go over the wages of all the post-runners throughout the Kingdom, or other such matters of detail. Special items of large amount might be with advantage referred to a Select Committee, but not the examination of the entire Estimates.

MR. RYLANDS: I shall only occupy a few minutes with reference to the points that I wish to bring under the notice of the House. My principal reason in rising is in consequence of the speech made by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of London (Mr. Lowe). That speech has been received with evident approval on the other side of the House; but I venture to say that the arguments of the right hon. Gentleman proceeded from an entire misapprehension of the objects of having the Committee. It is a fundamental principle, in reference to this House, that we shall have no power of proposing increases in the Estimates. I think it is a most valuable regulation, and clearly, if a Committee were appointed, it would have no power or authority to represent to the Chancellor of the Exchequer that Estimates should be further increased. There is no question, on the part of the opponents to the Committee, or on the part of those in favour of it, that the Government is responsible for laying on the Table of the House those Estimates for the Public Business which they think necessary; and they are bound, on their own responsibility, to keep down the expenses as much as possible. The hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Treasury admits that that is the duty of the Government, and that it is also the duty of the House of Commons to reduce, as far as possible, the Estimates. He said that the House cannot be too careful in sifting the Estimates. Well, the point we are now urging upon the House is this—we believe that, under the present system of Committee of Supply, there is not an opportunity of sifting the Estimates put before the House by the Government. We see—we may be mistaken, but I do not think we are—a strong reason for believing that if these Estimates prepared on the responsibility of the Government are subjected, before they are laid before a Committee of the Whole House, to a careful investigation by the Select Committee, we should be putting a very great check indeed on the expenditure of the different Departments, and be strengthening the hands of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in resisting the pressure put on the Treasury by the different Departments of State. We are in the presence of a very large army—the permanent officials—whose influence is continually brought to bear on the Members of this House, on the public Press, and upon others, to induce a large expenditure. The Chancellor of the Exchequer knows better than I do the influence which is constantly brought to bear on the Treasury to justify large expenditure in various directions. All we say is, this is an experiment. We ask for a Committee as an experiment, and if it will not act you may dismiss it in another year. But let me remind the House that we are not asking for an untried experiment. There have been cases where certain expenditure has been referred to Select Committees, and the Estimates so referred have come out with considerable reductions. That has been the experience on previous occasions. But I will not, at this moment, trouble the House with information which I think is important, and may, perhaps, be new to some of the hon. Members, though I may remind them that most of the civilized countries of the world have got Committees to which the Estimates are referred previous to being brought before the Legislature. France, Italy, Germany, Austria, Holland, and the United States have got them; and now, when we ask to have an experiment of this kind, which is adopted by nearly all foreign Legislatures, we are driven from it by what is very much in the nature of bugbears. I hope, however, that the House will support the experiment which has been proposed by the hon. Member for Swansea.

Mr. MACARTNEY pointed out that the Committee would have to be a large one, and expressed a belief that if it were appointed the time of the House would be very much more wasted than it was at present.

Mr. PARNELL said, he thought it would be admitted the question under discussion was one of the greatest importance. The difficulty of getting on with the Estimates, so as to make fair progress, had been increasing every Session. A variety of plans had been proposed from time to time to remedy that difficulty; but none of them had succeeded. Almost every foreign Legislature had adopted this system of referring to a Select Committee the task of going over the Estimates either before the commencement of the Session or during the Session. The reason was that those bodies had found it difficult to devote that amount of attention and consideration to the Estimates which they required. They had been told that there would be ample time for the consideration of the Estimates during the present Session; but he wished to tell the House what he thought about that. He believed if any set of Members in the House were to attempt the consideration and discussion of these Estimates fairly and profitably, that before the Session was over the Chancellor of Exchequer would bring forward a Motion for their imprisonment or expulsion. He did not see how the right hon. Gentleman would have any other resource, because if these Civil Service Estimates and the Army and Navy Estimates were fairly considered in the House, it would be quite impossible to obtain Votes for the supply of the nation during the period of six months which the House sat. This was a conclusion to which he had been forced to come after a most careful examination of the whole question. It had been said by some people, including the Secretary to the Treasury, who had let the cat out of the bag when he said—"Oh! if you submit these Estimates to a Select Committee you will have discussion in Committee of the Whole House increased." No doubt it would have that effect, and why? Because, by the labours of the Select Committee, the attention of the Committee of the Whole House would be directed to the necessary points of discussion, and in that way discussion would be increased. But after the first Session all that would disappear and these inequalities would be removed, and the recommendations of the Select Committee which were of value would be acceded to, and the necessity for discussing the Estimates would gradually disappear. Now, at present, they were in this position. Last Session the Estimates were brought forward at a very early period by the Government, and they were kept on the Notice Paper with very sufficient steadiness during the whole Session; in fact, he believed they had Estimates on the Paper once a week during nearly the whole of the Session. But before three months had elapsed, notwithstanding that the Notices of Motion did not prove a bar to the discussion of the Estimates in Committee, notwithstanding that in very nearly every instance when Supply was the first Order of the Day that the House got into Committee early—notwithstanding all this, before two or three months had elapsed the Chancellor of the Exchequer recognized his utter inability to get the Supplies for the nation voted, and the whole of the Parliamentary system broke down; and that was what he believed would occur again this Session, in spite of the proposals which had been made by the Government for the purpose of facilitating Public Business. They would have the attention of hon. Members directed in an exceptional way to the discussion of Estimates, especially on Monday, and Parliament would undertake what it was a physical impossibility for it to perform, and they would have continually occurring all that ill-temper and many of those unseemly exhibitions which they all so much regretted last Session; so that he would impress upon the Government that they ought to submit the Civil Service Estimates to the consideration of a Select Committee, the experience of foreign countries before them. Even if the Government believed their Estimates were as clear as the Secretary to the Treasury said they were, why should they not submit them to the examination of a Select Committee? It was all very well for the hon. Baronet (Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson), with that lofty demeanour which so became him, to contrast his position under the late Government; but he had frequently heard the hon. Baronet during last year say he could not defend certain Votes because he knew nothing about them. That was, of course, a necessary consequence of the system. It was impossible that one man could understand all the multifarious branches of these Estimates. They might depend upon it that either this year, next year, or, it might be, a good many years yet, the views of the hon. Member for Swansea (Mr. Dillwyn) would impress themselves upon the House; and that, however unpalatable they might be at present to Her Majesty's Ministers, and the majority of those who would follow them into the Lobby, they would ultimately be recognized and acted upon, if this House was to continue its functions as supervisor of the Expenditure of the nation. Of course, they knew that Ministers and ex-Ministers would be opposed to any change, because they were well enough aware that the system of patronage was a most important portion of the Government of this country. What was it that made such a vast number of Members obedient to the Government and follow them? It was more or less the system of patronage which, either directly or indirectly, had permeated every branch of the Government, whether Army, Navy, or Civil Service, and, in fact, its influence extended to the Church. It further extended itself to the policy of the Government. Whether at home or abroad there was no Department, however minute, upon which patronage had not its effect. It was not reasonable to suppose, therefore, that Ministers would lightly give up a weapon which was of so much importance to them, and which they knew so well how to use.

MR. WALTER said, he hoped that one result of this discussion would be that hon. Members would see that it was their duty to attend more scrupulously than they had hitherto been in the habit of doing on the occasions when the Civil Service Estimates were being discussed in Committee of Supply. Havlistened to this debate with attention, he had come to the good resolution of intending to give the right hon. Gentleman opposite as much trouble as he could whenever those Estimates were under consideration. As he understood the matter, what hon. Members really wanted was more definite information with regard to the vast mass of details relating to the Estimates than was afforded them by the statement of the Secretary to the Treasury. The difficulty would be largely met if a Report were formulated by the Treasury giving the information required and setting forth the reasons why hon. Members were called upon to vote the different items in the Estimates. At present, unless some hon. Member in pursuit of his particular hobby put questions to the Secretary to the Treasury, the House obtained no information whatever with regard to these items. They were asked to vote some £23,000,000 in respect of these Estimates, and of that sum probably about £20,000,000 would have to be voted without reduction; but he felt satisfied that a considerable reduction might be effected upon the remaining £3,000,000. To take one instance, a vast sum was wasted annually upon the printing of unnecessary Blue Books, some of which, two or three inches in thickness, and costing hundreds of pounds to print, contained nothing but a mass of undigested tabular matter. It was certain that £20,000 or £30,000 might be saved under this head alone every year, without any detriment to the service of the country; and no doubt similar savings might be effected under many other heads if the question were carefully examined into by a Select Committee. Whether or not it was advisable to interpose a permanent body between the Government and the House in reference to the Estimates might be a moot point; but he intended, on this occasion, to vote in favour of the hon. Member's Motion, in the hope that some improvement on the present system might result from the experiment he suggested being tried.

Question put.

The House *divided*:—Ayes 95; Noes 158: Majority 63.—(Div. List, No. 14.)

PARLIAMENT — PUBLIC BUSINESS (HALF-PAST TWELVE RULE).

RESOLUTION.

Mr. MOWBRAY rose to move the following Resolution:—

"That, except for a Money Bill, no Order of the Day or Notice of Motion be taken after half-past Twelve of the clock at night, with respect to which Order or Notice of Motion a Notice of Opposition or Amendment shall have been printed on the Notice Paper, or if such Notice of Motion shall only have been given the next previous day of sitting, and objection shall be taken when such Notice is called."

The right hon. Gentleman said, he should be very brief in proposing this Motion, as it was one which had met for several years with general approval. He moved the adoption of this Rule not from any Party feeling, but with a view to promote good order and the convenience of Members, and, indeed, the interest of the House generally. The Business taken after half-past 12 ought, he thought, to be Business on which they were all pretty well agreed, and which they could transact efficiently and in a way that would give satisfaction to the country. That Motion was originally proposed in the last Parliament, in 1872, by the right hon. Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone), then Leader of the House, and was unanimously adopted. It was brought forward the following year by no less an authority than Mr. Bouverie, and carried by a majority of 191 to 37. It had been adopted every Session during the existing Parliament, and in the last Division, when he had the honour of moving it in February, 1877, the votes were 185 for and 23 against it; therefore, they had had long experience that it had worked well. The hon. Baronet the Member for Maidstone (Sir John Lubbock) had an Amendment on the Paper which would prevent the Rule from applying to Bills which had passed the stage of Committee. Now, he proposed the Rule as it was originally proposed by the right hon. Member for Greenwich, and as the House had had experience of it during the seven years for which it had prevailed. It was true that in 1875 the hon. Member for Swansea (Mr. Dillwyn) induced the First Lord of the Treasury, then Leader of the House, to accept an Amendment to the same effect as that about to be moved by the hon. Member for Maidstone; but the House, after a trial of one year, went back in 1875 to the original form of the Resolution. In that shape he now proposed it, hoping that it would be agreed to and made a Standing Order of the House.

Motion made, and Question proposed,

"That, except for a Money Bill, no Order of the Day or Notice of Motion be taken after half-past Twelve of the clock at night, with respect to which Order or Notice of Motion a Notice of Opposition or Amendment shall have been printed on the Notice Paper, or if such Notice of Motion shall only have been given the next previous day of sitting, and objection shall be taken when such Notice is called."—(*Mr. Mowbray.*)

SIR JOHN LUBBOCK moved as an Amendment to the Resolution, in line 1, after the word "Bill," to insert the words "or a Bill which has passed through Committee of the whole House." The hon. Baronet said, that this had been the Rule in 1874, and, though the Proviso was dropped in 1875, no sufficient reason was given for the change. The noble Lord at the head of the Government then supported it, though he said he did not feel strongly about it. In 1874 the hon. and learned Member for Denbighshire (Mr. Osborne Morgan) and the hon. Member for Sheffield (Mr. Mundella) gave cases in which the Rule as proposed by the right hon. Gentleman opposite had led to very unsatisfactory results, as hon. Members had been compelled to accept proposed changes under pain of losing their Bill altogether. He would not occupy the time of the House by quoting cases which were probably familiar to most hon. Members. He submitted, however, that when a Bill had passed through Committee it was hard that the House should have no opportunity of determining whether it should become law. Under these circumstances, the time spent by the House in getting the Bill through Committee might be all thrown away at the discretion of a single Member; and he proposed, therefore, that the Resolution should not apply to such Bills. He concluded by moving the Amendment.

MR. MUNDELLA seconded the Amendment. He was not opposed to the spirit of the original proposal; but he thought the Rule would work much more advantageously, and a considerable amount of now wasted time would be saved, if the provision contained in the Amendment were embodied in the Resolution.

Amendment proposed,

In line 1, after the word "Bill," to insert the words "or a Bill which has passed through Committee of the whole House."—(*Sir John Lubbock.*)

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted."

MR. BERESFORD HOPE said, that the Resolution had been on previous occasions supported by Leaders of the House on both sides. It had worked well for many years; and he thought it had contributed not only to the health and comfort of individual Members, but to the real transaction of Business.

MR. SERJEANT SIMON said, the experience of the past week, when hon. Members had been kept there night after night until 2 and 3 in the morning, ought to strengthen the hands of the right hon. Gentleman who brought forward this Resolution. If an accidental circumstance had not deprived him of the opportunity, he had intended to move that the Rule should be amended so as to apply to all Business whatever at midnight.

MR. CHARLEY supported the Amendment.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE said, he thought the hon. Baronet the Member for Maidstone could not have found a worse defender of the Amendment than the hon. and learned Member for Salford (Mr. Charley), for many persons thought that the latter hon. and learned Gentleman had passed through the House some Bills which had much better never have been passed at all. His vote on the Motion would depend on the course taken with regard to the next Resolution. If the Motion were made a Standing Order of the House, he should vote for it; but if the Rule were to be as hitherto—a Sessional Order—he should vote against the Amendment, because otherwise Bills might slip through, as, for instance, early in the Session, before the Rule was set up, which otherwise might have been stopped.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said, he had never concealed his own opinion with regard to the half-past 12 o'clock Rule, of which he was not fond. He thought there was a good deal to be said for the Rule, and quite as much against it. It did not signify nearly so much what the Rules of the House were as in what spirit they were worked. If the Rule were worked in a proper and fair spirit, with a sincere desire to attain the objects its promoters had in view, it would be useful and valuable; but if, on the other hand, it was worked for the purpose of wasting a great deal of time over Business—which would be opposed only for the purpose of throwing something else over the limit of half-past 12 — it would be not merely useless, but mischievous. He was fully conscious that the Rule met the wishes of the large majority of the House; and he thought it the duty of the Government in such a matter to yield to its wishes. If the House adhered to its former decision, it would be convenient to make the Rule a Standing Order, because there was no use in wasting time in discussing it every Session.

Mr. DODSON said, he hoped the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the House would be induced to pause before making the Rule a Standing Order. If the Rule was popular in this Parliament, that was no reason why they should make it binding on the next. It would be better to let it remain as a Sessional Order, and leave it to the next Parliament to decide whether they would adopt it or not. He was prepared to support the Amendment of the hon. Member for Maidstone.

Mr. C. B. DENISON said, he did not think the argument of the right hon. Gentleman who had just spoken was valid against adopting the Rule as a Standing Order. This Parliament might last longer than hon. Gentlemen seemed to suppose. He objected to the Amendment of the hon. Member for Maidstone, because, if carried, there would be really only one occasion on which the Rule would operate, and that was the second reading, because, as a matter of courtesy, Members generally allowed a Bill to go into Committee.

Mr. ANDERSON said, he was very much opposed to making the Rule a Standing Order in its present form; but if the Amendment of the hon. Member for Maidstone were adopted, his objection would not be so strong.

Question put.

The House *divided*:—Ayes 57; Noes 81: Majority 24.—(Div. List, No. 15.)

Main Question put, and *agreed to*.

Resolved, That, except for a Money Bill, no Order of the Day or Notice of Motion be taken after half-past Twelve of the clock at night, with respect to which Order or Notice of Motion a Notice of Opposition or Amendment shall have been printed on the Notice Paper, or if such Notice of Motion shall only have been given the next previous day of sitting, and objection shall be taken when such Notice is called.

Mr. MOWBRAY moved that the Resolution be made a Standing Order of the House. Were that proposal accepted, there would be no need each year to waste time by repeated discussions as to whether the Rule should or should not be adopted. Those who had experience of the working of the Rule could tell the next Parliament how well it had worked.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the said Resolution be a Standing Order of the House."—(*Mr. Mowbray.*)

The Marquess of HARTINGTON remarked that it had been pointed out that it would be competent for the next Parliament to repeal or adopt this Resolution. If in the next Parliament they had anything to say about this Rule, they would have to tell something about it not so pleasant as the right hon. Gentleman supposed. They would have to tell them that, in the opinion of the Speaker, this Rule, so far from shortening the Sittings of the House, had had the effect of prolonging them. It also put into the hands of any individual Member the power of obstructing a Bill which the House generally desired to pass. They would also have to inform them that it placed in the hands of any Members who wished deliberately to obstruct the Business of the House the most convenient engine they could use. Although he thought it was to be regretted that the Motion was made so late in the Parliament, he did not intend to offer any opposition to it.

Sir JOHN LUBBOCK protested against the Resolution being made a Standing Order of the House.

Mr. BIGGAR supported the Motion. He considered that Business could not be properly carried on after half-past 12 o'clock. Bills might be pushed on; but they were not maturely considered.

Sir HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON said, he voted for the Amendment of the hon. Baronet because he believed it modified a Rule to which he had a very strong objection. He had always stated in the House that he looked upon this half-past 12 o'clock Rule with considerable distrust. He believed the experience of the past few years proved that when they had no such Rules the House did not sit later than it did under the operation of this Rule. He quite admitted that the general feeling of the House was in favour of this Rule, and he was not prepared, any more than the noble Marquess, to vote in opposition to the general feeling of the House; but he desired to record his protest against stereotyping a Rule which, in his opinion, had not tended to facilitate the progress of Public Business.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE thought it a little curious that, after the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer had led them to suppose that the Government would support the proposal, the only speech that had been made from the Treasury Bench had been one against it.

MR. HEYGATE, in reply to the statement of the hon. Member for Maidstone, that the House sat as many hours, in Sessions when the 12.30 Rule existed, as before, wished to point out that though the House might often be kept up to a late hour, and a few of its Members, including the officials and ex-officials, might not gain so much by the 12.30 Rule, yet to the bulk of the Members it was an enormous boon. The great majority of the House were enabled to see with certainty what measures could not come on, and to retire at a reasonable hour. Some of the Government officials would, no doubt, very gladly get rid of a Rule which was in their way; but which was, nevertheless, supported by the general feeling of independent Members. His belief was that hitherto it had certainly worked with advantage to the comfort and the health of every Member of the House, and that its continued action would equally be for the benefit of all concerned. No one could say that the Members of the House had not work enough to do. No one of common sense who had sat within the walls of that House 15 or 20 years could doubt the wisdom of the proposal, for they must know that before the Rule was enforced proceedings arose of which the House ought to be ashamed. A few nights ago, after the debate on the Irish Franchise Question, and a late division in a full House, he had sat up to watch the proceedings in the interregnum before the renewal of the Rule. What happened? Why, just as in old times—two Bills of private Members were urged on in a thin House and divided upon, when proper discussion was impossible, and newspaper reports of the proceedings were entirely absent. He had voted for both those Bills; but he felt it was a most unseemly procedure, and that such legislation was an absurdity, to say the least. Members should be exceedingly glad that there existed a Rule to put an end to such proceedings at an unreasonable hour of the night.

MR. DODSON strongly opposed the proposal. He would remind the hon. Gentleman, who had said that no one of common sense would oppose the Rule, that the Speaker had given evidence against it, and that a much humbler individual, but a former officer of the House, he (Mr. Dodson), had opposed it. The Return moved for by the hon. Member for Durham proved that it had no effect in diminishing the time of the Sittings; and he (Mr. Dodson) contended that it told against those who sought to promote legislation. As a challenge had been thrown down imputing want of common sense to those who opposed the Rule, he felt bound to answer that challenge, and to state that, in his opinion, it would be a mistake on the part of the House to make the Rule a Standing Order. It was in favour of those who wished to obstruct the Business of the House, and hon. Members sometimes prolonged debates on the first Motion in order to prevent the second from coming on.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said, so far as the Government were concerned, he never looked on this as a Government question at all. He regarded it more as a matter for the convenience of the House. But his opinion was that as the House had pronounced its opinion in favour of the Rule, it was better that it should be made a Standing Order, so that hon. Members might have a clear arrangement from the beginning of the Session, and be saved discussions on the renewal of the Rule.

MR. NEWDEGATE said, he believed he was the first person who mooted this question in the Committee on Public Business, and his appeal was immediately answered. The object was to correct an abuse. The protracting debate; the multiplication of Notices and Bills, until the length of the Sittings, and the late hours at which the House rose, incapacitated the senior Members of the House. He did not say that there were no disadvantages in the operation of the Rule; but as the Leader of the House approved it being made a Standing Order, he should not oppose it, although his impression would be in favour of retaining the Rule merely as a Resolution.

Mr. PARNELL said, that this was perhaps the first occasion on which he had felt compelled to differ from the hon. Member for Cavan (Mr. Biggar); but he thought they should not blindly rush into making this Rule a Standing Order. The Rule was a good and effectual one from Session to Session, but he did not think the House ought to bind itself down by making it a Standing Order. Standing as a Sessional Order, it had worked very well as a whole; but if they made it a Standing Order they might find reason to discover that they had made a mistake. There was a great difference between a Standing Order and a Sessional Order. It would be better if an understanding could be arrived at as to what Business should be proceeded with after 12.30, and what Business should not; but, unfortunately, that was difficult to accomplish. In former days there was an hon. Member of the House named Mr. Brotherton, and if Mr. Brotherton said that certain Business should not be proceeded with after 12.30, the House agreed with him, and they also agreed with him when he said the Business should be proceeded with. But in the absence of any Mr. Brotherton in the present day, he did not see what they were to do except to pass the present proposal as a Sessional Order. He (Mr. Parnell) had observed that there was no hon. Member, no matter how self-sacrificing he might be, who did not think his Bill better than anybody else's Bill, and therefore worth going on with after 12.30. He had often been annoyed at Bills of his own being stopped at that hour; but he had never been annoyed at stopping other Member's Bills. He repeated he was in favour of a Sessional Rule. Unless the House was to spend a couple of hours after 12.30, squabbling about the Business, it must have a Rule of the kind; but it would be better to confine it to the Session, for circumstances might change, the views of the majority of the House on the subject of Home Rule or Repeal of the Union might be reversed, and the 103 Irish Members might be relegated to their own House on the banks of the Liffey, and then English Members would have an opportunity of getting through their Business more quickly than they had now; or the plan of the hon. Member for Swansea (Mr. Dillwyn) might find favour; or the House might adopt the French system of bureaux; a hundred and one things might occur which would do away with the necessity of the 12.30 Rule, and by confining themselves to making it a Sessional Order, leaving future Sessions to regulate matters for themselves, and according to their altered circumstances, they would meet every real need of the case.

Question put.

The House *divided*:—Ayes 79; Noes 36: Majority 43.—(Div. List, No. 16.)

LAND TITLES AND TRANSFER.

Ordered, That the Evidence taken before the Select Committee on Land Titles and Transfer, of Session 1878, be referred to the Select Committee on Land Titles and Transfer.—(*Mr. Osborne Morgan.*)

PUBLIC PETITIONS.

Select Committee *appointed*, "to whom shall be referred all Petitions presented to the House, with the exception of such as relate to Private Bills; and that such Committee do classify and prepare abstracts of the same, in such form and manner as shall appear to them best suited to convey to the House all requisite information respecting their contents, and do report the same from time to time to the House; and that the reports of the Committee do set forth the number of signatures to each Petition only in respect to those signatures to which addresses are affixed:—And that such Committee have power to direct the printing *in extenso* of such Petitions, or of such parts of Petitions, as shall appear to require it:—And that such Committee have power to report their opinion and observations thereupon to the House:"—Committee *nominated*:—Sir Charles Forster, Sir Ughtred Kay-Shuttleworth, The O'Donoghue, Mr. O'Conor, Mr. M'Lagan, Earl de Grey, Viscount Macduff, Lord Arthur Russell, Mr. H. Corry, Mr. Cavendish Bentinck, Mr. Reginald Yorke, Sir Charles Russell, Viscount Newport, Mr. Simonds, and Mr. Mulholland:—Three to be the quorum.

PUBLIC ACCOUNTS.

NOMINATION OF SELECT COMMITTEE.

Sir WALTER BARTTELOT, Lord FREDERICK CAVENDISH, Mr. CUBITT, Mr. GOLDNEY, nominated Members of the Committee of Public Accounts.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Hankey be one other Member of the said Committee." — (*Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson.*)

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE said, he objected to the appointment of the hon. Member for Peterborough (Mr. Hankey), mainly on the ground of the retrograde speech which he had made in the course of the evening; but he would not move the rejection of that Gentleman's name from the list. In his opinion, the Committee was not strong enough, and he thought the names of some of the Members who had shown activity in financial matters should be added to it. He would suggest the appointment of the hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands), who was for some years a Member of the Committee.

MR. O'CONNOR POWER said, he entirely supported the views of the hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke). The Committee wanted reforming. Several hon. Members below the Gangway were kept off it.

SIR HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON said, the Committee was not appointed as the ordinary Committees of that House, but under a Standing Order of the House, and which Order limited the number to 11. If it was the wish of the House that the number should be increased, the Standing Order must be first altered. He hoped the House would not delay the appointment of the Committee, as it was important they should at once enter upon their duties.

MR. SERJEANT SHERLOCK agreed with what had been said by the hon. Baronet the Secretary to the Treasury, seeing it was scarcely practicable to alter the Standing Order that night.

MAJOR NOLAN said, that if these pleas were to be allowed they would never have any change whatsoever. There was no use in beating about the bush. What was wanted was a re-disbution of power on these Committees. It was a fact that those who sat below the Gangway were exactly the Members who were most inclined to economy in the Public Service, and it was they who ought to predominate on the Committee of Public Accounts, because they were the most jealous guardians of the public purse. He hoped the debate would be postponed until an arrangement could be made for enlarging the Committee. So far as he could see, it was the fashion to select these Committees without consulting any but a very small circle; and he thought it would be desirable to make an addition to the present names, and, perhaps, leave some of the present names out.

MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY said, he thought it was important on a Committee of this kind, which had to investigate Public Accounts, that the Three Kingdoms should be adequately represented, not merely on the principle of equality and fair distribution. Accounts relating to the different parts of the Kingdom came before this Committee, and instead of there being one Irish Member, as at present, he thought it desirable that there should be two, and that those two should be Gentlemen who had knowledge of the country, and who could fix their eyes on any particular Irish matter. Within the last two years they had seen some strange financial transactions in Ireland which had escaped the notice of the Government. In one case an officer in one branch of the Government service was carrying on a fraud—receiving money for a certain purpose and putting it into his pocket—and it was only the other day, after the end of four or five years, that it was discovered, and then under circumstances in which it was possible to prosecute, and the man escaped. Another case which he might mention was that of one of the Boards in Ireland which had lately been the subject of close investigation, not on account of fraud, but for gross mismanagement of public money. Now, if there had been a second Irish Member on this Committee, he would very likely have been able to direct attention to these matters. Besides, there was another principle which ought to be had regard to. As he understood, this Committee was re-appointed from year to year; and nothing short of death, paralysis, or defeat at election would get a Member off. That was an unfortunate thing. He thought new blood ought to be introduced, and that the principle of co-opting Members ought to be abandoned. They ought to encourage rising talent among the young Members, and at the same time have regard to the districts Members came from.

Notice taken, that 40 Members were not present; House counted, and 40 Members not being present,

House adjourned at a quarter after Nine o'clock.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Wednesday, 19*th February*, 1879.

MINUTES.]—Select Committee—East India (Public Works), *appointed* and *nominated;* Parliamentary Reporting, *re-appointed.*

Public Bills—*Ordered—First Reading*—Jurors' Remuneration * [81]; Licensing Boards (Scotland) (No. 2) * [82]; Assizes * [83].

Second Reading—Burial Law Amendment [10], *debate adjourned.*

ORDER OF THE DAY.

BURIAL LAW AMENDMENT BILL.

(*Mr. Balfour, Lord Francis Hervey, Mr. Wait.*)

[BILL 10.] SECOND READING.

Order for Second Reading read.

Mr. BALFOUR, in moving that the Bill be now read a second time, said, that the Resolution which had last year been brought forward on the subject by the hon. and learned Member for Denbighshire (Mr. Osborne Morgan), and which was rejected by a small majority, had been commended by him to the favourable consideration of the House on the ground that the long-pending controversy respecting burials in churchyards ought to be closed. If the Resolution had stopped there, there was not, he felt assured, a single hon. Member on either side of the House who would dissent from it; for he believed there was among all religious and political parties but one desire — namely, that this controversy should come to an end. He believed the present Bill contained a plan by which that object might be effected. So strongly was he of that opinion, that he had been induced to bring it forward in opposition to the wishes of many hon. Friends of his sitting around him, with whom in Church matters he generally concurred, and also against the wishes of the Government which he usually supported. Having made that remark, he thought it would be sufficient if he were to detail very shortly the main provisions of his Bill, the chief principle in which appeared to have been overlooked or misunderstood by many persons who had discussed it, and notably by a very influential newspaper in an article which it contained this morning. The main and central provision of the Bill had been put down by him on the Notice Paper as early as 1877, in the form of an Amendment upon the Motion of which the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite had given Notice, but did not bring forward. He had again put it down last Session, and it was now embodied as a substantive proposition in the present Bill, which had been drafted by his noble Friend (Lord Francis Hervey). Roughly speaking, the Bill had been drawn to attain three objects. The first was to give relief to the Clergy of the Established Church, and the provisions relating to that part of the subject would be found chiefly in the last clause of the measure. Another object was the preservation of the endowments to their original purpose. It was the more necessary that he should say something in reference to this portion of the Bill, because Petitions had been circulated among Members of both Houses of Parliament, in which it was stated that his Bill interfered with the rights of property, by handing over property originally given to the Church to the Nonconformists. That was a peculiarly gratuitous assumption, because by the 10th clause of the Bill its provisions were not to apply in the case where gifts of land for the purposes of burial had been made to the Church within the last 50 years. Therefore, whatever else might be said against the Bill, it could not be contended that it unduly interfered with the wishes of Church donors. But, important as they were, these two points were subordinate. The third and main object he sought to attain would be found in the 6th clause and the 7th section of the 10th clause. These two clauses taken together embraced the real marrow of his measure. By those two portions of the Bill it was provided that every single Nonconformist throughout the country, wherever he might have lived and wherever he might die, should be buried in the churchyard with such religious services as his friends might approve, care being taken, at the same time, that this gift should be handed over to the Nonconformists without any violation of the principle under which Church property was held. He conceived that his Bill was the only one of the six before the House which would attain these two desired objects. He admitted that his measure might be described as a compromise, and that it could not, therefore, any more than other compromises, afford full satisfaction to everybody; but he claimed for it the merit that, while on the one hand it gave to the Dissenters all that they could reasonably ask, it did not take from the Church its property. The main grievance which the Nonconformists had, and of which they had made a most successful political use, was that, as the law stood, they might have to be buried with forms which they disapproved in their lifetime, and of which their surviving relatives also disapproved. That was undoubtedly a substantial and a real grievance. He would not stay to inquire how that grievance originally arose, but that it existed no one even on the side of the House on which he sat would be bold enough to deny, and as it did exist it was only fair that it should be removed. His Bill really did remove it. So much for the Nonconformists. Looking at the measure from the point of view of the Established Church, he might bring forward considerations of a somewhat similar character. The debates in that House on this subject showed that hon. Members who had voted against the Bill of the hon. and learned Member opposite regarded the measures he had introduced as intended to be a step towards Disestablishment. Whether that was the intention with which the hon. and learned Member had introduced his Bills it was not for him to inquire; but certainly those measures had the appearance of having been introduced with that object, and it was clear that the principle upon which those Bills were supported might be applied with equal force to the churches as well as to the churchyards. It appeared to him, and also to the noble Lord who was associated with him on this question, that no Churchman could assent to a principle which would lead to Disestablishment, and therefore they had constantly voted against the Bills introduced by the hon. and learned Member. By the present measure, however, that dangerous principle was altogether avoided, because the gift to the Nonconformists was in some cases only temporary, and in all cases conditional. If Nonconformists had an absolute right to the churchyards then his Bill was unjust, because it gave them no indefeasible right to the churchyards. For instance, the Nonconformists would have no right to be buried in the churchyards under the Bill if there was a cemetery within three miles of such churchyard; and whenever a cemetery was established within that distance the right of the Nonconformists to be buried in the churchyard would cease. The course of historical events had no doubt produced a grievance, and he suggested a method by which that grievance should be dealt with; but, in doing so, he did not in any sense hand over ecclesiastical property to Nonconformists. It was an abuse of language to characterize the provisions of his Bill as having that effect. He therefore thought he had shown, on the one side, that the legitimate Nonconformist grievance was done away with, and, on the other, he had shown Churchmen that they would not be giving up any principle on which their right to ecclesiastical property depended, and that nothing done by this Bill could be used hereafter as an argument in support of Disestablishment. Having thus stated the main principle of his measure, he had nothing more to do but to commend it earnestly to the attention of hon. Members on both sides of the House. To his Nonconformist Friends he would say that they had been accused, justly or unjustly, of inventing or manufacturing grievances for political purposes, and that they had been accused of using those grievances with great skill as weapons for attaining their object of Disestablishment. They had been accused of using one set of arguments when they wanted to get rid of the church rates, and of using another set of arguments of an entirely opposite character now they wanted to get a footing in the churchyards. This, therefore, was the time for them to show that those accusations were groundless, by voting in favour of his Bill. If the main principles of his measure were accepted by hon. Members opposite, it would show that the motives which had formerly actuated them were either misunderstood or had lost their force. Unless, however, he had been greatly misinformed, he was afraid that his Bill would meet with a much less serious opposition from hon. Members opposite than from his hon. Friends around him. He sincerely trusted that this would not be the case. The grievances under which the Nonconformists suffered were confined to a few persons in a limited number of rural parishes; but the anxiety under which Churchmen suffered in respect of this question must be felt by every member of the Established Church. There was great danger to the Church Establishment through the impolitic resistance of Churchmen, who ought to be even more anxious than hon. Members opposite for a settlement of this vexed question. He had been compared to a General who, instead of holding out a stubborn resistance to the enemy, retreated when defeat was imminent; but if a strategic parallel were to be drawn, he would rather say that he was like a General who declined to fight for an outpost, which could be maintained only by an overwhelming sacrifice, and which could not in any case be held for long. He had often been asked tauntingly by hon. Members whether he intended to conciliate political Nonconformists by this act of concession? He expected to do no such thing. It would be a very poor compliment indeed to the political Nonconformists, who sought the Disestablishment of the Church, to expect that they would be content with accepting a right to be buried in a few churchyards in satisfaction of their far wider claims. But while he had no hope of conciliating them, he did expect, by means of this concession, to remove from their hands one of the most efficient and formidable weapons against the Established Church which they possessed. This was a question which, of all others, should not be fought by Churchmen *à l'outrance*. In the first place, the subject was one that appeared to the people at large, who had naturally little acquaintance with the historical aspects of the controversy, to be one which affected the Clergy rather than the Laity, and the privileges of the Clergy rather than their duties. This fact alone made the question a difficult one to fight; but, in the next place, the whole attitude of the Church had about it a flavour of intolerance, although, in strict point of fact, the law was not intolerant, inasmuch as no pressure whatever was brought to bear upon a man to induce him to change his opinions. There, however, was undoubtedly something shocking to the feelings in compelling a man's relations to see a service performed over him after death to which he objected during his lifetime. If any demonstration of this fact was required, it would be found in the opinions entertained in Scotland and in Ireland, and in the divisions which had occurred on this subject in both Houses of Parliament. In Scotland and in Ireland, of course, the question was no doubt imperfectly understood; but people in those parts of the United Kingdom regarded the attitude which had been taken by the Church of England on this subject as the mere insanity of intolerance. The divisions in both Houses of Parliament showed the tendency of the feeling which was entertained on this question by the average Laity of this country. No one would pretend to say that if it was supposed that the passing of a measure of this kind was a mere stepping-stone to Disestablishment and to a sequestration of Church property, that the divisions in the two Houses would have been what they were. The tendency of the large class of floating opinion was decidedly in favour of the Church; but it was not wedded to it by an indissoluble tie, and if it once received such a shock as would send it over to the Nonconformists, the days of Church Establishment would be numbered. It was evident to the eyes of all who could understand the signs of the times that this concession to the Nonconformists could not be much longer delayed. That concession, however, might be made in several ways. If wrested from Churchmen against their will, it might become a stepping-stone towards Disestablishment; but if made with sufficient safeguards, it might become an additional bulwark against it. In this way it might either become favourable to Churchmen or to the political Nonconformists. It was now within the power of Churchmen—and who knew how long it might be within their power? but it was certainly within their power now—to accept the more favourable of these alternatives, and he earnestly prayed his hon. Friends around him to assist him in carrying it. He wished to impress upon them that in trying to keep all they risked all; and that, from too great a determination to retain the churchyards in their power, they were endangering the whole fabric of the Established Church. In conclusion, he begged to move the second reading of the Bill.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."—(*Mr. Balfour.*)

MR. BERESFORD HOPE, in moving that the Bill be read a second time that day six months, said: I have to thank my hon. Friend, to whose eloquence we have been listening; for having made what is as good a speech as a man could make for his case, and by no means a bad speech, too, on my side. I have also to thank my noble Friend (Lord Francis Hervey), who was the draftsman of the Bill. It is very well drafted, as we might reasonably expect. No man in this House is so competent to draft a Bill on this subject as my noble Friend; for, whatever else our churchyards may be, everyone must own that they are "ancient monuments." I must also congratulate my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Denbighshire (Mr. Osborne Morgan), and other hon. Gentlemen I see opposite, on having selected, or having had bestowed upon them, so admirable a fugleman of their cause. My hon. and learned Friend has promised to vote for the second reading of this Bill, and the Liberation Society advertises in *The Nonconformist* its word of order to give a similar vote; and, accordingly, the Liberationists are voting in favour of the Bill of an hon. Gentleman who gets up and tells them, amidst cheers from this side of the House, that Dissenters have no claim to the churchyard, and similarly, and *à fortiori*, of course, no claim to the church. My hon. Friend, in the latter part of his speech, dwelt, in a very touching manner, upon the folly of our not giving up a part in the vain struggle to maintain the whole. That argument would be worth something if the something which he wants us to retain were worth anything. Our contention is that his Bill not only surrenders absolutely everything that is asked for by the other side, but surrenders that one thing also, which the French King is said to have boasted that he preserved—our honour—in the vain struggle. I put myself on the ground of my hon. Friend; and I assert that in endeavouring to retain the use, not of all but of a selected number of churchyards absolutely, and to acquire the power of ousting out of the remainder those who have got their foot into them by the action of this very measure, we surrender the principles which have made it our duty to contend for the maintenance of the existing system. My hon. Friend dwelt very strongly on his Bill only giving a temporary and incomplete user of the churchyards to the Nonconformists. Surely such a condition of matters would be intolerable! Either Dissenters must come in of right, and using, as they will do, the churchyards on an equal footing with everyone else as citizens, must retain their position permanently, or the present state of things must continue. I go thoroughly and entirely with hon. Members on the other side, and even with the Liberation Society, in condemning the injustice, the narrowness, the absence of logic, involved in grasping at a temporary advantage, and condescending to keep your own footing under those new and degrading conditions which are, as far as I can read this Bill, its most salient and flatulent elements. The Mover says that in his proposed provisions he has a great regard for property. Of course, he and I, like the Lincolnshire Farmer, have a great regard for property. But let the House consider in what difficulties this vain respect for property, grafted on a measure of regulated confiscation, would land us. Let us take the instance of two contiguous parishes, in one of which the churchyard was given 51 years ago, and in the other 49 years ago. To one of these my hon. Friend lets the Dissenter in, though only under his own proposed conditions, while he is to be ousted out of the other for ever. Can we suppose that such a provision can last for any time? Is it not a mere invitation to further agitation? What must come out of that 10th clause, which is propounded as the panacea for all existing troubles? Under it the Nonconformist is to be buried in one class of churchyards, but not all Nonconformists; only the Christian Nonconformist who has crystalized himself into a particular sect, which I deny that my hon. Friend has any right to force Nonconformists to do. We know there is such a thing as a Corporation sole, and I have never seen any reason why you should not have a Nonconformist Denomination sole made up of a single personage, or why two friends may not become a joint denomination, with an obligation on the survivor to bury the other with or without usages, and then to hand over a direction of burial for himself to his solicitor, who should officially inter his deceased and lamented client. My hon. Friend does not even allow the Nonconformist all round to be buried as he likes; he must be a member of a Christian sect, and have usages appropriate to that sect, which we know several sects have not got. Quakers have neither usages nor a distinct ministry. Your Nonconformist, he may not be a Christian, but belong to that influential and respectable denomination, whose distinctive peculiarity is that they hold a religion, not Christian, but anterior to Christianity. I must ask my hon. Friend why the Jews are quite shut out of all the good things of his Bill? Well, let the Jews answer for themselves. My hon. Friend knows a great deal, and he answers for the whole of the Clergy of the Church of England. He knows what their grievance is, and he knows how to settle it for them. He knows what the Jews would have, and the Secularists, too, I suppose; in short, he knows everything that everybody wants. He comes forward like Dr. Dulcamara, with his famous elixir, to make everybody young and well. I contend, however, that he proposes a remedy which is illusory and incomplete. He does not allow every Nonconformist to be buried with "usages," but only the one whose representatives can produce credentials—endorsed by whom I am utterly at a loss to conceive—that he was a Christian, leaving, however, the definition of "Christian" unexplained.

Supposing the state of things which he proposes ever to become an actuality, how long is it to last? The Nonconformist is in happy enjoyment of some churchyard in a pleasant county. He goes on burying in a "solemn and Christian" manner for 12 or 15 years, when suddenly some authority comes in to say that an anonymous benefactor has given an acre and a-half of land two miles and three-quarters off for the burial of Nonconformists. The next Dissenter who dies there is decently and quietly carried to that churchyard, in which the pre-deceased Dissenters have been buried for all those years; but the sexton stops the bier at the gate, and says —"Stop, gentlemen! A new cemetery has been provided under Mr. Balfour's Act. Take your body there." The executor will probably reply — "This is very hard; because some man, quite unknown to the place, and to whom that land is of no value, has chosen—perhaps to torment us—to give that barren corner, on which nothing but rushes have hitherto grown, therefore you are to drive us out of what we have been so long encouraged to look upon as our heritage." Does my hon. Friend seriously believe such a state of things would last? If we pass the second reading of this Bill, we simply pass the second reading of the Bill of the hon. and learned Member opposite (Mr. Osborne Morgan); so I, for my part, say if we are to be beaten, if we are to be ousted out of our own, let us fairly and honourably acknowledge that we are ousted out of our own—for the evasive attempt to parade ourselves as still holding something, while we have really lost the whole thing, is not respectable. That is what I mean, when I contend that we should lose all that the hon. and learned Member for Denbighshire would strip us of, and our honour to boot, if we accept this Bill. If we are turned out of the churchyard absolutely and wholly, we know the worst. We are prepared for the worst; and as honest, consistent, and conscientious men, we are able still to fight the battle for the churches which are menaced by the policy, towards which the Bill of the hon. and learned Member for Denbighshire is only the first step. He will, of course, get up and say that it is very unfair in me to impute such motives to him; he has no such wish. I fully grant this; but I must add that my hon. and learned Friend is too sharp a man of the world not to observe what is going on around him. He knows too much of what is behind the scenes not to be very well aware how many of those who most loudly support his Bill only advocate it, as this afternoon they only are advocating the Bill of the hon. Member for Hertford—namely, as the first step to ulterior objects. My hon. Friend the Member for Hertford may complain of being thought too halting, inconsistent, and grudging, in only giving one quarter of what is wanted, and that in the most ungracious way; but let him take this comfort to himself—the thorough-going Liberationist says the same of the Bill of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Denbighshire. I shall shortly prove this; but first let me place fairly before the House the demurrer which I mean to raise to any Burial Bill at all, except of a particular class. For purposes of argument, I grant there was a grievance some dozen years ago—a considerable one possibly—so long as church rates were compulsory. Whatever may have been the motives of the Liberation Society, many persons who do not belong to that Society thought that however much the Church might lose in money and prestige, there was reasonable expectation of closing the controversy by depriving the church rates of their compulsory character. I myself was one who held that opinion, and was accordingly looked upon as a very weak-kneed brother, and very sharply taken to task by sundry friends of mine. The Dissenters complained that they were taxed against their consciences, and the whole question was reduced to chaos by the decision of the Courts of Law that the minority in any parish could not make a rate. I held, therefore, that in face of this conviction of a grievance, we were right to remove it. But that being done, you took your compensation; and, in so doing, you surrendered any claim to urge the national character of churchyards. You said—"Let those who approve of what goes on in the churchyards have the churchyards." Having yielded that, we took a considerable burden on ourselves—no man has ever estimated how much it has cost Churchmen to surrender compulsory church rates; but we gave them up, and did so cheerfully; but not two years had passed over, after what ought to have been a settlement, and which was a most liberal compromise on our part, when you turned upon us and claimed to come in and use in your own way those churchyards, the whole expense of which you had thrown upon us. I see my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Denbighshire is prepared to get up and remind me, as he has done more than once before, that in the first draft of his Bill he did propose to restore the churchyard rate. I grant that. He may also tell me he found in me an opponent of that proposal; but was I not right to fight against a new rate? Can there have been anything more unpopular? Would it have ever gone down? I felt that, however an offer of a churchyard rate might have been made with the utmost *bona fides* by my hon. Friend, it would not go down with the House and would not go down with the country. You accepted our gift; you were very grateful for it; and then you turn round upon us and say—"Having made us a present of this money, be kind enough now to let us come in and make use of what we compelled you to maintain out of your own pockets." I believe the Mover, when he says they know very little about this question in Scotland or in Ireland. We well remember that although our majority was only 15 all round last year, the English Members—the people who are affected by and know something about it—who voted with us, gave an overwhelming majority of 101. My hon. Friend now comes forward and argues—"You had, no doubt, a majority of 101; but what business have people who know something about the matter to regulate it? I go to those who know nothing about it. I go to Scotland and Ireland. They live in pure and absolute ignorance of the English Burials Question; and, therefore, I call upon you to take the verdict of Scotland and Ireland." My hon. Friend, I know, can appeal to the precedent of a famous politician of the last century. He knows that Wilkes said he would appeal to the nonsense of the country against its sense, and boasted that he would win by 10 to 1. My hon. Friend proclaims himself the Wilkes of the 19th century.

However, I affirm that there is a possible solution of the controversy. We are so accustomed to be pillaged, that really the operation has become —I will not say pleasant — but less acutely painful than it was. Having given up our churchyard rates, we must proceed to extend the cemetery principle over the country as far as we can. It is already the established rule at the centres of Liberation agitation in all our great towns such as London, Manchester, and Birmingham. It exists in those places where speechifiers and lecturers have declaimed most loudly—they are out of the wood—they have settled the matter, and got what they pretended at the outset to want. It is an easy and pleasant amusement for them, in the interest of their "three hundreds," or "four hundreds," or whatever the number may be, to claim relief from a grievance which does not touch them. The fire does not singe even a hair of their heads, and yet they scream as if they were in the flames. Well, I promised the House a little taste of the eloquence and arguments of the gentleman whose mouthpiece, my hon. Friend, with touching innocence, has become. There is Dr. Landels, an eminent preacher of the Gospel of Charity, on whose words, on successive Lord's Days, Christians hang with becoming reverence. What is the message of Dr. Landels ?—

> "Do not conceal the fact that this (taking the 'fortress,' *i.e.*, the 'Church') is our final aim, and that we cannot rest satisfied until that aim has been realized. Our clerical friends, in arguing against the Burials Bill, tell us, with refreshing simplicity, that if we get into the churchyards we shall want to get into the church next. What charming innocents they must be to put it thus ! I think that if, by getting into the churches, they mean that we shall demand to have national property employed for national purposes, and not reserved for the exclusive use of a sect, why, then, of course, we mean to get the churches. And, what is more, if our right to the churches is as good as our right to the churchyards, we will succeed in getting what we demand."

My hon. Friend the Member for Hertford has virtually, though he does not say it, admitted their right to the churchyards ; virtually, then, he must have admitted, according to Dr. Landels, their right to the churches. But there is another gentleman even more eminent than Dr. Landels—Mr. Dale, of Birmingham—and what says Mr. Dale ?—

> "Nonconformists had not concealed what their real intentions were. What they were going in for was complete religious equality in life as well as in death, and as they asserted the graveyards belonged to the parish, so they asserted that the church belonged to the parish. They did not intend to disguise how far their principles carried them."

Mr. Beresford Hope

Here is my hon. Friend, who kindly helps them with the invitation—"Come, my friends, allow me to drive you a mile or two." Indeed, my hon. Friend's Bill itself starts under very favourable auspices. There is Mr. Carvell Williams, a gentleman of considerable eminence in the Liberation Society, of which he is, or was, the secretary. This gentleman published, two years ago, a pamphlet on *The Present Position of the Burials Question ;* and after observing the Notice of my hon. Friend's Bill, he has gratified the world by bringing out a second edition, continued down to the present time. His estimate of this Bill, the second reading of which he and his Society advocate, is as follows :—

> "The practical objections to the proposed limitations are as strong as the legal objections. For is it likely that the public would long tolerate the co-existence of two descriptions of churchyards—namely, those in which the ancient restrictions were abolished, and others in which they existed in full force ? Would not a second agitation, to secure what the first had failed to accomplish, be inevitable ? And would it not be certain to succeed ?"

Certainly, and in my hon. Friend's lifetime. But there is an influential Dissenting paper—*The Nonconformist*—and what says this organ about the Bill of my hon. Friend ? On the 11th of December, while the Bill was still in its fresh and salad days, *The Nonconformist* said—

> "There is, perhaps, some advantage in the fact that this time the debate will be initiated by a Tory—especially by one who goes so far in Mr. Morgan's direction as Mr. Balfour unquestionably does ; because, while he must of necessity rest his case to some extent on the same facts as those adduced by the Member for Denbighshire, his principal aim must be to convince Churchmen and Conservatives of the practical wisdom of making timely concessions rather than wait for a complete, as well as an inevitable, defeat."

I think there is considerable practical wisdom in that, so I read it for the edification of my hon. Friend. I resume my extract—

> "His motives may differ from Mr. Morgan's, but he will practically be his ally, though an ally who cannot yet screw his courage up to the full measure of Mr. Morgan's demand."

Just as the hon. and learned Member for Denbighshire cannot yet, I believe, screw his courage up to the full demand of the Liberation Society. That article appeared in December ; and on February the 12th, *The Nonconformist* returns to the charge, in anticipation of this debate, and says of this Bill that—

> "With all its defects, it unquestionably destroys the clerical monopoly, by allowing other than Church of England burial rites in churchyards, and also allowing other persons than its Clergy to officiate. Obviously, therefore, the measure is not one to be met by indiscriminate opposition; more especially as the restrictive provisions which make the measure, as it stands, inadequate and inconsistent, are such as can be modified with great facility."

Now I must call the attention of the House to another phase of the matter. I supposed, with all our dissensions, that there was one point upon which all right-thinking men, whether Christians or non-Christians, Churchmen or Dissenters, Conservatives or Liberals, were more than agreed:—That whenever, with general consent, a painfully-crowded churchyard can be closed, and whenever the piteous spectacle of ragged grave-heaps, where, if disturbed, the mouldering remains of former generations are turned up by the sexton's spade, can be removed, it should be done; and with it the dangers to the public health of corruption tainting the air and the water-springs. I believed it was agreed that when a well-kept cemetery could be supplied instead, it was a good thing, not only for the Church but for the State, and for the health and happiness of everyone. I fancied a general conviction, whether openly formulated or not, that the development of cemeteries was a practical solution of the question. I have never concealed that I looked upon the development to terminate the strife, as the only possible, I will not say compromise, but as the only possible, reasonable, and workable solution of this question. I thought, at last, we had come to unanimity upon that one point. I could not have believed that ingenuity could have been carried so far as to make the extension of cemeteries a battle-field between Churchmen and Dissenters, or that any legislator could have conceived a scheme which would have made it to the interest of the Liberation Society to put a check upon the provision of cemeteries. I should have laughed at the suggestion that the maintenance of our crowded churchyards, with typhus haunting their purlieus and poisoned water distilling out of the soil, could have been connected with a political advantage. But now I have lived to see that in the Bill of my hon. Friend. The vice of his Bill is that it is built upon the principle of revocable concession, as to which, I tell hon. Members on both sides of the House, that revocable concession is the one thing impossible in politics. Whatever one may think of special applications, we all know that the principle of modern legislation is that when a thing is settled you must accept it and make the best of it. That is the understanding upon which Constitutional liberty, the Parliamentary system, and Government by Party are possible in this land, because all sides have accepted that fundamental agreement. We see abroad the evils which have flowed from the imperfect and inconsistent acceptance of it, even in lands constitutionally governed. Well, but if this impolitic and impossible principle of revocable concession ever was embodied in any measure it is embodied in the Bill of my hon. Friend. I had to touch upon that point a few minutes since. I touch upon it again. I pointed out what would be the position in a parish in which the Church had been beaten, as it would be if the Bill passed, and accepted its beating, and in which Nonconformists had practically used the churchyard. There might come in the personal donor, with his cemetery at a little distance, and all the ill-blood and disunion and controversy would begin again. That is the practical result that we should get from the principle of revocable concession, which is the backbone of this Bill. I invite the House to consider what must the upshot be. To make the development of cemeteries a Liberation grievance, to put crowded churchyards now and Disestablishment hereafter against the Church of England, and cemeteries open to all. What a preposterous conclusion to bring matters to!—and not less mischievous than preposterous. Does not this consideration demonstrate, with a certainty absolutely mathematical, that this Bill of my hon. Friend is as a settlement of the matter illusory, and that the only possible satisfaction which any person can anticipate from it is the conclusion which the Liberationists will surely reach—that if it passes, half, at least, of the Bill of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Denbighshire—and that the worst part—will have passed;

while as to that which it preserves, it overlaps even that with such fantastical and irritating restrictions, as only to make the future passing infinitely more certain. On that account, I do not blame my hon. and learned Friend for announcing that he intends to vote for the second reading. I should consider him and his Friends very much wanting in the first elements of political tactics, if they did not do so. The only thing I might blame him for was proclaiming his vote beforehand. It was candid and magnanimous; but if he and his Friends had only kept their counsels in the dark, some Conservatives on this side—some "innocents," as Dr. Landels calls us—might have voted with my hon. Friend, and swollen his followers. For its part, the other side might have adopted the strategy recommended in the columns of a newspaper called *The Liberator*—

> "The citadel of the Establishment must be approached by mines, such as the Press and the Post Office afford; and in view of a General Election, it is the conviction of the electors you must win over."

I do not venture to guess when there may be a General Election; but whether it is to be this year or next, it is clear that the mighty shadow of "bunkum" is throwing its gloom over our deliberations, and people are talking with a view to what can only now be figuratively called the hustings. So I pardon my hon. Friend the Member for Hertford for giving expression to his political opinions, and having very proper regard and respect for the account he must one day render. But then, I put it to him, has he done what he wanted? Does he think his Bill a success? Is he proud of himself for the performance? Whom has he got to cheer him on his way? What Bishop, or Dean, or Archdeacon, or rural Dean; what Rector, Vicar, Curate, or Workhouse Chaplain, has he ever found to come forward and say—"*Ave Liberator?*" So far as one can tell, Church opinion has said—"This Bill won't do. It gives up what we think very precious, and it gives nothing in return." And when we turn to the other side, what do they say? They say, perhaps—"This is a very kind and scholarly offer of an accomplished gentleman, who proposes what he thinks will gratify us and meet all our grievances; while he says himself that he has drafted it in intentional contradiction of the claim which underlies our special case." My hon. Friend, acknowledging that he is legislating for a presumed grievance, brings his proposal before the House with much eloquence, in a speech in which he tells self-chosen clients—"You are an unreasonable set of agitators, asking what you have no right to ask. I do not mean to give you what you ask; but I mean to give you something that is so like what you ask for, that although it is not what you ask for, and although you know, and we know, too, that it is not so, yet it will help us to say we have met your demands, and perplex you to show that we have not; while we shall be free to denounce you for being so unreasonable as not to be contented with our thoroughly illusory offer." Some people may think that a statesman-like offer; but it can be only such if it is successful, if it goes down, if it takes anyone in—that is not a Parliamentary phrase, so I will say instead—if it carries conviction to the mind of anyone on either side of the House. If it does not carry conviction; if it is seen through as soon as it is propounded, then the sooner he drops it the better, for he will not settle the matter. My hon. Friend must not think I do not thoroughly and entirely believe in his absolute and perfect sincerity. I do so. It is my conviction of his sincerity that compels me to go into the subject with greater fulness than I might otherwise have done in trying to make him and my noble Friend below him see the matter as I believe it is seen by the great majority on this side of the House, and seen, as I am perfectly convinced, by the entire body of Members opposite, and by the entire body both of those who only wish to carry the Bill of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Denbighshire pure and simple, and to stop there, and of those whose policy is merely to use his Burials Bill as a stepping-stone to that so-called religious equality which the Liberation Society and the whole body of political Dissenters, so-called, through the country, proclaim to be their ultimate aim.

My hon. Friend will possibly urge that all Dissenters are not political Dissenters. I agree with him, and I believe there are many amongst the Noncomformist body who are not political Dissenters. I respect those who, while they cling to the dogmas which approve themselves to their consciences, and while they desire to worship God in the forms which move their spiritual nature, yet do not look on religion as the handmaid of politics, but desire to live in peace with their fellow-citizens, the Churchmen, in the full conviction that those fellow-citizens are equally desirous of being at peace with them. But why do they keep themselves in hiding? There was a time when the shining and conspicuous lights of Noncomformity were venerable men like Watts, Doddridge, Wesley, and other great names of the last century. They were not political but religious Noncomformists. But where can we find such as they were now? We are not to blame if we are driven to interpret the silence of unpolitical Noncomformists as something like an admission of failure, and a virtual surrender to the more violent members of the partnership. They let the Liberation Society speak for them. Dissenting literature speaks for them in the speeches of Dr. Landels and Mr. Dale, the articles of their favourite newspapers, the leaflets of the Liberation Society, and the words of Mr. Spurgeon, when he brags that—

> "To ravine like a wolf, and to plunder like a freebooter, has been the peculiar prerogative of the Church of England."

Yet who bears so distinguished a name in the Dissenting ministry as Mr. Spurgeon? Who is more looked up to as a pastor of souls by those who hang on his ministry? The Christian charity of such a sentiment we must all admire! But I wonder what Mr. Spurgeon would say, if an equally pious and equally distinguished preacher of our Church were to use the language of Mr. Spurgeon and Dr. Landels with regard to the sects to which they belong. The non-political Nonconformists have abdicated their position, and they now hold their tongue. They may have been convinced by more vehement polemics. They may be simply cowed and scared. They may be afraid of social excommunication, which people quite as much dread now as they formerly quailed before ecclesiastical censure. They may not dare to come forward, or to appear as black sheep among the "true blue" believing Christians. But we tell them —"So long as that is the case, we must measure you by your own measure, and pay you the compliment of thinking that you believe in the sincerity of your own chosen leaders' uncontradicted denunciations." If, however, you wish the Burials Question to be peacefully settled in any way at all, you must let me tell you to repudiate the Liberation Society and all its works. Do not revel in its vehement assertions, its flatulent platitudes, its burly denunciations. You must not mislead and trifle with us by parading statistics such as those which you have been parading lately, when you struggle to prove that there are 19,000 or 20,000 Dissenting places of worship in the country, when you know as well as we do that the places of worship which show any guarantee of fixity, by being licensed for marriage, only number 8,200, and that amongst the remainder that go to make up your alleged 19,000, you have I do not know how many railway arches, several harmonic halls, various rooms in cottages, the Agricultural Hall, and the Holborn Circus. All these places are licensed for Nonconformist worship, and help to swell up the statistics upon which you rely in order to discredit the visible proofs of the Church's growth in influence, popularity, and visible resources.

Now, then, as to the last clause about the clerical grievance. I wish to ask my hon. Friend whether—good as his intentions are—he acts wisely by trying to meet a grievance of the Church of England in such questionable company as the remainder of his Bill? Supposing you were to bring that clause in by itself, it would be acceptable on its own merits, and, at any rate, it could be discussed on independent grounds; but the Mover only prejudices the question by confounding it with others of so different a complexion, and making it necessary for us to reject it when it is brought in as the comet's tail of this rocket. Its fate must be the usual fate of whatever is left of a rocket when the illumination is over. And, thereby, what does he do? He only renders a possible remedy for the clergy more impossible by coming forward unasked, and not only without tangible support, but with most tangible opposition as to his main intentions from those whose mouthpiece he wishes to make himself.

I have spoken at length; but we have heard so much of this as the burning question of the day, and as really the one matter which divides Parties, that I felt I could not do adequate justice to it without trying to present an analysis in various aspects of what is certainly a very important and a very tangled controversy. I most heartily acknowledge all that earnest and devoted Churchmen owe to anyone who proposes remedies in the belief that he will restore peace to the Church and contentment to men's minds; but I think, Sir, that I have proved that all which my hon. Friend proposes, when brought together, is inharmonious and impossible; that his concessions are not only the precise concessions which we think it would be most mischievous to make, and that they are not only difficult to make without leading to other concessions still more mischievous, but in themselves over-weighted by fantastical and irritating limitations. But, Sir, I wish particularly to press upon the House that if my hon. Friend did succeed in carrying his Bill, if it could pass through its stages and receive the Royal Assent this week, yet people's feelings would be much more bitter and the matter would be in a much more hopeless state than now. The other side would, of course, only take the Bill as a stepping-stone, and would at once agitate to get rid of its restrictions, and we should be angry with the other side for doing so. That would naturally lead to a much worse fever of irritation and recrimination, to a much more hopeless antagonism—tending, perhaps, to the downfall of the Established Church—and therefore, as we believe, to the heavy detriment of spiritual religion. It is for these reasons that I move that the Bill of my hon. Friend be read a second time this day six months.

Mr. MARTEN seconded the Amendment. The Bill had been, he said, recommended to the House by the hon. Member for Hertford (Mr. Balfour) on the ground that it was a compromise. In a compromise, however, there must be two parties, and it was therefore well that the House should know in what spirit the other party with whom the compromise was to be made accepted the proposal. They were, no doubt, willing that the Bill should be read a second time, with avowed intent of assimilating it in Committee to the Bill of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Denbighshire (Mr. Osborne Morgan); and accordingly that hon. and learned Gentleman himself had, with his usual frankness, placed upon the Paper Notice of his intention of moving, when the Bill reached that stage, the omission of those very safeguards which the hon. Member for Hertford relied on when recommending it to the acceptance of his political Friends. The hon. and learned Member for Denbighshire proposed, for example, to omit entirely the 10th clause, which provided for the protection of churchyards which had been dedicated within 50 years of the passing of the Act, or where there was a cemetery within three miles. If the Bill was intended as a compromise, how was it being accepted? Instead of being accepted in the conciliatory spirit in which it was made, it was entirely repudiated, and the principal safeguard was to be rejected. Again, the hon. and learned Member for Denbighshire proposed that, instead of saying that the burial service should be a religious service or ceremony agreeable to the usages of the religious society of which the deceased person was a member, it should simply be conducted in a "decent and orderly" manner. It was quite consistent with that that there should be an address delivered at the open grave by some person professing atheistical opinions, and who declared under the shadow of the Church that he did not believe in a God, and had no faith in any religious service whatsoever. It was evident, therefore, that his hon. Friend's attempt at a compromise had failed, so far as the hon. and learned Member for Denbighshire was concerned. In the second part of his remarks his hon. Friend had confessed that one of his chief objects was to take out of the hands of the Nonconformists their strongest weapon for the Disestablishment of the Church. But the Bill would fail of silencing the political Dissenters. On the contrary, they were promised a further agitation. The object of the Liberation Society was to proceed by steps, and if all the concessions asked by the hon. and learned Member for Denbighshire were granted, the opponents of the Church would accept their new position not as a settlement, but only as a step for further advance. Therefore, on the two principal grounds on which the proposal was recommended—namely, compromise and the disarmament of the foes of the Established

Church—the Bill would clearly prove to be a failure. In the next place, the Bill contained provisions which were open to very serious objection. At present, Nonconformists had as much legal right as Churchmen to burial in churchyards. If it was said that this Bill gave no more rights than now existed, he denied that assertion. The 5th clause contained a positive declaration of the right of burial. That clause was most pernicious. Either the law as at present ascertained in regard to the right of burial was satisfactory or it was not. If it was satisfactory, that declaration was superfluous. If it was not satisfactory, let them have a measure fairly defining that right. But this Bill contained a declaration which was unnecessary unless it was intended to make some serious change in the law; and if such a change was to be made, its exact nature ought to be clearly stated and fully explained. It was urged in favour of the Bill that it was a stopgap, providing for the use by Nonconformists, with their own services, of churchyards until such time as cemeteries should be established. But, looking at the measure as one of a provisional nature, it was open to objection, because it dealt with important principles which must be of a permanent character. Mere stopgap legislation should interfere as little as possible with the feelings of large bodies of the people. But the great objection to the Bill was that it would seriously check and discourage that most beneficial improvement which had been going on for many years past in this country—namely, the general introduction of cemeteries. Throughout the Kingdom the existing churchyards were in many cases over-full, and in the majority of cases were a danger to the villages in which they were situated. The time had come when they should re-affirm, on sanitary grounds, the old maxim of the Twelve Tables, that sepulture should take place away from human habitations. There could, moreover, be nothing more repulsive to every right feeling than that people should go to the House of God surrounded by all the foul and decaying elements of humanity. They ought to insist on that being done for the rural districts which had been already done for the towns, and that the dead should not be buried in such a way as to endanger the health of the living. If Dissenters encouraged the formation of cemeteries, they would be pursuing a course in accordance with their own principles, and they would all be returning to the practice of the primitive Church. In the first seven centuries of the Christian era the places of burial were situated at a distance from the churches, and churchyards were introduced when superstition crept into the Church in connection with the practices of the priests, who prayed for the dead. He, therefore, now advocated a return to the early Christian usage. During the past 23 years the establishment of cemeteries in the country had proceeded much faster than the public generally supposed. From 1853 to 1875, in London alone, there were closed, either wholly or partially, 208 consecrated and 92 unconsecrated burial-grounds; and in the country, from 1854 to 1875, there were closed, either wholly or partially, 1,705 consecrated burial-places, and 1,143 unconsecrated burial-places. The result was that in London and the country together there were closed, either wholly or partially, in 23 years, 1,913 consecrated and 1,235 unconsecrated burial-places, making a total of 3,148. All these were dealt with by Orders in Council, and were practically closed; for, as explained by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Assheton Cross) in this House in 1876, the meaning of the term "partially closed" was, as a rule, that the closing was complete, subject to a reservation in favour of certain vaults. In the same period, on the other hand, between 600 and 700 cemeteries had been opened. These were available for 14,000,000 of the population of England and Wales, out of a total population of 22,000,000. The rural population amounted to about 13,000,000, and even if the whole of the 8,000,000 still unprovided for were in the rural districts, still 5,000,000, or one-third of the total rural population, had already cemeteries provided. Looking at what had already been done, it could not be regarded as a work either of great difficulty or requiring any great length of time to make provision for the remainder. Thus, by a great sanitary reform, they would be entirely relieved of that vexed religious question. He contended, therefore, that that should be treated wholly as a sanitary question.

It was said that the Nonconformists had a strong feeling upon this matter; but it should be remembered that Churchmen also had strong feelings, which were equally worthy of respect. With regard to the provision of cemeteries, he desired to say a few words on one point—namely, the necessity of consecration. Some time ago he had published a letter on the subject, in consequence of which many clergymen had written to him to say that in their opinion the consecration by the Bishop of the churchyard was not necessary. The Bishop of Ely, in a Charge delivered in 1877 in reference to that subject, had expressed the same view, and stated that he conceived it was undesirable to perpetuate the custom of dividing a cemetery into consecrated and unconsecrated parts. A strong preference was often shown, even among Nonconformists, for interment in consecrated ground; and if in particular districts there was a desire felt to have one portion of a cemetery consecrated and another unconsecrated, that desire might be gratified. But it was important to know on so high an authority as the Prelate to whom he had alluded that it was not ecclesiastically necessary that the ground should be severed into consecrated and unconsecrated parts; but that the cemetery of the future, if desired, should be appropriated by law to purposes of burial, and should not require any other or more formal service of consecration. That would greatly diminish the expense of providing cemeteries. It had also been said that it was unnecessary to have two chapels, or any chapel at all; and if that view were adopted nothing would be required for the cemetery but some building as a means of shelter. He had had calculations made as to the expense of establishing cemeteries, and they showed that it would be of a trifling character. A gentleman of great experience had calculated the expense of establishing 30 cemeteries in the sanitary district of South Molton, Devonshire, from which it appeared that the purchase of the land and the erection of mortuary chapels would involve the expenditure of a sum which, borrowed at the usual rate for 30 years, would on the rateable value amount to rather less than 1*d*. in the pound. No doubt, donations of land would be given in many instances for cemeteries, and the present churchyards might advantageously be converted into church gardens under proper conditions. In conclusion, he should regard the adoption of that Bill as a retrograde step; for, so far from promoting the welfare of the people at large, it would give a great discouragement to a beneficent sanitary reform, now in progress, and would also pave the way not for future religious peace, but for permanent and most serious religious strife.

Amendment proposed, to leave out the word "now," and at the end of the Question to add the words "upon this day six months."—(*Mr. Beresford Hope.*)

Question proposed, "That the word 'now' stand part of the Question."

SIR CHARLES FORSTER: Sir, I am not going to trespass on the House for more than a few minutes; but as reference has been made to the liberality of the Scotch Church as to burials, I wish to give an instance of it which will powerfully appeal to the feelings of those hon. Members who sat, as I did for many Sessions, with the late Lord Marjoribanks, better known as David Robertson, the genial and popular Member for Berwickshire. When I visited him some time back at his hospitable abode at Ladykirk, I was shown the parish church, rich in ancestral monuments and memorials of Flodden Field. There, not in the churchyard, but in what before the change of religion was the altar chancel, the vault of the Robertson family was situated. There, Sir, some few years afterwards, the honoured remains of our lamented friend were gathered to his kindred dust, the service being conducted in the old Scotch kirk according to the Episcopalian rites, and the words of interment pronounced by his own Episcopalian minister. Why will not English Churchmen take an example from Scotch Presbyterians in this respect, by throwing open their burial-grounds to their Dissenting brethren? Talk of additional cemeteries, silent burials, or approved selected services as fitting solutions of the question! Surely the true solution is to be found in the combination of common sense with the slightest tincture of Christian charity. It cannot be too distinctly known that none of these miserable makeshifts can be accepted. We ask you to recognize the ancient common law right of every parishioner to sepulchre in the parochial burial-ground, and to allow the exercise of that rite on terms of perfect religious equality. But in truth, Sir, our opponents know, especially after what has happened in "another place," how untenable is their position, and if the citadel of bigotry and intolerance has not finally surrendered, the defenders have at least begun to capitulate. It was an instance of judicial blindness on the part of the Government that they did not avail themselves of the Amendment carried in the House of Lords to settle the question. Another opportunity has been now offered to them in the Bill of the hon. Member for Hertford, who makes his proposal in the interest of the Church. It is not for me to give advice to hon. Gentlemen opposite; but I should have thought the commonest dictates of prudence would have induced them to remove this stumbling-block from their path before the next General Election. But, Sir, before sitting down, I desire to put it to Churchmen whether, when they see the gathering clouds and the danger, not only from within but from without, whether, under these circumstances, it is wise and prudent to aggravate the perils of the position by refusing such an equitable proposition as that contained in the Motion of my hon. Friend? If such Motions are obstinately resisted year after year, with all the strength of Party organization, it requires no great prescience to foretel that on the next turn of the political wheel the force of the ascending Party will naturally be directed against an institution identified with so much injustice, and the days of the Establishment are numbered.

MR. WILBRAHAM EGERTON believed he had had as good opportunities as any Member of that House for ascertaining the opinions of Churchmen on this Burials Question. He had attended many Diocesan Conferences at which the almost unanimously expressed opinion was adverse to a Bill like that of the hon. and learned Member for Denbighshire (Mr. Osborne Morgan) or that of the hon. Member for Hertford (Mr. Balfour). Although the latter hon. Gentleman claimed to act on behalf of the Church of England, he believed the majority of the Clergy did not share the hon. Member's views. Churchmen in general had no desire whatever to enter into a compromise such as the hon. Member proposed. Indeed, their experience of giving up points was not of a kind to induce them to make further concessions. When the church rates were abolished, it was said that the last shred of intolerance was done away with; but within a few years an agitation had commenced for obtaining possession of the churchyards. In his judgment, the present Bill attacked the property of the Church of England in a very serious way. No doubt his hon. Friend was sincere in disclaiming such an intention; but his measure was more in accordance with the views of the Liberation Society than those of an ardent supporter of the Church. For his part, he should like to know whether any hon. Member connected with that Society was prepared to get up and express his concurrence in the statement, made by its lecturers, that the property of the Church was the property of the nation, and that, therefore, it ought to be in the hands of all sects indiscriminately. If any claim of that kind was to be made in the House it should be presented distinctly and boldly, when it could be answered. How, he asked, did the Liberationists get over the Preambles of the Statutes of Edward III. and Henry VIII., which clearly affirmed that the property of the Church was given for the benefit of the Church, not by the State, but by private individuals? It was true that the hon. Member for Hertford did not go so far as the Liberation Society, which said that the churchyard ought to be vested in the general ratepayers of a parish. The claim of the Liberationists applied not only to the churchyards, but also to the churches themselves, which they alleged were the property of the nation. The Bill of the hon. Member for Hertford went too far for hon. Members on the Government side of the House and not far enough for hon. Members on the other, and for that reason it ought to be rejected. The supporters of the measure were those who wished to go further than the hon. Member. He maintained that the Amendments proposed to the present Bill would render it identical with that of the hon. and learned Member for Denbighshire, and if that Bill became law the Church of England would be the only religious body which could not hold land for its own purposes. This was not so much a clerical question as it had been said, but a question especially of interest to laymen, because it affected not only corporate but individual property. He denied that the Nonconformists had any grievance in this matter, many of them had not the slightest objection to burial in the churchyard with the Service of the English Church. He knew of the case of a minister of an Independent congregation in his neighbourhood who preferred being buried by the clergyman of the Church of England in the parish churchyard, rather than in the neighbourhood of his own chapel. The real grievance arose from a sense of irritation on the part of the Dissenting minister, who, feeling his social inferiority to the clergyman in regard to holding the Burial Service, was now agitating for a position not merely equal to, but superior to, that occupied by the clergyman. Not for a moment did he contend that this Burials Question was in a perfectly satisfactory state. The circumstance of there being six Bills before the House proved that the reverse was the case. He thought, however, that this discussion was not likely to lead to legislation at the present time. Still, there was now a favourable opportunity of discussing the whole subject, and possibly suggestions might be made of which the Government could take advantage. He did not think this was a matter to be taken up by private Members; and although he had a little Bill of his own on the subject, he intended to press it forward only in the just possible event of the hon. Member for Hertford's Bill passing. At the same time, he was decidedly of opinion that it would be better for the Government to take the matter up. It was impossible to satisfy the political Dissenters; but he should, nevertheless, be glad if something could be done to remove anything like a real grievance on this subject. At any rate, he was sure of this—that whenever legislation took place it would be necessary to study the position of the Clergy of the Church of England, and to see that they were not unfairly treated. They certainly ought to be relieved from the obligation of reading the Burial Service in certain cases. Hon. Members on that side of the House would not be justified in voting for this Bill, which the hon. Member for Hertford had brought forward, no doubt with the best intentions, but the consequences of which he could not foresee. The noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition had recently made a speech at Liverpool, in which he stated that the Liberal Party were pledged to religious equality, and to remove the inequalities of the laws that affected burials. Those inequalities he described as an injustice, a grievance, and a social stigma. That was a grave charge; but, as far as injustice went, there would be a far greater injustice in confiscating the property given by Churchmen for Church purposes than in anything now suffered by the Nonconformists. With regard to the social stigma, if it were a grievance at all, it was hard to see how it could be removed without giving Dissenting ministers the right to officiate in the churches as well as in the churchyards. Moderate as might be the views of the noble Lord as expressed at Liverpool, there was good reason to believe that what Members below the Gangway thought today the Leaders above the Gangway thought to-morrow. They were therefore bound, as prudent men, to see in what direction they were going. The noble Marquess did not look with favour at present on the Disestablishment of the Church of England; but in the speech which he delivered last year at Glasgow the noble Lord went a great deal further, for he said in reference to the Disestablishment of the Church of Scotland—

> "When the time comes, as I have said it may come, that Scotch opinion shall be fully formed on the subject, the Liberal Party in England will do its best to give effect to that Scotch opinion without undue consideration being given to other circumstances connected with the question."

He would ask the noble Lord to apply the same argument to this question. The English Members of the House had repeatedly, by large majorities, expressed their opinion that these Burials Bills ought not to be carried, and he submitted that the opinion of the English Members ought to be respected in questions of this kind, in which English Members — and especially the rural districts — alone were interested. As had been pointed out, there was a strong case for the extension of cemeteries, when future requirements were taken into consideration. He thought that where there were any number of Nonconformists the landowners in such districts would be glad to give land for the burial of Nonconformists. He believed that if a short Bill were passed facilitating the formation of parochial cemeteries in rural districts, the *bonâ fide* grievances of Baptists, who wished to have rites performed by their own ministers, would die away in the course of a few years. The churchyards belonged to the Church of England, and could not be taken away from it without confiscation. The real grievance on this question, so far as conscientious Nonconformists were concerned, was infinitesimally small, and did not affect one-tenth of the Dissenters of this country. In his opinion, the proper remedy for the present vexed state of the Burials Question was to afford increased facilities for establishing cemeteries in rural districts. He, therefore, called upon Churchmen and all Members who on that side had voted against the Bill of the hon. and learned Member opposite (Mr. Osborne Morgan), to vote against the Bill of the hon. Member for Hertford (Mr. Balfour), which would not satisfactorily settle this vexed question.

MR. ROBERTS wished to say a few words on the subject before the House, because it was one in which his constituents, and the people of Wales generally, felt the deepest interest. He was not going to take up the time of the House, and so to help in putting off a division on the Bill, by dwelling at any length on the discursive speech of the hon. Member who moved the Amendment; but he objected to the manner in which he had presumed to divide Nonconformists into sections, and to the motives which he ascribed for their actions. The hon. Member, and others who followed him, had spoken repeatedly of political and of non-political Dissenters. He wanted to know why they should speak of political Dissenters more than of political Churchmen? But to let that pass, he had been much interested in the criticisms of the hon. Member for Cambridge University (Mr. Beresford Hope) on those clauses in the Bill on which his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Denbighshire (Mr. Osborne Morgan) had given Notice of Amendments; and he trusted that when they went into Committee, they might rely on the valuable assistance of the hon. Member in making the Bill into what he termed a consistent Bill. The hon. Member for Mid-Cheshire (Mr. Wilbraham Egerton) had said many things on which he (Mr. Roberts) would have liked to follow him, but he must refrain for the reason given before; but the hon. Member had said that this question was not merely a clerical one, but one for laymen as well as the Clergy. In that he entirely agreed, and he ventured to say that if the question had been left to the decision of the laymen of the Church, it would long since have been settled. In proof of that assertion, he might mention that whereas nearly 15,000 clerical signatures were obtained in a few days to a Petition against Lord Harrowby's Amendment in the Lords, a canvass, described by a clerical correspondent in *The Times* as a most energetic one, only succeeded in obtaining 28,000 lay signatures to a Petition against his hon. and learned Friend's Resolution—that was, less than two lay signatures against that of each clergyman. But what he rose to say was that in Wales the difficulty which the Bill of the hon. Member for Hertford (Mr. Balfour) sought to solve was not an abstract one; not, as had been said by hon. Members opposite, a manufactured or fancied grievance, but a real practical grievance, with which they were brought into contact almost daily. The majority of the people of Wales were Nonconformists; the cemeteries in the Principality were few in number, and very unequally distributed. Such burial-grounds as were attached to chapels were generally very limited in area; so that, as a matter of fact, parish churchyards in most districts formed the only burial-grounds available, and it was unfair that the right to use these parish burial-grounds should be clogged with onerous conditions by imposing the use of a Service which, though beautiful and appropriate, was distasteful because it was enforced upon them, and by debarring Nonconformist ministers from saying a word of comfort or of exhortation to their own people at the grave-side of their departed friends. There had been many instances in which the unfairness and disadvantage of the present state of the law had been prominently shown. Reference had been made, he believed, in the House before to the funeral of the Rev. Henry Rees, the father-in-law of the hon. Member for Anglesey. Nearly 1,000 people had travelled from Liverpool, a distance of 80 miles, to attend the funeral of their pastor, and yet they were not allowed to hear a word spoken in the churchyard by any of the well-known ministers who were present. Similar cases had occurred since that time, and there were many other instances in which inconvenience and scandal had arisen from the present state of the law. He would only refer to one, and he would quote that only because it occurred in the parish in which he lived. At Abergele, last spring, arrangements were duly made for the interment of an old woman in humble circumstances; the hour was fixed, the bell was tolled, and, as was the custom in Wales, a considerable number assembled to pay their last token of respect to the deceased; but the curate —generally very attentive to his duties —had forgotten the engagement, the vicar not being at home, the interment had to take place without any service, though the minister of the Presbyterian church, to which the deceased belonged, was at the grave-side. An old man, however—a layman—ventured to break the law, and to offer up a short prayer before the friends left the churchyard. Those, therefore, who knew the condition of Wales, and the feeling of the people there, could readily understand that the Welsh were very anxious to have this grievance removed. He would not enter on the general question—he thought that it was now beyond the scope or the necessity of argument. His hon. and learned Friend had four times obtained large majorities for his Bill in the last Parliament, and in the present Conservative House of Commons he was last year only beaten by 15 votes. The principle for which they contended had been adopted by the House of Lords. No one would venture to assert that the House of Lords was a revolutionary Body, fond of innovation, or desirous of subverting the Church of England as by law established; and seeing that the House of Lords had approved of the principle of his hon. and learned Friend's Bill, it was idle for hon. Gentlemen on the opposite side to say that it was a measure promoted only by political Dissenters, and the hobgoblin which some of them had conjured up in the Liberation Society. Though the Bill did not meet the views of many of those who sat on the Opposition Benches in its present shape, still he hoped it would be carried, and, with the assistance of the hon. Member for the University of Cambridge, it would be properly amended in Committee, and be made a good and workable measure. He was of opinion that the Bill ought to be passed into law as a measure of justice; for it was not right that the people of England and Wales should be the only people in Europe who were not to be trusted to manage orderly and decent burials.

LORD FRANCIS HERVEY said, he owed some apology to the House for the part he had taken in introducing the Bill to the House, considering that there were no fewer than five other Bills on the subject of burial. The reason which had induced his hon. Friend the Member for Hertford (Mr. Balfour) and himself to propose a Burials Bill was because they heartily wished that the question might be got rid of, and they thought they had devised some expedients by which the grievance that was felt might be removed. The hon. and learned Member for the borough of Cambridge (Mr. Marten) had devoted nearly the whole of his speech to a consideration of the question from a sanitary point of view. He (Lord Francis Hervey) himself did not believe that the Bill now before the House would preclude or prejudice in the slightest degree any just or necessary measure which might be introduced to deal with the question of burials on sanitary grounds. He agreed that those grounds ought to be considered, though not, perhaps, so exclusively as the hon. and learned Member seemed to imply. The hon. and learned Member had challenged the framer of the Bill as to the meaning and object of the 5th clause, which declared the extent of the right of sepulture. The explanation was this. The hon. and learned Member opposite (Mr. Osborne Morgan) had, on more than one occasion, expressed the opinion that there existed, by common law, a right to interment in the parish churchyard, apart from the performance of the Service of the Church. He (Lord Francis Hervey) had himself made diligent search into legal authorities upon the question, and he had been led to think that the position assumed by the hon. and learned Member was an exceedingly doubtful one. The case of "the Queen *v.* Taylor" had been cited in support of it; and the hon. and learned Member for Denbighshire had even, he believed, gone so far as to describe this case as a "leading case." But it should be remembered that this "leading case" was never tried, never argued, and never brought to an issue, though, no doubt, some words fell, in the course of what might be called a conversation, from Justice Fortescue which would appear to favour the conclusion of the hon. and learned Member. The case was to be discovered only in manuscript in the Library. On the other hand, he would cite one or two counter-authorities—authorities which were respectable, and even eminent. In the *Parson's Counsellor*, for instance, which was said to contain all things necessary for a parson to know or to observe, it was laid down that—

> "By the custom of England every person (except such as are hereafter excepted) may at this day be buried in the churchyard of the parish where he dies. Some persons are denied Christian burial, and, therefore, such persons are excepted in what is said before, and may not be buried in the church or churchyard without special licence from the bishop."

In *Comyn's Digest*, under the title "Cemetery," they were told—

> "By the custom of England, every one (who shall have Christian burial) may have burial in the common part of the church or chancel. . . . Every person (who may have Christian burial) may have burial in the churchyard where he dies by the general custom of England. . . . . But by the canon, a *felo-de-se* shall not have burial in the church or churchyard without a licence from the bishop or ordinary. Nor a man excommunicated."

And Sir John Nicholl said—

> "Taking the context of the law . . . it leads to the same construction as the general import of the words—viz., that burial is to be refused to those who are not Christians at all, . . . our Church knowing no such indecency as putting the body into the consecrated ground without the service being at the same time performed."

These were authorities on which he relied for showing at least that there was much more to be said on the other side than hon. Gentlemen might suppose; and, therefore, a clause was introduced into this Bill to meet the difficulty. But on the merits, he and the supporters of his Bill had no controversy with the hon. and learned Gentleman. It was now very generally conceded that if this right did not in strict law exist, it ought to be conceded. There was another clause intended to meet the views of many of the Clergy, and of still more of the Laity of the Church of England. His hon. Friend behind him (Mr. Wilbraham Egerton) had expressed an opinion that some form of Christian burial ought to be introduced for those who had not been baptized. He would find a clause for this purpose in the Bill, and as two of the three main provisions of the Bill obtained the assent or acquiescence of his hon. Friend he would claim his vote for the second reading. It was proposed by the 10th clause of the Bill to admit Nonconformists to the use of the burial-grounds of the Church of England with such services as were usual in the religious society of which the deceased was a member, in all cases where there was no other available accommodation for the bodies of such deceased persons, and where, at the same time, the question was not complicated by recent or definite endowment of the Church intended expressly for the benefit of Church people alone. They drew that limit, because it was one which had been sanctioned more than once by enactment of the Legislature in recent years. He believed they were bound to secure due regard for the wishes of recent donors. They had done so, and the only reward they had got was that the allies of his hon. Friend had circulated a list of donors who demanded the rejection of the Bill, although the rights of every one of them were by the Bill expressly secured. His hon. Friend the Member for the University of Cambridge put the case of a Dissenter buried in a cemetery 49 years old, and within two miles and three-quarters of a burial-ground; but if his hon. Friend's opposition to the Bill were really founded upon such arguments, then he (Lord Francis Hervey) would ask the House to give the Bill a second reading, and to amend it in Committee. His hon. Friend objected that the restrictions which the Bill contained were so harassing and vexatious that they would not be accepted by hon. Gentlemen opposite; and yet, on the other hand, they were told that the Bill was accepted by the Liberation Society and by the hon. and learned Member for Denbighshire. His hon. Friend said, in the first place, they had surrendered all the Church of England wished to retain, and then turned round and said the Bill was perfectly outrageous, because it gave so little and did not surrender a tithe of what was desired. But the Bill could not be a measure of prodigal liberality and of niggardly parsimony at the same time. His hon. Friend must choose which stool he would stand upon. [Mr. BERESFORD HOPE: Both.] They all knew what happened to gentlemen who stood upon two stools. He would now state why the author of the Bill had not thought it right to adopt the proposition of the hon. Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Ritchie), who desired to follow the lines of Plunkett's Act. If changes were to be carried out, they ought to be done by force of law, and not by leaving them to the discretion of ministers of religion. Plunkett's Act was found insufficient in Ireland, and was repealed; and he could not but shrink from exposing the Clergy to the obloquy which the possession of so invidious a privilege would be sure to bring upon them. Again, objection had been taken to the word "Christian" as applied to the services in the churchyard, on the ground that it was vague. But this objection must have been considered in "another place" by many of the most eminent members of the Church and of the Legal Profession; and Lord O'Hagan, Lord Selborne, Lord Blackburn, Lord Coleridge, and Lord Hatherley, all appeared to have come to the conclusion that there was no extraordinary difficulty in interpreting the words "Christian services." Then it was said this was called the thin end of the wedge, and they were called upon to resist the Bill as the introduction to "Disestablishment," and some Members of the Episcopal Bench had even gone so far as to liken their position to the Greeks fighting at Thermopylæ. For his own part, he did not like so ominous and sinister a suggestion. Thermopylæ was a splendid disaster? He feared that if they were to listen to their right rev. Friends, they might find that while they were fighting the battle of the Church, receiving and giving hard knocks, from and to their Nonconformist opponents, some Malian scout might point out a path, say through Hatcham or Holborn, by which the enemy would pass through to Disestablishment, and they would thus suffer entire and total defeat. He would ask his political Friends where they supposed the strength of the Church, considered as an Establishment, to lie? He did not conceive that the position of the Church rested upon the possession of exclusive privilege or the preservation of professional dignity; their strength rested upon popular esteem and upon the sympathy and appreciation with which the work of the Church was regarded amongst the mass of the people. He did not believe that the opposition of the Clergy and others to this Bill was sympathized with and appreciated by the bulk of what he might call "unattached Christians" in the large towns. He believed that the Church of England, if wisdom guided her councils, had a great future before her, and that the mass of English artizans would not prove hostile to the Church so long as the Church not only upheld the standard of a vigorous and healthy energy, but also displayed a charitable, benignant, and tolerant spirit. He believed that the "common people" were utterly unable to understand for what reason it was that the Clergy of the Church of England so persistently refused to grant their Dissenting brethren the right to lay their dead in the churchyard of the parish with such decent and Christian services as their religious usages might sanction; and he believed that by such refusal they were gradually estranging the feelings with which the working classes regarded the Church. Before sitting down, he would quote the words of one justly considered a high authority on matters concerning the Church of England, though they were not spoken with reference to the present subject of debate. These words were—

> "What shall we gain if we adhere to the principle of 'No surrender' upon the subject? That is the question, which you must answer by looking at it in the light of the circumstances of the time. You must look not only to the disposition of the nation out-of-doors, but at the course of events in this House, the principles upon which parties guide their movements, and the laws by which public men regulate their conduct; and looking to, and having regard to, all these things, I am bound to say, taking the most impartial view I can upon the subject, I do not think the Church will gain anything by prolonging this contest. I do not conceal for a moment the reluctance with which I give up anything which the Church possesses; but I am bound to look to both sides of the question, and not to content myself with stolid opposition, and refuse to give way to that tendency by which it seems

to me so many of us are apt to be affected, of pursuing for many years a steady obstruction and then giving way to an unreasonable panic. I think, therefore, it is wiser to accept the terms now offered, because I am distinctly of opinion that we may go further and fare worse." —[3 *Hansard*, cxc. 970.]

These were the opinions of Lord Salisbury, spoken when he was Lord Cranborne in that House on the Church Rates Abolition Bill. The words were applicable without the alteration of a letter to the present question. They had a chance now before them of settling the question with dignity; but if they went further they would fare worse. In a few years this question would be settled. It would not be settled on a basis of "No Surrender;" it would be settled on a basis of sacrifice, and it rested with those who sat upon those—the Ministerial—Benches to say whether they would accept the best they could get under the circumstances, so that the sacrifice should be as little as possible, while it should be adequate to the necessities of the case.

MR. J. G. TALBOT said, that it would not be respectful to the House, or to his hon. Friend the Member for Hertford (Mr. Balfour), if the Government, however inadequately represented by him (Mr. Talbot), were silent on the question, or if a Representative of the University of Oxford did not make its voice heard on this Bill. He would endeavour to lay before the House the grounds on which he thought they would be justified in refusing their assent to this Bill. He could not help thinking that his noble Friend who spoke last (Lord Francis Hervey) was a little injudicious in one of the passing allusions he had made. His noble Friend had alluded—as he called it—to the "splendid disaster" of Thermopylæ; but surely he could not have forgotten that that splendid disaster was due to treason in the camp. The noble Lord had also told them, on the authority of the noble and learned authorities in the other House, that no difficulty would arise on the interpretation of the words "services of a solemn and Christian character." But he would point out to his noble Friend that the objection to those words was not only that they were vague, but that they were unjust. If they were going to settle this question, why were they going to settle it only on behalf of Christians? There were those who differed from the Established Church even more widely than any Christians whatever, and that was not the place in which they could ignore the existence of the Jews. It would certainly be a much greater sacrifice to make the Jews listen to a Christian service than it would be to any Nonconformist to listen to the Burial Service of the Church of England; and his hon. Friend the Member for Hertford could not say they had quite settled the matter as long as they only dealt with Christians of the various denominations. He congratulated his hon. Friend on the respectful consideration which had been given to this attempt to settle this question. He (Mr. Talbot) also had tried his hand in the matter, and the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Denbighshire (Mr. Osborne Morgan) took care that he did not go very far. He had had some difficulty even in being allowed to withdraw his Bill in 1876. The Government, also, must envy the hon. Member for Hertford, because they, too, two years ago, made an attempt to legislate on the question; but those proposals did not meet with a respectful hearing. There was a great gathering of Nonconformist deputies, and the measure was denounced as a monstrous invasion of the rights of conscience and the liberty of the subject, when they attempted to deal with this as a sanitary question. His hon. Friend had, however, been supported by both sides of the House; but he would ask him to consider how the Bill was received, and by whom. On the 10th of February of the present year the Executive Committee of the Liberation Society passed the following resolution:—

"That, as the Bill of Mr. Balfour recognizes the right of parishioners to have other burial services in churchyards than that of the Church of England, and is objectionable only as far as it limits the exercise of that right, the second reading may be assented to, with a view to proposing, in Committee, such Amendments as will secure the results aimed at by the Bill of Mr. Osborne Morgan."

Support of that kind must make them look upon the Bill with some suspicion. The Liberation Society was not an unknown or uninfluential body. They knew that the Liberation Society aimed at the separation of Church and State, or, as they expressed it, "the liberation of the Church from State control;" and if he (Mr. Talbot) wanted to liberate the Church from the control of the State, he would go and ask their assistance; but until that time arrived, he preferred to take on this question the opinions and authority of Churchmen. Now, what did the hon. and learned Member for Denbighshire say? In his speech to his constituents at Wrexham on January 6, 1879, the hon. and learned Gentleman thus expressed his intention of supporting the Bill of his hon. Friend—

> "Referring to Mr. Balfour's Bill, which this year had precedence in point of time over his own, he said that by admitting Nonconformists to the parish churchyards under certain restrictions, it virtually conceded the principle for which he had himself so long contended. He thought, therefore, the proper course would be to vote for the second reading of the Bill, and to amend it in Committee by rejecting limitations under which Nonconformists could never rest, and which, it was fair to say, the author of the Bill did not regard as vital to his Bill. If this was done—and it could be done by a few strokes of the pen—there would be no difference between Mr. Balfour's Bill and his own."—[*The Times*, January 7, 1879.]

How did he know that his hon. Friend did not consider these limitations as vital? Had the hon. and learned Member for Denbighshire been in secret conclave with his hon. Friend the Member for Hertford?

Mr. BALFOUR: There is no authority whatever for the statement to which my hon. Friend has just referred, as to what I regarded as being vital in my measure, and I am sure my hon. and learned Friend opposite will confirm that statement.

Mr. OSBORNE MORGAN: I quoted from a letter written by the hon. Member for Hertford to *The Daily News*.

Mr. J. G. TALBOT said, he would leave it to the two hon. Gentlemen to settle the matter between themselves. If there was any secret communication between his hon. Friend and the hon. and learned Gentleman, he did not know how far it had gone. But if the case was as stated, and if the Amendments of the hon. and learned Gentleman were agreed to, there would be practically no difference between his own Bill and that now before the House. If those Bills were the same, he would wish to know how his hon. Friend the Member for Hertford could suppose that the Conservative Government, and the Conservative Party, could give their sanction to it. Something had been said about the thin end of the wedge. He (Mr. Talbot) did not hesitate to say that he opposed the Bill, because he thought it was the thin end of the wedge of Disestablishment, and because he knew there was a thick end outside. If he saw the thin end of a wedge under his window, he would strongly object, and he would endeavour to remove the wedge with all the force he could command. He did not deny that there was a grievance in the matter; but he said it was an infinitesimal grievance, and it was one which was daily diminishing, and if hon. Gentlemen opposite would have allowed Her Majesty's Government to proceed with the Bills they had introduced, and to settle the question as it was proposed to settle it, the grievance might, he would not say entirely, but at least very greatly, have been removed. But there was no disposition on the part of hon. Gentlemen opposite to settle the matter by compromise in a satisfactory manner. As soon as any proposal was introduced from that side of the House, unless it was an entire surrender of principle, it was at once attacked by hon. Gentlemen opposite. What they really wanted was a triumph over the Church, and ultimately its Disestablishment. That was the more abundantly shown by the Amendments which had been put down by those who were now really supporting the second reading of the Bill. He could not understand how hon. Gentlemen on the other side of the House, whom he knew to be attached members of the Church of England, could make common cause with those whose avowed wish was to put it down; but that was so. Until there was an alteration, he did not see how the Government could be expected to help any measure such as that now before the House. He asked his hon. Friend the Member for Hertford whether this Bill was likely to be regarded as a settlement of the question? The proposal to permit an interment without any religious ceremony had been described as the "burial of a dog," and would certainly not be accepted as a settlement of the grievance complained of; while to bury a disbeliever in God or in revealed religion with a Christian ceremony was a mockery so dreadful as to be equally abhorrent to both the relatives of the deceased and Christians. If it were passed, there would certainly be a demand for amendment on a great many points in the clauses. Not alone would Jews be opposed to it, but those persons who, unfortunately, were in antagonism to all revealed religion, and who would not wish to have their bodies committed to the ground with any kind of Christian ceremonial. The hon. Member for the Flint Boroughs (Mr. Roberts) had said there was a wide difference between the number of signatures of the Clergy and those of the Laity attached to the Declaration which had been drawn up against the Burials Bill, the signatures of the Laity being comparatively few compared with those of the Clergy. The hon. Member, however, could not have paid much attention to the history of that document, if he did not know that the Laity who signed it were men of a representative character, and there had been no attempt to canvass for signatures among the Laity. The noble Lord who led the Opposition (the Marquess of Hartington) had used language upon the subject in his speech at Liverpool in the present month, which he (Mr. Talbot) thought were remarkable. The noble Lord said—

> "You know that we are pledged to religious equality. Although I may not attach to that phrase so wide a significance as is attached to it by some of our friends who sit near me, yet I think I may say that the Liberal Party as a whole is pledged to remove all civil disabilities which weigh upon any part of the people in respect of their religious opinions, and to repeal those laws, for instance, which affect burial, which are felt by our Nonconformist fellow-countrymen to be an injustice, a grievance, and a social stigma."

He would ask the noble Lord whether, in considering the question, he was not impressed by the feeling that it was the social stigma which was the sting of the whole Nonconformist grievance? He did not believe that the Nonconformists looked on this as an injustice. [*Cries of* "Yes, yes!"] Well, perhaps, they might consider it as a wrong or a grievance; but he would put it to the House whether there were not two sides to the grievance? Many of the churchyards were given to the Church by persons who wished the Services of the Church of England alone to be performed in them, and would not they feel an injustice if the Bill were passed? He could not help feeling great regret that it was upon social grounds that this matter pressed upon the feelings of Nonconformists; but surely this was a little unworthy of the great body of Nonconformists? The history of England spoke to the honour of the Nonconformists. There was a time when the Nonconformists considered it a high privilege to give up all the advantages they possessed, and when they did not mind going out into the wilderness, because they disapproved of what was being done, and because they conscientiously objected to the doctrines and discipline of the Church of England. He honoured the Nonconformists who acted in that manner; but when he heard so much about privileges and social stigma, he did not regard that as a very noble way of looking at the question. It was painful to him to take any part in opposition to an hon. Friend whom he so highly esteemed as the hon. Member for Hertford; but he had a long-cherished conviction that the connection between the Church and the State had been the origin of untold and increasing blessings to this country, and it was because he felt that the proposition of his hon. Friend, however well-intended, really went to weaken and ultimately destroy that connection, that he asked the House not to assent to the second reading of the Bill.

MR. OSBORNE MORGAN said, his name had been so often and so pointedly referred to during the debate that he wished to state frankly what course he intended to take in regard to the Bill. But, first, let him congratulate his hon. Friend (Mr. Balfour) on the courage, as well as the ability, which he had shown in grappling with this difficult and delicate problem. He would only add that, should the hon. Gentleman's Bill eventuate in the satisfactory settlement of a difficulty which he (Mr. Osborne Morgan) had spent nine or ten years in trying to solve, no one would rejoice more heartily than himself. As to the last speech they had heard (Mr. Talbot's), it contained one argument, and one argument only, against the Bill. The Government were going to vote against the Bill because he (Mr. Osborne Morgan) was going to vote for it. That was an argument which it was rather difficult for him to answer. Nor was he going to follow his noble Friend (Lord Francis Hervey) into his abstruse legal argument on the question of the parishioner's right. He would only ask him one question—Had he ever heard of Lord Stowell? Because Lord Stowell had laid down the law on this subject in these words—

> "Every parishioner has a right to interment in the parish churchyard without the leave of the incumbent."

Surely that ought to settle the question. Well, then, the law having, as Lord Stowell and, indeed, as this Bill emphatically declared, made the churchyard the burial place of every parishioner, irrespective of Church or creed, did it not follow that in a free country the burial ought to be allowed to take place with the ceremonies which were most in harmony with the professions of the dead man and, above all, with the wishes and sentiments of the mourners? They, and not the clergyman, were the persons for whose consolation the service was intended; and surely it was only reasonable to allow them to be consoled in their own way. That was the whole of their contention. Hon. Gentlemen opposite, on the other hand, contended that the law, having several centuries ago secured to every baptized person the privilege of being buried with a certain ceremony which was then universally accepted, you ought to continue to force that privilege upon those who had long since ceased to desire it, or if it were dispensed with, then that you ought not to allow any service at all. Well, then, those being the two principles for which they were respectively contending, what was the principle of that Bill? If they looked to the 2nd sub-section of Clause 6, they would find it provided that at the option of the mourners the burial might take place

> "Without the performance therein of the Burial Service of the Church of England, but with such religious service or ceremony as is agreeable with the usages of the religious society (other than the Church of England) of which the deceased person at the time of his death was a member."

Why, that was the very thing for which he had been struggling for the last nine years; and that being so, he felt bound to vote for the second reading. No doubt there were things in the Bill to which he objected; but he had always understood that if a Member approved the general principle of a Bill and objected to certain clauses, his proper course was to vote for the second reading, and then, when the Bill got into Committee, to endeavour to expunge the objectionable clauses, and that was exactly what he proposed to do. He objected to the service being made to depend on the "usages" of the religious society of which the deceased was a member. The word "usage," it had been well said, was one of the most expensive words in the English language, and never ought to be introduced into a well-drawn Act of Parliament. Besides, the ceremony ought not to be made to depend on the creed or church of the deceased, but on the wishes of the mourners, for whose benefit it really was intended. As the Bill stood, if the deceased had been a member of no religious body, or by reason of tender age, or for any other reason, had remained unbaptized, the Bill would not apply, and such scandals as the Akenham burial case would go on unchecked. He should, therefore, move in Committee to amend the 6th clause, by giving the right to select the service or ceremony to the persons who had charge of the burial. As to the 10th clause, he objected to it *in toto*. Why were the words of a "solemn and Christian character" introduced? After more than 25 years' experience of services in the unconsecrated portions of cemeteries, surely such a limitation, if it could be justified as a matter of right—which he denied—was unnecessary. The 1st sub-section would exclude the operation of the Bill in some 5,000 out of the 13,000 parishes in England and Wales in which the churchyard was still open, so that his hon. Friend would be giving a boon with one hand and taking away half of it with the other. But besides this, the sub-section involved a fallacy. It assumed a principle hitherto unknown to English law—that the donor of land for a public purpose could reserve to himself the right to dictate to the Legislature the way in which the purpose was to be carried out. The donors might, if they pleased, have given the land to private persons to be held in trust to permit the burial of Episcopalians therein, in which case they would have been, like Nonconformist burial-grounds, private property, and no one would have sought to interfere with them. In fact, as stated by Sir John Audry, in a letter to *The Guardian* last year—

"The complaint of the donors of land for churchyards has a colour of equity, but it is only a colour. If they gave their land for churchyards, they gave it for all to which the churchyards are liable, and they cannot repudiate the gift because they had not anticipated all its legal consequences."

But in some cases the land for the churchyard had been given by Nonconformists—a notable instance of which occurred in a parish close to that in which he had spent many years of his life, where the churchyard had been enlarged by land given for the purpose by a Unitarian. When the donor died, his family naturally felt it a hardship that he should not be allowed to be buried by his own minister in his own land. But this injustice would be perpetuated by the 10th clause. He objected to the clause on the further and broader ground that it would create side by side two classes of churchyards, one of which would be open and the other closed to Nonconformists. Nay, more; in the same churchyard one part might be open and the other closed, or, as pointed out by the hon. Member (Mr. Beresford Hope), a churchyard might be open one day and, in consequence of a gift of a piece of land some two miles distant, it might be closed the next. On these grounds, he would move in Committee to omit the clause altogether; and he felt so strong on the question that, if he failed in his attempt, he should be compelled to join the hon. Member (Mr. Beresford Hope) in endeavouring to reject the Bill on the third reading. But with these Amendments the Bill was his own Bill. It was a case of "Shakespeare and I thought of the same thing," only this time he thought he might say, "I thought of it first." Still the Bill was an honest Bill, and in this respect differed from the other 14 Bills which, since 1870, had been brought in from the opposite side of the House for the purpose, not of solving the difficulty, but of evading it. What was the use of offering cemeteries to people who did not want them? If the Report, which he moved for and obtained two years and a-half ago, showed anything, it showed that the people of England did not love those new-fangled cemeteries; for, at the rate at which they were being constructed, it would take 304 years to close all the churchyards in England and Wales. They loved the old churchyard, endeared to them by its solemn memories and its revered associations, the rugged yew trees under which

"The rude forefathers of the hamlet sleep."

And to say that any man, much less any minister of religion, could wish to enter that hallowed spot for the purpose of desecrating it, would be a calumny if it were not an absurdity. As an instance of the feeling in favour of keeping up the churchyard instead of constructing a cemetery, he instanced the case of the parish of Islip, where, the churchyard being full, the adjoining landowners had offered to enlarge it, and the following Memorial had been presented to the Rural Dean of the district by the Rector on behalf of the parish:—

"(1.) The feeling of the parishioners is unanimous that the (for us) heavy expenses of making the ground available by levelling, planting, building walls, should be defrayed out of the rates, and not be left to voluntary subscription.

"(2.) The feeling is uqually unanimous against turning the new ground into a cemetery, both on account of the extra cost involved, and also because it would perpetuate in the very centre of the villages, so that all could see, those religious differences which sometimes divide even families.

"(3.) There remains, therefore, but one course, concerning which once more there is no difference of opinion—that the ground should be converted into a churchyard at the expense of the parish, but that access should be given to religious ministers of all denominations to perform the burial service over all persons whose friends desire it.

"(4.) We have no choice, therefore, but to wait, at any inconvenience, and possibly danger, till Parliament sees fit to confer upon villages the power of extending their churchyards, subject to this equitable condition, as before stated. That I am fairly representing the opinion of the people of Islip I have no doubt whatever.

"THOMAS W. FOWLE,
"Dec. 7, 1878. Rector of Islip."

He had no doubt that Memorial fairly expressed the opinion of nineteen-twentieths of the rural Laity of England. But did it represent the opinions of the rural Clergy? Unfortunately, this was a subject on which there existed the greatest possible divergence of opinion between the Clergy and Laity, as was shown by the famous Memorial against Lord Harrowby's Clause, which, in a few weeks, had received the signatures of 15,000 clergymen; but, although it was hawked about the country, and no pains spared to obtain lay signatures, each clergyman could do little more than obtain two laymen—presumably his own churchwardens—to affix their names to it. The fact was the Laity of England were becoming ashamed of the opposition which was offered to his Bill. They were ashamed of being told, when they went to Austria or Russia, or even to Turkey, that England on this question was lagging behind the most bigoted countries in Europe. Why, Cyprus was miles ahead of us in this matter. The other day an English soldier was buried in one of the parish churchyards of the Greek Church in Cyprus. Now, if a Greek sailor had happened to die in a rural parish in England, everybody knew that he could only have been buried by an Anglican clergyman with the rites of the Anglican Church. But what took place in Cyprus? Why, the Burial Service of the English Church was conducted by an English chaplain. A Greek priest was present, but the only part he took in the service was to bless the grave! Well now, he really thought that poor Greek priest might have taught a lesson of Christian charity to many an Anglican Bishop; and if the acquisition of that unfortunate Island should lead us to assimilate our Burial Laws to those of other and more barbarous countries, he, for one, would feel almost disposed to condone the means by which it was acquired. He deeply regretted the course which the Government had thought proper to take. They had thrown away a great opportunity. They might gracefully have made to one of their own supporters a concession which they had always refused to make to himself. By so doing, they would undoubtedly have earned the gratitude of the Nonconformist bodies. But, paradoxical as it might seem, the Nonconformist bodies were not the religious bodies which were most deeply interested in the settlement of this question. Strong in the justice of their claim, they could afford to wait. They knew that their ultimate triumph was secure, and that the longer it was delayed the more complete it would be. But what about the Church of England? One thing was absolutely certain—that the prolonged agitation of this question was doing incalculable mischief to that Church, and was more than anything else hastening its downfall. If the Government chose to play into the hands of the Liberation Society, it was not for him to thwart them. But had they forgotten the solemn warning uttered two years ago by the Archbishop of Canterbury, when he entreated the House of Lords to remember that the most vital interests of the Church of England demanded that this question should be settled at once and for ever? And how, then, could it be settled? Did any man with a head upon his shoulders, and with eyes in his head, believe that it could be settled in any other way than upon the lines of this Bill? Why, if every one of those 14 Bills to which he had already alluded were passed tomorrow, they would not advance the settlement of this problem—no, not by one single inch! And it was just because he saw in this Bill an honest attempt to effect that settlement that he would give to the second reading his humble but hearty support.

Earl PERCY understood that the hon. and learned Member who had just spoken supported this Bill not with the view of carrying it, but in order that he might be enabled really to pass his own measure. He should like to know how the hon. Member (Mr. Balfour) and his other hon. Friends who supported the Bill felt, when they were given to understand that, in so doing, they were only playing into the hands of the hon. and learned Member (Mr. Osborne Morgan)? What object could they have in trying to force this measure on the House? The second reading could only be carried by the assistance of hon. Gentlemen opposite; and when they got it in Committee they would reject the saving clauses on which his hon. Friends relied. It was hopeless to attempt to conciliate the Liberationists by concessions. The question whether there was a real grievance to be remedied had been already so fully discussed that it was hardly worth while now to enter upon it; but it had been said that even if there were only a supposed grievance on the part of Dissenters, still it was the duty of the House to remove it. But there were many grievances with regard to which the House was not so unanimous as to assent to their removal. There were what were called the grievances of the Sister country; but it did not follow that what was called a grievance must be removed. He ventured to think that that would be a dangerous argument for the House to adopt. No one said that the Nonconformists would read over the dead services repugnant to Christian feeling; but there were sects in this country who, under such a Bill as this, would be able to hold services in the churchyards which would be most repugnant and repulsive to Christian feelings. What was it that was now proposed? The hon. and learned Member for Denbighshire last year said that the English Church could no longer consider herself both National and Denominational; but that would go much further than churchyards, and it was because of that frank avowal of the hon. and learned Gentleman that this Bill should be rejected. It had been said that it would be prudent on the part of Churchmen to yield upon this question; but what had they gained by yielding upon the question of church rates? He should vote against the Bill.

MAJOR NOLAN: I must say that I give my hearty support to this Bill, which, if it goes to a Division, would, I am sure, have the support of the majority of the Irish Members. Now, I will mention to the House a little fact which, I think, is a powerful argument in support of the Bill, and which came under my own personal observation. At Shoeburyness, where there is a large garrison, not long ago—in March last—a Catholic soldier died. There they were obliged to have him buried under Protestant rites. This fact, as I have said, is entirely within my own personal observation — indeed, the soldier belonged to my own battery, and I had to make most of the arrangements for the funeral. A Catholic clergyman was allowed to say prayers in the dead-house of the garrison—there was no objection to that; but when the funeral procession arrived at the churchyard the Protestant clergyman performed the rest of the ceremony, and the comrades of the man who had lived all his life a Catholic saw him at the last moment handed over to a Protestant clergyman. It was not the fault of the military authorities that this happened, for there was no cemetery within 40 miles. I say that the existing state of the law inflicts a great grievance, and I hope that it may be amended somehow. I think that those who refuse to allow the churchyards to be used for such burials are bound to find some accommodation elsewhere.

MR. GRANTHAM would not say that this was one of the worst attempts to settle this question, but he would say that it was one of the most dangerous. There was no doubt it was the Bill of the hon. and learned Member for Denbighshire (Mr. Osborne Morgan) in disguise; and the moment the Bill got into Committee that hon. and learned Member's Amendments would at once prove fatal. The Nonconformists had, he was prepared to admit, a grievance, and it was this—that there was no ground open to them in many parishes where they could bury with their own services; but that was the fault of the State and not of the Church, and that did not give them a right to force their ministers or their services into the consecrated ground of Churchmen. This Bill would cause heartburnings all over the country; because in one district the interments would be allowed, and in another, adjoining, they would not be allowed, owing to the grant being made within 50 years. What an invidious position this would place the recent donor of ground in; upon him would be thrown the onus of closing it against certain classes of the community. They had no right to place individuals in such a position as that. Besides, another great objection was that it proposed to re-create the difficulty again, after it had been once settled, by declaring that when once a cemetery was provided in a parish, the Nonconformists would, *ipso facto*, be debarred from continuing to use the parish churchyard for their services, after, perhaps, many, many years' quiet exercise of that right under this Bill. He believed there was a satisfactory way of dealing with the question. They must look at it from a sanitary point of view; and where it was necessary to close churchyards, cemeteries must at once be provided. That would leave, no doubt, many churchyards with ample accommodation for several years to come; and as many clergymen might not object to Nonconformists using their burial-grounds, this part of the question ought to be made a parochial one, and certain time allowed for arrangements to be made. They had a precedent to which they could look and by which they could be guided in what had been done by the Education Act of 1870. There, a certain time was allowed the advocates of Church schools and voluntary schools to determine whether they would or could provide sufficient accommodation for their respective districts, so that there should be both sufficient and efficient accommodation for the district. Give, therefore, each parish two years to deliberate whether they would provide a burial-ground or not. In most cases a ground would be given, and in others it would be bought by subscription. Still, in some cases, owing to there being so few Dissenters, or else so many, it would be thought better to let the Nonconformist minister officiate; so that in whatever parish at the end of two years no cemetery had been provided, it would be assumed that it was desired to let the Nonconformists in. His own opinion was that the Laity felt quite as strongly upon this subject as the Clergy themselves felt, notwithstanding what had been said about the "protest," for which signatures from the Laity had really not been sought, that protest having been signed simply to meet a particular feature that arose in the question.

It being a quarter of an hour before Six of the clock, the Debate stood adjourned till *To-morrow.*

QUESTION.

PARLIAMENT—BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.—QUESTION.

Mr. BERESFORD HOPE asked what would be the order of Business to-morrow; whether, considering the "accident" of last evening, the Mutiny Bill or the adjourned Resolutions upon their mode of procedure would be the first Order on Thursday?

Sir HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON, in reply, said, that the Government proposed to postpone the consideration of the Mutiny Bill until to-morrow week, so that the first Order to-morrow would be the adjourned debate on the Business of the House.

MOTIONS.

EAST INDIA (PUBLIC WORKS).

Ordered, That a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into and report as to the expediency of constructing Public Works in India with money raised on loan, both as regards financial results and the prevention of famine:—That the Committee do consist of Seventeen Members:—Lord George Hamilton, Mr. Fawcett, Mr. Balfour, Mr. Childers, Mr. Ashbury, Sir George Campbell, Mr. Onslow, Mr. John Cross, Mr. Pease, Mr. Hardcastle, Sir Joseph M'Kenna, Mr. Sampson Lloyd, Mr. Grant Duff, Mr. Mulholland, Mr. Ernest Noel, Mr. Agnew, and Mr. Edward Stanhope:—Power to send for persons, papers, and records; Five to be the quorum.

PARLIAMENTARY REPORTING.

Ordered, That the Select Committee of last Session on Parliamentary Reporting be re-appointed:—That Mr. William Edward Forster, Viscount Crichton, Dr. Lyon Playfair, Sir Alexander Gordon, Mr. Walter, Lord Francis Hervey, Mr. Hall, Mr. Mitchell Henry, Mr. James Barclay, Mr. Mills, Sir Henry Holland, Mr. Hutchinson, Mr. Joseph Cowen, Major Arbuthnot, and Mr. William Henry Smith be Members of the Committee:—Power to send for persons, papers, and records; Five to be the quorum.

Ordered, That the Evidence taken before the Select Committee on Parliamentary Reporting, of Session 1878, be referred to the Select Committee on Parliamentary Reporting.—(*Mr. William Henry Smith.*)

JURORS' REMUNERATION BILL.

On Motion of Mr. H. B. Sheridan, Bill for the payment of Jurors in Criminal Cases and on Coroners Inquests, and for the better payment of Jurors in Civil Actions, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. H. B. Sheridan, Sir Henry Jackson, Mr. Joseph Cowen, Mr. Whitwell, Mr. Burt, Mr. Wheelhouse, and Mr. O'Connor Power.

Bill *presented,* and read the first time. [Bill 81.]

LICENSING BOARDS (SCOTLAND) (NO. 2) BILL.

On Motion of Mr. Fortescue Harrison, Bill for the election of Licensing Boards in Scotland, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. Fortescue Harrison, Sir George Balfour, and Dr. Cameron.

Bill *presented,* and read the first time. [Bill 82.]

ASSIZES BILL.

On Motion of Sir Matthew Ridley, Bill to amend the Law respecting the holding of Assizes, *ordered* to be brought in by Sir Matthew Ridley and Mr. Secretary Cross.

Bill *presented,* and read the first time. [Bill 83.]

House adjourned at ten minutes before Six o'clock.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Thursday, 20th February, 1879.

MINUTES.]—SELECT COMMITTEE—Tramways, *appointed* and *nominated.*

SOUTH AFRICA—THE ZULU WAR.

QUESTION.

EARL GRANVILLE: May I ask the noble Earl the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether the Government can confirm the news which has appeared in the second editions of to-day's papers in relation to the war in Zululand?

EARL CADOGAN: My Lords, Her Majesty's Government have received no official confirmation of the news which appeared in the second editions of this morning's papers. That news, which is from Madeira, has been brought by the *Asiatic*, an extra steamer of the Union Company's Line, which left Cape Town on the 29th ultimo, two days later than the *Dunrobin Castle*, which brought the first news of the disaster of the 22nd January. The *Asiatic* took between 21 and 22 days to reach Madeira. The next regular steamer was to have left Cape Town on the 4th instant. If she had called at St. Vincent, we ought to have had telegrams from thence on the 17th, or, at latest, the 19th instant. As, however, no telegrams have come to hand, she has probably gone direct to Madeira, and we may expect to hear from there about Saturday.

TRAMWAYS.

SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED.

THE EARL OF REDESDALE moved the appointment of a Select Committee on Tramways, in accordance with the promise he gave to the House last year. He would remind their Lordships that hitherto the question had been mainly confined to tramways in streets and towns; but there were now several schemes for tramways carried along roads in the country. The matter, therefore, now required careful re-consideration, and it was very desirable there should be full inquiry.

Moved, That a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the regulations which it may be desirable to impose in relation to the construction and use of Tramways.—(*The Earl of Redesdale.*)

LORD HOUGHTON presented a Petition, signed by several persons on behalf of certain Railway Companies, for inquiry respecting steam tramways in connection with the passenger duty; and said that, in order to give effect to the prayer of that Petition, he would move an addition to the terms of the Motion.

Moved after the word ("Tramways") to add ("and the relation of Tramways on which carriages are conveyed by steam to the present imposition of the passenger duty.")—(*The Lord Houghton.*)

THE EARL OF REDESDALE objected to the proposed addition.

On Question, That the words proposed to be added stand part of the Motion? *Resolved* in the *Negative.*

Then the Original Motion *agreed to.*

The Lords following were named of the Committee:—

M. Ripon.
E. Derby.
E. Devon.
E. Cowper.
E. Redesdale.
V. Cardwell.
L. Colville of Culross.
L. Silchester.
L. Hartismere.
L. Carlingford.
L. Norton.

The Committee to meet on *Monday* next at Four o'clock, and to appoint their own Chairman.

SOUTH AFRICA—ZULULAND—IMPORTATION OF ARMS AND MUNITIONS.

QUESTION. OBSERVATIONS.

VISCOUNT SIDMOUTH, in asking the Question of which he had given Notice relative to the supply of arms to the Native tribes of South Africa, said, that the disaster which had befallen our troops on January 21 had created a profound impression in the country; and it was a matter of astonishment that the Zulus should have been so well armed in the manner and to the extent they were found to be. The able despatch from the High Commissioner must have prepared the public to find that the Zulus were in strong force; but they had been taken by surprise to learn that the savages were supplied not only with muskets and rifles, but with breech-loaders and all the appliances of modern warfare. Looking at the situation of Zululand, it was obvious that those arms and appliances could only have reached the country in one of two ways—either by the Portuguese frontier or through our own Colonies. If the former method had been resorted to, he hoped Her Majesty's Government had made representations to the Portuguese Government, with the view of putting an end to the traffic. If, as had been reported, the Portuguese Government were powerless to interfere, he saw nothing to prevent an agreement being arrived at to enable our Government themselves to take action in the matter. But there was reason to believe that, in many instances, the arms had been manufactured in this country. If so, that was very serious indeed; and he was sure their Lordships would agree with him in denouncing such a traffic as most nefarious and unpatriotic. He scarcely knew what could be done; but he trusted that the Government would devise some mode of action. Certain it was that many of our brave soldiers would have been spared had the Zulus not been armed so efficiently with British weapons; and thus it was that he ventured to trouble the Government with his Question. He had to ask, Whether any steps have been taken to prevent the importation of arms and warlike stores into Zululand?

Earl CADOGAN: I can assure your Lordships that the attention of Her Majesty's Government has been directed to this important and intricate question. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies and my noble Friend the late Secretary have been in constant correspondence with the local authorities on the subject. With regard to the export of arms from this country, that, I believe, has never been prohibited except in cases of great national emergency. With respect to the importation of arms into the Colonies of South Africa, those Colonies have their own laws and regulations, which, in the opinion of the Government, would, if strictly enforced, suffice to prevent this traffic. I need hardly state that under present circumstances it would be in the interest of Natal, as well as that of Her Majesty's Government, to do all that is possible to prevent the importation of arms to the Zulus. Perhaps I may be allowed to state the chief local regulations existing on this subject. There is no restriction on the importation of arms and ammunition to the Cape; but when imported they cannot be removed from the Queen's stores inwards without a licence. In Natal application must be made to an authority named the Arms Board in respect to the removal of arms; that body reports to the Attorney General, who accedes to or refuses the application in accordance with the instructions of the Lieutenant Governor. The importation of ammunition by private persons is forbidden. They can only be imported by the Lieutenant Governor or by an officer of the Government appointed by him in that behalf. The provisions as regards gunpowder are almost, if not quite, as stringent. In Natal and the Orange Free State the trade in ammunition is in the hands of the Government, and powder may be sold only from the Government magazines. In the Cape no great distinction is made between the trade in arms and ammunition, and gunpowder may be kept in private magazines if licensed, or, where the quantity does not exceed 100 lbs., in a place other than a licensed magazine approved by a magistrate. As to ports and harbours, the principal harbour on that coast where warlike stores can be landed is Delagoa Bay, which is in Portuguese territory: but Her Majesty's ships, which in time of war cruise in those waters, will take every care to prevent it. A correspondence has taken place between the Foreign Office and the Portuguese Government upon this subject. That Government, it is fair to say, has met us in the most friendly spirit, and has promised that its best efforts shall be directed to suppress the traffic wherever they have the power. I may give an instance to show the difficulties they have to contend with. My noble Friend says he believed Delagoa Bay was the only place where arms could be imported on those coasts; but when the Portuguese prohibited the importation at that harbour, they found that at a place north of their territory a large importation was taking place. Care will be taken to prevent it in future. I think it right to say that the arms of the Zulus have been largely obtained from Kimberley and the Diamond District, where Native labour can only be obtained by payment in guns and rifles. The Zulus will come any distance to work if they can only take away with them a gun or a rifle. I cannot help expressing my conviction that one of the most important results of Confederation, if it is ever attained, would be the establishment of a uniform system of controlling the sale of arms and ammunition in the Provinces of South Africa. I can assure the noble Viscount that every precaution has been taken and will be taken by Her Majesty's Government, and that all due vigilance will be exercised with a view of remedying the evil of which he so justly complains.

THE EARL OF CARNARVON: I quite feel with my noble Friend that in connection with South African affairs there cannot be a more important question than this. It is quite true, as my noble Friend says, that when I was at the Colonial Office I gave my best attention to this matter, and I am glad to hear that the present Head of the Colonial Office is doing the same. It was one of the first points to which my attention was directed, because I received from all quarters information as to the enormous quantity of arms and ammunition gradually being imported into South Africa, and over which we exercised no control. Arms in South Africa are the great object of ambition of every Zulu or Kaffir. They are, so to speak, the current coin in which the wages of labour are paid; and it has been, as we have reason to know, the policy of Cetewayo, the Zulu King, to insist on every man of his tribe somehow or other providing himself with a gun. The result has been that a very large amount of arms has been accumulated. Two years ago, while I was at the Colonial Office, I was led to believe there were not less than 500,000 arms of one sort or another in the Southern part of Africa. I am bound to say I think my noble Friend touched very lightly indeed on the conduct of the Portuguese Government in this respect; for it is my opinion that a very large portion indeed of the supply finds its way through Delagoa Bay—in fact, I believe the importation formed a large part of the revenue of that port. I am glad to hear that the Portuguese Government have promised, at all events, to exercise restrictions; but I should have been more pleased to hear that they had suppressed the trade altogether—for nothing short of that will have the desired effect. The question of Confederation has an important bearing on this matter. It was one of the great objects I had in view, when I urged the Confederation of the South African Colonies, that uniform laws as to the sale and regulation of arms should be adopted. In August 1875, I was able, after a good deal of correspondence and negotiation, to bring together a Conference here in London. At that Conference were represented the Colony of Natal, the Province of Griqualand West, and the Orange Free State. One Colony was wanting—namely, the Cape—and the Transvaal. The Transvaal had mixed itself up with Native hostilities, and the Cape was so very jealous of anything that approached a mere suspicion of Confederation that although Mr. Molteno, the Minister of the Colony, came to England at the time, he did not attend the Conference. That Conference met and discussed various matters—the sale of spirits, the education and apprenticeship of Kaffir children, and finally the introduction and regulation of arms. There was perfect unanimity as to the course which ought to be adopted on this latter point; and the Conference came to the conclusion—very sensibly—that in order to do anything effective it was necessary to secure the co-operation of all the European Settlements in South Africa. It is perfectly obvious that it must be so, because if you left one side open for the introduction of arms, it would be utterly useless for the others to pass restrictive laws. I endeavoured to get Mr. Molteno to give his support; but he could not see the matter in the same light. Consequently, the conclusions arrived at by the Conference were of no avail. That is a circumstance I have never ceased to regret, for it lies very much at the root of our present difficulty, and is the real cause of the loss of so many valuable lives. I understand that the Portuguese Government have now undertaken to impose restrictions on the sale of arms in Delagoa Bay. That will be a very great advantage if they carry out their engagement. And I am glad to find my noble Friend has laid on the Table documents which show that the Cape Government is disposed to view the matter in a very different spirit from that which it showed a few years ago; but it appears to me that the enactments my noble Friend quoted to-night require tightening up a good deal. There can be no doubt that arms have come through Delagoa Bay, and I regret to say through English merchants. There have also been rough manufactories in the interior beyond our Border where weapons are produced, which, although of a very inferior order, are capable of being used with deadly effect, There is an important despatch of Sir Garnet Wolseley's in existence upon the question of the importation of arms, and if there is no objection, I would suggest to the Government that its publication at this period would be interesting and useful.

Viscount SIDMOUTH asked if the second port which the noble Earl alluded to was in Portuguese territory?

Earl CADOGAN said it was.

House adjourned at a quarter before Six o'clock, till To-morrow, half past Ten o'clock.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Thursday, 20th February, 1879.

MINUTES.]—Public Bills—*Second Reading*—Prosecution of Offences * [68].
Second Reading—Referred to Select Committee—Coroners * [67].

QUESTIONS.

POST OFFICE (TELEGRAPHIC DEPARTMENT)—CONTINENTAL TELEGRAPH CHARGES.—QUESTION.

Dr. CAMERON asked the Postmaster General, Whether it is true that in the re-arrangement of the telegraphic charges between Great Britain and Germany and Holland, which came into operation on the 1st of January last, the additional shilling formerly charged on messages from provincial offices has been done away with; and, if so, whether he contemplates, in the case of telegrams to other foreign countries, the abolition of the differential rate at present charged on messages from the provinces?

Lord JOHN MANNERS, in reply, said, that the new tariff with regard to telegraphic messages between Great Britain and Germany and Holland came into operation on the 1st of January. Under its operation, the additional charges made upon provincial messages over London messages had been abolished; and it was intended, as opportunity occurred, to do away with the differential rate which still prevailed in the case of provincial messages to other foreign countries.

ECCLESIASTICAL SALARIES (INDIA).

QUESTION.

Mr. BAXTER asked the Under Secretary of State for India, Why the Return relating to Ecclesiastical Salaries in India, ordered by this House so long ago as the 5th July 1877, has not yet been presented?

Mr. E. STANHOPE: Sir, I am sorry to say that the Return has not yet been received; but it has been a very difficult one to prepare. After I observed the hon. Member's Question, in December last, I caused a letter to be written to India on the subject; but we have not at present received any reply.

ARMY—ARMY RESERVES—MILITIA.

QUESTION.

Mr. J. HOLMS asked the Secretary of State for War, How many recruits were obtained for the Militia in 1878; and, what was the number of the First Class Army Reserve on the 1st January 1879?

Colonel STANLEY, in reply, said, that the number of recruits to the first-named body in 1878 was 39,395; while the number of the latter branch on the 1st of January, 1879, was 15,085.

RAILWAY ACCIDENTS—LEGISLATION.

QUESTIONS.

Mr. BENTINCK asked the President of the Board of Trade, Whether it is the intention of the Government to introduce, during the present Session, any measure for the better preventing of accidents on Railways?

Viscount SANDON: Sir, we have not lost sight of the subject, but have been considering during the Recess the serious and difficult questions which are raised by the Report and recommendations of the Royal Commission on Railway Accidents. I would beg my hon. Friend to excuse me from stating the opinion of the Government on the subject until I bring in the Bill respecting the Railway Commission of which we have already given Notice.

MR. BRIGGS asked the President of the Board of Trade, If his attention has been drawn to the case of a child five years old named Charles Richard Hindle, who was killed on Saturday last by a passing train at Harrison's Level Crossing on the London and Tilbury Railway; whether he is aware that within the last ten years six persons have been killed and several others seriously injured at the same place; if it is true that the Railway Company purpose laying down two more lines of rails, thus adding considerably to the danger; and, whether, looking at all the circumstances of the case, he will take steps to compel the Railway Company to prevent this destruction of human life?

VISCOUNT SANDON: Sir, I have heard with regret of the accident to which the hon. Gentleman alludes, a return of which has been received from the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company, and not from the London and Tilbury Company, as is stated in the Question. I fear it is too true that within the last 10 years six persons have been killed and several others seriously injured at the same place. I have no information as to whether the Company propose to lay down more lines of rail, nor have I any power to make inquiry from a Railway Company on the subject. On referring to a Paper which was laid before Parliament the year before last, I find that the Railway Company stated that they were prepared to take steps for the erection of a bridge at this dangerous spot, if the expense was shared with them by the Corporation of Blackburn; but that the apportionment of the expense between the two parties was the obstacle to carrying out the work. I would again remind the hon. Member that I have no power to insist upon any action in a matter of this kind; but whatever steps I can take to guard against the destruction of human life I will take.

URBAN AND RURAL SANITARY DISTRICTS.—COUNTY MAPS—QUESTION.

MR. STANSFELD asked the President of the Local Government Board, Whether there is in his Department information which would enable him to lay upon the Table of the House the following Return, viz.—Return in respect of each county in England and Wales, in the shape of a map, showing the boundaries of the urban and rural sanitary districts, or parts thereof within the county; also showing the boundaries of all unions being wholly or partly within the county; together with an index for each county of all such districts and parts of districts and unions, referring to numbers on the map, with the population thereof respectively as near as can be ascertained; and, whether he can provide the Return before the day on which the County Boards Bill may be set down for Second Reading?

MR. SCLATER-BOOTH: Sir, there is, no doubt, much information in the Department which would be available for the preparation of such a Return and map; but it would be a work of considerable time, labour, and expense, that I cannot at present promise it shall be undertaken. I have, however, recently given instructions for a revised list of unions and constituent parishes, and will see if it is possible to add any further information such as would meet, to some extent, the wish expressed by the right hon. Gentleman; but I could not undertake that it shall be available before the second reading of the County Boards Bill.

SOUTH AFRICA—THE ZULU KING—NEGOTIATIONS.—QUESTION.

MR. JAMES asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether it is the case that an interview between Sir Theophilus Shepstone and the Envoys of Cetewayo took place on the Zulu frontier on the 19th of October 1877; if so, whether any despatches are in the possession of Her Majesty's Government stating the substance of the proceedings between Sir Theophilus and the Envoys on that occasion, and whether they can be laid before Parliament?

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: Sir, the despatches relating to the interview alluded to by the hon. Member arrived last spring, I think, and were marked "Confidential." I did not think it desirable to produce them at the time, because they related to a question then still pending before the Boundary Commission appointed by the Natal Government; and it seemed better that the production of the Papers on the subject should be delayed until after the award had been pronounced by the High Commissioner. That objection does not now exist; and the despatches will be presented among the forthcoming Papers.

PUBLIC HEALTH ACT—BACK-TO-BACK HOUSES.—QUESTION.

Sir SYDNEY WATERLOW asked the President of the Local Government Board, Whether that Board has, after communication with the local authorities, conceded the principle of erecting back-to-back houses; and, whether he would object to lay upon the Table of the House, a Report upon the subject prepared by Mr. Netten Radcliffe, of the Medical Department of the Board, and Mr. P. Gordon Smith, the Board's Architect, after local inquiry in the district where the concession of the principle was granted?

Mr. SCLATER-BOOTH: Sir, it would not be correct to say that the principle of erecting back-to-back houses has been conceded by the Local Government Board; but it is true that in the case of Idle, in the North Brierly Union, the Board have stated that, owing to the exceptional circumstances of the locality, they considered that this form of construction might be recognized, provided certain conditions could be complied with, and the regulation brought within the operation of bye-laws under the Public Health Act. But no bye-laws have as yet been submitted by the local authority, so that none have as yet been sanctioned by the Board. I should mention that one of the peculiar circumstances is that Parliament has sanctioned back-to-back houses in the neighbouring towns of Leeds and Bradford. There is no objection to lay upon the Table of the House the Report of Mr. Netten Radcliffe and Mr. Gordon Smith on this case.

THE METROPOLITAN FIRE BRIGADE —LEGISLATION.—QUESTION.

Mr. RITCHIE asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to introduce during the present Session any measure dealing with the subjects reported on by the Select Committee on the Metropolitan Fire Brigade?

Mr. ASSHETON CROSS: Sir, this is an important subject, no doubt, and one to which the attention of the Government has been called; but I do not know whether, under the present pressure of Business, we are able to promise the introduction of a measure this Session. Attention is being particularly called to the matter owing to the fire which occurred at the Colonial Office in Downing Street the other day.

BOARD OF WORKS (IRELAND)—CLARE CASTLE PIER AND HARBOUR.

QUESTION.

Mr. STACPOOLE asked the Secretary to the Treasury, Whether his Department will recommend the Commissioners of Public Works in Ireland to advance, on the security of the dues received by that body from the local authorities of the Clare Castle Pier and Harbour, county Clare, since 1843-4, the sum reported by the Board of Works engineer to be necessary for improving the pier and harbour, so that the existing obstruction to navigation may be minimized, if not altogether removed?

Sir HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON: Sir, the subject mentioned by the hon. Member for Ennis has not yet been laid before the Treasury, and I understand from the Chairman of the Board of Works in Ireland it is not likely to be so, unless a satisfactory answer is given to the inquiries which were made in the letter addressed to the hon. Member by that Board on the 15th November last. Should the Board of Works recommend a loan, such as that mentioned by the hon. Member, the matter will receive the best attention of the Treasury. I think, however, he will see it would be quite inconsistent with the position of the Treasury to take the initiative in making a loan without first being consulted by the local authorities.

ARMY (INDIA) — OFFICERS ON SICK LEAVE.—QUESTION.

Major O'BEIRNE asked the Under Secretary of State for India, with reference to a statement that the Government of India has never required officers coming from India to England on sick leave to appear before a Medical Board on arrival, If he will state whether orders issued by His Excellency the Commander in Chief of the Bombay Presidency are recognized by the Secretary of State for India in Council; and, if he will explain why the travelling expenses in England of the Paymaster of the 3rd Hussars have been disallowed by the Secretary of State for India in Council, that officer having received an order, dated Bombay, 4th April 1878, directing him to appear before a Medical Board in England?

MR. E. STANHOPE: Sir, I am informed that the paymaster referred to was refused his travelling expenses in accordance with the invariable rule of the Government of India, which has never admitted as a charge against Indian Revenues the cost occasioned by an officer's appearing before a Medical Board in London under orders originating solely with the War Office. The Order of the Commander-in-Chief in Bombay was in pursuance of the existing regulation of the War Office, which has since been withdrawn.

WATER COMPANIES BILLS -- PUBLIC HEALTH ACTS.—QUESTION.

MR. A. H. BROWN asked the President of the Local Government Board, Whether, having regard to the numerous Private Bills which have for their object the supply of water, and which Parliament every Session has to deal with, he proposes to take any steps to carry out the recommendations of the Select Committee which sat last year upon the Public Health Act (1875) Amendment Act, and especially that one which says that when a Water Company or a Sanitary Authority go to a rural district for water, or when their mains pass through a rural district which is in want of water, they shall be compelled to supply such district on proper terms; and, whether, to carry out the views of the Committee, the officers of the Local Government Board will be instructed to present to Parliament Reports to guide the various Committees which will be appointed to consider these Water Bills as to the wants of the districts from which the water is taken, or through which the water mains will pass?

MR. SCLATER-BOOTH: Sir, whenever I have the opportunity of introducing a Bill to amend the Public Health Act (1875) Amendment Act, I will not fail to give careful consideration to the recommendations of the Committee, and especially to the one referred to in the Question. As to the suggested Reports, they would necessitate careful local inquiry in every locality to which Water Bills refer, and there is no staff at my disposal adequate to such a duty. In their Reports to the Committee on Water Bills, however, the Local Government Board are this year drawing attention to the difficulties in which sanitary authorities may be placed by the inclusion of their districts in the limits of supply of a company unless the company *boná fide* intend to afford the district a proper supply, and we suggest that if this intention is not proved the district should not be included in the Bill. We further point out that if the district is not supplied by the company within a prescribed time the prior right of the company to supply should cease.

ARMY—THE 24TH REGIMENT.

QUESTION.

MAJOR O'GORMAN asked the Secretary of State for War, Whether it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to allow the vacancies occasioned by the death of the officers of the 24th Regiment, who lately fell in the performance of their duty in South Africa, to be filled up by the survivors of both battalions of that Regiment, or whether it is intended to allow half-pay officers to intrude?

COLONEL STANLEY: Sir, in answer to the hon. and gallant Member for Waterford, I have to say that until we know in strict accuracy what vacancies have unfortunately occurred, I am not able to speak positively on the matter; and I would, therefore, be glad if he would kindly repeat his Question at some later date. At the same time, I am bound to say, as far as my own opinion goes, that it would only be a proper tribute to the gallantry with which the 24th have fought that, as far as possible, the vacancies should be filled up by the surviving officers.

THE TICHBORNE CASE—SIR ROGER D. TICHBORNE.—QUESTION.

MAJOR O'GORMAN: Although the Question is not on the Paper in the form in which I gave Notice, I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether it is his intention to recommend the release of Sir Roger D. Tichborne, or, at least, the reduction of his punishment?

MR. ASSHETON CROSS: No, Sir, I have no intention of interfering.

PARLIAMENT—RULES AND ORDERS.

ALTERATION OF QUESTION.

MAJOR O'GORMAN, in whose name the following Notice stood on the Paper:—

> "To ask the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Whether it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to take any, and, if so, what notice of the conduct of the Constabulary authorities in ordering the men of the Constabulary to attend the Catholic Churches in Galway County for the sole purpose of taking down the words uttered by the priest from the altar,"

said: Sir, the Question on the Paper is not my Question, and I shall not put it. I do not see why it should be altered in the way it is. It is not my Question at all. Mine, Sir, was to ask the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Whether it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government —— [*Cries of* "Order!"]

MR. SPEAKER: The hon. and gallant Gentleman is not in Order. The Question put on the Paper by him was revised under my authority, as not being consistent with the Rules and Orders of the House.

MAJOR O'GORMAN: Well, Sir, I wish to ask you, whether I have the privilege of asking the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Whether it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to take, and, if so, what, notice of the conduct of the Duke of Marlborough, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, in any case?

No reply being given,

MAJOR O'GORMAN: Then, Sir, I shall repeat my Question on another day.

HIGHWAY ACT, 1878—CLAUSE 16.

QUESTION.

LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE asked the President of the Local Government Board, If it is true that the Law Officers of the Crown have decided that an application under Clause 16 of the Highway Act of last Session to dismain a road must apply to the whole of the trust, and may not apply to any part of a trust unless such part shall have been specially described in the Local Act constituting the trust; if it is the opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown that the second paragraph of Clause 16, beginning "Subject as aforesaid," applies only to main roads which have been disturnpiked since the passing of the Act or have been adopted under Clause 15 and not to roads which have been disturnpiked between the 31st of December 1870 and the passing of the Act; and, if it is his intention to introduce a Bill amending the Act in these and other particulars?

MR. SCLATER-BOOTH: Sir, the Law Officers have given their opinion that a Provisional Order can only deal with an entire disturnpiked road, or a road separately described in the Local Act. They have not been consulted on the second point, as to which no doubt has been entertained by the Department—namely, that the paragraph in question applies only to roads disturnpiked since the passing of the Act, or to such as have been adopted under Section 15. I have no intention, as at present advised, to amend the law in these particulars. Although it might have been convenient in some cases to have power to deal with parts of the disturnpiked roads mentioned in Section 13, it must be remembered that these roads have been exceptionally treated in their entirety since the year 1870. No doubt, it may be needful to amend the Act of last Session when we have had more experience of its working, and I have in contemplation a consolidation of the Highway Acts generally which may afford the opportunity.

NOXIOUS VAPOURS—LEGISLATION.

QUESTION.

VISCOUNT NEWPORT asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to introduce any measure, during the present Session, to deal with the great and growing nuisance in certain districts arising from smoke and other noxious vapours?

MR. SCLATER-BOOTH, in reply, said, he had a measure prepared on the subject and hoped to be able before long to submit it to the House.

TURKEY—PAPERS AND CORRESPONDENCE.—QUESTION.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether the Government is in possession of any Reports or Papers on the subject of the transactions relating to the suppression of the insurrection in Macedonia; and, if so, when such Reports or Papers will be presented to the House; and, whether it is intended to present any further Papers relating to Turkey down to a later date than those recently published, and the latest of which bears date September 30th 1878?

MR. BOURKE: Sir, in reply to both interrogatories of the hon. and learned Member for Oxford, I have to state that further Papers relating to Turkey, which will include reports on the Macedonian insurrection, are being prepared as rapidly as possible, and will be distributed shortly.

SOUTH AFRICA—THE ZULU WAR—THE REINFORCEMENTS—CATHOLIC CHAPLAINS.—QUESTION.

MR. ERRINGTON asked the Secretary of State for War, Whether he has already arranged that Catholic Chaplains should accompany the reinforcements for the Cape; if not, whether he will take the necessary steps in order that the Catholic officers and soldiers shall not be left without the assistance of ministers of their religion?

COLONEL STANLEY: Sir, we are sending out one Roman Catholic chaplain to the Forces, and Lord Chelmsford has already engaged the services of a priest who is at the Cape at the present time.

ARMY—LONGFORD BARRACKS.

QUESTION.

MR. ERRINGTON asked the Secretary of State for War, Whether the detachment of Infantry which he promised last year should be sent to occupy Longford Barracks after the drill season was over, has ever been sent; if not, whether he has any objection now to take the necessary steps to have it sent?

COLONEL STANLEY: Sir, when the promise was given by my hon. Friend the Financial Secretary, on the part of the War Office, that a detachment should be sent to occupy Longford Barracks, the qualification was given "that if it were possible." At the time the distribution of troops being rather low in Ireland, and still continuing so, it has been found impossible to comply with the wish of the hon. Gentleman; but I must add that the Government has not lost sight of the application.

TURKEY—FINANCE.—QUESTION.

MR. W. CARTWRIGHT asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether "the gentleman well versed in accounts," whom Her Majesty's Government has deputed "to make inquiries into the real condition of Turkish Finance," has made any Report to Her Majesty's Government; whether, if so, there will be any objection to lay the Report upon the Table; and, whether the statement made by Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, that no "financial engagements" in respect to loans to Turkey "will be entered into without the previous sanction of Parliament," may be understood to involve that, without such previous sanction, there shall be no engagement taken for the appointment by Her Majesty's Government of any Commissioner to be entrusted with the collection of or control over Duties or Taxes to serve as a guarantee in respect of moneys to be advanced to the Turkish Government, such as appear to be contemplated in the financial scheme of the Marquis de Tocqueville?

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, despatches have been received from Mr. Harrison, the gentleman to whom I referred, which treat of the financial accounts of Turkey; but he has not yet been able to forward the complete Report which he was sent out specially to make. With regard to the second part of the hon. Member's Question, the answers which I gave before the adjournment for the Christmas holidays with respect to financial engagements do not refer to such a case as that which he now mentions. They refer to questions of possible engagements with regard to loans to be made to Turkey. As to the scheme to which the hon. Gentleman alludes, the Question is one which has only just arisen, and the Government has not yet had time to consider it.

CRIMINAL LAW — CASE OF JOHN NOLAN.—QUESTION.

Dr. KENEALY asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether the Commission appointed by him to inquire into the case of John Nolan, who died in Clerkenwell Prison, and on whom an inquest was held, in which the jury returned the following verdict,

> "That the said John Nolan died of congestion of the lungs, and that death was accelerated by excessive and repeated punishments, on bread and water, ordered by the governor and sanctioned by the medical officer. The jury are further of opinion that it is impossible for the medical officer to attend to his duties at the Prison without being resident. The jury are also of opinion that all kinds of repeated punishment should only be administered under the supervision of the visiting committee,"

has yet made a report; and, if not, how soon it may be expected, and whether he will lay it upon the Table of the House, and have it printed and circulated among Members?

Mr. ASSHETON CROSS, in reply, said, the Report of the inquiry instituted into the case of that man, who died in Clerkenwell Prison, was received a week or 10 days ago, and if the hon. Member moved for it, it would be given as an unopposed Return.

Mr. MITCHELL HENRY inquired whether the evidence was included?

Mr. ASSHETON CROSS: No.

EDUCATION DEPARTMENT — THE EDUCATION CODE.—QUESTION.

Mr. ARTHUR MILLS asked the Vice President of the Council, Whether the Government will consider the expediency of redrafting the Education Code, which under the various titles of "Revised Code" and "New Code" has now existed for eighteen years, during which time a large number of Articles have been wholly or partially cancelled or modified, by which process the Code had been rendered rather complicated and incomprehensible?

Lord GEORGE HAMILTON: Sir, the Code is no doubt complicated; but this is due more, I think, to the somewhat complex contingencies under which deductions are made from the annual grants, rather than to want of arrangement or clearness of expression. No doubt, it could, however, be put, if we started entirely afresh, in a more succinct form. On the other hand, the school managers and teachers are well acquainted with the present form of the Code, although the conditions embodied in it are not sufficiently stereotyped to enable them to instantaneously recognize them if presented in an entirely new shape. All the printed Returns now in use both by the managers as well as the Department would have to be altered. On the whole, I think inconvenience rather than advantage would result from the sudden adoption of my hon. Friend's suggestion, though, in the annual revision of the Code, no opportunity will be lost by the Education Department in improving both its form and phraseology.

TRAFFIC REGULATIONS ON THE THAMES—THE OFFICIAL COMMITTEE.

QUESTION.

Mr. GOURLEY asked the President of the Board of Trade, When he anticipates being able to place upon the Table of the House the final Evidence and Report of the departmental Committee of the Board of Trade relative to the Rule of the Road in the navigation of the River Thames?

Viscount SANDON: Sir, the official Committee which I appointed to consider the traffic regulations of the River Thames have been constantly engaged upon the subject for the last four months. They have found it absolutely necessary, owing to the importance and difficulty of the subject, both to seek and to accept a large amount of evidence. All due despatch has been used, but I fear it will be impossible for the Report and additional evidence to be presented for some weeks without materially interfering with the advantage which I hope we shall derive from the investigations of this able Committee. I can, however, assure the hon. Gentleman that no time has been, or will be, lost in the matter.

RIVERS CONSERVANCY BILL.

QUESTION.

Mr. ANDERSON asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, If the proposed Rivers Conservancy Bill is to apply to Scotland?

MR. SCLATER-BOOTH: Sir, the Bill prepared under instructions from the Local Government Office has been designed as applicable to England and Wales only. I am unable to say, without consulting the Lord Advocate, whether its provisions can be made applicable to Scotland.

EGYPT—DISTURBANCES AT CAIRO.

QUESTION.

MR. W. CARTWRIGHT asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether the Government had received any official communication with regard to the statement in the newspapers of to-day that disturbances had occurred at Cairo, that Nubar Pasha had been compelled to resign, and that Mr. Rivers Wilson had sent in his resignation?

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, the Government have received a communication on this subject, which is substantially the same as that which has already appeared in the newspapers, with regard both to the disturbances at Cairo and the resignation or dismissal of Nubar Pasha. We have, however, received no information to show that Mr. Rivers Wilson has tendered his resignation.

VACCINATION ACTS—CASE OF JOSEPH ABEL.—QUESTION.

MR. HOPWOOD asked the President of the Local Government Board, Whether he is aware that Joseph Abel of Faringdon, Berks, after being convicted twenty-five times, and subjected to costs and fines amounting to £35 17*s.* 6*d.* for refusing to have his children vaccinated, has been served with fresh summonses for the same offence; and, whether he will apply to Parliament for power to control such proceedings?

MR. SCLATER-BOOTH: Sir, I have no reason to doubt the accuracy of the figures given by the hon. and learned Gentleman's Question, and I have heard recently from Mr. Abel that a fresh summons has been issued against him. My opinion, speaking generally, of the impolicy of too frequent prosecutions has been often stated, and I need not repeat it; but I must say that the guardians, in the course which they pursue, are exercising a discretion with which the law intrusts them. I have no intention of proposing to ask Parliament for powers to enable me to interfere in such cases, nor, were I otherwise minded, does the experience of the debate and division of last Session lead me to suppose that the House would be willing to concede any such powers.

SOUTH AFRICA—THE ZULU WAR.

QUESTION.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: I beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether Her Majesty's Government have received any further information from Natal since last week in confirmation or otherwise of the statements which have appeared in the newspapers this afternoon?

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: Sir, I understand that the intelligence which has appeared in the newspapers this evening was telegraphed from Madeira, to which place it had been brought by the steamer *Asiatic*, which was timed to leave the Cape the day after the *Dunrobin Castle*, which brought the first news of the disaster. We have as yet received no telegram from the *Asiatic* at the Colonial Office; but, of course, it is possible that one may arrive this evening; and I need scarcely say that I shall at the earliest possible moment communicate to the House that or any other intelligence I may receive.

PARLIAMENT—ORDER OF BUSINESS—THE ARMY AND NAVY ESTIMATES.

QUESTIONS.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: I think, Sir, it would be for the convenience of the House if the Chancellor of the Exchequer would state what Business will be taken on Monday next, because it is at present doubtful whether the Navy or Army Estimates will be taken on that day? I may also observe that the Navy Estimates are not yet in the hands of hon. Members.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, we propose to take the Army Estimates on Monday.

MR. GOSCHEN: It would also be for the convenience of hon. Members if the First Lord of the Admiralty would state when the Navy Estimates will be laid upon the Table?

MR. W. H. SMITH: Sir, I expect that they will be laid upon the Table this week.

LONDON BANKRUPTCY COURT—EXCLUSION OF REPORTERS.—QUESTION.

Sir GEORGE CAMPBELL asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, If it is true that during the examination in the London Bankruptcy Court of James Morton, the largest debtor to the City of Glasgow Bank, reporters were excluded; and, if he can explain why that portion of the investigation of a great public scandal, being conducted in England, is withheld from the public?

The ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir John Holker): Sir, during the examination of Mr. James Morton, reporters can hardly be said to have been excluded, for no reporters applied for admission. If representatives of the Press had, however, asked to be allowed to be present at the proceedings, their request would not have been granted. Mr. Morton was before the Bankruptcy Court as a bankrupt, and not in his character of debtor to the Glasgow Bank. The examination was not the public examination which takes place after the bankrupt's statement of affairs has been filed, but a private examination, appointed by the Court upon the application of the trustee, and resorted to for the purpose of interrogating the bankrupt as to the disposal of his estate and effects. At such an examination no reporters are allowed to be present, except the authorized shorthand writer, who takes notes for use in the bankruptcy proceedings and not for publication. I may point out to the hon. Gentleman that if the evidence taken at such private examinations were allowed to be published, the whole object of the examination would frequently be frustrated.

ORDERS OF THE DAY.

PARLIAMENT—BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.

RESOLUTION. [ADJOURNED DEBATE.]

Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Amendment proposed to the First Resolution, as amended [17th February],

"That, whenever the Committee of Supply appointed for the consideration of the ordinary Army, Navy, and Civil Service Estimates stands as the first Order of the Day on a Monday, Mr. Speaker shall leave the Chair without putting any question."

And which Amendment was,

After the word "Monday," to insert the words "and the Motion be made, That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."—(*Mr. Beresford Hope.*)

Question again proposed, "That those words be there inserted."

Debate *resumed.*

Mr. BERESFORD HOPE said, that he proposed to withdraw his Amendment.

Sir WILLIAM HARCOURT, in view of the numerous Amendments of the right hon. Gentleman's Resolutions, of which Notice had been given, suggested that time would be saved if some agreement were entered into with respect to them. He supported the proposal of the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington), that greater latitude of discussion should be allowed on the Report of Supply. In 1864 a Question was put to the Speaker on the subject of the limit of discussion to be allowed on the Report of Supply. According to the ruling of the Speaker, the right of discussion was as large and as open on Report of Supply as it was on going into Committee of Supply. If this really were so, it was plain that any Member could bring forward any subject of debate on the stage of the Report of Supply. Again, in 1857, his right hon. Friend who now represented Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone) intended to bring forward on the Navy Estimates a Resolution relating to the general Expenditure of the Government; but when his right hon. Friend was engaged in conversation with Lord John Russell, the First Lord of the Admiralty was adroit enough to slip into Committee of Supply, and the opportunity was lost. The consequence was that his right hon. Friend brought forward his Motion on the Report of Supply, notwithstanding the fact that it was not confined to the particular Votes. If, by the general assent of the House or otherwise, a general Rule was laid down on this point, no doubt a great part of the difficulty might be removed, inasmuch as no Member would be deprived of the Constitutional right of bringing on grievances before Supply was voted. If there was a tendency on the part of the Government to draw the strings tighter, that was all the more reason why Members should not relinquish the privileges they now possessed. If the Rule proposed by the Government were adopted without modifications, what would happen? The Government would have got Mondays, when no grievances could be brought forward at all, and there would be nothing to prevent the practice growing up of passing all the Estimates on Mondays. Thus all the money might be voted without grievances being brought forward. Certainly that was not an arrangement which the House could contemplate with satisfaction. He was one of those old-fashioned persons who thought it was not a good thing to part with Constitutional principles in order to get rid of small inconveniences. It was like a man burning his house down to warm his hands. What was the object held forth in order to induce the House to adopt this change? It was said that if the House went into Committee of the House at once it would have more time to discuss the details of the Estimates. He believed that this was a very great delusion. The time most uselessly spent in this House was that which was devoted to the discussion of the details of the Estimates. In the time of Joseph Hume, when the old system of jobbery and sinecures prevailed, good might be effected by attacking the Estimates in detail; but at the present day the only successful way to reduce the Estimates was by raising questions of principle, which were usually brought forward on the Question "That Mr. Speaker do leave the Chair." It was frequently objected out-of-doors that Parliament talked too much; but, as Lord Beaconsfield once observed, "Parliament" meant an Assembly that was engaged in talk; and it was the discussion of matters of this kind which ripened public opinion, and which prepared the mind of the Government for carrying into effect the objects pointed at in those discussions. The privilege of bringing on grievances before Supply had been a valuable safeguard in former times, and he thought it was so now; and he knew of no circumstances which could induce him to think that the House of Commons would do well to enlarge the powers of the Executive Government at the expense of the authority of Parliament. No doubt the House found itself confronted with many difficulties. The Government, as far as he could see, had offered no solution of one of these. At present the state of the Notice Paper was such that when a subject of great importance arose there was no means of bringing it before the House, except by the irregular method of a Motion for adjournment. This was a matter to which he thought the attention of the Government might well have been directed. If this Resolution were carried in its present form, and if the Government endeavoured to force on their Estimates on successive Mondays, there would probably be great delay in the discussion of them for the purpose of compelling the Government to propose the Estimates on those days on which general discussions could be raised on the Motion for going into Committee. Thus the Government would not save time, but waste time. Moreover, it was quite certain that many questions would be brought forward irregularly on Motions for adjournment. The immediate effect of shutting one door to discussion would be to open another. This was not a Party question, nor was he at all concerned in supporting the precedent of 1872. It was not a very binding precedent, for it was seven years since it was established, and it had been followed only in three. That did not look as if the House considered it a very good precedent in itself. But once a step of this kind was taken, it was made a precedent for taking another. Thus the precedent of 1872 was made use of for the present purpose. The power to state grievances was said to involve a great Constitutional principle. For his own part, he could not understand a great Constitutional principle which was to apply on Thursday, but not on Monday. This was a question which affected both Parties alike; it was a question of majorities and minorities. A minority ought so to act as if it would one day become a majority, and a majority as if it would one day become a minority. But if they threw all the power into the hands of the Government they would deprive the minority of its legitimate right of discussion. The Government had a very powerful arm in their majority. The minority had also a very powerful arm in their right to object to the policy of the Government; but that was a power which the Government sought very seriously to limit. The course of a river was according to the nature of the country through which it flowed; and if it were sought to dam it up, one never knew the amount of mischief which might result. A friend of his bought an estate in Scotland, and there was a stream upon it which he endeavoured to control. He dammed it up, but it overflowed its banks and caused a good deal of mischief, so that at last his friend said, in the bitterness of his heart, that there were only two things he had never been able to manage, and they were a Highland stream and a woman. He (Sir William Harcourt) ventured to suggest to the Chancellor of the Exchequer that there was another thing as difficult to bank up, and that was the House of Commons. The Government, he held, would have done better if it had left this alone. It was quite impossible that a matter of this kind could be satisfactorily settled merely by a majority. They could depart from the ancient Rules of the House only by general consent. The proposition of his noble Friend (the Marquess of Hartington) that Members should be allowed to discuss grievances on Report of Supply would go far to reconcile the House to the alterations proposed by the Government. But if there were to be no statement of grievances, either on going into Committee of Supply or on the Report, they would be embarking on a very dangerous course.

Mr. GORST complained that the Resolution was intended to put down, not obstruction, but criticism. Nothing was more salutary for Public Departments than to have their acts freely criticized; and to make Motions on going into Committee of Supply was the only way by which private Members could secure the opportunity of criticizing the proceedings of any Administration. If the Government were afraid of discussion of a grievance introduced by a private Member, they had recourse to the expedient of a "count out;" and now they made an attempt, by taking advantage of the outcry raised against obstruction, to pass a Resolution which would put down criticism. We were going through exactly the same phase as they were going through at Berlin. The disease in London was in a milder form. The Chancellor of the Exchequer could not bring in a gagging Act and play the part of Prince Bismarck on a large scale, so he was playing it on a minor scale, and had brought in a gagging Resolution. It had been said that Ministers in charge of the Estimates found it impossible to make their Statements except at very late and inconvenient hours, owing to the multitude of questions brought forward on going into Committee of Supply. But last year the First Lord of the Admiralty made his Statement at half-past 5, while the Speaker was in the Chair, and other Ministers could do the same if they chose. He was quite aware that the privilege of bringing forward grievances on the Motion for going into Committee of Supply might be abused; but he thought the House might rely upon the influence of public opinion and a man's regard for his own reputation to prevent the discussion of grievances of a frivolous nature. If this Resolution were passed it would lower the character of the House.

Mr. J. COWEN said, he was one of those Members who had been taken somewhat by surprise at the precipitate manner in which the Chancellor of the Exchequer had submitted those Resolutions. He was not a Member of the Select Committee that sat last Session, and he had not an opportunity of seeing the Motion that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had put on the Paper until Saturday morning. Since then, however, he had closely followed the discussion on Monday night, had studied the Report of the Committee, and looked through the evidence they took. He gave it as his opinion that the Government would not succeed in accomplishing what they wanted by the changes that were now proposed. Of course, it was only an opinion; but his deliberate judgment was that the Ministers would lose as much time in discussing the Resolutions as they would gain during the Session, even if they were eventually carried and put in force. It behoved Members of Parliament to guard with incessant watchfulness and constant jealousy the Rules under which their proceedings were conducted. These Parliamentary laws were conceived in the interests of free discussion, and framed for the purpose of securing the right of minorities. Many of them were memorials of interesting and important historical struggles. They formed a register of successful encounters between representative and arbitrary authority. The House of Commons, therefore, would do wisely in opposing the slightest encroachment upon hardly fought for and dearly cherished privileges. With this general declaration he was willing to admit—as all men familiar with the House of Commons must admit—that great changes had taken place in the conditions under which the legislation of this country was carried on. The work of Parliament had not only increased, but its character had altogether altered. Formerly their debates were limited to discussing the best means by which the Revenue could be levied and expended, settling the relations that had to exist between England and foreign States, and considering occasionally important Constitutional problems. Then talking was confined to these topics. Now their legislation was far-reaching. It entered into the minute ramifications of commercial, civil, and social life. They had taken under their inspection schools and ships, factories and mines. They had covered the country with a network of intricate sanitary regulations. These duties entailed a great increase of administration, and an increase of administration brought a larger amount of legislation. The administrative work of the Government in England had quadrupled during the last quarter of a century. In addition to that, the number of men who took part in the discussions had gradually enlarged. Only 30 or 40 Members in a Session spoke some years ago, now nine or 10 times that number engaged in their debates. All these circumstances pointed to the necessity of some change from time to time in the forms by which their work was guided. Another and more subtle, but still a potent influence was at work, which affected their doings. A few years ago the Members of the House of Commons consisted of sons and relatives of the aristocracy, country gentlemen, professional men, barristers, officers of the Army and Navy, and old and retired men of business. They might not have a uniformity of opinion; but there existed amongst them a uniformity of manners, of feeling, and of custom. They were all drawn from the same social strata. They had now a more extended suffrage — enfranchising not only the trading but the artizan classes —and this had slightly so far, but ultimately would largely, affect the composition of the House. The new Members representing a more democratic section of the State had sentiments and feelings not altogether in common with other classes, and a great deal of the friction —political and personal—that they had experienced in recent Sessions had unquestionably been produced by the imperfect mingling of these new elements. He admitted all this, and any reasonable proposal on the part of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to adapt the Rules of the House to the constantly shifting phases of Parliamentary life he had no objection to; but he would resist, stoutly and strenuously, any attempt to infringe upon the sacred privileges of English Parliamentary existence—the redress of grievances before the granting of Supplies. The Resolution proposed struck at the foundation of this principle. It was not a large concession that was asked, it was true. It only affected one day of the week; but if it were granted, other and further demands would follow. The only course for the independent Members was to meet the proposition with uncompromising resistance at the start. It was no use their concealing from themselves the reason why these Rules were proposed. The Government thought the progress of Business had been interfered with by the active criticism of the Irish Members. What was called the obstruction of the Gentlemen who sat below the Gangway had disconcerted the Ministerial arrangements. These new Rules were framed for the purpose of weakening the power of resistance of the Gentlemen who sat around him. He begged to point out, however, that they aimed at a matter that really they had no grounds of complaint with. The obstruction—if such was to be the word used—applied to Votes in Committee; but there was no attempt to alter the power of resistance there. What the Chancellor of the Exchequer proposed to do was to prevent Members raising discussions on principles of policy before the money was granted. So far as he was concerned, he would say that whatever might be the result, he would never vote for any infringement of that law. He thought the very moderate Amendment that had been suggested by the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition might be accepted, and with that the Government ought to be content.

Mr. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN said, there was one view of the subject which had not, he thought, been fairly laid before the House. The point at issue was not, as had been put by the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. J. Cowen), whether there should or should not be free discussion, but whether discussion should be controlled by legitimate Rules; because, if the argument of his hon. Friend who had just spoken were carried to its logical conclusion, the House must go back to the time when on the presentation of every Petition a speech might be made. If they were not to have Rules, their discussions would not be free but simply unruly and disorderly. Why was a Committee appointed last year? Why, because a revision of the Rules was felt to be necessary. In supporting some change, he did not do so in order that the Government might have more power, but in order that their discussions might be properly regulated. He had listened, he might add, with the greatest respect and attention to the observations which had fallen from his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt), who seemed to argue that on the Report of Supply there should be some such latitude of discussion as in the case of the Appropriation Act. There was much, he thought, to be said in favour of that proposition, and it might be made the basis of a compromise with general consent. But when his hon. and learned Friend went on to speak of the undesirability of altering Constitutional principles in order to get rid of certain inconveniences, he appeared to regard those inconveniences hardly in the light in which they were viewed by public opinion. Hon. Members did not possess those privileges with which they seemed so loth to part in order that they might be individually exalted, but as trustees for the people who sent them to Parliament, in order that they might be protected in the discharge of their duties, and in the due transaction of the business of the people. The moment, therefore, that they began to look upon them from a merely personal point of view and availed themselves of them to obstruct the progress of Business, then they became really not in the true sense of the word sticklers for privilege, but men whose action tended to imperil it, because they would make "privilege" unpopular in the country, and people out-of-doors would begin to ask themselves the natural and pertinent question, for what reason was it that these privileges had been given to Members of the House of Commons? There were many good things in the world, excellent in their use, but which became most mischievous in their abuse. For instance, Constitutional liberty was a thing of priceless value; but when it degenerated into unfettered licence, it might come to work as much evil against the welfare of a community as the worst form of despotism. So it was with the privileges of the House of Commons, with regard to which, if they were made use of for the purpose of impeding the Public Business, the question would be asked why hon. Members possessed them, or whether they ought to possess them in the same degree as at present? His hon. and learned Friend had pointed out that if the Rule under discussion were adopted the Government might run through all the Estimates on a Monday, and that that might turn out to be a great evil. In that case, said his hon. and learned Friend, Members would resort to all kinds of expedients to bring forward their grievances, and would harass the Government in order to oblige them to place Estimates on the Paper on other days than Monday in order to effect this object. But did not this argument of his hon. and learned Friend answer itself? The moment the Government sought to take undue advantage of this Rule, the consequences pointed out might ensue. But knowing that this would be the case, the Government, he felt sure, would take very good care not to abuse this Rule, and only to employ it for its legitimate purpose of facilitating the due transaction of the Business of the House. If ever they attempted to take any advantage of the House, they would find the public opinion too strong for them. He would not go into the question as to whether the custom of moving Amendments on going into Supply was an old one or not, though his hon. and learned Friend had no doubt been correct in stating that the custom began about the year 1811. The present proposed alteration was brought forward not on the mere Motion of the Government, but as the result of many Parliamentary Committees. No fewer than three Speakers of the House, as well as many other eminent personages, had agreed in stating that of late years the enormous increase in the number of irrelevant Amendments moved on the House going into Supply, not by one individual or one body of individual alone, but by all sections of the House, was such as greatly to impede the Public Business and to necessitate alteration. He hoped the House would in some form or other pass the Rule, because he believed it would tend not to impair, but to preserve, the privileges of the House. His noble Friend (the Marquess of Hartington) had made the offer of a concession; and he thought it would be well for all parties if the Chancellor of the Exchequer could see his way to its acceptance. But, in any case, it was not creditable to waste time in discussing a matter so easily understood; and he hoped they would show that they were really a business House, by permitting in some shape or another a settlement of this question.

MR. NEWDEGATE: The hon. and learned Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst) rests his hopes of regulating the Business of the House upon the support of public opinion; but he must be aware that there is a section who have upon this subject openly defied the public opinion of the House during the last three Sessions. The Committee upstairs was bound to take that fact into its consideration, because it was appointed with reference to the continuance of that system of obstruction. I wish to recall to the attention of the House that this is not a new subject. The hon. and learned Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt) adverted to the precedent of 1857; but he must remember that in 1861 there was a Committee of Public Business, presided over by Sir James Graham, because the discussions of the House had become frivolous, multifarious, and irrelevant. He has totally omitted to mention that the effect of the recommendations of that Committee was that Friday was appointed for such discussions as he desires to promote, and that the Government were enjoined to place Supply for Friday, in order that hon. Members of this House might have an opportunity of bringing forward for its consideration whatever subjects they wished. That arrangement was made subsequent to the precedent of 1857, to which the hon. and learned Member has referred. The real fact of the case is—as anyone who will read the Evidence may see—that the House of Commons felt that its character, its weight in the country, its position as an Estate of the Realm, was being imperilled by the introduction of these multifarious subjects of debate. Another opportunity had been given to hon. Members for obtaining information when the whole system of Questions, with which our Sittings commence, was inaugurated in 1861. The whole tendency of the arrangements in this House has been in favour of giving increased opportunities for discussion to the non-official Members of this House; until we have come to such an abuse of that privilege—we have seen these facilities so much taken advantage of—that the character of this House as a Legislative Assembly is again endangered. When the Committee of the last Session made a recommendation that the Government should have Monday evening for Supply without any discussion or your, Sir, leaving the Chair, they proposed that the same restriction should be placed against discussion on the House going into Committee on Ways and Means. The right hon. Member for Chester (Mr. Dodson) thought, and I agreed with him, that that would be placing Monday at the disposal of the Government to too great an extent; and I am glad that Her Majesty's Government have given up the proposal to bar general discussion before going into Committee of Ways and Means on Mondays. My own belief is that this House is endangering its position in the eyes of the country by undue discussion upon minor and multifarious subjects. I have heard from persons out-of-doors, over and over again, that unless the House of Commons succeeds in putting down the system of obstruction, to which it was subject for three successive Sessions, it would fall in the estimation of the country, and that the other Estates of the Realm would be invested with undue power. I ask Members of this House, do they wish to hand over their real power of legislation to the House of Lords, or do they wish to see it monopolized by the Crown? If the House of Commons intends to retain its position as the most powerful element in the Constitution, it must convince public opinion by regulating, limiting, controlling, and elevating its debates—that it merits the great trust which has hitherto been reposed in it.

Mr. MITCHELL HENRY submitted that the hon. Member for North Warwickshire's (Mr. Newdegate's) argument was not consistent with the facts of the case. The Resolution did not touch anything in the shape of obstruction, such as had been alleged against hon. Members on that side of the House; and he thought it unfortunate that the hon. Gentleman should have entered upon an irritating topic, which was better kept out of the way until the time came when it must be discussed, which would be when the second Resolution was placed before them. He ventured to assert that no peculiar obstruction had been offered by Irish Members on Motions for going into Committee of Supply. This Resolution was directed to that; and, as the hon. Member for North Warwickshire had stated, it had been under the consideration of the House for years before several of his hon. Friends around him, and against whom the charge of obstruction was levelled, entered the House at all. The matter was one which, in his opinion, ought to be approached very quietly and very seriously. There were few hon. Members who would not admit that there was great inconvenience caused by a Minister being kept waiting night after night to introduce the subject of Supply. And when he did obtain an opportunity of bringing forward the subject, his statements were frequently made to very small and dead Houses in consequence of the discussions that had preceded them. Could not that evil be met without abrogating the real privileges of the House of Commons? He believed that it could well be done. The proposition, moreover, before the House was not the original proposition of the Government. The Government asked much more than it was prepared now to take; and, while looking at that which they insisted on, they could not forget that what they did originally ask would seriously, in the opinion of the hon. Member for North Warwickshire, have crippled the privileges of the House. For his own part, speaking as an individual Member, he thought that if the Government would accept the proposal to permit discussion on the Report of Supply, it would go a long way to meet the objections felt by many Members to the Resolution. But if that concession were made, it must be done thoroughly, and the Report must not be taken, as it was taken now, at a very late hour of the night. It must be taken as part of the Business of the House, and as regularly as possible. He was far from believing that hon. Members should give up any of their privileges with respect to the introduction of all manner of personal questions and grievances of the people in going into Supply. On the contrary, he thought that there never was a time in the history of this country when it was so necessary for the House of Commons to preserve that power. Centralization was going on in every direction, and year by year the House was giving up its privileges to right hon. Gentlemen, the Representatives of Departments. Only last Session they gave up the management of prisons to the Home Secretary. That right hon. Gentleman knew very well that throughout the country there had been very disagreeable and painful discussions as to what had taken place in that direction. Having deprived the country of that important part of the administration, were they going to shut the mouth of the House of Commons and prevent hon. Members from bringing forward grievances in connection with that subject? At the present moment, if anyone went into the prisons of the country, he would see an army of warders bearing the effigy of the Royal Crown. This was something perfectly new in the country, and being so, it was not wholesome to make such a change. It was not desirable that the Crown should be brought into direct connection with the administration of prisons and every other part of the usual system of the country. But that was the policy of the Government, and he would ask hon. Members on the Opposition side of the House to consider that when they came to give their votes on this question. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Sandwich (Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen) had been making use of some of his leisure time in reading Burke on the French Revolution, and had given the House an admirable *resumé* of the principles of liberty and licence contrasted with each other. But the question before them was neither that of liberty nor of licence; it was simply a practical question as to how the Business of the House should be carried on. And such a question should be debated quietly, and in a business-like manner. Suppose the Government obtained what it desired, and the House went into Committee of Supply on Monday, they would, he trusted, obtain from the Minister bringing forward the Estimate a more full account of the finances connected with his Department than they had been in the habit of receiving. But would they obtain a fuller discussion of the Estimates themselves by the adoption of this Resolution? Suppose Supply was moved by a Minister at half-past 5 o'clock, and at 7 o'clock, when the discussion of the Estimates came on, where would the House of Commons be? Would 10 Members remain in the House during the time they were in the habit of taking for dinner? If Supply were brought on at 5 o'clock, he believed there would be a smaller discussion of the Estimates than under the present system, so that he was not clear in his own mind that the professed object of the Government—namely, to obtain a fuller discussion of individual matters of Supply—would be obtained by this measure. Moreover, if the privileges of hon. Members were curtailed, those who felt themselves aggrieved would avail themselves of every opportunity left to them to the uttermost. For his own part, he could wish some compromise were made by the Government, such as that proposed by the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition, accompanied by a promise to take the Report of Supply at an early period of the evening. If that were not done, he should feel it his duty to move the adjournment of the House on frequent occasions when not prohibited by the Rules of debate. There was another consideration deserving attention. The very fact that grievances could be brought forward on the Motion for going into Committee of Supply frequently obtained their redress. He had seen grievances redressed without even their being brought forward at all. One noticeable case was that of a very cruel grievance perpetrated by a right hon. Gentleman on this side of the House. His Colleagues disapproved of the action of the particular Minister in question, and a Motion was put on the Paper to call the attention of the House to the subject before going into Committee of Supply. The Motion was postponed several times while negotiations were going on, but was not removed until such pressure was brought to bear by the Prime Minister himself that the grievance was redressed. The Motion was, therefore, never brought forward at all. If private Members were deprived of the opportunity of bringing forward grievances of the people, subjects of the Crown would be deprived of the opportunity of redress from the fear of Ministers when they were in the wrong. The House was gradually giving up everything to the Government of this country, and was gradually abrogating, as it seemed to him, that Constitution by means of which they had grown into a great and free people. He had read the other day that in Burmah the Constitution was abrogated by the King, who was stated to be an amiable young man, only at times he had a disagreeable habit of pricking with his spear anybody he disliked. He feared that the Chancellor of the Exchequer was like the King of Burmah, for he wished to prick some of his (Mr. Mitchell Henry's) own Friends with his spear; but, in doing so, he forgot that he was abrogating the Constitution of this country. The subject would certainly not be easily disposed of, unless the Government would give hon. Members some compensation for depriving them of the privilege of bringing on grievances before Supply. Surely, if the object of the Chancellor of the Exchequer were merely to get his Supply taken in a proper and orderly manner, without interfering with the privileges of the House of Commons, he should yield to the proposal of the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition. The right hon. Gentleman could not be placed in a worse position by so doing, and would besides obtain the sympathy of many of those who might otherwise feel it their duty to oppose to the utmost a loss which they could not repair. The Rule could be tried during the present Session; and as all these matters were tentative and experimental, he trusted the Chancellor of the Exchequer would see the wisdom of accepting the proposal made by the noble Lord and acquiesced in by a strong minority on both sides of the House.

Colonel ARBUTHNOT said, although he had a Notice of Motion on going into Supply on the Army Estimates, which would take precedence of all others, he was one of those who attached so much importance to the Estimates coming on and being explained at a time when there was a full attendance that, even to his own loss, he should feel inclined to support the proposal of the Government. No doubt some assurance would be given that Supply would not be put down for every Monday night in the Session. A further assurance might be given that the Government would not take more than one evening in the week for each class of Estimates. He hoped they would not agree to the proposal to have free discussion on the Appropriation Bill, which came on in the middle of August.

Sir ALEXANDER GORDON said, he could corroborate what had fallen from the hon. and learned Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt), and from the hon. and learned Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst), with respect to the inutility of discussing in the House the details of the Army Estimates; for he could assure the House that by no class of persons were these discussions regarded with more indifference—he might almost say with more ridicule—than by the officers of the Army. The part the officers looked upon with interest was the opening Statement of the Secretary of State for War, in which his military policy was stated. There they learnt all that it was important for them to know. Any subsequent discussion was generally maintained by a small class of crotchety persons, and was of no great interest to the Army. The carrying out of the suggestion that a printed paper explanatory of the Estimates should be supplied would be a great facility. He hoped some steps would be taken which would prevent waste of time.

Sir WALTER B. BARTTELOT said, they had had several Committees on this subject, and he recollected especially that the right hon. Member for the University of London (Mr. Lowe) was Chairman of the Committee of 1872. The right hon. Gentleman began by proposing to that Committee that when Supply stood as the first Order of the Day, not only on Monday but also on Thursday, the House should go at once into Committee of Supply without any discussion whatever. What happened? Another right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Disraeli) immediately said —"No, that will not do. What we will do is this—we will give you Monday, and not Thursday." The reply of the Committee to that was this—"No; we are not going to be ruled by the two front Benches." The Committee then proceeded to discuss the subject, and the outcome of the whole was that the House adopted the Rule which gave power to Members to move grievances upon subjects relevant to the Estimates proposed upon Monday, and Monday only. He entirely disagreed with the hon. and learned Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt), when he said that that was a bad Rule—that it did not work well. The hon. and learned Member had quoted strong authorities; but he had given none so strong as the Speaker's. When the Speaker was asked whether the Rule of 1872-3 had worked well, he replied—

> "I am bound to say that the balance of my opinion is in favour of adopting the Resolution of the House of 1872, and mainly upon the ground that that is a Resolution which has been tried and approved."

Now, the Chancellor of the Exchequer could not successfully deal with this question unless he obtained a *consensus* of opinion; and what he ventured to suggest was—let the right hon. Gentleman try a solution in that direction. There were many proposals down on the Paper, and there were several pointed in this quarter; and he believed if the Chancellor of the Exchequer reverted to that which had been tried with success he would be able to carry his point. No doubt, there was the objection that a Minister would not be able to make his Statement when he came down to the House; but that was a minor consideration when the privileges of the House were concerned. He thought the House would maintain those privileges by adopting the Rule of 1872.

Mr. RYLANDS wished, in the first place, to tell the hon. and gallant Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) that he could not treat this question as one between the present Government and the last. It was a most unreasonable argument to advance that because a particular Committee in former years had recommended a Resolution which infringed the privileges of private Members, that was a sufficient authority for giving something up on the present occasion. What were Parliamentary Committees in former years? They were so constituted that Members of the Government then existing, or right hon. Gentlemen who had been in the previous Government, or hon. Gentlemen who expected to be in the next Government, formed or controlled the majority of the Committee; and, of course, right hon. Gentlemen, under those circumstances, were very ready indeed to recommend Resolutions which they must have felt would be very convenient to them in the administration of the affairs of the Government. He was delighted to hear his hon. and learned Friend (Sir William Harcourt) enforce the same views as he himself endeavoured to state on Monday—that this was not a time when the House should give up its power of controlling the Executive. He (Mr. Rylands) said that when they were in the position of having sprung upon them new lines of policy, when they found the Government taking steps which involved the expenditure of large and almost untold sums of money, when they undertook to bind the country to serious responsibilities without first giving Parliament an opportunity of being consulted, he said that this was a period when, of all others, hon. Gentlemen on his side of the House should resist every infringement of the rights of Parliament. But he might remind hon. Gentlemen opposite that the time might come when a Government might be seated upon that Bench who might exercise the power of the Executive in another direction, and in a manner which would be equally disagreeable to the Conservative Party, as the part the Government had taken was distasteful to the Liberals. Hon. Gentlemen opposite must not suppose that the present Conservative Government was going to last for ever, because it might not last for many years; and, at all events, it was certain the time would come when, under the change which had taken place in the Constitution of this Kingdom, they would have a very strong element of democracy represented upon the Government Bench. They would, perhaps, have Members of the Government who would be disposed to make use of the Executive power in a manner which would be disastrous to the country; but now, at the bidding of the present Government, in which they had confidence, the House was asked to give up one of the most powerful weapons which, perhaps, the Conservatives might then wish to use. He thought it was the most dangerous thing in the world to triflo with the rights of Parliament, simply because there had been circumstances in the House which were described as obstruction. The hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate) had, he thought, without any justification, alluded to the circumstances of the last and previous Sessions as a reason for the proceedings in connection with this Resolution. He (Mr. Rylands) disputed entirely that these circumstances had anything to do with the Resolution they were discussing at the present moment, because it was a Resolution which had been brought forward by previous Governments, and discussed by previous Parliaments, before obstruction ever took place. But even if it were so, he warned the House not to allow a temporary circumstance, which was probably not a lasting state of things, to induce them to change so materially the position in which private Members were placed in this House. His right hon. Friend (Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen) said the way to preserve these privileges was to make proper use of them; but he did not show how they were to make a proper use of their privileges by giving them up. If he properly interpreted the right hon. Member's language, he meant to convey that novel idea. That was the policy of the right hon. Gentleman, and he entered into an elaborate argument to show how they were to preserve the privileges of the House; and the conclusion of that argument was that he would consent that these privileges should be withdrawn from them. He (Mr. Rylands) did not hesitate to say that if they accepted this Resolution as it stood, the result would be eminently unsatisfactory. He was not prepared to say that the power of proposing Motions on the Report of Supply would be a satisfactory solution; but he would prefer that concession to having nothing at all. But he did not want to move from the present position of things, and he did hope that the Chancellor of the Exchequer, although he had a majority at his back, would not press upon a reluctant House, against the opinions of independent Members on both sides, a change of such a very violent character as that which was embraced in the Resolution which had been laid upon the Table. If that Resolution were passed in its present form, he did not hesitate to say they would be driven into one or two positions. One would be that they would find they had lost, without any power of remedy, a great advantage which they had possessed; the other position would be that they should be casting about to see how, by straining the forms of the House, they could make up for that withdrawal of their privileges. The effect would be that they would seek some inconvenient and new method of bringing forward, under the attention of the House, questions which they considered of importance. He was quite sure that if they had not the power to raise questions of principle and policy upon going into Supply, it would be necessary, to a much greater extent than had hitherto been the case, to criticize the Estimates with the view of raising general questions of policy. That would be a very inconvenient mode of discussing the Estimates, which he hoped they would not be drawn into. Motions for the adjournment of the House would also be more frequent, and other means would be taken which, in an inconvenient manner, would serve the purpose of those who wished to question the policy of the Government. He would again express a hope that the Resolution would not be pressed in its present form, against the opinion of so many hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the House.

Mr. WHITBREAD said, the Resolution before the House was aimed at obtaining a better mode of conducting the Public Business; and though it was true that, owing to the skilful manner in which the Estimates were drawn, hon. Members had no difficulty in hitting upon items which they wished to have struck out, there could be no doubt that the House did more good by preventing objectionable items creeping into the Estimates than by striking them out after they had got there. Therefore, he thought it important that the power of Members to bring questions forward on Supply should be retained; and he hoped the Chancellor of the Exchequer would be able to see his way to accepting the proposition of the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the House must have seen that there was a willingness on the part of the majority of hon. Members to assist him in making progress with his Estimates; and he would, therefore, do well not to take any course likely to produce a feeling of irritation in the House.

Mr. SYNAN contended that the Committee of last year was appointed for the express purpose of devising means to put down obstruction, and the evidence mainly related to that subject. But the Resolution now before the House did not point to obstruction, but aimed at the rights and privileges of the Members of this House — one of their principal rights—rights which this House held as trustees for the people. Various remedies had been suggested for facilitating the progress of Public Business; but he warned the House of the serious consequences that would follow if they gave up the privilege aimed at by the present Resolution. If such a Resolution were passed, hon. Members would cease to have a *locus standi* on the most important question that could occupy the attention of the House, and upon which it might be truly said that the existence of this House depended — namely, the redress of grievances.

Mr. WALTER said, there was nothing for which he could be more grateful than an intelligible definition of the word "grievance" — a word which in this debate had been used more frequently than any other. He had sat about 30 years in the House; and in former days, when Motions were interposed between the Government and Committee of Supply, they generally related to grievances, or alleged grievances, of a personal and substantial character, which had been sustained by some person or persons at the hands of the Government of the day, or to some palpable abuses of which the Government had been guilty. Now, however, the word seemed to have a totally different meaning, and to signify "that which causes grief to any person whatever." As he understood the matter now, every hon. Member was at liberty to introduce, in the form of an Amendment to the Motion for Committee of

Supply on a Government night, any question he chose, and to make as long a speech as if he were himself introducing a Bill on the subject. This was an entirely novel practice as far as his experience was concerned; and while he would deprecate any attempt to curtail the privileges of the House as far as the discussion of real grievances was concerned, he thought there was great force in all that had been urged on the part of the Government in favour of preventing the time of Parliament being occupied and Public Business delayed by the ventilation of alleged grievances which were, in fact, no grievances at all.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said, that the proposal to withdraw the Amendment of the hon. Member for Cambridge University (Mr. Beresford Hope) had given occasion for a general discussion, which was not, he thought, an inconvenient one, on the whole principle of the Resolutions to be proposed. It was, in his opinion, well that they had had an opportunity of taking, in the way they had been doing, the general sense of the House upon the first Resolution, and in a general sense upon the principle of all the Resolutions, inasmuch as it must tend to shorten the discussion upon them. He desired to repeat that the Resolution which he had brought forward was not a proposal which was made by the Government in support of encroachment, or of an attempt to take away the privileges of the general body of the House. It was a proposal which emanated not from the Government alone, but from a Committee of 17 Members appointed last Session, and comprising a very decided majority of Gentlemen who neither had been nor were in Office. The Resolutions which he had put upon the Paper, in their original form, were exactly in the language in which they were approved of by the Committee as it concluded its labours. A great deal of misapprehension appeared to prevail as to the circumstances which led to the appointment of that Committee, and as to the motives with which it had been nominated. Some hon. Members seemed to think that it had been appointed for the purpose of dealing with what was called obstruction. That, however, was not the case; and if hon. Gentlemen would bear in mind the line which he had himself taken on the subject, they would see that that could not be so. The object with which that particular Committee was appointed was to consider recommendations which had been made by Committees in former years—many of them three or four times over—as well as any other recommendations which might be offered, and to say which it was really desirable to bring to the test of a vote in the House. It did certainly happen that in the course of the proceedings of the Committee, after it had been appointed, circumstances led to its Members turning their attention much more to the question of obstruction than it was originally intended to do. But with regard to the original purpose with which the Committee was appointed, that was not the meaning of its nomination. The Government desired to see how and in what way the conduct of Business in the House could be improved. They had heard a great deal of the proper privileges of Parliament and of the great functions it had to discharge. He should like hon. Members to make up their minds as to what these were, and whether the House was a place for indefinite talk, to be no more kept within bounds than was a river which was not to be banked up. Was that to be the case, or were they to conduct the Public Business according to Rules which would be likely to enable them to get through it with reasonable facility? The House of Commons had a not inconsiderable amount of Business to deal with, and that Business could only be carried through in accordance with regulations. No doubt, where there was only a small amount of work, they could dispense with Rules more easily than under other circumstances; no doubt, where there were only a small number of Gentlemen who took part in debates, it would be much more easy to get on. But the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. J. Cowen)—though he was sorry for the conclusion at which that hon. Gentleman had arrived—hit the nail on the head, when he said that matters in the House of Commons were not now as they were at the beginning of the century. That was so for two reasons—first, they had a wider range of subjects to deal with; and, next, 10 times the number of Members took part in debate as compared with the former period. If the House made no change which would enable the Minister to get into Committee at once and make his Statement, they were placed in the difficulty both of keeping the Minister for a great length of time and of bringing about an irregular discussion of points which perhaps it would be found unnecessary to raise, or to raise in the same way, if his Statement had not been delayed. Several fallacies had been mentioned in the course of the conversation which had taken place. His hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Gorst) had stated that last year his right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty has made his annual Statement before the Speaker left the Chair. That he would, on reference, find not to have been the case. Other hon. Members, again, appeared to think that if the power of moving Amendments on going into Committee of Supply were done away with, they would lose the very valuable privilege which enabled them, on an emergency suddenly arising, to challenge the policy of the Government. In that view he could not concur. If an hon. Member desired to challenge the conduct of the Government on an occasion of importance and urgency, and to do so on going into Committee of Supply, he might, on coming down to the House, find 20 Notices having precedence of his. But if an appeal were made to the Government to give facilities for the bringing forward of such a question, if it were really one of interest which attracted the notice of the Whole House, the necessary facilities would, no doubt, be granted. There were other modes besides in which such a matter could be brought forward. The power and the ingenuity of the House were quite sufficient to make a way for the discussion of any question that required immediate consideration. What the hon. Member for Galway (Mr. Mitchell Henry) had said was perfectly true. They were there to consider the practical question of how the Business of the House was to be carried on; and he would ask him and other Members to consider whether the Resolutions that had been proposed would not assist the House in conducting its Business, for they would largely economise time. The Government were not in a position of antagonism with the House in this matter. They were on the same side with the House. Their sole object was to get through the Business of the House, and to do so with the greatest economy of time and labour. The Resolutions of the Committee of last Session had been modified by taking out the words "Committee of Ways and Means"—an alteration which left a considerable opening of which Members might avail themselves. They had made another alteration on the suggestion of the noble Lord opposite (the Marquess of Hartington), excluding special or Supplementary Votes from the operation of the Rule; and so it would be seen that the opportunities of hon. Members to bring forward Motions would not be unduly restricted. The House might be perfectly sure the Government, for their own sake, would not abuse the Rule. If they did, the House would have the remedy in its own hands. The Rule, he might point out, would have the incidental advantage of rendering less frequent the necessity for Votes on Account; and, by making certain the days on which Supply would be taken, would probably tend to diminish the number of Amendments now put down on the Motion to go into Committee of Supply, and which, in many instances, were put down there instead of on particular Votes, merely because of the uncertainty as to when those Votes would be taken. The Government was most anxious to adopt anything which appeared to be consistent with the general feeling of the House. They quite felt that in these matters, unless they had the great majority of the House with them, their objects would not be attained. He had been especially anxious to meet the views of the noble Lord opposite (the Marquess of Hartington), and had done so the other day to some extent with perfect goodwill; but he did not quite see his way to accept the suggestion which the noble Lord had just thrown out. He quite understood that his object was that greater latitude should be taken for the discussion of grievances on the Report of Supply; but it was not necessary to formulate any Resolution on the subject, and it would perhaps be sufficient to point out that discussions might be taken on the Report, which would supply the place of debates when going into Committee. It was difficult to say what was the nature of the discussions which might take place in that case; but if a new Resolution were necessary on the point, it would be for the House to say whether it ought to be brought in.

MR. W. E. FORSTER suggested that it would be for the convenience of the House if the Speaker would state what the Rule really was in regard to the Report of Supply.

MR. SPEAKER: In answer to the question of the right hon. Gentleman, I have to state that the established Rule of debate is that the observations of hon. Members should be relevant to the Question put from the Chair. There is one exception to that Rule, and that is when a Motion is made that this House resolve itself into Committee of Supply. Upon that occasion irrelevance of debate — that is to say, debate not relevant to the subject matter proposed to be discussed in Committee—is allowed; but I am not aware of irrelevant matter, generally speaking, being allowed upon any other occasion. No doubt, considerable latitude of discussion has been allowed occasionally on the Report of Supply; but I know of no instance where an irrelevant Amendment has been allowed on the Motion that Resolutions adopted in Committee of Supply be read a second time.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON said that, while he was perfectly willing to acknowledge the readiness with which the Chancellor of the Exchequer had accepted so much of the suggestions made on a former occasion as he thought would be for the advantage and convenience of the House, he regretted that the right hon. Gentleman had not been able to take a favourable view of the proposal as to the moving of Amendments on the Report of Supply. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that, in practice, there would be no risk of matters of urgent importance failing to obtain discussion, and that the Government would offer facilities for the purpose. It was perfectly true that the Government were always ready to offer facilities for the discussion of any Motion which impugned their conduct and which seemed to have the support of a considerable section of the House; what he thought the right hon. Gentleman did not perceive was that there might be various occasions upon which it might be extremely desirable that a discussion should take place and explanations given without any Motion being upon the Paper. He did not know that the Government would on all occasions be so ready to offer facilities for such discussions—discussions which, nevertheless, might be alike necessary and important; and it was to meet such cases that his suggestion was thrown out. What he wished to point out was that on such an occasion as that to which he referred, weeks might elapse before a Member obtained an opportunity of raising a question or making a Motion. He had now that opportunity. A Member knew that the Government could not get their Supply until he had an opportunity of bringing forward his question. If the Resolution of the Government should be sanctioned, the Government might put off Supply on Thursdays for some time with a view of preventing a discussion of a disagreeable topic. As to his own proposal, the Chancellor of the Exchequer had said he was not quite sure what it was; but if it were put in the form of a Resolution, it would take the same form as his suggestion to the Committee—

> "Provided that any question may be raised or Amendment moved on the second reading of a Resolution on the Report of the Committee of Supply."

He had not proposed this in the form of an Amendment or an extension of the proposal of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, because he thought the House should be consulted, and that it was probable that the Government might have some proposition of its own to offer. His proposal, in effect, was that the Speaker should not on Mondays alone, but on all occasions of going into Supply, leave the Chair without putting any Question. This would secure in all cases a certain consideration of the Estimates in Committee, and any discussion in the form of Amendments which were now moved would come up on Report. The principle of bringing grievances before Supply would be maintained, and the House would have the great advantage of knowing for a certainty when the Estimates would come on. It might be said that this would only postpone the general discussions till the Report; but he thought, in practice, that would not be found the case, as many of the grievances would be disposed of in the discussion in Committee. There would, no doubt, be an occasional block on the Report; but the Government had stated that they could not hope to put down these discussions altogether. The Government were, he knew, under the idea that they would gain nothing by his proposal; but he knew, on the contrary, that they would gain a great deal. In any case, the Government must understand that there were very many questions which they could not exclude under any system of Business; and if a proper opportunity were not allowed for their consideration, he very much feared that objectionable ones would be found.

Mr. RAIKES said, he regretted that the noble Lord who had just sat down had not put his propositions on the Paper in a definite form. He said, when he first heard them, that they seemed to him the most logical and the most effective way of dealing with the question aimed at in the Resolution. After having heard the more definite statement which the noble Lord had just made, he certainly wished to repeat that opinion in a still more unqualified manner. At the same time, it must be with all Members of the House a matter of regret that this proposition had not been put on the Paper in a definite form, and that they had not learnt definitely what were the proposals of the noble Lord till the second day of this discussion, and only then at a time when the House was by no means so full as it had been earlier in the evening. Though this proposal of the noble Lord would effect very many changes in the procedure, it was entirely consonant with the principles which governed their proceedings; and though it seemed to be a change of great importance, it need not, if sufficiently guarded, be an infringement of the liberties and privileges of any Member. He thought it would be necessary, if this proposition were adopted, that it should be accompanied with a Proviso that the Report of Supply should always when it was on the Paper be the first Order of the Day, in order to place hon. Members in the same position as if they were bringing forward Resolutions on Committee of Supply. By this proposal they would not merely carry out the object of the Government and the propositions of the Committee, but they would facilitate Business and secure the order, comfort, and convenience of independent Members. They would, in the first place, get the result on every day of the week that the Chancellor of the Exchequer now said would follow from making his Resolution apply to a Monday. They would be sure whenever Supply was down that it would come on, hon. Members would be perfectly certain what items in the Estimates would be under consideration, and they would be able to transact their Business with an ease and a certainty and, he ventured to think, with a celerity also, which would be most advantageous to the Public Business. They would have the Estimates discussed in the full face of the House, early in the evening, when Members were cool, collected, and perfectly prepared to conduct Business in a satisfactory manner, and so they would avoid those wrangles and acrimonious discussions which resulted from the late discussion of Supply. They would, in fact, get the whole of their Business carried on more speedily and certainly more creditably. Advantage might be taken of the opportunity, if the noble Lord did put his proposition on the Paper, to attempt to define the meaning of the word "grievance" as applied to Motions having precedence of Votes of Supply. Everybody would agree, if the House was to discuss grievances, that they should be, at all events, if not strictly relevant, at any rate, partaking of the form of grievances. Now, to give an example, last Session they had three discussions before Supply which were none of them in any sense grievances. For his part, he should define a grievance either as a misuse of power, or a neglect of administrative authority on the part of persons who by law were authorized to exercise it. The questions he referred to were the Burials Question, a question of International rights, and the question of the extension of the control of the Corporation of London to the whole of the Metropolis. All these cases, however desirable it was that they should be brought forward, were none of them grievances. They were complaints of the law as it stood, not complaints of maladministration; and, in his opinion, it was very necessary that they should be relegated, with similar questions, to the particular nights on which such Motions were usually brought forward. Another difficulty about this mode of procedure was that in Motions of that sort they had to deal with an abstract Motion without the possibility of moving an Amendment. The hon. Member, in fact, who brought forward any question, put the House in the position into which no Member had a right to put it, for he forced the House to say "Aye" or "No" to a particular definite proposition, and prevented any Member from moving an Amendment. Thus Members were compelled to come to a conclusion which very imperfectly expressed the opinion of the House, and he thought it would be far better that such Motions should be discussed at a time when they might be so amended as really to express the feelings of the House. He had merely glanced at this question by the way. He did not think that it would be well to adopt the proposition of the noble Lord in the imperfect form of confining it to the Monday, because then extraordinary difficulties would arise. They would have a Vote passed on Monday; therefore, when it came up for Report, there would be a general debate. But a Vote taken on Thursday would not be open for discussion on Report, and thus they would have confusion worse confounded. Red ink, or asterisks, or something of that sort would have to be used to indicate the difference. When, also, they got well into the Session, they would have three or four different Reports of Supply on the Paper, and enormous difficulty in getting them through because of these very complications. Therefore, he maintained that if they were to accept the suggestions of the noble Marquess they should extend them to the whole of the week. He did appeal to the House whether this was not a good opportunity for settling the Business of the House on the Rules as suggested by the noble Lord, and for making a real, practical, and efficient improvement in the Business?

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE observed, that the three questions to which the Chairman of Committees referred had all been brought forward on a Friday, and not on Supply nights. He was sorry to see the "No-surrender" tone of the Chancellor of the Exchequer's speech, though he could not wonder that he had not accepted the noble Lord's proposal. It was quite true that this Resolution came recommended by the Committee; but the right hon. Gentleman forgot to mention that the Committee were against the Resolution as it stood, and without the Amendments which would be proposed to-night. The Chancellor of the Exchequer was mistaken when he said that the Speaker had given it as his opinion that a Minister ought not to make his Statement with the Speaker in the Chair. The fact was otherwise. The Speaker, in his evidence, had distinctly stated that it was desirable that the Minister in charge of Estimates should make his Statement with the Speaker in the Chair.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said, he was not referring to the evidence of the Speaker, but to his ruling in the House as the matter now stood, and as proof that his right hon. Friend had made his Statement with the Speaker in the Chair.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE said, he did not think a Resolution of this kind was the proper remedy for the evil complained of. If independent Members were pressed too much they would retaliate, not by obstruction, but by bringing forward their Motions on other and more inconvenient occasions. It would be within their competence to bring forward Motions on the Budget night; but he did not say they would resort to that course. They would not, however, surrender their nights on appeal from the Government, as before, and in this way the Government would lose more nights in a Session than they would gain by the Resolution.

MR. SULLIVAN said, he would not charge the Chancellor of the Exchequer or the Government with any dark design against the liberties of the House or the country; but, whenever in any part of the world—from the Neva to the Tiber, or from the Golden Horn to Westminster—he heard of a Minister approaching Parliament to induce it to surrender some of its liberties, he was reminded of the picture of Richard III. tempting his nephews out of the safety of their sanctuary to confide in their tender-hearted uncle. He would trust no Government or Minister with the liberties of the people. The Prince Consort had once said that Parliamentary institutions in this country were on their trial, and what an outcry the remark called forth! The Government were certainly putting them on their trial now. The Government had no case to-day unless it was that Parliament had no right to be trusted with the liberties it had hitherto enjoyed. For the last 30 years, unfortunately, attempts had been successfully made by Governments to trench on the liberties of Parliament and to narrow the limits of debate. He was sorry the hon. Member for Berkshire (Mr. Walter) should have given his influence in favour of this strange encroachment on the liberties of the House. The hon. Member had complained that there were no real grievances brought forward now; but he did not define what grievances were. He inferred from his speech, however, that he thought a complaint as to the Irish land system would be no legitimate grievance; but that a grievance would be found in a complaint that Colonel Lord Fitznoddy had been deprived of his commission without having his case investigated. If that was the view taken by the Government as to what constituted a grievance, he should at once contest it. He contended that a grievance in the sense of the Constitution meant any complaint or demand on the concession of which the grant of money to the Crown depended. If they went back to history, they would find Bills had originated in the practice of the Commons tacking on to the grants made to the Crown certain Petitions demanding remedies for their grievances. It was in that practice that the whole freedom of the House and its rights to pass laws had originated. But to-night they found it suggested that Parliament performed no function in the political economy of this country, save as a mere law-making machine. He denied such a statement. It was a low and ignoble view to take of that House, which was no Chamber for registering the decrees of a Ministry or of any number of wise men, but a place where the voice of the country should be heard discussing as well as enacting. They could have no enacting without preceding discussion. No doubt, Ministers did not like discussion. Lord Eldon, 50 years ago, would, doubtless, have told them that the discussions on Reform were a nuisance, a waste of the time of Parliament, and an irritation to the King's conscience. Were they to be told to-night that the liberties enjoyed by Parliament 40 years ago must be clipped now for the convenience of a Ministry who wanted Votes more rapidly for their accumulating wars? Of course, in any Parliament there would be a great deal of talk; there was always chaff with the grain; but the spirit of the Constitution was that the voice of the country should be heard in order that our rulers might know what evils were irritating the mind of the nation, wisely or unwisely, for the time being. Suppress that, and they would share the fate of the despots of the Continent, to whom these ebullitions of popular feeling were exceedingly disagreeable. It was useful to the safety of the country that every feeling should have an outlet in Parliament. If they wanted to economize public time at the sacrifice of their most cherished institutions, there was a shorter and better mode of doing it. Let them elect some 21 of its wise men to do all the Business. They would have little talk then, and they would provide a greater number of Bills in accordance with the taste of the Government than they got now. It was really in that direction that they were being asked to travel to-night, and he should resist it by all the means in his power. In his short experience of the House he had seen the Prerogatives of Parliament substantially encroached upon; and he regretted that the Prime Minister, who rose into prominence by moving Motions on going into Committee of Supply, should lend his name to such a proposition as was now before the House, in order that, at the close of his first Parliament, he might retire on his laurels able to say—"I am that Minister who, during five or six Sessions, by measures not known for 100 years, introduced personal government, extended the Prerogatives of the Crown, and curtailed the liberties of Parliament."

Mr. SHAW LEFEVRE was not surprised that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should have repudiated the proposition of the noble Lord; for, however much it might be for the convenience of the House, it would not facilitate the passing of the Government measures. Unless, however, the right hon. Gentleman would offer some further compromise than he had done, he would have very great difficulty in carrying his first Resolution.

Dr. KENEALY: Mr. Speaker, when I came down to the House I did not intend to take any part in this debate; I was anxious to hear both sides, and to form my opinion. What I have heard to-night has satisfied me that I ought to support the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his first Resolution. I shall state in a few words the way in which the question presents itself to my mind. This House votes countless millions every year in Committee of Supply. The National Expenditure is rapidly increasing; the general ability to endure that Expenditure is growing less and less every day. It behoves us all, therefore, if we desire to do our duty to our constituents, to watch the growth of that Expenditure with the most wary eyes, and to do all we can that may make it less. How is this to be effected? By having better means than we now possess of checking these extensive money Votes. The hon. and learned Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt), and other hon. Gentlemen of the same school of politics, have ridiculed the idea of any good being effected by attacking money Votes in Committee of Supply. I dissent from him and them, because I know that the late Mr. Joseph Hume, by his persistent criticisms of Supply, saved the country millions every year. Under our present system, which the Chancellor of the Exchequer strives to improve, what happens? Supply is set down for a certain evening; 20 or 30 hon. Members at once give Notice of Motions on almost every possible subject, and these Motions have all to be discussed and decided upon before we get into Committee of Supply. Thus the whole night is often wasted, and we are called upon to debate the question of expending millions of the public money at 1, or 2, and often 3 o'clock in the morning, when hon. Members are broken down and utterly exhausted by the previous Sitting. The result is that there is no criticism, there is no real discussion, and Ministers get these millions often in a House consisting of a dozen Members, almost for the asking. I have seen Votes of the worst kind for many millions of money passed *sub silentio*, and almost as a matter of course, when day was dawning, in this way, because hon. Members were both physically and mentally incapable, by reason of their previous labours, to carry on the war any longer. I have come down here myself, over and over again, early in the evening, prepared to challenge items in Supply. I have waited during long aud dreary hours, hoping that the previous Motions would come to an end; and at last, finding that they were likely to go on and on, I have been compelled, long past midnight, from sheer faintness and exhaustion, to leave the House without having had a chance of moving for retrenchment, or expressing my dissent from extravagant claims made. Now, I know that there are many hon. Members, anxious reformers, like myself, of Public Expenditure, retrenchers of the extravagance that exists, who have been forced out of the House "in the small hours of the morning" by the same reasons that have so frequently operated in my own case. Hence it is that we have no means of resisting the wanton waste, or restraining the torrents of money which we see poured around us. And I regard it as a good measure, on the part of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that he offers to put an end to this abuse on one evening at least—Monday—in the course of the week. By this means, as we go into Supply at once, we shall—all of us who are economical reformers—be able to attack these items in the Estimates which we deem to be objectionable. I am constrained, therefore, by a sense of duty to support this Resolution, which I believe will prove itself to be one highly beneficial to the public, and which may save the country many millions every year. I lament the course taken by hon. Members on these Benches, and I think the general public will eventually disapprove of that course, and will derive great benefit from the change proposed. With reference to the wild and almost lunatic fears expressed that we are abandoning "wonderful rights and privileges," I am in no way alarmed at such high-flown nonsense. It may suit some ignorant platforms, and may probably delude the unthinking; but it is wholly unworthy of this House. I have not seen yet on the part of Ministers any real proof that they have entered into a conspiracy to destroy the just rights and privileges of Members. When they do so I, for one, shall be ready to resist them to the utmost. Nay, I may add that the whole House would rise in rebellion against them. For this reason I treat with scorn and disbelief those empty, sounding, and trumpery phrases by which only the most dull, foolish, or thoughtless could be misled. This House is well able, and I think is always willing, to guard its "rights and privileges" against all attacks; against all interference and encroachment. And by passing this Resolution, it will really regain one of its most priceless of all rights—that of criticizing and reducing the Public Expenditure. This right has practically been lost since the days of Joseph Hume. Hence the increase of Expenditure by £30,000,000 a-year; hence the fearful addition to taxation. In Mr. Hume's day the whole public annual Expenditure was less than £50,000,000; it is now £80,000,000. Why should I, then, resist a Resolution which will enable many of us to do now what Mr. Hume then did? Under 40 years of a "Liberal" Government, we have lost this most precious "right and privilege." I support the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who endeavours to restore it.

Sir GEORGE CAMPBELL said, that as the suggestion made on the subject before the House by the noble Lord the Member for the Radnor Boroughs (the Marquess of Hartington) could not be ignored, he thought the better course to be pursued would be to adjourn the debate upon the Resolution, in order that it might be considered how the noble Lord's proposal could be shaped so as to meet the views of the hon. Members generally. Meanwhile, there was plenty of other Business to which they could apply themselves. He regarded these Resolutions as mere nibbling at a great question, and as not in the least likely to effect the object in view—the improvement of the machinery by which the Business of the House was conducted. These Resolutions would not enable the House to get rid of the Irish Question, which stood in the way of English and Scotch Business. He had been studying the working of one of the United States Provincial Legislatures lately. In 40 or 50 days it got through more work than the House of Commons did in a whole Session, and the reason was that most of the work was done in Committee, and the House merely confirmed the Committee's operations. He was disposed to support the division of the House into Grand Committees for the purpose of carrying on contemporaneously the Business of the several Departments of the State. He confessed that it would be impossible to carry out this proposal without a considerable change in the character of the House; but the proposal was one that would deal comprehensively with the difficulty before them. It would be better to postpone the consideration of the Resolution then before the House, in order that they might have the proposal of the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition also before them and consider them together.

Mr. PARNELL said, he had always thought the proceedings of the Committee on Public Business last Session very imperfect, because they were only directed to one portion of the subject. Of late years they had got into the habit of thinking that the Government of the day was the House, and that, in fact, Government Business was the only portion of the Business of Parliament that was worthy of any consideration whatever. It appeared to him that that view was allowed to prevail very largely in the Select Committee on Public Business. History would show how dangerous it was to strengthen the hands of the Government as against the House. In years gone by, when that House was struggling for its liberties, Ministers were only admitted there on sufferance. Instead of the Government claiming two days a-week, as they did now, all the days should belong to private Members, who — and not the Government — really constituted the House. However, he supposed it had been found convenient to give the Government a day or two each week, not so much as the Representatives of the Crown in that House, but as the Representatives of the opinion of the majority of the people of this country, in order that they might bring forward those measures which the majority were in favour of. Parliament, however, in giving Mondays and Thursdays to the Government made the exception that when Supply stood for those days, any hon. Member might move Amendments, with the view of bringing up discussion on any grievance. Now, the Government wanted to go a step further, and convert Parliament into a mere machine for voting money for the purposes of the Government—whether good or bad. The whole of last Session was practically devoted to that purpose. The profession of the Chancellor of the Exchequer that he wanted to give more time for the discussion of the Estimates was all very well; but they all knew that no Minister really wanted his Estimates to be discussed at all. He did not believe the passing of these Resolutions would lead to any saving of time; and the House did not think so, for in regard to argument and moral support the Government really found themselves deserted. There were many considerations involved in a question like the present. There was the consideration as to whether, after they had done everything, they would really be a gainer thereby. The suggestion that grievances should be taken on the Report of Supply was condemned by the evidence of Sir Erskine May; and if as much latitude were allowed on Report as on the Motion to go into Committee, the loss of time would be equal to the saving. The evidence of Sir Erskine May and of the Speaker was opposed to the proposition of the Chancellor of the Exchequer; they doubted whether it would meet with the support of the House, and their doubts were confirmed by the debate. The Speaker supported the revival of the Resolution of 1872 and 1873, which provided for the discussion, on the Motion that the Speaker do leave the Chair, of Amendments relating to any of the Votes proposed to be taken in Committee. He freely admitted that the Chancellor of the Exchequer, when moving for the appointment of the Committee on Public Business, said he did not do so for the purpose of dealing with the question of obstruction, but of facilitating the general Business of the House; but the Committee had not proceeded very far in its labours before the Chancellor of the Exchequer, without Notice, introduced the question of obstruction by the horns, and thus the Committee was entirely turned aside from its original object to the very barren question of obstruction. No doubt, great questions could be brought forward on the Motion for going into Committee of Supply; but he would appeal to the recollection of hon. Members of the House whether that had been done —whether it had not been the practice for hon. Members who had charge of a question to ballot for a night? Unless under very special circumstances, no such subject as the Irish Land Question or the Irish University Education Question could be brought forward on the Motion for going into Committee of Supply on Monday or Thursday. Private Members had not an opportunity of knowing the intention of the Government as to Supply, and they could not tell sufficiently in advance whether there would be an opportunity of stopping Supply by bringing forward such questions. Originally the Chancellor of the Exchequer proposed that Friday should be made a Motion night for private Members as an equivalent or compensation for the loss of Monday; but after a time the right hon. Gentleman dropped that idea, and it was not brought forward again. He (Mr. Parnell) thought they ought to have Friday made a Motion night, in order that grievances might be brought forward. With regard to the question of Count-outs, the difficulty of keeping a House on Fridays was well known. It was comparatively easy for a powerful Party like the Home Rule Party to keep a House; but what of private Members? He would appeal to the hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate), whether there was not considerable difficulty in keeping a House even on such an important question as that of the Monastic and Conventual Institutions? If, however, they turned Friday into a Motion night, every hon. Member who had a Motion down on the Paper would be desirous of keeping a House on that night, because his Motion would be discussed. He made a proposition in the Committee on Public Business that questions relating to England, Ireland, and Scotland should be referred to Select Committees, consisting respectively of Englishmen, Irishmen, and Scotchmen; and he thought that might also be carried out with regard to Estimates. English Estimates might be referred to a Committee consisting of Englishmen, Scotch Estimates to a Committee consisting of Scotchmen, and Irish Estimates to a Committee consisting of Irishmen, with power to the House to direct that they should then be referred to a Committee of the Whole House if necessary. If a Rule similar to that were adopted with regard to Bills, Public Business would be greatly expedited. He did not believe the propositions of the Government, directed as they were against the rest of the Constitution, would in the slightest degree effect the objects for which they were brought forward. They were brought in ostensibly to promote Public Business, and to enable the Government to get Supply with as little discussion as possible. The origin of all this was said to have arisen out of the proceedings of certain Irish Members; but was it not a foolish thing for Englishmen to set to work to injure their own Constitution in the attempt to devise a remedy for that evil? Surely they could discover some better means of dealing with that matter than by adopting measures which would have the effect of impairing their legislative proceedings. He ventured to think that the common sense of the House would see that the proceedings of the Government were of an unconstitutional nature, and ought not to be sanctioned by it.

Mr. MUNTZ regretted that the Government had not thought fit to entertain the proposition of the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington), nor even the suggestion of the hon. and gallant Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) to adopt the old Rule of 1872, of which the House had had practical experience and which had worked so well. They might by an immense majority carry this Resolution; but they had other people besides the Members of that House to deal with—they had to deal with the opinion of the country. Did they think that they would put down Irish obstruction by these Resolutions? Nothing could be more absurd, because, whatever the form of those Resolutions, hon. Members would be able to drive a coach-and-six through them. They must trust to the feeling of forbearance among the hon. Gentlemen who formed that House. He was always anxious to facilitate the Business of the House, and always made it a point of supporting every means likely for promoting that end, and if he thought that the Resolutions would facilitate Business, he would be the last to object to them; but he maintained that their influence, if adopted, would be quite the reverse, and in addition they would be an interference with the Constitutional liberties of the country. The Resolutions would debar hon. Members from opening a discussion in a way which hon. Gentlemen would not tolerate, and instead of avoiding obstruction would really increase it. It was for these reasons that he objected to each and all of the Resolutions.

Sir HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON observed that the contention of the hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Muntz) was that this was a Resolution which had taken the House almost by surprise, and was intended to destroy the liberties of individual Members, and was aimed at obstruction. The hon. Member must have forgotten that the first introduction of the present system of bringing forward grievances on going into Committee of Supply dated no further back than 1811, and that from that time until 1821 only three Motions were made on Supply. From 1821, with rare exceptions, the practice was not pursued for many years. The notion that the custom dated back from time immemorial was therefore a delusion. The hon. Member also appeared to have forgotten that a Resolution similar to that now proposed, intended to facilitate the progress of the Business of the country, was adopted in 1872, and, being found to work well, was continued with some little difference in 1873. There were no complaints during those two Sessions from the Liberal Benches; no denunciations that private Members were being deprived of their rights; no charge against the Government of attempting to take the entire control of Business, and almost violating the Constitution. That fact at once disposed of the terrible statements of the hon. Member, who seemed to have forgotten the whole of the events in his distinguished career in the hope of putting another nail into what he believed was the coffin of this Resolution. He wished that the House would believe Her Majesty's Government, when they stated that they had proposed this Resolution honestly and in good faith, with the view to facilitate the transaction of the Business of the country, and especially Supply. Grievances and legislation were doubtless important enough in themselves; but the transaction of the necessary Business of the country was of at least equal importance, and indeed there were many statesmen of high authority who were of opinion that it was the most important of all. The object of the Government was to endeavour, on the lines that were successful before, to bring about some certainty in the conduct of Business, to insure the necessary consideration of the Votes, to prevent them coming on at the end of the Session, when they could not be properly considered, and to prevent what was certainly not a proper way of conducting financial business — the necessity of taking Votes on Account. When he was asked to withdraw the Resolution in order to consider the proposal of the Leader of the Opposition, he could not help asking if there was any prospect of agreement upon that Amendment? With regard to the fear which had been expressed that this Resolution would provoke criticism of a more minute character than had before been bestowed on the details of the Estimates, and that more time would be wasted, he replied that the same opportunity had existed up to the present moment, and no additional facility would be given after the passing of this Resolution. It could not fairly be said that the Resolution was one which pointed at an obstructive policy; it simply aimed at the proper conduct of Business, and as such he asked the House to consider it.

MR. MUNTZ, in explanation, said, he had been misunderstood by the hon. Baronet who had just addressed the House. What he said was that he regretted the fact that Her Majesty's Government had not adopted the same Rule.

GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOUR said, that he was strongly opposed to the Resolutions as an interference with the liberty of the people and the privileges of the House of Commons. They were meant to gag independent Members, who ought to resist to the utmost the curtailment of their rights. The rights of the people were far superior to the necessity for voting Supplies; and if those privileges and rights could not be enjoyed and vindicated, together with the necessary Supplies being voted in a Session of six months, why, then let them sit for eight or even ten months in each year.

MR. BENTINCK said, the great evil of the day was the disproportionate power of the House of Commons, and he would have cordially endorsed the Resolutions if he believed they would diminish that power; but he did not consider that they would. He thought that the most striking feature of the debate was that those who had taken part in it had not arrived at an understanding of what was the real question. The right hon. Member for Sandwich (Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen) said it was the personal privilege of private Members; but it was nothing of the sort. He admitted that that was an important matter; but the rights and privileges of constituencies were far more important. The real question was, whether the people of this country should be deprived of the only legitimate way in which they could bring their grievances before the House. He had been surprised to hear the hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate)—who was a high authority on these subjects—say that the arrangement for enabling private Members to state grievances on Friday evenings by setting up Committee of Supply as an Order of the Day ought to satisfy those Members; for, as a matter of fact, the House was counted out on nine out of ten Friday nights.

MR. NEWDEGATE, in explanation, said, he had only referred to the practice of setting up Supply on Friday evenings as one of recent origin; and that at the time of its institution it was intended and believed that the Government would keep a House on those evenings.

MR. BENTINCK said, that the explanation of his hon. Friend fully corroborated his remarks; and in providing this panacea the Government of that day bound itself, as a point of honour, to keep a House on Friday night. That was done for some years; but Government succeeded Government, and did not feel themselves bound by the professions of their predecessors. His hon. Friend had warned the House that if they did not pass Rules regulating their proceedings they would increase the power of the House of Lords. Well, it had been said that one reason of the delay of Public Business in the House of Commons was the increased power of that House; and he, for one, would not object to an increase of the power of the House of Lords, as he believed they ought to maintain a balance of power as between the Estates of the Realm. He could not but think, however, that if they passed this Resolution, they would be sacrificing the rights of their constituents to have their grievances brought, at the earliest possible period, before this House. He therefore asked whether, for the mere purpose of putting down obstruction which could not be put down, the House was prepared to vitiate a great Constitutional principle and say that the people of England should no longer have the opportunity of placing their grievances before the House of Commons?

Sir JOSEPH M'KENNA said, that the principle of putting grievances before Supply did not date from 1821, but from 1642. He should have expected the right hon. Gentleman, when he proposed to interfere with the privileges of Members, to show in what respect those privileges had been abused. What the Government were going to do was to provide for themselves an easy day for doing Business which they had never taken on that day before. The time of the House would be much better occupied in carefully examining the Estimates than in discussions as to what some policeman should have done at Clapham, as to what the master of a workhouse had done in Tralee, or as to some question connected with the arrival of an emigrant ship at Queenstown—a question which, generally speaking, was soon explained away. A great Constitutional question was involved in the proposals of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and he felt himself compelled to vote against them. He did join in the view that the Irish Members ought to be exasperated; it took a great deal to exasperate some of them, and others did not entertain a desire to be exasperated; but they intended to do the duty which they had been sent to the House by their constituents to perform, and they would somehow or other discharge that duty, even if the Government succeeded in carrying its Resolutions. In his opinion, it would be useless to pass the Rule under consideration, as the resources of Parliamentary science would enable hon. Members who were so inclined to occupy as much of the public time in the future as they had done, or could have done, in the past. These Resolutions could only advance the Business of the House if they were passed with general consent.

Major O'BEIRNE remarked that the contention that the Resolutions suggested by the Government would facilitate the Business of the House was a mere pretence. The Resolutions were aimed altogether at the Irish Members, and, therefore, he opposed them. They were in no way called for. The Irish Members had frequently rendered considerable service to the House by their criticisms of the Estimates. The Mutiny Bill of last Session and the Prisons Bill were illustrations of this fact.

Mr. O'CLERY said, this was not the first time that a Chancellor of the Exchequer had proposed a series of Resolutions to curtail the privileges of the Irish Members. The same course had been taken in the last Parliament by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of London (Mr. Lowe); but the right hon. Gentleman had been obliged to abandon his Resolutions on the third night of the debate, in face of the opposition of the whole House. That ought in itself to be a warning to the present Chancellor of the Exchequer to desist from the course which he was now pursuing of attempting to force upon the House the will of the Cabinet for the time being. Nothing would be gained by the passing of these Resolutions. On the contrary, their adoption would deprive those outside from having any fair representation made of their grievances within the Chamber, and this appeared to him to be a vital point. He objected to the country being subjected to a sort of despotism on the part of the front Ministerial Bench. He objected to this attempt on the part of the Government to dragoon the Irish Members. The Leader of the House might possibly have tried to take a leaf out of the book of Prince Bismarck, and it might even be in contemplation in certain eventualities to imprison particular Members of the House; but he ventured to think that hon. Gentlemen, no matter how they might individually disagree on some points, would combine in endeavouring to resist a Ministry, no matter how powerful, that put forward Resolutions of this description—Resolutions which were obviously introduced with the object of crushing out the rising spirit of indignation which must undoubtedly prevail at the way in which the Government had treated Ireland. Hopes had been raised that certain Irish measures would be brought forward at the beginning of the Session; but at the last moment, in obedience to a feeling of bigotry and prejudice on the part of some Members of the Cabinet, that good intention had been abandoned, and now it was proposed to stifle the voice of the Representatives of the Irish people. He hoped and believed that many Members of the Conservative, as well as of the Liberal Party, would, in a spirit of fair play, oppose these Resolutions.

MR. J. R. YORKE approved a proposal that had been made to print along with the Estimates some kind of abstract which might enable hon. Members to wade with some degree of intelligence through the masses of figures that to the unprofessional mind presented so unpromising an appearance. The want of some such guide as this usually caused the evening on which the Estimates were introduced to be almost entirely wasted. A Minister, in making a Statement, went into calculations which no one not an expert could follow. He received the congratulations of his Colleagues, while others truly said that it was impossible for them at that time to follow him in matters of detail; and practically discussion was postponed until Members had read the report of the speech in *The Times*. If, instead of the speech being made in the House, the substance of it were embodied in an introduction to the Estimates, they could read it and come duly prepared for an intelligent discussion of the Business of the House. That was one of the few practical suggestions that had been made in the course of the discussion. If any part of the object aimed at were the putting down of Irish Members, the Government had set about it in a tame and unintelligible manner. The first effect of the Resolution would be to prevent the legitimate discussion of grievances and to stop many quiet men who were unwilling to strain the forms of the House from bringing forward questions of importance. It would not operate for a moment to restrain Irish Members; if they chose to exhibit pertinacity and determination, they would not find the slightest difficulty in airing their grievances. In a debate which occurred in 1872, Mr. Henley said he did not think any sufficient ground could be alleged for curtailing the privileges of the House, and he could see nothing in the proposal but an intention on the part of the Liberal Government to muzzle the House of Commons. An alteration of one word would probably adapt that sentence to the present circumstances. Mr. Henley added that the proposal would not save time or facilitate the getting of money. It was against the law of nature, for it was as true in public as it was in private matters, that if you wanted to get money you must hear what people had to say. The operation of the proposed Rule would make it worse to get money, for grievances would be ventilated, without Notice, on the Motion to report Progress, seeing that it was not proposed that Supply should go on continuously as many hours as the Government pleased. He agreed with these sentiments, and did not think any new Rules were wanted to meet obstruction. That could be dealt with by a courageous application of existing Rules. If a Member was guilty of obstruction, the Speaker could call the attention of the House to the fact that he was guilty of contempt, and on a Motion by the Leader of the House or any Member of sufficient authority, the offender having been heard in his defence, the House could inflict an adequate penalty. If that course had been taken, they might long ago have dealt with obstruction more efficiently than by new Rules, which would abridge the legitimate opportunities of bringing forward grievances and prevent hon. Members doing what it was their duty to do. The Rules would be inoperative to prevent obstruction, and mischievous so far as they affected the legitimate Business of the House.

MR. ANDERSON said, it had been alleged that this Resolution would facilitate the getting into Committee of Supply. If that were so, he might be disposed to accept it, as he thought the discussions in Committee on the Votes, so far from being a waste of time, were most valuable; because, though they seldom got a reduction of the Estimates, the knowledge that these Estimates were liable to be discussed in detail had a beneficial effect on their preparation. He did not, however, believe that these Resolutions would enable them to discuss the Estimates better. The question of grievances before Supply was one in which their constituencies were greatly interested, and the Members of the present Parliament were bound to hand down unimpaired to their successors in the next Parliament those rights which they had received in trust for the people. He liked very much the proposal suggested by the noble Lord the Member for the Radnor Boroughs to substitute Report on Supply to going into Committee for the hearing of grievances, and to make the Report the First Order of the Day. He urged the Government, even at that late hour, to consent to some modification of the rigid line they had taken up.

Mr. GREGORY said, he could not agree with the view taken on this subject by the hon. Member for West Norfolk (Mr. Bentinck), and he believed the constituencies would take a very different view of the question before the House. The question really was how the Business of the country was to be carried on; whether the House was to be looked upon as a Legislative Assembly, or to degenerate into a mere debating society? Private Members had three nights in the week when they might discuss matters in which they and their constituencies were interested, and this might be taken as a sufficient recognition of the Constitutional principle of grievances before Supply. They were also in the habit of addressing 20 or 30 Questions, many of an argumentative character, to Ministers every night; and surely it was not too much to allow the Government to go into Supply on Monday without obstruction.

Mr. JACOB BRIGHT expressed his belief that any attempt made professedly to save time of the House did not promote Public Business; but, on the contrary, was made use of to waste the time of the House. There were various kinds of obstruction. The obstruction on that side of the House was only an exceptional circumstance; but obstruction in a certain sense to many propositions that were essential to the good of the country was on the other side of the House the normal condition of affairs. He believed the Government would find it impossible to pass this Resolution, opposed as it was by so many influential Members on both sides of the House. Even the Chancellor of the Exchequer himself had admitted that it would be useless to attempt to pass such a Resolution unless he carried the House with him. He therefore hoped the Government would consent to modify it as the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition had suggested.

Mr. BIGGAR remarked that if the Resolutions were adopted, the effect would be in a short time to prevent hon. Members from bringing forward their grievances. They would be at the mercy of Ministers, of Morning Sittings, and of Counts-out. He would remind Conservative Members that the day might come when they would wish to bring forward their grievances, and the law, which it was now proposed to enact against the Irish Representatives, might then be directed against themselves. There was the grievance of the Irish Land Laws, and there was the grievance of Irish University Education. Those were not second-class evils, but grievances of the first magnitude; and how were they to be brought before the House, if the Irish Members were to be precluded from introducing such questions in the only way in which they had really the power of raising them?

Amendment (*Mr. Beresford Hope*), by leave, *withdrawn.*

Major NOLAN moved to restrict the operation of the Rule to June, July, and August. He was sorry to say that the question, although one of gravity, was not one from which they would expect to receive any great support from the country. Very many persons, who thought a great deal of their own grievances, cared very little about the forms of the House, although what they were discussing to-night was simply the means of taking away from unfortunate electors in different parts of the Kingdom the means of getting their grievances brought forward and redressed. If they were to follow the fashion of some foreign Assemblies, where it was necessary to get the sanction of a large number of Members before any subject was discussed, it would be looked on as something startling; but that was precisely the effect of the present proposals of the Government. If the Resolutions were passed, there would only remain Tuesdays and Fridays for the ventilation of grievances, and hon. Members knew that it was necessary to get together 40 Members to keep the House, which was not always an easy matter. Of course, those who sat on the front Opposition Benches would be able to obtain sufficient aid to make and keep a House; but then they were not very fond of taking up ordinary questions, while the importance of most questions was only gradually made to dawn on the public mind. Some organized system of keeping a House ought in these circumstances, he thought, to be resorted to by the general body of Members; for if the new Rule were adopted, unless 40 Members were interested in bringing forward a subject, it would fail to obtain a hearing. His proposal would give the Government all the Mondays in the three last months of the Session for advancing Supply, and that he considered a very fair compromise.

Amendment proposed,

"After the word "Monday," to insert the words "in the months of June, July, and August."—(*Major Nolan.*)

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted."

MR. PARNELL said, he was sure that the Chancellor of the Exchequer would agree to the compromise of his hon. and gallant Friend, which would give him plenty of time to get through the arrears and grant the concession of the other months to the private Members.

MR. BERESFORD HOPE said, that although he was anxious to see the Resolutions of the Chancellor of the Exchequer modified, he could not support the Amendment, which he believed would create a congestion of Business and throw Supply into the last three months of the Session, when a sufficient examination of the Estimates would be impossible.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said, the object of his proposal was to get Supply at an early period of the Session, and prevent Votes on Account. The throwing of Supply into the latter part of the Session was exactly what the Government wished to avoid. He must therefore oppose the Amendment.

MR. ANDERSON asked if the Government would not give them some indication of what they intended to do when they came to the subsequent Amendments?

MR. MITCHELL HENRY also desired the Government to say whether they would accept any of the Amendments?

Question put.

The House *divided*:—Ayes 68; Noes 161: Majority 93.—(Div. List, No. 17.)

MR. ANDERSON then moved, as an Amendment in the Resolution, the insertion, after the word "Monday," of the words—

"Provided there be not on the Paper any Amendment relevant to the class of Estimates about to be discussed."

Amendment proposed,

After the word "Monday," to insert the words "provided there be not on the Paper any Amendment relevant to the class of Estimates about to be discussed."—(*Mr. Anderson.*)

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted."

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER wished to remind the House of that which he had stated more than once—namely, that in proposing those Resolutions he had come forward, not on behalf of the Government peculiarly, but on behalf of the real interests of Business and the general convenience of the House, and that he had proposed them, in his capacity of Chairman of the Committee of last Session, in the form in which they were passed by that Committee. He had felt throughout that the great object which should be gained was that they should come, he would not say to an unanimous, but to something like a general agreement as to the Rules by which the House should be guided. It was impossible for any Assembly to go on without Rules of some sort, and it was extremely difficult to carry on Business with Rules against which any very large section of Members had objection. What was desirable was that they should establish a *modus vivendi*—a manner of transacting their Business which should be satisfactory to the great body of hon. Members. He did not think it signified half so much what the actual Rule they had to guide themselves by was, as in what spirit it was observed. He believed it was once said by Mr. Fox that nothing could be more absurd in theory, or more excellent in practice, than the British Constitution. That was very often the case with regard to many of the Rules of that House and of other assemblies of Englishmen. The Rules appeared in theory to be open to a great many comments and criticisms; but when worked in a fair and reasonable spirit, they were found to be very well suited to the purpose they had in view. He had felt it his duty to propose these Resolutions, as he had said, in the form in which they had passed the Committee of last Session, and he had endeavoured—as others had endeavoured—to impress on the House that they were proposed in that spirit, and with a wish to meet the objections which had been made to them.

He had sought to persuade the House that the form in which they had been suggested to it was, on the whole, the best which it could adopt. He candidly admitted that in the course of the discussion more objection had been raised to the particular proposal he had made than he had been prepared to find. He could not deny that if the Resolution were to be carried by a majority against an unwilling and large minority, it was exceedingly probable that in practice it would fail. His object was distinctly a practical one, and he desired to arrive at some arrangement which would be more acceptable to the great body of the House. With regard to the suggestion of the noble Lord, to which a good deal of favour had been accorded, he, without expressing a positive opinion against the possibility of working it into shape, wished to observe that it was a novel proposal, and one to which, on further reflection, fresh objections might be raised. Therefore, he was not prepared to recommend the House to adopt so great a change in its procedure. Five or six hon. Gentlemen had given Notice of Amendments more or less in the sense of the proposal now submitted by the hon. Member for Glasgow (Mr. Anderson). All these Amendments might be taken together as pointing towards and centring around the Rule known as the Rule of 1872, which was in force for three years. It was discontinued at the beginning of the present Parliament, under the auspices of his noble Friend the present Prime Minister, whose desire was to endeavour to conduct the Business of the House without any limitations at all. However, the Rule worked fairly well during the time it was in force. It was proposed again in the Committee of last year, but was rejected in favour of the proposal now in his name on the Paper by a majority of 1. Yet it was rejected under circumstances which deprived the small majority even of the character which at first sight attached to it. In his opinion, the wisest course would be to endeavour to come to an arrangement upon this question, and he was prepared to accept the Amendment of his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot), which was as follows:—To add, as an Amendment to the Chancellor of the Exchequer's first Resolution, the words—

> "Unless such question should be an Amendment relating to the Class of Estimates proposed to be taken on Supply, on first going into Committee on the Army, Navy, and Civil Services respectively."

He hoped the House would see that he was making this proposal with a sincere desire to meet the wishes of the House, and that he had throughout not endeavoured to support any views of his own nor to make any Motion in the special interests of the Government; but that he only desired to consult what he believed to be the interest of the House. In conclusion, he trusted there would be a disposition to have the Motion of the hon. and gallant Member for West Sussex substituted for that which had just been proposed by the hon. Member for Glasgow.

Sir GEORGE BOWYER said, that in all his Parliamentrry experience he had never known such a waste of time as had been committed on this occasion. If the question were to be debated in all its details, there would be a much greater loss of time than had ever been caused by Motions on going into Committee of Supply. Her Majesty's Government had got into a mess, and did not know how to get out of it. They had much better give up the whole thing with a good grace, and be content to go on with the old Rules, which had worked extremely well. By this debate the House was wasting a great deal of public time, and was presenting a spectacle by no means favourable to the dignity of Parliament. Therefore, he moved that the debate be now adjourned.

Mr. GORST seconded the Motion.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Debate be now adjourned."—(*Sir George Bowyer.*)

Mr. W. M. TORRENS remarked that the Business of the country had outgrown the old Rule, and that it was desirable to adapt the machinery of the House to new necessities. It was mere nonsense to speak of the Whole House going into Committee of Supply. The Whole House never went into Committee of Supply; the Committee was attended only by a few hon. Members who understood the particular Estimates under consideration, and the other Members stayed away. In proposing the new Rules, the Government could have had no other object than to facilitate the conduct of the Business of the House, and it was clear that they were willing to accept suggestions. But it seemed to him, and he did not say it without consideration, that sooner or later they would have to go further. They would sooner or later have to come back to the good old way which prevailed a century and a-half ago, when the House divided itself into a number of Grand Committees and gave over to them the questions with which they were best qualified to deal. He would give his assent to the proposal of the hon. and gallant Member for West Sussex.

Mr. DODSON said, they one and all were agreed in upholding the honour of Parliament and the respect in which it was held by the country. But what view was likely to be taken by the country, if they were not able to arrive at a rational conclusion after all this debate? Having long been an officer of the House, he had great respect for its forms and Rules, of which he might be regarded as very conservative. But, nevertheless, he could not but see that from time to time some modification of those Rules and forms might become necessary. He believed it was the opinion of a large portion of the people out-of-doors that the forms of the House of Commons were incredibly clumsy and cumbrous. He did not share that opinion, but it was time that the public should be disabused of the idea that they were so conservative of the forms and Rules of the House, that they would be unwilling to make any alteration where it was conceded that a change was wanted. There were three difficulties with which the House had to contend. In the first place, the great multiplicity of Business; secondly, the prolixity of debate; and, thirdly, uncertainty as to the hour or even the day when any particular piece of Business was to come on. As to the first point, the House was most unwilling to part with any of the Business now intrusted to its charge. ["No!"] An hon. Member said "No;" but he had had the honour of submitting a plan for lightening its labours, and though he received considerable support, he had reason to know that the House was very jealous of any interference on that head. As to prolixity of debate, he hoped they would never be reduced to the necessity of a gag law, or the *clôture.* Then there remained the uncertainty as to the time of Business, and the evils of that uncertainty culminated in the case of Supply; for this reason, as had been said from the Chair, that going into Supply was an exception to all the Rules of the House as regarded the introduction of irrelevant subjects. The use of that liberty on going into Committee of Supply was one that had grown up in comparatively recent periods. Formerly it was, like the right of moving the adjournment of the House, seldom resorted to. Twenty-five or 30 years ago there were not in a Session more than three or four Motions on going into Committee of Supply. When he first entered the House there were, perhaps, 10 or 11 Motions on going into Supply. That had increased till there were at least 30 or 40 Motions on going into Supply, besides questions on which discussion was allowed. And while that change had been going on in one direction, another change had been going on in an opposite direction—namely, an increase in the number of Votes submitted to the House, greater minuteness in the form in which Votes were presented to the House, and the removal from the Consolidated Fund of a number of charges which were formerly not submitted to the House, but which now were. The Rule which had been proposed to the House was one which had not only been recommended by two Committees of the House appointed to consider this subject, but which had been substantially adopted in the last Parliament and in the present Parliament. For himself, he preferred to accept the Rule in the manner in which it was recommended by the Committee of last year, and proposed to the House in the first instance by the Chancellor of the Exchequer—namely, that when Supply was set down on Monday they should take Supply. This would secure certainty in regard to one of the most important Businesses the House had to transact. He was not one of those who thought that by the adoption of that Rule there would be any vital sacrifice of Constitutional privileges, nor did he believe that the individual Members of the House would find themselves to a very material extent deprived of any reasonable facility of bringing forward subjects which they now enjoyed. But, although that was his view, being anxious for the progress of Business and for the credit of the House, he was prepared, for the sake of agreement, to waive his own preference, and accept the Rule as amended on the suggestion of the hon. and gallant Member for West Sussex.

MR. BERESFORD HOPE said, he was sorry that the discovery, to which the Chancellor of the Exchequer confessed, was not made a little earlier in the week, as it would probably have saved a good deal of discussion. Appreciating, however, the frank and friendly way in which the matter had been put, he could assure the right hon. Gentleman, for himself and those with whom he was now acting, that they, too, were desirous of pursuing the debate in a frank and friendly spirit. Looking at the proposed Resolutions, he observed that they divided themselves into two classes. Those of the hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke), and the hon. and gallant Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot), only went as far as the Rule of 1872, whilst the hon. Member for Glasgow (Mr. Anderson), and the hon. and learned Member for Dewsbury (Mr. Serjeant Simon), as well as he himself, were in favour of the more general and further-extending Rule of 1876—a Rule which owed its birth to the present Chancellor of the Exchequer. It was to be regretted that the right hon. Gentleman had not made the concession more complete. With regard to the Amendment of his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot), it would go far towards removing objections, if he would consent to its amendment by the omission of the one word "first:" so modified, this Amendment would travel the whole distance along which he now proposed to take the House, and might result in general contentment. There was one thing at least on which he might congratulate the House—namely, that it had not allowed itself to be carried away by the proposition, seductive as it was, of the noble Lord the Member for the Radnor Boroughs (the Marquess of Hartington). It was surprising that a Member of his distinguished position, ability, and knowledge of the Business of the House, should have made such a proposal at all. For his own part, if he were an obstructive, he should be very glad of the opportunity which that suggestion supplied for dogging the steps of Supply. Suppose the scheme of the noble Lord to be adopted, how would the case stand on the Monday? Next Monday, let it be supposed, a certain amount of Supply might be run through; on Thursday the Report would be put down, for the Report must always follow the Supply like a shadow. On that Thursday, then, various irrelevant Amendments—irrelevant intentionally, and protected in their irrelevancy by the deliberate decision of the House—would be put down; and perhaps the House might get through these Amendments, if it was lucky, by 2 or 3 o'clock in the morning on the same Thursday. Then must come the substantive Report of the several Votes, and if the House continued in luck, and had got through the Amendments, it might dispose of those items in another week—taking Monday and Thursday. So the process of getting through a night's Supply would, by the noble Lord's plan, when times were critical, take a whole fortnight. As an enemy of obstruction, he was glad that the proposal had not been reduced to black and white and put upon the Notice Paper. He would accordingly suggest to his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for West Sussex, whether he would not agree to strike out the word "first" from his Amendment?

MR. SERJEANT SIMON thought that the Motion of the hon. and learned Baronet (Sir George Bowyer), if there was any soundness in it, should have been proposed five hours earlier, and all that time would have been saved to the House. As the hon. and gallant Baronet's Motion was substantially the same as his own, he was quite ready to yield to the preference accorded to the proposal of the hon. and gallant Member for West Sussex. A great deal had been said during the evening about the privileges of the House, and the control which it should exercise over the Estimates. His experience of two Parliaments had been that, under the plea or shelter of bringing forward grievances, that function of the House of Commons had been postponed on many occasions, to the great detriment of the public interest. Supply had been put down night after night, while the Notice Paper had been literally clogged with Motions which, under the colour of grievances, had really no other purpose than the proposal and discussion of abstract Resolutions which led to no practical results. As a consequence of this, the Estimates had been postponed to so late an hour that when at last they came on, hon. Members found themselves worn out with waiting, and the items were hurried through with little or no discussion. If hon. Members were present to transact the Business of the country, and if the control over expenditure was of the first importance, everything relating to them should be brought before the House at a time when they could be discussed with freshness and vigour. That had not been the case within his experience, and for that reason he thought there should be some modification and a recurrence to the Rule of 1872, which had been found efficient for all purposes. He was glad the Chancellor of the Exchequer had accepted a proposal made in that form.

MR. ANDERSON said, the House had to consider whether the Rule of 1872 or that of 1876 should be revived. He was glad that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had conceded something; but, in his opinion, he had not conceded quite enough in accepting the Amendment of the hon. and gallant Member for West Sussex. He thought the House should divide upon the Amendment; but he was not so wedded to that course as to press it in the face of a strong expression of opinion to the contrary.

MR. GORST thought the question which was before the House was one affecting its dignity, and ought to be decided in accordance therewith. It was not the most dignified mode of procedure that they should be obliged to make a change in their Rules before going to bed; and it was, therefore, on the whole, desirable that they should have at least one night to consider the new proposal before it was finally decided upon. One remarkable circumstance about the proposal was that it entirely did away with the whole argument by which the Government had hitherto supported the Resolution. Why was that argument dropped? Had the Government been convinced that, instead of making a speech, the Minister should produce a printed Report to the House, and that there should be no speech at all? The Chancellor of the Exchequer had twitted independent Members with having wasted the time of the House; but that evening, at any rate, time had been wasted by the speeches of Ministers themselves. He did not speak in a spirit of hostility to Her Majesty's Government; but, having heard from the Chancellor of the Exchequer over and over again that the subject of the Resolution was not one in which the Government was interested, that he made the proposition, not as a Member of the Government, but as a Member of their own Committee, he was compelled to say that the Representative of that Committee had, within the last 20 minutes, entirely changed the proposition which he was supposed to make to the House of Commons. He (Mr. Gorst) thought that the common sense and dignity of the House required that they should at least sleep over that proposition.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: I quite agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Chester (Mr. Dodson), that the Business of the House has so completely altered within the last few years that it has become perfectly evident some changes in its form of procedure are necessary. I confess I have been sometimes astonished at the spirit of Conservatism which has animated the speeches of hon. Members on this side of the House, who have held that because certain forms have been found satisfactory in times gone by, they must be altogether satisfactory now. If there is one thing inherent to this debate, it is the fact that any attempt to alter those forms is a very serious matter, and one which cannot be lightly undertaken. It is perfectly clear that if any effective change is to be made in our procedure, it must be by a measure in the carrying of which the House is prepared to expend a considerable amount of time. It is evident that the House is not prepared to accept the conclusions of the Select Committee without full discussion, and without any responsibility in the matter being taken by the Government. I expressed my opinion at a very early period on Monday evening that the original proposal of the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer was not one which would really effect any great saving of time. With regard to the two propositions before the House, I think the Government must see that a very great objection is felt to revert-ing to the Rule of 1872. They have not yet conciliated the opposition to this Rule; I have waited on purpose to see if there was any prospect of an agreement on this proposal being arrived at, and I find there is not; but I believe that the Rule of 1876 might be accepted. If this were adopted, the Government would be able to consider whether any radical change in the procedure of the House is required or not, and if so, they could come forward next Session with proposals on their own responsibility; but to revert to the Rule of 1872, which has not been enforced for many Sessions, and to which many objections were taken, will, I believe, lead to a very considerable waste of time without producing any commensurate result. As far as my experience goes, I believe the Rule worked well; but I am not aware that it produced such a saving of time to the House that it would be worth the while of the Government to spend one or two more nights about it. The reason why I suggest a compromise on the basis of the Rule of 1876 is that I have heard it might be accepted, and that we might then proceed to the consideration of the other Resolutions. Whether that is so or not I do not know; but I feel that it will be impossible for the Government to come to any arrangement to-night with regard to the Rule of 1872.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: I confess I was taken by surprise at the suggestion of the noble Lord who has just spoken, which was hardly what I should have expected after the proceedings of last Monday and this evening; but we must take things, however, as we find them. We are exceedingly obliged to the noble Lord for the kind attention he has paid to the interests of the Government; but I cannot myself accede to the suggestion which he has been good enough to make, and I prefer, under these circumstances, to trust to the mercies of the House rather than to the mercies of the noble Lord. I will ask hon. Members whether they think I have allowed myself to be guided by Party or personal feelings in modifying a proposal which appeared to me to be opposed to the views of a considerable body, if not to those of the majority, of the House? I have very largely diminished the demand which we made on the time of the House in carrying into effect a Rule which the noble Lord himself voted for in the Committee of last year. But these deeds of charity are immediately forgotten by those who benefit by them. I have with regard to the Supplemental and Special Estimates, always advocated that we should adopt the Rule proposed and carried by the Government of which the noble Lord was a Member, and which was in force during two or three years under an Administration of which he was so distinguished an ornament. After two evenings of debate, I have made a proposal to the House which is one that I have reason to believe is worthy of consideration, and which we are ready to consider as the best, since two proposals have been made. It has also been proposed, in a manner I think exceedingly fair, that the Amendment of the hon. and gallant Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) should be taken as a basis on which we might decide the question. In this case the question arises as to the use of the word "first," and it is suggested that a division be taken as to whether that word be retained. If the majority are in favour of this proposition, there would be a decision one way or the other; but the question now at issue is one that cannot be postponed with advantage, and on which arguments have been thoroughly exhausted. It appears to me that we shall not be any the wiser if we adjourn till to-morrow or Monday, while if we are to decide the point at all, now is the time to do so. Let us take some divisions on the subject—as many divisions as you please—but let us come to a decision one way or another.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said, he was sure that hon. Members were very anxious to appreciate in a proper way he spirit in which the right hon. Gentleman had conducted his Resolutions. He was glad to learn that the Chancellor of the Exchequer did not speak as a Minister, but only as Chairman of the Committee which sat last year, and which, he believed, was very much divided on the points under consideration. The right hon. Gentleman had himself told them that he had made many concessions. That was perfectly true; but with what object had they been made? As he said, in order to conciliate the opinions of a number of hon. Members who, although in a minority, were, nevertheless, an important minority. He (Mr. Chamberlain) begged to point out that however anxious he had been to conciliate that important minority, he had up to that time utterly failed to do so, and altogether misunderstood the feeling which actuated hon. Members on his side of the House. They were not acting in hostility to the Government, but simply wished to cherish the privileges of which they were possessed. In their opinion, the Amendment of the hon. Member for Glasgow (Mr. Anderson) made the utmost concession possible, while that proposed as a substitute by the Chancellor of the Exchequer was altogether inadequate to remove their objection to the Resolution. They knew just as well as the right hon. Gentleman what would be the result of taking divisions on the subject, as he had proposed—namely, a large majority against them; but, at the same time, that would not prevent them discussing the matter to the very utmost, and calling upon all legitimate forms of the House in order to secure that an Amendment of such importance should not be made without the fullest possible consideration. He ventured to suggest that the adjournment should be taken then, and to assure the right hon. Gentleman that there were many hon. Members perfectly willing to take up his challenge and proceed to as many divisions as he could wish.

Question put.

The House *divided*:—Ayes 57; Noes 143: Majority 86.—(Div. List, No. 18.)

Original Question again proposed.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: I shall be glad if the House will allow me to say one word. I regret that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should be of opinion that he had any reason to complain of the course taken by myself in this matter. As far as I am aware, it has not been my desire to throw any obstacles in the way of the Government in the adoption of Resolutions recommended by the Committee of which I was a Member. The Chancellor of the Exchequer very truly said that I voted for the Resolution which has been proposed on the Motion for the Amendment proposed by the hon. and gallant Member for West Sussex. I am also quite willing to admit that it was one proposed and adopted on the recommendation of the Government of which I was a Member. I, indeed, saw some objections to that course; but it is true that in Committee I gave it my support, and if the Government think it worth while to devote time to pass this Resolution, I am still ready to do so. But it is not possible that they should pass the Resolution of 1872 without a further considerable expenditure of time, while that of 1876 might be accepted at once. It is entirely a question for the consideration of the Government whether the subject is one of sufficient importance to justify them in devoting more time to its settlement. I am ready to support the Resolution which I supported in Committee; but it would be deceiving the Government and the House if I said that I thought that Resolution could be carried to-night. As far as I am able to judge of the temper of the House, that will not be the case.

MR. RYLANDS: I have to express in the fullest manner my appreciation of the extreme courtesy and consideration which have been manifested by the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I am quite sure that in dealing with this question he has met those who are most strongly opposed to this Resolution in the fairest possible spirit; and I think it only right that this House should understand that the Resolutions which the right hon. Gentleman has proposed are not in any way Government Resolutions, but Resolutions adopted by a majority of a Select Committee of this House appointed to consider the subject. I wish to point out to the Chancellor of the Exchequer that the great object, as I have understood, of these Resolutions being proposed by Government, has been that there should be some certainty concerning the introduction of the Estimates; in other words, that when a Minister of the Crown comes down to this House, with a view of laying the annual Financial Statement of his Department before the House, he should have the opportunity of doing so, and of securing proper attention without being interrupted by the introduction of irrelevant Motions. But, Sir, I wish to point out that the Resolution of 1872 does not meet this requirement in any way whatever, because it is on the first occasion, on the

Monday that the House goes into Committee of Supply on the Estimates, that it is competent for an hon. Gentleman to give Notice of Motion relative to Army or Navy matters. Until these Notices are disposed of, the Secretary of State, or First Lord, cannot make his Statement; and inasmuch as every hon. Member who wishes to raise a question on going into Committee of Supply knows perfectly well that the only chance he has of doing so would be on the occasion when the House first went into Committee of Supply, he would take care to put his Notice on the Paper at the earliest opportunity. The result would be that when the House first went into Committee on the Army or Navy Estimates, there would be such an accumulation of Motions that a certain number of Amendments would be carried over to the next Monday, and introduced on the same Motion. That was the case last year, when the Navy Estimates were to be brought forward. The Amendments were so numerous that the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty waited two nights without an opportunity being afforded him of making his Financial Statement. What happened on the third night? On an appeal from the Leader of the House, a number of hon. Gentlemen who had Notices of Amendment withdrew them, in order that the First Lord should make his Statement at an early period of the evening—hon. Gentlemen relinquished their right. What I would suggest as a fair and reasonable compromise would be this. That in return for the understanding that the First Lord of the Admiralty, or the Secretary of State for War, or a Minister in charge of Departments, should be allowed to make their Statements on the Motion that Mr. Speaker should leave the Chair, the Government might accept the Resolution of 1876. We should then have the certainty of the Ministers in charge of the Estimates bringing forward their Estimates on the first Monday; and on subsequent Mondays Amendments on going into Committee would be restricted to matter relevant to the question. I venture to make this suggestion as a means of a compromise. Before I sit down, I propose to move the adjournment of the House, but hope that we shall not be bound to go to a division. I trust that the Government will see their way to come to an arrangement such as I have ventured to suggest. I beg to move that the House do now adjourn.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—(*Mr. Rylands.*)

Mr. J. R. YORKE said, the adoption by the Government of the Amendment of the hon. and gallant Member for West Sussex was no concession at all; but was, on the contrary, illusory in its character.

Mr. NEWDEGATE said, that the Resolution originally proposed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer was one that had received the support of the majority of the Committee appointed to consider the question. He trusted the House would not be guilty of such an exaggerated piece of Conservatism as to turn round suddenly and say, after their Committee had reported certain changes to be necessary—"We made a mistake in appointing the Committee," and to every change, however small, to cry *non possumus*.

Mr. BIGGAR said, that in view of the lateness of the hour he thought it desirable that the House should adjourn, the Government not having shown any inclination to make any *bonâ fide* concession.

Mr. FAWCETT said, he had listened with very great attention to the remarks which had been made by the hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Chamberlain). It appeared to him that the subject had been discussed in every possible way. If he had thought that any unfair advantage had been taken of the House he would have been the very first to protest against it, and support the Motion for the adjournment; but, on the contrary, it appeared to him that the minority had been a little too hard upon the Government. Because, what had taken place on Thursday night? The Chancellor of the Exchequer had given Notice that he should bring on these Resolutions on Monday; they were down upon the Paper on Friday, and not one single word of objection was urged against their being taken, either on Thursday or Friday; but when they came down on Monday a very considerable objection was urged against the order of proceeding. It, therefore, seemed to him that the Government had in no way attempted to deal unfairly with the House. He was also of opinion that in discussing this subject many independent Members were apt to fall into the mistake of thinking that the Government were interested in passing the Resolutions then proposed, whereas it appeared to him that those most interested were the independent Members themselves. They were sincerely anxious to proceed to the early consideration of the Estimates, because, owing to the present practice, there was really no Vote of Supply taken except towards the end of the Session, in June or July, when the House was often wearied out and exhausted. The House ought to insist upon having Supply brought on at a period when they were certain that discussion could take place. He was bound to point out that in 1872, when the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone) was Prime Minister, he made a proposal identical with that now brought forward by the hon. and gallant Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot). At that time, many independent Members below the Gangway voted in favour of that proposal. He thought that his hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow (Mr. Anderson), and his hon. Friend the Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands), should have pointed out in what respect they considered that the Resolution had worked badly. Looking back to 1872, and comparing what took place at that time with what took place last year and the year previous, it seemed to him that the vote given by them in 1872 was justified, and that they had a much better chance of getting control over expenditure when they could come down to the House knowing distinctly that at some particular hour the Vote which they wanted to criticize would come on. But during the last two Sessions the case had been very different, for then they came down night after night, not knowing whether any particular Vote would be reached, while their patience became exhausted, and the feeling came over the House that the criticism of Parliamentary Estimates was altogether useless. It therefore appeared clear that some such proposition as that either of the hon. Member for Glasgow or of the hon. and gallant Member for West Sussex ought to be carried. As far as he could see, the Government appeared to have acted with perfect frankness and fairness, and he hoped, in consequence, that the House would that evening come to some decision.

DR. O'LEARY remarked that, although he was no politician, he had always considered that consistency of Party was one of the great principles of the House. Looking at the Division List which he held in his hand, he was much preplexed to find that amongst those who voted on the 26th February, 1872, in favour of Motions in almost every respect similar to those now objected to, were the names of the hon. Member for Glasgow (Mr. Anderson) and the hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands). The name of the latter hon. Gentleman had been so conspicuous in the present debate, and his energies so thoroughly marked, that he was sure the House would forgive him for only citing the name of the hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands).

MR. M'LAREN considered the Amendment of the hon. Member for Glasgow as much preferable to that of the hon. and gallant Baronet (Sir Walter B. Barttelot), and he should, therefore, vote for the former. The limitation of Amendments to three days practically appeared to him a perfect mockery.

MR. O'DONNELL said, he rose to express his opinion that the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett), in his anxiety for economy, had forgotten that beside the useful work of keeping down expenditure, the House had also the function to discharge, of explaining, exposing, and, as far as possible, redressing the grievances of the subject. He thought that if they were to support the refusal of the Government to allow Notices strictly relevant to be proceeded with they would be abrogating their most useful function. With regard to the facilitation of Public Business, he would express his opinion that the obstruction complained of would be in no way prevented by any such Resolution as that proposed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, which was only calculated to obstruct the ventilation of public grievances in that House. His own view on the subject of obstruction, after having studied it, was that when any obstruction arose it should be dealt with summarily. He thought that both Governments and individual Members should have the courage of their opinions, and that there was no poorer way of trying to deal with the question than by denying to the whole people the right of having their grievances ventilated. With regard to a concession on which the Government laid stress—namely, the concession of being allowed to raise a Motion on going into Committee of Ways and Means, were they to understand that to be *bonâ fide?* Was it possible that Notices on going into Committee of Ways and Means could be fully and fairly discussed if, as had been too frequently the case, the Committee of Ways and Means only made its appearance at the very end of the evening? It was only too clear that the proposition of the Chancellor of the Exchequer would be a purely illusory concession, for it was not at 12 or 1 o'clock in the morning that they could go fresh into the consideration of Motions preceding Ways and Means; therefore, if the Government would not assure them and place in the Resolution an engagement that the Committee of Ways and Means should be taken at a time which would allow a full discussion and investigation of grievances, that so-called concession was illusory to the last degree. He was very happy on that occasion not to be speaking as a Party man; but he was utterly unable to see in the arguments advanced, especially in those of hon. Members on the front Opposition Bench, any justification for the course they had pursued. Their argument was that for many years the Business of the House had been increasing, and the conclusion they drew was that instead of maintaining the liberty of the subject in proportion to the increase of Business, the facilities for control should be diminished. He thought that according as the necessity for taking up more and more subjects, and for dealing with larger and larger portions of Public Business presented itself, so the right of exposing the grievances of the subject in that increasing sphere of Parliamentary action should be carefully guarded. He thought that recourse even to those foreign methods of not permitting the interpellation of Ministers, except after due form and with the control and permission of semi-official bodies, would be less objectionable than the proposals of the Government. He felt that three months in the year would be utterly inadequate to discussing fairly and temperately the grievances that by right should be laid before Parliament. If the Government would accept the Amendment that only Motions relevant to the Estimates should be considered on Mondays, he believed that the House would be satisfied. How many objections had been taken to his (Mr. O'Donnell's) action on various points! Yet it happened that on Monday he had never taken any Motion to which objection had been raised, although that had never made the Government more resigned to his action on other days. It had been hinted that greater liberty in Committee would be the reward of surrendering the discussion of grievances previous to Supply; but if that suggestion were acted upon, he would altogether refuse to accept it as any reason for admitting the Government proposal. They should, by all means, discuss grievances at the proper time, and then deal with the Estimates from a purely business point of view. He did not know on what grounds the Liberal front Opposition Bench had acted; but if they were actuated by any kind of desire to enjoy greater freedom when they should be a Government again—greater freedom of neglecting the liberty of the subject—by backing up another Cabinet, he would only remind them that in their hurry to throw overboard the proper consideration of the rights of independent Members, they might jeopardise their chances of ever seeing themselves a Government again.

Mr. CALLAN pointed out that amongst the opponents to the Rule of 1872, the Division List contained the names of Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson, Secretary to the Treasury; George Cavendish Bentinck; the Secretary of State for the Colonies; the right hon. the Home Secretary, Sir William Hart Dyke, Rowland Winn, Lord George Hamilton, James Lowther, and W. H. Smith. He asked that the proposition of the hon. Member for Glasgow (Mr. Anderson) should be accepted by the Government, and he urged this particularly on the ground that they would only be endorsing their own action in 1872.

Sir HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON said, that as far as consistency was concerned, they had voted on the occasion referred to upon the ground that the question had not up to that time been sufficiently considered, and that a further Committee should be appointed. Their object, however, had been attained by the appointment of last year's Committee, and their position was therefore not quite that represented by the hon. Member for Dundalk (Mr. Callan).

Sir CHARLES W. DILKE said, he had no doubt that the hon. Baronet himself had distinctly stated his reasons for the vote; but he would remember that he walked out of the House when the second Division occurred.

Sir WILLIAM HARCOURT said, there was a far more important question than that of consistency to be considered—namely, the question between the Rules of 1872 and 1876. The former had been adopted, rightly or wrongly, in the last Parliament, and Her Majesty's Government, having had experience of that Rule, deliberately came to the conclusion that it was not necessary or proper for the conduct of Public Business. The former Leader of the House (the Earl of Beaconsfield) had come to the conclusion that the more this question was left alone the better. In 1876 a different policy was adopted. What was the Rule introduced by Her Majesty's Government? Was it the Rule of 1872? No. Acting upon their experience, they deliberately rejected that, and adopted the Rule of 1876, which they now asked the House to reject in favour of the one they themselves rejected. Of all the plans which had been proposed, that of 1872 was the worst. The House required that when Supply came on the Minister should make his Statement; but the Rule of 1872 made that impossible, inasmuch as the preliminary Motions could not, and would not, give way; for if they did, they would never get another opportunity. On many occasions these Motions had been waived out of courtesy; but the proposal of the Government made it absolutely certain that these Motions would not be withdrawn, while it did not secure to independent Members of the House those opportunities for discussion which they desired, and which he thought they had a right to have. It seemed to him a most futile and most extraordinary result to a discussion of two nights that they should not take the recommendations of the Committee and of Her Majesty's Government in 1876, but an old Rule which had been tried and abandoned. If they were to do anything, they should do something efficient. He believed that the recommendation of his noble Friend, made on the first night of discussion, was a substantial reform in the proceedings of the House, while he was quite sure that the Rule of 1872 was no practical reform at all. It had been condemned by Her Majesty's Government during the whole of the present Parliament, and rather than adopt such an ineffectual plan as that, he (Sir William Harcourt) thought it better to leave the matter alone.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: I do not want to go on with this controversy, but would suggest to hon. Members the desirability of coming to some decision upon the question before them with as little delay as possible, instead of repeating the same arguments over and over again. The hon. and learned Gentleman who had just sat down now says that the Rule of 1872 will be of no use at all. I admit that it leaves us still open to the difficulty with reference to the Army, Navy, and Civil Service Estimates; but we gain the grand point at which we aim.

Major NOLAN thought that the most sensible thing would be the adjournment of the House.

Mr. STACPOOLE considered that in the event of an adjournment some day ought to be fixed for the settlement of the question.

Question put.

The House *divided*:—Ayes 43; Noes 121: Majority 78.—(Div. List, No. 19.)

Original Question again proposed.

Mr. DILLWYN moved that the debate be adjourned.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Debate be now adjourned."—(*Mr. Dillwyn.*)

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: I shall, of course, not resist the Motion at this late hour—1.50. With reference to the continuance of the debate, we shall propose to take it as the first Order on Monday next before the Army Estimates.

Motion *agreed to.*

Debate *adjourned* till *Monday* next.

EAST INDIA (PUBLIC WORKS).

Ordered, That the Minutes of the Evidence taken before the Select Committee on East India (Public Works), in the last Session of Parliament, be referred to the Select Committee on East India (Public Works).—(*Mr. Edward Stanhope.*)

MOTION.

PUBLIC ACCOUNTS.

INSTRUCTION TO THE COMMITTEE.

Mr. MONK, in rising to move—

"That it be an Instruction to the Committee of Public Accounts, That they have power to consider whether any alteration in the Law is desirable, providing that a statement in each case in which the Naval and Military Departments have obtained the sanction of the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury to any expenditure not provided for in the sums appropriated to such services in the Votes contained in the Appropriation Act, setting forth the representation made to them by the respective Department, shall be laid upon the Table of the House within a limited period after such sanction shall have been given,"

merely wished to remark that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had stated, when he (Mr. Monk) brought forward the matter at the end of last Session, his intention that the subject should be taken up by the Committee of Public Accounts, and only urged in excuse of the oversight which had occurred that by some accident it had not been brought before that Committee. His hon. Friend the Secretary to the Treasury had also said he would take care that it should be in future referred to the Committee.

Motion made, and Question proposed,

"That it be an Instruction to the Committee of Public Accounts, That they have power to consider whether any alteration in the Law is desirable, providing that a statement in each case in which the Naval and Military Departments have obtained the sanction of the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury to any expenditure not provided for in the sums appropriated to such services in the Votes contained in the Appropriation Act, setting forth the representation made to them by the respective Department, shall be laid upon the Table of the House within a limited period after such sanction shall have been given."—(*Mr Monk.*)

Lord FREDERICK CAVENDISH replied, that it was the duty of the Committee of Public Accounts to examine the Appropriation Accounts, and to report to the House on all points which arose in connection with them. Those were important duties, and the Committee, which had now sat during many years, had pointed out evils, from time to time, whenever they were shown by the Accounts before them to have occurred; but it had not stated the manner in which those evils were to be prevented. The responsibility of supplying the remedy should rest upon the Executive. The Committee had not the practical knowledge to enable it to make important recommendations with respect to the mode in which the Estimates were to be framed. Suppose that the Committee, acting on their instructions, recommended a change of importance to be made in the Navy and Army Estimates. In the course of a year or two it might be found that this recommendation would have to be given up. Would not the authority of the Committee be much diminished by having made a recommendation afterwards found to be impracticable?

Notice taken that 40 Members were not present; House counted, and 40 Members not being present,

House adjourned at Two o'clock.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Friday, 21*st February*, 1879.

PRIVATE BILLS.

Ordered, That this House will not receive any petition for a Private Bill after *Friday* the 14*th day of March* next, unless such Private Bill shall have been approved by the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice; nor any petition for a Private Bill approved by the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice after *Friday* the 2*nd day of May* next:

That this House will not receive any report from the Judges upon petitions presented to this House for Private Bills after *Friday* the 2*nd day of May* next.

CRIMINAL LAW—BAIL IN CHARGES OF FRAUD.

QUESTION. OBSERVATIONS.

The Earl of AIRLIE asked, Whether Her Majesty's Government intend to propose any measure for the amendment of the law in respect of the admission to bail of persons who may be committed for trial on charges of fraud? He thought there was some occasion to consider this subject, as within the last few years frauds on a great scale had been brought under the notice of a Committee of the other House of Parliament, which was appointed to inquire into the subject of foreign loans. The Question which stood in his name did not refer to steps that should be taken to prevent frauds, but only to the mode of dealing with persons accused of fraudulent practices. In the great majority of cases the law with regard to bail worked satisfactorily; but in cases of persons charged with great commercial frauds there was this anomaly—that if the person who was charged with the offence was really guilty, the greater the scale on which operations were conducted, the easier it was for him to escape trial. If a person had succeeded in fraudulently transferring hundreds of thousands of pounds from other people's pockets into his own, it was a matter of very little moment to him that he should forfeit a few thousands by way of bail. A case occurred some two years since which excited a great deal of attention—that of Alexander Collie, who failed for some millions of money. He was arrested on a charge of fraud, and was admitted to bail. He, however, disappeared, and has never been heard of since. It would not be right to say that Alexander Collie was a fraudulent bankrupt, for, as he was never tried, he was never convicted; but his escape from trial involved a very serious miscarriage of justice. But if the law in England was unsatisfactory, in Scotland it was a great deal worse. There, everyone who was committed for trial, except for a capital offence, might demand to be admitted to bail on giving security to the amount of £300. As an illustration, he would allude to the trial of the City of Glasgow Bank directors. The bank failed about the beginning of October. The Crown acted with great promptitude. The directors were arrested immediately, and they were tried and convicted during the last month. He desired to guard himself against being supposed to criticize the conduct of anyone engaged in conducting that trial. He wished only to point out what appeared to him to be an unsatisfactory state of the law. The indictment against the directors was a very long one; but the only charge which made it possible to refuse bail to the directors was the charge of theft. They claimed, except Mr. Inglis, to be liberated on bail; but the Crown refused. The case was brought before the Court of Session, which held that the offence with which the directors were charged was an offence within the meaning of the statute for which bail might be refused. The Court was not unanimous. Lord Young, a very eminent authority, dissented on the ground that the offence with which the directors were charged could not be looked upon as theft, the offence charged being that bills intrusted to them for collection were discounted by them before they arrived at maturity. The directors were kept in prison for about three months till the trial came on. The Lord Advocate opened the case; witnesses were examined for the prosecution, and, on the second or third day, no witness having been called to speak to the charge of theft, the Lord Advocate said he withdrew the charge, as it was one he should have great difficulty in establishing. Great use—and he thought very legitimately—was made of that by the counsel for the defence. Suppose the directors had been innocent, and had been acquitted of the other charges, they would have had great reason to complain that they had been imprisoned on a charge of which they were not only innocent, but which had never been pressed against them. Although they were convicted of a most grave offence, still it was not a satisfactory state of things that in order to make sure of having men put on trial for a crime, however serious it might be, it should be necessary to commit them on a charge which no attempt was made to sustain. On the other hand, it could not be right that men charged with such frauds as those of which the Glasgow Bank directors had been convicted should be entitled to bail in finding security for the extremely small sum of £300 each.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR said, the Question of the noble Earl as it now appeared upon the Paper had assumed a different shape to that which it presented when he gave Notice of it. The Question brought to his notice a few days ago was, Whether Her Majesty's Government intend to propose any measure for the amendment of the Criminal Law in respect of persons who may be charged with or convicted of fraudulent offences? — and in answer to that Question he was prepared to say that a general measure had been introduced proposing the codification of the Criminal Law, making considerable changes in the distinctions which had hitherto prevailed between felonies and misdemeanours. That measure would, he hoped, in process of time, come before their Lordships, and any question which the noble Earl might wish to raise on it could be raised then. But since he came into the House, he found that the Question had been changed. The noble Earl called attention to the subject of the recent criminal trials in the Courts of Scotland, and now asked the Question in its present form. It would appear from the noble Earl's speech that his Question had reference to that recent criminal trial in the Courts of Scotland, and he (the Lord Chancellor) was not prepared to answer that Question as it was then put. He was not acquainted with the particulars of the case to which the noble Earl referred, except from general information; but he would make inquiry as to whether the law of Scotland with regard to bail was unsatisfactory in its working. He must, however, take leave to say one thing. He could not admit the suggestion of the noble Earl that the Lord Advocate of Scotland introduced into the indictment a charge of theft against the persons arrested, in order that they might be unable to obtain bail. He felt perfectly convinced that when that charge was introduced the Law Officers considered that they had evidence, or would have evidence, to substantiate that charge. It was introduced for that purpose, and in no wise with the view of debarring from the right of having bail. He did not know whether the noble Earl considered that any undue measure of justice had been meted out to them—he could only say that the general impression seemed to be that it was not so.

THE EARL OF AIRLIE said, the noble and learned Earl had misunderstood what he said. He said that he did not wish to criticize the conduct of anyone who was engaged in the conduct of that trial, and that, no doubt, when the Lord Advocate put that charge in the indictment, he believed that there was a reasonable probability of his being able to prove it; but he said, notwithstanding that, but for the circumstance of the inclusion of the charge of theft in the indictment, the accused men would not have been committed to prison.

ARMY—VOLUNTEER FORCE—COURTS OF INQUIRY.

ADDRESS FOR A RETURN.

LORD TRURO, in moving for a Return showing the number of courts of inquiry held in each year in the Volunteer Force since its establishment, said, he moved for this information, because he thought it would be interesting to the public, to the Volunteers themselves, and to the authorities, to know the nature of the offences charged against Volunteers, and what had been the conduct of those who had been employed as instructors of the Force. He believed such a Return would be highly creditable to the character of the Force since its commencement.

Moved, That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for Return showing the number of courts of inquiry held in each year in the volunteer force since its establishment; the number of volunteers of all ranks, the number of adjutants, and the number of instructors in each year on which such were held, and the several offences charged.—(*The Lord Truro.*)

VISCOUNT BURY said, that if the noble Lord wished for information on any specific point, he would be glad to give it to him if it was within the reach of the War Office; but these courts of inquiry were held on the authority of the officers commanding Volunteer corps—there were no records of them at the War Office. The Force had now been in existence 20 years, and to procure the information asked them the Department would have to apply to some 293 different corps, and ask them to go back on their records for that period. The Returns asked for would be inconvenient and expensive, if not impossible, and he hoped the House would not grant them.

LORD TRURO said, he only wanted the Returns of courts of inquiry ordered by the War Office.

Motion (by leave of the House) *withdrawn.*

SOUTH AFRICA—THE ZULU WAR—THE REINFORCEMENTS—THE CAVALRY EQUIPMENTS.

QUESTION. OBSERVATIONS.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH asked the Under Secretary of State for War, What alteration of equipment, if any, is contemplated in the appointments or uniform of the heavy dragoon regiment known as the King's Dragoon Guards, about to proceed on active service at the Cape of Good Hope, or those of the 17th Lancers, under orders for the same station? He thought it a very unwise step to send out the horses of the cavalry regiments from this country. Horses that had not been acclimatised in South Africa would be useless. He regretted that that most excellent force, the Cape Mounted Rifles, had not been maintained. The men were well drilled and accustomed to the country, and their native horses were thoroughly acclimatised—and altogether they were a most useful body of men.

VISCOUNT BURY, in reply, said, there had been some minor alterations in the equipment of the two regiments which the noble Lord had named. Cork helmets had been substituted for brass helmets; a second ammunition pouch, making a total of 40 rounds for each man, had been supplied; some extra leather had been put on their overalls; a clasp knife had been given to each man; also, waterproof saddle covers, waterproof sheets, and a certain number of sets of harness for lasso purposes. The changes of equipment had been of a very minor character.

THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE wished to add that the two regiments in question would remain exactly as they were before, and although they had been sent out with these additional equipments there was the fullest permission to the commanding officers to put into store anything that was not required. Probably lances might not be found useful for service in the bush; but all lancers now carried the carbine as well as the lance. The noble Lord was in error when he described the King's Dragoon Guards as a heavy dragoon regiment. It was a medium regiment; and the men of both regiments were active, efficient, and not over heavy for their horses. With regard to equipments, the fullest permission was given to the commanding officers to make necessary alterations. For instance, the Lancers were furnished with a carbine, as well as a lance; and if the latter were found unserviceable or not fitted for the bush, the commanding officer could have it placed in store. As regarded the horses, the question was settled by the requisition from the Cape. It had been asked that the men should bring their horses with them. Even if the horses died, it would be undesirable that the authorities at home should refuse to send them when asked for in that way by those who must have the best knowledge on the subject. The reason was obvious. To collect a large number of horses on the spot would take time, and it was necessary that the men should go ready to proceed to the field at once on landing. Accordingly horses had been sent out with the cavalry, and also with the artillery. Everything had been done to assist the authorities on the spot, and he hoped and believed that the arrangements made here would give them entire satisfaction.

House adjourned at a quarter before
Six o'clock, to Monday next,
Eleven o'clock.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Friday, 21st February, 1879.

MINUTES.]—NEW MEMBERS SWORN—Earl of Yarmouth, *for* Warwick County (Southern Division); Colonel Daniel La Zouche Colthurst, *for* Cork County.

PUBLIC BILLS—*Second Reading*—District Auditors * [79].

Committee—Ancient Monuments [52], [House counted out].

QUESTIONS.

RAILWAYS — CONTINUOUS FOOTBOARDS.—QUESTION.

MR. THOMSON HANKEY asked the President of the Board of Trade, Whether he has received any further communications from the South Western Railway Company, since the end of last Session, respecting the wish generally expressed by the public in favour of continuous footboards to all the carriages, and likewise as to the adaptation of the height of the platforms at all stations, so as to prevent the risk of accidents to passengers alighting from carriages without the power of placing their feet directly on the station platform?

VISCOUNT SANDON: We issued a Circular to all the Railway Companies at the end of last Session, requesting them to give us the fullest information as to their views and intentions respecting continuous footboards, and the height of their platforms, which is, of course, a part of the same subject. We have now printed and laid upon the Table all the replies which we have received, together with the Circular itself, and they will be in the hands of Members very shortly. Replies will be found from most of the leading Companies; but I regret to say that the South Western Railway Company has sent no answer whatever to our Circular.

TREATY OF BERLIN -THE GREEK FRONTIER.—QUESTION.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether Her Majesty's Government have received information to the effect that the Turkish Government have declined to accept the frontier proposed for Greece by the 13th protocol of the Congress of Berlin even as a basis for negotiation, and have refused to surrender any territory in Epirus?

MR. BOURKE: The House will recollect that a day or two ago I stated that negotiations upon this subject were still going on. I am sure, therefore, that the hon. Baronet will see that it is impossible for me to state at present the details of those negotiations. I may also remind the hon. Baronet that Her Majesty's Government must necessarily be imperfectly acquainted at the present moment with the details of the negotiations.

ARMY—THE ZULU WAR—THE ARMY RESERVE.—QUESTION.

SIR HENRY HAVELOCK asked the Secretary of State for War, Whether it is the case that many men of the Army Reserve, trained soldiers, were willing to have volunteered to serve at the Cape, to fill up the regiments now embarking for foreign service, if permitted to do so; and, what objection there is to men of that reserve being allowed so to serve if willing to do so?

COLONEL STANLEY: Sir, as a matter of fact, I am not aware that any men of the Army Reserve have volunteered for service at the Cape, although I have no doubt, from all that I have heard, they would be very ready to do so if an opportunity were given. With regard to the second Question, I must speak with some reservation; but, as I am advised at present, the men who have joined the Army Reserve are covered by the Statute Law of 1867, under which they are allowed to serve upon two conditions—first, a Proclamation under section 10 in case of a national emergency; and, secondly, by volunteering for duty. Under the first condition they can serve for six months after the emergency is over; but under the second—which would be the one applicable to the Question of my hon. and gallant Friend—they can only serve for six months from the date of volunteering for service; and I do not think, under the circumstances, that it would be worth while to accept them for short a time.

INDIA (FINANCE)—INDIAN TAXATION.—QUESTION.

MR. GRANT asked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether Her Majesty's Government have taken, or intend to take, any steps towards providing that the official and professional classes in India shall contribute their share of the taxation imposed upon the people as a security against future famines in that country?

MR. E. STANHOPE: This matter has been for some time engaging the serious consideration of the Indian Government; but I must ask the hon. Member to be good enough to wait for further information as to their decision until the Budget is published at the end of the present month.

INDIA—EAST INDIAN RAILWAY.

QUESTION.

GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOUR asked the Under Secretary of State for India, If, before the East Indian Railway Bill for the purchase of the Railway is brought on, he will supply the House with a tabulated statement which will give the House information about the entire working of this Railway, so as to exhibit the annual gross traffic receipts and gross working expenses, net receipts, the capital created, guaranteed interest thereon, excess of that interest over net receipts and debt created, or excess of receipts over the guaranteed interest, portion of that excess paid to the Railway Company, portion appropriated to pay off debt, and the diminished interest debt, with a total of capital and debt on which the purchase-money is based?

MR. E. STANHOPE: I am afraid that to give the Returns in the form asked for by the hon. and gallant Member would be very troublesome and would cause some delay; but I will endeavour to have a summary prepared which will give, in a short and convenient form, the information which the hon. and gallant Member desires upon the subject. Further details will be found in the annual Reports of Mr. Danvers.

SOUTH AFRICA — TRANSMISSION OF INTELLIGENCE.—QUESTIONS.

MR. OTWAY asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether, having regard to the interest and importance of early and reliable intelligence from South Africa, Her Majesty's Government see any objection to following the course by which a portion of the Press obtain priority of intelligence; and, whether they will instruct Consular Officers or detach gentlemen from the Colonial Office to St. Vincent and Madeira, for the transmission of telegraphic information from South Africa?

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: The Government have already priority for official despatches, and they have no reason to complain of any undue delay in their transmission. I do not think it advisable to instruct Consular officers or to detach gentlemen from the Colonial Office to St. Vincent and Madeira, for the transmission of telegraphic information from South Africa of an unofficial nature which might possibly not be accurate.

MR. OTWAY: Have the Consular Agents at St. Vincent and Maderia any cypher by which they can insure secrecy of their messages?

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: I do not know. It is not in my Department.

RUSSIA AND TURKEY—THE DEFINITIVE TREATY.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION.

MR. BOURKE: I wish, Sir, with the permission of the House, to give a short explanationof the answer I gave three days ago to my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham (Mr. Otway). My hon. Friend asked me—

> "Whether Her Majesty's Government adhere to the statements of Lord Salisbury in his despatch enclosing copy of the Treaty of Berlin—viz., 'That it results from these declarations, that Turkey is not internationally bound, and cannot be compelled to pay any portion of the indemnity until the claims of all the creditors of loans anterior to the war have been paid in full.'"

I thought the most satisfactory answer I could give my hon. Friend was to refer him to the 11th Protocol of the Congress of Berlin, which contained a declaration of Prince Gortchakoff, which was one of those upon which Lord Salisbury's statement was founded. My hon. Friend has, however, communicated with me privately on the subject, and he thinks it would be more satisfactory if I gave a definite answer to the exact words of his Question; therefore, I have no difficulty whatever in stating that Her Majesty's Government adhere to the statements of Lord Salisbury in his despatch inclosing a copy of the Treaty of Berlin, and then follows the copy of the quotation, referred to by my hon. Friend.

PARLIAMENT — BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.—QUESTION.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer a Question of which he had given him private Notice, with reference to the Business of the House on Monday. He wished to know whether the right hon. Gentleman intended to ask the House to proceed to the consideration of all the Resolutions on that day, or only of the first Resolution? If he only intended to proceed with the first, what Business did the Chancellor of the Exchequer propose to go on with afterwards? He asked this Question, because if it was intended to proceed with all the Resolutions it would be likely to occupy the whole or a considerable part of the Sitting; but if only the first Resolution were to be taken up he hoped that, after the very prolonged discussion they had last night, the House might possibly come to a decision upon it in time to enable them to proceed with other Business.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said, he had great difficulty in forecasting what the wishes of the House might be with regard to the Business on Monday. Undoubtedly the Government wished to proceed as early as possible with the Army Estimates; and if it should be the pleasure of the House to come to a speedy conclusion with regard to the first Resolution, so as to enable them to take up the Army Estimates afterwards, he should not ask them to proceed with the other Resolutions, but to let them stand over. He should move to amend the Resolution in accordance with the compromise he had offered last night; and if any agreement was come to within a short time after the meeting of the House he should propose the Army Estimates be proceeded with.

ORDERS OF THE DAY.

SUPPLY—COMMITTEE.

Order for Committee read.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

EDUCATION DEPARTMENT — SCHOOL INSPECTORS.—RESOLUTION.

MR. RATHBONE, in rising to call attention to the appointment of School Inspectors without sufficient preliminary special training for the work they have to perform; and to move—

> "That, in the opinion of this House, arrangements ought to be at once made to provide that in future, before being appointed to an independent post, newly appointed Inspectors should have one year's training under an experienced Inspector, unless they have been previously engaged in the education of children for a sufficient time to make this unnecessary,"

said: I trust I need only detain the House a very short time, for I have really never met anyone who would deny the importance of the change which I propose, or who would dispute the grounds on which I advocate it; and yet the change is not made. I believe it has been delayed solely on grounds of expense. I hope, therefore, before sitting down, to show how very small an expenditure would be necessary for the purpose, and that this small expenditure would be a real economy, as it would make the very large expenditure now going on in our elementary schools much more efficient than it is. I am sure it will be admitted by all who have given even the most superficial attention to the subject that inspecting a school is a skilled, and highly technichal, and complicated process, which it cannot be expected a man would be able to perform properly, except after some training and practice in the work; nor will it be denied by anyone that this work is as important as it is difficult. Upon the Inspector's Report depends the amount of grant to be received by an elementary school; while it is to the Inspectors that we must mainly look to raise steadily the character of our elementary education, by pointing out to managers of schools and schoolmasters in what respect they are inferior to other schools, and how, as shown by the experience of those other schools, these defects can be best remedied. If anyone doubts the amount of skill required to conduct efficiently, and yet fairly, that process of inspection and examination, and to draw up the resulting Report upon which the grant to an elementary school depends, or so to distribute encouragement and blame as to improve the education given in our elementary schools, I would refer him to a small book on School Inspection, written by Mr. Fearon, and published by Macmillan. Mr. Fearon, now in the Charity Commission, was selected by the Education Department as one of the ablest and most experienced Inspectors to make these inquiries, upon the results of which the Elementary Education Acts of 1870 and 1876 were, to a great extent, founded. Anyone reading that book will at once see how wise are the suggestions which Mr. Fearon's experience enables him to make. He will see, also, how technical many of the most important of them are, and that it would take a young Inspector fresh from College some years to find out for himself, at the expense of the *corpus vile* of our elementary schools, what a little preliminary training would show him in a year. But mere written instructions of that sort will not give the training which a young man would very rapidly derive from seeing in practice the work of an experienced Inspector, and from inspecting a school under his eye for a certain period. The House is not fond of extracts, and therefore I will only read one—and that a very short one—from Mr. Fearon's book, to show what an experienced Inspector says "inspection" and "examination" mean.

> "By 'inspection' is meant the process of seeing a school at work in the course of its ordinary routine; noting how it is constructed, warmed, drained, ventilated, furnished, and supplied with apparatus and other materials; how its journals, registers, and other records are kept; what is the course of education, physical and intellectual, which it supplies to its scholars; whether it is conducted on the most approved methods for economising time and labour; what is the order and discipline; what the relations of the scholars to their teachers, and to one another; how the teachers give their lessons; and how in other respects they are qualified to perform their duties. By 'examination' is meant the process of testing, by written and oral questioning of the scholars, whether the results of the instruction given in the school are satisfactory."

It must be evident to the House how much skill is necessary to do such work as this, and how valuable—nay, how necessary—a certain amount of training and technical knowledge is to enable a man to do it; and the question I ask the House to consider is whether that training and that technical knowledge are to be gained at the cost of efficiency in our system of elementary education? It is evident that a young man, however able, fresh from College, who may, perhaps, have had very little to do with children, and nothing to do with elementary education since he was himself a child, will, if he comes to the work of inspection without sufficient previous training, be almost sure to fail in justly dealing with the masters of elementary schools. If he comes to his work with a very high standard, and is very conscientious, he may exact more than is possible; or, in his anxiety not to be unjust, he may be too lax. In either case he will injure the schools under his charge by creating a sense of injustice or a disposition to carelessness. This is no theoretical danger. Elementary schoolmasters do feel that they are subject to great injustice by their labour being judged of by those who have had no sufficient training or experience to enable them to judge justly; and the irritation and discouragement produced by this feeling have a most serious effect upon education. The want of such training has a further bad effect on the system in the great want of uniformity in the decisions of different Inspectors. A just and strict Inspector is exposed to much abuse and difficulty in his work from his decisions being compared with the laxity of neighbouring Inspectors; whereas, if young Inspectors were trained by eight or ten of the best Inspectors in the most important districts of the country, and these Inspectors were to meet periodically and compare notes, there would be a much more even standard of inspection than now exists, and much less discontent. But the work of an Inspector is not merely to ascertain whether those conditions have been fulfilled which are required by the Department for the payment of grants. Our main hope of a steady improvement in our system of elementary education is through the Inspectors. They can compare the teaching and system of one school with that of another, and, by a judicious apportionment of blame and encouragement, can gradually raise the general standard of education to the level of the better schools. They can show the schoolmasters where their teaching is defective; they can convince them by what has been done elsewhere that the defects can be removed, and they can point out how to remove them. This Department of their work is not only very important, but requires highly-skilled and technical knowledge, and training can alone enable them to do it really well. I have said in the Resolution that this training is necessary, unless the new Inspectors have been previously engaged in the education of children for a sufficient time to make it unnecessary, because it seems to me that the Department may find it wise to apportion a certain number of these higher appointments to elementary schoolmasters who have distinguished themselves by their success in improving the system of elementary education. The number of such appointments might be limited, so as still to secure for this work the best materials which our Universities offer. But a certain number of such appointments, if given to first-class schoolmasters, would give great encouragement, and the country would get some very good Inspectors. Even for these men some special training would be very desirable, but less necessary than it would be for a young man fresh from College, with no experience in the art of elementary education. My practical proposal, then, is simply this:—The number of Inspectors appointed annually is, I learn from the Department, about eight. I propose that the Lord President of the Council should select from the numerous candidates on his list for this work eight of those whom he thinks most suitable, and that, without waiting for vacancies to arise, he should place them under eight of the most experienced and able Inspectors in the service of the Department. For one year such commencing Inspectors—if I may so call them—should work with the experienced Inspectors, see how they inspect schools, and inspect them under the experienced Inspectors' eyes. While thus waiting to be appointed to an independent sphere of action, they should receive a salary of say, £250 a-year. A staff of such commencing Inspectors, constantly kept up, would only cost £2,000 a-year additional, and this would give increased efficiency to an expenditure on the part of the Central Government alone of the sum of £114,000 for inspection, and £2,100,000 for the total expenditure chargeable upon the Treasury for elementary education, besides the still further large expenditure derived from voluntary sources. I would ask the House and the Government, is it not a monstrous absurdity that, whereas in England we consider a much longer apprenticeship than the term I have named necessary to make a man a good cobbler, a good joiner, a good merchant, or lawyer, we should expect men to do satisfactorily, without any previous technical training, such highly-skilled and technical work as the inspection of our elementary schools? I, therefore, do urge upon the House to accept the Motion that I have now made, and thus strengthen the hands of the Government to do what I cannot doubt for a moment they are anxious to do.

Mr. BRISTOWE, in seconding the Motion, said, he thought the House was indebted to his hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool for bringing forward that question, which was one of considerable importance to the country at large. Masters and mistresses and managers of schools looked anxiously to the visits of the Inspectors, for upon their report it depended whether the grant would be earned by the school; and, moreover, they naturally looked to the Inspectors for guidance and suggestions in order to make their schools more efficient. Those advantages could only be gained through having Inspectors who had experience in tuition or in examination. If they wished to make their schools efficient, the Education Department must take care that their Inspectors were thoroughly up to their work. It did not at all follow that because an Examiner was well-informed and highly-cultivated himself that he should have the power of testing others in subjects with which he himself was familiar; that was generally to be learnt by experience. By placing young Inspectors for a year under training in the way recommended by his hon. Friend (Mr. Rathbone), they would be better prepared to enter upon their duties. The propositions of his hon. Friend would tend to produce uniformity of examination, which was a matter of great importance, and he believed that it would meet with the approval of the Inspectors themselves.

Amendment proposed,

To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "in the opinion of this House, arrangements ought to be at once made to provide that in future, before being appointed to an independent post, newly appointed School Inspectors should have one year's training under an experienced Inspector, unless they have been previously engaged in the education of children for a sufficient time to make this unnecessary,"—(*Mr. Rathbone,*)

—instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

Mr. MAC IVER agreed in spirit, at all events, with the hon. Member for Liverpool, but thought that the particular scheme proposed involved needless expenditure. He felt compelled to rise on the present occasion on account of having received a communication bearing on the question from a source entirely independent of his hon. Friend — a communication which pointed out the evils which his hon.

Friend wished to remedy. The letter showed that however good an Inspector might be as an examiner, and however fit for the post he might be in other respects, he might be deficient in the common sense which could only be learned by experience—such experience as the hon. Member for Liverpool suggested. His informant, Colonel King, writing about the Oxton Schools, said—

> "The manner of the Inspector was such as to frighten the children, and not give them a fair chance."

Then Colonel King went on to say—

> "I do not wish to injure the Inspector; but I think it would be well if he understood that when examining a school he has something else to do than cut down the grant."

He (Mr. Mac Iver) had no desire to trespass longer on the attention of the House; but he could not conclude without saying that it seemed to him that the proposition of the hon. Member was well worthy of the consideration of the House and the Government.

MR. W. E. FORSTER said, he thought his hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool had made out a strong case. He (Mr. W. E. Forster) hoped the Education Department had become convinced that the time had arrived when they should make use of the older Inspectors in giving some training to those who were about to be appointed in future. Many of the old Inspectors had professional and special training for the work which it was impossible to expect in the eight gentlemen it was proposed annually to appoint. Inspection was no easy matter. It could not be learnt at College, because it required some kind of experimental teaching, as well as storing the brain with the subjects taught in the schools. This apprenticeship, if he might so term it, was required for several reasons. First, the art of inspecting ought to be taught by those who had themselves practised it. It would be a great advantage if a newly-appointed Inspector could work for a few months with a man who had been accustomed to inspect, and have the opportunity of learning the art of inspection without frightening the children; and practise, at the same time, perfect justice and fairness to the masters and the mistresses. Again, teaching, as well as inspecting, was becoming of Government importance. There was now an army of teachers all over the country who exercised good influence in their respective localities. The country expected a great deal from them, and Parliament must not ignore their feelings, or expect that they had none in the matter. All must, he thought, sympathize to some extent with a schoolmaster or schoolmistress who for many years had taught children with great success, and who found them inspected by a young man just from College. He did not think an Inspector ought to be thus brought into contact with experienced masters and mistresses without some previous training in inspection. In too many instances hard-working and struggling masters and mistresses looked forward with alarm and anxiety to the visit of the Inspector. These people felt deeply any kind of injustice from young Inspectors, though the latter might not mean to do any. The manner of inspecting required to be taught as well as the art of teaching. The necessity of a uniform system of inspection was universally recognized. At present money was given for results. Those results depended on examination. One Inspector might make the examination very different from what it would be under another, and thus a different standard for payment by results would be established in different schools. That would be no economy; but might lead to an enormous waste of money. It was, therefore, most desirable that there should be uniformity in their system of inspection. The plan put forward by the hon. Gentleman appeared to be very simple, and had a great deal to recommend it. If eight Inspectors were appointed every year, he saw no reason why they should not submit to a year's training, with small remuneration.

MR. WHEELHOUSE said, there could not be two opinions on the necessity of improving their mode of inspection, which he would endorse by an incident which had come under his knowledge in a district in Yorkshire with which he was acquainted. A newly-appointed Inspector went to the school, and all who were interested in the school went to see him conduct the examination. Taking up a little child about six years old, he said—"Well, my little woman, what do you call a baby cow?" The child innocently answered — "A mutty calf, sir." The Inspector said—

"Mutton, my child! who taught you that? Go down." He (Mr. Wheelhouse) ventured to say, there was not a child of six years old or less in the whole of Yorkshire who would not call a female calf by the local name by which it was known. It would have been infinitely better if that Inspector, who was a Southerner, had had some training before he was sent into the North of England, about which he knew nothing.

Mr. MUNDELLA complained that under the system of close inspection which at present prevailed the most competent persons were not allowed to become Inspectors of schools. The fact was that there was no promotion from the ranks. Why should they spend £2,000 a-year in giving gentlemen a year's training, when at the present moment there were above 100 assistant Inspectors, who were duly qualified for the office of Inspectors, not alone by education and standing, but by long experience as teachers in elementary schools themselves? Several of the Scotch Inspectors had been raised from the rank of schoolmaster. The London School Board had appointed five Inspectors who were formerly schoolmasters, and Sir Charles Reed had informed him that nothing could be better or more satisfactory than the way in which these men did their work. Such foolish questions as the one he had heard of—"What is the nature of the despotism by which India is governed?"—showed that some of the young Inspectors were untrained for their work. The noble Lord had now under him more than 100 Inspectors' assistants, some of whom had been among the ablest schoolmasters in the country, had taken high honours at the Universities, and practically did all the work of the Inspectors, except writing the reports. He intended during the present Session to bring the subject of school inspection before the House.

Mr. A. MILLS agreed that it would be desirable there should be some mode of training the Inspectors; but it ought not to be assumed that the present Inspectors did not do their work in a satisfactory manner. Much had been said about frightening the children; but all of them, when examined at the Universities and elsewhere, thought examination a very alarming thing and the Examiners very alarming persons. As a member of the Board, he entirely agreed with the hon. Gentleman who had last spoken as to the satisfactory manner in which the Inspectors of the London School Board who had been raised from the ranks did their work, and he would wish to see more of that class promoted. The object of the hon. Member for Liverpool (Mr. Rathbone) was to improve the machinery of inspection, and in that sense his proposal was very well worthy of attention.

Mr. RAMSAY said, that everyone acquainted with the working of a school must agree with the hon. Member for Liverpool that experience in the education of children would be an advantage to an Inspector. It would be desirable, before adopting any change in the present system, that the noble Lord should consider whether some months of training, not under an Inspector, but under an eminently qualified teacher, would not be necessary for the proper performance of the duties of Inspectors. Unless something of that kind were done, they would continue to have going forth from the Department Inspectors who, however high their attainments might be in classical and scientific knowledge, were ill-fitted for the work of inspecting common schools, and thereby determining the amount of the grants that ought to be made to them. He hoped the noble Lord (Lord George Hamilton) would consider the suggestion made by the hon. Member for Sheffield (Mr. Mundella), that the profession of Inspector should be open to teachers generally. In that way a stimulus would be given to them to work hard and qualify themselves highly.

Sir JOSEPH BAILEY said, as to promotion to the rank of Inspector there was no bar but one—the early age at which Inspectors were chosen. It was very clear that if an Inspector was to be selected at an early age, it practically prevented elementary teachers of experience from obtaining the post. He would therefore suggest to the Department that, where a teacher of great ability and experience stood for the position of Inspector, he might be allowed to enter upon his work at a later period of his life than 30 years.

Lord GEORGE HAMILTON said, that any proposal emanating from the hon. Member for Liverpool (Mr. Rathbone) with a view to improving the present system of elementary education would be well worthy of the attention of the House and the consideration of the Government, for there was no man in the House who had shown greater zeal in the cause of education, both in his capacity of Member of Parliament and in the town which he represented. Wherever there was a system of education such as that now in force in England, for which Parliament annually voted large sums of money to be paid as results of examination and inspection, it was necessary that that examination and inspection should be conducted with method and uniformity. In the case of examination *vivâ voce* instead of by printed papers, it was all the more necessary that uniformity should be secured. He thought the Motion on the Paper would be likely to mislead the House as to one particular of the existing system, because it stated that "newly-appointed Inspectors should have one year's training under an experienced Inspector" before they were appointed to independent posts. It might be inferred from that language that a young man was taken straight from the University and at once, without any preliminary training or term of probation, set to the task of examining and inspecting schools. That was not the case. At present all newly-appointed Inspectors had to serve a certain term of probation with the senior Inspector of the district to which they were appointed. The minimum period of their probation was a fortnight, and in many cases more. At the end of that period they were not at once appointed to independent posts, but were sent to some district where there was a chief Inspector, of whose advice and experience they would have the benefit. The principle for which the hon. Gentleman contended had, therefore, been acted upon already to a certain extent by the Department. But it was proposed that all the Inspectors should have one year's training, and that the Department should at once appoint eight new Inspectors, each with a salary of £250 a-year. If that proposal were agreed to, the result would be that a sum of £2,000 a-year would have to be added to the present education expenditure, and the House was aware how rapidly that expenditure had increased during the last 10 years, till it now amounted to considerably over £2,000,000. The Estimates for the coming year would, he feared, show a still further considerable increase, which was partly due, no doubt, to the increase in the attendance and in the efficiency of the children. The increase in the attendance had rendered an augmentation of the staff necessary, and the Education Department had been obliged to apply to the Treasury for a number of fresh Inspectors. It was, however, probable that the Treasury, seeing all the claims which it had upon it, would object to any further increase which was not absolutely necessary; nor had the hon. Member for Liverpool, in his opinion, brought forward such a case as would justify the House in accepting the Resolution which he had placed upon the Notice Paper. The hon. Gentleman seemed to think that the work of the Inspectors was imperfectly done at the present time; but a fairer way of putting the matter, he thought, would be that, although the work was very well done, it had not been as well done as it might be, and he was sure that, taking into account the character and ability, generally speaking, of the Inspectors, the hon. Gentleman would not wish to convey to the House the impression that they did not perform their duty. As to an Inspector being unacquainted with the dialect of a particular locality, he believed that the more experienced Inspectors, when they had occasion to go into a district where it was doubtful whether they would be understood by the children, allowed the masters to put the necessary questions, so that they might be intelligible to them. That being so, he did not think the mere fact of an Inspector betraying ignorance of the peculiar phraseology of a district furnished sufficient ground for asking the Treasury to increase the grant for the inspection of schools. It was quite an open question, however, and one which he would undertake to bring under the notice of the Department, whether the period of probation might not be extended. He had no doubt it might be possible to make some regulation for the future which would secure that in those cases in which a newly-appointed Inspector happened to have had no previous experience of elementary education or the examination of children, he should serve a longer period of probation than that which was now required. He was, however, afraid that he could not assent to the Motion of the hon. Gentleman, because its adoption would have the effect of adding to Estimates which were already excessively high, without any absolute necessity for the increased expenditure. He might also remark that there were a certain number of Inspectors who had been teachers. It should not, however, be forgotten that Inspectors were sometimes called upon to investigate very difficult and delicate matters, and it was essential that they should be able to meet on equal terms with managers of schools. They also required tact, self-possession, and patience to enable them to discharge their duties satisfactorily, but he did not think the Lord President would be indisposed to appoint teachers of whose qualifications he was satisfied; but it ought not to be established as a rule that teachers should have a priority of claim. He might, in conclusion, observe that to have a teaching and inspecting department composed of the same individuals would be to form a close corporation which might hereafter be found to work by no means satisfactorily.

Mr. RATHBONE said, that after the explanation of the noble Lord he would not put the House to the trouble of dividing.

Question put, and *agreed to.*

EGYPT—FINANCE.—OBSERVATIONS.

Mr. H. SAMUELSON, in rising to call attention to the paragraphs in the Letter of the Marquess of Salisbury to Lord Lyons of August 7th, 1878 (Turkish Papers, No. 48), stating that Her Majesty's Government required the Government of Egypt to pay in full the May Coupon of the Unified Debt; and also to the conditions under which the Egyptian State Domain Loan of November, 1878, was contracted; and to move—

> "That no sufficient justification has been shown for the enforcement by Her Majesty's Government of the payment of the May Coupon of 1878 of the Unified Debt of Egypt, nor for their interference in regard to the State Domain Loan of 1878;"

said, his object in calling attention to these two questions was to learn what was the justification of the Government for interfering with the financial concerns of Egypt. In reference to the May Coupon of 1878, the Government had, in conjunction with the French Government, brought strong pressure to bear on the Egyptian Government to secure the payment of that Coupon in full. In doing so they were running a considerable risk, and the lamentable event which had recently occurred might be to some extent traced to the interference of Her Majesty's Government. The next transaction to which he referred was revealed by the publication of the prospectus of the loan issued by the Messrs. Rothschild in October last. The security for this loan was the transfer of certain lands from the family of the Khedive to the State, and the hypothecation of these lands for the interest of the bonds; and Her Majesty's Government had undertaken to nominate a manager of those lands, who should not be divested of his functions without their previous consent. The object of this was, no doubt, to give a certain security to the subscribers to the loan; but up to the present moment they did not know what was the nature of the agreement between this country and Egypt. In pressing for the payment of the May Coupon, the Government were guilty of great injustice at once to the people and to the creditors of Egypt. Moreover, Her Majesty's Government either were aware, or ought to have been aware, that at the time they insisted on the payment of this interest, the Revenues of Egypt were insufficient to meet the public charges. As early as the end of March last year, there were in the possession of Her Majesty's Government Estimates of the Revenues of Egypt, and, of course, also Estimates of the Expenditure; and at the time they required the payment of this Coupon, they had no reason to believe that the income for 1878 would be larger than the income for 1877 had proved to be. In point of fact, it now turned out that the Revenue for 1878 was only £8,372,000 in the gross, out of which the Government of Egypt had to pay items of interest, including £4,028,000, interest on the sinking fund of the Unified Debt, and making, in the whole, no less than £6,886,000. Deducting this from the year's income—and next year's income would probably fall below that of 1878—there remained a balance of £1,536,000, and that was all there was to pay the interest on an unknown floating

Debt, provide all the expenses of the administration of Egypt, provide for the Army and the Navy, the public works—excepting railways—education, the Civil List, and every other charge incidental to the government of the country. Now, the sum which was necessary to provide for the expenses of the administration of Egypt was estimated by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Shoreham (Mr. S. Cave) at £3,000,000, and by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the City of London (Mr. Goschen) at £3,500,000. Taking it at the lower sum, it would be seen that, if the full interest was to be paid on the Egyptian Debt, the other Services, including the Army and Navy, must suffer to the extent of 50 per cent. Though it was true that Her Majesty's Government, in the letter to Messrs. Rothschild, guarded themselves against any liability to pay interest on the new loan, yet by the course they had adopted, they took upon themselves, to a certain extent, the custody of the property which had been pledged for its security. Scarcely had they heard of this property being pledged for the payment of this particular loan, than news came that certain creditors had got a Decree from the International Court which enabled them to put an execution on this property. But suppose the Khedive or the Government of Egypt should fail to perform the convention into which they had entered as regarded the custody of these lands, or suppose the whole thing came to a deadlock through a disagreement between the three gentlemen who represented the various interests, were they to go to war on behalf of the private creditors of the Khedive? They had given a *quasi*-security to the creditors, which they might be called upon in a very inconvenient manner to fulfil. The question was, whether both of these transactions were not contrary to the precedent which they had hitherto followed? He did not speak of loans which had been guaranteed in cases of emergency, but the undertaking of a liability, however slight, in regard to loans by private parties with a foreign Government. It was not to the interest of the English people—clergymen, widows, and others—to enter into these foreign loans, and he contended the promoters of the loans should receive no encouragement. It would be much better to invest the money in Three per Cents or good railway debentures. He supposed he should be told that it was desirable England should co-operate with the Government of France. It was at least desirable that the two Governments should be on friendly terms; but whether England should enter into any entangling engagement with regard to Egyptian affairs was quite another thing. That raised a very wide question, but he should not enter into it on the present occasion. However, he would say this—If, instead of remaining on good terms with our neighbours across the Channel, the Government wished to get into trouble, and to create differences, jealousies, and disputes, they could pursue no course more likely to produce that effect than that of tinkering loans on joint account.

MR. SPEAKER intimated that, as an Amendment had already been moved, it was not competent for the hon. Member to move his Resolution.

MR. W. CARTWRIGHT reminded the House of the declarations made on behalf of the Government when the Suez Canal shares were purchased. That step was taken on the undivided responsibility of the Ministry, and there was no previous consultation with other countries. It was laid down that the purchase was made on behalf of what were thought British interests. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, in referring to the question of the purchase of the shares, laid stress on the political consequences of the step. The House was told by the right hon. Gentleman that the action of the Government was taken not because it desired the Canal for purposes of war, but the Government was desirous of seeing that the Canal should not be used as a political engine against England. The Premier said he had recommended the purchase of the shares as a political transaction, and thereby obtain a great hold on that part of Africa. There had been a great change in the attitude of this country; and he believed it could be shown that within the last few months undertakings had been entered into which altogether altered the liberty of action of this country. England was no longer free to form her own engagements. The proof of this was to be found in a Parliamentary Paper containing a Correspondence in which Lord

Salisbury, M. Waddington, and the French Ambassador at Berlin were concerned. From this Paper it was clear that M. Waddington insisted that, in the event of any joint action between his Government and that of Her Majesty in reference to this question, such action should be based upon a perfect equality both of attributes and powers. This was not the case in 1876, when the Suez Canal shares were purchased, nor in 1877, when Lord Derby stated the conclusions which he had arrived at on his own independent judgment. In forming that judgment Lord Derby was not hampered by any engagements such as were subsequently entered into between Lord Salisbury and M. Waddington; and the noble Lord consistently refused to enter upon any course like that which now unfortunately existed, and which had an inevitable tendency to limit the freedom of action of this country with regard to Egypt, by establishing a partnership fixed upon an artificial basis. The practical consequence of this understanding as interpreted by M. Waddington became apparent when Nubar Pasha, in his capacity as President of the Council, selected Mr. Rivers Wilson as his Finance Minister. The moment this was done M. Waddington refused his assent, unless Mr. Wilson had appointed to act with him a French Colleague, possessing equal attributes and armed with equal powers. This point was at length conceded, and the net result of the whole business was that they had drifted into a position replete with complications and opportunities for entanglement, and had, moreover, introduced into Egypt an element of international jealousy and rivalry. They all knew the astuteness with which the Oriental mind could make use of international jealousies to serve their own ends. He did not wish to hurt the feelings of the French politicians; but no one could be sanguine that two years hence France would be administered by the same Government—the wise and temperate administration of M. Waddington—which she now enjoyed. By their recent action in Egypt they had introduced the materials with which a cunning hand might play with dexterity. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had yesterday admitted that the intelligence of the fall of Nubar Pasha was authentic; but up to the present they had no news of the intentions of Mr. Rivers Wilson. No one who had any notion of what was going on in Egypt could have been surprised by the news of the last few days. He was sure Her Majesty's Government must have been prepared for it. He himself, with his limited sources of information, had heard three weeks ago of intrigues which were attributable to a hand in the Palace, and this day there was a telegram from a well-informed source that these intrigues were also traceable to foreign influence. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman would be able to tell the House whether Mr. Rivers Wilson had tendered his resignation, and whether, also, M. de Blignières was not waiting for instructions from his Government as to what he should do; whether, in fact, he was acting only as the political delegate of France, or whether he was acting in concert with Mr. Wilson? He knew that these were delicate questions, but he should like to have as much information as was consistent with the circumstances. He feared that their change of policy had given them the maximum of disadvantage with the minimum of advantage, and had put upon them a great amount of responsibility without giving them in return anything like a material benefit.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: I think, Sir, I ought to rise at once, in order to give the hon. Gentlemen who have spoken the information they have requested of me. I must, in the first place, say that at the present moment it is not possible for me to speak with entire freedom, because events are passing which are of a character which imposes a certain amount of reticence upon me. But I am anxious to speak generally as to the position we hold financially as regards Egypt, and also to express my entire dissent from the theory which has been advanced by the hon. Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. W. Cartwright), that we have, in consequence of the arrangements made within the last 12 months, altered our position towards France with regard to Egyptian affairs. That is altogether an error. We have, from first to last, been desirous of acting in a cordial spirit and with full friendliness with our neighbours. We know that throughout the relations which the two countries have had with Egypt there have been many occasions of difficulty — occasions on which persons who had any interest to serve in stirring up international jealousies have been able to avail themselves of opportunities for so doing, and we have felt it necessary to be on our guard that we might disappoint and defeat intrigues for that purpose from whatever quarter they might come. That has been equally our policy from the time we took Office, as indeed it was the policy of our Predecessors, and it is our policy up to the present day. With respect to the interest which England has in the matter, and with respect to the finances of Egypt, I took notice of an observation made by the hon. Member for Banbury (Mr. Samuelson), when he referred to what he had heard some time ago about persons who had come over to England desiring to induce the Government of England to interfere on account of the creditors of the Peruvian Government. The hon. Member seemed to think that there was some analogy between the desired intervention on the part of England to save the English creditors of Peru and any action which England would think proper to take with respect to Egyptian affairs. That is not so. That illustration marks the entire difference between our policy in Egypt and our policy with regard to other countries. We do not think it would be right; it would be contrary to the spirit of British policy that, for the sake of merely protecting the interests of British subjects who might have lent money to other States, we should interfere to enforce the claims of bondholders throughout the world. But in the case of Egypt very peculiar considerations arise. Hon. Members have adverted to what has passed in this House on former occasions and to observations made by Members of the Government, myself among the number, as to the reason why we have felt it necessary to watch with particular care the position of Egypt. It is not only that Egypt is on the high road between England and India, but it is also because of the relations which Egypt bears to the Ottoman Empire and to France and other countries which have interests there. They are such as to render it a matter of extreme political importance that we should, if possible, avert anything like a catastrophe which would overthrow the Egyptian dynasty and the Egyptian system of government. We have special interests, too, even of a financial character, because, as the House is aware, certain Revenues of Egypt form one of the securities pledged to this country with respect to a debt which we have guaranteed, and Egypt is also herself a debtor to us with respect to the purchase of the Suez Canal shares. There are thus a number of financial considerations that have to be taken into account, and over and above that there are an infinity of complicated political interests which we have to bear in mind. That being the case, the short history of what has occurred has been this:—Since the day when my right hon. Friend the Paymaster General—to whom, I think, we hardly pay sufficient acknowledgments for the very excellent services he rendered in pioneering the way—ascertained the truth with regard to the maze of Egyptian finance, since the return of my right hon. Friend we have had our eyes necessarily and not from choice fixed upon what is going on in Egypt. After that inquiry had been made, the Khedive expressed a wish to appoint an Englishman of ability and position to re-arrange his finances, and Mr. Rivers Wilson was allowed to go out and ascertain for himself by actual inquiry whether that was a position which he could undertake. Mr. Rivers Wilson accordingly made inquiries, which ended in his declining to undertake that office. But in the meantime he became still further acquainted with Egyptian finances, and acquired a position which gave him a considerable reputation in Egypt. Subsequently to that, another step was taken, with which Her Majesty's Government had no official connection. After Mr. Rivers Wilson had returned, the Government had neither directly nor indirectly anything to say to the financial affairs of Egypt. But the bondholders — English and French — who had, of course, a very large interest in the country, deputed two gentlemen of very high position—one being the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the City of London (Mr. Goschen)—to represent their interests and to endeavour to make some arrangement with regard to the property held by them. Those gentlemen received from the English Government, and I have no doubt the French Government also, a certain amount of support, such as is accorded to any Englishman who may be going abroad, in the way of civility; but they conducted their business entirely on their own account. They ultimately came to an arrangement which appeared to be, as they thought, promising and satisfactory to the bondholders, and which was accepted by Egypt. That arrangement was confirmed by a Decree of the Khedive's; but in a short time difficulties arose, which attracted the notice of the Government. They were these. For a considerable time it had been the practice of the subjects of different nations having claims against the Government of Egypt to go to their respective Consuls and induce them to press their claims against the Government. Subsequently, in consequence of the inconvenience that had resulted from the want of proper administration in Egypt, a system of tribunals was established by agreement between the European Powers in concert with the Government of Egypt, and no doubt the European Governments were to a great extent pledged in honour and otherwise to see that these tribunals were upheld. Certain persons then obtained judgment for debts against the Khedive before these tribunals, and when those judgment debts came to be presented, it was, of course, necessary that the Khedive should pay them, or set aside the authority of the tribunals. Well, it appeared that when these judgment debts came to be presented, after the settlement had been made between the Khedive and the bondholders, the funds at the Khedive's disposal either were, or were alleged by him to be, insufficient to meet them. The consequence was that there was great danger of the judgments which had been obtained before the tribunals being set aside, and that the nations of Europe who were more or less responsible for the tribunals would find themselves in a difficulty on seeing the authority of these tribunals thus set at nought. On the other hand, it was alleged that if the Decree which had been made was worth anything, the bondholders were entitled to certain rights under it. Under these circumstances, the representatives of the bondholders, I believe, thought that there ought to be another and more complete inquiry into the financial condition of the country. "Let us be quite sure," said they, "that the difficulty is a real one, and not a mere pretext to evade payment based on the concealment of real sources of wealth." A new inquiry accordingly was set on foot, and the services of Mr. Rivers Wilson were requested, on the part of the bondholders, to assist in it. Meanwhile, it was thought only fair that the scheme which had been devised by the bondholders should be allowed fair play, and that a whole year should be allowed to run in order that they might see what, as regarded Revenue and Expenditure, was the real financial condition of Egypt. There were better means of learning that than had ever existed before, because, under the scheme, independent persons—Englishmen and Frenchmen and others—had been nominated to positions of high authority in the administration of the finances of Egypt, so that it was felt from what they experienced in the working of the system, results could be arrived at which could be depended upon. Of course, however, the claims for postponement and for putting off payments arose from before the full working out of that experiment. Well, it was during that year that the question arose about the payment of the Coupons to which the hon. Gentleman refers—the Coupons of May, 1878—and it appeared that when the time was approaching for the payment of these Coupons the bondholders apprehended default. Accordingly, representations were made to the French Government and other Governments on the subject. In the first instance, a communication was made by the French to the English Government on the subject, and a desire was expressed that the Representatives of the two nations should urge upon the Khedive that he should make an arrangement for paying the Coupons of the Debt, in consequence of which the English Government worked with the French Government on that occasion. But the hon. Gentleman says the Coupons could only have been paid either by setting aside the claims of other creditors, or by exercising an unfair pressure on the people of the country. These representations, no doubt, were urged by various persons, and it is due to those representations that Lord Salisbury made the references in his despatch which have been referred to. But at the same time that Lord Salisbury instructed our Consul to make these representations, he also directed him to impress upon the Khedive that this pressure was put upon him in consequence of the firm belief that he had resources at his command which he would be able so to apply if he chose, instead of expending them in palace building and other matters to his own private advantage; that it was a question of drawing upon his own private funds, and that there was nothing to justify him in putting undue pressure upon his people. The hon. Member for Oxfordshire, commenting on the despatch, said he gathered that from this period a new position was taken up; but the fact that Lord Salisbury refers in that despatch to events which had taken place at an earlier date shows that that is a mistake.

MR. W. CARTWRIGHT: I said that a new political departure had taken place.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: I do not quite understand in what the new political departure consists. There has always been a desire to act cordially with France, and I am not prepared to admit that there was any new political departure in the matter. The desire of the English Government has always been in every possible way to avoid creating any jealousy between the two countries in relation to the affairs of Egypt. We claim, on our own part, that we have a large interest in the maintenance and stability of the country; that we have large interests in her prosperity and good government, and in the avoidance of those complications which may so easily lead a country first into bankruptcy and then into political embarrassment. It is hardly necessary to point out that the financial embarrassments of Turkey aided in bringing about political events of a very serious character; and it is really on political grounds well worth our while to prevent a country like Egypt—a country naturally wealthy, with great resources, and with ample means to bear all the necessary expenditure and to pay the debts she owes without any oppression upon the people—provided only that the system of tax collecting is a good one, and that all which is collected finds its way into the Treasury, and provided that the expenditure of the country is on a reasonable and moderate basis—from falling into the same embarrassments. Well, that brings the history of the case up to the time of the Commission of Inquiry to which I have referred. Now, that Commission of Inquiry undoubtedly was appointed with the goodwill both of the English and of the French Governments. We were anxious, and we directed our Representatives to inform the Khedive that we were anxious, that fair play and a full opportunity for conducting their inquiry should be afforded to the Commissioners, and we represented to the Khedive how essential it was in his own interest that the inquiry should be full and complete; that the position depended greatly on his taking advantage of the services of those who were employed to prosecute the inquiry, and that we felt no doubt that he would act honestly and wisely in the matter. Well, that Commission completed its labours, and the results were of the character which has been alluded to. I cannot state the figures precisely; but, at all events, it carried its inquiry so far as to arrive at certain resolutions of an important character, to the effect that the Revenues of Egypt, properly administered, would be sufficient for its expenses, but that a new system of administration was required. The result was that the Khedive determined, on his own motion and the advice of those on whom he relied, to make the sacrifices which the Commission had pointed out. One of these sacrifices was a very important one to him. His revenues consisted, of course, of all the ordinary taxes of the country. They consisted, also, of the produce of certain lands which were known by the name of Daira, and those had been dealt with under the arrangements made by previous settlements. But over and above what was known as the public Daira, there was an amount of land which was the private property of the Khedive himself and the members of his family; and it was strongly urged on him that his only way to get out of his difficulties was to give up these lands and all his possessions, to alter his whole position, and take a certain revenue that would be allotted to him in the form of a Civil List. The Khedive decided on adopting that course, and he agreed to this arrangement. He also agreed to what was more important—that he should become a Constitutional Sovereign, with a responsible Ministry; and he placed Nubar Pasha, who had filled a very high position before, at the head of the Ministry. From that moment Nubar Pasha was in the position of what may be called the Prime Minister of a Constitutional country. I do not say that the parallel in practice was complete; but the theory was that there should be a responsible Government with a chief Minister at the head of it. Nubar Pasha was appointed to that position, and he formed an Administration by introducing into it certain persons who were to fill different offices. Among these Mr. Rivers Wilson was appointed Minister of Finance. On being offered that office, Mr. Rivers Wilson accepted it with the reservation that he should obtain from Her Majesty's Govornment leave of absence for a certain time, which would enable him to undertake the duty with greater freedom than he could otherwise command. The Government gave him the two years' leave of absence he desired, and he undertook the position of Finance Minister in the Khedive's Cabinet. Undoubtedly it is true that the French Government, finding out what was going on, were anxious that a French Minister also should be attached to this Administration. That was a matter with the decision of which we had nothing whatever to do; but it was the occasion of some correspondence between the two Governments. Ultimately a French Minister was appointed. That Administration has been holding the position for some months of the responsible Government of the Khedive until the events of the last few days, which have led to Nubar Pasha ceasing to hold his office. I may say, in the meantime, that Mr. Rivers Wilson has not resigned, neither has M. de Blignières, the French Minister, thought it necessary to resign. The hon. Member asks what is the meaning of the arrangement which has been made with regard to a loan charged on the Daira lands? That step, it is said, has led to the nomination of one of the trustees for the Daira lands. The history of it is this—When Mr. Rivers Wilson accepted the office of Minister of Finance, he naturally considered what arrangement he could make with regard to the finances of Egypt. Among other arrangements, he desired to raise a loan of £8,500,000. He considered what security he had to offer; he had the security of the Daira lands on which, as part of the resources of Egypt, he was entitled to raise a loan. He applied to Messrs. Rothschild to advance the sum required, and they agreed to advance the money on the security of those lands; but they made this stipulation—that they should have some security that the revenue of those lands would be applied properly to the purpose of defraying the charge. They stipulated that there should be, at least, one Englishman and one Frenchman, designated by their respective Governments, who should be responsible for the proper application of the revenues of the Daira. Accordingly, that request was agreed to by the English and French Governments. A French gentleman was designated by the French Government, and Mr. Rowsell was designated on the part of England, the understanding being—and that understanding was subsequently put into a note from Nubar Pasha—that the persons so designated should not be removed without the consent of their respective Governments. That, I think, is the whole history of our transactions in this matter. I feel that it is one the details of which may well excite the attention of hon. Gentlemen and of this House; but there is nothing in it that we are in the least disposed to conceal, or, as we think, that in the least requires apology, but rather the contrary. We quite admit that transactions of this character are so exceptional that they require full explanation, and our desire has been, and is, to give that explanation. I hope what I have said will meet the wishes and objects of hon. Gentlemen who have addressed the House. I can only say the principles on which we have acted thus far are principles by which we intend still to be guided, and it has been one main object of our proceedings to maintain good and thoroughly confidential relations with the Government of France in this matter. I am persuaded that nothing could be more advantageous for the interests of Egypt herself, and of Europe generally, than that there should be a good and thorough understanding between England and France on this question. It is quite certain that our Representatives must have considerable influence in Egypt. It is all very well to say that they should have nothing to do with the affairs of the country, such as have been the subject of debate; but we know very well that intrigues are always going on, and attempts are made to play off the Representative of one

Power against another. I am glad, however, to say that at the present moment and the present crisis we are in close and confidential communication with the French Government, and our understanding is of an entirely satisfactory character.

SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL entirely agreed with the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, as to the desirability of maintaining the most cordial relations with France in this matter; but he did not think the right hon. Gentleman had fully met the objections that had been urged. The common belief was that the Government had been forced to join France in this financial enterprize, against their own judgment, in order to smooth over and humour the French susceptibilities which they had excited by their Eastern policy. He thought Her Majesty's Government would have done better to have kept their hands from interfering in such a nasty kettle of fish as the foreign debts of the Khedive. The right hon. Gentleman had shown no good reason why they should have forced the Khedive to pay the coupons of his debt in full, and leave the servants of the State unpaid. The decent administration of a country entirely depended upon the zealous and honest work of its officials, and this could not be procured by leaving them unpaid. If their salaries were not paid, they would be left to prey on the country. In fact, the recent crisis in Egypt had been caused by the outbreak of those officials, who had this reasonable pretext for their conduct, though, no doubt, they would hear a different account of the causes of the outbreak in the versions that came through sources connected with foreign creditors. He did not think facilities should have been given for raising a new loan, which would be an additional burden upon the overtaxed people of Egypt. It seemed to him that up to the present time everything had been done for the bondholders, and nothing for the people of Egypt. Things in that country were going from bad to worse. New loans might be used to pay interest and raise the value of the bonds in the market; but they pressed heavily on the taxpayer. It was said that wherever the carcase was, there the vultures would be gathered together, and Egypt was a prey to all the vultures of Europe. Considering that the Native officials had been deprived of their proper salaries, while the bondholders had received their dividends, it was not altogether surprising that the recent crisis had occurred. He hoped Mr. Rivers Wilson would see that the officials were paid as well as the bondholders, and that the result would be a better state of things for the future. The right hon. Member for Shoreham (Mr. S. Cave) made a very good report, but went out on his Mission to Egypt as the Representative of a creditor of that country—namely, the British Government, which had purchased several millions' worth of the Suez Canal shares—not to set matters right in the interest of the people. Next came the Mission of the right hon. Member for London (Mr. Goschen), who went out avowedly as the agent of the bondholders, although his high character and position were a guarantee that in pressing the claims of the bondholders, nothing that was unfair would be done by him. At the same time, events had shown that the right hon. Gentleman had taken too sanguine a view of the finances of Egypt. The right hon. Gentleman had always said that the system he initiated was only an experiment, and that if it should turn out that the Revenues of Egypt could not suffice to pay the creditors in full, and also carry on the government of the country, a new arrangement must be made. Now, it seemed to him that that was exactly what had happened, and that a new arrangement was necessary. Next came a third Mission—that of Mr. Rivers Wilson. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said the Khedive made up his mind to introduce Constitutional government and a responsible Ministry in Egypt; but it was difficult to understand what the right hon. Gentleman meant by those phrases. What was the Constitution of Egypt? He (Sir George Campbell) was not aware that it was founded on anything except the will of the Khedive, nor did he know that the Ministry was responsible to anybody but the Khedive—as, indeed, the events of the last few days had shown. He saw no essential difference between all that and any other Oriental despotism. A great deal had been said about the reforms that were to be effected by the new Ministry. Now, they had often heard of such schemes in connection with Turkey and Egypt; but there was invariably this little *addendum* to all of them—namely, that the Oriental Potentate who was to effect all these great reforms was going to have a new loan. Mr. Rivers Wilson might be a very able man; but as far as he (Sir George Campbell) could see, he had only shown his ability by obtaining a new loan for the Khedive of Egypt, which had been devoted to paying the interest of the bondholders, which he did not think was right. On that account he very much regretted that Her Majesty's Government should have touched the matter, as it were, with the tip of their little finger, and would have much preferred that they should have left it alone altogether. They should have refused to have anything to do with the loan, at least until the administration of Egypt was put upon a proper footing, and the arrears to which he had referred were paid. They might go on paying the interest of one debt by creating another; but it was a proceeding very much of the character of the doings of the Directors of the City of Glasgow Bank, who paid 11 and 12 per cent dividend to their shareholders when they owed a great deal more money than they were ever able to pay. It seemed to him also that, in all the proposals that had been made in respect to Egypt, too much importance was attached to the sending out there of swarms of European officials. He admitted that men were sent out there who were not vultures, but many others had come from all parts of Europe in search of places. Not only were there three or four times as many officials in Egypt as were really required, but every time a new Mission went out to that country a fresh layer of officials was, so to speak, super-imposed upon the old set of officials. Mr. Romaine, a man of great experience, was appointed to occupy a very important position in the Egyptian Administration. He had only one fault—he was a great deal too honest for Egypt. He exposed the true state of the finances in a way that was not agreeable to the foreign bondholders, who wished to raise the value of their stock. He was engaged for a term of years, at a high salary, together with other foreign officials; but he and they were all suddenly told that the Administration had been changed. Officials were multiplied in the most reckless manner, and a new set were appointed. Our Government were responsible for some of these matters. For instance, as to the Daira estates, they were in the charge of a most competent officer, Mr. Money, an ex-official of the Indian Government, who had had the management of the Revenues of Bengal. Now, Bengal was 10 times larger and more populous than Egypt, and Mr. Money consequently went from a charge 10 times greater than that of the whole Revenues of Egypt. But, nevertheless, he had only charge of the Khedive's estate, which represented about one-tenth of Egypt. Under the circumstances alluded to by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, some further Daira estates were surrendered to the creditors; and it might have been supposed that Mr. Money, who had had so great a charge in India, would have had that additional charge imposed on him. But it was thought necessary—he knew not why—to send out another English official. Mr. Rowsell, he understood, was a very able man, and one who would be much missed at the Admiralty here; but he was not aware that that gentleman was particularly qualified to deal with agricultural affairs in Egypt. It was unfair to the unhappy and heavily-taxed people of Egypt that Mr. Money and Mr. Rowsell should both be paid for doing work which one of them could do 10 times over. He had been in Egypt last year after the bad Nile, and he did not think the bad Nile sufficiently accounted for the financial shortcomings. They scarcely realized how heavily the taxation pressed on the people. Head for head it was as heavy as the taxation of the people of England, and that for so poor a country as Egypt was enormous. It should be reduced instead of being increased. Any reform of the administration in Egypt meant a reduction of the Revenue, because the present Revenue was only obtained by harsh measures which it would be impossible for a good European administration to enforce. It would, therefore, be the most prudent thing not to force the people of Egypt to pay this great debt in full, but to make a reasonable compromise.

Mr. GOSCHEN said, he did not know whether, in consequence of Her Majesty's Government having intervened to a certain extent in Egyptian finance, it would in future be necessary that an Egyptian Budget should always be discussed in that House. He did not think that the House of Commons was the proper arena for the discussion of questions of Egyptian finance. His hon. Friend who had just sat down (Sir George Campbell) had addressed himself partly to the action of the Government; but the main portion of his address had been directed to the bondholders' question, and the course which they ought to pursue. He (Mr. Goschen) would not follow his hon. Friend's example. Deeply interested as he had been in the matter, he should not take the opportunity of either defending the original arrangements which were made, or of entering into any future arrangement which ought to be made, as he did not consider questions of that character ought to be discussed there, as the discussion would naturally be interminable. He could not complain of the manner in which his hon. Friend had spoken of his (Mr. Goschen's) Mission to Egypt. His only reason for rising was that it might not be asserted that silence as to any of the observations of his hon. Friend was to be construed into acquiescence in the statements which he had made. He wished to remind his hon. Friend that he had distinctly stipulated, when he undertook his Mission to Egypt, that he should never be expected, in the interests of the bondholders, to propose or to accede to anything which, on political grounds, could not be fully justified. And, further, he had made this stipulation in writing, that he would not urge any steps on the English Government which, although useful to the bondholders, he might deem to be politically inexpedient. He was aware of the fearful suffering that would be produced by the bankruptcy of Egypt, and he was certain that it would not be for the benefit of this country that Egypt should become bankrupt. As he believed at the time that she was on the high road to bankruptcy, he had consented to act on behalf of the bondholders; but thinking, at the same time, that it would be of political service to this country that a country of such large resources as Egypt should be saved from bankruptcy. When his hon. Friend spoke of the Egyptian creditors as if they were paid in full, while others had been sacrificed, he (Mr. Goschen) would like to tell him that he forgot that what they were now receiving was really a compromise, and was less than what they were entitled to under their original agreement. He had been anxious, while protecting the bondholders from beginning to end, that he should not in any way appear to be bolstering up Egyptian credit. He had always said it was impossible to forecast what the Revenue would be until it had been for some time under European administration; and he was not concerned to answer at any greater length the remarks of his hon. Friend.

Main Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," by leave, *withdrawn.*

Committee *deferred* till *Monday* next.

ANCIENT MONUMENTS BILL.—[BILL 52.]

(*Sir John Lubbock, Mr. Beresford Hope, Mr. Osborne Morgan, Sir Richard Wallace.*)

COMMITTEE.

Bill *considered* in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

Notice taken that 40 Members were not present,—Committee counted, and 40 Members not being present,

Mr. Speaker resumed the Chair:—House counted, and 40 Members not being present,

House adjourned at a quarter after Eight o'clock till Monday next.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Monday, 24th February, 1879.

THE PLAGUE IN RUSSIA—SANITARY PRECAUTIONS.—QUESTION.

LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEY asked Her Majesty's Government, Whether they will adopt the same precautions against the plague with regard to shipping coming to this country from Russian ports in the Baltic as have been adopted for shipping from the Black

Sea; and whether they have placed restrictions on the importation of rags or other equally contagious merchandise from Russia?

THE DUKE OF RICHMOND AND GORDON replied, that Her Majesty's Government did intend to take the same precautions in regard to shipping coming from Russian ports in the Baltic as had been adopted for shipping from the Black Sea as soon as it might be necessary to do so; but as at present all navigation in the Baltic was stopped, it was not necessary to issue the Orders with respect to the ports in the Baltic, as had been done in reference to those in the Black Sea. Her Majesty's Government had not placed restrictions on the importation of rags, nor did they think that at the present time there was any necessity for such a measure.

CONTAGIOUS DISEASES (ANIMALS) ACT, 1878—DAIRIES, COWSHED, AND MILKSHOPS ORDER, 1879.

QUESTION.

LORD COTTESLOE asked the Lord President of the Council, Whether it is the intention of the Government to include within the provisions of the Dairies, Cowshed, and Milkshops Order, 1879, cowkeepers and dairymen who use the produce of their dairies in the manufacture of butter and cheese for sale, not being sellers or purveyors of milk? The Order in question was generally felt to be unnecessarily stringent, and that it was also expensive to those who were brought within its scope.

THE DUKE OF RICHMOND AND GORDON said, he was sorry to hear that there were such objections to the recent Order as those spoken of by the noble Lord. The Order had been issued in accordance with the 34th section of the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act of last year. He could, of course, state what were the intentions of the Government in framing that Order; but it would be impossible for him to make an authoritative statement as to the particular cases that might from time to time be brought within the Order. Each case must rest on its merits. He would, however, state very distinctly that the intention was that those who sold butter and cheese and milk should be included within the Order. He did not think that those who sold butter and cheese, but did not sell milk, would come within it, the object being to secure to the public a supply of pure and wholesome milk. The noble Lord appeared to think that the regulation was a stringent and expensive one. He did not see how it could be expensive; for if the noble Lord referred to the 56th section of the Act, he would see that no charge was made by the local authority for anything done under the Act, so that there was no expense whatever to anyone registered under the Order. He did not imagine that the noble Lord would wish that persons who sold milk should be allowed to keep their cowsheds and dairies in an unclean and unwholesome condition. All were aware of the prevalence of typhoid disease in this country, and it was recognized that that disease was much spread by the use of bad milk; and, therefore, he thought the Order must be regarded as one made in the interests of all consumers of milk, both high and low, throughout the country.

ARMY—THE REINFORCEMENTS FOR SOUTH AFRICA.

QUESTION. OBSERVATIONS.

LORD TRURO asked Her Majesty's Government, Whether it is true, as has been stated, that, after the men selected for service had been despatched from their several depôts and head-quarters, an Order was issued by the Horse Guards that men under twelve months' service should be excluded, and, if so, what was the date of that Order; and whether it is true that the 91st and 94th Regiments have received between 300 and 400 volunteers to complete their establishment for active service? The Question had a twofold character. First, it touched upon the Horse Guard administration; and, secondly, upon the system carried out by the War Office. He could not doubt that both those Questions would receive a full and complete contradiction; because, if they did not, they would lead to the most unfortunate inferences that at the Horse Guards there had been no careful consideration of these matters previously, and no Regulation in force as to the age, efficiency, and drill, and thorough instruction in the use of the rifle by the men sent out in such services, or their ability to withstand the effects of such a climate. It would lead to the inference, equally unfortunate, that very young men were being sent out on an extremely hazardous service, and one requiring the utmost caution and care, but for which they had been selected without due care; and to the inference that the reputation of the regiments and of the officers commanding them, and the honour of the Army, were not sufficiently considered. Those inferences no one would be disposed to draw; and, therefore, he could not help thinking the first Question would meet with an unqualified negative. In reference to the next Question—Whether the 91st and 94th Regiments have received between 300 and 400 volunteers to complete their establishment for active service?—he would only say that we seemed to have adopted the system of universal incompleteness in order to adopt another system of indefinite expansion of establishment. It appeared that in the case of one of the regiments he had mentioned volunteers were received from no fewer than eight other regiments; so that they must have appeared on parade in motley. This fact implied that instead of having regiments we had nothing more than half-battalions—a state of things which was very undesirable. The system of expansion was admirable to a certain extent; but it would be well to consider whether five or six or seven regiments standing first on the list for foreign service should not be of full strength and completely equipped, so as to be capable of being transported to any part of the world where they were needed. This did not appear to have been the condition of any one of those regiments when this emergency arose. If there was any advantage in having an inspection of troops before they leave the country for foreign service, it ought to secure that the regiments should leave properly dressed and provided in other respects, and certainly not in the condition they had been led to believe those troops were in.

VISCOUNT BURY: The noble Lord has put two Questions to Her Majesty's Government which I will answer *seriatim*. The noble Lord described, with regard to the first, three inferences, highly unfavourable both to the Horse Guards and the War Office, which he should draw if his Question were not answered in the negative. I am glad to be able to relieve the mind of the noble Lord by telling him that no Orders such as he imagined, and upon which he has founded those inferences, have been issued by the Horse Guards. Therefore, I need not try to refute the inferences which he says he would have drawn had my answer been otherwise.

LORD TRURO said, his Question was founded on what had appeared in *The Times* newspaper.

VISCOUNT BURY: The noble Lord says he would have drawn certain inferences from a statement he found in a newspaper if I did not contradict the statement; but I entirely contradict the statement. With regard to the second Question of the noble Lord, it appears to have been framed with the view of finding fault with the scheme of the localization of the Army. But that scheme, having been fully discussed and agreed to by both Houses of Parliament, it is hardly to be expected that I should defend it or try to say anything in its favour. I will answer the Question of the noble Lord by saying that it is quite true that the 91st Regiment did receive 374 volunteers to make up their battalion, and that the 94th did receive 346 men to make up their number. By the localization scheme of the Army, the noble Lord must be aware that these regiments are linked with battalions serving abroad, that one-half of each regiment is at home, and the other half abroad, and that the regiment at home must keep up the regiment abroad. The 91st is linked with the 72nd, serving in India, which they had to keep up, so that, according to the scheme, when the 91st was ordered abroad they had to receive volunteers. The 94th is linked with the 89th, also serving abroad, and had to receive 346 men in order to raise its strength, and that in accordance with the provisions of the localization scheme, which, as I have already said, I am not now called upon to defend.

House adjourned at a quarter before
Six o'clock, till To-morrow, half
past Ten o'clock.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Monday, 24th February, 1879.

MINUTES.]—Public Bills—*Second Reading*—Assizes [83].
Committee—Habitual Drunkards [47]—R.P.

QUESTIONS.

CUSTOMS RE-ORGANIZATION.

QUESTION.

Mr. RITCHIE asked the Secretary to the Treasury, When the scheme for the re-organisation of the Customs Department, which has for some time been under consideration, will come into operation?

Sir HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON, in reply, said, he was sorry he was not in a position to state when the promised scheme would come into force. The matter was still under consideration, and he expected that the basis of the new scheme would be submitted to the Treasury in the course of the next two or three days. No time would be lost, when that scheme had been received, in coming to a conclusion upon it; and he (Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson) hoped before very long to be able to give a more satisfactory answer to the hon. Member's Question.

SALE OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS (IRELAND)—RATE OF DUTY.

QUESTION.

Mr. O'SULLIVAN asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether he will revise the scale of taxation for the sale of intoxicating liquors in Ireland, having regard to the reduction of the hours of sale by the legitimate trader, owing to the passing of the Early Closing and the Sunday Closing Bills?

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: Sir, at present the law provides for a reduction duty in the case of six-days' licences of six-sevenths of the full duty, and for a lower rate of five-sevenths in the case of others. In these circumstances, there did not appear to be any grounds for a further reduction.

PUBLIC HEALTH ACT—DIPHTHERIA IN NORTH LONDON.—QUESTION.

Sir CHARLES W. DILKE asked the President of the Local Government Board, If he will lay upon the Table of the House the Report made by Mr. W. H. Power on the cause of the late outbreak of diphtheria in North London?

Mr. SCLATER-BOOTH, in reply, said, he had no objection to lay upon the Table the Report referred to if the hon. Baronet would move for it.

INDIAN RAILWAYS — SHIPMENT OF RAILWAY MATERIAL.—QUESTION.

Mr. RYLANDS (for Mr. E. Jenkins) asked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether any supervision is exercised by the Indian Council over the shipment of Railway material and stores from Great Britain for the use of the Guarantee Railways in India generally or the East Indian Railway in particular; whether it is a fact that the general body of shipowners are virtually excluded from competing for the conveyance of such material and stores from the circumstance that all such shipments pass through the hands of particular brokers, who make it a condition that the ships taken shall be consigned to certain houses in the East, thus securing private profits; whether the results of this exclusion of competition is not to enhance very greatly the expense of the conveyance of such stores, and whether it is in the power of the Indian Council to secure that the contracts for such conveyance shall be unconditionally placed in the open market; and, whether he will cause to be prepared and laid upon the Table a Return of the freights paid during the past five years by the India Office for stores shipped on Government account, and rates paid by the various Indian Railways upon such stores respectively—distinguishing Railway materials from other stores?

Mr. E. STANHOPE: Sir, supervision is exercised by the India Office through the Government Director of Indian Railways over the shipments of stores for the guaranteed railways, including the East Indian. I understand that the East Indian Railway employ a broker to engage tonnage for the conveyance of their stores, and I have also heard that it is the practice of the Company to consign their stores to particular firms in Calcutta; but I have no certain knowledge about it. But I am told by the Chairman, Mr. Crawford, that the suggestion that private profits are secured to individual members of the Board or their firms is quite erroneous. The result of this so-called "exclusion of competition" does not appear to have enhanced the expense of the conveyance. The rates paid by the East Indian Railway Company for the period of five or six years which I have examined do not compare unfavourably with those paid by others shipping at the same port. The India Office has, no doubt, the power to secure that such contracts shall be placed unconditionally in the open market; but it is doubtful if it would lead to economy. The expediency of employing or not employing a broker is a moot point, upon which the best authorities differ. It is thought undesirable to lay down any hard-and-fast rule in the matter, but to leave it to the discretion of the companies to obtain the best terms they can. There is no objection to laying on the Table a Return of the freights paid during the past five years by the India Office for stores shipped on Government account, and rates paid by the various Indian railways upon such stores respectively.

PUBLIC HEALTH ACT—SMALL-POX IN THE METROPOLIS.—QUESTION.

DR. CAMERON (for Dr. LUSH) asked the President of the Local Government Board, If the inquiry instituted by him last year into the causes of the great prevalence of small pox in the metropolis has led to any definite results; and, if he will explain to the House what increased sanitary safeguards he proposes to recommend for adoption, either by legislation or otherwise?

MR. SCLATER-BOOTH, in reply, said, the Report had not yet come into his hands; but he had no doubt it would contain information that might lead to a useful amendment of the law. At present he had no intention of proposing legislation; but arrangements were now being made for a more careful carrying out of the Act dealing with vaccination.

INDIA—THE MAHARAJAH OF CASHMERE.—QUESTION.

MR. GRANT DUFF asked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether his attention has been called to an article in "The Times" newspaper of December 27, 1878, in which it is asserted that the Maharajah of Cashmere has been instructed to carry out operations in the direction of Chitral and the Hindoo Koosh; whether he is able to assure the House that the Maharajah of Cashmere has not been instructed to carry out operations in that direction, and that he has not in fact been either carrying on nor is about to carry on operations in that direction; and, whether he is able to inform the House that the Maharajah is not carrying on nor is about to carry on operations beyond his own borders, and that the rumour of his having been instructed to co-operate in the "rectification of the frontier" is without foundation?

MR. E. STANHOPE: Sir, I have read the article in *The Times* of the 27th of December, 1878, as to military operations in this quarter. I am able to assure the House that the Maharajah of Cashmere has not been instructed to carry out military operations in the direction of Chitral and of the Hindoo Koosh, or beyond his own frontier; and that he has not been instructed to co-operate in the "rectification of the frontier;" and so far as we know, he is not carrying out, nor about to carry out, any such operations. The hon. Member will, however, of course understand that that my answer applies to existing circumstances and not to contingencies at present unforeseen.

POOR LAW (IRELAND)—BELFAST UNION WORKHOUSE.

QUESTION.

MR. BIGGAR asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland, If he will lay upon the Table of the House a Return of all Correspondence that has taken place, or Orders made, or Resolutions or Minutes received by the Local Government Board (Ireland), relative to the payment of £25 a-year by the Government through the Guardians of the Belfast Union to the assistant teacher (Mr. Bellard) for the instruction of the boys at the union workhouse in instrumental music, which salary has been paid by the Government since 1872, and is now withheld by reason of the Local Government Board declining to give the required certificate to the Government approving said payment; and, if he will state why said certificate has been refused?

Mr. J. LOWTHER: Sir, the reason why the certificate to which the hon. Member refers was refused was that it did not appear to the Government that the cost of music-masters was a legitimate item of workhouse expenditure. I will look into the Correspondence and see if there is any which can, with advantage, be laid upon the Table of the House.

REGISTER HOUSE BUILDINGS, EDINBURGH.—QUESTION.

Mr. M'LAREN asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether, as the result of his recent personal examination of the different departments within the Register House buildings in Edinburgh, he intended to introduce a Bill to remedy the existing defects, and to confer on the Treasury the same power of appointing all the clerks as they have in other Government establishments; and, whether the Bill will provide for the appointment of an Under Secretary of State for Scotland, as was done by the Bill which he introduced last Session?

Mr. ASSHETON CROSS, in reply, said, the Question belonged more to the Treasury than the Home Department; but having been over the buildings and seen their working he had made certain recommendations to the Treasury with respect to them. As soon as the two Departments had come to a conclusion on the matter, the proper time would have arrived to state the nature of the Bill it was proposed to introduce. He could assure the hon. Member that the matter was not being lost sight of.

PRISONS ACT (RULES)—SALFORD GAOL.
QUESTION.

Mr. HOPWOOD asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether it is true, as stated in substance in the "Manchester Guardian" of a recent date, reporting the Salford Hundred Quarter Sessions and the discussions of the Bench of Justices, that the Chief Commissioner of Prisons, Sir Edmund Du Cane, presented himself some time since at the Salford Gaol, unannounced and unknown, to the warder, and, being admitted through the outer door, ordered the warder to open the inner iron gate; whether the warder, pursuant to the rules of the Justices, declined to open the gate to a stranger, and requested to know his name and business; whether the account is true, which states that the Chief Commissioner of Prisons shook the iron gate in anger, and tried to take the keys from the warder's hands, and, not succeeding, then stated who he was, and was admitted; whether the warder for this was, by Sir Edward Du Cane's order, immediately put on six months' probation as a punishment; whether that order has ever been formally revoked, and when and whether care will be taken that the warder be not prejudiced; and, whether there will be any objection to lay the Correspondence and Papers relating to this matter upon the Table?

Mr. ASSHETON CROSS: Sir, the first paragraph of the hon. and learned Member's Question is substantially true, with the exception of the word "unannounced." As to the second and third paragraphs, the rule of that gaol consists of two parts—first, persons desirous of seeing the Governor should be politely asked what is the nature of their business and detained pending the receipt of orders; secondly, a Visiting Justice or a Justice of the Peace having jurisdiction in the prison is to be admitted at once; if a stranger, the gatekeeper will inquire his name. The Commissioner says, "He told the gatekeeper who he was and his office at once." The gatekeeper says, "He ordered me twice to open the gate before he told me that. I said I could not allow any stranger to enter the prison without sending his name and the nature of his business to the Governor. He said, 'I am the Commissioner; open that gate,' &c. He shook the iron gate and tried to take the keys out of my hand. I sent up to the Governor and Sir Edmund was admitted." It is only fair to state that the Commissioner says he never touched him. I am asked whether the gatekeeper acted pursuant to rule. If the case fell within the first part, he certainly did, and he ought to have been rewarded rather than punished. The Commissioner, however, being a Visiting Justice, came under the second part of the rule. Therefore, I cannot say that the officer acted "in pursuance of the rule;" but it was only a mistake through over zeal and not one, in my opinion, deserving of punishment. However, though not degraded in rank, he was afterwards put on probation for six months. This was cancelled in December by a Minute of the chairman on the report of the inspector, and the inspector made the announcement to the gatekeeper in the presence of the Governor and principal and senior warders. I can only repeat now what I informed the Visiting Committee, that I very much regretted the incident; that I had fully expressed my regrets to the Commissioner; that I had insured that no injury should happen to the prospects of the gatekeeper in any way; and that I had received from the Commissioner the expression of deep regret at having been so betrayed into impatience on being, as he thought, improperly refused admittance, contrary to the rule and the usual practice. Sir Edmund is a public officer of long standing and experience, and his hard work, his ability and efficiency have constantly received high praise. I can only add on his behalf that no one regrets this incident more than the Commissioner himself. In these circumstances, I cannot see that any good would come from laying any Papers on the Table.

PERSIA—EMPLOYMENT OF RUSSIAN OFFICERS.—QUESTION.

MR. ONSLOW asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether Her Majesty's Government has received any information from Her Majesty's Consul at Teheran, or from any other source regarding the reported organization by Russian officers of the Persian Army?

MR. BOURKE: Sir, it has been reported in the newspapers that the Persian Government had determined to employ some Russian officers for the purpose mentioned by my hon. Friend; but Her Majesty's Government have not received information to that effect.

TREATY OF PRAGUE—ARTICLE 5.

QUESTION.

MR. J. COWEN asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, If the Government has received official notification from the Governments of Austria and Germany, or either of them, of the abrogation, in the month of October last, of the 5th Article of the Treaty of Prague of August 23rd, 1866, and any communication on the subject from Her Majesty's representatives at the Courts of Vienna and Berlin; and, if so, whether the Government will lay Copies of the Papers, together with any replies on the part of the Government, upon the Table of the House?

MR. BOURKE: Sir, the abrogation of the 5th Article of the Treaty of Prague has not been notified officially to Her Majesty's Government either by the Government of Austria or Germany. Information of the fact of the abrogation has been received from Her Majesty's Representatives at Vienna and Berlin, but it is not intended to answer those communications, and, therefore, no Papers will be laid on the Table.

SOUTH AFRICA—ZULULAND—THE AWARD.—QUESTIONS.

MR. DILLWYN (for Mr. CHAMBERLAIN) asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether the Despatch from Sir Henry Bulwer, dated 12th June, No. 96, and mentioned on page 25 of the Papers respecting the Affairs of South Africa, presented to Parliament in February 1879, has been included in the correspondence hitherto published; and, if not, whether there is any objection to now laying it upon the Table?

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: Sir, the despatch of Sir Henry Bulwer dated the 12th of June was not included in the Correspondence published last summer because, like Sir Theophilus Shepstone's account of his interview with Cetewayo, referred to the other day by the hon. Member for Gateshead (Mr. James), it was not only marked "confidential," but dealt mainly with the question of the boundary dispute, and I did not consider it desirable to publish any Papers discussing that subject until after the High Commissioner had pronounced his award. It will now be published, together with two previous despatches written in April and May last dealing with the same question.

MR. DILLWYN (for Mr. CHAMBERLAIN) asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies, with reference to a statement in Despatch No. 92^{a}, dated October 17th, 1878, in which it is stated—

> "All the information that has hitherto reached them (the Government) with respect to the position of affairs in Zululand appears to them to justify a confident hope that by the exercise of prudence and by meeting the Zulus in a spirit of forbearance and reasonable compromise it will be possible to avert the very serious evil of a war with Cetewayo;"

And, whether the information above referred to has been published in the papers laid before Parliament; and, if not, whether there would be any objection to produce it?

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: Sir, the word "information" quoted by the hon. Member included all those general means of forming a conclusion, in addition to official communications, which were at the command of the Government; but so far as it referred to communications from persons holding official positions they have been published in the Papers laid before Parliament.

THE MERCANTILE MARINE—LEGISLATION.—QUESTION.

MR. EVELYN ASHLEY asked the President of the Board of Trade, Whether the Government have abandoned their intention of proposing legislation on the subject of the discipline and condition of Merchant Seamen, similar to that embodied in the Bill which last year was referred to and considered by a Select Committee?

VISCOUNT SANDON: Sir, my hon. and learned Friend has, I think, overlooked the fact that it was mentioned by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the first day of this Session that the Government had arranged to bring in a Bill respecting merchant seamen if the state of Public Business permitted. I may add that I have given my best consideration during the winter to the Report of the Select Committee of last year as well as to the subject generally, and we have prepared a Bill which, though I am happy to say it is a short one, deals with matters of considerable importance to our Mercantile Marine, and will, I have reason to hope, prove acceptable generally to both shipowners and sailors.

NAVY—EXPLOSION ON BOARD H.M.S. "THUNDERER."—QUESTION.

LORD HENRY LENNOX asked the First Lord of the Admiralty, Whether he could give the House any information as to the decision of the Committee who inquired into the explosion on board the "Thunderer"?

MR. W. H. SMITH: Sir, the Report of the Committee and full Minutes of the proceedings of the Committee appointed to inquire into the explosion on board the *Thunderer* arrived at the Admiralty this morning. The documents are exceedingly voluminous, containing several hundred manuscript pages. I have not yet had time to read them through, but I have ordered them to be printed immediately. I trust in a few days to be able to lay the whole, or a great portion, of them upon the Table. The Committee report the cause of the accident to be as follows:—

> "The Committee have now to report the cause which they are unanimously convinced burst the gun was that the gun, having missed fire at the time of the electrical broadside, and this misfire not having been noticed, the gun was presented to receive the full charge and empty common shell for the independent firing, and did receive this charge and shell while the battering charge and the Palliser shell were still in the gun."

I am not yet able to inform the House as to the nature of the evidence which was sufficient to convince the Committee that this was the cause of the accident; but I may state that their conviction was arrived at in the most satisfactory manner, each member of the Committee separately writing down his opinion and handing it to the secretary without communicating its nature to the others. Singular enough, their opinion was unanimous. Experiments have been made with the view of preventing a recurrence of the accident; but the Committee have recommended that further experiments should be made. The whole matter will receive the very careful consideration of the Admiralty. As to breech and muzzle-loading guns, the Secretary of State for War stated a few days ago that the War Department were considering the question of breech-loading ordnance, and the Admiralty are in communication with the War Department to see whether it will be desirable to extend the system to guns on board iron-clads now building.

PRISONS ACT (RULES)—FEMALE PRISONERS.—QUESTION.

MR. HOPWOOD asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether he is aware that the orders for putting women to the treadwheel, crank, &c., said to have been sent to Kirkdale Gaol only, were also, to the number of 350 copies, sent to Salford Hundred Gaol, and in a few days recalled because "the standing order of the 9th September, respecting the furnishing of mattresses and pillows to plank beds modifies the rules for female prisoners," and after nearly a month's delay revised orders were substituted, omitting the provisions as to treadwheel and crank for female prisoners; whether the original draft was submitted to the Commissioners, and any copies sent to any other gaols; and, if he has any objection to lay upon the Table the Correspondence between the Visiting Justices of Lancashire, himself, and the Prison Commissioners on this and other matters relating to the prisons of the county since the coming into force of the Prisons Act?

MR. ASSHETON CROSS: Sir, the story detailed in the Question of the hon. and learned Member carries its own refutation on the face of it. As I stated the other day, the documents referred to were not fresh rules or orders issued for the guidance of the prison officers. They were merely abstracts of existing rules intended to be posted in the cells for the information of prisoners, in the same manner as abstracts of the Factory Acts are posted up in factories. The abstract of the rules applicable to males was submitted to the Commissioners and printed, and they directed that similar abstracts of the rules relating to females should also be printed and submitted to them. The latter were printed at the same place as the former; but by some mistake the abstracts relating to females were issued without having been sent to the Commissioners for revision. The latter abstracts were issued on Thursday and reached the prisons on Friday; and the mistake being discovered, they were recalled on the following Monday. Having been properly revised, they were finally issued in correct form on the 6th of December. If the hon. and learned Member for Stockport will call at the Home Office, the whole of the Correspondence on the subject will be at his service; but we do not think it necessary to print it and to lay it upon the Table of the House.

PRISONS (IRELAND) ACT—MEDICAL OFFICERS.—QUESTION.

MR. ERRINGTON asked the Secretary to the Treasury, Whether the General Prisons Board (Ireland) has submitted to the Treasury any proposals for increasing, under the provisions of the Prisons Act, the pay of the surgeons of county infirmaries in proportion to the considerably increased duties thrown on them by that Act; and, whether, as these surgeons have, in spite of the repeated applications to the General Prisons Board within the last twelve months, been performing these increased duties without extra pay, he can hold out a hope that the sanction of the Treasury will be given without further delay to a reasonable increase in their salaries?

SIR HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON: Sir, in answer to the hon. Member for Longford, I can say that it is only within the last two or three days that the Irish Government have submitted to the Treasury proposals for the remuneration of medical officers in Irish prisons. I have not yet had an opportunity of examining them properly, and therefore I cannot give information as to what effect they may have on the pay of surgeons of county infirmaries in Ireland. I assure the hon. Gentleman I shall lose no time in looking at these proposals and coming to a conclusion, and I hope before long to settle the question.

THE NEW FOREST—STONY CROSS INCLOSURE.—QUESTION.

MR. FAWCETT asked the Secretary to the Treasury, Whether, as his predecessor stated on the 7th August 1876, that the Law Officers of the Crown were considering the legality of an inclosure made a short time previously near Stony Cross, in the manor of Minestead, in the New Forest, he can now inform the House what conclusion has been arrived at as to the legality of the said inclosure; and whether, if it is illegal, the Government intend to take any action in the matter?

SIR HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON, in reply, said, that the opinion given by the Law Officers had been to the effect that they could not say that any rights of the Crown which it would be possible to enforce had been infringed by the inclosures made by the lord of the manor of Minestead. In these circumstances, it was impossible for the Government to take any action in the matter.

Mr. FAWCETT asked whether there would be any objection to lay the opinion on the Table?

Sir HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON: No.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS—REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION.—QUESTION.

Mr. HANBURY-TRACY asked the Paymaster General, When the Report of the Royal Commission, appointed to inquire into the privileges and revenues of certain Municipal Corporations, will be laid upon the Table of the House?

Mr. STEPHEN CAVE: Sir, I am not surprised at this Question. The inquiry has been prolonged far beyond what I expected when I undertook it. There were 101 Corporations on the original list, to which 10 others were afterwards added. We have examined a large number of witnesses from most of these places, though nothing like all who were anxious to come; and we have had to wade through a mass of Correspondence, former Reports, old charters, and other documents. A Royal Commission is not like a Parliamentary Committee, which can sit on stated days throughout the Session. The Members of this Commission, over which I have the honour to preside, are men fully engaged elsewhere. One is a member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. There are three Queen's Counsel; there are, also, Chairmen of Quarter Sessions in distant counties. I myself was Chairman of four Committees of this House last Session, and, of course, my time was much taken up. Nevertheless, we have held 118 sittings, of which 46 were during the Recess. We have completed 65 boroughs, and have received evidence with respect to all the rest; and I hope we may report before Whitsuntide. The hon. Gentleman may rely upon our losing no time, for I can assure him that we have had quite enough of the subject.

CORONERS BILL—THE SELECT COMMITTEE.—QUESTION.

Mr. PELL asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether he will move to enlarge the reference to the Select Committee to which the Coroners Bill was committed, in order to enable that Committee to take evidence and report on the whole question of the appointment, duties, and payment of Coroners?

Mr. ASSHETON CROSS, in reply, said, that the way in which the Bill was drawn would give ample opportunity to the Committee to which it had been intrusted to report on all the subjects alluded to in his hon. Friend's Question. He had ordered a statement to be prepared for the use of the Committee, which he hoped would give them valuable information. He would venture to suggest that the Committee should, in the first place, go through the Bill without taking evidence; and if they should afterwards think it advisable to take evidence, he would have no objection to the Reference being enlarged to enable them to do so.

FACTORY LEGISLATION (INDIA).
QUESTION.

Mr. ANDERSON asked the Under Secretary of State for India, If the Indian Government has yet decided to introduce Factory legislation into India; and, if he is yet prepared to lay upon the Table the Report that was obtained as to the condition of the Factories in India?

Mr. E. STANHOPE: Sir, I am sorry to say that we do not yet know the decision to which the Government of India has come upon this subject; but a Bill is certainly under their consideration. The only Report we have at present is one of July, 1875. It would, therefore, be probably better to await more recent information before laying any Papers on the Table.

THE SLAVE TRADE IN THE RED SEA.
QUESTION.

Mr. ANDERSON asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, If there have been any recent negotiations with Turkey on the subject of Slavery in the Red Sea, and what is the present footing of that question?

Mr. BOURKE: Sir, a despatch, dated the 3rd of February, has been received from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, reporting that the draft of the Anti-Slave Trade Treaty which was submitted to the Porte last summer has passed the Council of Ministers, and that Caratheodori Pasha has been instructed at once to enter into negotiations with the British Representative for its conclusion.

FINANCE—EXCHEQUER BONDS.

QUESTION.

MR. WHITWELL asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether the Exchequer Bonds for £2,750,000, which become payable on 16th, 23rd, and 27th of March next, and which are enumerated in a Paper recently laid upon the Table of the House, comprise the whole of last year's deficiency to be provided for before the 31st March next; and, whether he intends paying the bonds off out of the surplus income of the present year or renewing them ; and, if the latter, for how long ?

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER : Sir, I believe there will be no further deficiency disclosed by the Appropriation Accounts to be provided for this year. But with regard to the more important part of the hon. Gentleman's Question, I would, with his permission, request him to wait two or three days, when I shall have to make a proposal to the House with regard to the necessary provision for meeting the bonds which are in question.

MR. CHILDERS asked whether, before the right hon. Gentleman made his proposal, a Statement of the Supplementary Expenditure for the present year would have been laid on the Table ?

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, in reply, said, he hoped he would be able to lay on the Table in a few days a Statement with regard to some of the Supplementary Expenditure; but he was not sure that he could give a complete Statement.

THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS—THE PERAK EXPEDITION—MEDALS.

QUESTION.

COLONEL NORTH asked the Secretary of State for War, Whether any application has been made to confer a medal on the officers and men who composed the expedition to Perak ?

COLONEL STANLEY, in reply, said that, so far as he could trace the matter, some application of that kind was made two or three years ago ; but the service performed at Perak was not thought to be of so important a nature as to render it the subject of a special medal. At the same time there was some hard fighting ; and he was, therefore, prepared to place himself in communication with the Colonial and the India Offices with the view of seeing whether the medal for frontier service could not be so extended as to include a special clasp for Perak.

DIVINITY SCHOOL—THE UNIVERSITY, DUBLIN.—QUESTION.

MR. PLUNKET asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Whether he will now state what course the Government intend to pursue in regard to the recommendations of the Royal Commission of last year relating to a Divinity School in the University of Dublin ?

MR. J. LOWTHER, in reply, said, the matter to which his hon. and learned Friend referred was one involving the greatest consideration, and still engaging the attention of the Government. He hoped shortly to announce the decision at which they had arrived.

ORDERS OF THE DAY.

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PARLIAMENT—BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.

RESOLUTION. [ADJOURNED DEBATE.]

Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Amendment proposed to the First Resolution, as amended [20th February],

> "That, whenever the Committee of Supply appointed for the consideration of the ordinary Army, Navy, and Civil Service Estimates stands as the first Order of the Day on a Monday, Mr. Speaker shall leave the Chair without putting any question."

And which Amendment was,

> After the word "Monday," to insert the words "provided there be not on the Paper any Amendment relevant to the class of Estimates about to be discussed."—(*Mr. Anderson.*)

Question again proposed, "That those words be there inserted."

Debate *resumed.*

MR. O'CONNOR POWER : Hon. Members who have discussed these

Resolutions at some length have incurred an amount of censure which it seems to me is entirely undeserved. The House of Commons would be unworthy of its name, and it would be false to its character as the Representative Assembly of the people, if it did not offer a determined resistance to these despotic and reactionary Resolutions. The more these Resolutions are considered, the more objectionable they appear to independent Members on both sides of the House. We were told at first that the Resolutions had nothing to do with obstruction; but the hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate), who loves to persecute opinion, religious or political, when it differs from his own, declared the real motive of these restrictive proposals. By the first Resolution the Chancellor of the Exchequer would push us at once into Committee when Supply is down; and when he gets us into Committee, without any previous discussion, he will then still further restrict our freedom of debate; and yet we are told, in the blandest possible manner, that all this will facilitate the discussion of the Estimates. If you want to facilitate the discussion of the Estimates, why do you propose, in the second Resolution, to gag Members in Committee, to limit their freedom of speech, and restrict their right of taking divisions? While many plausible excuses are put forward for these proposed alterations in the Rules, the principal argument urged in their favour is that they will facilitate the despatch of Public Business. Now, this is the one important point which the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and those who have spoken on his side of the question, have, I venture to say, entirely failed to prove. The hon. Member for North Warwickshire says the time has come when something must be done to maintain the dignity of Parliament. I quite agree with him; but when he suggests that the House of Commons shall put on a straight jacket and wear a strong chain, held in the hands of the Executive, in order to look dignified and respectable, I fail to appreciate the force of his reasoning. If the House were capable of that, it would be capable of sacrificing at once both its character and dignity; and no one ought to be surprised, therefore, at the opposition which the House has given to these very obnoxious Resolutions. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Sandwich (Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen) has distinguished himself among the champions of Parliamentary coercion on this side of the House; and he asked us the other night to consider what was the complaint of the country against the House, and he told us that it was that the House was unequal to its work, and unable to get through the legislation urgently demanded. The country has certainly a right to complain of the deadlock in legislation; but I venture to contend that the remedy which has found favour with the right hon. Gentleman will aggravate the disease instead of removing it. If you stifle the expression of popular wants in the House of Commons, where shall they find utterance? You may say these Resolutions do not go so far as that. But, remember, they lead the way in that direction, and the experience of all history shows that if encroachments of this kind are not sternly resisted at the outset, they will be repeated again and again, and they will find you on each successive occasion less able to repel them, until finally you are obliged to succumb without raising a murmur of opposition. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Chester (Mr. Dodson), who has been referred to as a high authority on the Business of Parliament, told us he had endeavoured to induce the House to part with some of its work. I regret very much that his efforts in that direction were not successful. He was then on the right track, and pursuing a more statesmanlike course than he is now pursuing in lending his support, however cautiously, to the proposals of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. There are only two rational courses, by either of which the difficulties of the House can be removed. You must either so enlarge the powers of local government as to give Home Rule to Ireland for Irish affairs, Home Rule to Scotland for Scottish affairs, and Home Rule to England for English affairs, while at the same time maintaining the Imperial Parliament in all its strength and integrity for carrying on the government of the Empire, and for the transaction of all Imperial affairs; or, taking the Representatives of the three nationalities as they are in this House, you must assign to each national section respectively the legislation affecting the country which each represents. With the continued accumulation of work you must introduce the principle of the division of labour, or get rid of such portions of the work as you are unable to perform. The latter is by far the more sensible course to adopt; and I assert, emphatically, that this House is utterly incompetent to legislate satisfactorily for the internal wants of the three Kingdoms, besides grappling with the multitude of affairs comprehended in the management of a vast and widely-extended Empire. One day the House is summoned to discuss a question of high Imperial interest, on another to debate the merits of a Turnpike Bill—or, as somebody said a few days ago, a road across Hyde Park; but no one has undertaken to show why Parliament should stoop to questions of this description. What should I, as an Irish Member, know about the merits of the Scotch Roads and Bridges Bill, and why should I be obliged to master its details to the possible neglect of matters in which my constituents take a deeper interest? Why, on the other hand, should Englishmen and Scotchmen insist on having a voice in deciding the merits of Irish Water Bills, Gas Bills, and Railway Bills? These are plain questions and urgent questions which the Select Committee on Public Business seems to have entirely ignored; but they are important questions which will one day force themselves on the attention of statesmen, and demand recognition and settlement. You have sanctioned a policy which is extending the Empire every day and adding to your tremendous responsibilities. But domestic affairs are not less pressing on that account. They are constantly growing with the growth of modern civilization. There is now a school in every village, and the land is dotted with libraries and reading-rooms, like oases in the desert, where the people resort to drink of the fountain of knowledge. There is education, and information, and enlightenment everywhere, accompanied by discussion; and the consequence is that a thousand new problems of social, industrial, and political interest spring up every year which demand the consideration of the highest statesmanship. Looking at the condition of Germany and other countries, it must come home to the mind of every thoughtful man that some of the questions of the day, to which I allude, are questions which it would be dangerous to ignore. The transformation which the work of Parliament has undergone has been well described by my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-on-Tyne (Mr. J. Cowen), and the evils of which he complains arise from the tendency to centralization, which has been growing stronger and stronger every year, and which the present Executive has forced to a point which is simply intolerable. It flatters the vanity of the House to assure it that when local institutions are brought under the control of the Government they will be under the control of Parliament also; and that, as the people control the House of Commons, they will always rule, no matter who may govern Statements of this kind were put forward in support of the Prisons Bill; but nothing could be more delusive. The prisons were handed over to the Government. But does any unofficial Member of this House imagine that any word or act of his will influence prison discipline or prison management? No; it was the officials of the Home Office, and not the Members of this House, who obtained control of the prisons when you centralized the prison system. They will take care to capture each new Home Secretary, and bind him hand-and-foot with the red tape of their system; and the same thing happens in each of the other Departments. The Minister presiding over each is in the hands of his own officials. By-and-bye, when these evils shall accumulate beyond endurance, the people will cry out, not against the tyranny of the Government or the tyranny of Parliament, but against the tyranny of confederated officials, against the tyranny of an odious bureaucracy, which is the most hateful tyranny of all. Surely it is time to make a stand against centralization, if local liberty and local power are not to be entirely surrendered. The necessity of doing something to facilitate Public Business appears to be a sufficient argument with some hon. Gentlemen in favour of these Resolutions; but if you are to go on tightening your Rules, and increasing your Business, the logical conclusion of your action will be a despotism which will dispense with Constitutional liberty and Parliamentary institutions. It will certainly be something like the irony of fate, or poetical vengeance, if this House, which has often used its power to destroy the liberty of many nations, should, as a necessity of its policy, end by destroying its own. It is not, perhaps, from an Irish Representative whose country has felt the tyranny of your sway that you should receive warning of such a possible catastrophe; and I will conclude by declaring that, as a friend of freedom of speech and popular rights, I, for one, will consent to no part of the coercion code which the Minister has attempted to fasten upon the House.

MR. BERESFORD HOPE believed that the House was generally of opinion that they should arrive at some compromise on this question, and proceed to that very interesting and important topic—the future of the British Army. When his right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in a friendly and generous spirit, accepted the compromise of his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot), he (Mr. Beresford Hope) ventured to point out reasons why he thought it was not sufficient. There were certain evils which were inherent in it which were not so conspicuous in the proposition of 1876. Under the Rule of 1872 there would be much more temptation than under that of 1876 to heap the Notice Papers on first Supply nights with Motions which might be raised so as to prevent the Minister in charge of the Estimates from making his Statement till after the dinner-hour, when the House was in a state of exhausted collapse. In contrast to this, the expedient which the Chancellor of the Exchequer suggested in examining Mr. Speaker before the Committee, and which Mr. Speaker in his evidence unmistakably supported, and of which the Chairman of Committees also most strongly approved, was that the Minister in charge of the Estimates should make his Statement on the Motion that the Speaker should leave the Chair. He would make his Statement in face of the Amendments on the Paper, and could therefore traverse and answer a great many of them by anticipation. If that were done, and the Resolution of 1876 adopted, the Government would gain considerable advantage, and, at the same time, no hon. Members would be stopped from the right of stating a grievance before Supply. The *rationale* of the present system was that the House being already in Committee of Supply the Minister stated the reasons of the Vote for which he asked. The *rationale* of the one which he proposed was that the Minister gave his reasons for going into a Committee of Supply by a general sketch of what would be asked for when that Committee was set up. If, therefore, his right hon. Friend would take the framework of the Resolution of 1876, modified by that other reform which he himself originally suggested, of allowing the Minister to make his Statement on the Motion that the Speaker should leave the Chair, he believed that it would meet the general wish of the House.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said, he was anxious to agree to a compromise in order to cut short the protracted discussion, and with that view he had already accepted certain Amendments to his Resolution; and he thought that the compromise he had so offered was quite sufficient. He was not, therefore, prepared to accept the additional Amendments suggested. He could only repeat now what he had said on one or two previous occasions. They had discussed the matter very fully, and as far as the technical question of the alteration of the Rules was concerned the argument had been exhausted. He admitted, of course, that the larger and wider questions raised by the hon. Member for Mayo (Mr. O'Connor Power) would require, and indeed they deserved, larger and fuller examination; but they did not arise upon this technical question, and the House would hardly think it convenient to go into them. He hoped, therefore, the hon. Member would not think him discourteous in declining to follow him. The present Resolution dealt with the question of the best way of so arranging the details of the Orders as to give the best facilities for pursuing Business with decent rapidity, and, at the same time, without unduly fettering the rights and liberties of the House. Of course, hon. Members would understand that it was impossible to have any Rules that would not in some way fetter the liberty which was the natural privilege of every man in this country. Even the Rule that they must not speak twice on the same subject might be said to fetter the liberty of every man to speak when he liked. The question before the

House had been carefully considered, not only in this debate and in the Committee which sat last year, but also in former years. On the whole, he thought the Resolution which he had proposed, with the Amendments which he had already accepted, and which were very considerable, would be a fair and reasonable arrangement and one which they might work upon. It was pretty much the arrangement that was adopted in 1872 and 1873; and while carrying out the proposal of his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter W. Barttelot), and the hon. and learned Member for Dewsbury (Mr. Serjeant Simon), it would not infringe the liberty of anyone. What he hoped was that now, after so much discussion, the House would be allowed to come to a conclusion. They would first divide on the Amendment of the hon. Member for Glasgow, and if he was successful, the Rule would be adopted in that form. If he failed, then he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) was prepared to adopt either the Amendment which stood in the name of the hon. and gallant Member for West Sussex or that of the hon. and learned Member for Dewsbury. The Business on the Paper was important and interesting, and there would be a good deal of disappointment felt if the Army Estimates were to be put off. His proposal was that if they should come to a vote at an early hour on the first Resolution, he would not ask the House to take the other Resolutions into consideration at present; but they might stand over for another time.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE said, he was sorry that the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer had refused to surrender the point, and would remind him that if he wished to proceed to the consideration of the Army Estimates at once, the only way of succeeding in his desire was to accept the suggestion of a further compromise. He (Sir Charles W. Dilke) would move to add the words "or Notice" to the Amendment of his hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow (Mr. Anderson), in order that questions requiring some explanation might be put and debated before Supply.

Amendment proposed to the said proposed Amendment, to insert, after the word "Amendment," the words "or Notice."—(*Sir Charles W. Dilke.*)

Question proposed, "That the words 'or Notice' be there inserted."

MR. ANDERSON said, he willingly accepted the addition proposed by his hon. Friend. He was also sorry the Chancellor of the Exchequer was not able to accept his Amendment, because the right hon. Gentleman put himself in the peculiar position of going back to the Liberal Resolutions of 1872, instead of to his own in 1876. It was quite clear, if the 1872 Rule were adopted, irrelevant Notices would be piled up on Monday nights, and that was exactly what the House wished to avoid.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON thought it would be more convenient to take the sense of the House on the Amendment of the hon. Member for Cambridge University (Mr. Beresford Hope). He hoped, therefore, the hon. Member for Glasgow would withdraw his Amendment.

MR. MITCHELL HENRY thought the Government must have had some other object in view when they refused the reasonable compromise which had been offered. They were all equally interested with the Government in the proper conduct of the Public Business; but they could not be silenced by the statements of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, which were not arguments; and he protested against the *sic volo sic jubeo* style in which the right hon. Gentleman was treating the House.

MR. ANDERSON said, he would withdraw his Amendment in deference to the appeal of the noble Lord (the Marquess of Hartington). The sense of the House would be taken distinctly on the Amendment of the hon. Member for Cambridge University (Mr. Beresford Hope), which practically was the same as his own.

Amendment to the proposed Amendment, and Original Amendment, by leave, *withdrawn.*

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE, in moving, as an Amendment, to insert after the word "shall," the words "except on first going into Committee on the ordinary Army, Navy, or Civil Service Estimates respectively," said, that its object was to allow Amendments, whether relevant or not to the Estimates, to be brought forward on the first night that they were placed on the Paper. In consequence of the appeal made on a former evening by the noble Marquess the Leader of the Opposition, he would not move it, unless the House wished it. At present he asked leave to withdraw it. [" No, no!"]

Amendment proposed,

After the word "shall," in line 3, of the First Resolution, to insert the words "except on first going into Committee on the ordinary Army, Navy, or Civil Service Estimates respectively." —(*Sir Charles W. Dilke.*)

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted."

Mr. PARNELL said, he must really appeal to the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer as to whether it was his determination to maintain the attitude of adhering to the Rule of 1872 in preference to that of 1876? He thought the right hon. Gentleman might save a great deal of time, and might enable the House to proceed to a consideration of the Army Estimates, if, in deference to what was undoubtedly the feeling of a considerable section of the Opposition, he agreed to accept the principle of the latter Rule. The principle of the Rule of 1876 had the sanction which experience always gave; but, according to the evidence given before the Select Committee, the Rule of 1872 had been tried and found wanting. It was proposed by the Liberal Government of the day, and was strenuously resisted by the whole of the then Conservative Opposition (including the present Leader of the House), with the single exception of the present Secretary to the Treasury (Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson), who seemed to have a singular prescience that the Rule would not work, and who voted in favour of inquiry and examination into the whole question, before the House ventured to adopt so startling an alteration. He (Mr. Parnell) fully admitted that this was a two-edged weapon, and that it cut both ways. Still, he thought he might ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether it was really worth his while to perpetuate a struggle of this kind? No doubt, the right hon. Gentleman might have entered into a very accurate mathematical calculation as to the amount of time which he might save by persisting in his present course of action. He might have seen that there was a prospect, if but a bare one, of getting his first Resolution carried that evening; and he might have thought that with that Resolution adopted, and becoming a Sessional Order of the House, he might by that means gain sufficient time during the rest of the Session to make up for the loss of one evening. But he (Mr. Parnell) would ask the House whether that was either a sensible or a statesmanlike view for a Government to take who were intrusted with such great responsibilities, and that, too, in connection with a proposal which cut directly at the root of a Constitutional principle? No doubt, the Members of the Government might say to themselves—"Our position is very powerful. We may occupy our seats here for years to come. There is no sign of cohesion in the Opposition, and there is no prospect of our rivals being in power." But, after all, things did sometimes alter. Sudden changes did occur. Great Powers had fallen in a moment. Napoleon III. appeared to have an assured maintenance of his position for years to come; but he fell suddenly, and although he (Mr. Parnell) did not suppose that the Zulu King would be able to bring about a catastrophe of a similar description, which would compel the Chancellor of the Exchequer to fly from his capital, no one knew what foreign complications might arise, or when the right hon. Gentleman might have to vacate his present high position. The Chancellor of the Exchequer could not hope to make the Rule of 1872 a Standing Order that evening; and he (Mr. Parnell) must really ask him whether it was worth his while to keep alive an element of contention of this description, and to face a renewal of the difficulties which had already risen in the House during the last eight or nine days? He did not wish it to be said that by any conduct on his part the privileges of the English Parliament were being diminished. The House of Commons had a great history, and although Irish Members might think their country had been injured by the necessity of having to seek justice in an English Legislature, they could not look back upon that history without feelings of some reverence for it, and for the exertions of the men who had raised the House to the position which it now occupied. But what were the

Government now proposing to do? They were going to drive a nail into the work of their ancestors—men who won their liberties and who fought for them. It remained for the despised Irish Members to insist upon preserving the rights and liberties of the House. No equivalent would be gained by the Government for the loss which would be sustained in other directions were their proposal to be accepted.

MR. NEWDEGATE said, the hon. Member for Meath (Mr. Parnell) had appealed to him (Mr. Newdegate) as one who had had, for a long time, the honour of a seat in the House. The hon. Gentleman had spoken in support of the principle of the Rule of 1876; but it was to be hoped he would come to see, by degrees, that it would be neither for the advantage of the House, nor of the country, that the course which he recommended should be followed. The Resolution of 1872 was certainly to be preferred to that of 1876; or, rather, the substance of the one was to be preferred to the substance of the other. The hon. Member for Meath had laid great stress upon the ancient privileges of the House. Those privileges had been asserted quite as much by the forbearance of hon. Gentlemen as by their exacting the full extent of their rights; and what he (Mr. Newdegate) had seen convinced him that, under the Resolution of 1872, the practical Business of the House had been much more smoothly conducted than under the Resolution of 1876. If hon. Members would but recall what took place between those years—1872 and 1876—and compare the course of Business during the Sessions between those dates with what had occurred since 1876, they, he thought, must come to the conclusion that the House had been able to perform its duties better in every sense, between 1872 and 1876, than it had been able to do since.

Amendment, by leave, *withdrawn.*

MR. BERESFORD HOPE said, he now desired to move the Amendment which stood in his name on the Paper. The proposal which he submitted to the House was in the following terms:—

"To add at the end of the Chancellor of the Exchequer's first Resolution, 'except an Amendment relative to the Class of Estimates which has been set down for consideration on that day be moved, in which case Mr. Speaker shall be bound to propose the question in respect of such Amendment: Provided always, That the Member of the Government who proposes to move the Estimates upon that day may make his statement with Mr. Speaker in the Chair.'"

No doubt, the first portion of his Amendment had been already discussed; but the second part of it imported, as he thought, a very beneficial colouring into the whole matter. He had already touched on the question, and he was rather disappointed that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had taken no notice of what he had been urging. The object of that second portion was to enable a Minister, charged with the duty of giving a Statement to the House as to certain Estimates, to make that Statement while the Speaker was in the Chair. He had been very much disappointed to find that, in the remarks which were made a short time previously by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, his right hon. Friend entirely passed over the appeal which he had made to him in reference to this subject; and he must again endeavour to impress its importance upon the House and upon the Government. The proposal which he now made not only rested upon the recommendation of very high authorities, but it would be attended with obvious advantages in facilitating that despatch of Business, which it was the object of the Resolutions of the Government to promote. It would enable a Minister to rise and make his Statement about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, when the House was full, when the Minister himself was fresh, and when the Statement would be delivered in time for post and telegraph. By adopting the proposal which he urged upon the attention of the Government, the Chancellor of the Exchequer would get rid of the scandal of a hungry Minister making an important speech in an almost empty House at 9 or 10 o'clock; and that, in his opinion, ought to more than compensate the Government for anything they might give up by agreeing to accept his proposal. Hon. Members might put the matter to the most practical test by considering what would have been their own experience that very night if the House were doing and not talking of Business, and if his proposal had been in operation. Long before the hour on which he himself was at that time speaking the Minister for War would have been able to make his

Statement, instead of having, either under the old Rule, or that of 1872—it being a Monday and the first night of the Army Estimates—to wait till a series of Amendments had been disposed of, and either get up at some late hour, or be altogether thrown over for the night. He appealed to the right hon. Gentleman who led their deliberations to give peace and contentment to the House by agreeing to a proposition which would not only facilitate the despatch of Business, but afford an additional privilege to Ministers themselves.

Amendment proposed,

At the end of the First Resolution, to add the words "except an Amendment relative to the Class of Estimates which has been set down for consideration on that day be moved, in which case Mr. Speaker shall be bound to propose the question in respect of such Amendment: Provided always, That the Member of the Government who proposes to move the Estimates upon that day may make his statement with Mr. Speaker in the Chair."—(*Mr. Beresford Hope.*)

Question proposed, "That those words be there added."

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said, he was not insensible to the value of the Proviso which his hon. Friend who had just spoken (Mr. Beresford Hope) proposed to attach to his Amendment. No doubt, on the first occasion of bringing forward the Army and Navy Estimates, that Proviso would be of great convenience, and would facilitate the Business of the House. That, however, was not the point which they had now to consider. The question which had been raised, and with which the House had to deal, was as to how they were to conduct the Business during the whole of the Session upon questions of Supply. According to the proposal of his hon. Friend, all through the Session, whenever Supply was put down, it would be competent for hon. Members to bring forward Motions relative to the class of Estimates set down for consideration; but it was obviously very difficult to say—and this was one of the great objections to the working of the Rule of 1876—what Amendments were or were not relative to the class of Estimates so set down. By a little ingenuity a very large number of Amendments might be brought within that term—such, for instance, as the conditions under which Kew Gardens should be open to the public. Now, what he desired was to secure certainty in the discussion of the Estimates, so that the time of the House should not be wasted; and he hoped, therefore, the House would at once come to a division, and not go again over the arguments which had been so repeatedly urged.

MR. SYNAN said, he could not understand on what possible ground the Chancellor of the Exchequer could object to the use of the word "relative" in the proposal of the hon. Member for the University of Cambridge (Mr. Beresford Hope), as that word occurred in all the Amendments to the Resolution, including the Amendment of the hon. and gallant Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot), which the Chancellor of the Exchequer had accepted. Surely, either the Speaker or the Chairman of Committees would be competent to decide such a point, when they were asked to decide the question as to whether a particular Motion was in Order. The effect of adopting the Resolution of the Government would be to curtail and narrow the rights and privileges of hon. Members without facilitating the despatch of the Business of the House. The Amendment of the hon. Member for the University of Cambridge facilitated the Business of the House without encroaching on those rights, and he therefore supported it.

MR. MITCHELL HENRY said, he could not see that the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer had yet brought forward any sound argument in favour of the proposition which he had submitted to the House. Hon. Members must retain and not lose the rights and privileges they at present possessed.

MR. PAGET suggested that if the hon. Member for the University of Cambridge (Mr. Beresford Hope) would withdraw his Proviso, which seemed to him (Mr. Paget) to rest on an entirely different ground to the main body of the Amendment, it would be easier for the House to come to a clear understanding on the matter. The Amendment would then become practically the same as that of the hon. and gallant Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot); and it would, in that case, better recommend itself to the adoption of the House.

MR. BERESFORD HOPE said, he could not consent to do so, as the withdrawal of the Proviso would spoil the symmetry of the system embodied in his Amendment.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON said, he entirely agreed with the Chancellor of the Exchequer that this not very large question had been debated as much as it could be. He therefore should not have said anything more on the subject except for the statement made by the hon. Member for Meath (Mr. Parnell), who had said that he (the Marquess of Hartington) had shown a decided preference for the Rule of 1876 over that of 1872. He did not think that anyone had shown any preference of that kind except his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt). The importance of the difference between them had been greatly exaggerated; but if he had a preference for either of them, it was for the Resolution of 1872, under the working of which no hon. Member had thought himself injured by being shut out or excluded from bringing any question to which he attached any importance under the consideration of the House. The Rule of 1872 was not, as the hon. Member for Meath had stated, abandoned because it was not found to work well. It worked, so far as he knew, perfectly well, and without producing any complaint; but it was abandoned by the Government during the first Session of their existence, because the state of Business was such that they did not feel the necessity for its continuance which they now felt. The suggestion which he made the other night, although not accepted in its entirety by the Government, still, he thought, pointed to a remedy in this matter. If the Government refused to discuss a point in dispute on the Estimates, a Member had another opportunity of bringing forward the subject when the Resolutions relating to the Estimates were reported to the House. As regarded Kew Gardens, the hon. Member for Galway need not be under any alarm, as he would have a full opportunity of raising the question upon the Motion for the payment of the salary of the officers. He should certainly support the Rule of 1872 as proposed by the Government.

MR. PARNELL, in apology, said, he must certainly have made a mistake if he had said that the noble Lord (the Marquess of Hartington) had ever shown any decided preference for the Rule of 1876 as compared with that of 1872; because the noble Lord had never shown any decided preference for anything as compared with another.

Question put.

The House *divided:*—Ayes 79; Noes 191: Majority 112.—(Div. List, No. 20.)

MR. SHAW LEFEVRE, who had an Amendment upon the Paper, to add the words—

"Unless on going into Committee an Amendment be moved relevant to the Votes to be considered on that day,"

said, after the vote just given by the House, he should not move it.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE said, in that case, he would do so, with the addition of the words "or Question asked" after the word "moved," in order to draw attention to a subject which had not yet been sufficiently discussed. If the Resolution was passed as it now stood, a Member would have no opportunity of calling attention to a subject, or of asking a question on any matter, however relevant it might be, unless he moved a definite Resolution.

Amendment proposed,

At the end of the First Resolution, to add the words "unless on going into Committee an Amendment be moved or Question asked relevant to the Votes to be considered on that day."—(*Sir Charles W. Dilke.*)

Question proposed, "That those words be there added."

MR. NEWDEGATE hoped the House would very gravely pause before it adopted the Amendment. One of the great difficulties at the present time was that hon. Members called attention to subjects without giving the body of the House any opportunity of expressing their opinion thereon. Such a vast enlargement of the privilege of asking Questions had taken place of late years, that he thought the House ought to be careful before it granted any further enlargement, or how it permitted a Member to draw attention to a subject, and set on foot a discussion which might last the whole evening, without the House having an opportunity of expressing its opinion thereon.

MR. O'CONNOR POWER thought the hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate) might just as well say that no Questions should be asked at half-past 4 o'clock; that was the logical conclusion of his argument.

Mr. RYLANDS: I am rather surprised that the hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate) should raise an objection to the proposal of the hon. Baronet, because it is in accordance with the course hitherto followed, and which has been found of great convenience, by giving an opportunity for discussion on a Question being put involving a certain amount of argument. I am quite sure, if the hon. Member (Mr. Newdegate) will recall his own experience, he will remember that convenience has arisen from discussions of that character. We have an instance at hand at the present moment on the Motion for going into Committee of Supply this evening. The hon. Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke) has given Notice that he will call attention to the subject of the occupation of Cyprus, and ask certain Questions. I happen to know that my hon. Friend does not intend to bring this subject on to-night; but I mention it, as it is clearly one of the kind of Questions which, with great propriety, might be brought forward on going into Committee of Supply; and the hon. Baronet might put to the Government Questions on a matter of great public interest, coupled with certain statements, which he would not be enabled to make at the Question time at half-past 4 o'clock. But I wish, Mr. Speaker, to appeal to you in this matter, on which I am inclined to hold an opinion contrary to that of the hon. Member for Chelsea. If a Notice of this kind had been put down on the Paper, a Notice relevant to the class of Estimates, would it be competent under the Amendment of the hon. and gallant Baronet (Sir Walter B. Barttelot), for the hon. Member for Chelsea to raise the question without absolutely putting his Notice in the form of an Amendment? Perhaps, Sir, if you would give an opinion on this point, it might remove the necessity of altering the words of the Resolution as now proposed, and I do think that such a Notice should be permitted under the Standing Order of the House.

Mr. SHAW LEFEVRE said, he could not see how the Government could refuse to accede to the principle of the proposal now made.

Mr. SPEAKER, in reply to the question of the hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands), said, that in the event of the House passing the Resolution before it, with the addition of the Amendment about to be moved by the hon. and gallant Baronet the Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot), if an Amendment relevant to the class of Votes proposed to be taken were moved and negatived, it would not be competent for the House to divide on any other Amendment, even though it were relevant; but the subject-matter of such Amendment might be discussed. If on the Motion to go into Committee, an hon. Member rose in his place, even though he had no Amendment on the Notice Paper, it would be his (Mr. Speaker's) duty to assume that the hon. Member intended to conclude with a Motion, or to address himself to the Question before the House; and therefore he could not prevent him from proceeding to address the House.

Mr. RITCHIE said, that the Amendment merely put into a definite form that which was already the practice of the House.

Mr. DODSON thought the Amendment was not necessary, and they were only wasting their time by beating in the air.

Sir CHARLES W. DILKE said, he should not, after the explanation which had been given, put the House to the trouble of a divison.

Amendment, by leave, *withdrawn.*

Sir WALTER B. BARTTELOT moved the insertion of the following words:—

"Unless an Amendment be moved relating to the Class of Estimates proposed to be taken in Supply on first going into Committee on the Army, Navy, and Civil Services respectively."

Amendment proposed,

At the end of the First Resolution, to add the words "unless an Amendment be moved relating to the Class of Estimates proposed to be taken in Supply on first going into Committee on the Army, Navy, and Civil Services respectively."—(*Sir Walter B. Barttelot.*)

Question proposed, "That those words be there added."

Sir CHARLES W. DILKE moved to amend the proposed Amendment by inserting the words "or Question raised" after the word "moved." That would raise the question whether an hon. Member who merely wished to call attention to a relevant subject without Motion or Amendment would be at liberty to do so.

Amendment proposed to the said proposed Amendment, after the word "moved," to insert the words "or Question raised."—(*Sir Charles W. Dilke.*)

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted."

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said, it was intended that an hon. Member should be at liberty to do so. In that view, the Amendment of the hon. Baronet was perfectly reasonable, and he would agree to it.

Question put, and *agreed to.*

Question again proposed,

"That the words 'unless an Amendment be moved or Question raised relating to the Class of Estimates proposed to be taken in Supply on first going into Committee on the Army, Navy, and Civil Services respectively,' be there added."

MR. WHITWELL moved the omission of the words "Class of," so as not to confine the discussion to any one class of Estimates.

Amendment proposed, to leave out the words "Class of."—(*Mr Whitwell.*)

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said, the proposed Amendment was immaterial, and he would agree to it.

Question, "That the words 'Class of' stand part of the proposed Amendment," put, and *negatived.*

Question again proposed,

"That the words, 'unless an Amendment be moved or Question raised relating to the Estimates proposed to be taken in Supply on first going into Committee on the Army, Navy, and Civil Services respectively,' be there added."

MR. MITCHELL HENRY proposed further to amend the proposed Amendment by the substitution for the words "the Civil Service Estimates" of the words "the several Classes of the Civil Service Estimates." Many of those classes differed widely from each other, and if the Amendment were not agreed to, the Irish Members would be debarred the opportunity of discussing questions in which they were much interested. Hon. Members would then be driven to use every possible privilege they still retained, and, instead of Business being advanced, it would be very much retarded.

MR. DILLWYN seconded the Amendment.

Amendment proposed,

After the words "Navy and," to insert the words "the several Classes of the."—(*Mr. Mitchell Henry.*)

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted."

MR. DODSON thought a reference to the Rule of 1872 would simplify the matter. The words used in that Rule were, "the several divisions of the Estimates."

MR. BIGGAR, in supporting the Amendment, remarked that the ostensible cause of these new Rules was the obstruction of a small number of Irish Members. He denied that there had been any obstruction, except in the case of the South African Bill.

MR. BERESFORD HOPE said, that the Amendment would really shorten the Monday Business, and he would counsel the Chancellor of the Exchequer to accept it. If the Civil Service Estimates were broken up into classes, he supposed the Chancellor of the Exchequer would not take more than one class each night, while the Minister representing that class would offer his explanation. Such a classification, in his opinion, was quite necessary.

MR. ANDERSON contended that the Amendment was a reasonable one, and hoped the Government would not oppose it, as it would give an opportunity to the House to discuss more than one question relating to the Civil Service Estimates on one day, which was no more than right, seeing there were at least seven branches as dissimilar from each other as from the Army or Navy.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said, that the condition sought to be attached to the Resolution would do very much away with the advantage of the Rule. He thought quite enough was given, considering the many opportunities there would be for discussing any question that might arise, if one day were set apart for the discussion of any of the questions affecting the Civil Service Estimates. If the Estimates were sub-divided into classes, the time of the House would be really frittered away, without any corresponding advantage. He did not think it was proposed to carry the Amendment so far as was suggested.

Mr. SHAW LEFEVRE thought that what Government lost in one way it would gain in another; because on going into, say, the Education Votes, it would be impossible to raise any question on Public Parks.

Sir HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON ventured to think that if the House at any time desired to have further information of the Minister in charge of the Estimates, it would be able to obtain it; that a general discussion could be raised upon any part of the Estimates; and that the Secretary to the Treasury would not be able to force them on. That information could be obtained if the House passed the Resolution as agreed to by the Government. Though the Resolution were passed, it would not necessarily follow that Monday would be the only day on which Estimates would be taken. Hon. Members might, therefore, rely on having ample opportunities for the discussion of the Estimates. It was never contemplated that there should be such a sub-division of Estimates as was now suggested. The Rule was introduced in 1876 by the noble Lord at the head of the Government in the form in which it had worked well in 1872-3; and although it was amended, that did not imply any admission that it had not worked satisfactorily.

Mr. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN said, the Amendment would raise a practical difficulty to reporting Progress in the middle, say, of Class 1, and on a subsequent night finishing that class and proceeding with, say, Classes 2 and 3; because Class 1 would not be entered upon then for the first time, so that no Amendment could be moved on going again into Committee upon it, whilst Classes 2 and 3, though they might have been down on the Paper the first night, would not actually have been begun. This alteration would render it necessary, therefore, to take only one class each night, and would be productive of great inconvenience. As the Rule only applied to one night, and the Government had made several concessions, they might pass the Resolution as it stood.

Mr. O'SHAUGHNESSY said, it was admitted there should be an opportunity of discussing each division of the Estimates before going into Committee; the different classes of the Civil Service Estimates were as important as the Army or the Navy Estimates; and it was the business of the Ministers to devise the words by which the necessary latitude should be assured and not to leave hon. Members at the mercy of any particular Minister who might bring on the Estimates. If the Government did not accept the Amendment, the variety of topics that would have to be mooted on going into Committee on any division of the Estimates would render it impossible that any abuse, however serious, could secure sufficient attention from the House and the Government. They ought to put a limit to the concessions now being made to the Government.

Sir PATRICK O'BRIEN said, the alternative to the Amendment proposed would be Amendments in Committee of Supply; but that would not be a satisfactory mode of discussing some grievances.

Mr. PARNELL said, the Government apparently desired to drive independent Members to obstruction; he did not mean now, but in the future course of Business, for as such it would be regarded to impede the Report of Supply at the time it was often brought on. That stage was often taken at such an hour that any discussion on the Estimates became impossible. This Rule was, therefore, an incentive to the adoption of methods of Parliamentary warfare which ought to be seldom resorted to. It was impossible to conclude that the Rule adopted in 1872 would work well now, because since 1872 the Civil Service Estimates had very much increased. The Amendment moved by the hon. Member for Galway was, therefore, one that raised a most important question.

Mr. ERRINGTON thought the major portion of the arguments which had been adduced were decidedly in favour of the proposal of the hon. Member for Galway (Mr. Mitchell Henry). He (Mr. Errington) thought, however, that the Government might consent to a compromise. Several of the classes of Estimates were, of course, more important than others, and he would suggest that some of the least important should be grouped together. For instance, the Classes numbered 1 and 2 might be grouped; Class 3, or the Administration of Justice, would, of course, deserve a night to itself; Class 4, Education, would also deserve a night; and he proposed that Classes 5, 6, and 7 should be taken together, and one night devoted to them; so that instead of seven nights being required for the Civil Service Estimates, they would need only four. That was a less concession than hon. Members asked for, but one worthy of the consideration of the Government.

MR. O'DONNELL said, the fact that the Government would not accept the Amendment would impose upon independent Members the obligation of taking steps to counteract what the Government wished to impose, which was nothing more than an attempt to stop the exposition of grievances in respect to the Civil Service Estimates; and he really thought there could not be a scheme better calculated to bring the authority of this House into contempt, and better calculated to shake the confidence of the nation, than the scheme which the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer had presented to them. When hon. Members took an undue advantage of a liberal and generous regulation of debates, they could only do so at the imminent risk and at the practical certainty of finding themselves condemned not only by the Government whom they disturbed, but by the country at large. On the other hand, when Members, in obedience to a public duty, and in recognition of the claims of men who came to them and asked that their grievances should be exposed in Parliament, could only obtain a hearing by adopting some Parliamentary chicane, and getting round and about the devices of Government, they would not be condemned by the country at large for obstruction, but they would be applauded. Under even a generous regulation, Members had sometimes to push the liberty of discussion to its utmost limits, and Members had been found to do that with reasonable ground, and an irritated Government did not dare to take measures to punish their objectionable action. Under these circumstances, he asked the Government to consider, would Members of similar resolution hesitate for one single moment to challenge the displeasure of the Government when they had such a good excuse and ground for setting at naught the threats of Government penalties as these Resolutions practically set forth? It was perfectly true, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer had said, that if they looked at the Rules and Orders of the House generally, the proposed restrictions of the Government would not in the slightest degree interfere with the liberty of independent Members, if such Members were only resolute in maintaining their liberties. He meant to say that if the Government refused to allow independent Members a fair opportunity of expressing their grievances, those Members certainly, by making use of the forms of the House, could contrive a means and find an opportunity to bring their grievances forward, and irregular in reality though they might be, nevertheless their conduct would be regular in outward seeming, and would be according to Parliamentary form. What the Government said in effect to the independent Members was that they did not propose to interfere with their liberties, because they knew that would be useless on their part; yet by way of improving the conduct of debates in that House, they intended to force them to give up bringing forward their grievances in a regular form, and compel them to avail themselves of irregular opportunities. This was the notion which the Government entertained of raising the dignity of that House in the eyes of the country. It was unfortunate that the Amendment of the hon. Member for the county of Galway (Mr. Mitchell Henry) had been introduced in a thin House, and in the almost total absence of all Government authority, because no more important Resolution had been proposed during the period that matter had been under discussion. The Government had admitted the principle that special opportunities ought to be given for the discussion of grievances relating to the Army and Navy, when the Estimates relating to those Services were going to be brought forward, yet they denied that there existed the same necessity of giving facility to discuss grievances in relation to the Civil Service Estimates when those Estimates were to be proceeded with. Nothing could be more illogical than the position of the Government on that point, and nothing could be more aggravating. They seemed to be desirous of provoking an opposition to their views from certain hon. Members which would enable them to propose a still further curtailment of their liberties. That they should be simply a recording Assembly, and take their cue from the Government of the day, was doubtless an idea which might commend itself to Members of the Cæsarist School, of which there were many in that House; but in the Civil Service Estimates they had to deal with diplomatic changes, with education, and with very many other subjects of the highest importance to the whole community—subjects which were more prolific of discussion than all the Votes of the Army and Navy Estimates put together. There was not much reason for discussion on the Army and Navy Estimates as a rule, because those Estimates did not enter into the domain of Party politics, both Parties in the House being interested in having an efficient Army and Navy; and only for the large number of officers who were in the House it was extremely probable the Estimates of those two Services would pass over quietly and after brief discussion, and with just a minimum of amicable conversation between the experts of the House. But the Civil Service Estimates covered ground of a very large extent, and they absolutely bristled with controversy. Those Estimates included such subjects as the administration of the Poor Law, Education, the Revenue, the Post Office, the Telegraph Service, and numberless other matters, while 99 per cent of the citizens of the Empire took no interest in the Army and Navy Estimates beyond the natural and moderate interest of knowing that they were being fairly conducted. On the other hand, 99 per cent of the people were obliged to take a deep interest in the Civil Service Departments, because their best and dearest interests were affected by them. Now, these Estimates were to be more and more withdrawn from the cognizance of Parliament; and by the proposal of the Government it appeared to be the intention of the Government to keep the people more and more from a knowledge of their own affairs. If it was the intention of the Government to rule without criticism and without observation, if it was their wish to do everything they pleased with the Civil Service Estimates, if they wanted to job and re-job, to be extravagant or parsimonious just as they pleased, to introduce arbitrary rules, to interfere with the discipline of prisons, to meddle with the conduct of education, to make and unmake in a hundred different ways without giving the people an opportunity of knowing what was going on, the policy which the Government was pursuing was just the one to accomplish those objects. Their proposals were a provocation to Members to combine together in order to interfere with the progress of Public Business, so that they might have something like an opportunity of bringing forward their grievances. The plan of the Government, therefore, instead of facilitating Business, would simply prove a stumbling-block. Their conduct was reconcilable with no theory of public government except that of Cæsarist rule, and ruling behind the backs of the people. The Government were proud of their majority, and as regarded their foreign policy, he believed, represented the views of the country, at least of the English people; but if they were to persevere with that attempt to stop grievances being heard on the Civil Service Estimates, they would find they had lost more in the country that they had gained by their foreign policy.

Question put.

The House *divided*:—Ayes 49; Noes 88: Majority 39.—(Div. List, No. 21.)

Question again proposed,

"That the words 'unless an Amendment be moved or Question raised relating to the Estimates proposed to be taken in Supply on first going into Committee on the Army, Navy, and Civil Services respectively,' be there added."

Mr. O'DONNELL said, that in the interest of Ireland he felt bound to endeavour to obtain some opportunity for the discussion of Irish subjects in the Civil Service Estimates. He would therefore move an Amendment to insert words in the Resolution which would give an opportunity for raising discussion on going into Committee on the Classes of the Estimates relating to "Law, Justice, Education, and Public Works of Ireland." No one could say that was an obstructive Amendment. The Departments he had named were of the first importance conditioning the progress and prosperity of Ireland in the most vital manner. The conduct of the Government, on more than one occasion, supplied them with a precedent for making the present demand. They had, on more than one occasion, set apart a special day for the consideration of the Irish Classes of the Estimates, much to the convenience of Irish Members who wished to attend, and to the convenience of other Members who wished to be absent. Even though a powerful contingent of Ministerial supporters might be waiting to give Irish opinion its usual *coup de grace*, still it would be a satisfaction to the Irish people to know that their grievances had been brought forward.

MR. BIGGAR seconded the Amendment.

Amendment proposed to the said proposed Amendment,

After the word "Services," to insert the words "and the Classes relating to Law, Justice, Education, and Public Works in Ireland."—(*Mr. O'Donnell.*)

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted."

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER deprecated the insertion of the words proposed. He very much doubted whether they would have the effect of getting greater attention paid to Irish questions than under the proper application of the present system. He was sure the hon. Member for Dungarvan (Mr. O'Donnell), and those who sat near him, would themselves acknowledge that there was always a desire on the part of the Government so to arrange questions relating to Ireland that hon. Members might have an opportunity of discussing them on the Estimates. It had frequently happened that Irish Votes had been postponed for a considerable time for the convenience of Irish Members. He could assure hon. Gentlemen from Ireland that that was the spirit in which the Government desired to work, and that they always wished to consult the convenience of Irish Members by fixing such days for the discussion of Estimates relating to Ireland as might be convenient to them.

MR. BIGGAR, in supporting the Amendment, pointed out that, with a special night for Irish subjects, the argument as to convenience would apply as well to discussion before going into Committee as to discussion in Committee. They had heard much of obstruction which had occurred during the present Parliament, and which, in his opinion, was without a parallel. A Bill called the Agricultural Holdings Bill was before them night after night, and hours were spent upon its consideration; and yet he understood that it had never to this day been in operation in any degree in any part of England.

MR. SHAW LEFEVRE opposed the Amendment. Its effect would be to give Irish Members an unfair advantage, and he did not see why Irish Members should have special opportunities of discussing their grievances which were not given to English and Scotch Members.

MR. M'LAREN said, he generally voted with the hon. Members from Ireland for the removal of their grievances when these were real; but in the case of a fanciful grievance, which he held the one spoken of to be, he could not vote with them. There was a vast difference between the case of the removal of certain disabilities which he believed the Irish people did labour under and the present case, where they were not content with equality, but demanded superiority over England and Scotland. The description of Estimates mentioned in the Amendment were applicable to England and Scotland as much as to Ireland. Were the Irish Members to be allowed to bring forward, for instance, a Motion with regard to the administration of law in Ireland, and the Scotch Members not to be allowed an equal right to bring forward a Motion in regard to the administration of law in Scotland? In Ireland, for example, they got out of that Class of Estimates two or three times as much as Scotland; and why should Scotland not have the right to bring forward her great grievance in reference to her treatment in this respect compared with Ireland that got so much, while Scotland got so little? This being a claim not for equality, but for superiority, he must vote against the Amendment.

MR. O'CONNOR POWER, referring to the Chancellor of the Exchequer's statement that the Irish Members had always had great facilities given them for bringing forward their grievances, said, he must be allowed to point out that what had happened before in reference to Irish grievances was no criterion of what would happen in future in consequence of the passing of the first Resolution. The hon. Member for Edinburgh (Mr. M'Laren) had delivered what he doubtless considered was a conclusive speech. He asked why Irish Members should want the privilege of raising questions on going into Committee of Supply, when English and Scotch Members would have no such privilege? But if English and Scotch Members voluntarily surrendered their privileges, the Irish Members were made of different and sterner stuff. It might be that public virtue would take refuge amongst the Irish Members, and they alone might be permitted to make a stand to maintain the Constitution. Moreover, there was a great difference between the Irish and the English Civil Service Estimates. He remembered a case in point. A public meeting was held in Phœnix Park, Dublin. The Irish Government issued orders to the police to disperse the meeting by force, and that was actually done. Now, no one would contend that that was not a subject that might be fairly brought before the House of Commons. It was so brought before the House of Commons. The Irish Government repented of its conduct before a week had elapsed, and the meeting was held after all in the place it was intended to be held. The Irish Government receded from its position, and it was afterwards adjudged blamable in the Courts of Justice. But what would have happened if it had not been possible to bring forward the smallest grievance on going into the Irish Estimates? It would not have been in the power of any Irish Member, under this first Resolution, to call attention to that violation of Constitutional power. He therefore maintained that the circumstances would be entirely changed if this Resolution became a Rule of the House. For these reasons, it appeared to him that the hon. Member for Dungarvan had acted wisely and judiciously in proposing this Amendment, and if it were carried to a division he should certainly give it his hearty support.

Mr. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN said, he was always desirous of meeting the views of Irish Members if he could possibly do so: he admired the eloquence of the Irish Representatives, even if their arguments failed to convince him, and he thought they would be quite as able as English or Scotch Members to find opportunities for bringing their grievances before the House. Why should Irish Members desire additional privileges? They ought to blush to make such a demand. What did it virtually mean? That, whilst all other Members were clever enough to find means to bring their grievances before the House in the ordinary way, Irish Members alone were not competent to do so. As a friend to Ireland, he indignantly denied such an imputation upon her Representatives. Some Irish Members had, during the course of the debate, spoken as if there were those in the House who thought themselves superior to Irish Members. He was sure he might disclaim such an idea on behalf of every Member of the House; and, for his own part, he should be very sorry to lose the Members from the sister country. But he could not see why Irish Members alone should require special opportunities of bringing their grievances before the House. He dissented from any attempt to separate Irish Members from the great body of the House; and the House would be paying no compliment to the Irish Members by offering them such special protection as they claimed.

Mr. O'SHAUGHNESSY said, no matter how eloquent the speeches of the Irish Members, the grievances had remained; but they should cease, whether Irish affairs were managed in London or in Dublin. If not, they would see, as at present, compliments coming from the front Opposition Bench and stern refusal from the Government. He saw before him the Gentleman representing Hyde Park (Mr. Noel), the Gentleman who represented the workhouses (Mr. Sclater-Booth), and others; but where was the Chief Secretary; he was not in his place? Under the present system one Minister was responsible for every Irish Department, often a young man without claims on Ireland, and totally unacquainted with her position, and even without official training. He was completely in the hands of the officials in Dublin. The system was entirely separate from that which prevailed in England. It only required a man to show some ability in the matter of Irish affairs—as the late Chief Secretary did—and to show he was capable of doing something, to have him promoted, and another person sent in his stead. They might send constabulary soldiers to spy over the sermons in churches; but it was only when Press attacks were made on the Lord Lieutenant that notice was taken of such an occurrence. That state of things could not occur in England, and would not occur in Ireland if ample opportunity were given to expose special abuses. Scotland was part and parcel of this Kingdom, and her affairs were managed at the Home Office. That was not the case with Ireland. He could assure the House that something more than an assimilation of the laws was required before Ireland became prosperous. The country wanted careful, well watched, and impartial administration. Heretofore, the administration had not been careful or impartial—it had been full of abuses, and until these defects were remedied there would be no respect for British laws in Ireland.

MR. SULLIVAN said, it had been suggested that Irish Members wanted to be supplied with facilities beyond the Rules of the House; but what really was the case was that the Irish Members said if the Government were going to restrict the liberties of the House hitherto enjoyed they, at least, would oppose it. They were standing there in defence of existing privileges, and not to ask for any special favour. Their position in the struggle they were making that night was not for the purpose of hindering the progress of the debate on the Rules in any way; but it was because the Irish Members believed sincerely the Government wished to take from them almost the last advantage which they possessed as Members from Ireland. It was argued that as they were steadily voted down by an arithmetical majority, and that nothing they could say would convert the majority, they had better hold their tongues. His answer was that there was a great advantage in their using their place in Parliament for leavening the public opinion of Parliament and the country, and of enlightening them on the way in which Ireland was governed, and the way in which she ought to be governed. The late Chief Justice Whiteside said the country was governed by Larcom and the police. Larcom, he might tell the House, was the Under Secretary of Dublin Castle, and why had he the government of the country in his hands? Because the House was too busy to think about discussing those questions on the Irish Estimates, which really concerned the Government of Ireland. Mr. Horsman, who graduated in Ireland, as did also the late Chief Secretary before he was appointed to look after the Zulus, was asked to say how he governed the country, and his reply was that he did the hunting and Carlisle did the dancing. Since 1874, however, Ireland had a real representation in the House; and at the peril of incurring the misunderstanding of the House, and often even facing its anger, Members had stood there to insist on debating, and thoroughly debating, Irish questions—often inconveniently, sometimes, perhaps, with somewhat of ill-temper, but still discussing them usefully. Whatever progress had been made in England—and there had been great progress in England within the last few years towards a better understanding of Irish questions, and towards a more friendly feeling between the two countries—was consequent on the excitation of English feeling by the debates on Irish grievances; and he had no hesitation in saying that Coercion Bills and Prison Bills, such as existed in Ireland, would not be tolerated in England so long if the English people had better known of their existence. He appealed to the House not to curtail the liberties of the Irish Members; because the present was the only arrangement by which they could protest against a majority which ignored the opinions of the Irish people constitutionally expressed.

MR. PARNELL said, he thought the hon. Member for Edinburgh (Mr. M'Laren) was a little unreasonable in denying to the Irish Members the right of doing something for themselves. The hon. Member had referred to other parts of the Kingdom. Those for whom he (Mr. Parnell) spoke would not be opposed to an extension of the principle which they claimed for themselves to Scotland and to England. On the contrary, he firmly believed that his hon. Friend (Mr. O'Donnell) would willingly agree, if the House desired it, to alter his Amendment so as to include those two countries. At the same time, many of the Irish Representatives believed that there were reasons why, perhaps, Ireland might ask to be exceptionally treated in this matter. There was a very exceptional Government in Ireland, which, practically, consisted of the Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant, who occasionally strolled into the House to see how the amusement was progressing. The Irish Members had not the opportunities which were enjoyed by English and Scotch Representatives of urging their grievances, in connection with the various Departments, upon the attention of the Legislature, and they were few in number in a House consisting of 650 Gentlemen. They were thus placed at a disadvantage from the start in balloting for a place on going into Committee of Supply; and that disadvantage would be increased one hundredfold by the action of the Resolution of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, if it were to be adopted without the Amendment which was now urged. That Amendment appeared to him to be a very small and reasonable proposition. The Leader of the House knew perfectly well that the Irish Members had in no instance misused the privileges which they now possessed; that the questions which they had brought forward had been few in number; and that those questions had not unduly occupied the attention of the House. In these circumstances, surely a little concession of the description now proposed to Irish public opinion was well merited, and he believed that it would be received with kindly feelings. The Chancellor of the Exchequer might think he would facilitate the obtaining of the Irish Estimates by the course which he was following; but if that course were to be persisted in, there was no resource for the Representatives from Ireland but to refuse Votes on Account in connection with all those questions in which they were interested, and thus compel the Government to bring forward their Estimates at an early period of the Session, in order that they might be properly discussed. At present, their discussion was little better than a farce.

Mr. DILLWYN was strongly in favour of there being a more efficient and careful consideration of the Votes; but he could not support a proposal which would give his Irish Friends exceptional privileges.

Mr. Serjeant SIMON said, he sympathized very much with the Irish Representatives in the complaints and grievances which they brought forward; but he could not support them when they sought exceptional privileges which he did not think they could properly ask for. He reminded them that the Rule of 1872, which was substantially the same as the proposal of the hon. and gallant Baronet, which the Government had accepted, was passed by a Parliament which had done more for Ireland than any other, and under no less a person than the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich, one of the best Friends that Ireland ever had. Under his Administration the Church of England and Ireland had been disestablished, and the Land Laws had been altered and brought into conformity with the wishes of the Irish people. It was during the Administration and in a Parliament which had accomplished these things, and many others, for the good of Ireland, that the Rule he was speaking of had been passed, and no Irish Member then, that he could call to mind, had objected to it. Under the circumstances, therefore, he appealed to the Irish Members to withdraw the Amendment.

Mr. MITCHELL HENRY said, the Irish Members were not seeking any exceptional privileges. They simply asked to be allowed to retain those rights which English and Scotch Representatives had willingly given up at the instigation of the two front Benches on either side of the House. This was nothing more nor less than a combination between those two Benches. Those for whom he spoke had done their best to preserve the privileges of the House; but they were the trustees of a poor and weak nation. It was trampled on by the Government Session after Session. ["Oh!"] They were the trustees of a people who were insulted day after day. ["Oh!"] Why, in the course of the recent debate upon the Irish Franchise Question, one Representative—partly an official Member, for he was private Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant—had spoken in a manner which was grossly insulting to Ireland and her people. The Government refused to give Ireland equality of privileges; and its inhabitants were mocked year after year by being told in articles in English newspapers and speeches from the two front Benches in the House that they had the same privileges as England enjoyed. They were now going to take away from the Irish Members even the facility of making their complaints known. Did they suppose that Irish Members, who had been driven to move this Amendment against their will, would now withdraw it? They were perfectly mistaken if they thought they would do anything of the kind. He did not care how small the number might be in the division in favour of the Amendment—it would at least be a protest. He knew hon. Members who represented English and Scotch constituencies, who often voted with the Irish Members, but who would not do so as regarded this Amendment—and for why? Because they knew that in a weak moment they had given up their privileges; and they now saw the stubborn fight the Irish Members were making for the possession of theirs—therefore, the English and Scotch Members would not vote with them, because it would imply that they had not endeavoured sufficiently to keep their own privileges. The Irish Party would carry with them into the Lobby none but the Irish votes; yet it would be a protest which would go farther and would remain on record as a proof or test that they had done what they could to help the English Members to retain their privileges, and that the English Members did not support them when they wanted to retain theirs. Let that fact be known to the country, and it would be known in history; though he ventured to say that this Rule would not remain many years unaltered, because it would be found to trench too much on the privileges of the Members who would form the new Parliament.

Question put.

The House *divided:*—Ayes 31; Noes 131: Majority 100.—(Div. List, No. 22.)

Question,

"That the words 'unless an Amendment be moved relating to the Estimates proposed to be taken in Supply, on first going into Committee on the Army, Navy, and Civil Services respectively,' be added to the First Resolution,"

—put, and *agreed to.*

Main Question, as amended, proposed,

"That, whenever the Committee of Supply appointed for the consideration of the ordinary Army, Navy, and Civil Service Estimates stands as the first Order of the Day on a Monday, Mr. Speaker shall leave the Chair without putting any Question, unless an Amendment be moved or Question raised relating to the Estimates proposed to be taken in Supply on first going into Committee on the Army, Navy, and Civil Services respectively."

MR. PARNELL moved to amend the Resolution, by adding the words—

"And unless Notice has been given of an Amendment to be offered to the Question calling attention to the grievance arising out of the conduct of the Government or the administration of the Laws."

All he wanted was to retain the ancient privilege of calling attention to grievances, and in drawing his Amendment he had carefully followed the words used by Sir Erskine May in his book on Parliamentary practice.

Amendment proposed,

At the end of the Question, to add the words "unless Notice has been given of an Amendment to be offered to the Question calling attention to any grievance arising out of the conduct of the Government or the administration of the Laws."—(*Mr. Parnell.*)

Question proposed, "That those words be there added."

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said, he did not think the House would accept the proposal of the hon. Member, inasmuch as it could only have the effect of introducing great confusion into the conduct of Business as to what was and was not admissible in the way of Amendment to the Motion to go into Committee of Supply. If the Resolution as it was drawn were adopted, there would remain abundant opportunities for calling attention to any grievances which might be alleged to have resulted from mismanagement on the part of the Government, and those opportunities were made conspicuous by the action of hon. Members on the other side.

MR. MORGAN LLOYD said, he had in previous divisions voted in the minority, but on the present occasion he should support Her Majesty's Government; because he regarded the Amendment before the House as an attempt to re-open a question which he thought had been compromised. It might be said that every grievance worthy of being made the subject of an Amendment on going into Committee of Supply was directly or indirectly a grievance arising out of the conduct of the Government, or the administration of the law. The proposed Amendment, therefore, simply raised in another form the question already decided by the House.

MR. O'DONNELL denied that every Amendment which was moved on the Motion to go into Committee of Supply was necessarily a question calling attention to a grievance arising out of the conduct of the Government or the administration of the laws; and it was not a good omen that the Members of the Liberal Party, such as the one who had just spoken, should support the Government in their policy of gagging and despotism. Not only the liberties of the Irish people, but those of the English people, were being sacrificed; and he repeated that it was a curious thing to see that this policy was supported by Members of the Liberal Party, who desired to succeed the present Party in the reins of power.

Mr. O'CONNOR POWER said, that if the argument of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Beaumaris (Mr. Morgan Lloyd) were really a sound one, he should be inclined to appeal to his hon. Friend the Member for Meath (Mr. Parnell) not to press the Amendment.

Mr. O'CLERY remarked that he would give his hearty support to the Amendment of the hon. Member for Meath, because it involved, he thought, a question of great importance to Irish Members, who represented a country where it could not be said that the laws were administered as fairly and equitably as in England. It was, unfortunately, the case that in too many instances legal appointments in that country were bestowed as a reward for services to a particular Party. That principle had been extended even to the Bench; and there was a time when men who had served their Party in that House at the expense of their own honour and conscience were actually raised to the Irish Bench. English Members might be proud that the Judicial Bench in this country had never been disgraced in that way. There had been many offices in Ireland which had been filled up by persons whose sole claims consisted of services, sometimes of a doubtful character, which they had rendered to their Party; and therefore he maintained that the Amendment of his hon. Friend was worthy of consideration, when they took into account the position which Ireland held in that respect. By the Constitution, Ireland was allowed to be represented in that House; and yet they were about to deny to her Representatives the right of criticizing the action of the men whom the Government sent, against their wish, to administer justice in that country. He thought that his hon. Friend deserved the thanks of every liberty-loving man in that House for bringing forward this Amendment; and he sincerely hoped that a good many Members on both sides would be found to support it. He had not taken much part in these discussions; but he must say that, in his humble judgment, the best of the argument had been entirely on the side of the men who had striven to protect the House with its traditions of 600 years of freedom, and the defence of public right against the attempt of a Minister, however powerful, to force his will upon it. It was still not too late to say to the Minister that if he had any regard for the honour of the institutions which Ministers were so much in the habit of extolling at the Mansion House and elsewhere, he would, at any rate, accede to the Amendment, if he could not altogether abandon the Resolution.

Mr. BIGGAR observed that the Amendment raised a very different point to that which usually arose out of Motions moved as Amendments to the Motion that the Speaker leave the Chair. The laws in Ireland were administered by persons who received no salaries, and to whom no money was voted directly or indirectly; so that, in reality, there would be no opportunity during the progress of Votes through Committee whereby to impugn their conduct, should it be thought necessary. Really, in many cases, administration of the law was of the most partial character, and the instances in which magistrates misconducted themselves were by no means rare. Therefore, they ought to have an opportunity, as the occasion arose, of discussing the conduct of the great unpaid. In the case of the Judges it was altogether different, because they could move to reduce their salaries, and perhaps it might become necessary to do so. Some of their Judges administered the law in a manner which made it a burlesque. He had been told by a gentleman connected with the Profession that one of the Judges now on the Bench was thoroughly incapable of trying criminal cases, because his invariable custom was to go for a conviction. What, then, could they expect from the great unpaid, who, in many cases, were thoroughly ignorant of their duties, and were in all cases greatly prejudiced? The Government would do well, therefore, to agree to the Amendment, and thus give an opportunity to hon. Members to raise questions as to the administration of the laws in a Constitutional manner.

Question put.

The House *divided*:—Ayes 47; Noes 139: Majority 92.—(Div. List, No. 23.)

Main Question, as amended, again proposed.

MR. O'CONNOR POWER moved an Amendment to the effect that on Fridays Notices of Motion should have precedence of Orders of the Day.

Amendment proposed,

At the end of the Question, to add the words "and on Fridays Notices of Motion shall have precedence of Orders of the Day."—(*Mr. O'Connor Power.*)

Question proposed, "That those words be there added."

MR. MONK thought the Amendment was one deserving of the attention of the Government. The Government would lose nothing by accepting it, and they would, further, confer a fair and reasonable boon upon Members on Fridays.

MR. SERJEANT SIMON supported the Amendment.

MR. SHAW LEFEVRE pointed out the inconvenience to private Members which arose on Fridays, when Supply was the first Order of the Day, from their being frequently unable to bring their Motions to the test of a Division, owing to the fact that any of the preceding Motions happened to have been negatived. He did not, however, know whether the present Amendment would furnish the best means of obviating that inconvenience.

MR. BERESFORD HOPE disapproved of the Amendment. There had been quite enough in the way of innovation in the conduct of the Business of the House, and in this case matters might with advantage be left as they were. The present Rule imported something of elasticity into their forms, and gave an opening for discussions on topics worthy of consideration, but not calling for cut-and-dry Resolutions. It would be a clear loss to the facile powers of the House if this free and easy method were abolished, and a hard-and-fast compulsion of Divisions on all days substituted.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, without entering into the merits of the question, pointed out that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the Government to make the proposed alteration. He hoped the Amendment would not be pressed, as he apprehended it would not be, in order to attempt to repeal, as it were by a side wind, a Standing Order of the House in accordance with which Supply was set down on the Notice Paper as the first Business on Fridays.

MR. NEWDEGATE said, the system of "calling attention" was almost unheard of when he first entered Parliament. It was a practice which had the effect of debarring the House from expressing an opinion, and, at the same time, enabled individual Members tyrannically to occupy the attention of the House.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON said, he quite agreed with what had been said as to the undesirable practice of invariably negativing the first Motion for going into Supply. He did not believe it was of any advantage to the Government; because the effect was that many of the Motions that remained were put down for some other day. He did not know whether any practical remedy could be adopted against this practice; but it was one which, no doubt, it would be well to put a stop to. With regard to the Amendment that had been moved, there was one suggestion he wished to make for the consideration of Members who delighted to call themselves independent. They ought to recollect that if Friday were converted from an Order Day into a Notice Day, the probability of a "Count-out" on Friday would be increased. At present, it was very much to the interest of the Government to keep a House on Friday; but this would no longer be the case if Friday were converted into a Notice Day. The gain, if any, which the independent Members would obtain would be, to a considerable extent, neutralized by the great risk of losing the evening altogether.

MR. MORGAN LLOYD suggested that the Rules of the House might be altered so far as to allow a Division on every Motion brought forward as an

Amendment to the Motion that the Speaker should leave the Chair.

Mr. PARNELL said, he was very much disappointed with the reply of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The right hon. Gentleman had promised last year to give private Members compensation by making Friday a Motion night instead of a Supply night. Now he seemed to think that private Members ought to have no compensation at all for their loss in giving up Mondays.

Mr. ERRINGTON and Mr. BIGGAR supported the Amendment.

Mr. ANDERSON suggested that, instead of the Speaker putting the Question in a form which, if affirmed, prevented any Amendment, subsequent to the first being voted upon, on a Supply night, he might put it, "That the Amendment be affirmed," and this would allow of every subsequent one being voted upon. The Government might also revert to the old practice of keeping a House on Fridays.

Question put.

The House *divided:*—Ayes 50; Noes 139: Majority 89.—(Div. List, No. 24.)

Main Question, as amended, again proposed.

Mr. BIGGAR said, the next Amendment stood on the Paper in the name of his hon. Friend the Member for Dungarvan (Mr. O'Donnell); but as he was prevented from moving it by the Rules of debate, he had undertaken to move it for him. It was to add, at the end of the amended Resolution—

> "Provided always, That when Notice of a Motion has been given which, but for this Rule, would have been moved on a Monday, the next succeeding Committee of Ways and Means shall be a first Order of the Day, and Notices applicable on going into Committee of Supply on Monday shall be transferred to going into Committee on Ways and Means."

He expected the Government would accept the Amendment, for the reason that originally Ways and Means was included in Supply; but during the early stages of the discussion on this question the Government agreed to withdraw Ways and Means from the operation of the Rule. The object of the Amendment was to give an opportunity of discussing general questions on the Motion to go into Committee of Ways and Means. If the Government assented to this principle it could only be reasonable to make Ways and Means the first Order, as otherwise these questions might be brought on at a very late hour.

Amendment proposed,

> At the end of the Question, to add the words "Provided always, That when Notice of a Motion has been given which, but for this Rule, would have been moved on a Monday, the next succeeding Committee of Ways and Means shall be a first Order of the Day, and Notices applicable on going into Committee of Supply on Monday shall be transferred to going into Committee on Ways and Means."—(*Mr. Biggar.*)

Question proposed, "That those words be there added."

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said, the hon. Member could not have expected the Amendment to be accepted by the Government. According to it, the next succeeding Committee of Ways and Means would be a Wednesday, for it was a Standing Order of the House that Ways and Means should always be on the Paper on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays. Therefore, the next day for the Committee would be Wednesday. The hon. Member next proposed that the Committee on that day should have precedence. But by the Rules of the House Bills of private Members had precedence on Wednesdays. Therefore, this proposal would create considerable confusion. He did not himself see what object would be gained by the Amendment; because if any hon. Member failed to bring on his Motion on Committee of Supply he could himself postpone it to the next occasion of Ways and Means, with the exception, of course, that he could not take precedence of those hon. Members who had already put their Motions. They would only be encumbering themselves by passing this Resolution.

Mr. O'DONNELL said, the Chancellor of the Exchequer had very clearly and lucidly shown that the concession of the Committee of Ways and Means, on which he laid so much stress last week, did not amount to anything at all. He had asked the House to give the Government a great deal of credit for their concessions with regard to the Committee of Ways and Means; but as it was now admitted that by the present Standing Orders the Committee was only fixed for certain days, it was quite clear that to call attention to grievances previously would be very little use. It followed conclusively that the Government had made a concession which was, in fact, no concession whatever; and he strongly suspected that several other so-called concessions should be cast under the same head.

MR. BIGGAR said, by the advice of his hon. Friend the Member for Dungarvan (Mr. O'Donnell) he would withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, *withdrawn.*

Main Question, as amended, put.

The House *divided:*—Ayes 130; Noes 50: Majority 80.—(Div. List, No. 25.)

Resolved, That, whenever the Committee of Supply appointed for the consideration of the ordinary Army, Navy, and Civil Service Estimates stands as the first Order of the Day on a Monday, Mr. Speaker shall leave the Chair without putting any question, unless an Amendment be moved or Question raised relating to the Estimates proposed to be taken in Supply on first going into Committee on the Army, Navy, and Civil Services respectively.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said, there were other Resolutions on the Paper, but it would be obviously impossible to move them at that hour. He should propose, therefore, that they stand over till Thursday week. On Thursday his right hon. and gallant Friend the Secretary of State for War would introduce the Mutiny Bill; and he hoped on that day to take Supply as the first Order for the purpose of taking some Supplementary Estimates, which would be presented next day—Tuesday—for the purpose of providing for the Exchequer Bonds, shortly falling due. He hoped to lay the Estimates on the Table to-night (Tuesday), to have them in the hands of Members on Wednesday, and to go into Committee of Supply on Thursday.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON supposed that the Orders of the Day would be postponed after Supply had been taken till the Mutiny Bill had been brought in.

MAJOR NOLAN asked whether the Government could bring on the Mutiny Bill in that way before the Army Estimates had been submitted?

COLONEL STANLEY said, it was perfectly competent for the Government to do this. The Mutiny Bill of this year would consist of two parts—one that which he proposed to introduce on Thursday, and the other the annual Bill, which gave the actual control over the Force.

MAJOR NOLAN said, he had always understood that the Mutiny Bill could not be introduced till after the Army Estimates had been voted. Was this a change that the Government was introducing; and, if so, what authority had they for making it?

MR. ASSHETON CROSS said, the Secretary of State for War proposed to introduce on Thursday what was, in fact, an Army Discipline Bill; and this, when passed, would be a permanent Act. He would also introduce afterwards a short Mutiny Bill, which would have to be passed year by year, and which undoubtedly could not be introduced until the Army Estimates had been brought in.

Further Consideration of Resolutions relating to the Business of the House *deferred* till *Thursday* 6th March.

ASSIZES BILL—[BILL 83.]

(*Sir Matthew Ridley, Mr. Secretary Cross.*)

SECOND READING.

Order for Second Reading read.

SIR MATTHEW WHITE RIDLEY, in moving that the Bill be now read a second time, said, it gave the Government power by an Order in Council to group certain counties and boroughs together for the purpose of the Spring Assizes, as it would be in the knowledge of some hon. Members had already been done in the case of the Winter Assizes. The Spring Assizes would shortly commence; and it was very important, therefore, that this Bill should be at once passed. Its object was to effect an economy of time and labour; and therefore he hoped the House would not object to read it a second time.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."—(*Sir Matthew Ridley.*)

MR. PARNELL thought more time should have been given for considering the bearing of this important measure. Did it apply to Ireland? ["No!"] If it did not, his objections to it were, to a certain extent, removed; but, at the same time, he doubted whether it was desirable to have additional Assizes. The Bill of last year had not worked particularly well. In any case, however, he thought the practice of bringing in Bills of that importance at so late an hour was to be deprecated.

Mr. ASSHETON CROSS said, the Assizes began on the 22nd of next month; and unless this Bill passed it would be necessary for the Judges to go to each town on the Circuit, to the great expense of the country, the jurors, and everybody else. The Bill was simply to enable small counties to be grouped together, in order to save expense at the Spring Assizes.

Mr. COURTNEY said, he wished to ask a Question on a point of Order. He understood the hon. Member for Cumberland had given Notice of an Amendment to the Bill?

Mr. ASSHETON CROSS: He has withdrawn it.

Mr. WADDY asked the House whether it was a right and proper thing to ask them to pass a Bill which was not printed? [Mr. Assheton Cross: Oh, yes, it is.] He asked for the Bill within the last ten minutes at the Office, and was told that he could not have one, as the Bill was not printed. [Mr. Assheton Cross: It was circulated last Saturday.] As a matter of fact, he had asked for it within the last ten minutes, and told that he could not have it.

Mr. MORGAN LLOYD said, the Bill appeared to him to be one of a merely temporary nature. There was a difficulty in regard to the Spring Assizes which could only be got over by the passage of a short Act of this kind. He should like to ask whether this Bill was to be considered as finally settling the question of the arrangement of the Assizes, or whether, even supposing the Bill passed, the House might not have an opportunity hereafter of discussing the whole question?

Mr. ASSHETON CROSS hoped the House would allow him to explain that this Bill was not at all meant as a settlement of the question. The House would have another opportunity of fully discussing the whole matter.

Motion *agreed to.*

Bill read a second time, and *committed* for *Thursday.*

Mr. Parnell

HABITUAL DRUNKARDS [SALARIES, STAMP DUTY, &c.].

Considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

Resolved, That it is expedient to authorise the payment, out of moneys to be provided by Parliament, of the Salaries, Remuneration, Allowances, and Expenses of the Inspecter and Assistant Inspector of Retreats; also of imposing a Stamp Duty on Licences for the admission of Patients into Retreats, and for the renewal of such Licences, which may become payable under the provisions of any Act of the present Session to facilitate the control and cure of Habitual Drunkards.

Resolution to be reported *To-morrow.*

HABITUAL DRUNKARDS BILL.

(*Dr. Cameron, Mr. Clare Read, Mr. Ashley, Sir Henry Jackson, Mr. Edward Jenkins, Mr. William Holms, Mr. O'Shaughnessy.*)

[BILL 47.] COMMITTEE.

Order for Committee read.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."—(*Dr. Cameron.*)

Mr. DILLWYN said, he very much disliked the principle of the Bill, and he opposed the second reading; but as the feeling of the House was evidently very much in favour of the measure, and there was a great disposition to pass it, he would not put the House to the trouble of dividing. Since then he had communicated with his hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow (Dr. Cameron), and that Gentleman had accepted some suggestions he had made, which seemed to him to get rid of the dangers to the liberty of the subject. He would not, therefore, now be under the necessity of further opposing the Bill, and he should offer no objection to the Speaker leaving the Chair.

Motion *agreed to.*

Bill *considered* in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

Preliminary.

Clause 1 (Short title) *agreed to.*

Clause 2 (Commencement of Act).

Mr. DILLWYN said, the object of the Amendment of which he had given Notice was to prevent the Bill being made absolute, so far as regarded persons who had a pecuniary interest in retaining persons under their charge. In this respect the Bill ought to be limited, and to be treated merely as an experiment. He, therefore, proposed that the Act should only extend to the year 1886, by adding at the end of the clause—

> "And in the case of retreats kept by private persons shall cease and determine on the first day of January one thousand eight hundred and eighty six."

Amendment *moved,* at end of Clause to add—

> "And in the case of retreats kept by private persons shall cease and determine on the first day of January one thousand eight hundred and eighty six."—(*Mr. Dillwyn.*)

DR. CAMERON said, he had no objection to the Amendment which only affected retreats kept by private persons for their own profit. If it were passed, however, it would be necessary further on to introduce a definition into the Bill exempting from the operation of this Amendment institutions maintained by private charity, which were not open to the objection raised by the hon. Member for Swansea.

Amendment *agreed to.*

Clause, as amended, *agreed to.*

Clause 3 (Interpretation) *agreed to.*

Clause 4 (Incorporation of Schedules with Forms and Rules therein) *agreed to.*

Clause 5 (Local authority and clerk to local authority) *agreed to.*

Retreats.

Clause 6 (Establishment of retreats) *agreed to.*

Clause 7 (Power of local authority to transfer licence) *agreed to.*

Clause 8 (Removal of habitual drunkard from unfit habitation. Notice of such removal).

DR. CAMERON moved, in page 3, line 30, after "Act," to insert "or otherwise unsuitable for its purpose."

Amendment *agreed to.*

MR. DILLWYN moved, in page 3, line 31, after "Act," to insert "shall order the discharge from such retreat and." By the clause as it stood it was optional whether or not the inmates should be discharged. He proposed to make the clause compulsory; for he did not think people ought to be maintained in retreats of this character which had been declared to be unfit for their habitation.

Amendment *agreed to.*

Clause, as amended, *agreed to.*

Clause 9 (Persons may be admitted to retreats on their own application).

MR. DILLWYN moved, in page 4, to leave out "the" at the beginning of line 9, and insert

> "by a personal interview with the applicant unaccompanied by any other person he has satisfied himself that the said."

He desired in every case that the applicant should be personally free to act as he thought best; and that, therefore, he should see the magistrate unaccompanied by any other person.

Amendment proposed,

> In page 4, line 9, to leave out the word "the," and insert the words "by a personal interview with the applicant unaccompanied by any other person he has satisfied himself that the said."—(*Mr. Dillwyn.*)

Question proposed, "That the word 'the' stand part of the Clause."

MR. MITCHELL HENRY said, the wording of the Amendment was rather awkward, because it might be very desirable that the person going before a magistrate should be accompanied by someone.

MR. DILLWYN said, that was just the object he had in view. He did not want a man to go to the Justice in a state of drunkenness; but he wished him to go when he was sober, and knew what he was about. When a man really did not know what he was about, he ought not to be able to sign away his liberty in this manner.

DR. CAMERON thought the Amendment was not so objectionable as his hon. Friend (Mr. Mitchell Henry) thought. Under the clause as it stood the habitual drunkard would go before the Justice with his friends, and produce such evidence as was necessary to prove that the man was an habitual drunkard. Then, if the Amendment were added, the Justice would retire with the habitual drunkard, and convince himself, if necessary, that it was the habitual drunkard's own desire to have himself committed. In that way, the object of his hon. Friend, that the man's promise should not be unjustly obtained, would be attained.

An hon. MEMBER thought it might be left to the judgment of the Justice without instructing him to retire with this lady or gentleman, as the case might be, and examine them privately.

MR. MITCHELL HENRY said, the Amendment would be a most disagreeable one to enforce. The Justice might be an aged gentleman, and it would be very unpleasant for him to be required to go into a private room with an individual who came before him placarded, as it were, with the name of habitual drunkard, and who might be on the very verge of *delirium tremens,* and who, when he got him into the private room, might take it into his head to ill-treat him. He submitted that this was not an Amendment which would improve the Bill in any substantial degree, or would in any particular way protect the liberty of the subject; while it might place gentlemen who were intrusted with the administration of the law in a very painful and invidious position.

EARL PERCY said, the speech of the hon. Member who had just sat down seemed to him a strong argument for the Amendment. The Bill was not intended to affect people who were on the verge of *delirium tremens,* or to give a Justice of the Peace power to send such persons into retirement. The Bill really was intended for persons who were in the habit of getting intoxicated, and who, being perfectly conscious of their failing, were yet unable by the present law to sign away their liberty.

MR. DALRYMPLE said, the hon. Member for Swansea (Mr. Dillwyn), having been strongly opposed to the Bill in the first instance, was now desirous to make it as inoperative as possible. The object of the hon. Member for Glasgow (Dr. Cameron) had been to make terms with him; and he had therefore accepted, to a considerable extent, the Amendments of the hon. Member. Of course, one object of the Bill was to induce persons voluntarily to enter these retreats; but, at the same time, he ventured to think there might be cases in which a certain amount of pressure, not of an unfriendly kind, and not in the nature of compulsion, should be brought to bear to induce these drunkards to enter a retreat, and where this was so it would be unnecessary that they should go before the Justice, accompanied by their friends. The Amendment would defeat the benevolent design of the Bill; and he could not but think that the hon. Member for Glasgow, in his desire to propitiate the hon. Member for Swansea, had accepted this Amendment too readily, and had fallen into a trap. He did not suppose for a moment the Amendment would be withdrawn in consequence of what he said; but he did think that it would do harm in the very cases with which the Bill was especially designed to deal.

MR. DILLWYN said, a man in a state of half-maudlin repentance might be induced and wheedled into going before a magistrate, not liking to say no to his friends, although all the time he did not really wish it; and therefore he thought the Amendment more important than other hon. Members apparently considered it to be. He was sure that the hon. Members did not wish a man to go into a retreat against his own inclinations; and he only wished to make sure that nobody went in except of their own free will.

LORD FRANCIS HERVEY said, it was by no means certain that the Amendment would have the effect intended by the hon. Member for Swansea, and the presence of a third person might act as a check on the Justice signing too hastily. On the other hand, it might very well be that a person applying for an order to enter one of these retreats might be brusque, offensive, or even a little alarming, in his demeanour, and the magistrate might consider that quite sufficient proof, and sign the warrant off straight at once.

COLONEL MAKINS said, the whole object of the Bill was to give habitual drunkards an opportunity of retrieving their character; and it did not much matter whether, when they applied to enter a retreat, they were in a half-maudlin state or not. If the man was in that state the magistrate could decline, under the provisions of the Act, to exercise his functions; while, on the other hand, if the man was sufficiently himself to sign away his own freedom, that would only be quite carrying out the object of the Act.

Question put.

The Committee *divided:*—Ayes 43; Noes 35: Majority 8.—(Div. List, No. 26.)

Clause *agreed to.*

Clause 10 (Licensee of retreats to send notice of admission) *agreed to.*

Clause 11 (Power of discharge).

DR. CAMERON moved, in page 4, line 24, after "proprietor," to insert "licensee." The Amendment was purely a verbal one.

Amendment *agreed to.*

MR. DILLWYN moved, in the same line, after "retreat," to insert—

> "Or of that of such person, a clear week's notice having been given by him or her to the licensee of the retreat."

He thought an habitual drunkard, when he was shut up in one of these places, ought to have the power of getting out again; and he therefore proposed to place in his hands the same power of applying to a Justice of the Peace that the Bill gave to the licensee. Of course, the applicant would have to satisfy himself that the case was made out, and then he would have power to make an order of release.

MR. WHITWELL thought there ought to be an addition to the clause, so as to deal with the case of a licensee who had received money for a patient. There ought to be a provision that he should not go out at once, but should remain for a certain time.

EARL PERCY said, the hon. Member really ought not to press his Amendment. If he entertained such views, he ought to have moved the rejection of the Bill. The object of the Bill was to place persons in a position where they could not change their minds, and get out of one of these retreats as soon as they had a wish to do so. The clause directly enabled them to do that. It was true the patient must give a week's notice. He spoke under the correction of persons who knew more of these diseases than he did, when he said that this would make very little difference. On the other hand, there was no limit to the trouble which a patient might give. He might apply to one Justice after another, going in turn to all the Justices on the Bench, until he found one who took a crotchety view of this question, and let him out. He appreciated most fully the desire of the hon. Gentleman to protect the liberty of the subject, and he voted with him in his last Amendment; but this proposal would really defeat the whole object of the Bill.

MR. MITCHELL HENRY said, he sat on the Committee which inquired into this question three years ago, and he quite agreed with the noble Lord that the Amendment which had been proposed would overthrow the Bill. Habitual drunkards were persons who were habitually getting drunk and being sorry for it afterwards—persons whose infirmity of mind made it necessary to legislate for them. They were, in fact, in a manner, insane persons, having sober and lucid moments. In those sober and lucid moments they formed good resolutions, which they were not able to carry out, and so relapsed again into drunkenness. The object of the Bill was that when they had these favourable impulses, after a debauch of drunkenness, they should be enabled to place themselves under control in one of these retreats for a certain length of time. The habitual drunkard could not expect to be cured by one incarceration. He might go in for two or three months, and be discharged, and relapse again. That would almost certainly happen, because all experience showed that an habitual drunkard was only cured by a long period of incarceration in a retreat. Next time, then, the patient would agree to go there for eight or nine months, or perhaps a year, and then he would be radically cured. But under this Amendment, by the time his system had got rid of all the alcohol it contained, and the patient was beginning to get into sound health, he would wish to be out again, and the consequence would be that he would be able of his own desire to remove himself from that remedial legislation which it was the very object of this Bill to provide. Anybody under the Bill would be able to place himself in one of these retreats for a period in no case longer than 12 months, and certainly 12 months was a very short time taken out of the life of a man in which to cure him thoroughly of so terrible a disease as that of habitual drunkenness, a disease, too, which brought so many evils upon society.

For his part, he greatly pitied his hon. Friend in charge of the Bill. He could hardly approve of this Amendment, and yet he knew perfectly well that the Forms of the House of Commons would enable the hon. Gentleman the Member for Swansea to defeat the Bill if his opposition were continued. Therefore, he had been obliged to make terms with him, and to give way on Amendments of this kind. He hoped, however, that the House would come to his assistance, and would so deal with the Bill that, when passed, it should be a real good measure.

Mr. DALRYMPLE hoped the Committee would not only stand between the hon. Member for Swansea (Mr. Dillwyn) and the Bill, but that it would also stand between the hon. Member for Glasgow (Dr. Cameron) and his Bill. On the last division, that hon. Member, by telling with the hon. Member for Swansea, had voted distinctly against what were the interests of his own Bill. The fact was the hon. Member for Glasgow had had a bad time of it with the hon. Member for Swansea, and, no doubt, he felt bound to vote in that way in fulfilment of his compact. But that only the more made it the duty of the Committee to befriend the Bill, and to protect it from the danger in which it was placed by its author. The one object of the Bill, when once an habitual drunkard had gone into a retreat, was to detain him there as long as the Bill permitted; and there would be little or no chance of reforming him if the Amendment were carried. He would only have to apply to a Justice to let him out, and then the whole object of the Bill would be defeated. It had happened to him, in consequence of the name he bore—the same as that of a former advocate of this measure—to receive a great many communications on this subject, and that must be his excuse for taking part in the debate. Many of the cases he had heard of would not be remedied at all by remaining a week or two in the retreat. The hon. Member for Swansea was endeavouring, by every means in his power, to weaken the Bill, and he would entreat the Committee to resist his Amendment.

Mr. MORGAN LLOYD said, if the Bill was a good one, they certainly ought to reject the Amendment; because, if carried, it would render the measure perfectly useless. A drunkard would get sober in a week, or less, and then he would apply to a magistrate; and no magistrate, he felt certain, would consider himself justified in detaining a sober man in a retreat if he wished to get out. Therefore, he hoped this Amendment would be rejected.

Sir MATTHEW WHITE RIDLEY said, it was very desirable that proper safeguards should be placed on the powers given by the Bill, and certainly every reasonable facility should be given to a man to get out if he wanted. But the object of the hon. Member for Swansea would be attained with equal effect by the insertion of the words now proposed in Clause 17. That clause enabled a Justice of the Peace, at the request of the licensee, to grant a licence to the person in the retreat to go out. The addition of a few words so as to include all applications from this person also would fairly meet the case. Suppose, for instance, after a man had been in for a fortnight or three weeks he felt himself a changed being, a sober man, and his friends were willing to take charge of him, they could then obtain a licence and take him out, or he could apply for it himself and go out.

Mr. DILLWYN said, if the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary (Sir Matthew Ridley) would propose that alteration in Clause 17, he would accept the suggestion.

Earl PERCY said, he should oppose any such proposal. The whole principle of the Bill was that the habitual drunkard should be placed in a position in which he could not, of his own action, escape from these retreats. Of course, if the Amendment were inserted in Clause 17, the same result would follow as if the words were put in. The patient would go the round of the magistrates, until he found one who would give him a licence—perhaps against the advice of the licensee who had charge of him—and the whole value of the Bill would be destroyed.

Mr. MITCHELL HENRY said, this Amendment should be opposed in the interests of the drunkard himself. If he knew that he had an opportunity of getting out of these retreats whenever he thought desirable, his mind would be kept in a state of constant turmoil, and he would always be thinking that he ought to be let out. The principal object of these retreats was to produce perfect tranquillity in the mind of the patient. If he knew he was in for a certain time he would remain there quietly, and go out at the end a better man. But if these words were inserted in either this clause or the 17th clause, the patient would be in a constant state of agitation; and therefore, for his sake, it would be a cruel thing to pass the Amendment.

THE CHAIRMAN: Do I understand that the Amendment is withdrawn?

MR. DILLWYN said, he would withdraw it, on the understanding that the Under Secretary (Sir Matthew Ridley) would propose the Amendment he had sketched out when Clause 17 came on. He admitted that he objected to the principle of the Bill, and he was doing his best to minimize its evils. He preferred his own Amendment; but he would, nevertheless, accept the suggestion of the Under Secretary.

An hon. MEMBER hoped that the Under Secretary would give no such pledge. The proposed Amendment would frustrate the whole Bill and render it useless. A person once in would always be coming out if this Amendment were accepted.

DR. CAMERON said, the provision in the Bill for granting licences was intended for a numerous class of persons who could not afford to submit to any prolonged detention, and who, if they were obliged to do so, would prefer not to submit to any restraint whatever. Many cases had come under his notice of gentlemen belonging to certain Professions who for a long time would be perfectly sober and rational, and very anxious to keep free from the weakness of which they were perfectly well aware; but every now and then they would break out and go desperate lengths. It occurred to the promoters of the Bill that many gentlemen who, from the nature of their occupation, could not submit to a long incarceration, might be induced to put themselves under restraint for a short time, on the understanding that they should be let out under licence under the care of friends. These persons would hold licences, and the fact of their escaping from the care of their friend, or giving way to intemperate habits contrary to his advice and command, would be deemed a revocation of the licence. Then the patient could be at once taken back to the retreat, instead of being allowed to go on a prolonged drinking bout.

MR. WADDY hoped the hon. Baronet the Under Secretary would not give way to the suggestion. If the Amendment were carried, a man might make 52 applications to go out during the year he was under restraint, and even more, if there were several Justices resident in his district. The Amendment would make the Bill unpractical and absurd. He hoped the hon. Baronet would give no such pledge. It was one thing to make a suggestion; if, on the other hand, an Amendment was moved from the Government Bench, it largely increased the difficulties of the promoters of the Bill.

SIR MATTHEW WHITE RIDLEY said, he certainly never intended to convey that he would move the words which he had suggested would be more fitly inserted, if at all, in Clause 17. It would, of course, be his duty later on to consider how the Bill affected his Department; but before putting down Amendments, he was anxious to see how the Bill would be shaped in Committee.

MR. DILLWYN said, he would himself propose the words as suggested.

Amendment, by leave, *withdrawn.*

Clause, as amended, *agreed to.*

THE CHAIRMAN: I must point out to the hon. Member for Glasgow that Clause 12 cannot be passed in the present form, as the Committee has not yet reported the Resolutions on the Bill.

DR. CAMERON said, he would postpone that clause, and Clause 13, till the Report.

Inspection and Visitation of Retreats.

Clause 12 (Inspectors and assistant inspectors of retreats may be appointed by the Secretary of State) *postponed.*

Clause 13 (License to bear stamp. Fees to be accounted for to local authority) *postponed.*

Clause 14 (Inspection of retreats).

DR. CAMERON moved, in page 5, line 23, after "retreat," to insert—

> "And shall at the same time furnish to the clerk of the local authority of the district in which each retreat is situated, a copy of any report affecting such retreat."

His object simply was that copies of the Reports sent to the Home Secretary should also be sent to the clerk of the local authority, in order that they might know what was going on in the district under their jurisdiction.

Amendment *agreed to.*

Clause, as amended, *agreed to.*

Clause 15 (Rules as to visitation of retreats) *agreed to.*

Clause 16 (Judge of High Court of Justice, &c., may make orders to inspect) *agreed to.*

Leave of Absence from Retreat.

Clause 17 (Permission that person detained may reside out of retreat).

MR. DILLWYN said, he would move, as suggested by his hon. Friend the Under Secretary, in page 6, line 3, after "drunkard" to insert—

> "Or at the request of such person, a clear week's notice having been given by him or her to the licensee of the retreat, may."

He would only say, in answer to what had fallen from his hon. Friends, that of course the magistrate would use his discretion, and would not grant a licence without due inquiry. Something had been said of the American system; but he happened to have some American papers sent him the other day, in which it was said that these retreats had broken down in that country, and been an entire failure.

Amendment proposed,

> In page 6, line 3, after the word "drunkard," to insert the words "or at the request of such person, a clear week's notice having been given by him or her to the licensee of the retreat may."—(*Mr. Dillwyn.*)

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted."

MR. MITCHELL HENRY said, if his hon. Friend had read all that the American newspapers had said about these retreats, he would have learned that one great reason why they had failed was because the period of detention was not long enough. Another point brought out very strongly by a very pains-taking and patient Committee, which sat on this subject upstairs three years ago, was that to be effectual the confinement of the patient must be for a considerable period of time, or it was perfectly useless. The Committee must remember that this Bill was not intended for persons who occasionally got drunk, but for persons who were almost insane, who were quite unable to control themselves, who dissipated their property, and brought untold misery on their families by their craving for drink, and yet who were not mad enough to be called insane. So far from this power of leaving the retreat being any good to such people, it would be a great evil inflicted upon them.

EARL PERCY said, the Amendment did not read, for it spoke of "such person" although there was no "person" previously mentioned in the clause. As to the principle of it, he could only point out, as he had done before, that if this power of appealing to magistrates were given, a man would be certain to find some Justice who would give the required licence. That would result in removing the control which it was the object of the Bill to confer. As to what was said about America, the principle of the Bill had already been discussed, and these points were then satisfactorily answered. In any case, that objection struck at the Bill itself, and should have been raised on the second reading.

MR. DALRYMPLE said, the hon. Member for Swansea appeared to claim the support of his hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for the Home Department for his Amendment, but he (Mr. Dalrymple) understood that the Under Secretary did not do more than suggest that this was a suitable place to propose the Amendment; and he certainly did not understand him to say he would support it. The great point was to get the patient into one of these retreats, and not to let him be able to leave it prematurely, which would do him the greatest possible harm. He certainly should oppose the Amendment, and would divide upon it, even if no one else would do so.

MR. WADDY said, the Amendment would place the Justice of the Peace in a very great difficulty. A man might be sufficiently sober to be quite fit apparently to go out; and yet his craving for liquor at that very time might make that exactly the position in which he ought not to be.

MR. ANDERSON said, the keeper of the retreat was the man most interested in keeping people in, and yet it was solely on his petition that they were to be allowed to get out; and as regarded the argument of the noble Lord opposite (Earl Percy), who seemed afraid of facile Justices, he asked if Justices might not be as easily influenced to put men into these retreats as the noble Lord seemed to think they would be to let them out? It might even happen that a Justice might be a relative of the patient, and pecuniarily interested in shutting him up. Care should be taken that there were not too many facilities in the Bill for putting persons in these retreats.

MR. MACARTNEY said, the hon. Member had overlooked the very strong safeguards in Clause 16.

Question put.

The Committee *divided*:—Ayes 11; Noes 58: Majority 47.—(Div. List, No. 27.)

MAJOR NOLAN said, he would advise the hon. Member for Swansea not to go into the Lobby with so small a number of Members again. The hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate) had formed a Schedule of all Members who voted in Divisions under 20; and if the hon. Member divided again he would find himself scheduled.

Clause *agreed to.*

Clause 18 (Absence to be reckoned in time of detention) *agreed to.*

Clause 19 (Habitual drunkard may forfeit leave of absence) *agreed to.*

Clause 20 (Revocation of leave of absence) *agreed to.*

Offences.

Clause 21 (Penalty for false statements) *agreed to.*

Clause 22 (Offences by licensees of retreats) *agreed to.*

Clause 23 (Offences by officers, servants, and other persons).

DR. CAMERON moved, in page 6, line 38, after "act" to insert—

> "Or neglects, or permits to be neglected, any habitual drunkard placed in the retreat in respect of which he is licensed."

These words were inserted to remedy a defect in the Bill—that it did not secure the attention of the licensee to his patient.

THE CHAIRMAN pointed out that the Amendment did not read.

DR. CAMERON explained that the Amendment applied to Clause 22.

THE CHAIRMAN said, that the hon. Member was now too late to move it.

DR. CAMERON said, he would bring it up on the Report. He would then move to insert in place of the words "lawful authority" the words "the authority of the licensee or the medical officer of the retreat." The only question was as to with whom the right to order these things rested, and the Amendment cleared that up.

LORD FRANCIS HERVEY asked whether the authority of the licensee, when he was not a properly qualified medical officer, was sufficient for the administration of narcotics and the other drugs mentioned? If they left the administration of these drugs to a person who was not a skilled practitioner, they might have serious consequences.

DR. CAMERON said, it would be the business of the licensee to conduct the institution in such a way that his administration should be attended with the greatest amount of success. If he were to allow the indiscriminate use of stimulants in the retreat he would defeat his own object, and very soon come to the ground. It was very desirable to guard against any improper use of stimulants, but occasions might occur on which it would be necessary to administer something of this kind on the spot; and if the medical officer were not there, the insertion of the suggested words would enable the licensee to use them. Otherwise, no person could administer stimulants without being liable to some penalty.

LORD FRANCIS HERVEY said, he remembered a case in which some patients were treated with hydrate of chloral, or something of that sort, to keep them quiet and make them amenable to discipline, and death was the result. However that might be, the licensee might be tempted to treat unruly and undisciplined patients in this way; and if the licensee were not a medical man and acquainted with drugs the most serious consequences might happen.

DR. CAMERON said, in the case referred to a medical man administered the drugs, and therefore there was no want of the proper qualification. In the case of sleeplessness arising from the want of drink there was a very considerable difference of opinion among medical men as to the use of narcotics and stimulants, and it was certainly not the intention that unqualified and uneducated licensees should treat such cases.

Mr. HERSCHELL said, as to bringing stimulants on to the premises, authority might be intrusted either to the licensee or the medical officer. He would suggest that the words should run thus—

> "Without the authority of the licensee or the medical officer brings into any retreat or without the authority of the medical officer of the retreat, except in case of urgent necessity gives or supplies," &c.

In case of urgent necessity there would be power to do it; while, in the case of general treatment, it would only be fair to require the authority of the medical officer. That would meet the objection.

Amendment *agreed to.*

Dr. CAMERON moved, in page 7, line 9, after "sedative" to insert "narcotic."

Amendment *agreed to.*

Clause, as amended, *agreed to.*

Clause 24 (Offences by habitual drunkards while detained in retreats) *agreed to.*

Clause 25 (Escape from retreat).

Mr. DILLWYN said, he should move an Amendment here, undeterred by the warning of his hon. and gallant Friend (Major Nolan), and he did hope the Home Office would support him a little more strongly. The clause dealt with the re-capture of escaped habitual drunkards, and he thought it would give rise to great abuse of the law. Where a man escaped he ought not to be liable to re-capture, at any rate by the servants of the retreat; but a proper officer should be employed. He entirely objected to Jack, Tom, or Harry being intrusted with this power, and he would move, in line 26, to leave out "by any officer, attendant, servant, or other person employed in or about such retreat."

The LORD ADVOCATE said, nothing could be more dangerous than to intrust the liberty of any man at large to the mere servant of any licensee in the general words of the clause. It was not done in the case of a lunatic asylum, so far as he was aware, though there were stronger reasons there for the detention and recovery of a man who had escaped. There was no limitation to the power of the clause, and a man who had been at liberty a fortnight or more might be taken back to the asylum. The framer of the Bill ought to consider the whole structure of the clause. He did not know exactly what a peace officer meant. It meant one thing in England, and another in Scotland. He had also the greatest reluctance to intrust to any man—peace officer, constable, or anyone else—the right of interfering with the liberty of the subject, without a warrant at his back. If he had a warrant, it should either come from the licensee, or some person responsible for his agent. He heartily supported the Amendment.

Dr. CAMERON thought the suggestion a good one; but pointed out that the licence was intended to give greater freedom to the patients, and prevent the necessity for always keeping them within four walls.

Mr. WHEELHOUSE said, the clause was far too wide. If a peace officer had a warrant they would know whence he got his right to act; but to give him the power to act without a warrant seemed to him very dangerous, and contrary to all precedent. He would move to substitute the word "by" for the word "without" in page 7, line 28.

Mr. MITCHELL HENRY thought it would be better to postpone the whole clause, or allow the Law Officers of the Crown to confer with the Home Office and the hon. Member for Glasgow.

Mr. ASSHETON CROSS said, his hon. and learned Friend and Colleague had undertaken to see the clause was properly settled; but they certainly ought not to pass it as it stood, and it should be amended as suggested.

Amendment, as amended, *agreed to.*

Mr. DALRYMPLE said, it was useless to oppose an Amendment of the clause supported as it was; but it had entirely changed the character of the clause. It might not be right to give to the attendant of an institution the power of arrest without warrant; but to call in an officer of the peace and to arm him with a warrant was to introduce machinery foreign to the character of the Bill. He suggested that the clause should be withdrawn for the present.

MR. BULWER said, the clause had better be postponed to the Report, and in the interval the necessary forms and machinery could be provided and the clause settled. If the Bill passed as it stood, not a magistrates' clerk in the Kingdom would be able to draw up the warrant.

DR. CAMERON said, he would withdraw the clause for the present.

Clause, by leave, *withdrawn.*

Remaining clauses *agreed to.*

THE CHAIRMAN: I must point out to the hon. Member that it is usual to consider postponed clauses before the Schedule.

DR. CAMERON: I will move to report Progress.

Motion *agreed to.*

Committtee report Progress; to sit again upon *Wednesday.*

PRENUPTIAL CONTRACTS BILL.

(*Mr. O'Shaughnessy, Mr. Courtney, Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Joseph Cowen.*)

[BILL 60.] SECOND READING.

Order for Second Reading read.

Second Reading *deferred* till *Wednesday.*

Notice taken, that 40 Members were not present; House counted, and 40 Members not being present,

House adjourned at ten minutes before Two o'clock.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Tuesday, 25th February, 1879.

MINUTES.]—PUBLIC BILL—*First Reading*—Medical Act, 1858, Amendment (16).

MEDICAL ACT, 1858, AMENDMENT BILL.

BILL PRESENTED. FIRST READING.

THE DUKE OF RICHMOND AND GORDON, in presenting a Bill to amend the Medical Act, 1858, said, it was not necessary that he should enter at any length upon the previous legislation with regard to medical education, as he did so last Session; but he might remind their Lordships that the object of the Bill he then submitted to their Lordships, and which he had now the honour of laying on the Table, was to amend the Act of 1858, which, though it contained a great number of valuable enactments and provided for the granting of certificates by Conjoint Boards to practise in medicine and surgery in England, Ireland, and Scotland, yet contained no compulsory provision for that purpose. The Conjoint Examination Board had, in reality, never come into action. No steps had been taken by Scotland or Ireland for the formation of a Conjoint Board, though in England some progress had been made in that direction. The matter remained unaltered until the year 1870; but in the latter year the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Ripon), who preceded him in the Privy Council, introduced a measure in that House for the purpose of amending the Medical Act of 1858. That measure provided that the establishment of a Conjoint Board should be compulsory instead of permissive, and that a certificate to be given by the Board to an applicant should qualify him to enter the Medical Profession. That Bill was discussed and carried through all its stages in their Lordships' House; but in the other House of Parliament it failed to pass, in consequence of the Medical Association having objected to the constitution of the Medical Council. The Medical Association desired that there should be a representation on the Medical Council of the whole Medical Profession. The opposition which was instituted against his noble Friend's Bill in the other House of Parliament was successful; and from that time until last year, he (the Duke of Richmond) thought he was right in saying no medical legislation on the part of the Government had been attempted. But, occupying the place which his noble Friend recently occupied, he (the Marquess of Ripon) could well understand that he had the subject constantly before him. He had consultations with various persons qualified to judge of the question of medical education; and, in consequence, he had come to the conclusion to deal with the question last year. He accordingly introduced a measure in their Lordships' House. In that Bill, so far as England was concerned, the principle of a Conjoint Board was approved of; but as regarded Scotland and Ireland, the establishment of such a Board was allowed to be optional, instead of being made obligatory, or, in other words, the medical authorities were only to adopt the provisions of the Act if they should see fit. Having since then considered all the arguments which had been brought forward against the optional character of the Bill in that respect, he was of opinion that to leave the setting up of a Conjoint Board optional would not be consistent with reason. Therefore, in the Bill he should lay on the Table, the establishment of a Conjoint Board in each division of the Kingdom was made compulsory. Some of the most distinguished medical men in this country had manifested a desire for the establishment of a Conjoint Board, and he was himself convinced that if a measure were passed of an optional character an attempt to set up a Conjoint Board would fail. The English Committee for settling a Conjoint Board had held more than 50 meetings. In that Committee the College of Surgeons was represented by Sir James Paget and Mr. John Marshall; the University of Oxford by Dr. Henry W. Acland and Dr. George Rolleston; the University of Cambridge by Dr. G. E. Paget and Dr. G. M. Humphry; the University of Durham by Dr. G. H. Philipson and Dr. George G. Heath; the University of London by Dr. Richard Quain and Dr. W. B. Carpenter; the College of Physicians by Dr. James Risdon Bennett and Dr. Henry Pitman; and the Society of Apothecaries by Mr. E. Cradford and Mr. George Corfe. This Committee had given the fullest consideration to the subject, and they were strongly in favour of the change he now proposed; and he trusted that the same reasons which had induced him to propose a compulsory measure would also have weight with the Medical Bodies of Ireland and Scotland. The Bill provided that where a Medical Corporation refused to admit a student to their body, he having produced a certificate of having passed the examination of the Conjoint Board, the student should be entitled to go to the Registrar for the purpose of having his name inserted in the register as of right. This provision had become the more necessary since they compelled the Conjoint Board to examine female students; if, therefore, women were refused admittance to the Corporation, they would, under this provision, having passed the examination of the Conjoint Board, be entitled to be placed directly on the register. With regard to the penalties on unregistered practitioners, and kindred matters, these being practically the same as those in the Bill of last year, he did not think it was at all necessary that he should trouble their Lordships by going into details of the clauses. He might, indeed, now conclude all he had to say upon the Bill, if it were not for one subject, to which he had already lightly alluded, and that was the constitution of the Medical Council. He was sure his noble Friend (the Marquess of Ripon) would excuse him for saying that that was the rock on which shipwreck was made in 1870; and it was with a view to avoid a similar disaster that he proposed to touch the subject in a different way now. The Medical Council consisted of the representatives of the 19 various licensing bodies. There were six nominees of the Crown and a President appointed by the Council. He should like to read the names of the Council—The President, Dr. Acland; Crown nominees, Dr. Quain, Sir William Gull, Mr. John Simon, Mr. Teale, Dr. Fergus, and Dr. Hudson; representative members, Dr. Pitman, Sir James Paget, Mr. Bradford, Dr. Pyle, Dr. Storrar, Dr. Haldane, Dr. Orr, Dr. Wood, Professor Turner, Dr. Pettigrew, Dr. Aquilla Smith, Dr. Leet, Dr. S. Haughton, Sir Dominic Corrigan, Dr. Rolleston, and Mr. R. Macnamara. This was a very eminent body of men; and he might now say that no objection had reached him as to the qualifications of the Crown nominees. Certainly, in those he had recommended to the Crown, he had been actuated only by a desire to select the best men he could find in the Profession for the purpose, and from his knowledge of those appointed by his Predecessors in Office, he was confident that they were actuated by the same feeling. He was equally certain that those elective bodies had the same object in view, and would select men who were most competent and who would carry out their duties in the most efficient manner. He was sure he might say that his noble Friend opposite (the Marquess of Ripon) would corroborate his statement, that all those gentlemen had performed their duties faithfully and well. The Council had been in action for 20 years, and he thought all would agree that they had deserved well of their country. Of course, the argument of the eminence of those gentlemen, or reference to the manner in which they had performed their duties, did not weigh with those who thought there ought to be a representative Council, and those who desired to have votes in the representation and who desired to have the Council very much altered in its character. There were several schemes for the amendment of the Council brought forward by various bodies. One scheme was that there should be representatives of the whole Profession upon the Council. To enable them to do this some would increase the number of the Council. He did not adhere to that view, because he thought the Council was already sufficiently large. There was another proposal — that the bodies now sending representatives to the Council should have their number curtailed in order to make room for the representation of the Medical Profession at large. There was another proposal—that the number of persons nominated by the Crown should be diminished with the like object. All these were questions which seemed to him not unworthy of consideration; but they involved a very wide inquiry, and he certainly did not feel himself justified in including the matter in the Bill without further information than he possessed at the present time. It was, therefore, the intention of the Government to suggest that there should be a Committee of the other House appointed to inquire into the matter; and at the end of that inquiry, when that Committee should have reported, the Government would be able to see whether any, and, if so, what alteration in the Council was required. It did not seem desirable to endanger this Bill, which contained many valuable features, by interfering with this subject of the Medical Council. This measure could not be considered a Party measure in any particular sense, and he looked forward to receiving from his noble Friend opposite (the Marquess of Ripon)—than whom no one was more competent to give advice, because he had great experience in dealing with this subject—his valuable assistance in achieving what was the object of all—the maintenance of a high standard of professional reputation. He did not despair of the solution of what seemed to be a very difficult question, if the subject were, as he could not doubt it would be, fairly considered by their Lordships. He begged to present the Bill, and to move that it be read a first time.

Bill to amend the Medical Act, 1858—*Presented* (The LORD PRESIDENT).

THE MARQUESS OF RIPON said, he had paid close attention to the statement of his noble Friend the Lord President, and should be happy to give him all the assistance in his power in passing the Bill. As his noble Friend was well aware, he was strongly impressed with the conviction that the most urgent reform in respect of medical affairs in this country in the interest of the public was the establishment of a single Medical Body for the three divisions of the United Kingdom, through which, and through which alone, persons should be able to get their names on the register. He understood his noble Friend intended to adopt that principle, instead of leaving it optional to the various Medical Bodies in England, Scotland, and Ireland to establish one Conjoint Board of Examination in each country. That he held to be the first object of medical reform at the present time; and he, for one, should approach the consideration of the Bill with every desire to give assistance to his noble Friend in passing it. It seemed to him that something might be said in favour of those provisions, which were inserted in the Bill of last year at his suggestion, but were modified in this Bill; but he should be ready to lay aside his own opinions on minor points, and he only hoped and trusted that others would do the same. With respect to the other part of the statement of his noble Friend, he was not surprised he had thought it wise to make a concession on the subject of the composition of the General Medical Council. He could fully bear his testimony to the correctness of the statement with regard to the ability of the members of that Council, their high standing and reputation, and the excellent manner in which they had discharged their duties. But there was no doubt there did exist, and had existed many years, a large amount of opinion in the Medical Profession that the Profession, as a Profession, ought to have a more direct share of representation on that Council. He did not desire to express an opinion on it at the present moment, except that when one saw a great body of the Profession entertain that opinion, it was quite fair and right that the subject should be investigated by an impartial inquiry before a Parliamentary Committee. All he trusted was that his noble Friend on one side, and those who were the cause of the failure of his own Bill of 1870 on the other, would take care that a question altogether distinct from the main object of the Bill should not produce a failure of the present measure. If the Committee, after considering the subject, should report that a change in the Medical Council was desirable, he hoped it would be carefully considered; but that no side interests of any kind would be allowed to interfere with the success of the Bill. He hoped there would be no delay with the second reading, as he thought it important the Bill should be speedily taken to the other House and considered there.

Bill read 1^a; and to be read 2^a on *Tuesday* the 11*th of March* next. (No. 16.)

RAILWAYS—WRIT OF ELEGIT.

QUESTION. OBSERVATIONS.

The Duke of ST. ALBANS rose to draw the attention of the Chairman of Committees to the statement in *The Times* of 6th of February, that Mr. Terry, a contractor, under a writ of *elegit,* obtained judgment before the Under-Sheriff of Oxfordshire against the Banbury and Cheltenham Railway, and that the jury had delivered 15 miles of land, of which they were possessed in that county for the construction of their line, in execution to the plaintiff; and asked the noble Earl, Whether the Parliamentary powers, under which such lands were acquired, in his opinion, allowed such a proceeding? It seemed to him that this case involved a very important principle. Railway Companies came to that House every year for compulsory powers to acquire land, and he thought their Lordships might reasonably ask that those from whom the land was thus taken should have some guarantee that its use should not be diverted from the purpose which Parliament had sanctioned. The popular opinion that a railway was the Queen's highway did not seem always to hold good, and especially before it was opened. He did not know if a writ of *elegit,* which gave the legal but not the actual possession, made any difference. He supposed it was impossible to expect the whole of the capital for carrying out these works to be found when the Company came to that House for their powers; but he thought a miscarriage of the intention of Parliament such as this should be impossible. Perhaps he ought to apologize for addressing the Question to the noble Earl the Chairman of Committees instead of to Her Majesty's Government; but he thought, from his long experience, the noble Earl would be able to give the House a very valuable opinion on the matter.

The Earl of REDESDALE said, that while not professing to be able to give a legal opinion on the Question asked, he did not think the statement in *The Times* was strictly accurate. The position of affairs, he believed, was this. Mr. Terry carried on the work intrusted to him in so unsatisfactory a manner that the Company discharged him and took the execution of the work into their own hands, and let the work and materials on the line to other contractors. The question of what Mr. Terry was entitled to receive for the work he had actually done was referred to arbitration. The award had been made, and Mr. Terry was found entitled to £5,000. The money was not paid, and Mr. Terry proceeded to take possession of the land by a writ of *elegit.* The finding on that writ was that the Company had acquired the land between the fencing to which the writ applied. Mr. Terry could get nothing off the land, there being no chattels on it belonging to the Company, and really he had gained nothing by his movement. It was perfectly obvious that whatever he had got was subject to the conditions under which the land was held by the Company under their Act of Parliament. The landowner, who had not been paid for his land, had the first claim, and next to him the persons to be paid were the debenture holders. He presumed that if the railway was abandoned the land would revert to the original owners. He could give no further information.

House adjourned at a quarter before Six o'clock, to Thursday next, half past Ten o'clock.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Tuesday, 25th February, 1879.

MINUTES.—SELECT COMMITTEE—Public Accounts, Other Members *nominated.*

PRIVATE BILLS (*by Order*)—*Second Reading*—Tipton Local Board*; Leadenhall Market and Improvements.

PUBLIC BILLS—*Ordered*—Parliamentary Franchise*; Friendly Societies Act (1875) Amendment*.

PRIVATE BUSINESS.

LEADENHALL MARKET AND IMPROVEMENTS BILL.—(*By Order.*)

SECOND READING.

Order for Second Reading read.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."—(*Sir Charles Forster.*)

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE said, he was very much astonished at the course which had been taken with regard to this Bill. It was a Bill of considerable bulk and importance; but the House was left to gather its character from a perusal of the Bill itself, and hon. Members were well aware that as Private Bills were not circulated, hardly anybody was ever in a position to say for himself what was the nature of a Private Bill brought before the House. As a general rule, when they had a debate on a Bill of this sort they had a speech to explain its objects, or someone made a statement as to the nature of its provisions on moving the second reading. On this occasion they had had nothing of the kind, and the House was left to derive its notions as to what the Bill was from a perusal of the Bill itself, which, in regard to Private Bills, was a very difficult matter indeed. Now, it appeared that the City of London had lately appointed a new Remembrancer, and he believed that one of the duties of the Remembrancer was to jog the memory of hon. Members of that House in regard to Bills in which the City was interested, and to inform them of the character of each measure. He had received a statement that morning signed by the Remembrancer, but it was a statement of the baldest possible character. It merely stated that the Bill was coming before the House, and went on to say—

> "The object of the Bill is the establishment of a new market, in lieu of the ancient Leadenhall Market, and the improvement of the neighbourhood by the formation of new streets."

No reason whatever was given why the House should pass the Bill, and the House was, therefore, put in the position of being asked to pass a Bill for which not one single word was said, and in regard to which no statement had been made to the House, except the two lines contained in the document of the Remembrancer, that—

> "The object of the Bill was the establishment of a new market, in lieu of the ancient Leadenhall Market, and the improvement of the neighbourhood by the formation of new streets."

He was glad to see the Secretary to the Treasury (Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson) in his place. Last year they discussed very fully in the House the Cattle Bill, and the question was incidentally mooted of the establishment of a market monopoly in London, and the desirability of having new markets in London. Under the monopoly now enjoyed by the Corporation of the City of London, the construction of markets was very much mixed up with the City improvements, and this was done in such a way that it was impossible to gather from the figures laid before the House what was the profit or loss to the City upon their markets. The City contended that they lost money on the whole by the markets; but, on the other hand, it was contended that they made very large sums of money by their markets, but appeared to lose, because they mixed up the expenditure on markets with that incurred in the formation of new streets, which was not an expenditure of a remunerative kind. He thought, therefore, that a statement to clear up this matter ought to have been made in moving the second reading of the present Bill, seeing that one of its objects was the formation of new streets. It appeared to him that if the Bill passed large tolls would be levied in Leadenhall Market at the expense of the consumer, which would be wasted or spent, as the case might be, in the formation of new streets, and the result would be that on the whole a loss would be shown upon the market, instead of what ought to be indicated as a clear gain. He was informed that the Bill did not come before the House with anything like the unanimous support of the Corporation itself. Quite apart from the question of the monopoly of markets possessed by the Corporation, he believed there was considerable opposition in the City itself to this particular Bill. The old Leadenhall Market had nearly died out. It was almost extinct, and had been replaced by a large number of very flourishing shops. The market itself, as a market, was, however, very nearly dead. The object of the present Bill was to revive a bygone state of things, and to create a new Leadenhall Market. It put down the 40 or 50 shops by which the old market had been replaced. With regard to the markets generally, the City monopoly had this result—that it produced a concentration of markets, all the markets of the Metropolis being either in the City or close to the borders of the City. He contended that this concentration of markets was a bad thing for the consumer. It caused a large amount of food to be brought into one place. Owing to the great size of London, it had to be carried a long way in order to get to where it was to be for the second time sold. The result of the concentration caused by the monopoly was that a large amount of food was kept so long that it became unfit for human food. If they were to have markets—and there was a doubt whether the market system was on the whole advantageous for London—they ought to be more scattered, and not concentrated in the City or close to it. In this case the City, by this Bill, were proposing to carry on a competition against their own market, because they had already one market in another locality in which they sold the same kind of goods which would be sold at the new Leadenhall Market. The competing market also was not at a very great distance from the proposed market. He believed it was the competition with their own market which had given rise to the great opposition which the Bill met with in the City; but he would not enter into that question, because he saw several hon. Members in their places in the House who were Aldermen of the City, and who would be better able to state what the facts of the case were. He had no desire at present to go into the matter at any greater length, because he felt it was inconvenient that the Public Business of the House should be postponed by too long a discussion upon a Private Bill. His only object in moving the rejection of the Bill was to elicit the opinion of those who had more acquaintance with the subject and all its details. He would only make once more the remark with which he set out, that the House was asked to read the Bill a second time without one word having been said or printed and sent to hon. Members to explain and support its provisions. He begged to move that the Bill be read a second time on that day six months.

Amendment proposed, to leave out the word "now," and at the end of the Question to add the words "upon this day six months."—(*Sir Charles W. Dilke.*)

Question proposed, "That the word 'now' stand part of the Question."

MR. CHARLEY said, this was a very small Bill on which to found an attack upon the City of London. The Bill dealt with a very ancient market—a market established in the reign of Edward IV., and re-built nearly 150 years ago—in the year 1730. The Corporation of the City of London, having observed that Leadenhall Market was rapidly falling into a state of delapidation, thought that the time had arrived when the old market should be replaced by a new one better adapted to satisfy the wants of the people, and more accessible to the public. The Corporation proposed that this should be done at their own expense, and they asked in the Bill for the usual compulsory powers of purchase. That simply was the object of this Bill; but there was another matter included in it—the opening out of new streets. That question had been touched upon by the hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke), and if the hon. Member would look at the plans, which had been published by authority, he thought that the hon. Member would say that the new street, which it was proposed to run from Leadenhall Street to Fenchurch Street, would be a very great improvement, and would afford a very considerable relief to the traffic in that part of the City. If this had been a Bill brought forward by any other municipality than that of the City of London, he did not think that any hon. Member would have risen in his place to move the rejection of the Bill—the ordinary courtesy would have been extended to the promoters of the Bill of allowing them to go before a Private Bill Committee up-stairs, that they might have an opportunity of stating their case. But because the Bill was introduced by the Corporation of the City of London, the hon. Member for Chelsea, who entertained a great dislike to the City—as he did, indeed, to most of the useful institutions of his country—got up in his place and moved the rejection of the Bill. The hon. Baronet had referred to the monopoly of the City with regard to its being the market authority within a radius of seven miles round St. Paul's. No doubt it was so; but did the hon. Member want to erect a market in Chelsea? If he did not, he (Mr. Charley) did not see why the hon. Member should come down to the House to oppose the present Bill. It was simply a dog-in-the-manger policy. The hon. Member did not want a market for himself or for his constituents, and yet he objected to the citizens of London enjoying the benefits which this Bill would confer upon them. This was not a new market at all, but one which had existed from time immemorial. He trusted the House would reject the proposition of the hon. Baronet, and consent to read the Bill a second time.

SIR ANDREW LUSK remarked that, at all events, his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Salford (Mr. Charley) could not say that he (Sir Andrew Lusk) had no interest in the City of London. If he thought that the City had done what was right and proper in the case, he should not have risen to oppose the Bill. He need not remind those Members of the House who were interested in the matter that some 18 or 20 years ago, after the Cattle Market was moved up to Copenhagen Fields, several gentlemen, and among them Mr. Charles Pearson, conceived the idea of having the Metropolitan Railway made, and of moving Newgate Market and Leadenhall Market, and of constructing a new market on the site of the old Smithfield Cattle Market. That project, in the end, was carried out, and the City went to the expense of building a splendid new dead-meat market there, and in that market, by the authority of the House, Leadenhall Market and Newgate Market were included. The new market at Smithfield had been of great benefit to everyone who was engaged in the City. At the present moment, they were able to get along Leadenhall Street without having 50 or 100 butchers' carts standing in the street. It appeared to him somewhat singular that the same men who carried out this great improvement, so far as the City was concerned, should now desire to revive the old market in Leadenhall Street. It was of no use talking about the City doing this at their own expense. No doubt, they were going to spend £100,000 in reviving the old market; but it would be necessary to levy tolls in the market, and it would require a good many tolls to make up interest on that sum. These were really the facts of the case. Leadenhall Market at present was not a market, but a place where a great many stolen dogs were sold, and stolen cats, stolen partridges' eggs, stolen pheasants' eggs, and foxes, and things of that kind. Perhaps hon. Members would appreciate the advantages of that class of trade. He was not one of "our old Nobility." He did not count his acres by tens of thousands; but he could say this, and he believed he would be confirmed in what he stated, for it was a very important fact—that it was a great trouble and a great expense to produce food in this country—beef, mutton, and corn—for the people. And many hon. Members must be astonished when they looked at the enormous disparity between the amount they received for what they sold, and the sum they paid when they bought in London. He attributed part of this result to the concentration of markets in one place, which had the effect of raising up third and fourth and fifth men between the seller and the buyer. He did not think it was desirable for the benefit of those who bought and sold to concentrate the number of markets they now possessed. All the meat went to Smithfield, and all the fish to Billingsgate. In the case of the latter market, there was a great difficulty in getting there. Three-fourths of the people who wanted to go there could not get into the market. The streets leading to the market were constantly blocked up, and it was impossible to get access to Billingsgate. The consequence was that, in some way or other, more than 400 tons of fish every year were destroyed, because it could not get out of the market in time to be of use to the public. It was very questionable, therefore, whether it was desirable to revive the market in Leadenhall Street. He should like to know where the advantages were to be found? He spoke as a merchant in London. He and other merchants having business in the City wanted to get to their offices, and did not want to have the streets blocked up again, as was the case in times past. They had been endeavouring to set the traffic in the City free by the aid of the Metropolitan Railway, and other means. He objected, therefore, to the concentration of the markets of the Metropolis in the City where they were not wanted. There was nobody there to buy, and they had already a splendid market elsewhere. Therefore, in the name of the merchants of London, and of those who had business to carry on in the City, and wanted to get out and in, he asked the House not to concede to the Corporation permission to start another great market in the centre of the City. It certainly could not be recommended from a sanitary point of view; because, wherever they had a market of that kind, they got a great deal more dirt than was desirable. For these reasons, he appealed to the House to throw the Bill out, or, at any rate, to send it to a Select Committee to ascertain whether it would be for the benefit of the Metropolis generally to establish another market as proposed.

Sir THOMAS CHAMBERS pointed out that the request of the hon. Member for Finsbury (Sir Andrew Lusk) was all that the promoters of the Bill asked—namely, that the Bill should be sent to a Select Committee to ascertain whether it was a suitable Bill to pass or not. It was quite true, as the hon. Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke) said, that no particular reasons had been circulated for the passing of the Bill; but it was by no means the rule that such reasons should be circulated. It was not uncommon to do so; but in the case of the majority of Private Bills he believed it was not the practice. The Bill was brought into the House, not on the authority of individuals or of private speculators, but upon the authority and credit of the Corporation of London. And as to the Corporation not having been unanimous in its favour, it was hardly necessary to remind the House that the Corporation was unanimous on very few subjects. But what Corporation was? He could not help telling the House that his hon. Friend the Member for Finsbury (Sir Andrew Lusk), who had just spoken, knew very well that the maintenance of Leadenhall Market was a concession on the part of the Corporation of London to the feeling of the inhabitants of the neighbourhood. Indeed, there was a Petition, signed by upwards of 10,000 persons, praying that this very ancient market should be maintained in their midst. But the Corporation of London could not keep Leadenhall Market in its present condition. It had fallen into decay, in a certain sense, in its trade and in its buildings, and in all the accessories of a market it was absolutely deficient. There was, as had already been pointed out, no proper access to it. No doubt, his hon. Friend (Sir Andrew Lusk) would be disturbed in coming to and going from business if there was no better access to the market than existed now; but the object of the Bill was to do that which, however, was complained of by his hon. Friend the Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke)—namely, to carry out street improvements at the same time that the market was made. The hon. Member for Chelsea made it a matter of complaint against the Corporation that whenever they made a market they made street improvements in order to give a better access to it. The hon. Member for Chelsea also complained of the market monopoly enjoyed by the City of London. Now, if there was one duty which more than another imposed a primary obligation upon a united municipality, it was that of making provision for markets for the use of such united municipality. It was a duty of every municipality to take charge of that matter so far as it could, and in London, with a population of 4,000,000 of persons at stake, it was the imperative duty of the Corporation to take the lead. At the same time, it was a matter of great difficulty to provide markets to which the people would resort. Lady Burdett Coutts spent hundreds of thousands of pounds in establishing the Columbia Market. The great object which Lady Burdett Coutts had was to provide accommodation for the buyer. She did everything that could be done to make that market a success; but she did it all in vain. Then, again, did not the City take away one of the greatest scandals that existed in London before most hon. Members were born—the Fleet Lane Market—which was situated opposite a ditch, and build a beautiful market in the same neighbourhood—the Farringdon Market? But it had been a dead failure, and the new market had never taken root at all. Again, in close contiguity with the Great Northern, the North-Western, and the Midland Railways, in an admirable situation, amidst an immense population, a market was established which was intended to supply food cheaply to the public. Upon this new market great efforts were expended and large sums of money spent. An admirable market was built; but no customers would come. He could multiply instances of the same kind. It was by no means easy to plant a market. Let anyone try to plant one at Chelsea. A market in London was the most delicate thing in its constitution that could be imagined. And some which had been in existence for 30 or 40 years were comparatively empty and without profit. The Corporation of London had spent £2,500,000 in markets; and as far as the income of the Corporation was concerned, they were none the better for the markets they had built. They had built them because they considered, and he supposed the House would also consider, that it was one of their primary obligations to do what they could towards performing the daily miracle of feeding 4,000,000 of people with food—meat, fish, and fruit, and all other things necessary. No doubt, the obligation which thus fell upon them was well discharged. Whether it might be done better was another question, but that it was done well at the present moment nobody could doubt. Four hundred tons of fish might be condemned every year, not through the fault of the market, but through a fault which, in many cases, happened before the fish arrived in London at all. All the Corporation asked was that the Bill should be allowed to go to a Select Committee. No doubt, the Corporation were divided about it. It was a competition with their own market; but that was rather in its favour than against it. It showed that they were willing to allow competition with their own market, if a demand was made for it by a sufficient number of their constituents, who felt that a local market would be of advantage to them. His hon. Friends the Members for Chelsea and Finsbury said it was a great mistake to bring all the markets to one point and to pass a Bill with that object. But the arguments of his hon. Friends would not hold water at all. If the Bill went before a Select Committee, and if it then turned out that there was no reason why it should be passed into law, the House might depend upon it that it would not be passed into law. But, at any rate, it ought to be read a second time; and if the Select Committee thought it was a proper measure to become law, they would be bound to pass it.

MR. W. H. JAMES thought the Corporation of London would have done wisely, and have shown a little more worldly wisdom, if they had taken the advice once given by a distinguished statesman, who said—" Why cannot you let it alone." It would be within the recollection of the hon. and learned Member for Salford (Mr. Charley) that the whole of this subject of markets was raised last year in the discussion of the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Bill. At that time it was said that it was rather an awkward and undesirable thing that the question should be raised at that particular moment. He thought this movement ought to have been a little longer deferred, and then the Corporation could have come forward boldly and have asked Parliament to support their Bill. The hon. and learned Member for Salford said that it was a very small Bill. *Primâ facie* he was ready to admit that it was, and that there was a tolerably good case for improving Leadenhall Market if it was ever again to be used as a market. In its present condition, the market was a very dirty and disagreeable place. But if it was a small Bill, it was one that affected a very large question; and he must contend that the present provision for the supply of markets over the whole of the Metropolis was absolutely indefensible. There was not on the Surrey side of London a single market. Walworth and Camberwell were destitute of markets. Then, again, on the North side of London, there were no markets either at Stoke Newington or Hoxton, and nothing was proposed to be done there for providing anything in the shape of market accommodation. No doubt, the present Bill would have slipped through the House unnoticed if it had not been for the hon. Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke). Hon. Members had only had to-day to gather information. He (Mr. James) had inquired in the Library if there was any information to be gathered upon the question of markets. There were very few subjects which some time or other had not been inquired into by that House; but the only information to be obtained on the question of markets was to be found in some little evidence given before a Royal Commission which inquired, in 1854, into the finances and general state of the Corporation. And the evidence taken at that time all tended to show that even then the want of markets in London was greatly felt, and was, indeed, something absolutely deplorable. No Committee of the House of Commons had ever at any time inquired into the subject; and he asked the hon. and learned Member the Recorder of London (Sir Thomas Chambers), whether he was prepared to contend for a single moment that the City of London, the population of which was dwindling away every day, and was not more than 75,000 at this moment, was the proper authority to possess the entire market monopoly of this great Metropolis, with a population of 4,000,000 of people? He had no wish to attack the Corporation of London; but he thought he had the right to defend the wants of the Metropolitan ratepayers, who had no good opportunity for expressing their opinion on this or any other question. In the absence of favourable markets, costermongers' carts filled the streets, and distributing their garbage in every direction, were instrumental in placing the thoroughfares in a bad sanitary condition. Sometimes, when unable to sell their wares, they took them home and deposited them in their backyards; and the consequence was that many of the homes of the poor were placed in a very unsatisfactory sanitary condition. He had placed an Amendment on the Paper in regard to the present Bill, the effect of which was that after it had been read a second time it should be sent to a Select Committee nominated by the Whole House. At the time the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Bill of 1869 was brought in by his right hon. Friend the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster), the right hon. Gentleman proposed to take away the monopoly now enjoyed by the Corporation of the City of London, unless they complied with and fulfilled certain conditions which were considered necessary in the interests of the inhabitants of the Metropolis. As the Corporation had not complied with and fulfilled those conditions, it was only a reasonable request that the House should now be asked to refrain from passing this Bill, which dealt with a small part of the larger question, until the whole matter had been inquired into by a Select Committee. If this proposition were not accepted, he should feel it his duty to offer an uncompromising opposition to the second reading of the Bill. He must confess that from time to time these ancient and antiquated privileges possessed by the Corporation required revision. The whole thing ought to be gone into entirely, and made the subject of a full and complete investigation. If the Corporation objected to inquiry, the House could only come to one conclusion — namely, that they were afraid of giving a full explanation, because they knew perfectly well what the nature of the *exposé* would be, and that, when weighed in the balance, they would be found wanting.

Mr. Alderman COTTON, in supporting the second reading of the Bill, said, he could assure the hon. Member for Gateshead (Mr. James) that the Corporation of the City at all times courted inquiry, and nothing would please them more than to answer any queries addressed to them by a Select Committee or any inquiry which the House might be pleased to make. With regard to the Bill now before the House, it was pretty well known that the market at Leadenhall was one of the most ancient markets in the City. The land on which it was built was the property of the City of London, and the Corporation, in their present Bill, simply asked the House to allow them to improve that market and the approaches thereto. The City had been moved to take this action by one of the largest, most influential, and most honestly signed Petitions ever presented to the Corporation of the City of London. It contained upwards of 7,000 signatures, all duly certified with name and address. It was one of the most useful markets in London, and, situated as it was on the borders of Gracechurch Street, it was easily approached both from East and West, and North and South. Then, again, the market was required by City men themselves, who lived mostly in the suburbs, and required to take their provisions home with them. In the market every necessity could be obtained, and he failed to see what advantage would be derived from destroying this very useful market. He certainly hoped that the House would not listen to the hon. Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke), and let it go forth to the City that the markets, which had always been well conducted, and had always given satisfaction to those who frequented them, were no longer required. He trusted that the House would reject the Amendment and read the Bill a second time.

Mr. W. E. FORSTER remarked that if this Bill came up from any Corporation in the Provinces, he did not suppose that the House would waste any time in its discussion. It seemed to him to be a very reasonable Bill, so far as it took power to improve a very ancient market. The hon. Gentleman who had just sat down described the market of Leadenhall as one of the oldest in London; but the whole difficulty in the case arose from the fact that the market authority of the Metropolis was not the municipality of the whole of the Metropolis, but the municipality of only a small part of it. His hon. Friend behind him the learned Recorder of London (Sir Thomas Chambers), in his eloquent pleading for the City, told them there was no greater duty a municipality could perform than to look after the markets. That was perfectly true, and he did not for a moment deny it. But, in this case, what were the conditions? It was proposed that the Corporation, which represented some 200,000, or even a much less number of the inhabitants of the City, should provide markets for the 4,000,000 which formed the whole population of the Metropolis. They could not now go into the question whether they ought or ought not to intrust this special power of providing markets to the City of London. The power did exist at the present moment, and it was proposed now, to some extent, practically to extend it. One great argument which had been used by the City when fresh markets had been projected was that they had already spent a great deal of money upon markets, and that there ought to be no competition. At the present moment, however, some little difference of opinion seemed to exist among the Corporation as to the propriety of having a competition among themselves. And by the Bill now before the House, he understood it was so proposed to alter Leadenhall Market as to make it a market of competition with the existing markets. He thought if they did that they afforded a very fair ground for the rest of the inhabitants of the Metropolis to say that their interests ought to be thoroughly considered when the Bill got into Committee, and that they ought to have a full opportunity of opening the whole of the Market Question. His hon. Friend the Chairman of Ways and Means (Mr. Raikes) would correct him if he was wrong; but his impression was that if this Bill went upstairs without any special direction, but simply as an ordinary Private Bill, the consumers in the Metropolis would not have a *locus standi* before the Committee. He imagined that the Metropolitan Board of Works would have a *locus standi* on account of their Building Acts which gave them power over the erection of buildings in all parts of the Metropolis, even including the City of London. But he did think that when they were proposing to establish a fresh dead-meat market, which was to be not merely for the sale of meat to consumers in the City, but for the sale of meat to consumers outside the City, that the consumers in all parts of London should have a *locus standi*. At the same time, he did not believe they could have that *locus standi* unless the Bill was referred to a Select Committee, nominated by the Whole House in the manner proposed by his hon. Friend the Member for Gateshead (Mr. James). He did not suppose that there would be any real objection to that proposal. The hon. Member opposite (Mr. Alderman Cotton), who was well acquainted with the feeling of the Corporation of London, said there was nothing the authorities of the City would court more than an inquiry into the matter. If they really desired to have the whole question fairly sifted in the interests of the consumers, he could not help thinking there would be no real objection to the suggestion of his hon. Friend the Member for Gateshead (Mr. James). Under these circumstances, he hoped his hon. Friend the Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke) would not persist in his opposition to the second reading of the Bill, but would allow the Bill to be read a second time with the view of having it referred to a Select Committee nominated by the Whole House.

Sir HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON thought that if this was an attempt to construct an absolutely fresh market outside the jurisdiction of the Corporation of London who were the promoters of the Bill, it was possible the objections which had been raised to it by the hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke), and his right hon. Friend opposite (Mr. W. E. Forster), might have considerable force and weight with the House. In such a case—he did not say that he agreed with the proposal—it might fairly be argued that if such an attempt were made by the City to extend the number of their markets, the time had come when they should consider generally the question whether the old Charter granted to the City of London constituting them the sole market authority of the Metropolis, was one which ought not in some way to be altered. But he would remind the House that in this instance they were not dealing at all with any such creation of a fresh market. All he understood from this Bill was that the City asked within their own limits and under their own Charter to provide, instead of a market which at present was inadequate for the wants of the locality, a better market on the same site—carrying on the history of the market from the past, only under improved conditions. Such being the simple object of the Bill, it rendered it difficult, he thought, for the House to refuse its assent to the second reading. They knew perfectly well that the Bill would be submitted to the consideration of a Committee upstairs, where, as his right hon. Friend the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) had said, the Metropolitan Board of Works would have a *locus standi,* and where the owners of property in the neighbourhood who objected to it would also have a right to be heard. But the question, which the right hon. Gentleman referred to, of the consumer's interest, would arise simply on the creation of a fresh market outside the limits of the existing one, and not in the continuing of a market which existed at the present moment, and which would be found of great convenience to the locality in which it existed. Although he was not in a position to speak with the same authority as hon. Members for the City upon this matter, he believed that, in connection with another market in the City—Billingsgate Market—there were people who had business in Leadenhall Market, and therefore any idea of satisfying the wants of the traders, or customers who had for so long a period been accustomed to the market in Leadenhall Street, would not be met by sending them to the market in Smithfield, which the City held as another outlet. He confessed that he was considerably surprised at the arguments adduced by his hon. Friend the Alderman who represented the borough of Finsbury (Sir Andrew Lusk). The hon. Baronet had endeavoured to prove to the House the disadvantages of centralizing all the traders in one market, and had then asked the House to refuse the continuance of the second market in Leadenhall Street. The two things did not seem to him (Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson) to be consistent, so far as the interests of the consumers in the Metropolis were concerned. He thought the whole of the arguments they had heard upon the Bill had simply been addressed to the general question which ought to be raised at some other time, and which certainly did not apply to the continuance of Leadenhall Market, which had been, and would be, under the proposed arrangement, a useful addition to the market purposes of the Metropolis itself.

SIR SYDNEY WATERLOW said, the district affected by the Bill occupied a very large portion of the ward which he represented in the Corporation of the City of London. He trusted that the House would consent to read the Bill a second time on account principally of the very great improvements which it would effect in the City itself. It would, among other things, enable the old Hide Market in Leadenhall Street to be properly utilized, and a new street would be carried from Leadenhall Street to Fenchurch Street, which would greatly facilitate the traffic in that part of the City. There was a very strong feeling in the district in which the market was situated that the market itself ought not to be abolished, and an important Petition signed by a very large number of persons had been presented to the House, praying that the market should be continued. The Bill now before the House was in reality a compromise. The City had consented, at the request of a very large number of persons, to continue the market. But what was the market? There was in reality nothing that could be called a market. There were two wholesale dealers, a few small shops, and a variety of dealers in foxes, dogs, cats, rabbits, and all sorts of animals; but to call it a market from which was distributed any considerable portion of the food of the Metropolis was a folly and absurdity. It never could be made a large market in its present condition, for this reason. It was right in the centre of a block of houses, and at the present time it could not be got at except through a few narrow courts. The hon. Member for Gateshead (Mr. James) asked why they should not leave things alone? Now, that was the very thing they ought not to do. At the present moment, it was an abomination and not a market at all, and it was so situated that it could not be carried on as a market. He hoped that the House would consent to the second reading of the Bill, and leave it to a Committee upstairs to determine whether it would be an improvement to make the new street and re-constitute the market, or whether it would be an improvement to be without any market at all.

MR. RAIKES said, his right hon. Friend the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) had asked him a question in regard to the *locus standi* of the citizens of the Metropolis if the Bill went before a Committee upstairs in the ordinary way. He was not aware that the consumers in this case would have any more *locus standi* than they would have in any other case. Their opposition was precisely the same as that of the consumers in Liverpool or Manchester, supposing the Bill had been introduced by the Corporation of Liverpool or Manchester in regard to the markets already existing in those towns. He hoped that the discussion, which had no doubt been a useful one, would not end in a division; because, although the hon. Member for Gateshead (Mr. James) and the hon. Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke) had shown that there was a great deal of interest felt out-of-doors with regard to the monopoly possessed by the Corporation of London in regulating the markets of the Metropolis, it appeared to him (Mr. Raikes) that this was hardly an occasion, nor did the present Bill afford the most fitting opportunity, for conducting an inquiry into that subject. The Corporation of London, by this Bill, asked for no power to make any new market, or to make or regulate any market beyond the limits of the City itself. If, therefore, in any case the promoters of a Bill ought to be allowed to proceed and to bring forward their Bill in the ordinary course of procedure, adopting the usual mode of dealing with questions which formed the subject of Private Bills, this was a case of that nature. If it were intended by this Bill to establish a new market in the borough of Chelsea, or if it were a proposition which involved in any way the opening of new markets on the Southern side of the river, where he had every reason to believe market accommodation was greatly required, such a proposal would certainly have afforded a fair opportunity for instituting such an inquiry as that suggested by the hon. Member for Gateshead (Mr. James), and the hon. Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke). But on this occasion the Corporation of London, as the promoters of the Bill, were merely asking to be allowed to improve an already existing market, which was altogether unfit for the purposes for which it was intended. It was notorious that the present market at Leadenhall was inconvenient and difficult of access. The Corporation of the City proposed as part of the present Bill to construct a new street, and he believed that such a street would be a very great convenience to that part of London. Under all the circumstances, it did appear to him that it would be hard upon the Corporation of London that they should be placed in the trying position of attempting to carry out improvements that were essentially required, and, at the same time, that their action should be hampered by requiring them to enter into a long and troublesome inquiry as to the nature and advantages of the general powers which they possessed by Statute. He trusted that under these circumstances the House would allow the Bill to follow the ordinary course, and be sent, not to a special Committee, but to an ordinary Committee, who would have full power to go into all the details of the matter in the ordinary way. He might, perhaps, be allowed to add in regard to the question which had been raised with respect to the costs being defrayed by heavy tolls, which would ultimately come out of the pockets of the consumers, that that was a matter which an ordinary Private Bill Committee had full power to investigate, and it would be their duty to see that no injustice was done by the imposition of any undue charge. He hoped that, under all these circumstances, the House would now consent to read the Bill a second time.

Sir CHARLES W. DILKE said, he proposed to accept the advice of his right hon. Friend the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) and allow the division to be taken on the Amendment of the hon. Member for Gateshead (Mr. James) to refer the Bill to a Committee nominated by the Whole House, after it should have been read a second time. He, therefore, begged to withdraw the Amendment which he had submitted to the House.

Amendment, by leave, *withdrawn.*

Main Question put, and *agreed to.*

Bill read a second time.

Mr. W. H. JAMES moved that the Bill be referred to a Select Committee, to be nominated by the Whole House.

Sir CHARLES W. DILKE, in seconding the Motion, said, he had only one remark to make, and he wished to make it in reply to an observation which had fallen from the Chairman of Ways and Means (Mr. Raikes). The Chairman of Committees spoke of the consumers in London being in the same position as those in other towns. That was hardly the case. In other towns they were represented by the Corporation, but in London they were not.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be committed to a Select Committee."—(*Mr. James.*)

Sir THOMAS CHAMBERS remarked that the Bill was promoted under the authority of the Corporation of London, and the nature of the measure had already been fully stated. It was not to establish a new market, but simply to improve an old and existing one, and a more unfair occasion for raising any general question of the kind which had been suggested, and of which it must be remembered the Corporation had had no notice, could not be conceived. The whole object of the Bill was merely to re-construct a tumble-down market, and give a better access to it.

Question put.

The House *divided*:—Ayes 83; Noes 137: Majority 54.—(Div. List, No. 28.)

Bill *committed.*

QUESTIONS.

CRIMINAL LAW—THE REV. H. J. DODWELL.—QUESTION.

Mr. J. COWEN asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, If his attention has been drawn to the statements that have appeared in the medical newspapers, respecting the mental condition of the Rev. H. J. Dodwell, who is now confined as a criminal lunatic; and, if it would be safe to order his release?

Mr. ASSHETON CROSS: Sir, I wish that I could give a favourable answer to this Question; but I am afraid it is not in my power to do so. I had this gentleman examined on the 31st of May by one medical officer, who certainly decided that he was insane. He was again examined in June by two other medical officers, when the same answer was returned. In consequence of a report which appeared by Dr. Winn and Dr. Forbes Winslow, I thought it better that he should be examined again by two perfectly independent gentlemen. I wrote to the Lunacy Commissioners asking them to name two gentlemen to undertake such an inquiry. They did so, and those gentlemen examined him on the 18th of September, and their opinion was that he was decidedly insane, and that it would be unsafe to liberate him. I gave instructions that information should be sent to me of any improvement in his condition; but I am sorry to say that I have received no report.

PAROCHIAL BOARD (SCOTLAND)—LEGISLATION.—QUESTION.

MR. HIBBERT asked the President of the Local Government Board, Whether it is the intention of the Government to bring in a Bill, during the present Session, to carry out the recommendations of last years' Select Committee repecting the election of Guardians of the Poor in England and Ireland, and of Parochial Boards in Scotland?

MR. SCLATER-BOOTH, in reply, said, a Poor Law Board Amendment Bill had been prepared which would deal, among other things, with the more important recommendations of last year's Select Committee respecting the election of Guardians of the Poor in England and Ireland; but he could not say anything about the Parochial Boards in Scotland. He hoped the Bill would be introduced by his hon. Friend the Secretary to the Local Government Board as soon as the state of Public Business would permit.

SOUTH AFRICA—THE ZULU WAR—PRESBYTERIAN AND WESLEYAN CHAPLAINS.—QUESTIONS.

MR. COWAN asked the Secretary of State for War, with reference to his statement as to sending Catholic Chaplains with the troops to South Africa, Whether, as there are now or will shortly be three Scotch regiments out there, he will consider the propriety of sending out Presbyterian Chaplains to be with some or all of the Scotch regiments?

COLONEL STANLEY: Yes, Sir; it is intended to send out one Presbyterian chaplain, but we do not intend to send more at present, unless Lord Chelmsford should express a wish that we should do so.

MR. WADDY asked the Secretary of State for War, Whether, as there are now or will shortly be a large number of Wesleyans in the army in South Africa for whom when in barracks at home and on foreign stations the Wesleyans provide church accommodation and clerical supply without asking for assistance or repayment from the Government, he will consider the propriety of allowing Wesleyan Chaplains to accompany the troops in proportion to the number of declared Wesleyans sent out?

COLONEL STANLEY: Sir, I have received a letter from the Wesleyan Foreign Missionary Committee, stating that they had directed four of their missionaries at the Cape to report themselves to the Commanding Officer of the Army against the Zulus. I propose to reply to this letter that, though it is most desirable to limit the number of non-combatants, I should have no objection to instructing Lord Chelmsford to admit as many of their number as he thought desirable, and to give them such opportunities as he might think proper for carrying out their ministrations.

EMPLOYERS LIABILITY.
QUESTION.

MR. MACDONALD asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, When the Bill which has been promised by the Government on the subject of employers liability to compensate their workmen for injuries in certain cases, will be introduced into the House?

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, I am not able, in the present state of Public Business, to name a day; but I hope we shall be prepared to introduce the Bill before Easter.

NAVY PROMOTION—ORDER IN COUNCIL, 1872.—QUESTION.

MR. SERJEANT SIMON asked the First Lord of the Admiralty, Whether it has not hitherto been the rule or practice in Her Majesty's Navy to promote sub-lieutenants to the rank of lieutenant at the end of four years service; whether it is intended to alter that rule or practice by extending the period of service; whether such an alteration will not affect the promotion of officers of all grades and their prospects as to the rank upon which they might have to retire;

and, whether such alteration is to apply to officers now serving who entered upon service under the hitherto existing rule or practice?

Mr. W. H. SMITH, in reply, said, there was no fixed Regulation which determined the period of service for sub-lieutenants to obtain their promotion; but latterly it had been the practice to promote them after four years' service. The Order in Council of November, 1872, gave the Admiralty the power to do so, provided the list of sub-lieutenants was above 250. The number was now below that figure, so that promotions could only be made under the provisions of the Order in Council of March, 1870, which provided that until the list of active lieutenants should have been reduced to 600, only one in every four vacancies, caused by retirement and promotion consequent thereon, should be filled, but that vacancies caused by death were to be filled as they arose. He was not in a position at present to say that the Admiralty had any intention of altering the system which prevailed; but he would admit that the slower promotion did very seriously affect sub-lieutenants and other officers.

EDUCATION DEPARTMENT — INDUSTRIAL SCHOOLS.—QUESTIONS.

Mr. W. E. FORSTER asked the Vice President of the Committee of Council on Education, Whether the guardians of an Union have power to pay for the maintenance of a child sent to an Industrial School upon complaint made by the local authority of a school district not having a School Board; and, if not, how in such case sec. 12 of the Education Act of 1876 can be carried out?

Lord GEORGE HAMILTON: Sir, some doubt has arisen whether the local authority, being a school attendance committee and having sent a child to a certified school, has power, with consent of guardians, to pay for the maintenance of the child. Assuming that they have not the power to pay, the prison authority would in such a case be the disbursing authority. We propose, however, as the point is of some importance, to refer it to such legal authority as will settle the case one way or another.

Mr. W. E. FORSTER asked, Whether, in case the prison authority had the power, the resolution of the guardians or school attendance committee would bind the prison authority?

Lord GEORGE HAMILTON said, he could not answer that Question; but it would be referred to the legal authority.

EGYPT—DESPATCH OF SHIPS OF WAR.—QUESTION.

Mr. ELLIOT asked the First Lord of the Admiralty, If the statement in "The Times" of yesterday is correct that France has ordered the despatch boat "Renard" to Egypt, and an English ship is going in the same direction; and, if so, whether these vessels have any special or joint mission?

Mr. W. H. SMITH: Sir, it is true that an English and French ship have been ordered to Alexandria. The Governments of England and France deem it desirable, in present circumstances, that there should be a ship of each nation in Egyptian waters. No special mission has been given to the commanders of those ships.

ARMY—THE 24th REGIMENT—OFFICERS.—QUESTION.

Major O'GORMAN asked the Secretary of State for War, Whether it is intended, as reported in the public prints, to send to South Africa six Officers of the Guards and three of the Line to fill up the places vacated by the Officers of the 24th Regiment lately slain in action?

Colonel STANLEY: Sir, it is intended to send out the officers to whom the hon. and gallant Member refers, but it is under these circumstances. The draft for the 24th goes out 533 strong; obviously they could not go without officers; but those officers do not belong, nor will they be posted to, the 24th Regiment.

EDUCATION DEPARTMENT—OFFENDING TEACHERS.—QUESTION.

Mr. J. C. BROWN asked the Vice President of the Council, Whether, considering the serious consequences to both teachers and schools where the teacher is found guilty by the inspector of certain offences, and that they are put in the black list without power of appeal, he would take into consideration the constitution of some Court of appeal; and, if there is any intention to throw the inspectorate open to Public Elementary School Teachers, many of whom would be well qualified for the position?

LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: Sir, the present practice is not for the Inspector to convict, but to send in his report to the Education Department, where the case would be personally investigated by one of the heads of the Department, and the teacher convicted only when, in the opinion of this official, the evidence is conclusive. Teachers are not at present debarred from becoming Inspectors, the Lord President being ready to consider the claims of all persons who, in his opinion, have the qualifications necessary for the proper performance of those duties.

CONTAGIOUS DISEASES (ANIMALS) ACT, 1878—MERSEY DOCK AND HARBOUR BOARD.—QUESTION.

MR. MAC IVER asked the Vice President of the Council, Whether his attention has been called to the large and immediate expenditure proposed to be made by the Mersey Dock and Harbour Board in providing accommodation to meet the requirements of the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act of last Session, and whether the approval of the Privy Council has been obtained as regarded the works about to be undertaken, and whether the whole of such works are necessary?

LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: Sir, the Mersey Dock and Harbour Board have applied for and received the sanction of the Lords of the Council to their proposal to erect lairs and slaughter-houses on certain landing places in the port of Liverpool for the reception of foreign animals. No correspondence has taken place in reference to the cost of the proposed erections; but it is believed that the accommodation will not be more than adequate to the requirements of the trade. For some time past the accommodation for landing, lairage, and slaughter of foreign animals in the port has been insufficient.

MEETING OF THE HOUSE.

Resolved, That this House will meet To-morrow at Two of the clock.—(*Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer.*)

MOTIONS.

BANK DEPOSITS.—RESOLUTION.

SIR JOSEPH M'KENNA, in rising to call the attention of the House to the subject of deposits in the banks of the United Kingdom, and to move—

> "That, in the opinion of this House, it is worthy of the consideration of Her Majesty's Government whether a moderate and discriminating scale of Stamp or composition Duties may, with advantage to the interests of the Country and of the Banks, be hereafter applied to all interest-bearing deposits in the Banks of the United Kingdom, and whether a Bill on that subject should be introduced to Parliament at an early date;"

said: The subject to which I desire to draw the attention of the House to-day is not one forced upon my own mind by the contemplation of those recent financial disasters which may be said to have culminated in, rather than to have commenced with, the failure of the City of Glasgow Bank. I feel it due to myself to say this, and to remind the House that in a period of profound repose—when no one dreamt of the failure of the City of Glasgow Bank, and none outside its walls suspected its solvency—on the 16th of May, 1876, I occupied the attention of the House for above an hour in demonstrating, or to the best of my ability in endeavouring to demonstrate, that the system of banking credit which prevailed in the United Kingdom was of a nature which of necessity must produce at irregular but constantly recurring intervals the panics and crises, with the appearance of which most of us are unhappily familiar. I have no intention of going over the same ground in the same terms as those which may be found in *Hansard* of 1876, because many of the results and conditions which I then predicted as likely to arise have so lately come to pass as to be actually within our present cognizance, and the recency of such occurrences enables me to dispense with all such arguments as were of the nature of foreboding in 1876. My main contentions are that the system of deposit credit which has grown up in the joint-stock banks of the United Kingdom is essentially unscientific and practically unsound, and that the tendency of the evil is to increase and not to cure itself, as some people imagine that such things are likely to do if left to themselves. There are, as I estimate, about £300,000,000 to £400,000,000 sterling of deposits held by the various joint-stock banks of the United Kingdom on which these banks pay interest to the depositors. The great bulk of these deposits is again lent by the banks, and employed by the borrowers in carrying on the trade, manufactures, and other enterprizes of the United Kingdom. If we were not to look beneath the surface, as we are now about to do, I admit that things in ordinary times look natural and sound enough; but when we examine the conditions under which these £300,000,000 or £400,000,000 are borrowed and again lent, we find a state of things singularly unstable, and, as it has always appeared to me, actually dangerous to the interests of the trading community of the Empire. The instability and the danger arise from the three following conditions, which are inherent in the present system:—First, the banks which borrow the £300,000,000 or £400,000,000 at interest undertake to repay the depositor in each case, either on demand or at a very few days' notice. Second, the condition under which the banker borrows the money being to pay interest upon it, he is necessitated to re-lend it at interest to someone else at a somewhat higher rate than that which he himself pays, or to invest it in some security on his own account. Third, there is not a sufficiency of solvent borrowers to take from the banker on discount of trade bills anything approaching the large amount which the banker has to lend; nor can the banker lend what he does lend on terms—as to repayment on notice—as stringent as those to which he has himself submitted. Now, these are the three conditions which constitute, or out of which arises, the unsoundness which needs legislative intervention. I maintain that it is unsound business for any man, whether banker or not, to borrow at interest money which he may be called upon to repay at an earlier date than he can be certain of having the means of repayment, and that which is unsound in principle on a single transaction cannot be sound by being multiplied into a thousand or a million of such transactions. But what the present system amounts to is simply the multiplication of the first unsound transaction by thousands or tens of thousands in reliance on an assumed and unscientific doctrine of chance, that while business is kept going there will be always sufficient coming in, or which may be made to come in, to meet outgoings and repay depositors. I grant that under the normal condition—a fair trade, and a clear political horizon—not only is there no difficulty, but there is a great ease in carrying on the business of the country under the system which prevails; but that very fact adds most seriously to the difficulties which arise in seasons unfavourable to the trade, manufactures, or agriculture of the Empire. People hope that a system which has gone on for many years doing much good may go on for ever doing but little harm. I do not take this view, quite the contrary; but, nevertheless, I say that it is still possible, without any great organic change, without any shock to credit—without any injury to existing interests—nay, with immediate and enormous benefit to those interests, to guard against and obviate the dangers and disasters which, if not guarded against, before very long will, I apprehend, prove inveterate and irremediable. It must not be supposed that the only evil, or even the chief evil, is that which is developed when a bank fails; a tremendous amount of injury is done to the interests of traders by the means which, under the present system, are had recourse to to prevent a bank from failing, and these means or measures become indispensable solely in consequence of what I will describe as the improvident system under which money is borrowed by the banks from their depositors, and the consciousness on the part of bank directors and managers that it is of vital importance to them, and, therefore, a kind of duty under the present system to maintain an appearance of prosperity in adverse times, lest their credit suffer in the minds of those whose moneys they hold, reclaimable with interest on demand, or at a few days' notice. I do not wish to repeat myself in this House; but if hon. Members desire to learn my views as to the origin and growth of the several financial panics of the last half-century, they will find them set out in *Hansard's* report of my speech in May, 1876. I have nothing to vary, and but little to add to the history there told. What has since happened in Glasgow, South

Wales, and elsewhere, is in my opinion only a natural sequel to that history. The frantic efforts of the City of Glasgow Bank for the last 10 years to appear prosperous, originated, no doubt, from the consciousness of the directors that the bank was at the mercy of depositors who might recall their moneys at a few days notice. Even at a period when they may have been solvent, and before their capital was irretrievably lost, this reverse was by no means improbable if they confessed to any impairment. I will, however, treat the City of Glasgow Bank as an exceptional case. I found no argument, and point no moral out of it at present, save to this extent—that it proves the terrible expedients to which directors will have recourse to avoid reducing their dividends. But now the question arises, how are we to deal with a state of credit which has grown up about us, and how are we to deal with the business and interests of institutions of such importance as the joint-stock banks of the United Kingdom? Well, Sir, I think I see the way to do so without doing any violence to the principle involved in the right of private contract, and not only without injury to existing banks, but with great and incalculable advantage to those institutions whose interests I not only do not disregard nor underrate, but desire in every reasonable way to protect. Now, the process whereby the results, which I desire to bring about, may be reached is essentially simple, and it is one quite in accordance with the principles of our present laws of contract and of finance. We all know that a bill of exchange is not a lawful instrument in the United Kingdom, unless it has impressed upon it—or in the case of foreign bills negotiated in this country affixed to it—a stamp denoting a duty paid to the State at the rate of 1*s*. per cent—that is to say, at the rate of 1*s*. for each £100 of the amount of such bill without regard to whether the currency of the bill is for 10 days or 12 months. Thus a £100 bill pays a 1*s*. stamp duty, a £500 bill 5*s*., and so on. There is, however, another system of duty applicable to bills and notes by which the duty is not calculated nor levied upon the amount of each bill or note separately, nor represented by a stamp impressed or affixed. That other system is that which provides that a composition duty shall be levied in lieu of stamp duty on all bank notes in circulation, and on bankers' bills, which are permitted to be issued without any stamp impressed or affixed. The composition duty now known to the law is levied at the rate of 7*s*. per cent per annum on the average amount of the bank notes or bankers' bills which the bank has in circulation during the year for which the duty is payable. Now, what I recommend being done in the case of interest-bearing deposits is to adopt the principle involved in both systems to meet the varying conditions under which interest-bearing deposits are accepted by bankers. I wish to introduce certainty and forethought into the system of taking deposits. I start with the assumption that if any solvent man, banker or anyone else, borrows money on which he pays or agrees to pay interest, he must, in order to indemnify himself, invest the money in some security, negotiable or otherwise. I next say he should know absolutely when the money he borrows will become payable by him, and he should be prepared to pay it on the day of maturity. I assume that there is a period within which a banker will have time to turn his money—that is to say, to employ it profitably and to repay it without difficulty. I assume such a period to be three months. I assume that the great bulk of the deposits in the banks of the United Kingdom could and would be as well fixed by the depositors at renewable periods of three months as they are now at a few days' notice; but, although I assume this, I am not about to propose that any hard-and-fast line of three months, or any other period should be adopted. I simply propose to make it for the advantage of the depositor, if it be convenient for him to do so, to lodge his money for three monthly periods, renewable by him at his option, and without trouble of any kind. I will now endeavour to explain how all this may be done consistently with those principles of free contract which no hon. Member of this House would more jealously watch over than I would myself. The State has always exercised the right of imposing a tax on contracts in the nature of a stamp duty or a composition duty, in lieu of a stamp impressed or affixed. Ordinary bills of exchange pay a stamp duty at the rate of 1*s*. per cent, and this duty is quite as high on a bill payable at three days' date as on one drawn for three months. It is the practice of business that the man to whom credit is given by taking his bill, or one for whose accommodation a bill is issued, pays the stamp duty. In the cases of bankers' notes there is no stamp impressed or affixed; but the banker pays a composition duty in lieu of stamp duty on his notes and post bills in circulation, at the rate of 7*s.* per cent per annum on the average amount he has had in circulation during the year. I mention these facts, and the state of the law in these respects, in order to be able to show as I proceed that the changes which I recommend for adoption are no violation of the principle of freedom of contract, nor any innovation of principle whatsoever. If a banker pays a composition duty at the rate of 7*s.* per cent per annum on the bank post bills which he draws, payable at seven, or 10, or 15 days, or any other date, there is no violation of principle in subjecting him to a far lighter composition duty in respect to the average amount of credit which he may obtain by the issue of his deposit receipts. I confess, however, I have no object of raising Revenue in view. I simply seek to introduce a principle of order into the system of interest-bearing deposits, for the protection of bankers and the public alike from the fitful and panic-breeding conditions which have insensibly grown up throughout the whole of the United Kingdom. I propose that in future there shall be two classes or kinds of deposit receipts established by law for bankers—the one which I would call the statutable deposit should be issued repayable at three months from the date of the deposit, and if not demanded at its maturity should be again fixed as payable at three months from the day of maturity, and so on from time to time, being, in fact, a three-monthly renewable deposit. I would have the banker to pay some duty on all such deposits—say, for example, 2*s.* per cent per annum—that is to say, 6*d.* per £100 for each three months, as a composition in lieu of stamp duty on the average amount he held of money during the year on these statutable deposits. This impost would fall solely on the banker, and would be paid by him in the same manner that bankers now pay a composition duty in lieu of stamp duty on their bank post bills or bank notes in circulation. I assume that in this new class of deposits the banker would derive sufficient advantage from the nature of the contract that he could well afford to pay the 2*s.* per cent per annum to the Crown on such transactions. But then the question arises, how are we to deal with these depositors who are not satisfied to lodge money at three months with their bankers, but who wish to lodge it at one month, or at 10 days' notice, or at some other currency? Well, there is nothing complicated in my plan. I propose that in all such cases the depositor, and not the banker, should feel the incidence of the duty, and that he should have 6*d.* per cent deducted from the interest payable to him by the banker for each period less than three months and as fixed by himself for which he had lodged his money. The banker would, of course, be merely a receiver of the duty to pay it over to the Crown, and there would, of course, be a provision that the duty should never operate as a greater charge than could be provided for out of the accrued interest. Now, that is the sum and substance of my plan, free from all mere technical detail. The advantages which I foresee would arise from this system are very great indeed. I believe the three-fourths, probably the seven-eighths, of the deposits now lying in the joint-stock banks of the United Kingdom would be converted into statutable deposits; and the immediate effect of such a translation would be to render it possible for every well-managed bank in the worst of times to provide for every demand upon it without requiring to raise money in any irregular fashion. The hon. Gentleman concluded by moving his Resolution.

MR. COLLINS, in seconding the Resolution, said, he thought his hon. Friend the Member for Youghal was entitled, under the circumstances of the case, to the thanks of the House for the able and clear way in which he had put forward his views on the question. It seemed to him, however, that his hon. Friend had underrated the value and importance of the subject by fixing the amount of the interest-bearing deposits in the banks of the United Kingdom at a sum of £300,000,000 to £400,000,000 sterling. He (Mr. Collins), after careful investigation and examination, had come to the conclusion that they amounted to something approaching £1,000,000,000 sterling. There were in England and Wales 119 joint-stock banks, with a paid-up capital of £37,000,000; in Scotland 11 joint-stock banks, with a paid-up capital of £9,000,000; and in Ireland 9 joint-stock banks, with a paid-up capital of £7,000,000; and there were, having offices in London, 56 foreign and colonial banks, with a paid-up capital amounting to £44,000,000. In round numbers, that would amount to about £100,000,000 of paid-up capital. Then, again, there were 190 private provincial banks in the United Kingdom, and 50 private banks in London; and, on the same basis of calculation, he believed it would be found that the amount of capital engaged in the 240 private banks could not fall far short of £100,000,000. Then, with regard to interest-bearing deposits and current accounts, he could not find any authorized published returns of a reliable character on which to base a calculation; but in order to arrive at the best estimate in his power, he took the yearly reports of 20 joint-stock banks, and he believed he was safe in concluding that the interest-bearing deposits and current accounts together reached about six times the amount of the paid-up capital of all those establishments. From his own experience he would deduct for current accounts one-sixth of the entire sum which would leave £1,000,000,000 as the interest-bearing deposits of the United Kingdom. He had made a calculation as to what that sum would produce to the Exchequer, and he found that at the moderate sum of 1*d.* per cent per month, or 1*s.* per cent per annum, it would produce a revenue of £500,000. He thought, however, that the proposal of 2*s.* per cent for every three months, which would produce £4,000,000 per year, was too high. [Sir JOSEPH M'KENNA said, his proposal was 2*s.* per cent per annum.] He was glad to find that he was in error. He and his hon. Friend were at one as regarded the principle of the proposal. There might be differences of view in regard to points of detail; but the principle involved in the question was of serious and grave importance, and deserved consideration. The great objects his hon. Friend had in view were to give increased security and confidence to the public, and to facilitate bankers in controlling the enormous sums with which they had to deal in the conduct of their responsible business, and in protecting them against the unnecessary and most injurious panics which, without cause or reason, at times influenced public opinion. The discussion of the question would at least have the useful result of directing public attention to it; and if opinion in the country were found favourable to its consideration, the Chancellor of the Exchequer might be the better enabled, if he thought fit, to embody in the measure, which it was said he had in contemplation, some provisions dealing effectually with the entire subject.

Motion made, and Question proposed,

"That, in the opinion of this House, it is worthy of the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, whether a moderate and discriminating scale of Stamp or composition Duties may, with advantage to the interests of the Country and of the Banks, be hereafter applied to all interest-bearing deposits in the Banks of the United Kingdom, and whether a Bill on the subject should be introduced to Parliament at an early date."—(*Sir Joseph M'Kenna.*)

MR. SAMPSON LLOYD said, he was sure the House would feel indebted to any hon. Members who brought before it the subject of commercial crises, and propounded any reasonable and just remedy against their recurrence; but if the House were to be misled into lending the high sanction of its authority to any scheme which was not wise, and which was not truly calculated to attain this object, it would do enormous harm by leading public opinion astray after a will-o'-the-wisp remedy instead of keeping fixed on the true principles which alone could save them from crises. It appeared to him that the proposal made by the hon. Member for Youghal (Sir Joseph M'Kenna) would be utterly inefficacious for the purpose aimed at. It seemed to be thought that the large amount of deposits in banks were more or less the cause of these crises; but it was not the fact of large deposits being in banks which led to bad banking or to crises; it was the employment of deposits by a minority of bankers and other persons engaged in monetary business that led to great evils, the consequences of which could not be exaggerated. He was glad to hear it said, for the credit of bankers generally, that the case of the City of Glasgow Bank was an exceptional case; it was due to the bankers that that should be said. Unhappily, there had been one or two other cases which could not be characterized as anything but discreditable to the persons concerned. But, on the other hand, if the House would remember how many hundreds, if not thousands, of banks and branches in England, Scotland, and Ireland had been conducted, some of them for more than a century, and many for more than half-a-century, without disaster, in spite of great fluctuations in credit, in the supply of money, and in the success of trade, we might congratulate ourselves that scandalous cases like that of the City of Glasgow Bank had been so few, and that, on the whole, our banking system was not unsound. The Mover and Seconder seemed to differ rather widely as to the aggregate amount of deposits in banks, and he had not seen any computation that could be relied upon; but whether they were £300,000,000 or £1,000,000,000, he did not concur in the opinion that bankers could not find enough good borrowers, and were tempted, by the very magnitude of their deposits, to lend on doubtful securities. He had never experienced any difficulty in finding borrowers; sometimes there was a difficulty in finding lenders, but there was never any in finding borrowers. He did not think the difficulty troubled most bankers, and he did not admit that the purchase of securities of a right kind was an improvident investment; it was a most wise and legitimate investment of those deposits; but well-managed banks did not rely upon them generally, and certainly not at a time of pressure. He did not see any reason why the banks should not have these large sums as deposits. As to the remedy proposed, if the unlucky depositor happened to forget to put down the date, his money would be locked up for another two months against his will; but the maker of that proposal reckoned without the public—depositors would be unwilling to submit to it. It was not proposed to place any restriction on the large amount of money deposited in banks, not at sight, but at call; and bankers might play ducks and drakes with that as disastrously as with money deposited at interest. In many cases money at call did bear a small interest; so the proposed distinction failed again. These restrictions and interferences could not do any good, and they were calculated only to deceive and trouble the public. No doubt, any act of their lives might be taxed; but that was not a sufficient reason for taxing special transactions or tradesmen unless due cause were shown. It was not urged as a primary reason for this proposed tax that it would produce Revenue. It was supposed that it would restrict deposits; but he did not believe it would have the slightest effect on them, any more than stamps had on bills. All bad bills had borne stamps, and bankers would be improvident with deposits whether they were stamped or not. As to there being no violation of the freedom of contract in what was proposed, there did seem to be a violation of freedom in preventing a man doing what he would with his own. The hon. Mover had entirely failed to prove his case, and he hoped the House would not lend its support to the Motion. Attention ought to be directed to a comparison of the state of this country with that of France, which had comparatively few changes in its rates of discount, and scarcely any commercial crises like ours. It was worth inquiry whether that was due to the large metallic basis of her currency, or to any other cause. He should be glad to co-operate in promoting an inquiry into that subject, as well as into the possibility of suppressing frauds by more stringent legislation, which he thought was wanted. Such inquiry would be worthy of the support of the House.

Mr. THOMSON HANKEY said, he must enter his emphatic protest against the House attempting to legislate as to the principles or way in which bankers should manage their business. Such action would, he was convinced, lead to great evil, and he was perfectly certain that it would be of no possible use. He protested, also, against bankers being taxed in the way proposed. No doubt it was the first duty of the banker, or any person receiving money on deposit which he engaged to pay back at a certain time, to take care that he had it when the time came; but to lay down a rule for a particular description of banking, although it might offer a bait to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, would be opposed to the principle of our legislation. He trusted, therefore, that the right hon. Gentleman would not rise at it. What did the hon. Member for Youghal (Sir Joseph M'Kenna) mean by banking? Did he exclude the Rothchilds, the Barings, and a dozen others, who, although not called bankers and not paying a small tax which the Chancellor of the Exchequer managed to get from bankers, were the bankers of half the great Powers of Europe and in all parts of the world? How did the hon. Gentleman propose to deal with those great firms? He (Mr. Hankey) was convinced that when the hon. Gentleman came to the point, he would find it almost impossible to define what was meant by a banker, when it was proposed that a particular transaction should be carried out in a particular way. He agreed with the remarks made as to the risks run by bankers receiving money on deposit and allowing interest, and yet subjecting themselves to have it recalled at very short notice, or at call, which was worse; but the matter was so fraught with difficulty that he was surprised to hear a banker of the hon. Member for Youghal's experience treat it in such a manner. Great evil resulted from the undue expansion of that risk; but the principle of allowing interest was sound, for bankers were but agents between lenders and borrowers; but he denied that on that account they ought to be singled out for taxation.

MR. W. SHAW said, he had listened with great attention to the speech of his hon. Friend the Member for Youghal (Sir Joseph M'Kenna), and he was sorry to say he could not support his Resolution. There was nothing in the world to prevent banks at present agreeing to take deposits at fixed periods of one, two, or three months, at all events, so far as Ireland was concerned. The Resolution would do nothing to avert panics; because, at present, banks must base their calculations on the law of probabilities, and, if they were wise, should always be prepared to pay a certain amount of their liabilities, so that it really did not affect the facts of the case whether the money was taken for a fixed period or not. As to the other question, of placing a tax on deposit receipts, for money deposited upon short notice, he hoped the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer would not entertain the proposal; because, while it would fail to bring in a large amount of Revenue to the Government, it would most certainly very seriously interfere with the business of banking, by introducing into it certain elements of trouble which would most seriously affect it. For instance, it would materially lessen the banking fund on which the business of the country mainly depended. There was the competition between bank and bank; and it must also be remembered that the Post Office savings banks, and other similar institutions for the deposit of money, competed largely with the regular banks and tended to reduce the amount of the general banking fund. If the right hon. Gentleman were to tax the deposits at the bankers, it would be like taxing the raw material of the manufactures of the country, and would prove most injurious to commercial enterprize, without in any way preventing the recurrence of panics. The question of the means that should be taken for preventing the recurrence of panics had doubtless been well pondered by the Chancellor of the Exchequer; and he (Mr. W. Shaw) hoped that he would that week bring before the House some proposal which would touch the very source of the evil complained of. There was one branch of banking with which the right hon. Gentleman might fairly deal, and that was with reference to the note circulation of the country. He might look at the circulation of the country banks, and see whether he could not give facilities for the amalgamation of the small ones. He believed that in England especially an immense deal of the evil was due to the great number of small banks, for when there was anything like fear of a crisis they would make a special effort to prepare themselves for the evil. That, of course, pressed on the whole finances of the community, and often led to the very crisis which they dreaded, and which, but for them, would not have existed. He thought it would be wise of his hon. Friend not to press the Motion to a division.

MR. HERMON said, the money on deposit in the banks was borrowed at 1 per cent below the bank rate and lent out at 1 per cent in advance of it, and the margin represented their profits. If they kept a sufficient sum in hand to meet the ordinary amount of withdrawals, there was no danger in that business. Where the danger did lie was in the fact that the great banks were ready to receive from their customers amounts to the extent of £15,000,000 or £20,000,000, repayable at four or seven days, while they were in the habit of lending it on three months' bills. And then, again, these bills were maturing at different dates. He had listened with great attention to the arguments of the hon. Member for Youghal (Sir Joseph M'Kenna), but did not think that his plan would be acceptable to the public, or that it would effect the end he wished to attain, and therefore he could not support it. At the same time, he agreed that the rules of banking required consideration.

Mr. COURTNEY said, the House seemed disposed to give but scant justice to the plan laid before it by the hon. Member for Youghal (Sir Joseph M'Kenna). He (Mr. Courtney) thought, however, that if some plan could be adopted which would prevent deposits being made for short periods, bankers would be protected from the sudden calls to which they were now subject. He did not at all agree that the proposal of the hon. Member would diminish the savings of the country; but thought, on the other hand, that it would encourage deposits at a longer notice, and that deposits at short notice and at call would necessarily be abandoned. The idea that the savings would decrease was chimerical, for they would still accumulate and be the foundation of trade. Nor did he agree that it was a conclusive argument against the proposal that it interfered with the conduct of bankers' business. Banks had been interfered with time after time, and notably in 1844 by Sir Robert Peel. He must say, however, that he did not at all see how the proposal would work except upon the condition that stamped deposit receipts were to be given for all sums deposited. Neither was he convinced that it would avoid the evils which the hon. Member sought to avoid. The hon. Member was bound to convince them on both these points before he could expect them to support him. How could the Chancellor of the Exchequer secure the stamp duty on the deposit notes as they came in to be periodically renewed? He did not believe that the plan would prevent the recurrence of panics, inasmuch as panics had arisen over and over again long before joint-stock banks and the practice of receiving money at call or on deposit for short periods existed. Panics depended upon far larger causes than money being received on call. There was another reason which had been alluded to by the hon. Member for Plymouth (Mr. Sampson Lloyd)—namely, that if they gave any countenance to that proposal they would *pro tanto* interfere with that sense of responsibility on the part of bankers on which they must so largely rely. He thought they had good reason for relying on that sense of responsibility. No doubt, they had had the disastrous failure of the City of Glasgow Bank. But let them look at the vast number of banks which had so long conducted their business on just and sound principles, with a due sense of the responsibility that attached to them, and which were always ready to meet their engagements. It required stronger arguments than any yet adduced to justify the laying down of the proposition that if a man was willing to lend another a sum of money for a certain time the State should interfere because that bargain was likely to be injurious to the community. The hon. Member for Cork County (Mr. W. Shaw) had suggested that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should consider the advisability of promoting the amalgamation of the small banks. He (Mr. Courtney), however, hoped that the right hon. Gentleman would approach that suggestion with very great caution. Danger arose already from the fact that they had banks having hundreds of branches scattered over the Kingdom, and which were superintended by the directors of the central establishment, who often could not possibly exercise the control which was necessary, if the business was to be properly conducted, with so many separate branches. They could not have the directors of a bank in London excercising that due supervision over the borrowing and lending transactions of hundreds of country branches, without which the conduct of its affairs must sometimes be put in jeopardy.

Mr. MUNTZ said that, in the course of a long experience, that was the first time he had known a Member, and especially a Member of the Opposition, come forward with a proposal to increase taxation. He must protest against that House assuming to itself the function of meddling in the management of the commercial, or, rather, imaginary commercial, affairs of the country. It would be practically impossible for any law to regulate deposits to work, and there was no more reason why they should interfere with the management of banking than with any other business. No doubt, there had been some very great swindles and most infamous frauds in connection with banking; but those cases were very exceptional, and it was one of the most wonderful things that, in spite of the want of confidence caused by the frightful calamity in Glasgow—one of the most wicked that ever occurred in the banking history of the country—and by the failure of a bank in the West of England, the great body of the banks in this country had so managed their affairs that nothing of importance had occurred to them. The arguments of the hon. Member for Youghal (Sir Joseph M'Kenna) went to discourage deposits. But deposits were the very things they ought to encourage. Those deposits, received by the banks and then lent out, judiciously, to those who wanted accommodation at the time, fertilized the whole trade of the country. An hon. Member had put the total amount of these deposits at £1,000,000,000 sterling; but he (Mr. Muntz) thought it must be nearer £2,000,000,000. Why were they to interfere with the accommodation afforded by the private banks, which had, on the whole, been prudently managed? The hon. Member for Liskeard (Mr. Courtney) said Parliament had been constantly interfering with banking, and he had quoted what was done by the late Sir Robert Peel. Now, Sir Robert Peel, no doubt, put an end to the capacity of the private banks to make money; for that was what their power of issuing notes really amounted to. He, however, knew of no plan brought forward by that great statesman and skilful financier for interfering with the management of banks. To suppress their capacity of making money was a totally different thing from interfering with the internal affairs of banks. The proposal now before the House would have a mischievous effect, because it would tend to check that confidence which he was glad to see now entirely restored.

SIR GRAHAM MONTGOMERY said, that the people of Scotland would view with great disfavour any proposal of the kind made by the hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir Joseph M'Kenna) in his Motion. They, although few had suffered more, did not attribute what they had suffered from the failure of the City of Glasgow Bank to the system of taking deposits. That system had, he (Sir Graham Montgomery) believed, conferred incalculable benefit on the Scotch people. In 1826 it was estimated there were not more than £20,000,000 of deposits in all the banks of Scotland. Now, he believed, they exceeded £70,000,000. It might be said that it was a dangerous principle to encourage the deposit of money at call; but, as far as Scotland was concerned, it had answered extremely well, and he should be sorry to see any interference with that. Any proposal such as that now made to the House would, he was sure, notwithstanding all the suffering that had been inflicted by the great failure to which he had referred, be viewed in Scotland as a serious interference with the rights of banking; and he hoped that the hon. Member for Youghal would not persevere with his Motion.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER presumed, after the discussion which had taken place, that the hon. Member for Youghal (Sir Joseph M'Kenna) would not ask the House to express any opinion on his Motion by a formal vote. But he thought everyone must feel that they were indebted to the hon. Gentleman for having brought on a very interesting discussion, and one which could hardly fail to be of value. He thought they ought also to make this acknowledgment—that the proposal of the hon. Member had not been made merely under a feeling of excitement, owing to particular events which had recently occurred, because, as they knew, that was a matter which had been in his mind for some considerable time; and before the close of last Session he distinctly intimated his intention of bringing forward the proposal embodied in his speech of that evening. At the same time, the sense of the House would, he thought, go entirely with the tenour of the remarks which had been made by so many hon. Members, by his hon. Friend the Member for Peterborough (Mr. Thomson Hankey) and others, on both sides of the House —namely, that it would be altogether indiscreet and incompatible with the Rules which should guide them in their Parliamentary proceedings that Parliament should undertake to interfere with the details of the management of a business such as banking. The hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Muntz) had, as he thought, most accurately distinguished between the course taken by Sir Robert Peel in regard to banking and the course now proposed. He (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) had always understood that the principle on which Sir Robert Peel proceeded was that banking, as banking, ought to be left as free as possible. But as to the power of issuing money, that was a matter which was properly under the control of the State, and one which the State ought to regulate. There was no doubt that, in regulating the question of issue to a certain extent, the liberty and the proceedings of the issuing banks were interfered with; but that was only as a subordinate part of the main object of that legislation, the regulation of the issue. Now, having adopted the proposition which he had laid down, that it was not a part of the functions of Parliament to regulate the details of a business such as banking, and having stated that it was undesirable that they should come to a Resolution on such a question, he thought he should be inconsistent with his own doctrine if he were to attempt to examine that proposal on its merits, because the ground he would rather take was this—that it was a proposal, although useful to converse upon, the merits of which they should not discuss too minutely. At the same time, he would say that it struck him that there was something rather inconsistent on the face of the proposal in one respect; because, as he understood the hon. Member's argument, it was this—Inasmuch as the necessity for making a sufficient profit out of the deposits on which interest was paid to cover the interest paid to the depositors and leave a margin, necessarily tempted bankers to invest in risky securities in order to get a high rate of interest, it seemed to him a rather curious remedy that they should add to that temptation by imposing a tax on the banker, who would not only have to cover the interest he had to pay his depositors and to get a little profit for himself, but also have to cover the tax to be paid to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He did not wish, however, to discuss that point very much. He admitted that there was something very tempting in the suggestions of the hon. Gentleman who had brought this matter under the notice of the House. When they referred to the £500,000 a-year which he might realize as Revenue, he could not help saying, like the Governor in *The Critic* on his being offered £1,000—"Thou hast touched me nearly." If he saw any object of taxation which it was proper, and which it appeared convenient to tax, he should be right in proposing that a tax should be laid upon it for the purpose of raising a Revenue. But when it was proposed to impose a tax, not for the purpose of obtaining a Revenue, but in order to regulate a business, he was obliged to regard the proposal from another point of view. With respect to this particular question of a tax on deposits, many hon. Members might remember that in former times there used to be a tax on deposits. Up to the year 1853 there was a stamp duty on all receipts given for money lying at interest. In that year the tax was done away with. In 1870, when the consolidation of the Stamp Laws was effected, the Bill was so drawn that it contained a clause that would have imposed the tax again; and he believed that, on the Motion of the late Sir David Salomons, the House again decided not to re-impose the tax. In consequence, the Bill was so amended that the tax was not introduced. He was not quite sure, however, that the whole question of the stamp duty and of income tax on money derived from deposits was in an entirely satisfactory state. He thought the subject required consideration; but hon. Gentlemen were aware that the interest derived from deposits was liable to income tax. The banks did not, however, deduct that income tax, and therefore the recipient was left to pay the tax himself. That was not always a convenient mode of raising the money. He mentioned this fact, which was a separate one, incidentally, only in order to show that he had all these questions under consideration. With regard to the hon. Member's proposal, which was that they should introduce taxation so as to discourage the system of deposits, that was a matter with which the House had better not attempt to interfere, and in which he could not encourage it to interfere. A conversation of this sort was valuable on account of the opinions it elicited, even although the House might stop short of action in the matter; and what was said in the House might assist in dispelling misunderstandings elsewhere.

SIR JOSEPH M'KENNA acknowledged the question was not quite ripe for decision. He should, therefore, with the leave of the House, withdraw the Resolution, at the same time thanking it for the attention it had given to the subject. He further hoped that the discussion would have the effect of keeping the public mind directed to banking.

Motion, by leave, *withdrawn.*

LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE WATER SUPPLY.

MOTION FOR AN ADDRESS.

MR. E. S. HOWARD, in rising to move—

> "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying Her Majesty to issue a Royal Commission to inquire into the supply of water to the manufacturing districts of Lancashire and the west of Yorkshire, and any deficiencies likely to arise therein; and, whether it is necessary or expedient to resort to the Westmoreland and Cumberland Lakes to make good any deficiencies in such supply; and, if so, to what extent, and under what conditions, such resort should be sanctioned,"

said, that he felt it necessary to submit the reasons which induced him to call attention to this subject a second time. Last year he placed upon the Paper Notice of a similar Motion, but the Eastern debate intervening, he was compelled to postpone it, and he then raised the question by moving the rejection of the Manchester Corporation Water Bill, stating, at the same time, that if he was successful in obtaining the rejection of the Bill he should move for a Royal Commission. The reason of his opposition to that Bill was that it was a Bill of too great public importance to be dealt with by a Private Bill Committee, but that a careful investigation was demanded. The present Prime Minister, in one of his earlier works, stated that the opinion of a country was better represented through the Press than through Parliament; and if that statement was as full of "sense and truth" as some of his later utterances were said to be, they were fully justified in carrying on their opposition to the Bill, because almost the whole Press of the country united in condemning it. The result of their efforts last year was that a Select Committee was appointed, with special instructions, to

> "Inquire into and report upon the present sufficiency of the water supply of Manchester and its neighbourhood, and of any other sources available for such supply: To consider whether permission should be given to make use of any of the Westmoreland and Cumberland Lakes for the purpose; and, if so, how far, and under what conditions: To consider the prospective requirements of the populations situated between the Lake District and Manchester: To inquire and report whether any, and, if so, what, provisions should be made in limitation of proposals for the exclusive use of the water of any of the said Lakes."

The opponents of the Bill agreed to the conditions, because they believed they contained the principle for which they had been contending—namely, that the question was one of public interest and importance; that the inquiry ought to be public; and that the expenses of fighting it should not be thrown entirely on those individuals who had formed themselves into an Association for preserving the natural features of the Lake District. The Committee commenced at once to regard the case simply as one between the promoters and opponents. They did not seem to have sought any further evidence. Now, it was impossible for that Association to which he had referred, with its limited means, to present such elaborate plans and details as Mr. Bateman, the Engineer to the Manchester Corporation, was able to produce. The Manchester Corporation had the services of Sir Edmund Beckett, who treated the evidence of the opposition in his usual complimentary manner, and the Committee seemed to have adopted his views. They said, moreover, that the evidence which had been adduced as to the supplies which might be obtained from other sources was unworthy of consideration, and thus simplified their task by assuming that there was no other water supply. He (Mr. Howard) had been told that evidence was offered to them of an entirely different and most comprehensive scheme, and that they declined to go into it. He maintained, therefore, that the opponents of the Bill had raised a *primâ facie* case that there were other sources of supply, and that the Select Committee ought to have gone further than they did; and that that Committee did not use the powers with which they had been armed to the extent to which the public had a right to expect. The Committee seemed to accept the statements of the promoters of the Bill without sifting them. Take, for example, the question of population. To begin with, there was a remarkable discrepancy on this point. When the Bill was first introduced into this House, a deputation from Manchester waited on the Chairman of Ways and Means, and, in presenting their case, the Mayor of Manchester said that the number of people the Manchester Corporation had to supply with water was 800,000. But a few weeks afterwards, before the Committee, it was stated by the promoters of the Bill that the number of people was over 900,000. He (Mr. Howard) did not know whether these people had been hastily manufactured in the interval, or how Manchester had increased so rapidly; but if the population of Manchester was to keep on increasing with such power of multiplication, any scheme for supplying them with water short of a reproduction of the Flood would fail in its object. One of the main allegations of the supporters of the Bill was that in less than 10 years there would be a deficiency in the supply of water at the present rate of increase in the population. Twenty-five million gallons was the present supply, and they admitted that that would be sufficient for 1,000,000 people; but they said that before 10 years the population of Manchester and district would have increased to 1,300,000, and that, therefore, there would be a deficiency of water; and they argued that, because it would take seven years to carry out their present scheme, there ought to be no delay in passing their Bill. But how did the Committee arrive at that estimate? They took the number of additional houses and warehouses erected each year in Manchester and the neighbourhood, allowing five persons to each house. That was the way the estimate was arrived at that Manchester and the neighbourhood would increase to so great an extent. It ought to be remembered, however, that the time at which these calculations were made was a time of exceptional prosperity, when houses and manufactories were springing up like mushrooms; and he (Mr. Howard) did not think the number of additional buildings in any one year formed a sound basis on which to calculate the increase in the population. Taking the Census itself, the figures told quite a different tale. The increase was estimated by the Committee and by the Manchester Corporation to be very nearly 39 per cent; whereas, if estimated according to the last Census Returns, the increase would only be 12½ per cent. Perhaps he might be told that the increase rose in every decennial period. On the contrary, the fact was that when they came to compare those periods since 1821 they would find a regular decrease. The county of Lancashire gave a return of 27 per cent from 1821 to 1831; from 1831 to 1841, 25 per cent; from 1841 to 1851, 22 per cent; from 1851 to 1861, 20 per cent; and from 1861 to 1871, 16 per cent. Taking Salford and South-East Lancashire, the percentage decreased from 30 per cent in 1821-31 to 13 per cent in 1861-71. Therefore, the estimate of the Select Committee was formed on entirely erroneous information. Beyond this, the independent investigations which the Committee had made had cost the Treasury simply six guineas—and this in a scheme which involved an estimated outlay of £4,000,000; which estimate would probably increase much faster than the population which had to pay it, and which would more like reach to £6,000,000 before the works were completed. He, therefore, contended that the Committee had limited the nature of their investigations to such an extent that the inquiry was not at all adequate to the subject, and that they failed to give it that consideration which the public had a right to expect. However, they passed the Bill with certain alterations. They were very good alterations. They required that Manchester should supply all the towns on the line of conduit, and supply it at a profit of not more than 5 per cent. That did away with the speculative character of the Bill, because it was notorious that the object of the Corporation was to obtain a monopoly of this supply, and then to sell it to all the towns which might be hard up for water for as much money as they could get. The House of Lords threw out the Bill on the Standing

Orders, and it had been introduced again this year, amended in accordance with the proposals of the Select Committee. Therefore it was that he had now thought it worth while to ask the House to pause once more before sanctioning this scheme — a scheme which involved such great alterations in the features and characteristics of the Lake District which many of them prized so high, a scheme which involved the outlay of a sum equal to that which Her Majesty's Ministers thought fit last year to ask the House to grant for the preservation of the Empire. He asked the House, before sanctioning such a scheme, to institute a thorough inquiry into the whole question of the water supply of those districts. The importance of the subject was too evident to need demonstration from him. About 10 years ago a Royal Commission was appointed to consider the water supply of London, and they were also instructed to extend their inquiry to the provincial towns. But the nature of the first inquiry was so protracted that they could not go into the second, and they merely laid down a few general principles, and pointed out a few gathering grounds for future investigation. The further investigation had not taken place, and if it seemed important then it must be much more important now. No doubt he should be told that because a Select Committee had already inquired into the subject there was no need for further inquiry; but he submitted that he had already shown that the inquiry of the Select Committee of last year was of too limited a nature, and was not such as the public had a right to expect. He thought he had also shown that their estimates of the increased population of Manchester and the probable requirements of that population had been much exaggerated. It was admitted that the present waterworks of the Manchester Corporation cost more than was estimated; and, no doubt, it was in order to make up for that that the Corporation had been obliged to sell the water to manufacturers which had been intended for future generations. This had occurred in years of prosperity, when new manufactories sprung up in the district, and that was the reason why they were short of water now, when their works ought to have lasted much longer. They were told on the highest authority that the present depression of trade was due to over-trading. Perhaps they might not have an opportunity of repeating that process for some time to come, and no doubt they would be glad to postpone it as long as possible. He thought, therefore, in all the circumstances, delay would not be a misfortune to Manchester, but rather a great boon and benefit, by delaying or preventing the execution of this scheme, involving such an enormous outlay to the ratepayers, and calculated as it was to reproduce that distress from which they had so recently suffered. For these reasons, he asked the House to assent to the Motion. If a Royal Commission were appointed, they would insure that the Lakes should not be subjected to such operations as were contemplated by the Bill until other resources had been fully inquired into and found wanting; and if the Royal Commission should decide that it would be right and proper to use the Lakes for the purposes contemplated, they would lay down limitations as to interference with the natural features and characteristics of the district; but if the Bill were allowed to pass, and the Royal Commission were not granted, and if Lake Thirlmere were to be "restored to its ancient condition," they should submit to the inevitable result, and see their Lakes taken one after another and "restored" to their ancient or some other shape by some eminent engineer. He was afraid there were many persons, although he was not one of them, who would agree with the wish of an eminent Professor, that "rather than see the waters of Thirlmere brought to the tops of the houses of Manchester, he would prefer to see the houses of Manchester brought to the bottom of the waters of Lake Thirlmere." The hon. Gentleman concluded by moving his Resolution.

MR. WHEELHOUSE, in seconding the Resolution, said, that he was strongly of opinion that it would not only be in the interests of the people of the West Riding of Yorkshire, but also in the interests of the ratepayers of Manchester, to have this question of water supply from Thirlmere fully inquired into. He might say that no one would be more willing than himself to facilitate any measure for supplying the inhabitants of Manchester with an abundant supply of water; but he denied, in the first place, that there was any danger of a water famine in that town; and, in the second place, he believed the Thirlmere scheme was the most expensive that could have been devised by the Corporation of Manchester or any other body of persons. The people of Manchester had quite close to them, in Derbyshire, one of the most admirable gathering grounds that could be imagined—a gathering ground which could give a supply of water for any length of time and in any circumstances, at a rate infinitely less than it would cost to get water from the Cumberland Lakes. There were, of course, those who would tell them that the people of Manchester knew their own concerns best, and that they could undoubtedly carry on their business better than anybody else. Now, while giving the people of Manchester every credit for the proper comprehension of their own affairs, he would accept any such statement on this particular question with more or less reserve, and for this reason—that he believed the idea of gathering water for the legitimate supply of Manchester on the spot where it could be most usefully utilized had never been dreamt or thought of practically until the Thirlmere Water Scheme had taken possession of certain minds in the Corporation of Manchester. And, again, the Corporation of Manchester itself was not unanimous by any means in favour of the Bill, for after the scheme was introduced into Parliament there was ample evidence of this. It was well known that, in the first instance, it was the intention of the Corporation of Manchester to become practically a huge association of dealers in water; and that if they had been successful in passing this Bill in its original form, they would have proceeded to make their own terms for the supply of water to other towns. They also knew, as a matter of fact, that if the Corporation of Manchester succeeded in getting their Bill, even in its amended form, and were allowed to appropriate the Lake, a precedent would be established for other towns to follow. Other Corporations would assuredly come to Parliament and say—" We want this Lake, or that Lake," with the inevitable result that at last there would remain no available source of supply for West Yorkshire. Leeds itself, and the other large towns, it was true, could not be said to have a bad supply of water; but when they came to the small manufacturing towns in the district running from Todmorden to the east of Leeds—a very wide district, indeed—they found that immense pressure had existed on account of the general want of an adequate supply of water. The water supply had been certainly deficient throughout this network of small towns and villages; and to allow any one Corporation to say to the inhabitants of West Yorkshire—" We will appropriate by Parliamentary powers, if we can get them, the whole of a large Lake, and you may get your supply as best you can," would be a matter calculated, not only to irritate, but to work public injury. It was with great cordiality, therefore, that he asked, on behalf of those who surrounded him in the neighbourhood of Leeds, that, before any legislation took place on the question, they in that district should have what they asked for—namely, a full and searching inquiry, not only for Manchester itself, but for the whole district to which he had referred. In the event of such an inquiry taking place, he sincerely hoped that it would not be confined to Thirlmere, or to any other Lake of East Cumberland. The whole question of the permanent water supply throughout the entire North of England should be entered into; and it should be ascertained whether Manchester might not have confined itself for a water supply to the immense gathering ground afforded by the rivers and other head waters in its vicinity. If it were possible to obtain water so close at hand, such sources would be far better utilized for the purposes of Manchester than that contemplated by the Thirlmere Scheme. In conclusion, he would again cordially press upon the House the advisability of adopting the Motion of the hon. Gentleman the Member for East Cumberland.

Motion made, and Question proposed,

"That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying Her Majesty to issue a Royal Commission to inquire into the supply of water to the manufacturing districts of Lancashire and the West of Yorkshire, and any deficiencies likely to arise therein; and, whether it is necessary or expedient to resort to the Westmoreland and Cumberland Lakes to make good any deficiencies in such supply; and, if so, to what extent, and under what conditions, such resort should be sanctioned."—(*Mr. Edward Howard.*)

MR. BIRLEY: I listened with great regret and no less surprise to the speech of the hon. Member for East Cumberland, who introduced the Motion. I was prepared for an attack on the Manchester Corporation and upon those who have promoted the Manchester Corporation Water Bill; but I was not prepared for an attack to be made on the Select Committee by whom the Bill was last year considered. That Committee was chosen with great care, and was, I am sure, as competent to deal with this important question as any Committee that could have been chosen by this House—I would also venture to say as competent, probably, as any Royal Commission Her Majesty's Ministers could choose for this purpose. The question of the Thirlmere Scheme was laid before the Select Committee, and their Report upon it was, I believe, adopted with singular unanimity. That unanimity was no less felt in the district which it is proposed to benefit by the scheme. A public meeting was held, according to the Statute bearing upon the question, in Manchester, to approve or disapprove of the scheme. A poll was demanded, and a poll was taken, and the result was a majority of 40,000, as against less than 3,000, in favour of a scheme which we are told is so heavily to tax the people of Manchester. Then we are told in the same breath that it is to relieve Manchester from the burden imposed on it by the failure of the present water scheme. I am free to admit that that water scheme has cost a great deal more than was originally contemplated; but I should say, from the observations of the hon. Member for East Cumberland, that he has a superficial knowledge of the subject himself. He tells us that from the present sources there is an abundant supply of water, only that the Corporation are obliged to sell it in order to raise the money to recoup the expenses. Now, the fact is, all the water that is sold is sold under statutory obligations. The Corporation of Manchester is bound to supply the neighbourhood and district. The water is readily taken, and when a dry season occurs considerable distress is felt. I submit that the question of providing an abundant supply of water to a great population is one that ought to be treated with the greatest favour by this House, owing to the necessity for it in our manufacturing districts, both for the personal wants of the population and for manufacturing purposes. This scheme, as the hon. Member has truly stated, has been enlarged by the direction of the Committee, so that it is not merely a scheme for supplying water to Manchester, but for providing the manufacturing districts of South-East Lancashire. He approves of that alteration, so does the Corporation of Manchester; therefore I would suggest to him that if he does wish the House to accept his Resolution, that he should eliminate from it everything which relates to the county of Lancaster, and content himself—probably with the approbation of the hon. and learned Member for Leeds (Mr. Wheelhouse)—with confining it to West Yorkshire—if, indeed, it should be found to be desired by that part of the country. I very much question, however, whether the West Riding does desire a Royal Commission of this kind. The Report of the Duke of Richmond's Commission is substantially carried out by the Thirlmere Scheme as it now stands. I might bring forward many other arguments to show why this Motion ought not to be passed, and I do not think that any practical purpose would be served by passing it. Of course, the wants of West Yorkshire deserve the utmost consideration. Yorkshire ought to have every opportunity of making known its requirements; but it is not the case that this Motion is really supported by West Yorkshire, and it is perfectly clear that the object is to hinder and obstruct the Manchester Scheme, at whatever cost and whatever inconvenience to a population approaching 1,000,000, in order that the æsthetic views of the hon. Member and his Friends may be respected. The views of the hon. Member are not the views of his constituents, for the people of Cumberland generally are in favour of the scheme; but there are a few persons who take views similar to the fullest extent. I believe those views are imaginary. I believe the Corporation of Manchester will be able to satisfy them that the picturesque beauty of the Lakes will not be interfered with, and that every care will be taken to preserve the natural features of the country. The principal holders of property in the district are already satisfied, and there is, in short, no real substantial objection to the Bill. I therefore think that this Motion, which is one merely hostile to the Manchester Bill, ought not to be accepted by this House.

Mr. A. H. BROWN said, he was of opinion that the House should not appoint a Royal Commission as proposed. The whole question of water supply was one which deserved the attention of the House. At this moment there were before Parliament 23 Bills and 10 Provisional Orders dealing with water supply; and when he informed the House that these schemes involved an expenditure of nearly £6,000,000, the importance of the subject would be perceived. The practice of the House had been when such Bills had been read a second time to refer them to Select Committees, who dealt with them according to the evidence that came before them. One great objection to that system was that there was no uniformity in the action of those Committees. The General Acts which governed the question of water supply, though sufficient in former years, were not sufficient at the present time; and if reference were made to the Acts of 1835 and 1847, it would be found that they might now be greatly improved upon. As regards the purity of the water, for instance, it was not of such a high standard as it ought to be. Then, again, it very often happened that the Water Companies or Corporations taking powers to supply areas failed to supply portions of those areas, and thus practically created a water famine in the parts which they were bound to supply. This was a question which ought to be scrupulously investigated and guarded against in every private Water Bill. In the case of the Manchester Bill, the Committee were empowered to consider questions outside the area which the Manchester Corporation was supposed to supply; but in all the ordinary Water Bills it was impossible for the Committee to consider the water wants of any village or town which might be outside the particular area proposed to be supplied. These were matters which ought to be remedied; and he would suggest that the Chairmen of the various Committees which would be formed should have some means of laying down a uniform line of action. He desired to see some kind of uniformity with reference to these Water Bills; and if they would compare one Bill with the other, they would see that these points should receive attention, and that uniformity was required. He believed it was necessary that further provisions should be made in these Water Bills for the protection of the public. His suggestion would be that a number of experienced Members of the House should be chosen as Chairmen of the Private Bill Committees who would consider all the water schemes submitted, and that they should be formed into a panel, similar to the General Committee on Railway Bills, and by that means the House would insure that not only uniformity would be preserved, but that justice would be done. He cared very little what the remedy was to be; but he did object to the present system, which was really chaos, and anything they could do to improve it would be acceptable. He hoped in making these remarks he was not out of Order; and he made the suggestion simply that more experienced Gentlemen in the House should take the matter up and do something in the direction he had indicated. He must, however, conclude by saying that he should oppose the Motion of the hon. Member for East Cumberland.

Mr. SCLATER-BOOTH: The House will hardly expect that the Government will be prepared to assent to the appointment of a Royal Commission on the statement which we have heard from the hon. Member who proposed the Motion. The statement he made was of a very limited character, and resolved itself into the details of what is known as the Thirlmere Water Scheme—which will, I believe, be before the House to-morrow—and the view the Committee took of that matter last year. I should have thought, in bringing such a subject forward, the hon. Member would have done so on broader grounds; that he would have attempted to show that the Lake Districts were being injured, and that the water supply of certain localities was in danger in consequence of a preference being given to certain large towns over some of their smaller neighbours, or that there was fear of a water famine in Lancashire or South Yorkshire. Indeed, I should have supposed that the hon. Member would have brought forward a case which unmistakably called for the intervention of Parliament; but in that respect he has, I consider, entirely failed. The question of a Royal Commission on the subject of water supply is a large one, and it was brought before me by an important and influential deputation in 1874, and by the Society of Arts in the early part of last year. Had the hon. Gentleman proceeded on broader grounds, and applied for a Royal Commission as a reformer in respect of water supply, and as one anxious to promote the general interests of the public, I should have been able to give information from Blue Books, as there are not only the Report of the Duke of Richmond's Committee, but in the sixth Report of the Commission on the Pollution of Rivers in 1874 there is a mass of evidence of an exhaustive character and great precision, and a number of suggestions as to a quantity of districts, all more or less bearing on this subject. There are also other Reports, and other Blue Books and Notices, having reference to water supply generally, which are open to the inspection of anyone, and are of a most valuable description. I may mention that there is a compendium, which was arranged last year at the request of the Society of Arts, which gives information as to the whereabouts of any of these Reports; and for that, among other reasons, I do not see the necessity of further special inquiries. If I had been challenged as to the grounds upon which I objected to the Motion, I should have said simply that I did not see what useful end could be gained by appointing such a Commission. The Public Health Act of 1875 greatly increased the powers of local authorities with reference to water supply, and protected them against Water Companies, and under that Act large sums of money are being borrowed for the purpose of water supply. Again, we are indebted to the hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. A. H. Brown) for the Committee which sat last year, and which greatly facilitated the powers of local authorities to obtain water. That Committee, I consider, obtained ample information, and the Bill which was before them came out a good and improved measure. Having thus dealt with the general subject in the way I have mentioned, the present Motion does not commend itself to my mind, because it is not only an attack upon the Committee of last year, but it is also an attack upon the Thirlmere Water Scheme, which is to come before us on another day. The House was not last year prejudiced in favour of that scheme. It was read a second time after ample discussion; it was referred to a Hybrid Committee; and when that Committee was appointed the whole subject was left to them. The Committee amended the Bill and reported in its favour, and it was lost in the Lords because the promoters accepted the suggestions of the Committee and embodied them in the Bill. It has now been revived, and the Manchester ratepayers have strongly supported the policy of the Corporation in bringing the subject again before the House; and the Bill, I believe, is set down for second reading to-morrow. I cannot, therefore, see what the House would gain by accepting the Motion, and thus delaying the second reading of a measure which comes to us so strongly supported. The hon. and learned Member for Leeds (Mr. Wheelhouse) went so far as to admit that there was an ample supply of water for Yorkshire itself already existing; but that is not the case at Manchester. Manchester, however, does not seek to monopolise the Lakes; but, on the contrary, a large population will be supplied by the aqueducts which carry the water. In these circumstances, I do not see that any case has been made out for a Royal Commission. Whether the Committee did all the hon. Member thinks they ought to have done or not I am not prepared to say; but if he desires to challenge the conduct of the Committee, I think he should have done so by a more specific Motion, so that the Members of the Committee might have been prepared to meet it, and might have been made aware that their conduct was under examination. It is a little unusual to make such attacks as the hon. Member has levelled at the Committee without giving the Members of it notice; and we shall be led into endless controversy if the action of every Committee is to be brought in review before the House, as has been the case here. If the Committee obeyed the instructions given to them by the House, as I must assume they did, those instructions were not very wide from what the hon. Member would give to a Royal Commission, and the House will see that the Committee did obey their instructions, because they improved the Bill in a manner acceptable to the House, and put the whole subject in a form which was still further developed in the Bill of this year. On the part of the Government, therefore, I may say that we do not feel called upon, simply upon the ground stated, to issue a Royal Commission on the subject.

Mr. W. E. FORSTER said, his hon. Friend (Mr. Howard) had stated his case to the House, and he (Mr. W. E. Forster) felt bound to say that on public grounds he agreed with the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Sclater-Booth). He (Mr. W. E. Forster) said this as one who had taken considerable interest in the water supply from Thirlmere Lake, and the question of the Lake scenery generally. He hoped his hon. Friend would not put the House to the trouble of dividing upon the question. He would not now enter into the question of whether the water could be obtained elsewhere or not; that was a point decided by the Committee; but it appeared to him that the Corporation of Manchester had consented to obligations which, if Manchester was to get water from the Lake at all, would, as far as possible, protect the Lake scenery. Looking at the matter from the point of view in which he was most interested, he did not think that any advantage could accrue from the appointment of a Royal Commission. On the other hand, he was not at all sure that even greater interference with the Lakes than had already been proposed would not be the result of such a step. It was said that care would be taken to prevent the water being taken from the Lakes, unless it were clearly shown that it could not be obtained elsewhere. But he would not like to guarantee that this Commission, or the Committees, to whom future Bills might be referred, would endorse this view of the matter. With regard to the Bill of last year, he confessed that he thought the promoters had a good case. The Hybrid Committee appointed last year gave great consideration to the subject. That Committee had come to a conclusion he regretted; but he could not deny that it was a Committee which included many able men, who fully entered into the subject, and they made certain recommendations which the promoters accepted, and it was in consequence of that that they lost their Bill in the House of Lords. He repeated he was sorry the Corporation of Manchester had set their minds upon getting water from Thirlmere; but he believed they were doing what they could to secure that as little harm as possible was done to the scenery; and, looking at all the circumstances, he was unable to vote for the Motion.

Mr. RAIKES said, that the hon. Member for East Cumberland was not open to censure for bringing this subject forward. His hon. Friend asked him whether it would be regular for him to move an abstract Resolution on the second reading of the Bill; and he (Mr. Raikes) pointed out the difficulty that would naturally arise if he did so. The consequence was that the Bill was read a second time after a very full and important discussion. He (Mr. Raikes) had taken an active part in the proceedings of the Hybrid Committee of last year, and he considered that no Committee was ever better constituted. His greatest difficulty, which was one of policy, was removed by the action of the Committee in depriving the Bill of the speculative character it originally possessed, and in insuring that a reasonable price was paid for the water. But he thought that the hon. Member had a perfect right to be dissatisfied with the result arrived at, and to come before the House to ask, if he deemed such a course necessary, for a Royal Commission, thus challenging the opinion of the House on the subject before the Bill that had been brought in could be read a second time. At any rate, this was a much more convenient course than if the whole question had to be raised on the Motion for the second reading. He had not the advantage, apparently possessed by the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Local Government Board, of being familiar with the large amount of information upon this subject to which he referred; and he regretted that so much confusion should exist on this question throughout England in those districts where the different communities were fighting for the water which was to be had from the several watersheds—a rivalry that was, in reality, a great scandal. The right hon. Gentleman the President of the Local Government Board had, however, stated that the Government would supply Members with the Rules under which, in their opinion, water supply should be regulated. It would be very convenient to

Members to be supplied with those Rules.

Notice taken, that 40 Members were not present; House counted, and 40 Members being found present,

MR. RAIKES, in conclusion, advised the hon. Gentleman not to press his Motion to a division.

MR. LYON PLAYFAIR said, he had had the honour of being Chairman of the Hybrid Committee that had sat for many weary days, and had devoted much time to the examination of this question last year. The Committee was, indeed, more like a Royal Commission than an ordinary Committee of that House. Its Members had examined the whole question in an impartial sense. They had to deal with a general meteorological fact, for the great south-western winds swept over the Atlantic and evaporated a large quantity of water on the way, while the high mountains of Westmoreland and Cumberland acted as condensers, so that the water was poured over the district in which those mountains were situated. The Committee had to consider whether the Lake regions thus formed were to be regarded as the property of one district, or whether they belonged to the whole of England, from the position in which they were placed, and the peculiar function they discharged; and, consequently, they had examined the question in its fullest and largest sense. It so happened that in the House of Lords the Bill, as it passed from that Committee, was thrown out because a Local Bill had been made into an Imperial Bill. The Duke of Richmond's Commission had examined the Bill in the same catholic spirit, and the House of Commons' Committee were, in reality, only able to ratify the decisions of that Commission. Not only had they to consider the question of the supply of other towns in Lancashire besides Manchester, but they had also to consider how all the intervening towns might benefit from the common depository of water in the Lake district. The Committee, therefore, did not restrict its labours, but examined the question most fully. Under these circumstances, he thought, considering the fact of so much time having been devoted to this question, and so much labour having been expended upon the Bill, which was not a Local Bill, but one generally affecting the great manufacturing districts of the country, that to form another Royal Commission would cast some doubt on the fulness of the labours of that Committee; and therefore he trusted the hon. Member for East Cumberland (Mr. Howard) would not press the matter to a division, but would be contented with having called attention to the subject.

MR. E. S. HOWARD wished to be allowed to state, before withdrawing his Motion, that he was very much obliged to the hon. Member for Chester (Mr. Raikes) for coming to his assistance, and saying that he had done nothing irregular; because he thought, from what the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Sclater-Booth) said, he had done something which was not only irregular, but atrocious. He begged leave to withdraw the Motion.

Motion, by leave, *withdrawn.*

PUBLIC ACCOUNTS.

Mr. HANKEY, Sir HENRY HOLLAND, Sir JOHN LUBBOCK, Sir CHARLES MILLS, Mr. O'REILLY, Mr. SEELY, and Sir HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON nominated other Members of the Committee.

PARLIAMENTARY FRANCHISE BILL.

On Motion of Mr. ELLIOT, Bill further to amend the Laws relating to the Representation of the People in England and Wales, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. ELLIOT, Mr. RODWELL, and Mr. Serjeant SPINKS.

FRIENDLY SOCIETIES ACT (1875) AMENDMENT BILL.

On Motion of Mr. CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER, Bill to declare the true meaning of Section Thirty of "The Friendly Societies Act, 1875," *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER and Sir HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON.

Notice taken, that 40 Members were not present; House counted, and 40 Members not being present,

House adjourned at half after Eight o'clock.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Wednesday, 26th February, 1879.

MINUTES.]—SELECT COMMITTEE—Hall-Marking (Gold and Silver), *appointed.*

PUBLIC BILLS — *Resolution in Committee — Ordered — First Reading*—Watch-Cases (Hall-Marking) * [87].

Ordered — First Reading — Medical Act (1858) Amendment (No. 2) * [86].

First Reading—Parliamentary Franchise * [84]; Friendly Societies Act (1875) Amendment * [85].

Second Reading—Consecration of Churchyards Act (1867) Amendment [13], *put off;* Poor Law Amendment Act (1876) Amendment * [44].

ORDER OF THE DAY.

The House met at Two of the clock.

CONSECRATION OF CHURCHYARDS ACT (1867) AMENDMENT BILL.

(*Mr. Monk, Mr. Grantham, Mr. Forsyth.*)

[BILL 13.] SECOND READING.

Order for Second Reading read.

MR. MONK, in moving that the Bill be now read a second time, said, that it had been conceived in a spirit of conciliation, and with the view of providing for Nonconformists in the rural parishes the same means of burial as had been provided for them in the Metropolis and in all the large towns in England and Wales. He hoped the subject would be approached in a spirit of forbearance and reasonable compromise, and he could not believe that the hon. and learned Member for Denbighshire (Mr. Osborne Morgan) would approach it in any different spirit. If the question was to be considered one upon which compromise was impossible, he (Mr. Monk) admitted that the Bill was not worth the paper on which it was printed, and it would be better to make no further attempts to settle the question. It was brought forward in no spirit of antagonism to the hon. and learned Gentleman's measure. Indeed, he hoped to see that measure carried into law, and he had always voted for it since 1870; but the hon. and learned Gentleman must be aware that Parliament at present would not accept his Bill, and he could not expect to see it passed into law until public opinion had a more considerable effect on the votes of Members of that House. But because the hon. and learned Member could not pass his Bill, he (Mr. Monk) did not see why other hon. Members should not endeavour to provide relief, even if it were not so effectual as that provided in the larger measure of the hon. and learned Member. In 1867 the Consecration of Churchyards Act was brought into the House of Lords by the late Bishop of Winchester. The object of it was to enable Bishops to consecrate additions to existing churchyards without the formalities which, up to that time, necessarily attended consecration—namely, the attendance of the Bishop's officials, the Chancellor, the Registrar, and others; and it also repealed the stamp duties payable on the conveyance of the ground so added to the churchyard. Under that Act, consecration of the whole of the ground was compulsory; but the Act had been found to be a great boon to parishioners. His present Bill proposed that a portion of the ground, according to the necessities of the parish, might be left unconsecrated. He had seen it stated that a mere strip of the ground was to be left for the burial of Dissenters; but there was nothing in the Bill about a strip of ground, and a-half or two-thirds of it might be left unconsecrated. In this Bill it was proposed that the whole ground should be under the control of the churchwardens, and that the setting apart of any portion of the ground to remain unconsecrated should be voluntary, as it was desirable that the appropriation of the donor should be respected. Should the House adopt the Bill, it would greatly facilitate the carrying out the principle of the Burials Acts, which had been in operation for something like a quarter of a century, and under which boards were created to provide public cemeteries—part of the ground to be consecrated, and the remainder to be unconsecrated. His experience was that it was not the act of consecration which the Dissenters objected to, and he had found that the Dissenting as well as the Church members of the board were always willing to meet the Bishop, when he came to consecrate a burial-ground. His Bill, therefore, did not propose to interfere with free gifts of land; but it tended to place public burial-grounds throughout the Kingdom on the same conditions that regulated public cemeteries. He regretted that he had inserted words in the Bill separating portions of the ground by means of boundary marks of stone or iron; but he must remind the House that those were the words contained in the Burial Acts. If the House allowed the Bill to go into Committee, he would himself move the omission of the words "boundary marks of stone or iron," as a mere pathway fixing the boundary between the consecrated and unconsecrated portions was sufficient. He did that in deference to the feelings of some of his hon. Friends, who thought the provision would be objectionable to Nonconformists. He could not help remarking that the Bill had been received with unnecessary warmth by some hon. Members, the hon. Member for Swansea (Mr. Dillwyn) having even asked the House to refuse its sanction to the first reading, although last year the Bill was read a second time without a division; while, as to opposition by Churchmen, he was of opinion that there was no reason to warrant it. The principle embodied in the Bill was one that had been strongly insisted on by the late Mr. Charles Gilpin and other leading Nonconformists in 1867; and that, he thought, should be a sufficient guarantee that it would not be objectionable to those who were acting on behalf of the Nonconformists in this matter. What was the act of consecration, which seemed to arouse their susceptibilities? The act consisted only in the Bishop of the diocese signing a document reciting the conveyance of the ground, and its appropriation to the burial of the dead according to the rites and ceremonies of the Church of England, and its registration in the diocesan registry. The Bishop usually recited a psalm, offered up a few prayers, and addressed the bystanders; but these after-proceedings were by no means essential to the act of consecration itself, which was purely a formal and official affair. He held in his hands letters from the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Bishop of Peterborough, the Suffragan Bishop of Dover, who was also Archdeacon of Canterbury, and other eminent ecclesiastics, who had expressed their hearty approval of the Bill. They believed that the Bill was a useful measure, and hoped that it would receive the sanction of the House. Although it might not have any very large effect, yet he believed it would prove useful in many instances. As the law at present stood, burials took place in large towns in ground which was partly consecrated and partly unconsecrated. That arrangement had given great satisfaction, and it was the object of the Bill to afford the same relief in rural districts with regard to the necessity for having the service read by a minister of the Established Church, while provision was made for the enlargement of churchyards at a mere nominal cost. He desired to repeat most emphatically that his Bill had not been conceived in a spirit of opposition to the Bill of the hon. and learned Member for Denbighshire, but simply in order to provide a remedy for the grievance under which Nonconformists undoubtedly laboured. That Bill was certain to pass one day, but, until it did pass, he hoped the House would not refuse to give rural districts the relief which in large towns had proved so acceptable and satisfactory. He, therefore, begged to move the second reading.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."—(*Mr. Monk.*)

MR. ERNEST NOEL, in moving, as an Amendment, that the Bill be read a second time that day six months, said, that, while admitting that the Bill was meant to be a conciliatory measure in favour of the Nonconformists and to remove the grievances under which they suffered, he thought that the hon. Member for Gloucester (Mr. Monk) had been successful in introducing a Bill which was equally disagreeable to all denominations. He considered it as repugnant a measure to every Liberal mind as it was possible to produce. It was one that ought to be—and, indeed, was—opposed by all Nonconformists; and it should be as repugnant to Churchmen as to Dissenters. It was in his character of a Churchman that he objected strongly to the measure, because nothing could be more dangerous to the Established Church than to offer to the Nonconformists, under the guise of a boon, that which insulted their best feelings. He could hardly imagine any hon. Gentleman sitting on the Government side of the House defending the Bill, because if the Bill of the hon. and learned Member for Denbighshire (Mr. Osborne Morgan) could be described as the thin edge of the wedge directed towards Disestablishment, this measure, though a little thinner as a wedge, was at all events a more insidious one and went in the same direction. Many hon. Members, himself among them, desired to see this question settled upon some statesmanlike compromise; but the compromise proposed by the Bill had been rejected by both sides, and it would certainly not offer any lasting solution of the difficulty. The Bill had passed a second reading last Session by the mere accident of coming on unexpectedly at a late hour of the evening towards the end of the Session, and therefore much importance could not be attached to the fact. With regard to consecration, as far as he understood the wishes of the Nonconformists, they had no objection to lie in consecrated ground; but this act of consecration was made an excuse for preventing their being buried in that ground with a service such as the people of their denomination were accustomed to. The Bill they were now asked to pass would, no doubt, allow Nonconformists to have a strip of ground where they might be buried according to their own rites; but that was in no wise what Nonconformists felt they were entitled to. They were entitled to much more than being buried with their own rites in a small strip of parish ground—a sort of pariah ground—separated from their relatives and friends, and where they would be looked upon as unholy and unclean. [*Cries of* "Oh!" "No, no!" *and* "Hear!"] He did not know how Nonconformists might regard it, but as a Churchman he so regarded it. He pointed out that though this piece of ground which they were proposing to set aside for Nonconformists was to be at one side of the churchyard, it would be within its walls; that the funeral *cortége* at a Nonconformist's funeral must enter by the common or lych gate, and that they would thus have what hon. Members opposite regarded with so much fear—an invasion of consecrated ground by rites other than those of the Church of England. The proposal was offensive to Churchmen also, for, in order to carry it into effect, it seemed that while the churchwarden was left to protect the unconsecrated, the clergyman was to be on guard to prevent any desecration of the consecrated precincts, by any service other than his own, and to keep the Nonconformists on their own ground. It was wrong to impose such an office on the clergyman. His main objection to the Bill was that as far as it went it would stereotype those old and painful divisions which existed in the country over the open grave, and which were so much to be deplored. Why could not Churchmen and Nonconformists alike be buried in the same old parish churchyard when there was plenty of room for them? There was no objection to the division of land in cemeteries where the ground was laid out in equal portions, and two chapels, as like as a couple of peas, were erected for the use of Churchmen and Nonconformists respectively. That was, however, very different to what was proposed here, and he should prefer to have no burial places at all except cemeteries, rather than have churchyards divided in the unprecedented manner now recommended. He could not conceive how anybody could hope to settle the matter by this Bill. He did not believe that the hon. Member for the University of Oxford (Mr. J. G. Talbot) could support it; and he trusted that it would be rejected by the House. He did not think that it could be amended in Committee so as to meet the views of those who wanted to see a permanent settlement of the question, and for that reason would move its rejection.

Amendment proposed, to leave out the word "now," and at the end of the Question to add the words "upon this day six months."—(*Mr. Ernest Noel.*)

Question proposed, "That the word 'now' stand part of the Question."

Mr. FORSYTH said, that as his name was on the back of the Bill he wished to say a few words in its support. The speech of the hon. Member who had just sat down (Mr. Ernest Noel) showed how vain was even the most sincere attempt to arrive at a settlement of the question by conciliation. It was but too evident that there were many Nonconformists who would not be satisfied with anything less than a total surrender on the part of Churchmen. He admitted that the Bill would not satisfy those who put their case on the high ground of principle; but he maintained that it did supply a practical remedy for a practical grievance, which to some extent prevailed. There were about 4,000 unconsecrated burial-grounds in the Kingdom, and as they did not supply the whole want, some such measure as the present was required. He respected the feelings of those Dissenters who wished to be buried in the parish churchyard, hallowed in their minds by so many old associations in connection with their ancestors who were buried there. If the Bill passed, additions might gradually be made to all the consecrated churchyards, surrounded by the same walls, in which Nonconformists could be buried with their own religious ceremonies, while the consecrated ground appropriated to the Church would not be interfered with. What objection could there be to trying the proposal as an experiment until some better solution of the question could be arrived at? There was no hope of the Bill of the hon. and learned Member for Denbighshire (Mr. Osborne Morgan) being passed by the present Parliament, and probably it would not be passed by the next—possibly by no Parliament at all. The present Bill was undoubtedly a step in the right direction, and it would leave the main question entirely open. Its effect would be to diminish the inconvenience that Nonconformists were subject to at present in having either to submit to have the Burial Service of the Church of England read over them, or to be conveyed many miles to the nearest cemetery. The practical result of the measure would be to extend to the churchyards the principle adopted in all cemeteries — of dividing the land into two parts, one consecrated and the other not. Dissenters had not originally objected to this division in cemeteries, and why should they in the churchyards? He was, however, sorry to see that some of them had lately protested against such a division as invidious and improper. If Nonconformists rejected this Bill, it would be fair to assume that they did not so much desire to have their practical grievance redressed as to secure a triumph over the Established Church. He believed that Dissenters and Churchmen, also, would be willing to give ground to be added to churchyards, and thus eventually the greater part, if not the whole, of what the Dissenters now demanded would be obtained. The Bill required or implied that a portion of the ground to be given should be consecrated; but he should like that provision to be altered, and it might be amended in Committee, so that no part of the ground given by Dissenters need be consecrated. He commended the Bill to the attention of the House, because it was a step in the right direction, and met a practical want in a practical manner, without offending what some might call religious prejudices, but which he (Mr. Forsyth) believed were sincere and conscientious convictions.

MR. OSBORNE MORGAN considered that of the six Bills which had been introduced during the present Session to settle the Burials Question this measure was incomparably the worst, and his only regret was that any hon. Member sitting upon the Liberal Benches should have been found to introduce it. It was some consolation, however, to find that his hon. Friend (Mr. Monk) could not get a single Liberal Member to back his Bill, and that he was obliged to seek that assistance within the ranks of the enemy. He could not help thinking that that opinion was shared also by the constituents of his hon. Friend, because he (Mr. Osborne Morgan) had read a correspondence purporting to emanate from the whole of the Liberal voters and Nonconformists of Gloucester, in which they spoke of the Bill in no measured terms. The Bill proposed in new churchyards to rail off by boundary marks of stone or iron a Dissenters' corner, just as there used to be a suicides' corner. The Bishops were to be the judges of the size of the corner. He was not a Nonconformist, but if he were, he should regard such a proposal as a deliberate insult. It was no answer to say that such a solution had been accepted by Nonconformists 12 years ago, for many things which might have been accepted as concessions then would be resented as insults now. As to the proposed introduction in the country of the cemetery system, so far from that being a recommendation of the measure, it was to him its objectionable feature. He detested the cemetery system. It divided members of families who in death ought not to be divided, and was a disgrace to England and to Christianity. Last year he had mentioned the case of a Nonconformist widower at Birmingham, who, having interred one of his wives in the Church of England cemetery, and another in the Roman Catholic cemetery, was compelled to purchase a third grave for himself in the Nonconformist cemetery. Was not such a system a disgrace to their country? He was taunted with refusing to accept a compromise; but his position being perfectly clear and defined, and having for its basis the common-law rights of all parishioners to interment in the churchyards, it was not to be expected that he could support such a pitiful makeshift as the measure now before the House. It would be impossible to invent any weapon more deadly to the Church of England than the opposition which had been offered to his (Mr. Osborne Morgan's) Bill, and the attempt to substitute for it this miserable stopgap. It seemed to be the determination of hon. Gentlemen opposite to make this a hustings' question, and to fight it out to the bitter end, for they had met all his efforts to settle it with a stubborn *non possumus.* On his side there could be no misgiving, for upon it he had common sense, justice, and humanity; and he felt sure that while the responsibility of the struggle would rest with hon. Gentlemen opposite, the victory would be with him.

Mr. GREGORY said, that the number of Bills which had been introduced during the present Session on the subject showed that there was a desire in favour of some settlement of it, and he thought the proposal of the hon. Member for Gloucester (Mr. Monk) formed a basis on which some conclusions might be arrived at by those who could not accept the settlement supported by the hon. and learned Member opposite (Mr. Osborne Morgan). He did not approach the measure in any spirit of antagonism to the Nonconformists of the country, and it was in that mood that he ventured to support it. He knew of a case in point in which the system proposed by the Bill worked admirably. He was in the habit of attending a church in the country, where a portion of the churchyard was unconsecrated. It was inclosed within the churchyard wall, and formed an integral part of the churchyard. He could point out no distinction between that portion of the ground and the rest of the graveyard, and any distinction between them was only known, perhaps, to the clergyman and one or two other persons. It was open to the Nonconformists to avail themselves of that place for the burial of their dead with their own services. That was the arrangement proposed under the Bill, and there appeared to be no substantial difficulty in carrying out the proposal which it contained. No doubt, many persons would be willing to avail themselves of the provisions of the measure, and make grants of land for churchyards in their neighbourhood. There would be no distinction to the eye between one portion of the churchyard and the other; and he denied that it was any insult to the Nonconformist bodies to offer to allow them to enter an integral part of the churchyard, and use it in that manner for the interment of their deceased friends and relations.

Mr. WALTER opposed the Bill. He disputed it as being in any sense a settlement of the question, and thought the remarks of his hon. Friend who had just sat down (Mr. Gregory) told rather against than in favour of its principles. His hon. Friend had described the division of a churchyard in a remarkable manner, inasmuch as within its precincts the funerals of Dissenters were conducted without let or hindrance. There was, his hon. Friend said, no visible distinction between the one portion of the churchyard and the other, and no stranger entering that churchyard would know what portion was consecrated and what was unconsecrated. He (Mr. Walter) presumed there was no more difference between the two than between the dust of Dissenters and that of Churchmen. If that case proved anything, it proved the utter absurdity of the present rule. If it was possible, in the circumstances which his hon. Friend had described, for Churchmen and Dissenters to be buried within the precincts of the same churchyard without let or hindrance, without the parishioners being aware that one part of the ground was different from the rest, why should not the same be the rule for the whole Kingdom? Then, how did his hon. Friend know that the old churchyards were consecrated at all? That was very questionable. It was doubtful whether there were any records of anything of the kind. But the great objection to that Bill as it stood was that it belonged to that most objectionable class of Bills of which they had had too many of late—namely, Permissive Bills. Whatever might fairly be the subject of permissive measures, there was one matter which he thought ought never to be so, and that was the law which regulated the burials of the people of this country. There was nothing permissive about death. A man must die, and the arrangements for his interment ought not to depend on permissive legislation, but on some broad and national principles. Since he first began to consider that question, it had seemed to him possible to solve it only in one way—namely, by recognizing the right of interment as a civil right, and letting the religious rites performed over the deceased follow the religious opinion of his friends. He could see no other rational mode of settling the question. A man must be buried somewhere. Granting that he must have a place of interment, and granting also that which could not be denied, that the common law had so far overridden the law of consecration—whatever that law might be—as to entitle every parishioner to be buried in his parish churchyard, it seemed to be only a matter of good feeling as well as common sense and justice that the funeral rites of the deceased should be in accordance, not with the rule of the Church and the opinions of the clergyman, but with the opinion of his friends. It was strange that while people detected so many gnats in that controversy they did not appear to see the real camels before them. The real difficulty was not so much the place of interment, as the strain which was put on the consciences of so many clergymen in being compelled to read the Burial Service of the Church of England over everybody indiscriminately. Two or three days after the last discussion on that subject he went home to his parish in the country, and the first person he met was the clergyman. "Why," said the reverend gentleman—"Old So-and-so is dead; he succeeded at last in drinking himself to death," referring to an old notorious drunkard who made no secret of his intention to drink himself to death. On that he remarked—"And you will have to bury him." The clergyman replied—"That is true; but I cannot help it." And he had to read the Burial Service over such a notorious drunkard as that, who had drank his life away. That grievance remained. How it was to be remedied was a difficult question; but in comparison with a grievance of that kind all those miserable squabbles about consecrated and unconsecrated ground, and whether Dissenters were to have a service of their own choosing read over their graves, were paltry and insignificant. As to the question of consecrated ground, had they thought what it amounted to? Whoever had found any such difficulty in regard to the case of persons who died at sea? It might be said that the sea was a different element from the land. Well, let them take the case of those who fell at Waterloo, Sadowa, or any other battle-field. Was it not the fact that the funeral service for Churchmen and Dissenters was read by their respective ministers over their common grave without any form of consecration having been gone through over the soil where they were buried? And why in the case of a churchyard was that form of consecration, which meant nothing more than that the soil was set apart for the interment of the dead and was not to be disturbed, to be so interpreted as if it constituted an eternal barrier between Churchmen and Dissenters after death as well as before it? He could not consent, then, to vote for the second reading of that Bill. As one of those who had given a piece of land for a churchyard, he confessed that under that Bill he could not — he should be ashamed to add to it another field, or any part of a field of his to form the unconsecrated corner of that burial-ground. He saw no sound objection to Nonconformist ministers entering the parish churchyard and reading their own burial service over the graves of deceased members of their congregations.

MR. EVELYN ASHLEY said, he had never addressed the House on this question before; one reason being that there was nothing new to say, the other being that the matter had now passed away from the region of argument to that of mere pride and prejudice. When they were attacked for not wishing to compromise they were just simply being attacked for being logical and consistent. There could be no compromise in this matter, for it was impossible to divide a principle. If the principle entertained by himself and others was correct, that everybody had a right to interment in the churchyard, they could not consistently compromise the matter by retreat-ing from the position they held—that the right of using their own ceremonies must also be conceded to those who were by the law of nature compelled to come to the churchyard sooner or later. There were only two compromises which he could suggest as meeting the point at issue. One would be a Bill to dispense Dissenters from the necessity of dying. No doubt, that would be very satisfactory to the Dissenters, but he was afraid it would be *ultra vires*. But if they could not relieve Nonconformists from paying the debt of nature they might, perhaps, relieve everybody from the necessity of being buried, by a Bill providing that they should all be cremated. Perhaps some hon. Members opposite would propose this. But, seriously, he deprecated these frequent discussions, because they were painful and often very mischievous. The Bills of this character which were brought in were trying to evade the question, not to settle it, and he condemned more than any other the Bill then before them as being the worst that had as yet been proposed, and as one that sought to settle the difficulty by aggravating it. The promoters of this measure were not content with perpetuating distinctions at the grave side. They would maintain them long after the grave was closed, and even the generation had passed away. In Ireland Roman Catholics and Protestants were buried side by side by the ministers of their own denominations without any difficulty arising, and why should not the same thing be done in England? He hoped before many years were over this question would be settled on the only basis—namely, that of the Bill of his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Denbighshire. If this became a hustings' question, he, for one, would not fear the result.

Mr. NEWDEGATE: I regret most sincerely that the hon. Member for Berkshire (Mr. Walter) is about to oppose the Bill, and that, as it appears to me, his opposition is based upon most intolerant grounds. I have served with him for many years in this House, and have known him, I may say, from boyhood; I sincerely regret that he should have uttered it, for I cannot conceive of a more intolerant speech than his, unless it be the speech of the hon. and learned Member for Denbighshire (Mr. Osborne Morgan). It is my intention to vote for the second reading of the Bill on the same ground that I most anxiously supported the Cemeteries Act—because the Bill proposes in nothing to violate the common-law right of the Church of England, as a denomination, but, on the contrary, recognizes that common-law right. Every parishioner has a right to be buried in the churchyard, if he be a Churchman, or one who respects the Services of the Church of England. Parishioners have no right in the churchyard, except as the yard of the church belonging to the denomination called members of the Church of England. To say they have no other right whatever, and never had any right, that is a bold assertion, which is only a half truth; but to assert that everyone has a right amounts to a statement absolutely false, for I deny that any man has any right whatever by common law to interment in the churchyard, according to any other ceremonies or rites than those of the Church of England. It is the performance of those ceremonies and those rites which constitute the common-law proof, and recognition, of the title. With regard to the feeling in favour of the Services of the Church of England, I must say, for my part, that I value the Burial Service for its tolerance. The hon. Member for Berkshire said that he met his own clergyman one day, and wished him joy of having to read that Service over a neighbour, of whose past life neither approved—and that the clergyman, who seems to have had but little charity, expressed his difficulty in performing the Service in such a case. This is the very kind of intolerance that I detest, because what is the substance and the tenour of the Burial Service? Is it not the expression of a fervent hope that Almighty God has pardoned the sins of the departed, and received him into eternal rest? I cannot help saying that a clergyman who hesitates to read the Burial Service in a case where no objection is made on the part of the friends of the deceased is open to the charge of a presumptuous intolerance which is unworthy of civilization. I repeat that I value the Services of the Church of England, but still I would not force them upon anyone who has a conscientious objection to them. I would do my utmost to respect the conscientious feelings of all persons who entertain such objections, however much mistaken I may think them. Therefore, I would make provision to meet their difficulty, and that is done in the present Bill without invalidating the common-law right with regard to the churchyards. I honour the feeling which makes a man wish to be buried near the old church of his parish. When I say that I vote for the second reading of the Bill moved by the hon. Member opposite (Mr. Monk), because he respects the feeling to which I have just referred, and proposes to give effect to it, without violating the common-law right and title of the Church of England, as a denomination, I put it simply as a civil matter, and maintain that we have no right or title by use and custom to the churchyards capable of proof, except through the condition that the Service of the Church shall be performed there. That is the necessary proof of our right. The vice of the Bill of the hon. and learned Member for Denbighshire is that it strikes at the very root of the common-law title of the Church; it would dispossess the majority in order to benefit the minority; whereas the Bill of the hon. Member for Gloucester (Mr. Monk) suggests a plan whereby we may preserve the title of the Church as a denomination, while respecting the conscientious feelings of those who, though they have separated from the Church, still feel a veneration for her. The Bill may need alteration in Committee; but I am convinced that it is a step in the right direction. The hon. and learned Member for Denbighshire said he hated the Cemeteries Act. Well, I differ from him totally on this, for I laboured in support of the passing of that Act, and I think of all measures it is one of the most tolerant. I worked in order to obtain the passing of the Cemeteries Act, and I saw it passed into law. It is an Act which respects the feelings of everyone—the feelings of Nonconformists not less than those of members of the Church of England. That was a thoroughly tolerant measure, and I am sorry that the speech of the hon. and learned Member for Denbighshire distinctly marks the progress of this agitation towards intolerance. I detest intolerance. There is no greater intolerance than an attempt to invade the civil rights of a great denomination, simply because it cannot, consistently with security of the possession of the trust property it holds, accommodate itself to every suggested means for satisfying the scruples of others who form no part of that denomination. The Bill of the hon. Member for Gloucester is a tolerant measure; it may need amendment in detail, but its principle recognizes the dignity, which ought always to be considered, as attached to every question which affects the religious feelings of the people. I shall certainly vote for the second reading of the Bill.

MR. HIBBERT said, he had, as a Churchman, always supported the proposal of his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Denbighshire (Mr. Osborne Morgan); at the same time, not desiring to offend the feelings of Churchmen on this question, he would not use strong language, but when he looked at the Bill of the hon. Member for Gloucester (Mr. Monk), he was bound to say that it was neither a compromise, nor would it lead to a settlement of the question. In the first place, it was merely a permissive Bill, capable of being worked only in a limited number of parishes, for there were hundreds, he might say thousands, of small parishes in the country where no landowner was likely to be found willing or able to give land in the way indicated by that Bill. The measure was, therefore, no answer to the demand of the Nonconformist bodies. In the second place, the Bill also seemed to make a distinction between members of the Church of England and members of Nonconformist bodies, for the latter were to be given a small strip of land adjoining the churchyard. In the majority of cases, the funerals of Nonconformists would have to enter the gate and pass through the churchyard in order to enter the unconsecrated ground set apart for them; and that being so, he asked whether it was not fighting for a shadow to oppose the Bill of his hon. and learned Friend? It was a question admitting of no compromise, and this House had had set before it by the House of Lords an example of the way in which it would be treated. Instead of finding fault with Nonconformists for wishing to be buried in the parish churchyard, Churchmen ought rather to be pleased that they were ready to give up their conscientious objections and allow their dead to be interred there. After all, what was that rite of consecration? Some Bishops said it was one thing, and others said it was another. Speaking as a Churchman, he could not see that there was the least difference in principle between allowing the Nonconformists to go to a piece of ground to be added to the churchyard under a Bill of that kind and giving them access to the burial places now surrounding their parish churches. The present Bill would not settle that question, and therefore he must vote against it. He thought the Government, in whose hands the question had been left for the last few Sessions, should give the House their views on it.

Mr. BERESFORD HOPE said, the impression which that debate had given him all throughout was that on the other side there had been singular weakness. He did not mean weakness of language, for he had never known so much unmitigated use of strong adjectives as had been indulged in by the hon. and learned Member for Denbighshire (Mr. Osborne Morgan), who had uttered the adjective "miserable" half-a-dozen times in as many consecutive sentences. What was all that fume and fret about? They were simply asked to pass a Bill which would allow a man to make an innocent use of his own property for the chance of other people liking to avail themselves of his gift. If it had been intended to compel landlords to give land for the burial of Dissenters, or to send the parish constable to seize the corpse of a Nonconformist and carry it, *vi et armis*, and the living minister too, to the graveyard, and to compel the minister to use the Church Service there, the vehemence with which the Bill had been opposed could hardly have been exceeded. It had even been made a complaint against it that it was not a Party measure, because it was backed by Members on both sides of the House. Surely a question about the burial of the dead was one into which no feelings but those of religion, humanity, and order should enter; and yet it was now made a matter depending on this or that side of the House. Why was the Bill to be rejected because it had the singular good fortune to be supported by hon. Members sitting on both sides? He might himself have used that argument a week ago, but he should have scorned to do so. He left the other side to do that, and he congratulated them on the true Liberalism of their sentiments. This was a purely permissive Bill. The Church was an established one, and it accordingly existed under regulation. The duties of the clergy were more or less regulated by Statute; the churchyards were regulated by Statute. There were certain limitations on those churchyards. That Bill merely proposed to relax those limitations for the advantage of the whole community. On the one hand, they had men willing and able to give the land, and on the other, ecclesiastical authorities were willing and able to second them in their intention, which was only impeded by the limitations of a very recent Statute. Why not let the Bill be read the second time? Why not indulge those who desired to help in appeasing the burials' agitation in the hope that something might now be done? Why not reserve to themselves in grim silence the satisfaction of seeing that Bill prove a failure in its working hereafter? That would be common sense. But hon. Gentlemen opposite showed that they were nursing the question up for the hustings. The position of the hon. and learned Member for Denbighshire reminded him (Mr. Beresford Hope) of the old story of the squire who asked a friend out to shoot with him. The snipe rose, up went the friend's gun, and down went the snipe. "Good heavens!" exclaimed the squire, "what have you done? You have spoilt my sport—you have killed my snipe!" The Burials Question was the snipe of the other side, and especially of the hon. and learned Member for Denbighshire. If it were settled, the hon. and learned Member would, no doubt, be free to devote his learning, ability, and industry to those general questions which he was so well able to handle, but his snipe would be killed. Where, then, would be the Dissenting clergy of the mountains of old Wales? He asked the House to rise above Party and do a generous thing by assenting to a Bill which might do some good, and certainly could do no harm. It would at least be an innocent Act on the Statute Book—a good deal more than could be said for a great many other portions of their legislation.

Mr. RICHARD: I have so frequently spoken here on this Burials Question, and the objections to the present Bill have been so well stated by previous speakers, that it will not be necessary for me to trespass on the attention of the House for more than a few minutes. I was rather glad to hear the protest of the hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Cambridge (Mr. Beresford Hope) against the use of strong language. I hope he will take the lesson home to himself; for, of all those who take part in these discussions, no one employs such energetic and emphatic epithets as he does. I am quite at a loss to understand what could have prompted my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester (Mr. Monk) to bring forward this Bill, and to press it forward against the declared wishes of those more immediately concerned, and against the earnest remonstrances of his own political Friends. He declares himself in favour of the Bill of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Denbighshire (Mr. Osborne Morgan), and has, in fact, constantly and consistently voted for it for seven successive Sessions of Parliament. But now that the principle of that Bill has been affirmed by a considerable majority of the House of Lords, and would have been affirmed in this House last week if the opponents of the Bill of the hon. Member for Hertford (Mr. Balfour) had not been afraid of submitting to the test of a vote, when everything is thus so well proceeding in the direction which the whole Liberal Party desires, my hon. Friend comes and trails his little red-herring across our path. This Bill is not only utterly inadequate as a settlement of the question, but it is in direct contravention of the essential principle of the Bill of my hon. and learned Friend; for whereas the latter seeks to remove the disabilities under which the Nonconformists now labour, this Bill distinctly, and even offensively, perpetuates them by still excluding Dissenters from being buried in consecrated ground, even though it be within the same walls as the other. I am quite sure it was not the intention of my hon. Friend to put an affront upon the Nonconformists; but the effect of his Bill will undoubtedly be to place them in a most invidious and humiliating position by banishing them from the common resting-place of their fellow-parishioners, as though they were something common and unclean, and relegating them to a spot which would, no doubt, come to be called the Dissenters' corner. Of course, in thousands of parishes it would be wholly inoperative, for there are thousands of churchyards in the rural districts which would require no enlargement and would receive no enlargement; while, as respects the thousands and tens of thousands of Dissenting families whose relatives are already buried in churchyards, it would either oblige them to be separated in death from their nearest and dearest kindred, or submit, as now, to be buried as members of the Church of England. Then, as has already been remarked, it would introduce into our churchyards the offensive distinction between consecrated and unconsecrated ground. I am glad to see the right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary in his place, for I remember when, 10 years ago, I had the honour of sitting on the same Committee with him upstairs—the Committee to which the Bill of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Denbighshire was referred—he expressed with great emphasis his disapproval of this distinction as it exists in our cemeteries. With regard to consecration, I think I can explain the views of Nonconformists in a sentence. A great Christian teacher in the Primitive Church was asked his opinion in a case of conscience, as to whether Christian converts might eat of meat that had been offered to idols. His answer was—"Certainly you may, if you have no scruple about the matter yourselves, for," he added, "an idol is nothing at all." I do not wish to say anything offensive to the feelings of hon. Gentlemen opposite; if they attach any significance or sacredness to the act of consecration, I entirely respect their feelings; but to us Nonconformists consecration "is nothing at all." We have not the smallest objection to be buried in what is called consecrated ground; for, in fact, the whole purpose and design of the Bill of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Denbighshire is to secure permission for us to bury our dead in consecrated ground with such forms and rites as are in harmony with our feelings. This insistance upon keeping a distinction between Churchmen and Dissenters in death betokens a state of mind which is to me absolutely inexplicable. Some time ago we had a declaration circulated amongst us signed by a considerable number of noblemen, gentlemen, and clergymen—I observed, indeed, that nearly one-half of them were clergymen—in which they said in effect that, having given bits of ground for purposes of interment, if they had thought it possible that the time would ever come when the ground so given would be profaned by the foot of any Christian minister except one episcopally ordained, or when the air floating above it would vibrate to the voice of prayer and praise from any but sacerdotal lips, they would never have given those bits of ground at all. I sometimes wonder what such people think of the life to come. I suppose they will insist upon having a corner of Heaven to themselves, free from the intrusion of all vulgar Dissenters, railed off, as my hon. Friend proposes to do with the churchyards, by boundaries of stone or iron, where they could sit in solitary grandeur, singing their own psalms, presided over by their own Archbishops and Bishops in lawn sleeves. My hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester admits that his Bill, even if passed into law, would not settle the question. But the settlement of the question once for all is surely what everybody must desire. Does he think it would be wise to try to patch up the difficulty by a small measure of this sort, leaving the grievance complained of practically unredressed, and rendering further agitation necessary for its removal? For this reason, if for no other, I would oppose the Bill, because it leaves open a question which breeds so much irritation and animosity.

Mr. J. G. HUBBARD said, that some hon. Gentlemen opposite professed to be the friends of religious liberty, yet they seemed to think that religious equality ought to be secured only for those who were dissentients from the Established Church; but he wished to uphold the right of Churchmen to religious liberty. As Churchmen, they had a religious system of their own, and they had a right to practise their own religion and their own ceremonial according to the laws of their own Church. The proposal of the hon. and learned Member for Denbighshire conflicted with their religious convictions, and impaired the security of the religious system to which they were attached. He admitted that this Bill would not settle the question; but why would it not settle it? Because the question was really one of religious equality—of the Disestablishment of the Church with all its consequences—and everybody must know that the Bill would not settle that. Still, to whatever degree the Bill might operate, it must have the effect of mitigating the difficulty of the present position. He could not understand, indeed, why the hon. and learned Member for Denbighshire should have become so exceedingly infuriated against this very harmless measure, unless it was because he thought it would cut away the position which he held in the House; but he did not believe it would have that effect, for so long as there was a Church in this free country there would be always some agitation, and he did not regret the wholesome exercise of it. The hon. and learned Member contended that every parishioner had the right to be buried in the churchyard, and with the ceremonial of the religious body to which he belonged. [Mr. OSBORNE MORGAN: I said he ought to have the right.] Every parishioner had a right to join in the services of the parish church; but if he chose to join any one of the 161 sects which existed in this country, it surely would not be contended that he had the right to worship in the parish church with the ceremonial of the seceders he had joined? If such a right were allowed and exercised, utter confusion and chaos would be the result. He maintained that the arguments which would disestablish the churchyards would logically disestablish the Church. This consequence was denied as improbable, and he concurred in that opinion, for mankind were not logical; but they, as legislators and statesmen, should be logical, and not yield to arguments which would carry them on to measures which they now repudiated. They could not separate the church from the churchyard. Together they made the portion of the parish which had been placed in the custody of the clergyman. No doubt it belonged to the nation, but it was to the nation in its religious character. Churchmen had great respect for their consecrated buildings and consecrated grounds. They looked upon the dead in the churchyards as lying there till the Day of Resurrection, and they naturally objected to throwing open either their churches or their churchyards to those who disbelieved the Resurrection, and who would do in their churchyards what was done the other day at Berlin. There, not long ago, the body of a Socialist was accompanied to the grave by 10,000 people, and was interred in a cemetery of the Free Congregation, over the portals of which was the inscription—"There is no hereafter, and no meeting again." He asked that Christians should not be exposed to the indignity which they would suffer, if all persons, whether believers or unbelievers, had unrestrained freedom of access to their consecrated churchyards. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Clackmannanshire (Mr. Adam), who made a kind of political progress last summer in the Northern counties of Scotland, whilst informing his countrymen of the many enormities of the Burial Laws of England, said—

> "Though you may be loth to believe such a very shocking thing, it is the case that in English churchyards burials are refused to those not of the same denominations as the Church of England."

He was surprised that the political conductor of the Party opposite should give such inaccurate information to the highly intelligent and educated people of Scotland. He took the opportunity of writing to *The Scotsman*, to explain that the English burial law did nothing of the kind. The law of England enjoined Christian burial to every Christian, whatever his denomination. If any difficulty was raised on the subject it was by the friends of the deceased, for the Church, in her charity, asked no questions and withheld the Service prepared for the burial of departed Christians only where the departed had not been christened. This erroneous exposition of the Burials Law by the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Adam) was accompanied by his declared adoption, in the name of the Liberal Party, of the hon. and learned Member for Denbighshire's (Mr. Osborne Morgan's) Burials Bill—a declaration the more ominous when they knew that the Bill of the hon. and learned Member was admitted to be the first step towards the acquirement of religious equality, to be evidenced in the Disestablishment of the Church of Scotland, and to be followed, when quite prepared, by the Disestablishment of the Church of England. Such was the programme, to the overture of which, in the Burials Bill, the Liberal Party were invited through the lips of the Liberal Whip. It might be useful to have some sensational rallying cry; but he trusted the great Liberal Party might find some nobler, some more patriotic and generous object for which to unite, than an attack on that Constitution, to which they owed, in its growth of centuries, not only their power and their wealth, but their religion and freedom as a people.

MR. W. E. FORSTER said, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the City of London (Mr. J. G. Hubbard) seemed to suppose that the right hon. Member for Clackmannanshire (Mr. Adam) made a most extraordinary statement when he asserted that, according to the present Burial Laws of England, a clergyman might, and sometimes did, refuse to bury persons who considered themselves and were supposed to be Christians.

MR. J. G. HUBBARD said, the right hon. Member for Clackmannanshire did not speak about what an individual could do, but the law.

MR. W. E. FORSTER said, it appeared to him that, according to the law, an incumbent had the right to refuse burial to persons who were unbaptized.

MR. J. G. HUBBARD said, the words used by the right hon. Member for Clackmannanshire were that burial could be "refused to those who were not of the same denomination as the Church of England."

MR. W. E. FORSTER said, he did not suppose the right hon. Gentleman really wished to dwell upon that mode of putting the case. What the right hon. Member for Clackmannanshire doubtless meant to say was that burial could be refused to unbaptized persons. Such a statement appeared to him to be strictly true, and, no doubt, any Scotchman would be surprised to hear that such a law existed in this country. Another statement was that if the parish graveyard was thrown open to Dissenters it was a necessary and logical consequence that the Dissenters would acquire the same right over the churches. This was an argument which the defenders of the Church ought to be wiser than to use, for it might be used against the Church hereafter. He was himself surprised at the persistency with which that argument was raised, and that it should not be admitted, after all, that there was some difference between the freedom which it was possible to exercise in regard to a place of worship and a place of sepulchre. The question had been debated as if it was not going to be settled soon, whereas everyone knew that it must be settled very soon, and that that settlement would proceed on the lines of what the House of Lords had already agreed to, and what there was every reason to believe the great dignitaries of the Church had also agreed to. The question would never be satisfactorily settled until a clergyman was prevented from refusing the right of burial to anyone with such services as accorded with the convictions which the person had entertained during life. Such a settlement would come, if not before the next General Election, certainly immediately after it. He hoped the hon. Member for Gloucester (Mr. Monk) would consider the course which the debate had taken, and withdraw his Bill. The hon. Member, he was sure, had brought forward this Bill believing it would do some good and no harm, while it would tend to remove unpleasantness in some places, and that, at any rate, it was not a foe to the Bill of the hon. and learned Member for Denbighshire, which he himself supported; but he (Mr. W. E. Forster) thought what had been said on the other side of the House would tend to show him that such was not the case, and that the proposal was really in direct opposition to some of the fundamental principles of the measure his hon. Friend supported. The objections to the present law were based on both right and feeling. The Dissenters considered that they had a right to burial in the churchyards, and that that right carried with it the right to be buried with their own services. As a matter of feeling, Dissenters thought they ought to be allowed to rest alongside of their Church relations. To neither of these claims did this Bill offer any respect; indeed, the hon. Member must be convinced, from the arguments by which his Bill had been supported from the other side, that it was opposed to the principles which he himself had at other times advocated. As for the cemetery system, he regarded it as a disgrace to a people who were supposed to desire Christian brotherhood, and altogether the situation was such that he had expected some statement would be made on behalf of the Government, and was disappointed that none had been given.

Mr. ASSHETON CROSS: I must apologize for having been detained from the House by Public Business during the early part of the afternoon. I have, however, heard the speeches of the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydvil (Mr. Richard), and those who followed him, and I wish to say a few words on the subject under consideration. I do not quite appreciate the humiliation of which he spoke. I do not understand that those who do not belong to the Church of England feel any humiliation at their friends being buried in unconsecrated parts of cemeteries; nor, therefore, do I believe that there would not be a large majority of Dissenters who would not to some extent feel conciliated if ground were provided in which they could bury their dead with their own services. For my part, however, I never pass a cemetery anywhere without feeling the deepest possible regret at seeing that in this Christian country we are obliged to have three chapels in every public burial-ground. I am not ashamed to state that in the House, and should not be elsewhere. At the same time, the system has worked without much difficulty so far, and I believe has received a certain amount of general acceptance, and will, I presume, continue. I do not quite understand, however, why there should not be both consecrated and unconsecrated ground. It seems to be the very height of ecclesiastical tyranny to say that, because you do not care to have consecrated ground for burials, those who do care for it should not be allowed to have it. And if there is to be consecrated ground in the future, as well as in the past, there must, of course, be a distinction between the burial-places of those who take one view on this point, and those who take the opposite. In that light, the question is in the broadest possible way one of religious freedom. A practice has, I believe, been very long in force in a very large section of the Christian Church—namely, that of consecrating, not the churchyard itself, but the graves; and I have never yet heard of any satisfactory reason why this should not be done in the churchyards of other denominations. Moreover, I am not one of those who think that the presence of a Bishop is necessary to consecration, there being no reason why the ceremony should not be conducted by the parish clergyman. That is allowed in the Church of Rome. All, however, that I want to enforce in connection with this part of the question is, that those who say that there is a broad distinction between consecrated and unconsecrated ground must, in order to avoid being guilty of religious tyranny, allow us to have consecrated ground, the logical result being that all cannot be buried in the same piece of ground. The right hon. Gentleman who has just spoken conveyed to this House an incorrect impression of the law on the subject of burial in parish churchyards, for he stated that there were certain classes of persons who differed from the Church of England—those who are unbaptized, for instance—and who are not entitled to burial in a parish churchyard. That is not so. The law, as I take it, says that every person has a right to be buried in the churchyard of the parish in which he has died; and only when we come to the question of the clergyman of the Church of England reading the Service of the Church over the grave does the law step in. The law says that over unbaptized persons, excommunicated persons, and those who have laid violent hands on themselves, the Service of the Church shall not be read. [Mr. W. E. FORSTER: There shall be no service.] No service, of course. As for the statement that those who oppose the Nonconformist demand fear that to admit it would be to make way for the Disestablishment of the Church, I have never heard that fear expressed by my hon. Friends; but what I understand them to say is, that Disestablishment is the avowed object of the Liberation Society in agitating the Burials Question. Of course, hon. Gentlemen on this side are quite entitled to use the argument in question without being bound to support Disestablishment, should any change be made in the Burial Laws. If any grievance at all arises from the present laws, it is this—and I admit that it is a substantial grievance—that there is no power of any kind or description in anybody to enforce the making of a burial-ground where one is needed. In making any change you ought not to provide simply for the present, but also for the future. There is no doubt that a very large proportion of the churchyards scattered up and down England will, in the course of perhaps the next 10 years, be closed, and in all the parishes with which they are connected the Bill of the hon. and learned Member for Denbighshire (Mr. Osborne Morgan) would have no effect whatever. There is an instance of this in Northampton. There, all the churchyards are closed; and when the people met, as they were bound to do, to consider this state of affairs, they decided to have no burial board, and, therefore, to have no burial ground; and the only satisfaction which remains to the people of Northampton lies in the fact that there is at that place a cemetery which belongs to persons differing from the Church of England. I think that a state of the law which produces such a result ought not to be allowed to exist. One outcome of it is that the Church of England has provided of its own free gift, from time to time, and especially during the last 100 years, burial-grounds all over the country, or at least in a great number of parishes, thus supplying a want which the law of England of itself did not supply. Hon. Members opposite have often alluded to the law of Scotland as entirely in their favour, and as a reason why we should make a change in the present case; but if the law of England were the same I should be perfectly content. But that is not the case. In Scotland the burial-grounds are the property of heritors, and, oftener than not, they are away from the church instead of being near it. How do the hon. and learned Member for Denbighshire and his Friends propose to proceed? They pass over the real grievance which I have pointed out, and proceed in a totally different way. Some time ago they were bound, like everybody else, to pay church rates; but these were abolished, even as concerned churchyards. At that time they said—"No, we don't want the churchyards, and we won't pay the rates for them." But the moment the latter part of their declaration is acceded to they come to this House and say that now they have got rid of the burden of paying rates they must have their rights in the churchyards again. That is, I think, proceeding on a wrong principle. I find fault equally with all the Bills which have been brought before the House on this question, for not one of them proposes to provide a burial-place in every part of England. They all, in fact, come to this—"Here is an apple. So long as there is any apple left we will eat it; but we make no provision for any other apple for the persons coming after us." The first principle that ought to be dealt with in this matter is that any law amending the law of burial should enact that there should be burial-places in every part of England, not necessarily, however, in every parish. No one of the half-dozen Bills before the House touched that point, and for that reason I deem them all unsatisfactory. The Bill presented by the Government proceeded in that direction, for it provided that there should be a burial-ground provided convenient for every person to be buried in. You would find that, starting from this point, you could make very much better provision for the intermediate stage during which the existing churchyards could be used without injuring the consciences of those who are at present interested in them. See for one moment what the result of any of the Bills which we have before us would be! If one of them were passed, its effect would be to allow any religious body but the Church of England to have burial-grounds where its own religious services might be exclusively used, while the Church alone would not be allowed to provide at her own expense a burial-ground exclusively for the use of her own people. That, I think, would be a grievance, and I cannot think that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Denbighshire would press his demand to that point. Let every person, I say, be buried with the services which he or his friends like. That would not, however, be the case if the law said that the Church of England, as the Established Church of the country, were bound to provide burial-grounds, both consecrated and unconsecrated, for everybody. Surely, in altering the law we ought to consider, as far as possible, the conscientious scruples of Churchmen as well as of Dissenters; and though you may think them foolish you are not entitled to deny the fact that those conscientious scruples exist. Therefore, we ought to be as tender as possible in trying to get rid of what they consider a grievance, instead of doing it as roughly as we can. For the sake of argument, I am not denying the Nonconformist grievance; but I do not hesitate to say that the House could not inflict a greater blow at the conscientious scruples of the Laity as well as Clergy of the Church than by carrying the Bill of the hon. and learned Member for Denbighshire. Then, what are we to do with the Bill of the hon. Member for Gloucester (Mr. Monk)? It certainly does not meet my view. The really important provision to which I have just alluded as being desirable was embodied in the Government measure brought forward some time ago; and I cannot help thinking that when it is made the groundwork of legislation, as I hope it will be, there will not be so much difficulty in making provision for the intermediate stage—which will be practically the only difficulty—in the work of giving a burial-ground to every part of the country. This Bill does not do that. It is entirely permissive, and I am rather surprised that it should have been treated so seriously by hon. Members opposite. I do not myself believe that it carries the law the least bit further than it is at the present moment. I know several parishes myself, and I have a very strong impression that there are many more, which, without the assistance of this Bill, have given for Nonconformist burials considerable portions of land attached to the churchyards. If, however, the Bill did not do very much good, what harm could it do? I cannot understand the objection to that kind of permissive legislation, when not the slightest harm can be alleged against it. If asked my opinion of the Bill, there are certain things in it which I do not like. I should not like to see those little bits cut off from the churchyards; but I cannot conceive any reason why people who do like them should not be allowed to have them. I shall give my vote for the Bill, for the simple reason that it is a permissive Bill, which enables persons to do what there is not the slightest harm in doing. It will show a feeling I cannot understand, if hon. Gentlemen vote against a measure which would, at least, alleviate their grievances. I hope that when a measure is brought forward to settle the whole question it will lay down the principle that there should be burial-grounds in England where all persons should have a right to be buried with their own religious services.

Mr. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN said, he not only disliked little strips of unconsecrated ground attached to their old churchyards and permissive Bills, but also those little nibbling attempts to deal with a great question, which everybody knew must shortly be settled in another manner. But there was another thing he also disliked, and that was a strong Ministry which admitted that there was a grievance and yet would vote for a Bill which they acknowledged did not deal with it, and would not bring in a Bill to deal with it themselves. On both sides of the House there was too great a disposition to look on this matter in a Party light. The right hon. Gentleman who had just sat down devoted the greater part of his speech to attacking a measure which was not before the House; and then, with respect to the Bill they were discussing, said that he did not think it would do any good, but would vote for it because he thought it would not do any harm. To such legislation he (Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen) objected. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for the City of London (Mr. Hubbard) claimed liberty for the Church of England; but the Church of England did not require liberty, for she claimed authority, and her demands for liberty were quite of another character from those of denominations which protested against and existed in spite of her authority. The true wisdom of the Church of England was not to exclude Nonconformists, but to open her arms to receive them. With Infidelity on one side, and the Church of Rome on the other, the real policy and the safety of the Church of England was to encourage, and not to check, that feeling which led Nonconformists to wish their dead to be laid in the old churchyards, and to smooth away rather than to perpetuate the points of difference between Nonconformists and Churchmen. He strongly opposed this Bill.

MR. MARTEN said, that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Sandwich (Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen) objected to permissive Bills; but the Act of 1867 was permissive. The right hon. Gentleman also regretted that a strong Government like Her Majesty's Government did not bring in a comprehensive measure to deal with the question. The answer to that was that Her Majesty's Government had brought forward such a measure, and if it had failed in the House of Lords, the attempt was an honest one, and the failure was through no fault of theirs.

MR. MONK regretted that his hon. Friends around him had unanimously condemned the Bill. It was intended to afford relief in rural parishes; but after this debate, it must be evident that the Bill would not give that satisfaction he had expected. He was entirely in the hands of the House. He would ask leave to withdraw the Bill.

MR. SPEAKER said, there was an Amendment before the House, and the Motion could not be withdrawn unless the Amendment were first withdrawn.

MR. ERNEST NOEL said, he was quite prepared to withdraw the Amendment. ["No, no!"]

Question put.

The House *divided*:—Ayes 129; Noes 160: Majority 31.—(Div. List, No. 29.)

Words *added*.

Main Question, as amended, put, and *agreed to*.

Second Reading *put off* for six months.

MOTIONS.

HALL-MARKING (GOLD AND SILVER).

Select Committee *appointed*, "to inquire into the operation of the Acts relating to the Hall-Marking of Gold and Silver manufactures."—(*Sir Henry Jackson.*)

And, on March 5, Committee *nominated* as follows:—Mr. BATES, Colonel BLACKBURNE, Mr. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN, Mr. COURTNEY, Mr. ORR EWING, Mr. FRESHFIELD, Mr. GOSCHEN, Mr. HAMOND, Mr. HANKEY, Sir JOSEPH M'KENNA, Sir ANDREW LUSK, Mr. MUNTZ, Sir PATRICK O'BRIEN, Mr. ONSLOW, Mr. PULESTON, Sir CHARLES RUSSELL, Mr. TALBOT, Mr. TORR, Mr. WHITWELL, and Sir HENRY JACKSON:—Power to send for persons, papers, and records; Five to be the quorum.

MEDICAL ACT (1858) AMENDMENT (NO. 2) BILL.

On Motion of Mr. ARTHUR MILLS, Bill to amend the Medical Act, 1858, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. ARTHUR MILLS, Mr. CHILDERS, and Mr. GOLDNEY.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 86.]

WATCH-CASES (HALL-MARKING) BILL.

Considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

Resolved, That the Chairman be directed to move the House, that leave be given to bring in a Bill to amend the Law relating to the Hall-Marking of Watch-Cases.

Resolution *reported*:—Bill *ordered* to be brought in by Sir HENRY JACKSON, Mr. EATON, Sir ANDREW LUSK, and Mr. TORR.

Bill *presented*, and read the first time. [Bill 87.]

House adjourned at five minutes before Six o'clock.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Thursday, 27th February, 1879.

MINUTES.]—Sessional Committees—Standing Orders Committee on Private Bills, Committee of Selection on Opposed Private Bills, Office of the Clerk of the Parliaments and Office of the Gentleman Usher of the Black Rod, *appointed* and *nominated.*

THE PLAGUE IN RUSSIA—SANITARY PRECAUTIONS.

QUESTION. OBSERVATIONS.

The Earl of CARNARVON, in asking a Question of his noble Friend the Lord President, of which he had given him private Notice, said, that at the commencement of the Session he had, as their Lordships would remember, put a Question to his noble Friend with respect to the plague in Russia, and received a reply stating what precautions had been adopted by the Government on the subject. That morning he had read a startling announcement in the papers, to the effect that the plague was no longer confined to the south-eastern districts of Russia, but, by a sudden bound, had made its way to St. Petersburg, and that 48 persons who were supposed to have been in contact with a person seized by it had been interned. It would be wrong to say anything on the subject which would have a tendency to create any agitation in the public mind; but the matter was one of a very serious character. The plague was of a deadly description, and there was a great difference between its existence in the province of Astrachan and its making its appearance in a capital, which one might say was within a few hours' journey of this country. He was concerned to read in the papers to-day that in a debate which took place upon this question in a learned Society yesterday—the Epidemiological Society—in the course of which a great deal of valuable information was given, and in which certainly nothing was said which could create a panic, a gentleman connected with a Government Department seemed to attach so little importance to the absence or presence of the disease in England that, speaking upon this subject, he went so far as to express a hope that the Government would keep themselves clear of all the nonsense of quarantine. He fully admitted that it was quite competent for a medical gentleman to express any opinion he pleased on such a subject; but he ventured to think that anyone connected with a Government Department was bound to observe great caution, and to use the most guarded language in dealing with such a subject. No doubt, his object was to discountenance anything like a panic; but, at the same time, he was bound to attach due importance to it. He (the Earl of Carnarvon) now repeated what he had said upon a former occasion—that he trusted that Her Majesty's Government would take every precaution that lay in their power. He was sure, from what his noble Friend had said, that he considered it his duty to adopt every possible precaution. In the discussion which took place last night among the medical authorities at the learned Society to which he had referred, it was pointed out that our sanitary code was an excellent one, but that it had not as yet been brought into practical operation. Of course, it was for his noble Friend to consider whether it was possible to do so. If this newspaper report was true, the danger was very close at hand. Upon one point all authorities seemed to be agreed, and that was that distress, poverty, and want of food were conditions that were very favourable to the existence of the plague; and, unfortunately, these conditions existed at the present time to a higher degree than had been experienced for a very long time. He was sure that while his noble Friend would not give any undue importance to any rumours on the subject he would regard the subject as one deserving the attention of the Government; and therefore he hoped he would take every precaution that seemed desirable to prevent the introduction of the plague into this country.

The Duke of RICHMOND and GORDON, in reply, said, that no official confirmation of the report which had appeared in the newspapers of the appearance of the plague at St. Petersburg had been received by Her Majesty's Government—in fact, he had received no information on the subject beyond what his noble Friend possessed. As to the speech to which his noble Friend had more particularly called attention, as having been made by a gentleman connected with a Government Department at a meeting of the Epidemological Society, he hoped he should not be regarded as wanting in courtesy if he declined to endorse all the opinions of that gentleman—supposing him to have been correctly reported. From the statement of his noble Friend, that gentleman was reported, in the first place, to have said that he would not object to one or two cases of plague occurring here in order that they might be scientifically considered. If he had been correctly reported then, in his (the Duke of Richmond and Gordon's) humble opinion, he had much better not have said it—at any rate, he thought he would not find many persons to agree with him. His next statement was, that he hoped the Government would keep clear of the nonsense of quarantine. To that he could only say that quarantine in certain cases was part of the law of this country; and so long as it remained so, and he continued to fill the office of President of the Privy Council, he would see that the provisions of the law with respect to quarantine were effectually carried out. Scarcely a day passed without the subject of the plague coming before him in some way or other; and he could assure his noble Friend that the Government had been adopting, and would continue to adopt, all due precautions. He was in constant communication with the officers of Customs, and he was of opinion that the powers already possessed by the Privy Council were sufficiently strong.

SOUTH AFRICA—THE ZULU WAR—DESPATCHES.—QUESTION.

Earl GRANVILLE asked, Whether Her Majesty's Government had received any further information from South Africa?

Earl CADOGAN, in reply, said, that the Government had received no despatches from the seat of war by the *Asiatic*, the steamer which arrived on Wednesday night; but that she did bring Government despatches from the Cape. It must be remembered that the *Asiatic* left the Cape only two days after the steamer which brought the first news of the disaster, and had been 27 days on her voyage to this country. Another steamer left on the 4th instant, and the substance of her despatches was forwarded by telegram from Madeira on Saturday last, the vessel itself might be expected to arrive this evening. Another steamer left the Cape on the 11th, and the Government hoped to receive telegrams forwarded by her from Madeira on Saturday next.

FAIRS AND MARKETS (IRELAND).

QUESTION. OBSERVATIONS.

Viscount MIDLETON asked the Lord President of the Council, Whether it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to introduce, during the present Session, a Bill for the better management of Fairs and Markets in Ireland? The noble Viscount said, that of late years there had been a considerable increase in the practice of holding fairs and markets in small towns in the South and West of Ireland. Those fairs at present created a great deal of inconvenience; and if they were properly regulated, it would involve a certain expense in making proper provision for their management. The result of the want of proper accommodation was, that the fairs and markets were held in the high roads or the main streets of the small towns, and that practice caused great inconvenience to the community in general. Some attempts had been made in both Houses of Parliament to legislate upon the subject, but nothing had been done. He hoped that some attempt would be made this year to deal with this question, which was of more importance than their Lordships might, perhaps, think.

The Duke of RICHMOND and GORDON said, he could corroborate the statement of his noble Friend, that attempts had been made in both Houses of Parliament to deal with this subject. In the year 1854, in the year 1857, in the year 1861, in the year 1862, and in the year 1867, Bills were introduced either into this or the other House of Parliament for the purpose of dealing with that question; and the Bill of 1857, and that of 1861, went before a Select Committee. Moreover, the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland appointed a Commission of Inquiry into the subject in 1852, and that Commission made its Report in 1854. The only successful attempt to deal with the subject was by a very small Bill, which became law in 1868, enabling the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland to alter the legal times and days for the holding of fairs and markets. The difficulties in legislating on this subject were great, owing to the private interests which were affected by it, and that was, no doubt, the reason why, up to the present time, there had been no legislation upon it. With the amount of Business that Her Majesty's Government had in hand, it was not intended —at all events, at present—to bring in a measure in either House of Parliament for dealing with this subject.

PRIVATE BILLS.

Standing Orders Committee appointed: The Lords following, with the Chairman of Committees, were named of the Committee:

D. Somerset.
Ld. Chamberlain.
M. Winchester.
M. Lansdowne.
M. Bath.
E. Devon.
E. Airlie.
E. Carnarvon.
E. Cadogan.
E. Belmore.
E. Chichester.
E. Powis.
E. Verulam.
E. Morley.
E. Stradbroke.
E. Amherst.
E. Sydney.
V. Hawarden.
V. Hutchinson.
V. Hardinge.
V. Eversley.
V. Halifax.
L. Camoys.
L. Saye and Sele.
L. Balfour of Burley.
L. Colville of Culross.
L. Boyle.
L. Monson.
L. Ponsonby.
L. Digby.
L. Colchester.
L. Silchester.
L. De Tabley.
L. Skelmersdale.
L. Belper.
L. Ebury.
L. Egerton.
L. Hartismere.
L. Penrhyn.
L. Wolverton.

All petitions relating to Standing Orders which shall be presented during the present Session *referred* to the Standing Orders Committee, unless otherwise ordered.

OPPOSED PRIVATE BILLS.

The Lords following; viz.,

M. Lansdowne.
L. Colville of Culross.
L. Boyle.
L. Skelmersdale.

were appointed, with the Chairman of Committees, a Committee to select and propose to the House the names of the five Lords to form a Select Committee for the consideration of each opposed Private Bill.

OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF THE PARLIAMENTS AND OFFICE OF THE GENTLEMAN USHER OF THE BLACK ROD.

Select Committee appointed: The Lords following were named of the Committee:

The Duke of Richmond and Gordon

Ld. Chancellor.
Ld. President.
Ld. Privy Seal.
D. Saint Albans.
Ld. Chamberlain.
M. Lansdowne.
M. Salisbury.
M. Bath.
Ld. Steward.
E. Devon.
E. Doncaster.
E. Tankerville.
E. Carnarvon.
E. Bradford.
E. Granville.
E. Kimberley.
E. Sydney.
E. Redesdale.
V. Hawarden.
V. Hardinge.
V. Eversley.
L. Colville of Culross.
L. Ponsonby.
L. Colchester.
L. Skelmersdale.
L. Aveland.

House adjourned at half past Five o'clock, till To-morrow, half past Ten o'clock.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Thursday, 27th February, 1879.

MINUTES.] — New Member Sworn — Sir David Wedderburn, baronet, *for* Haddington District of Burghs.

Supply—*considered in Committee*—£2,750,000, Exchequer Bonds; £1,500,000, War in South Africa (Vote of Credit).

Private Bill (*by Order*)—*Second Reading*— Manchester Corporation Water *.

Public Bills—*Ordered*—Army Discipline and Regulation.

Second Reading—Referred to Select Committee— Summary Jurisdiction [69].

Committee — Report — Assizes [83]; Habitual Drunkards * [47].

QUESTIONS.

FRENCH LAW OF BANKRUPTCY—THE BANKRUPTCY BILL.—QUESTION.

Sir GEORGE BOWYER asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether, before further progress is made with the Bankruptcy Bill, the Government will obtain and lay before Parliament a statement of the French Law of Bankruptcy, and the way in which it is administered in that country?

Mr. ASSHETON CROSS: I have consulted the Lord Chancellor upon this subject, and I find that it will be impossible to delay the progress of the Government Bankruptcy Bill in its early stages whilst the information asked for is being obtained; but if the hon. and learned Baronet will move for it, I will do my best to obtain such information as he wants.

ARMY—MILITIA FINES.—QUESTION.

COLONEL NAGHTEN asked the Secretary of State for War, When it is his intention to carry out his promise of last Session that the fines for drunkenness stopped from militiamen should be credited to the stock purse or contingent fund of all militia regiments?

COLONEL STANLEY, in reply, said, that the Financial Secretary had had his attention directed to the subject, and before the next training he would issue an Order for appropriating the fines in the manner promised last Session.

TURKEY—LOANS.—QUESTION.

SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, If Her Majesty's Government have yet decided whether, by appointing Commissioners to receive certain revenues or otherwise, they propose to do anything to assist the Turkish Government to raise new loans; and, if so, whether anything has been arranged regarding the precedence of Russian and Roumanian claims for war indemnity, so as to avoid future complications on that score?

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: The question is one upon which Her Majesty's Government and the French Government have been consulting, and it is still under consideration.

CRIMINAL LAW (SCOTLAND)—CASE OF MR. BARR.—QUESTION.

MR. J. W. BARCLAY asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether his attention has been called to the case of Mr. Barr, a respectable farmer occupying 150 acres in Renfrewshire, who on Wednesday 19th February last was sentenced by Sheriff Cowan at Paisley to fourteen days' imprisonment with hard labour, without option of a fine, for killing a rabbit on land immediately adjoining his own farm; whether he will remit the sentence; and, whether it is proposed in the new Criminal Code to modify the Law so as to prevent the infliction of such sentences?

THE LORD ADVOCATE (Mr. WATSON): The circumstances of the case are not quite as they appear in the terms of the Question. Mr. Barr was charged before the Sheriff Substitute with a contravention of the Night Poaching Act, and pleaded "guilty." No option was, therefore, left to the Sheriff Substitute except to pronounce sentence of incarceration, with hard labour. I may state, however, that the Home Secretary, having considered the whole facts of the case, has directed that Mr. Barr should be liberated. I do not know whether it is intended in the new Criminal Code to make any alteration in the punishment for such offences; but I may remind the hon. Member that it is not proposed to extend the provisions of that Code to Scotland.

SOUTH AFRICA—THE DESPATCHES. QUESTION.

LORD ROBERT MONTAGU asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies, with reference to the Despatch from Sir Bartle Frere, dated Dec. 10th (II. p. 182), in which he says—

> "I can add little to what has been already said in previous Despatches on the subject of the Military necessity for the reinforcements asked for; but I would venture to add a few remarks on the observations in your Despatch, that 'all the information that has hitherto reached Her Majesty's Government with respect to the position of affairs in Zululand appears to them to justify a confident hope that, by the exercise of prudence, and by meeting the Zulus in a spirit of forbearance and reasonable compromise, it will be possible to avert the very serious evil of a war with Cetywayo.' I am, of course, not aware what information may have reached Her Majesty's Government on this subject other than what has passed through me. But I confess that, looking back at the information I have had the honour to submit to Her Majesty's Government for the past 12 months, I can find little ground for any such hope of avoiding a war with Cetywayo;"

whether he received this Despatch on Jan. 15th; whether he gave any other answer to this Despatch than what is contained in his Despatch of Jan. 23rd—

> "It has, of course, been impossible for Her Majesty's Government as yet to examine the whole of the case as it is now placed before them;"

and, whether he will lay upon the Table "the general means of information" which outweighed the "official communications" before the latter had been examined by Her Majesty's Government?

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: The despatch from Sir Bartle Frere, dated December 10, was received by me on the date stated in the Papers that have been laid before the House; I think it was the 15th of January. It was answered, with other despatches from Sir Bartle Frere, generally, in my despatch of January 23, and in that whole despatch, not in the particular portion of a sentence quoted by the noble Lord in his Question. I do not quite understand the last portion of the Question; but I gather, from the words which he appears to quote in it, that it has reference to my despatch of October 17. That despatch, of course, refers to the means of information which were in the possession of the Government at that date, and not to despatches since received. So far as I know, everything that can be laid before the House in connection with that subject is already in the hands of hon. Members.

CRIMINAL LAW PUNISHMENT — ADMISSION OF THE PRESS.—QUESTIONS.

Mr. P. A. TAYLOR asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether it is true, as recently stated in the "Pall Mall Gazette," that he has ordered the exclusion of the representatives of the Press from witnessing the flogging of criminals; and, if so, if he will state to the House what other provision he has made for ensuring to the public the advantage of whatever deterring character there may be in such punishments?

Mr. PAGET said, that perhaps the right hon. Gentleman would, at the same time, answer the following Question:—If his attention has been drawn to statements which appeared in the evening papers of the 25th instant, professing to give minute details of the execution of Peace; and, whether it is possible for him to prevent the attendance of reporters at executions, and thus to prevent the publication of details of a revolting character?

Mr. ASSHETON CROSS: My attention has been called to the statements which appeared in the evening papers of the 25th instant, professing to give minute details of the execution of the unfortunate man Peace; and, having seen those statements, I am at a loss to see what public advantage would be gained by the admission of reporters to witness the flogging of criminals. I take it that the proper

course to follow is to see that all such punishments are executed in the presence of certain official and responsible persons not connected with the gaol in order to see that they are properly applied. With this safeguard I think the public may rest content. As to the latter part of the hon. Member for Somersetshire's Question — which has reference to preventing the attendance of reporters at executions—I may say that the Sheriff has by statute the conduct of all those matters in the case of executions, and I have no power to interfere with his discretion.

ARMY—MILITIA TRAINING.

QUESTION.

Viscount EMLYN asked the Secretary of State for War, If it is true that the Militia Regiments in the United Kingdom are to be called out this year for twenty days' training instead of for the usual period of twenty-seven days; if so, what is the reason of this change; and, whether it is intended that the arrangement should be permanent, or merely for this year?

Colonel STANLEY: Sir, it is true that the Militia of the United Kingdom are to be called out for 20 days' training this year instead of 27, the usual time, and that it is also intended to curtail the period for Yeomanry training. I can hardly, within the limits of an answer, give details of the reason for the alteration; but I hope an opportunity will soon offer for the statement of my reasons for the curtailment.

ARMY (INDIA)—PAYMENT OF TRAVELLING EXPENSES—THE 3rd HUSSARS.

QUESTION.

Major O'BEIRNE asked the Under Secretary of State for India, If he will explain why the Indian Government allowed the claim for travelling expenses in England of the Paymaster of the 3rd Hussars in December 1872, and again in October 1873, and how this fact is in accordance with the invariable rule of the Indian Government to disallow the travelling expenses in England of an officer ordered home from India on sick leave; and, does the order of the Indian Government of November 1878 apply to the Paymaster of the 3rd Hussars, who was directed to proceed to England to appear before a Medical Board by an order of the Indian Government dated 4th April 1878?

MR. E. STANHOPE: The claim for travelling expenses in England of the Paymaster of the 3rd Hussars at the dates named has not been made to, nor paid by, the India Office. The action of the Government of India in November, 1878, had no retrospective effect, but only that of putting an end to the submission of inadmissible claims for the future.

POLICE SUPERANNUATION—LEGISLATION.—QUESTION.

SIR CHARLES RUSSELL asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether it is his intention to introduce a Bill, during the present Session, to give effect to the recommendations of the Select Committee on Police Superannuation, of April 1877?

MR. ASSHETON CROSS, in reply, said, he should like to take that opportunity of paying his tribute to the Committee for their labours in this matter, and for the admirable Report which they had drawn up. He thought that they had come to a right conclusion that the amalgamation of the Forces for the purpose of a superannuation fund would not meet the justice of the case; and therefore he was inclined to view the latter part of the Report with favour. He could not promise, however, to introduce, at an early period of the Session, a measure on the subject.

CUSTOMS BILL OF ENTRY—THE COMMISSION ON OFFICIAL STATISTICS. QUESTION.

MR. RYLANDS asked the Secretary to the Treasury, Whether a Report has been received from the Commission on Official Statistics with reference to the Customs Bill of Entry; and if there will be any objection to lay such Report upon the Table of the House?

SIR HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON, in reply, said, there would be no objection to lay upon the Table that part of the Report relating to the Customs Bill of Entry.

ENGLAND AND PORTUGAL—THE COMMERCIAL RELATIONS.—QUESTION.

MR. W. CARTWRIGHT asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether any communication has been received relating to the unsatisfactory state of commercial relations between England and Portugal, such as is referred to in Mr. Morier's Despatch of May 15th 1878, at page 1, of Return No. 21 (Commercial), 1878, on the Portuguese Tariff; and, if so, whether he could present the same in time to admit of its being considered by Members before discussion of a Motion relating to the Wine Duties that stands in my name for 18th March?

MR. BOURKE: It appears that in May last Mr. Morier, Her Majesty's Minister at Lisbon, stated that he would take an early opportunity of calling Lord Salisbury's attention to the unsatisfactory state of the commercial relations of the two countries; but it does not appear that any despatch has yet been received from Mr. Morier such as is referred to in the Question of the hon. Gentleman.

THE PLAGUE IN RUSSIA—SANITARY PRECAUTIONS.—QUESTION.

MR. PULESTON asked the President of the Board of Trade, Whether, as the navigation from the northern ports will be shortly opened, the Government contemplate imposing any restrictions upon the importation of hides and skins and any other animal products from Russia?

LORD GEORGE HAMILTON: The Baltic will not be open before April. The Government have not thought it necessary at present to take any special precautions affecting the trade from Russia; but they have full powers under the Quarantine Act to do whatever may be found expedient for the protection of this country against plague, and will be prepared to exercise those powers should there be any danger of the disease approaching our shores.

SOUTH AFRICA—THE ZULU WAR—THE DESPATCHES.—QUESTION.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, When the further Papers relating to the Zulu War, which the Government appear to consider essential to the discussion of the causes of that War, will be in the hands of Members?

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: I am informed that further Papers will be published the day after to-morrow, or certainly by Monday. I am sorry to say that these Papers will not include despatches entering into details of the military disaster, which I had hoped to receive before this date. They have not yet reached us.

POOR LAW (IRELAND)—REMOVAL OF IRISH PAUPERS.—QUESTION.

Mr. O'DONNELL asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, If it is true that the Clerkenwell Board of Guardians have passed a resolution directing the removal to Ireland of "all removable Irish poor?"

Mr. SCLATER-BOOTH: Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will grant me permission to answer the Question. I have made inquiries of the Guardians of the Holborn Union, in which Clerkenwell is situate, and I find it is true that they have passed a resolution respecting certain paupers—four men and two women—who are to be removed to Ireland. They appear to be the only paupers who are to be removed; and I am told that in each case the paupers have expressed their willingness to go to Ireland, not only to the Board, but before the magistrate before whom the order for removal was signed. It was in consequence of the application of some of these Irish paupers that the Board has taken the resolution in question.

THE TREATY OF BERLIN—RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN BULGARIA.—QUESTION.

Mr. O'DONNELL asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether it is true that the proposed Constitution for Bulgaria, while professing to grant "liberty of conscience and worship" to the various denominations not belonging to the Established Russo-Bulgarian Church, adds that such liberty must be always subject to the "Laws" which may be passed from time to time by the Legislative Assembly; and, whether any guarantee has been obtained against the eventual passing of "Laws" in regard to non-established worships calculated to render liberty of conscience more and more purely nominal?

Mr. BOURKE: The proposed Constitution of Bulgaria has not yet been received from Her Majesty's Consul in Bulgaria, and we have, therefore, no official knowledge of its provisions. I would remind the hon. Gentleman that Article 5 of the Treaty of Berlin lays down as the basis of the public law of Bulgaria that difference of religion shall not exclude any persons from the enjoyment of civil rights, and that freedom of all forms of worship is assured both to persons belonging to Bulgaria as well as to foreigners.

ARMY — THE 24TH REGIMENT — APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS.

QUESTION.

Major O'GORMAN asked the Secretary of State for War, Whether it is his intention to re-consider his resolution of sending six officers of the Guards and only three of the Line to act as officers of the 24th Regiment on the embarcation of a draft of that Corps for service at South Africa; and, whether the disproportion between the numbers of the officers of the Line and those of the Guards is not such as to entitle the former to a majority in selection for the above duty? In reference to reports that I have served in the 24th Regiment, I beg leave to say, Sir, first, that I did not serve in the 24th Regiment; second, that I have no relatives in the 24th Regiment; third, that I am not acquainted with any officer of the 24th Regiment, and that I never met the 24th Regiment in quarters or elsewhere.

Colonel STANLEY: It is unnecessary for the hon. and gallant Gentleman to disclaim being actuated by private motives in putting this Question, the matter to which it relates being of considerable public interest. As regards the Question of the hon. and gallant Gentleman, I have to state that there is no intention to re-consider the arrangements made for sending out six officers of the Guards with this large draft of the 24th Regiment. I am not prepared to admit that the question of sending these officers for such duty is altogether a matter of proportion. But if it were so, the fact that there is a large number of officers of the Line serving on special duty with the Forces in South Africa would confirm me in a desire to make no change in the arrangements already made.

IRELAND—CORK AND MACROOM RAILWAY—ACTION AGAINST DIRECTORS.

QUESTION.

Major O'GORMAN asked Mr. Attorney General for Ireland, Whether his attention has been attracted to the fact that the defendants in the case of the Cork and Macroom Railway accident, that is to say, the directors of that Railway, did about the 25th November last apply to the Court of Queen's Bench for an order to bring up the Inquisition (which had resulted in a verdict amounting to manslaughter against the defendants) to be quashed; whether a conditional order had on that occasion been granted; whether that order has since been made absolute; and, whether he had taken steps to show cause against this conditional order being made absolute; and, if not, whether it is his intention to interfere so as, in the interest of the public, to prevent the verdict of the jury being quashed?

[No Answer was returned to the Question.]

SUPPLY—SUPPLEMENTARY VOTE OF CREDIT—THE QUEEN'S COLLEGES IN IRELAND.—QUESTION.

Major NOLAN asked the Secretary to the Treasury, Whether, in the Supplementary Vote of Credit, the item of £33,000 includes any Votes for stationery for the Queen's Colleges in Ireland?

Sir HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON: No, Sir; it does not.

ARMY—THE TRANSPORT SERVICE.

QUESTION.

Sir BALDWYN LEIGHTON asked the Secretary of State for War, Whether, in view of the disbandment of the Native troops in South Africa, Her Majesty's Government have considered the propriety of employing Coolie or Chinese levies under British officers for the purpose either of Military or Transport Service?

Colonel STANLEY, in reply, said, the subject had been brought to his notice, especially with reference to the selection of Coolies or Chinese for transport service; but although he was making inquiries, he was not yet in possession of sufficient information to justify him in coming to any positive conclusion.

ARMY—SERGEANT INSTRUCTORS OF VOLUNTEERS.—QUESTION.

Colonel BARNE asked the Secretary of State for War, Whether the Sergeant Instructors of Volunteers appointed Sergeant Majors under Article 204 of Volunteer Regulations, 1863, and previous to the issue of the Volunteer Regulations of 1878, would when they retired be entitled to the pension as laid down for a Sergeant Major in the Royal Warrant dated the 6th of September 1876, and amended the 9th of July 1877?

Colonel STANLEY, in reply, said, he was not prepared to give any positive answer at present to the hon. and gallant Member's Question, and hoped he would repeat it on a future occasion.

SOUTH AFRICA—THE ZULU WAR—THE REINFORCEMENTS.—QUESTION.

Mr. WHITWELL asked the Secretary of State for War, If he would state to the House the names of the Regiments and drafts and the strength of each with the number of horses, and of big and Gatling guns already embarked or under orders immediately to embark for South Africa?

Colonel STANLEY: I am afraid that I should unduly take up the time of the House if I gave these details. I may say that the total strength of the forces and drafts will be between 8,000 and 9,000 men, 1,800 horses, and about 225 waggons, six 9-pounder, eight 7-pounder guns, and four Gatlings. In a few days hence I shall be able to lay the embarkation Returns, which will give all the details required, on the Table of the House.

SUPPLY—THE SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATES, 1878—THE KAFFIR WAR.

QUESTION.

Mr. WHITWELL asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether the £400,000 named in his answer to a Question on the 9th August last as included in the Supplementary Estimate, and which he stated to be sufficient for the Kaffir War, was found to be sufficient, or whether any additional expenses arising for that War have to be covered by the proposed Supplementary Vote of £1,500,000; and, as the Appropriation Accounts for the Army Expenses have not been circulated, what have been the War Expenses in South Africa during the three years past and the current year up to the 31st March next, inclusive of the proposed Supplementary Vote of £1,500,000?

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: The statement which I made in August had reference to two distinct matters. They were the expenses incurred in the Kaffir War, or what we may call the "Transkei" War, previous to the 31st of March, 1878, and the expenses incurred and estimated for the remainder of the year—that is, for the year 1878-9. With regard to the expenses incurred previous to the 31st of March, 1878, it was impossible to get them in time for the Statement at the beginning of the financial year. We had, however, reason to believe that they would amount to something like £400,000; and I warned the House that it was probable that an excess Estimate for that amount for the expenditure of the year 1877-8 might have to be provided for. We have, however, since found, on the appropriation of the accounts of the Army, that the saving on other Votes has been sufficient to cover the whole of that amount; and, therefore, no further money will be asked from Parliament in respect of that charge. I should say that we have not been able to include in the appropriation accounts the month of March, 1878; and there may be a balance of something like £60,000 or £70,000 to be carried to the next financial year's accounts. Then, with regard to the Supplementary Estimates I presented to the House in August, amounting to some £300,000 or £400,000 for the Transkei War, they related to the expenditure subsequent to the 31st of March, and I have every reason to believe that that sum is sufficient. No part of it is intended to be charged on the Supplementary Vote of £1,500,000, which has reference only to the Zulu War. With regard to the last part of the Question, I shall have a Statement to make giving the information the hon. Gentleman asks.

CRIMINAL LAW—THE CONVICT CASTRO OR ORTON.—QUESTION.

DR. KENEALY asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether it is true that Charles Peace, the Banner Cross murderer, before his execution, made a statement in which he confessed that he had murdered at Whalley Range, near Manchester, in August 1876, a police constable named Cock; whether subsequently, at the Manchester Assizes, a young man named Habron was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for the said murder, which sentence was afterwards commuted by the Home Secretary to one of penal servitude for life; whether, taking into consideration that the case was one merely of identity, he will institute an inquiry which may be the means of releasing the said convict, who appeared to be wholly innocent; and, whether, if there be such a case of mistaken identity in fact, he may not be induced to reconsider the conviction of Sir Roger Tichborne, who may also have been wrongly convicted under a similar error?

MR. ASSHETON CROSS: It is true that William Habron was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for the murder of a police constable named Cock, at Whalley Range, near Manchester, in August, 1876. It is also true that his sentence was commuted to penal servitude for life, on the ground that there was some reasonable doubt as to whether his was the hand that fired the shot which killed the police constable, but not as to whether he was implicated in the murder in other ways. It is true that the convict Charles Peace made a statement after his conviction, and while under sentence of death, that he was the man who shot police constable Cock. The House, I am quite sure, will feel, on the one hand, that this is a matter which will require most careful consideration; and, on the other, hand, that the statement so made is one which must undergo the most careful scrutiny. But whatever the result of the inquiry into the matter may be, it can in no way affect the case of the prisoner Thomas Castro, otherwise Arthur Orton, now undergoing a sentence of penal servitude for a totally different offence.

PARLIAMENT—PRIVILEGE—THE PRESS.—OBSERVATIONS.

MR. MITCHELL HENRY: I am sorry, Sir, to interpose for a short time between the House and the special Business which is set down for this evening, but I have no alternative. I have to call your attention to a serious breach of Privilege, which is contained in a leading article which appeared in *The Times* newspaper of Tuesday last, reflecting on the conduct and misrepresenting the action of Members of this House. I have provided myself with a copy of the newspaper in question, and I have marked the portion of it to which I have to take exception, and if it is your wish, Sir, I will hand it in to be read from the Table, or I will now state as shortly as I can the substance of it, and it can then be read. In bringing this matter forward, I feel that it is only under the gravest circumstances that I should be justified in doing so. Having carefully considered the article in question, and the position of Members of this House, I can come to no other conclusion than that it is a deliberate attempt to intimidate hon. Members in the discharge of their duty, and also a reckless misstatement of facts occurring in this House. The law of Parliament on this subject I hold to be perfectly clear. It is a distinct breach of the Privileges of this House, and destructive of the freedom of Parliament, for anyone to publish the names of hon. Members of the House, and to reflect on and misrepresent their proceedings. Now, *The Times* newspaper of Tuesday published an article referring to the proceedings of the House as to the alteration of its Rules, and I am prepared to read a short epitome of it. I may here state that I am named individually, and that, therefore, I should have a right, as a Member of Parliament, to bring this matter under the notice of the House; but I believe I am also supported by a very considerable number—I may say by all—of the Members who are around me, and who are also referred to in the article. Sir, *The Times* says in that article that the Home Rulers watched the debates in Parliament on this subject—that is to say, as to our Rules—"with a malign intent," and at a given moment, as soon as the opposition of the independent Members appeared to have exhausted itself, and a compromise was coming into view, the Obstructionists "emerged from their ambush" for the purpose of putting into operation "their policy of exasperation." The article goes on to say—

> "The proceedings in the House last night reveal a resolution to obstruct progress as clear as that which has been conspicuous in former debates."

And referring to myself and another Member by name, the article points out that the Home Rulers voted in minorities of 49 and 31; and adds that we, whom it calls "Obstructionists," seemed almost to have succeeded in postponing a division on the first of the Chancellor of the Exchequer's Resolutions till another night. Another inference is further added that—

> "The irritation of the priesthood against the Government, and the approach of a General Election, combine to give the Obstructionist view a temporary predominance."

Now, Sir, I am in a position to prove, from the Division Lists, that a more unfounded statement was never made. In all the Divisions, except one, that took place, there were more English than Irish Members; but it seems to me that whatever may be the opinion of the writer of this article, it is a very serious matter for any person to allow himself to accuse hon. Members of this House of lying in wait with "malign intent," to commit a breach of the Privileges of the House. Obstruction is a distinct Parliamentary offence, punishable by the Rules of the House; and to attribute deliberate obstruction to Members of this House is to attribute to them a serious offence against the House itself, of which the House ought to take cognizance. If these charges of obstruction are to be made without foundation, I submit that there is an insult to the majesty of Parliament itself. To show that the House of Commons is obliged to submit to obstruction of this character, and that it is not able to vindicate its authority, is, I submit, not for the benefit of this House. But the Division Lists will show how far this charge was well founded, or the reverse. The debates commenced on Monday, the 17th of February. In the first Division the minority consisted of 77 Members, 50 of whom were English and 27 were Irish. In the second Division the minority consisted of 71 Members, 45 of whom were English and 26 Irish. In the Divisions on Thursday the minority in the first was composed of 68 Members, 42 of whom were English and 26 Irish. In the second Division the minority consisted of 57 Members, of whom 37 were English and 20 Irish. In the third Division the Question of Adjournment was moved by an English Member, and seconded by another English Member. The Mover was the hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands), and the Seconder the hon. Member for East Gloucestershire (Mr. J. R. Yorke), who sits on the other side of the House. The minority consisted of 45 Members, of whom 25 were English and 20 Irish. On the 24th of February the minority in the first Division consisted of 81 Members, of whom 62 were English and 19 were Irish; and I may mention, to show the difference of opinion which existed as to the proposed alteration of these Rules, that in the minority was the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich, while the Leader of the Opposition voted on the opposite side. In the second Division, which was one taken on a Motion of my own to divide the Estimates, and specially alluded to in the article, the minority consisted of 51, of whom 29 were English and 22 were Irish. To show whether there is any foundation for the libellous article of *The Times*, I may mention that in the minority was the hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Cambridge (Mr. Beresford Hope), and I think he will be surprised to hear himself called an Obstructionist. I always thought the Gentleman the University of Cambridge honoured by making its Representative did honour to the University in return. On the third night there was one Division in which the number of Irish Members was larger than the number of English Members. In the Division, which related specially to Ireland, the minority consisted of 33; but there were 10 English Members who voted in it. In another Division on that night the minority consisted of 49, of whom 24 were English and 25 Irish; but amongst the English Members were the hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke), and the hon. Member for the City of Bristol (Mr. Morley), and an hon. and gallant Colonel (Colonel Mure), so that I think there must have been some reason in the Division. In the fifth Division the minority consisted of 52 Members—30 English and 22 Irish; and the last consisted of 52 Members, who were also made up of 30 English and 22 Irish, and amongst them were the hon. Member for the University of Cambridge, who has been so consistent throughout the discussion of this question, and other hon. Members on the Government side of the House. I think, therefore, it is proved beyond the shadow of doubt or cavil that the charge of wilful obstruction in the House against the Home Rulers is a totally unfounded and improper charge. The House, I suggest, is now sitting in a judicial capacity, and I think it ought to lay aside for a moment—if it will allow me to say so—all Party considerations and to consider whether the freedom of hon. Members of all classes should not be vindicated when it is assailed in this way. If these statements appeared in an uninfluential journal, I would not have occupied the time of the House by calling attention to them; but *The Times* is regarded at home as the leading journal of this country, while on the Continent it is considered to be the leading journal of Europe. Numbers of persons take their opinions from *The Times*, and believe nothing except what they read in its leading articles. *The Times*, as it came out in the Parliamentary Committee on Reporting, has exceptional advantages in the Reporters' Gallery. It has specially assigned to it a place for a summary writer, or leader writer; and, therefore, it may very well be that this very article, which totally misrepresented the facts, was written by one who at the very time, from the place in which he has a right to sit, had an opportunity of ascertaining the real facts of the case. I think Gentlemen who are proprietors of newspapers in this House occupy a peculiar position. The hon. Member who is known to be the proprietor of *The Times* is a gentleman whom everyone respects, and, of course, he has an opportunity of combatting the opinions of hon. Members from his place in this House. But it is a very serious matter beyond that, when in his paper the conduct and demeanour of Members of this House are misrepresented in a journal under the control of the hon. Member who is to go without responsibility. After this article in *The Times* has been read from the Table I shall move that it is a distinct breach of the Privileges of this House, and if the House be of that opinion, I shall make a further Motion respecting the proprietor and publisher of the paper. [*Laughter.*] Hon. Members may laugh; but I beg to say this is a matter of great seriousness. The only thing that could be accomplished by it, and the only object of that article, is to bring odium on the Members of this House, and to excite ill-feeling between the two countries of England and Ireland. For my part, I do not think that ill-feeling ought to be more stimulated at the present moment; and if this House is not ready to protect hon. Members in the discharge of their duties, I can only say that we shall very much fail in our duty if we allow ourselves to be intimidated by such articles as this. In conclusion, I beg to say these charges of Obstruction appear to me to be becoming to be made a little too often, and, in fact, the House is losing its dignity. [*Ironical cheers*]. I expected these cheers, and I was prepared for them. There is nothing new in this charge of Obstruction. When the Government at present in Office was not in Office, the noble Lord the Member for Haddington (Lord Elcho), in a debate on the Business of the House, expressed himself to the effect that the House ought to be cautious in allowing the two front Benches to arrange the Business. The noble Lord went on to remark—

> "The burden of the speeches of Ministerial Members during the Recess has been that the conduct of the Opposition last Session brought Public Business to a standstill, and that the Forms of the House must be altered, so as to take away from the minority powers which had been improperly exercised."

That charge, made against Gentlemen who are not usually called Obstructionists, is the very charge now brought against those Irish Members who maintain their right to debate fully every question. The shrinking from a fair stand-up fight on a particular question is a characteristic of an effete Parliament. If we are to have our debates of a namby-pamby order, we had better go to the country at once. I am not willing—I have no right—to put any Question to the Chair; but I will appeal to experienced Members of the House, whether there has or has not been on any one of these occasions anything that could fairly be called Obstruction? I have shown that if there was Obstruction, it existed on the part of English Members more than on the part of Irish Members; but I repudiate this wretched charge of Obstruction. We have duties to discharge in this House. We must discharge them manfully, and, if necessary, with pertinacity. Some years ago another newspaper charged hon. Members in this House with venality, and an hon. Member, who is now no more, brought the matter before Parliament. The Irish Members at that time were called "Ultramontanes." They were previously to that called "the Pope's Brass Band," and they are now called "Obstructionists." There is always some opprobrious name to be attached to the Irish Members. On that occasion *The Pall Mall Gazette*—a journal which says it is written for gentlemen by gentlemen—the next day apologized for the statement, which drew from both sides very strong condemnation. In its apology, it said that the gentleman usually employed to write the article was away, and the leader had been entrusted to a fresh hand. May I not hope that perhaps the leading journal on this occasion found not its proper leader writer, but an apprentice hand, and one who, in making this accusation, has not brought credit on that journal, but very considerable odium on himself, and injury to the dignity of the House? I beg to move that this article be read.

[Complaint made to the House by Mr. Mitchell Henry, Member for Galway County, of an article in the "Times" newspaper of the 25th day of this instant February.]

MR. SPEAKER: Let the hon. Member bring it up.

The said paper was delivered in and the article complained of read.

MR. MITCHELL HENRY: I move that—

> "The said article contains libellous reflections upon certain Members of this House in breach of the Privileges of this House."

MR. DEASE seconded the Motion.

Motion made, and Question proposed,

"That the said article contains libellous reflections upon certain Members of this House in breach of the Privileges of this House."—(*Mr. Mitchell Henry.*)

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, the relations between the House of Commons and the Press are always, I think, delicate, and we must be careful of the way in which we take notice of comments which are made upon our proceedings in the journals of the day. Undoubtedly we do see, from time to time, articles in papers of the highest character which appear to us, or some of us, to give an inaccurate, and sometimes, as we think, an unfair, account of what takes place within the walls of this House. Sometimes, no doubt, remarks and comments are made upon the speeches and actions of hon. Members which are of a nature to cause dissatisfaction, and sometimes to induce us to take notice of them, either by correction addressed to the paper itself, or if thought worthy of the attention of the House by calling that attention. But I think there is a general feeling among us that in all these matters we ought to be very tender, and not to interfere with the fair liberty of the Press. We do not require to insist upon privileges of, perhaps, a rather obsolete character, which would enable us entirely to forbid or prevent any remarks upon what has taken place in this House. We do not desire in any way to object to fair comments, although those comments may sometimes appear to be mistaken and unfair. But I do think that it is quite right and proper that Members who may feel themselves specially aggrieved by anything that has been said should call attention to it, and should ask the protection of the House against such misrepresentation. Now, Sir, we have heard read the article of which the hon. Gentleman complains. Undoubtedly, in listening to that article, one cannot help feeling that it contained some severe remarks upon the conduct of Members of this House, and that the writer of the article used one expression which was worthy of special notice. I refer to the words that the Irish Members "had watched the debate with a malign intent." Now, if there is one Rule that is more strictly observed than another amongst Members of this House, it is that we object to one Member imputing motives and intentions to other Members, and that which we object to amongst ourselves we regard with some jealousy when it is applied by others. Well, what was "the malign intent" with which the Irish Members were charged? It was the malign intent of obstructing Public Business. Now, the question arises whether hon. Members opposite consider that to be a serious offence? I have heard language upon former occasions which induced me to think that they would have hardly looked upon that as so serious an offence as I am glad to see that the hon. Member and his Friends consider it. I must say I think it is a matter for special congratulation that the hon. Member, occupying, as he does, so prominent a position amongst the ranks of the Irish Members, should have distinctly put it as one of the grounds of complaint that the article in question accuses him and hon. Members near him of being guilty of that which is a distinct Parliamentary offence. [*Cheers.*] He is perfectly right in stating, in my opinion, that wilful and deliberate obstruction of the Business of the House is a distinct Parliamentary offence; and we gladly welcome from him and from hon. Members sitting near him, as I gather from their cheers, that there is no intention to minimize or palliate that offence. In these circumstances, the question as to what was intended in the three nights to which reference has been made is one which we must consider in the light of the facts which the hon. Gentleman has brought before us. Unquestionably, if the opposition offered to the Resolutions on the Business of the House was of an obstructive character, the hon. Member has proved his case that the charge of obstruction cannot be altogether confined to any particular section of the House, or to the Irish Members. A considerable number of Members of the House felt that the proposals contained in these Resolutions were important, and that they raised questions which in their view were deserving of very long and serious consideration, and of opposition which might be carried to a very considerable length. Among those were Members who clearly cannot be accused of having the slightest sympathy with obstruction. My hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge University (Mr. Beresford

Hope), for instance, is a man whom nobody would think of accusing, under any circumstances, of obstruction, and yet that hon. Gentleman was quite as vigorous as anybody else during the debate. I am glad that the matter has been brought forward in the way it has been by the hon. Member — good-humouredly and temperately. The hon. Gentleman acknowledged that if a charge of obstruction could be maintained it would be a serious one; because obstruction is a distinctly Parliamentary offence, and he disclaimed for himself and those who sit near him any such intention. I hope, in the circumstances, we shall not be called upon to go further than what has now passed. We may place ourselves in a position of some embarrassment if we are called upon to vote on the Question that he has moved. Supposing the House were to decide that these words did amount to a breach of Privilege, we should have to follow that up by calling the proprietor and printer of *The Times* to the Bar; and I do not think it would be either for the interest of the House or of the public that we should engage in a conflict of that kind. On the whole, therefore, I venture to think that, having called attention to the subject in the manner he has done, the hon. Member would do well to withdraw his Motion.

MR. BERESFORD HOPE: Having been mentioned in the article, by the hon. Gentleman opposite, and by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, I hope the House may allow me to say a few words on the question. I thank my right hon. Friend for vindicating me so thoroughly from the charge of obstruction. So far from obstructing, I was obstructed by the Forms of the House, because it happened that on the greater part of the second night's debate I was prevented from speaking at all. On the first night I proposed an Amendment which did not quite satisfy me; on the second, therefore, I asked leave to withdraw it, in order that it might be cast in a better form—such leave was a matter of course, and would have been the work of only a few seconds; but my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Oxford (Sir William Harcourt) took the occasion to deliver one of those noble orations after the manner of the ancients to which we always listen with such delight. The general debate thus raised in so irregular a way, on a question in which the House was very much interested, occupied the greater part of the night, and I was the only Member that was precluded from speaking on it. I cannot accept the history which is given in this article of what took place during the three nights as accurate; but though it may be inaccurate, I cannot say that it is libellous. Members of Parliament must, above all things, show that they are not thin-skinned. Parliament is the great institution of the country, but the Press is a great institution, too. If there is anything in the Press which it is our duty, in the interest of public morality, to protest against, let us do it—but do not, I repeat, let us be thin-skinned on merely personal matters. The Resolution now before the House would, in my opinion, inflict a blow on the liberty of the Press, though the hon. Member cannot intend to do such a thing. To censure *The Times* for an article which, at the worst, is a little inaccurate and one-sided, would, in my judgment, not be a wise thing to do.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: Sir, I am extremely anxious, if possible, to avoid entering into a debate on what was the meaning of *The Times'* article, and, therefore, I make no apology for rising thus early in the discussion. I would appeal to my hon. Friend to consider the advice given by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I presume the object of my hon. Friend was to have an opportunity of repudiating the accusation of obstruction put upon the conduct of himself and his Friends rather than to bring the publisher of *The Times* to the Bar of this House for punishment. I think my hon. Friend has entirely gained his object. The Leader of the House has stated, with very general assent, that the account which has been given in *The Times* was inaccurate, and that an unfair construction has been put upon the conduct of the Home Rule Members. I think my hon. Friend will do well to be satisfied with that statement, and will not press the matter further. The House will remember that two Sessions ago I endeavoured to induce the House to re-consider the Rules which regulate its relations with the Press. The House, I am sorry to say, was not willing to entertain those proposals, and the Standing Orders and Rules which regulate these relations still remain, in my opinion, of a most unsatisfactory and obsolete character. Such as they are, it is absolutely necessary that we should avoid placing ourselves in a very unworthy and discreditable position. We must exercise the great Privileges we possess with great caution and forbearance. Therefore, I think it would be undesirable, in such a case as this, to carry the matter further. I do not wish to say a word in palliation of the article in *The Times;* I do not wish to invite the House to enter upon that subject; but I would point out, for the satisfaction of my hon. Friend, that the obstruction imputed to him is not that wilful obstruction which I understand has been declared by the highest authority as an offence against the Privileges and dignity of the House, but that kind of obstruction which, from time to time, is practised in all parts of the House, and about which there is great difference of opinion. We shall never agree whether speeches are too long or not, or whether an undue number of speeches are made. I do not think, so far as the article in *The Times* is concerned, there was any intention of imputing "wilful" obstruction. However, we should waste our time in attempting to settle that point. I think my hon. Friend will be satisfied with the expression of opinion which he has obtained from the Leader of the House.

MR. SHAW: I venture, also, to express a hope that my hon. Friend will not press his Motion to a division. I read the article, and think it went considerably further than the Chancellor of the Exchequer would seem to imply. It appeared to me to grossly misrepresent the action of certain Members of the House who were in a minority. When my hon. Friend expressed his intention of bringing forward his Motion I was completely staggered; and I said to him that as there was exactly the same kind of descriptions of our conduct to be seen in the English papers week after week, that it would be useless to take the trouble of puffing into notoriety an article which would pass out of mind the day after its appearance. If we are to fight a battle we must not be thin-skinned. I am not a bit afraid myself if the whole House and the whole Press of the country called me an Obstructionist. Where I honestly oppose a Bill I shall oppose it, no matter what the papers say about me. We must not do anything that would in any way prevent comment in the Press upon the conduct of Members of this House. I believe the liberty of the Press was of still more importance than some of the privileges we enjoy in this House. For my own part, the only newspaper I am afraid of is *The Skibbereen Eagle*, which made a greater man than me—the late Lord Chancellor—tremble in his shoes. The article complained of went beyond the customary rule of comment and imputed improper motives; but the hon. Member having elicited a strong expression of opinion from both sides of the House as to its impropriety might, I consider, fairly withdraw his Motion.

MR. PARNELL presumed his hon. Friend the Member for Galway had fulfilled the object he had in view, and therefore it would not be necessary for him to go to a Division. He rose merely to point out that there was something more serious than many people thought in the practice of *The Times* and other newspapers in misrepresenting the conduct of the Irish Members. Their desire was, above all things, to cultivate the good opinion of England with reference to Irish questions, and such articles in *The Times* would mislead public opinion with regard to them. The outside public would, therefore, be entirely misinformed as to the motives and action of Irish Members, and a feeling would be got up against them so as to prevent Irish Members doing their duty in the House. A proposition was made before the Select Committee last year that when any Member was accused of obstruction a Division might be taken without debate, and a decision come to summarily on the conduct of the Member in question and the punishment to be inflicted on him. If such a Rule were enforced —and it might be by the Chancellor of the Exchequer during the present Session—the opinion of the Members of the House might be so perverted by the publication of such articles that many who had not heard the speech of the Irish Member whose conduct was impugned might come in and vote for his suspension and the suspension of the rights of his constituency, not on the ground of their actual observation of his conduct, but by reason of the injurious impression derived from reading such articles. He submitted, in these circumstances, such articles assumed a much more serious complexion. The article in question imputed a deliberate intention to commit a Parliamentary offence, and, in a most invidious way, drew a line between English and Irish Members. But having performed a public duty in calling attention to the article, and having elicited an expression of opinion from all sides of the House as to its unwarrantable character, he hoped his hon. Friend would withdraw his Motion.

MR. MITCHELL HENRY: My object in bringing this matter before the House was, not because I want to make a stand against the newspapers of the country, or to unduly curtail their liberty of fair comment and criticism. I believe I have most conclusively shown that there is not the slightest foundation for the mis-statements which appear in the article to which I have drawn the attention of the House. At the same time, I do not think the Chancellor of the Exchequer made a fair and generous acknowledgment of the erroneous character of the article as I should have expected; but the noble Lord has done so. Other Members may have their own opinions about it; but in withdrawing my Motion, in deference to the expressed wishes of the House on both sides, I hope the House will remember that if ever an accusation of this serious character be again made, it may turn out on examination to be as equally unfounded as the present.

Motion, by leave, *withdrawn.*

MOTION.

ORDERS OF THE DAY.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER moved—

> "That the Orders of the Day subsequent to Supply be postponed until after the Order of Leave for a Bill relating to the Discipline and Regulation of the Army."

MR. DILLWYN asked whether it was intended to take the Supplementary Estimates other than the Vote of Credit for the South African War to-night?

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said, he should be very inconsistent with himself if he were to try and press forward the Supplementary Estimates without giving proper time for their examination. The Secretary to the Treasury was perfectly prepared to go on with them; but he quite saw the reasonableness of the objection made by the hon. Member opposite (Mr. Dillwyn), and he should, therefore, confine himself to proposing a Vote in connection with the Exchequer Bonds, which expired on the 16th of March, and a Vote of Credit in connection with South Africa.

Motion *agreed to.*

ORDER OF THE DAY.

SUPPLY—COMMITTEE.

Order for Committee read.

SOUTH AFRICA—THE ZULU WAR—THE VOTE OF CREDIT.—OBSERVATIONS.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: I think, Sir, it would be for the convenience of the House that before you leave the Chair I should say a few words upon the two Votes which will be submitted in Committee. There is the Vote to renew the £2,750,000 of Exchequer Bonds, which fall in in the last weeks of March, and there is the Vote of Credit for the South African Services. With regard to the Bonds I need say but little. They belong to the finance of the year 1877-8. They were issued in that year to meet certain expenditure which had been voted, and it was hoped at one time that, in part at least, they would be discharged in the course of the present year. Circumstances, however, have been against us, and we have not been able to pay them off this year; and, therefore, it is necessary that we should take power to re-issue, or rather to issue, new Bonds in order to enable us to pay off these as they become due. With respect to the Vote of Credit, it is, of course, a new feature. As I explained just now, in answer to a Question of the hon. Member for Kendal (Mr. Whitwell), I last year warned the House that there might be a sum of, perhaps, £400,000 required for hostilities in South Africa. That did not refer at all to the Zulu War. It is well the House should bear in mind that the hostilities in South Africa are distinctly divisible into two periods—the period of what we may call the Transkei War, and the period of this unhappy conflict. The Transkei War was begun in August, 1877, and ended about July, 1878, and it was with reference to that that our Votes and my observations were made. No accounts were made up in time for the last Budget as to the expenditure up to March 31, 1878, as regards the Transkei War. We knew, by the drafts on the Treasury Chest, that there had been great expenditure; and I therefore warned the House that it was probable, before the expiration of this financial year, I should be obliged to present an excess Estimate. But that has not been found necessary, because the Army Votes were sufficient for the Services for which they were intended, and there were enough savings upon them to cover the amount. Well, then, there were further Supplementary Estimates taken of £300,000 for the Army, and about £40,000 for the Navy in August last. That was for the same war; and, as far as we at present know, that sum will be sufficient for the expenses incurred. With regard to the Zulu War, the expenditure properly chargeable to that contest may be said to have commenced in October last, when the first preparations appear to have been made. It is rather difficult to give full information as to what has been the actual expenditure occasioned by that war; but my right hon. Friends the Secretary of State for War and the First Lord of the Admiralty will be able to tell the House when it gets into Committee on what grounds the Estimates have been framed, so far as they have been able to frame them. I may only add that, being myself aware that the Treasury chest has been heavily drawn upon, I have thought it right to put into the Vote a sum of £300,000 for contingencies over and above the more detailed Estimates to be presented by my right hon. Friends. The House will bear in mind that that expenditure in respect to a distant war is carried on through the Treasury chest, and that the way in which that is done is this—the Treasury chest has a fixed Fund of, I think, about £1,000,000, which ought always to be maintained, and out of that Fund either payments are directly made, or bills are drawn, and the fund is used to meet these drafts, and from time to time it is replenished out of the Votes for the Army Fund. The Military chest has been heavily drawn upon for South Africa, and we therefore are now obliged to replace that Fund again. With regard to the Vote of Credit, the amount we propose to take is £1,500,000, and the details relating to it will be found in the Papers submitted to the House. I shall be asked—and I may as well enter on the question briefly now—in what way I propose we should raise this £1,500,000? I desire to point out to the House that we are now at a period so nearly approaching the close of the financial year and the next Budget, that it is hardly convenient for us to enter upon new financial operations at this moment; and, therefore, I shall propose a temporary arrangement to carry us over the end of this year and the beginning of next. I hope it will be in my power to bring in the Budget very early in April, before Easter; and, in the meantime, I propose that this money, if voted, shall be raised by the issue of Exchequer Bonds. In mentioning Exchequer Bonds, I wish to say two or three words in regard to what appears to me to be rather a mistaken idea in many quarters as to the nature and amount of our floating Debt. I observe that in many influential organs of public opinion there is an impression that the floating Debt has of late years been increased to a very large and even dangerous extent. I think that in some respects the idea arises from a confusion between the terms floating Debt and unfunded Debt, and that there is evidently a disposition to think that all unfunded Debt is floating Debt, which is not the case. The objections to a large floating Debt are, of course, these—that the securities which properly constitute a floating Debt may be presented for redemption suddenly or at inconvenient times, and in such a manner as to somewhat embarrass the Exchequer, or that, in renewing them, it might be necessary to give a high rate of interest. Now, that is the case undoubtedly with what is properly called a floating Debt—that is to say, Exchequer Bills and Treasury Bills. There can be no doubt that those bills are liable to be so presented, and that if they were in excess they might occasion some embarrassment. On the other hand, it is not quite to the same extent the case with Exchequer Bonds, which run for certain periods — two, three, or four years— even if these bonds are in the hands of the public; but still less is it the case with regard to a great deal of the unfunded Debt which now exists, because that is not in the hands of the public at all. It is money advanced by the National Debt Commissioners, and which, in fact, is only advanced from one hand of the State to the other, and is not, and cannot be, liable to the objection to which Exchequer and Treasury Bills are supposed to be liable. Let us see how we stand. The present amount of unfunded Debt is about £24,661,000; that consists of £14,458,000 of Exchequer Bonds, £4,497,000 of Exchequer Bills, and £5,706,000 of Treasury Bills. But of the £14,458,000 of Bonds now in existence no less than £11,708,000 are in the hands of the hands of the National Debt Commissioners, so that even if we reckoned as part of the floating Debt the Exchequer Bonds in the hands of the Bank of England the unfunded Debt is really no more than £12,953,000. That is a sum which, though I do not say it is altogether insignificant, is by no means open to the charge of being extravagantly large. I have seen it stated that we ought to take steps, by funding or otherwise, to bring the floating Debt down to within £15,000,000. There can be no doubt that a certain amount of floating Debt is a convenience to the public, and also an advantage to the Exchequer; because the public, as hon. Gentlemen connected with business are aware, are glad to get a certain amount of Treasury and Exchequer Bills, and they take them at a lower rate of interest than they would have to pay if the same money was raised by the issue of Consols. I therefore think that the alarm which has been expressed with regard to the supposed magnitude of the floating Debt of the country is somewhat exaggerated. Having said these few words respecting it, there is one other question that may probably be asked of me. I may be asked what effect these Votes will have upon our financial position? I have said that at this time of the year, and with the Budget so near at hand, I must speak with reserve, and I hope I shall not be called upon to go into minute and conjectural details. There are always difficulties in estimating the Revenue towards the close of the year, and these difficulties are likely to be as great this year as upon any other occasion. But, speaking generally, I think I may say that the Revenue may probably fall short of the estimated Expenditure by something under £1,000,000; and I am sorry to say that the Expenditure, including the Vote of Credit and the Supplementary Estimates, and without reference to the £2,700,000 of Bonds, will exceed what we may now expect to be the Revenue by something like £3,000,000. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that £2,000,000 of that amount has been already provided for. In August we obtained permission to issue £2,000,000 of Exchequer Bonds, and these will absorb £2,000,000 out of the £3,000,000. I cannot say the outturn will be as I have described. I have put the figures in what I think to be the most unfavourable light, and I think I am making a safe statement when I put the probable excess of Expenditure over Revenue at £1,000,000. Under these circumstances, it might be sufficient for me to ask for £1,000,000 of Exchequer Bonds; but I desire to be on the safe side, and to guard against any contingencies that may arise from disappointment in the Revenue. It will, therefore, be my duty at a later time—in Committee of Ways and Means—to propose an issue of £1,500,000 of Exchequer Bonds to carry us through to the end of this year. Of course, if my anticipations are fulfilled, and we do not want this money, the power will not be exercised to the extent I have indicated. I may mention, with regard to the Vote of Credit, that it is proposed to take it for the remainder of the present financial year. The power will lapse on the 1st of April, and anything further which may be necessary will be found the subject of a Supplemental Estimate. With these remarks, I beg to move that you, Sir, do now leave the Chair.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."—(*Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer.*)

MR. CHILDERS: I do not remember any instance of a Financial Statement of the importance of that which we have just listened to being made before the Whole House, such Statements having always heretofore being made in Committee of Ways and Means. But, Sir, I shall not press that objection; but there is one remark which I feel it absolutely right I should make to the House upon the Statement of the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He has told us that he is taking the present course because we are approaching the end of the year, and he followed that with the remark that after the end of the financial year it would be his duty to place the Budget before the House. I wish to say to the House—and I hope the Chancellor of the Exchequer will be able to make a clear answer to my allegation—that according to all precedent, when our finance is in its present serious position, the Budget ought not to be postponed to the month of April. In every previous case when the finances have been in this position, the Government has come down to the House with the Budget either in February, or, at least, never later than the beginning of March; and considering the great effect which is produced on trade by the expectancy in which the country is kept when a Budget of such importance as this year's is delayed—to say nothing of other considerations my reticence as to which my right hon. Friend will appreciate — the Government ought not to delay it, not a mere week or two weeks, but, as it will turn out, for two months, from the commencement of the Session. The Budget ought to have been brought in within a week or two of the meeting of the House, as has been done under similar circumstances in previous years. My right hon. Friend, some years ago, published a valuable work, from which I have taken some facts which I will quote to the House. From that work it appears that Sir Robert Peel had a very serious deficit in 1842, and the Budget was produced on March 11. In 1845 great changes were necessary, and the Budget was produced on February 17. In 1847 it was necessary to raise a very large loan, amounting to something like £8,000,000, and the Budget was produced on February 27. In 1848 there was a very serious deficit, and the Budget was produced on February 18. In 1854 there were important financial operations rendered necessary by the possibility of war with Russia, and the Budget was produced on March 6. In 1860 there was a still more serious state of things, and the Budget was produced on February 10. The only very recent case of serious deficit was in 1867, at the time of the Abyssinian War, and the addition to taxation was made in the month of November. Those are all the cases since the time of Sir Robert Peel when there has been a deficit of serious magnitude, and in every case the Budget has been produced, not at the beginning of the financial year, but some time before the end of the previous financial year. I think I have shown to the House that the Chancellor of the Exchequer must explain why on the present occasion, when our financial position is so serious, the Budget is not brought in at once without waiting till the first week in April. And now let me sum up in a few sentences our present financial position. We concluded the year 1877-8 with a deficit of £2,750,000. We were told in the original Budget of 1878-9 that the new taxes would yield enough to give a surplus of from £710,000 to £1,210,000 to go in reduction of that debt, and that next year it would be entirely wiped out. The Chancellor of the Exchequer was allowed to amend his Budget in August. Instead of a surplus in 1878-9, he then estimated for a serious deficiency of £1,577,000, which, added to the deficit of the previous year, would compel us to begin 1879-80 with a deficit of £4,307,000, and he proposed no Ways and Means to meet it. We protested, but in vain. What is the case now? Last year we were charged with audacity in thinking that the Revenue Estimates were sanguine; but now we are told that they will fall short by something under £1,000,000. We are told that there is to be a deficit this year, exclusive of 1877-8, of at least £3,000,000, and that we shall not be safe unless we meet this to the extent of £3,500,000 by the issue of the Exchequer Bonds which the right hon. Gentleman now proposes; so that the years 1877-8 and 1878-9 are to close with an accumulated deficit of from £5,750,000 to £6,250,000. Has the House thoroughly appreciated the fact? I am not exaggerating, or giving a single figure which the Chancellor of the Exchequer has not given himself. Here we are at the commencement of a Zulu war, with a falling Revenue, with almost a certainty that the financial position of next year is going to be serious even in comparison with this, with an accumulated deficit of £6,000,000, and yet we are going to delay the Budget till April. Sir, there has not been a more serious deficit since the first Reform Bill. Therefore, I say it is the duty of the Chancellor of the Exchequer not to postpone introducing the Budget. I will not suggest, or even hint, at the measures that must be taken by the Government; but I would urge that the Budget should be at once brought forward, in order that the commercial public may see what the effect of the Government finance will be. With regard to the other question of the unfunded Debt, it is a very inconvenient time to discuss it now. There are many points which, I allow, it might be very desirable to raise, but which cannot be well raised or discussed with you, Sir, in the Chair, and when, after asking a Question, it is out of our power to rise again. I think the Chancellor of the Exchequer has done good by showing the difference which exists between what is popularly called the floating Debt and the unfunded Debt; but when he speaks of the unfunded Debt as being of no importance, and would appear to regard the transactions of the last year or two in that respect with perfect satisfaction, let me remind him of this one fact—that while he has been adding very largely indeed to the unfunded Debt in the hands of the public during the last few years, the Government brokers have been at work all the time, and, partly by their operations, and partly in another shape, the unfunded Debt—exclusive of the Terminable Annuities—has been very considerably decreased in each year. Whether it is wise to increase the unfunded Debt in years of emergency is a matter of opinion; but nothing can be more undesirable than, at the same time, to increase your unfunded Debt, and to reduce your funded Debt. I hope, when the proper opportunity comes round, the House will discuss these matters and the effect in this respect of the finance of the last few years. For the present, I will content myself with pointing out that we are about to start a fresh year with the most serious deficit that I remember, and yet we are to have no Budget for five or six weeks. That is, I venture to say, a state of things with which the House ought not to be satisfied.

ARMY — THE ARTILLERY — BREECH-LOADING AND MUZZLE-LOADING GUNS.—RESOLUTION.

MAJOR NOLAN, in rising to move—

> "That the great difference which exists between our cannon and those which find favour with Foreign Powers calls for careful investigation, and that it would be unwise to further postpone experiments on such classes of breech-loading guns as are now possessed by other Powers;"

said, the question, although perhaps not so interesting to the House as the discussion on financial matters which had just taken place, was, nevertheless, one of considerable importance to the country; and he had more than once drawn attention to the difference in the construction of the cannon of this country and that of other Continental Powers. It was generally allowed in the Press that England stood alone in the class of cannon which she had, England holding to the muzzle-loader, while on the Continent the breech-loader was favoured. He made a statement to that effect last year, and he was corrected by the noble Lord opposite the Surveyor General of Ordnance (Lord Eustace Cecil) who said that his statement as to the general adoption of breech-loading ordnance by the Continental Powers was only partly accurate. The noble Lord admitted that the four great military and naval Powers — Russia, Germany, France, and Austria, were exclusively in favour of breech-loading guns, and two were entirely in favour of muzzle-loading. The two, he said, which were half in favour of muzzle-loading were Italy and Belgium, while Sweden and the United States were the two exclusively in favour of muzzle-loading. Well, no doubt, these were four important countries, though not such important countries from a military point of view as Russia, Germany, France, and Austria. But even as regarded these smaller Powers, he did think the present state of the case was now that which it was when the noble Lord made his statement. It might have been accurate at the time he made it; but he (Major Nolan) did not believe it was strictly accurate at the present moment. Now, take the case of Italy. That country had been steadily, for the last eight or nine years, replacing all her muzzle and her field artillery with breech-loading cannon. No doubt, last year she seemed to favour muzzle-loading, because she ordered four 100-ton guns in this country on that system; but he believed that those guns had since come into the possession of Her Majesty's Government. He did not know why Italy had parted with them, whether under pressure or not, or whether she was glad to get rid of them; but the fact remained she had those guns no longer, and she was not now so much in favour of muzzle-loading as she had been; in fact, she was going in about a fortnight's time to try a breech-loading gun larger than our 80-tun gun. Therefore he claimed Italy as being in favour of breech-loading. With regard to Belgium the case was this. That in those cases where she was best able to judge she was going in for breech-loaders. As to Sweden, she prided herself upon her cast-iron guns; and although the noble Lord last year quoted her as being exclusively in favour of muzzle-loading ordnance, that was no longer the case, and very lately she had decided to abandon muzzle-loading guns as her field guns and adopt breech-loading cannon. There then remained the case of the United States, which was a peculiar one. The United States determined upon a policy of the most rigid economy after her war, and they had of late scarcely made any new cannon whatever. She had made a few experiments, however. The great war left her as a legacy a large number of cast-iron guns, and she had altered these so as to make them better weapons by converting them into rifled cannon. On the whole it had been easier to turn these guns into muzzle-loaders than it would have been to have made them breech-loaders; but the whole scientific opinion of America, which was to be read in the Reports of the Directors of Naval and Military Ordnance in that country, seemed to be exclusively in favour of breech-loading guns. The Chief of the American Ordnance said whatever difference of opinion existed as to the relative efficiency of the breech and the muzzle-loading, the latter being exclusively used by England, and the former exclusively used by the great Continental Powers, there could be no question that in certain cases the breech-loading had peculiar advantages. Therefore, from what he had said it would be seen that the four Powers to which the noble Lord had alluded as being half in favour of the muzzle and only half in favour of the breech-loading system were rapidly getting round to be in favour of breech-loading as against the muzzle-loading. If that should prove to be so, England would be left without a single follower or supporter of any consequence in Europe in her system of ordnance, and they would be in a perfectly isolated position with their guns, if they continued to maintain that the muzzle-loading system was the best against the naval and military opinion of the whole of the rest of the world. What he (Major Nolan) proposed was that extensive experiments should be made by the Government with breech-loading guns, and with breech-loading guns only, because enormous experiments had already been made with muzzle-loading weapons. Herr Krupp had circulated a paper among many hon. Members of the House within the last week, in which he said that his 6¾-inch gun had been tried against an English 9-inch gun, and his gun had given far better results. His main reason for advocating breech-loading for field artillery was that the breech-loader, from the great length of its bore, and from the fact that the chamber was of larger diameter than the bore, not only gave the gun a greater power and a longer range, but also diminished the danger to which artillerymen were usually exposed when charging the gun, inasmuch as they were entirely protected from the attack of small arms while they were engaged in that operation. This was shown to be the case very clearly in the Report of the special Committee some seven or eight years ago, although that Committee did not report in favour of breech-loading. It was demonstrated that there was far better cover for the men with the breech-loader. No experiments, however, were carried out at Shoeburyness to show which gun gave the most cover, so that the special advantage of the breech-loader was not proved to exist; and he hoped, when the noble Lord next made experiments, he would go into this point. If the two guns, a breech-loader and a muzzle-loader, were put in the open field, there would be no difference as to cover; but in intrenchments a very much superior protection was given by the breech-loader. When muzzle-loaders were adopted in this country, it was absolutely necessary that they should be made short, because it was more difficult to ram down charges in a long gun than in a short one; but now the whole tendency of modern artillery was to make guns longer, in order to render them more efficient.

Even if the muzzle-loader was improved in that respect, it would only be by imitating the special quality of the breech-loader—its very great depth; thus making the muzzle very clumsy and difficult to handle. He had seen the experiments at Shoeburyness as to cover for muzzle-loaders; but he was convinced there would be four or five times more men killed by small arms with the muzzle-loader than there would be in cases where the breech-loader was used. These, then, were the advantages of the breech-loader—the length of the gun, larger chamber for powder, and the great extent of cover. Therefore, this question of the character of English ordnance was a most serious one, and therefore it was that he pressed it upon the attention of the Government. He might refer to what was called the *Thunderer* system. There the cover was the same as with breech-loading; the gun itself stopped the port-hole, and prevented the fire of the enemy getting in at the men. Had the gun of the *Thunderer* been a breech-loader, it would have been impossible that it could have received a double charge, and its destruction would have been avoided. Such an accident was one which could not occur again for a long time to come, and he did not wish to make too much of it. The fact was, it was an accident inseparable from the construction of the gun and the mode of loading it. He did not believe the explosion was in any way due to a deficiency in the strength of the gun, which was almost bound to burst when loaded with two charges, inasmuch as the fact caused at least seven times the ordinary amount of pressure to be brought to bear at the point of bursting. Another strong objection to the system of muzzle-loading—and this also was shown in the case of the *Thunderer*—was that the gun was loaded at a distance from the firing detachment, the members of which could know nothing of what had been done, or of the danger to which they were, or might be, subjected. This was a necessary consequence of the system, and great care would be necessary to prevent a recurrence of similar disasters; but that would not do away with other evils that would inevitably crop up. He did not object to the use of hydraulic machinery, for with large guns it was very useful; but the fact of having the loading party 20 or 30 feet away from the firing party was a great defect, and one likely, as in the present case, to lead to accidents. Yet another danger arising from muzzle-loading ordnance was that the gun had to be loaded at one elevation; then raised to prevent the missile from falling out of the muzzle; and, in the third place, depressed to bring it to the proper elevation for firing. Thus, there were, at least, three changes in the elevation of a muzzle-loading gun from loading to firing, and this in itself was, in his opinion, a strong ground for objecting to the system altogether as compared with breech-loading. Another point was that, up to the present time, English artillerists had derived great benefit from being able to watch the systems in use in other countries; but this advantage was now withdrawn from them by reason of the fact that England now stood alone in the use of muzzle-loading ordnance, although such use was contrary to the practice of all Europe, and was opposed to the theories of civil engineers universally in the country. He would like to know on what authority the Government based its opinion? When the question had been raised before, the noble Lord opposite (Lord Eustace Cecil) had replied in general terms that his action had been based upon the advice of his official and professional advisers. But the only name given beyond the personal opinion of the noble Lord was that of Captain Nolan, and he thought the noble Lord ought not to shelter himself behind a cloud of names, but he should state the names of his advisers in this matter. If he had a distinct opinion from the Director General of the Ordnance that muzzle-loading guns were superior to breech-loading ones, that would, of course, be most valuable. If the noble Lord had a considerable body of scientific evidence in favour of muzzle-loading guns, he ought to name the officers who supplied it. At present they were going against the scientific practices of Germany, Austria, and America, and against engineering opinion also, and he thought that was most unfortunate. If they were going to retain the muzzle-loading principle, the country ought to know the evidence on which that decision had been arrived at, and the grounds on which it rested. The two systems could not co-exist together; but if the two were used alongside each other, breech-loaders would drive out muzzle-loaders. It was scarcely satisfactory; and it was to be hoped that on the present occasion the noble Lord would give the names of the gentlemen whose advice had guided him. It might, perhaps, be thought that he was a little pressing in bringing this subject before the House; but, as it was one which might possibly determine the issue of a battle by land or a naval engagement, it was, he thought, well worthy the consideration of the House of Commons. He was not now asking the noble Lord to introduce breech-loaders, but to have such exhaustive experiments made as would satisfy the House as to their value, and that could be done for £100,000 or £200,000, or a cost certainly not exceeding what was now being spent in adding to their muzzle-loading ordnance. It would be better to incur that expenditure than to proceed farther on their present course without well knowing what they were about. There was a very good opportunity for introducing them in some of the forts which required larger guns, and in which there was much practical difficulty in fitting in heavier muzzle-loaders—a difficulty which would vanish if they only put in breech-loaders. The hon. and gallant Member concluded by moving his Amendment.

General Sir GEORGE BALFOUR said, he thought his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Galway (Major Nolan) had done good service by again, this Session, as in the previous one, bringing forward his Motion on the subject of breech-loading ordnance, and he should very much wish that his suggestion for instituting experiments on the subject of the relative merits of muzzle-loaders were adopted and carried into practice. On that account he should beg to second his Motion, in order that, when the time came for making the change from muzzle-loading to breech-loading pieces, at which the hon. and gallant Gentleman's remarks pointed, they might be in a position to make it with despatch and certainty. On the previous occasions when the change from muzzle-loaders to breech-loaders was carried out, the nation was hurried into a vast expense before the best and most suitable breech piece was perfected. Then, 11 years later, the change made from a breech-loader was equally hurried before the best kind of gun was ascertained; indeed, the nation escaped at great outlay in avoiding a brass rifled gun instead of the present iron and steel tube. He was sure that the noble Lord the Surveyor General of Ordnance would not fail to give the attention they deserved to the obviously intelligent and scientific recommendations of his hon. and gallant Friend, and that he would cause experiments to be carried out which would settle the question in which the country was so deeply interested—namely, as to the best kind of gun for the Army and the Navy. A nation like England ought to possess not only the best ships and army that could be formed or produced, but the best guns that scientific skill could devise. He trusted that what his hon. and gallant Friend had said as to the recently proposed 4-ton 6-inch gun would be borne in mind. It was a piece of ordnance perfectly well suited to the class of vessels which the present First Lord of the Admiralty had so wisely introduced into the Service. It was in every way so far superior to the gun of 64 cwt. with which the *Isis* was armed that it might be truly said, if adopted for that vessel of great speed, to double her power as a vessel of war. He would suggest to his hon. and gallant Friend to submit a programme of the experiments it was desirable to make, and to place a Resolution on the Paper of the House which would require the authorities to give their best attention to the subject. He was aware that the noble Lord was always willing to obtain information from hon. Members at either side of the House, and would not disregard the suggestions of his hon. and gallant Friend merely by reason of his not belonging to the Party of the present Government. What was required was not a hasty and sweeping, but a gradual change, so that the country might, after careful investigation, secure the best possible gun for the Army and the Navy.

Amendment proposed,

To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "the great difference which exists between our cannon and those which find favour with Foreign Powers calls for careful investigation, and that it would be unwise to further postpone experiments on such classes of breech-loading

guns as are now possessed by other Powers,"
—(*Major Nolan,*)
—instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

SIR JOHN HAY said, he did not wish to oppose the Motion of the hon. and gallant Member (Major Nolan), which he had brought forward with much practical knowledge and ability. The advance of science had, he admitted, altered the position of the question very much from that which it occupied when, on the then perfectly sound recommendation of the Ordnance Committee, muzzle-loading guns were adopted for both Services. The system of breech-loading had then great disadvantages, while the muzzle-loading gun had the advantages of cheapness and simplicity, the latter being of considerable advantage to the Naval Service. The breech-loading gun had a considerable number of different pieces of various kinds to be attended to, and a slight derangement disabled the gun and was the cause of accidents. The present system of breech-loading was, however, a vast improvement on the old. It was simple, and had the advantage of securing to them a longer gun, with increased charge and accuracy. These reasons induced him to concur with the hon. and gallant Gentleman in desiring that the subject should undergo consideration, and that, if necessary, further experiments should be made. The appointment of a Scientific Commission would probably answer every purpose. He hoped, however, it would be done in a more permanent manner than was suggested by the hon. and gallant Gentleman. He desired to see the Ordnance Select Committee re-established, which, consisting as it did of the ablest officers both of the Navy and Army, gave confidence to the Services in its inquiries and in its reports. He should prefer that, if re-established, it should be in such a manner as to insure the more frequent change of its members than formerly prevailed; either by the adoption of the five years' rule, or in any manner which the Secretary of State for War thought would introduce fresh blood into the Ordnance Select Committee. The fact of the noble Lord instituting such permanent Committee would give confidence and convey an assurance to the officers of both Services that the result of an impartial scientific investigation would be adopted.

LORD EUSTACE CECIL said, that the hon. and gallant Member for Galway (Major Nolan) had rather sprung a mine upon him. He was not aware that the Motion would be brought on as it had been, as it was put down for the Army Estimates. He had, however, listened attentively to the able observations of the hon. and gallant Member; but while acknowledging their force, he must correct him on one point. He had represented his (Lord Eustace Cecil's) opinion as being in favour of muzzle-loaders. It was perfectly true that year after year he had defended the course taken by the Government, but for himself he had never expressed any opinion; and for the Government he could truly say that they were neutral in the matter, and that their great anxiety was to adopt that system which, on the whole, would be the best and most useful. The present Government found a certain system in use. That system was, after several years' inquiry, adopted by the Government who preceded them, and it was adopted at very great expense, after an expenditure of from £4,000,000 to £6,000,000 in experiments. It was supposed at that time—and he never heard any opinion to the contrary—that they had as good a gun as any in the world. No doubt, invention did not end there, and it was quite possible that a better gun on a different principle might be discovered; but that better gun did not seem at present to be forthcoming, and he would repeat that the country was now in possession of a good gun. The hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Galway had stated that other countries had got a better gun, and that they had adopted Messrs. Krupp's gun; but that was not, as he (Lord Eustace Cecil) showed on the 12th of March last, the case generally. No doubt, other Governments would keep their eyes open to see whether a better system could be discovered; but that was just what the War Department of this country were doing—they were watching for further improvements—and when found out, he ventured to assure the House that no time would be lost in testing any invention which promised to be of advantage to the country. The hon. and gallant Gentleman had suggested that he (Lord Eustace Cecil) should inform him of the names of the officers who advised him; but he really did not think that that was necessary, as the hon. and gallant Gentleman must be quite as, perhaps more, familiar with those names than he was. He knew the Director of Ordnance, and also the Head of the Gun Factory. They were all distinguished officers, very capable of dealing with the question. The Director of Ordnance had always said he was perfectly prepared to see introduced any improvement that could be carried out; he was neither a "muzzle-loader" nor a "breech-loader," but was anxious to obtain the best gun possible for the Service. However, there were very great difficulties in the way of making a sudden change. In gunnery, it was as true as in most other things—"the more haste, the worse speed." It was absolutely necessary that any new step should be taken with great caution, and that it should recommend itself not only to military, but also to naval opinion. He would not now follow the hon. and gallant Member in his remarks with regard to the accident on board the *Thunderer*, because at present the Papers bearing on the subject had not yet been presented to the House, and because it was impossible as yet to say what change in the present system, if any, naval opinion would recommend. It was quite possible that, in consequence of that accident, it might be thought necessary to introduce breech-loading guns into the turrets of their ships. It was not, however, for him to anticipate what might be done in that matter. All he could say about it was that he felt quite certain the Secretary of State for War would cordially co-operate with the First Lord of the Admiralty and naval opinion in this matter; and that if it should be found necessary to make any great change in their guns the Government would not shrink from doing it, but would do it cautiously, gradually, and, he hoped, thoroughly. He hoped the hon. and gallant Gentleman would not press the Government too hardly. Considerable stress was laid in some quarters on the Krupp system of breech-loading; but unless he was very much mistaken, there were other systems of breech-loading equal, if not superior, to it. The question would, no doubt, receive the fullest consideration from the Heavy Gun Committee now sitting, and further experiments would probably be made if necessary. Two of their officers had been invited by Herr Krupp to attend some new experiments in Germany, and possibly their Report might point to some new invention in the Krupp system worthy of imitation. He could assure hon. Members that every effort was being made to keep up with public opinion in these matters all over Europe. At the same time, he thought it only right to remind the House that experiments in gunnery were extremely costly, and if they allowed a particular inventor to have his gun tested, they must extend the same indulgence, if not to all foreign, certainly to native inventors. The present system of muzzle-loading was only adopted after an immense amount of money had been expended, and still the inventors, as a body, were not satisfied. They never were, to whatever length the experiments were carried. Not anticipating any discussion of this nature, he had not brought any Papers with him; and he was, therefore, unable to go into the subject as fully as he might have done. He could only, in conclusion, repeat his assurance that as soon as a better gun was forthcoming they would not fail to introduce it. It was a mistake to suppose that a prejudice existed against breech-loaders in official circles. Indeed, as the hon. and gallant Member was no doubt aware, breech-loaders were in use to a certain extent both in their fortresses and on board ship, therefore the two systems had been working *pari passu*. He did not think there had been any unfair detraction of the breech-loading system; on the contrary, he believed there had been every desire to give the breech-loading system a perfectly fair trial, and that civilians and officers of the Army and Navy were all animated by one wish, which was to secure the best gun for the country.

Amendment, by leave, *withdrawn*.

ARMY ORGANIZATION—THE BRIGADE DEPOT SYSTEM.—RESOLUTION.

Major O'BEIRNE rose to call attention to the brigade depôt system, and to move—

> "That, in the opinion of this House, the Brigade Depôt system requires amendment, as it is costly, unsatisfactory, and inadequate to the requirements of home and foreign service."

He said the system had completely failed to attain two objects with which it was introduced — the furnishing of drafts for foreign service, and the welding into one harmonious whole of the forces in the sub-district, so as to form a nucleus of instruction for all auxiliary forces. Instead of that, however, it had been found necessary, in the two cases of emergency that had just occurred, to draft large numbers of men from other regiments in order to make up the strength required. For instance, to fill up the regiments sent to the Afghan Frontier and the Cape the regiments at Aldershot had been denuded of their best men. Then, again, there was a preposterous superabundance of officers at some of the depôts; in some cases there were only 80 men fit for duty under one colonel, one major, four captains, and four subalterns—a great disproportion of officers to men, whose number was utterly insufficient for the purposes of instruction to the auxiliary forces of sub-district. The men ought to be raised to 900 at least, and then they would be able to furnish strength to the battalions if required for foreign service, and be a nucleus of instruction to the Militia regiment and Volunteer corps of sub-district. As regarded the cost of these depôts, it bore no relation to the money paid for the work done and the responsibility incurred by colonels with the Army; and the officers at the depôts were examples of idleness in the districts, which was very injurious. The whole cost of the depôts was £274,000—an enormous sum of money spent on an object which was a complete failure. This Estimate ought to be cut down this year. He begged to move the Motion which stood in his name.

Amendment proposed,

To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "in the opinion of this House, the Brigade Depôt system requires amendment, as it is costly, unsatisfactory, and inadequate to the requirements of home and foreign service,"—(*Major O'Beirne,*)

—instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

COLONEL ARBUTHNOT said, he was not aware that these debates were coming on that evening, nor he was sure were a large number of officers in the House, or they would have been present. He agreed with the hon. and gallant Member (Major O'Beirne) that the cost of brigade depôts was very disproportionate to the results obtained. The hon. and gallant Gentleman suggested that the number of men in the battalions should be increased to 900. No doubt, they would then be of much more use for the purpose for which they were intended; but surely, if the number of men were increased, it was only reasonable to ask that the number of depôts should be reduced. The fact was that a mistake was made in establishing so many depôts, and all soldiers, if not all Members of Parliament, were agreed that, however good the design might have been, the territorial principle was not exactly adapted to the size of England, nor to their habits and institutions. The brigade depôt system, it was perfectly true, had failed entirely as regarded the localization of regiments. It could never have been otherwise, for as soon as the two regiments at a depôt centre were filled up, all the recruits were taken away for general service, and sent anywhere all over the country. Again, in some of these centres recruiting was actually at a standstill—had never, indeed, even begun; while in others a very large number of recruits were obtained. This showed that the system did not and could not work well everywhere. He did not quite agree with the hon. and gallant Member about the idleness of the officers. That depended a good deal upon the character of the commanding officer. He knew one depôt where the objection was the other way, and the duties of the officers were discharged with 20 or 30 men in precisely the same manner as if there had been 900 men in barracks. No doubt that was going too far, and was a mistake of the commanding officer; but, on the other hand, where there were few men. the officers usually had very little to do. If the regiments were kept up to a sufficient strength of officers, he was not sure that it was not a good thing for a certain number of those officers to have a pleasant and an easy time as they might have at the depôts. His principle always had been, and he commended it to everybody else, to make the Service as pleasant as it could be, so long as it was combined with a careful discharge of duty. He believed it would be more carefully discharged if every facility were given to officers and men to be employed and amused. There was one little point he should like to bring to the notice of his right hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Stanley), in which he thought a good deal of expense might be saved, and that was in the case of recruits proceeding on foreign service. They were enlisted for foreign service at, let them suppose, Cardiff. If the home battalion was serving in some remote part of the country, as Scotland, and the other battalion was abroad, it was thought necessary to send these recruits up to Scotland, and then to bring them down again to Southampton and Portsmouth to embark them for India. As he was not aware that this debate was coming on, he did not fortify himself by looking at the Returns, to which reference had been made, and he did not even know how many depôts had been established; but he hoped his right hon. and gallant Friend would think once, twice, and thrice before he began to carry out the system where it was not already in operation. In his opinion, the general feeling of officers of the Army would be decidedly in favour of the modification rather than the extension of this system of brigade depôts.

Colonel STANLEY said, he, too, like the hon. and gallant Member (Colonel Arbuthnot), had come down to the House unprepared to give figures on these matters. He had no right to complain that the hon. and gallant Member (Major O'Beirne) had brought forward this Motion on the present occasion; but he feared he could not give him a full answer. But, inasmuch as he had had some rather intimate acquaintance with the subject, he hoped to be able to show the hon. and gallant Member why some of the objections he entertained were not altogether valid, and why they could not very easily or lightly depart from the system which had been some time settled. To begin with, the hon. and gallant Gentleman left out of sight, for purposes of argument, that the objects of the so-called brigade depôt system were not limited in their effect to the Army. Although the Army was now the primary consideration, its object as laid down by the late Secretary of State for War (Viscount Cardwell), was not only to form a training depôt for every pair of battalions, one of which was on foreign service and the other on duty at home, but also to serve as storehouses for reserve stations where Militia recruits might train in all seasons of the year, and camping places for the Volunteers. He was not prepared to concede that these brigade depôts had wholly missed their original object. With regard to the disproportion between officers and men, at first sight he would be very much disposed to agree with the hon. and gallant Member. But it would be recollected that when they were considering the point, and obtained Returns from the authorities, they found the number of officers returned for duty at the depôts by no means disproportioned to the men. When it came to be reduced to a matter of actual fact, there was not in the majority of cases much incongruity. But in some cases there did appear to be an excessive number, and the Committee over which he had the honour to preside recommended that those officers should, as far as possible, be sent to rejoin their battalions. As regarded the number of men, there was nothing which, as Secretary of State for War, would rejoice him more than to see the depôts extended to the full size of 900 men; but this would mean a fine addition of 40,000 to the Army, and it was, therefore, hardly necessary to discuss it at the present moment. But, apart from this, if they had this large number of men tied up at these little depôts, they would be precisely undoing the object of late years, which had been, not to split regiments up apart from one another at country places, but to bring them together in large camps for better instruction, and in order to teach them the duties they must fulfil when they formed part of a large army. The number of the depôts was a subject on which he did not feel indisposed to speak, for he believed this was one of the very objections he, the late Colonel Anson, and others, had raised when the measure had been first proposed by Viscount Cardwell in that House. His opinion at that time had been that it would be far better not to split the men into such small detachments, but to have fewer and larger centres and more ground. From that opinion he had seen no reason to depart. But, on the other hand, he was bound to say that any alteration of these centres was not a thing to be lightly undertaken. If they called to mind the number of days and nights that had been spent in the discussion of this localization scheme, they would feel bound to admit that it was one thoroughly accepted on the part of the country, and that the money for it had been voted with open eyes. As to the disturbance of these centres, if it could be shown that, without expense, certain depôts could be reduced without any loss, either direct or indirect, to the country, that was an obvious matter of administration with which anyone would be prepared to deal. But, as a matter of fact, when Viscount Cranbrook acceded to Office, he found in almost all these places either the contracts so far advanced, or the depôts themselves so far proceeded with, that he scarcely had the power, without throwing away good money after bad, to alter the original system. Again, why should they turn back, after having gone half-way, in a scheme which was decided on by Parliament, for which Parliament had voted large sums of money, and when the purposes for which the money had been voted had been only half fulfilled? He confessed he would shrink from the responsibility of lightly asking Parliament to depart from the scheme. There might be small points of administration, here and there, which might be remedied; but if hon. Members looked upon these depôts as being so many men required for duty, they altogether failed of their purpose; they were depôts, and did not purport to be battalions. Perhaps, at another time, it might be his duty to touch on some points where he thought some remedy might still be required; but he was certainly not prepared to go as far as the hon. and gallant Member. The uneven number of recruits was always a difficulty in this country. It was impossible that centres of recruiting should coincide with the depôts; but the distances between the two were short. There could be no doubt that the depôts had served their original purpose of supplying more centres of recruiting than there had been before. He would mention one other point. One of the great complaints of late years had been that the stores were too much centralized. Now, it was quite evident in the late mobilization that the more they were making use of the storehouses at the depôts to distribute the stores, the better was the service of mobilization likely to be performed. He, therefore, could not see any reason for departing from this brigade-depôt system, at least, so far as the centres themselves were concerned.

MR. WHITWELL thought the brigade depôts were exercising a very beneficial influence. They were more or less affecting the whole body of the Volunteer Forces. He hoped that brigade depôts would soon become the means of affording instruction to the Volunteers.

Question put, and *agreed to.*

PUBLIC BUSINESS—QUESTION OF PROCEDURE.—OBSERVATIONS.

MR. RYLANDS: I desire, Sir, before you leave the Chair, to enter a protest on the part of independent Members against the course taken by the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in making his Statement on the Motion that you do leave the Chair instead of in Committee of Supply. While, of course, I do not presume to say that the right hon. Gentleman was out of Order, yet the course he has taken is one which, in my recollection, is entirely unprecedented, and one which has exposed the House to a very considerable amount of inconvenience. The right hon. Gentleman has brought in what in effect is a third Budget for the present financial year. That, in itself, is most unexampled, and in consequence of the extraordinary step taken to-night it has been followed by a Motion on going into Committee, which has led to a discussion of matters entirely apart from the financial proposals of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. It is quite clear, if the right hon. Gentleman had adopted the usual course in moving that you, Sir, do leave the Chair, without making any observations, then the Motion on going into Committee would have come forward in due course, and the right hon. Gentleman would then have made his Statement with the Chairman of Committees in the Chair. The discussion in that event would have proceeded in a regular and orderly manner; but, as it is, I am doubtful whether even on the Vote, which will be put from the Chair when we have resolved ourselves into Committee, I should not be precluded from making general observations which appear to me to have been called forth.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer has taken a course to-night which I feel myself—and I believe I am not alone in that opinion—is calculated to confuse the mind of the House. If the House of Commons is to possess any efficient control over the Expenditure and over the taxation of this country, it is quite clear that they ought to have a full Statement, in regard to the Expenditure and taxation, placed before them in an explicit and ample manner by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the occasion of his moving the Budget for the year. But he has not done so. The Chancellor of the Exchequer came down with a Budget at the usual time of the Session, and he gave the House to understand what would be the Expenditure of the financial year; and he laid before the House certain proposals as to the taxes he intended to levy during the year. We were supposed to base our judgment and opinion upon the Budget as stated. But what do we find? That the Estimates of the right hon. Gentleman prove in the course of a very few months to be utterly delusive. You find the right hon. Gentleman coming down to the House from time to time, no doubt with sincerity, but under the influence of a very large organ of hope, and in the most sanguine manner, anticipating that the Expenditure would be less, and the Revenue greater than it has subsequently proved. Thus, after the first Budget had been found to be delusive, and after the right hon. Gentleman had taken another unprecedented course, of laying upon the Table of the House a scheme embracing the ordinary and extraordinary Expenditure—a scheme alike confusing to the country and the House —he came down with a second Budget. The Government shirked new taxation, so the Chancellor of the Exchequer proposed to borrow, admitting that the Expenditure was getting beyond the sums that he had anticipated. Again, he had hopes for the future, which had not been realized. We have now a third Budget, and again we find that the Chancellor of the Exchequer comes down to the House and tells us that the Expenditure is greater than he had estimated, and that the taxes have not realized what he expected. The result of all is that he has landed us in a financial difficulty, which I do not hesitate to say is without example in recent years. The system of borrowing cannot go on for ever. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has put off the evil day as long as possible, and the time is fast approaching when he will have to impose additional taxes upon the country. What will be the inevitable effect of the Statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in bringing his third Budget before the public? It will be this—that persons engaged in large mercantile operations—persons interested in tea, spirits, and tobacco—will go in for heavy operations in the anticipation of some additional taxation on one or other of these articles. Such operations will certainly cause men engaging in them very great inconvenience, and the passage of a large and unusual quantity of goods through the Customs will give to the Chancellor of the Exchequer a large amount of Revenue this year which does not belong to the year. Present appearances of Revenue will, of course, be improved; but next year will not present so favourable an aspect. Those connected, as I am, with the commerce of the country, have a right to complain of the Statement made to-night, and a right to assert that there should be no delay in laying before the House the Budget for the coming financial year. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) has shown that it has always been the custom, when there was a large deficiency, for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to come down immediately and state the facts of the case in Committee of Ways and Means. If the Chancellor of the Exchequer does what he now proposes, he will not only do serious injury to the commerce of the country, but he will be setting up another precedent which it is undesirable to pursue. I do not desire to occupy the House longer than necessary, but I have one remark to make which I could not well make in Committee. The Chancellor of the Exchequer stated that he intended to apply a sum of £400,000 to the military operations in South Africa, which had been provided by savings in other Departments of the State. Now, I wish to point out to the right hon. Gentleman that this is a clear case of a transfer of sums voted by this House for particular purposes to other purposes not contemplated by the House at the time the money was voted. I think it a most objectionable course, although a legal one, to be adopted. Let me put this to the right hon. Gentleman. It might have happened that if he had come down to the House for a Supplementary Vote for the expenses of the South African War, the policy and conduct of the Government with regard to that war might have been fairly challenged. The Government, by taking the course they had pursued, had prevented any consideration by the House of the transactions of an important part of the Imperial policy. They had escaped any challenge of their policy in consequence of the Treasury giving authority to the Army Department to transfer sums of money which had been voted out of the funds granted in this House under entirely different conditions to entirely different objects. That £400,000, so granted by this House, had been taken with the sanction of the Treasury to pay for the South African War. I say that the control of Parliament in such matters does seem very much like a farce. I am not prepared to say that under no circumstances ought such a transfer to be allowed; for I know that if a rule was laid down too stringently, there might be a certain amount of public disadvantage; but if this system is to be so largely adopted I contend that, whatever may be the inconvenience to the Departments, the House of Commons ought to be determined to put a stop to it. I wish it to be understood that £400,000, voted for certain specified purposes, has been expended in war, and this has been done without Parliament being consulted in the matter. I must apologize for intervening between the House and its going into Committee of Supply. I should certainly not have done so had not the right hon. Gentleman thought it right to depart from a practice of this House without the consent of the House.

Main Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," put, and *agreed to.*

SUPPLY—EXCHEQUER BONDS.

SUPPLY—*considered* in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

(1.) £2,750,000 Exchequer Bonds.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said, he had been so much criticized for irregularity that he hardly knew whether he was justified in taking notice in Committee of observations which were made out of it; and, in fact, he doubted whether he should be justified in making any Statement except as to the particular Vote before the Committee. He also, with some hesitation, referred to the other questions which had been raised, and he hoped he was in Order in doing so. He did think, however, that he was consulting the convenience of the House in making the Statement he did. In the first place, there undoubtedly had been occasions—several occasions—on which Budgets had been brought forward earlier in the year than the present time. He did not know whether all the cases which had been mentioned were exactly in point, because the change made in 1854 in the date of the financial year affected some of them, though he did not wish to insist very much upon that. At the same time, he was quite sure that there were inconveniences, and always had been, in making a Budget Statement prematurely. That inconvenience had been very much increased of late by the change made in collecting the Revenue. The great charge of the Income Tax fell upon the third and fourth quarters of the year, and there was great difficulty in estimating with accuracy what the whole amount of the tax would be. Of course, there was a similar difficulty with other sources of taxation; but he referred especially to the Income Tax. He thought his right hon. Friend opposite (Mr. Childers) would agree with him that though it might be inconvenient, and undoubtedly was inconvenient, to the public to have any delay occur in making the Financial Statement of the year known, yet that it would be almost more inconvenient that an imperfect Statement should be made prematurely, necessitating fresh arrangements afterwards. There was considerable difficulty, at the present time, in estimating, not merely the Revenue for next year, but the Expenditure also. This latter must depend very much upon what they might have to pay for the operations in South Africa; and at the present moment, and until they got the next fortnight's despatches, of course, it would be extremely difficult to know for what sum it would be necessary to make provision. Therefore, it would hardly be consistent with certainty in taxation if they were to attempt to introduce a Budget at so early a date as the beginning of March. For these reasons, he had suggested that they should wait until the beginning of April for his financial propositions. The right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Childers) had rather exaggerated the position in which they stood. He said it was the gravest and the greatest since the time of the first Reform Bill. That, he thought, was a statement calculated to alarm the public mind quite unnecessarily.

Mr. CHILDERS said, that was not quite his statement. He said it was the most serious deficit since the first Reform Bill.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said, he did not agree with the right hon. Gentleman in that opinion; but he would not discuss that point for the present. However, if it had not been for the South African War the arrangements he had made last year would have been sufficient, and it would have been unnecessary for him to make any Financial Statement at all. He now had to propose a Vote for the renewal of those Bonds which were issued for the Service of the year 1877-8. He had hoped they might have been able to pay off a portion of these Bonds in the present year. They had not been able to do so, partly on account of the deficiency in the Revenue, partly on account of the greater demand for Expenditure; and he had, therefore, no other alternative but to make provision for meeting these Bonds when they fell due on the 16th, and the following days of March. He hoped the Committee would see that in making these propositions they were only carrying into effect the contemplated arrangements.

Mr. DODSON said, the right hon. Gentleman had just told them that it would not have been necessary for him to come down to the House and ask for power to make any alteration in the arrangements he proposed last year had it not been for the breaking out of the war in South Africa. That was a very important qualification, and bore very materially upon the plan of finance put before them in the month of August last. In that month the right hon. Gentleman contemplated an excess of Expenditure over Revenue for the current year of £1,556,000, and, adding to that the deficit which he would have to provide for of the Exchequer Bonds for Expenditure in connection with the Vote of Credit incurred in 1877-8, left him with a deficit of £4,306,000. The right hon. Gentleman said he proposed to spread that over the next two years, and, assuming that his Revenue for the next two years continued the same as in the current year, *plus* £600,000, the additional amount of the new 2*d.* on the Income Tax, and that his expenditure continued the same, *minus* the expenses incurred in connection with Turkish affairs, he hoped to be able in each of the two years to pay off, roughly speaking, £2,000,000 of Debt, and thus, in the two years, to wipe off the £4,000,000 odd of deficit. The right hon. Gentleman justified his action by saying that if this was not actually war expenditure it was next door to war expenditure, for it was the cost of averting war. If, however, the cost of averting war was to be treated as war expenditure, he did not know where they were to stop. In one sense, the whole cost of the Army and Navy was the cost of averting war, for they were intended to guard them—to protect them—against war. Unfortunately, this expenditure for averting war proved, in the case of Afghanistan at least, to be rather the cost of provoking war. It could not be doubted, indeed, that the policy pursued in regard to Turkey led to the Afghanistan War. Then the right hon. Gentleman, on the assumption that his Revenue and Expenditure would continue the same, spread his deficit over the two coming years. But he had been singularly unfortunate, because since that time he had had two fresh wars—the Afghanistan War and the Zulu War. He was not then going to discuss the policy of the Government, or to lay any blame upon the right hon. Gentleman; but the course he had taken did show the danger of spreading the so-called cost of averting a war over future years, and trusting that the future years would be so uneventful as to enable them to pay off such arrears. The right hon. Gentleman had certainly met with singular ill-fortune in having the Zulu War and the Afghanistan War come upon him. Besides this, the right hon. Gentleman had told them that he was about to propose a loan to India of £2,000,000 without interest. He would not stop to discuss whether that would not, in reality, be a gift; but, in any case, the money would have to be provided. Therefore, in addition to the deficit of £4,306,000, they had also to face a proposition for £1,500,000 for the Zulu War, something over £354,000 for the Supplementary Civil Service Estimates, and the prospect of a loan of £2,000,000, without interest, to India. The right hon. Gentleman had also told them what they must have all been exceedingly sorry to hear—that the Revenue was likely to fall short of the estimate by something not much less than £1,000,000. He was afraid, looking at the Revenue Returns, that that shortcoming would be, at all events, in great part upon the three most important heads of finance — Customs, Excise, and Stamps. At the close of the third quarter, the receipts from these three heads were £200,000 behind the receipts for the same period in the previous year. But, at the present time, according to the Return up to February 22, the falling off was £371,000; or, in other words, the falling off, during the last seven or eight weeks, had almost doubled. It must be remembered that the right hon. Gentleman, instead of calculating on a falling off, had reckoned on a considerable increase under two of these heads, for he had calculated on an increased Revenue from Customs of £531,000; from Excise, including the additional dog duty, of £136,000; and a decrease on Stamps of £26,000. Therefore, while he had reckoned on an increase by the 31st of March next of £641,000, he had instead, up to the present time, a decrease of £371,000. It was obvious that, unless these three important heads of Revenue much improved, the right hon. Gentleman would be £1,000,000 short of his calculations. He dared say that the Revenue would come in better, as it often had done before, just before the close of the financial year; but still the prospect was, as these three important heads of Revenue were falling off with remarkable rapidity, that they would disappoint the expectations of the right hon. Gentleman; and the fact that this falling off had been recently so rapid did not promise well for the Income of the next year. He wished to call attention to one other point with regard to the new Sinking Fund, established in 1875. The right hon. Gentleman, by means of that Sinking Fund, paid off in the first year £280,150; in the second year, £624,780; and in the third year, £764,825, making a total paid off in the three years during which the Fund had been in operation of £1,669,755. But in the course of the same three years the Debt had been increased by a larger amount than the total amount paid off; therefore, while they had been paying off the Debt with one hand, they had been adding to it with the other. The money, in fact, by which it had been paid off had been borrowed for the purpose, or if not actually so borrowed, was withdrawn from Revenue, at the cost of leaving a corresponding amount of Expenditure to be met by borrowed money. The result was an increase in the Debt, funded and unfunded. The right hon. Gentleman estimated, in his Budget last April, that he would pay off in the current year, by means of that Sinking Fund, £684,747. He would suggest to the right hon. Gentleman whether he would not apply that money to meet part of his deficit, seeing that he must borrow so much the more if he were going to keep the Fund up. Of course, if the operation of the Sinking Fund were a continuous one, with a definite object to be attained in a definite time, it might be worth while not, even temporarily, to hinder its progress. But as this was not the case, and as the proposition simply was to provide so much surplus each year in order to pay off a certain amount of Debt, it seemed to him, when no such surplus was provided, an illusory and useless operation to continue it. Without expressing any definite opinion, he would merely suggest to the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether it would not be a wise thing to suspend the action of the Sinking Fund for the current year, at all events until they saw what their prospects were?

GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOUR suggested to the Chancellor of the Exchequer that he should put into the financial accounts every year a statement showing by whom these Exchequer Bonds and Bills were held. He could tell him frankly that, by allowing the very large amount of unfunded Debt to exist without making the public acquainted with the way in which it was held, he had done himself much harm, as one of their ablest financiers, and lowered the national credit, because the public was not acquainted with the fact that these Bonds and Bills were at present mainly in the hands of the Commissioners of the National Debt and the Bank. They amounted to £14,500,000, leaving about £5,000,000 only in the form of Treasury Bills in the hands of the public. But, as nobody knew where they were, it was assumed that all were mainly in the hands of the public; and until they had heard the Statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, it was generally assumed that this kind of indebtedness, known as the Floating Debt, must end in the issue of Consols, and with this notion the rise in price had been checked of this kind of securities. If the right hon. Gentleman would publish the statement to which he had referred, it would do much to insure that steadiness in the Money Market which was so essential. With regard to the plea urged for delaying the Budget till after the close of the year, he very much regretted the assigned cause being the change that had taken place of late years in the mode of collecting the Revenue from the Income and Property Tax. Appeals of the strongest character were made to the late Chancellor of the Exchequer not to do it, but in vain; and then appeals were made to the late Prime Minister, but he did not feel himself justified in interfering to stop the unwise project of his Chancellor of the Exchequer. Therefore, the right hon. Gentleman had, he thought, some right to urge that the mode of collecting this Revenue by which the larger portion of this tax was collected in the last quarter of the year, had placed them in their present position of being unable till the year closed of dealing with the Estimates for the year ensuing. He hoped the Chancellor of the Exchequer would deal with the deficiency in a bold and statesmanlike manner. Within one year this Floating Debt had increased by £7,000,000. It was not safe to allow of further increase, and it would be preferable to reduce the amount. He hoped, if necessary, he would ask not only for 1*d.* but 2*d.* more on the Income Tax, and that he would not any longer run the great danger of leaving this heavy burden of a dangerous kind of Debt hanging over them.

Sir GEORGE CAMPBELL said, he should like to know how this money was to be raised. He hoped it would not be carried beyond next year, and that the matter would be dealt with in the Budget.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said, the money would be raised by Exchequer Bonds, which would only be current for a year; and when he brought in the Budget he would make a statement concerning the manner of providing for them.

Vote *agreed to.*

(2.) £1,500,000, War in South Africa (Vote of Credit).

Mr. PARNELL said, he merely rose to protest against the Vote of this sum of money. Of course, he was aware that no protest of his would have the slightest effect; but he felt, on the other hand, that he would not be discharging the duty he owed to himself and his constituents if he did not protest against this most unjust and flagitious war. They had deliberately invaded a country inhabited by people who had done them no harm, and they had, for several years, deliberately prepared this invasion. It had been the policy of Her Majesty's Government to provoke this war, in order that it might annex portions of the territory of these Zulus. At the time of the annexation of the Transvaal this tendency of theirs was pointed out, and it was shown clearly, and proved, as far as anything could be proved, that if the Transvaal were annexed the next step must be the annexation of a portion of the lands of the enemy. Of course, the Colonial Governor was carefully instructed as to his duties, as to how he was to get up this little war, and the name of humanity was put to shame by the proceedings of the Government. Then, after the way had been carefully prepared, and after excuses had been carefully got ready, troops were sent into the country, and these people were attacked. He knew that the disaster which had recently befallen the troops would compel the re-instatement of the military position; and, so far as that went, he supposed nobody would object to that. But he did not apprehend, from the temper he had recently seen displayed by the people of this country, that the Government would be satisfied with the recovery of the military position. On the contrary, he supposed the Government would proceed to carry out their original intentions with regard to attacking the country. Of course, it was now clear that the panic and the alarm sedulously got up when the news first arrived of the massacre of a battalion of the 24th, and that Natal was in danger, were utterly groundless, and that the Forces on the spot were perfectly capable of defending the Colony against any attack from the Zulus. The resistance of Lieutenants Bromhead and Chard, at the head of only 80 men, after they had had time to entrench themselves in a very slight and scanty manner, showed that the Zulus were perfectly incapable of conducting an offensive campaign against our troops. These enormous preparations, and the dispatch of these thousands of men, meant neither more nor less than a premeditated determination to annex that country, as the Transvaal had already been annexed. He supposed that there would be no quarter given to these savages, as, in accordance with their savage nature, they had given none; that the sword would go amongst them, and that their villages would be burned, as they had burned the villages of the unfortunate people in Afghanistan. These poor people had displayed instincts which, in other nations, were supposed to indicate heroism, for they had endeavoured to defend their country against the attacks of foreigners and strangers. He would not go through the form of dividing the House; but he would again protest against the application of this money to what he was sure would be a war of annexation and extermination.

SIR JOHN HAY said, he could not allow one charge brought by the hon. Member for Meath (Mr. Parnell) against Her Majesty's troops to pass unanswered. The hon. Member had said that no doubt their troops in South Africa would have received orders that no quarter should be given; but that was very far from being the case, as would be seen from the examination of a document already published, but which had not, as yet, been laid upon the Table of the House. The document to which he (Sir John Hay) alluded was an order of the late Lieutenant Governor at the Cape, Sir Arthur Cunynghame, and it contained the most positive instructions, not only to British troops, but to the ordinary Native levies, both to give quarter, and, if possible, to make prisoners in battle, instead of the course suggested as likely to be pursued by the officers and men of Her Majesty's Army by the hon. Member who had just sat down. He (Sir John Hay) could not have imagined that any hon. Member would have expressed such an opinion at once to the House, the Committee, and the country. That suggestion was entirely unfounded, and one which it would be seen could not possibly be carried into effect. The hon. Member had further said that Her Majesty's Government had conceived this scheme of spoliation and war; but he (Sir John Hay) believed that the South African War had come upon them as a matter of great surprise. If the hon. Member would read the despatches and Blue Book, it would be found that there was not a single instance of any order from Her Majesty's Government to carry the war into the Zulu country. On the contrary, so far from there existing any desire to carry fire and sword into that country, the arbitration which had been held, under that distinguished Governor, Sir Bartle Frere, had resulted in the arrangement that a very considerable portion of territory, which had been in dispute, should be conveyed back to the Zulus. Pending the further opportunity of discussing the question of the war, he thought that the study of the publications he had referred to was desirable, as they certainly did not bear out the statements of the hon. Member for Meath.

SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL said, he thought it undesirable that any debate should be taken upon the causes of the war at that moment; but he could not help expressing his surprise that a Vote of such enormous importance should be submitted to the House without any explanation or statement whatever on the part of the Government. The £1,500,000 just asked for was but for two months' expenses of a war which might attain a great magnitude. [The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: No, no!] It was for expenses up to the 31st of March; it was a Vote for beginning a war, the end of which they did not see. But whether the inception of the war were just or unjust, it was a fact, and must be carried to a conclusion —namely, the entire disarming of the Potentate with whom it was being waged. A great distinction was to be drawn between wars of such different characters as the late Kaffir War, which the Chancellor of the Exchequer had called the Transkei War, and the present Zulu War. His impression and experience was, that when they had districts of savage and unruly tribes, wholly surrounded by British territory, the best course was to take them in hand, conquer, and bring them entirely under British control. In that view he considered that the Kaffir War might be a good job; and if the expense was not excessive, he might not object to the result, on the express condition that henceforward the Cape Colony should undertake the wars within its own borders, and that Kaffraria should be treated as part of the Cape Colony which should bear the cost of its own defence. On the other hand, the Zulu War was one of a totally different character. In that case they were not forced by circumstances to attempt the conquest of a bit of territory, but were undertaking the conquest of a great Kingdom upon the borders of our Colony, beyond which extended the whole Continent of Africa, with its enormous population. They were, consequently, brought face to face with the great question—were they to be forced to go on more and more into that great Dominion in Africa against their will, just as they were formerly forced to go into the great Dominion of India? He felt surprise and regret that it had been found necessary to employ only their finest regiments in the present somewhat ignoble war against savages, and that no assistance had been derived from the Indian Army. The Native Indian soldiers were, in his opinion, admirably well fitted for the kind of work now on hand in South Africa. If, instead of making an unfortunate demonstration at Malta and Cyprus, and allowing their Representative in India to entangle his troops in Afghanistan, Her Majesty's Government had been able to move a brigade or division of their best Indian troops into Africa, the war might have been carried on and concluded without that destruction of the power and sinew of the country, which he knew very well had resulted, and must result, from what he must call this ignoble war. He was not sanguine that the people at the Cape would be willing to undertake the responsibility of government with respect to the Zulus by consenting to federation when the war was over, for it was their opinion that they had already enough to do within their own borders. He did not think they would be willing to relieve us of the expense and responsibility of future wars in the interior of South Africa. They had a large Native population to deal with, whilst they were separated at present by British Colonies, and the Orange Free State, from places in which they had no concern. If the Cape Colony would not, the Colonies of Natal and the Transvaal could not undertake to deal in a fitting manner with the Native African population, especially now that they were supplied with arms from the Portuguese Coast—they were without the resources needful for the prosecution of great wars. But while these Colonies were not able to carry on war on their own account, they had, on the other hand, enormous temptations to get the British Government to carry it on for them. The present war would be enormously profitable to the people of Natal. Sir Arthur Cunynghame's Book showed this. He had seen lately that the carriage of 1 cwt. of goods from Durban to the capital of Natal had run up from 2*s*. 6*d*. to 15*s*. 6*d*. He noticed in the Estimate that there was only £200,000 for the cost of Naval transport, while £1,200,000 was devoted to the military charges, almost the whole of which would go into the pockets of the Colonists, who had the greatest inducements to promote war for the sake of the profit accruing to them. Another reason why the Colonists were inclined to war was, that they were habitually wont to carry it on in the form of a cattle raid; and during the first 10 days of the present Zulu War the troops were engaged in collecting many thousand head of cattle from the peaceful villages, which they afterwards divided among themselves in the name of loot. There was another important point about which he would say a few words, and that was the land system now prevailing in South Africa, which gave another and very strong inducement to the Colonies to engage in war. He asked hon. Members to compare the present Colonial land system with the wise policy pursued in the United States, where the lands were reserved in the power of the Government as a means of forming new Colonies. Of all the monopolists of land, he was quite sure that the South African Colonists were the greatest. And it was their habit not only to divide the whole land which they could appropriate, but to encroach upon the land of their neighbours. Hon. Members might observe that these Colonists had a habit of dealing in what they called farms; but the term had a very different meaning in South Africa to what it had here; for there a farm consisted of at least 6,000 acres—indeed, farms out there might reach a maximum of more than 20,000 acres. Such were the farms in the Transvaal, where every boy who attained the age of 16 years was entitled to one of 6,000 acres and upwards. Sir Arthur Cunynghame told them that the demand for farms was such that the authorities of the Transvaal were obliged to appropriate their neighbours land in order to distribute it among the rising population. The farms, of course, could not be cultivated by boys of 16, and the consequence was that they were sold for a song, and got into the hands of monopolists, who left none for new Colonists. He was not prepared to say that it might not be a wise and merciful policy to establish their rule over greater regions in South Africa; but that they should not leave it in the power of the Colonists to job away the land. He asked the other day a gentleman travelling who came from the Cape — "Why they did not get more Colonists in South Africa?" And the reply was—"The real fact is that we have no land to offer them; it has all been jobbed away." He (Sir George Campbell) impressed on Her Majesty's Government the advantage of carrying out the wise policy of the United States of reserving the land in the power of the Central Government, and not letting it fall into the hands of jobbing Colonists. By those means they might be able to settle a Colonial population, and so free themselves from the great burden of future wars. It appeared to him that if we must advance in South Africa, one of two policies must be followed—either the government of the country under a despotic system, like that of India, or the establishment of free Colonies, which might be capable of relieving the Home Government by taking upon themselves their own burdens. There was a good deal to be said in favour of the acquisition of land in South Africa. If this were fairly dealt with, it would become an admirable outlet for the younger sons and brothers of the upper and middle classes in this country, for whom it was sometimes difficult to make provision, and who were not prepared to do that which must be done by those who wished to succeed in America—namely, to work with their own hands. They might have the assistance of Native labour.

Mr. ASSHETON rose to Order. He could not see that the land question had anything to do with the Motion before the Committee.

Sir GEORGE CAMPBELL would not trouble the Committee longer. When the hon. Member for Clitheroe (Mr. Assheton) called him to Order, he was just coming to the end of his speech. He implored Her Majesty's Government to look the question in the face, and feel that they had part in a great war—he would not add of conquest and annexation. He should be happy if the question were dealt with in a large and serious spirit, and the land question made the means of colonization and improvement, instead of jobbery and profit.

Sir HENRY HOLLAND said, he would not attempt to follow the hon. Member who had just sat down (Sir George Campbell), as it required a much cleverer man than himself (Sir Henry Holland) to see any connection between the subjects introduced by the hon. Member and that before the Committee. The institutions of the United States of America on the land question had nothing whatever to do with the question under discussion; but in listening to the hon. Gentleman when he was showing us how to govern Zululand, he was struck with the truth of the old advice "to hatch your eggs before you nurse your chickens." He (Sir Henry Holland), however, rose to correct the statement of the hon. Member for Meath (Mr. Parnell), who said that this country had annexed the Transvaal with a view to the subsequent annexation of Zululand. Nothing was more contrary than this to the view of the Government. The Transvaal was annexed because the Dutch were in constant collision with the Zulus. from which resulted danger to the peace, lives, and property of our Colonists. In April, 1877, after the annexation, we sent to Cetewayo to inform him that in the case of any aggression having been made on his territory we were prepared to have the whole question considered, and the question of disputed territory properly arbitrated upon. This proposition was agreed to, and very able and experienced men were sent to examine thoroughly the question of disputed territory. An award was made, by which we were enabled to hand over to the Zulus a large portion of territory unfairly annexed by the Boers. He (Sir Henry Holland) had, therefore, the right to say that the observation of the hon. Member for Meath as to our reasons for the annexation of the Transvaal was certainly without foundation.

Sir ALEXANDER GORDON would be glad if Her Majesty's Government would state, by way of explanation, to the House what had become of that vast amount of warlike stores prepared last year in view of another war. Of the £3,000,000 voted last year, the sum of £987,500 was spent upon two items under this head. He wished to know why the shot and ammunition, the appliances and warlike stores were not available for the purposes of the war in South Africa? He thought the House was entitled to a statement, showing how the Supplies granted last year were disposed of, and trusted that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, or the noble Lord the Surveyor General of Ordnance (Lord Eustace Cecil), would favour them with an explanation.

Mr. DILLWYN said, that the hon. and gallant Member who had just sat down (Sir Alexander Gordon) had urged the Government to give an explanation of the expenditure of Supplies voted last year. He felt bound to support him in that request. He only wished to add, that he failed to see why the Government had not employed Indian troops in the South African War, as they had recently done in the Mediterranean and at Cyprus. Whether the policy of the Government was right or wrong was an important question; but the present was not the proper time for discussing it. It appeared to him that the House required much fuller particulars in order to be able to form a correct opinion of the war now being waged, and, therefore, that discussion should be delayed until such particulars had been received. He thought that the urgency of the case did not allow of contention in the matter of granting the money asked for; and his only reason for rising was to say that the agreement to the Vote by hon. Members on this side of the House must not be taken as an approval of the general policy of Her Majesty's Government in South Africa. So far as he was able to judge from the information before the House, he thought that Government were not justified in embarking in these wars. As to what fell from the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Stamford (Sir John Hay), he wished to observe that the Zulus appeared to have been unfairly treated in the matter of their award. It had been agreed that the lands, about which the dispute arose, should be restored to them; but it appeared that, in direct opposition to this, we had allowed the Boers to remain in occupation of them.

Mr. MACDONALD quite agreed with the hon. Member for Meath (Mr. Parnell), who had objected altogether to this Vote. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Stamford (Sir John Hay) had stated that they were much indebted to Sir Bartle Frere for his services in South Africa; but in his (Mr. Macdonald's) opinion, they were only indebted to him for having incurred an expenditure which required this Vote of Credit to meet it. He considered that if Sir Bartle Frere had not been there, they should not now be embroiled in this war. He felt bound to enter his protest against it, and regretted exceedingly that the hon. Member for Meath did not press for a division in the matter. If he might be allowed to make the remark, in reply to the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell), who had said that the Government should follow the example of America in the matter of public lands in South Africa, he should say that it would be a baneful day for England when she decided to enter upon such a course. How did they find it in that country? The poor had 160 acres each out West, if they chose to go and select the same and pay taxes upon it. The great Railroad Corporations of the United States had gone to the Legislature and got over 200,000,000 of acres by a system of jobbery unequalled in any country on the face of the earth. He hoped that, whatever might be done in the matter of public lands in Africa when acquired, at least one example would be avoided, and that was that of the United States. The disposal of those lands had been a greater scandal than any other public matter in that country.

MR. WHITWELL said, that the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer seemed not quite to understand the Question which he had put to him. His Question was as to the amount of money in successive years which had been voted for war in Africa.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER intimated that he had not understood the hon. Member's Question in that way.

MR. WHITWELL entirely agreed with the words that had fallen from the hon. Member for Swansea (Mr. Dillwyn); but still it seemed to him that hon. Members must decide for themselves whether this was or was not an unavoidable war. It was certain that during the last few years too much assistance had been rendered to Colonists by Her Majesty's Government. He held that the war was entirely unnecessary, as the Colonies in South Africa ought to defend themselves. He could not understand how the Votes that had been given had been spent or accounted for. In 1876-7, £170,000 was voted by this House for South Africa; in 1877-8, £208,000; in 1878-9, £428,000—of course, that was connected with the affair in the Transvaal. Now, in 1879-80, a Vote was required for £642,000; so that it had gradually increased during the last few years from an almost nominal sum to the present amount of more than £500,000, to conduct a war in a Colony in which it was an acknowledged fact that a war was more expensive than in any other. They had derived no benefit from these wars. They had increased their territory, and that was all. They had little interest in things as they were; but now they hoped to improve the condition of the Natives, not by example of self-government, but by enjoining upon the neighbouring States the necessity of leaving the Natives out in their policy of annexation and aggrandizement, and by those means they hoped eventually to reach the centre of Africa. And, above all, the Government had been asked to commence the system of carrying the legions of India to protect their territories and extend their annexations over every barbarian tribe. He had listened with great attention to what had fallen from the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell); but he failed to hear him say that he hoped this war would prove of benefit to the Natives. He trusted that the matter would be ventilated thoroughly, and that before long they would be able to enter upon a minute discussion with reference to it, and that they would be supplied by Government with Returns of men and money that had been sent to Africa during the last 10 years. He feared, however, that they would find that they had received nothing in return.

MR. CHILDERS said, that beyond question the Vote would be accepted by the House, although, no doubt, on a future occasion, the policy of the war would have to be fully discussed. It would be some time before they would be in possession of sufficiently full information to be able to discuss that question thoroughly in all its bearings. But he rose to call attention particularly to a question which occurred to him when the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer made his Statement before they went into Committee, and which was to be reserved until the discussion on the Vote. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that last Session a sum of £340,000 was voted for operations in South Africa, £40,000 of which would be required for the Navy. But, in addition to this £340,000, £400,000 had been previously spent—in fact, to a great extent, in the financial year 1877-8; and this the Chancellor of the Exchequer only knew by the drafts maturing on the Treasury Chest. The Chancellor of the Exchequer last August warned them that probably it would be found necessary to take a Vote to place this matter in a right position. He (Mr. Childers) wished to point out that thus a very large expenditure had been going on without any Supplementary Estimate, although subsequent expenditure of the same character had been the subject of an Estimate voted six months ago. He thought that no one would deny that such a financial arrangement was very unsatisfactory. He did not wish to blame the Government; but he thought that it was a bad precedent to take Votes in such a manner. What, however, he asked especially was this

—as the £1,500,000 which they were now asked to vote was for the expenditure of the Zulu War, or South African transactions, beginning last October — was it expected that this sum would cover the entire expenditure up to 31st March, which had been incurred either in this country or in South Africa? In other words, whether the amount covered the total expenditure to 31st March; or only those drafts which had up to this time been presented against the Treasury Chest?

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said, he had some real difficulty in answering the question. He thought it would be understood, with reference to last year, that, in the first place, the Government had had no information beforehand for the year ending 31st March, 1878. But inasmuch as an extraordinary expenditure had been going on, it was certain that, sooner or later, an amount would be required to adjust the account of the Treasury Chest from which sums had been drawn. But that amount could only be ascertained when the Government were in possession of full information. At the time he was speaking—at the beginning of August—it was thought that the amount required would be the £300,000 for the expenditure of the Army, and £40,000 for the Navy, and the Government anticipated a further charge for the year 1878-9. A saving had been effected on the several Votes in the Estimate; but what had been expended over the amount saved would require to be voted. He was unable to say what was the amount of actual expenditure; but the War Office had given the Government an approximate account of what had been spent since October, and they estimated the amount to 31st March at £1,000,000. The Admiralty, however, who were able to calculate with greater precision than the War Office authorities, had named £200,000 as the amount they would require. The Government had considered that another £300,000 would be sufficient—probably more than sufficient—to cover contingencies, and on that account they had now asked for a Vote of £1,500,000 to cover all outlay to 31st March next.

Mr. CHILDERS asked whether the Government had taken any steps to ascertain the actual expenditure going on in South Africa?

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER replied, that a financial officer had been sent out to take charge of the matter.

Mr. SULLIVAN: Sir, we find ourselves once again sitting in Committee of the Whole House to vote a war subsidy. I grievously fear that so long as the present occupants of the Treasury Bench retain their places they are determined the Temple of Janus shall not be closed. In the Reading Room of this House, a couple of years ago, Her Majesty's Ministers were kind enough to send up, for the convenience of the Members of the House of Commons, and to hang on the walls, maps of our latest acquisitions and our seats of war. We had maps of Cyprus and the harbours of Famagousta and Limasol, and all the rest of it. Then came the seat of war in Afghanistan, which covered all that remained of the wall; and the other day, when the clerks of the Intelligence Department came to fix up our newest seat of war, it was discovered that we had on hand so many seats of war, that there was no room for any more maps on the wall. Sir, if this sort of thing is to go on, where is it to end? I will tell you, at any rate, that it will not end so long as Her Majesty's Government can have money voted in this House on the excuse that, because we are involved in war, money must be voted to carry it on. It is always too late, or too soon to protest. For my part, I do emphatically protest against what seems to have become a system of plunging us into wars from which our consciences revolt, and then, because the butcher's bill is incurred, we are told that Government must needs have money, that it would be unpatriotic to refuse it. I object to being placed in any such predicament by the conduct of the Government. I know there are hon. Members round about me who will say—"We are as much opposed to this Zulu War as any man can be. We believe it to be an unjust war; but will vote for the money because the country is now engaged in the struggle." I can quite recognize that that is a ground which conscientious men of this House may take up; far be it from me to quarrel with them; but, for my part, I say my conscience recoils from having act, hand, or part in voting a sixpence for a war which I challenge any man in or out of this House to defend on the principles of public equity, if he will only suppose that it is Russia that is waging the war, and not England. I say that no man in this House will dare to apply to such a war the principles which you apply towards elsewhere. If this dusky savage, spear in hand, set forth to defend his home against the Frank, the Russian, or the German, English pens would trace his record of glory, and English poets would sing his fame. We have been reminded of the days of Pizarro, when men, savages perhaps, withstood the civilizing tyrant that came upon their shores. And when we stand in Pizarro's place in South Africa to-day, is no voice to be raised in England better worthy of being heard than mine to say—"I believe this to be an iniquitous and a wicked war. It is one in which I cannot sympathize. It is against all my convictions of right and wrong?" And at what an hour do we find ourselves so far gone in this onward march of aggression—this lust of territory, this greed of annexation? It is at the very moment that you have been contesting the right of a Christian Power to redress Christian wrongs in the East of Europe. You call Russia an aggressive Power, and treat us to homilies on the iniquity of her pushing her frontiers forward. Was ever hypocrisy so gigantic as yours? To call Russia aggressive, when you are reaching out your hands to grasp more territory in every region of the globe by every violation of right. You annex the Transvaal, and it is incontestible that you led this man to believe that you favoured his claims to this strip of land. The British authorities induced him to believe that they would recognize his claim; but no sooner had you annexed the Transvaal, than you turn round upon him in conduct which he calls—and I say justly calls—something very like perfidy. Now, that you are the Rulers of the Transvaal, you say he shall not have what you led him to expect. I wonder where slumbers the public morality of England? I look in vain in the public Press of this country for that voice which ought to speak out, when we read the Ultimatum—that impudent and insolent missive of Sir Bartle Frere. I know of nothing more audacious than the document which was sent to provoke this war; and now the land is agitated from end to end by the story of the terrible disaster in Zulu, and money is being sought here—not for defence of our South African Possessions, but in order to wage a war of vengeance on Cetewayo, and carry sword and flame into his territory. I pay my tribute—and it is all the more honest because it comes from me—to the gallantry and heroism of those soldiers who fell in support of their colours. They served their Queen and their colours well; but while I admire them, I more admire the men, savages though they be, who fell, with their feet on their native soil, defending themselves against invaders. My morality is not cribbed, cabined, and confined by geographical lines. I mete out to the savage the same measure of justice which I do to the more civilized races. Although a man is a savage, we ought not to deny him the degree of praise which is due to his patriotism, as praise was paid to Caractacus and Kosciusko. This Prince stood within his own territories, and he only did what Queen Elizabeth did in the case of the Spanish Armada, when it threatened English soil. He called his forces around him, as she did hers, and said—"I will make the invader bite the dust," and he did so. England, with the £1,500,000 you vote to-night, will doubtless succeed in a war of revenge upon this wretched Zulu Prince. £1,500,000! Why, if the Government had asked for £5,000,000, they would have got it. For my part, if I saw Cetewayo pushing his advantage so far as to invade the territories which do not belong to him, and to endanger the safety of peaceful settlers who are outside his own land, I could sympathize with your military movements; but in so far as he stands in the position of one who is resisting invasion, and is on his own soil, defending his own people and country, for my part I cannot avoid confessing—whatever consequences may follow from my avowing it—that I feel for the savage man, and say he ought to have from us the same admiration that the writers of history have taught us to pay to the men who resisted the Spanish invaders in Central America. I prize very highly the advantages of civilization, and the blessings of civil and religious liberty; but never shall a vote of mine be given to encourage unjust invasion and conquest on the pretext of pushing civilization, or to carry the Bible with the sword, so that rapacity may call its crimes the diffusion of Christianity. No, Sir; I will give no vote to extend this already swollen Empire at the cost of the liberty of these Natives, howsoever dark their skins may be. I protest here to-night against further annexation. I believe if the Representatives of Ireland, or the people of Ireland, had a voice in this question, they would say that the British Empire is wide enough, great enough, grand enough, powerful enough, and rich enough, without sending an Ultimatum to take a rood of ground from Cetewayo. We might leave this dusky savage to himself, and the British ensign would float as proudly from the turrets of Windsor Castle as it does now. Nay; much better and happier might we all be by giving up these aggressive enterprises and costly schemes of aggrandizement. While trade is languishing, and industries are perishing in our midst, and the cry of absolute destitution comes to us from the Midland Counties, £1,500,000 is being asked for from us in order to carry out this most iniquitous war. But all vainly I speak. To-night this money will be voted. I know that well; but I know what verdict will yet be passed on this episode of British history. When the present feeling of resentment has passed away—when passion has cooled, and reason returned—there will arise some Alison, or some Macaulay, or some Lecky, to trace this chapter. They will say it was a reproach to the British Parliament that it had not patriotism enough, or independence enough, to resist this application for money to spend in a war which is as unjust, as wicked, and as wanton, as that which George III. waged—thank God, he waged in vain!—against the liberty-loving people of the American Colonies.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN said, he had listened with a great deal of sympathy to the eloquent words which had fallen from the hon. and learned Member for Louth (Mr. Sullivan). He (Mr. Chamberlain) had studied the Papers which had been presented to the House with reference to the unfortunate war in which they found themselves engaged, and he must say that, as far as those Papers went—as far as the information went which had at present been afforded to Members of the House—he believed that nothing had been produced which justified the war. It appeared to be a war as iniquitous and as unjust as any with which this country had ever been engaged. He, however, felt they were bound, in fairness to the Government, and still more in fairness to those persons in authority who were incriminated in the proceedings, to wait until they had all the information which their friends considered necessary to their defence. They had been assured by the Government that there remained to be produced Papers of the greatest importance; and if he had rightly understood the answer of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Papers which were to be published on Monday would contain all that the Government considered to be essential to the proper consideration of the causes of the war. [Sir Michael Hicks-Beach: I did not say so.] He had understood the right hon. Gentleman to say that there would be further Papers which would have reference to the disaster at Isandula; but that as regarded the causes of the war they should have Papers on Monday that would enable them to come to a right conclusion.

Sir MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: So far as I have them, the hon. Member will have all such Papers by Monday; but there may be other despatches on the way that may be of great importance.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN said, all he wished to urge was this—That until the Government could tell them that they were in possession of all essential documents, it was undesirable to discuss this matter in detail; but as soon as they were in possession of those documents, unless the further documents which were to be produced threw an entirely new light upon the subject, he should be prepared to condemn, as absolutely and as entirely as did his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Louth, the proceedings which, unfortunately, had led the country into war. In his comprehension that was the view of the hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke), who had put a Resolution upon the Paper, which, as he understood, the hon. Baronet was determined to discuss as soon as the full information was before them. Under these circumstances, there only remained the question as to what was to be done with reference to the Vote they were asked to pass that night. It appeared to him that it was one of the misfortunes of all inequitable proceedings, by whomsoever initiated, that while it was very easy to drag this country into war, or to allow it to drift into war, it was not easy to stand still after the mischief had been done. At the present time the result of the action in South Africa had been to place in danger a large number of British subjects, and possibly also the British troops who had been sent over to their assistance; and he did not see how, while holding the Government to their common responsibility in this matter, they could refuse them the resources which they believed to be necessary, not, as he understood, to prosecute a war of revenge, but in order to secure life and property in the Colony which was menaced. Under those circumstances he was prepared to support the Vote, while he reserved absolutely his opinion as to the causes of the war for discussion at another period. Now he was on the subject, he should like to ask a Question of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. When the right hon. Gentleman first introduced the Vote in the House, he understood him to say that the previous war in which they were engaged—the war in Transkei—had finished in July, 1878. He should like to know whether he correctly understood the right hon. Gentleman, and in what sense he meant to represent the war in Transkei as having been entirely concluded? As far as he (Mr. Chamberlain) could judge from the Papers presented to Parliament, he thought that war was only standing over until they had had time to deal with Cetewayo; and at the present moment he understood that one of the dangers with which the Colonies in South Africa were menaced was the possibility that Secoceni might take advantage of our being engaged with Cetewayo and might invade the Transvaal territory. There appeared no certainty whatever that they might not have two wars on their hands at the same time; and he did not understand the confidence with which the Chancellor of the Exchequer told them that the £400,000 which they voted last Session would be sufficient to pay the whole expenses of the war, which, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer said, had been concluded.

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH said, the war in the Transkei was concluded last July. That district was on the borders of Cape Colony, many hundreds of miles from the points at which their troops were now engaged, and still further from Secoceni's country. It was perfectly true that the war with Secoceni might, in a certain sense, be said to stand over; but as he believed this Chief to be but a vassal of Cetewayo's, it might be reasonably hoped that when the Zulu War was concluded little more would be heard of him.

SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL understood that the £1,500,000, if voted at all, was voted for ever; and that it was not a Vote of Credit, detailed Estimates for which would be afterwards furnished. There appeared to be a great discrepancy between the charge for Naval transport and the Military charges; for while the sum of £200,000 only was asked for the former, the latter amounted to the enormous sum of £1,300,000. As the 8,000 or 9,000 men now being sent to the Cape could not arrive till the end of March, it was clear that hardly a farthing of military expense could be incurred on their account; and it appeared that by far the greater part of the £1,300,000 must have been expended in South Africa upon the small force now there. He must express a hope that the Head of the Department concerned would afford some idea of the mode in which the sum in question had been applied.

SIR ALEXANDER GORDON said, he had received no reply to his inquiry about the stores provided last year. He wished to know why the large amount of stores, prepared last year for a war which did not take place, were not now available for the war in which they were engaged? He must beg to have a reply from some Member of the Government.

COLONEL STANLEY said, with regard to the Question of the hon. and gallant Member for Aberdeenshire (Sir Alexander Gordon), as to the amount for warlike stores voted last year, he must ask the Committee to consider the very difficult services their Army had to perform, and the stations which were in question when the Vote was granted. He was speaking without figures and from recollection; but the Committee was, perhaps, aware that undoubtedly a very large amount had been spent for warlike stores—torpedoes, heavy guns, field guns, and stores of that kind. Their present requirements, it must be borne in mind, were of a very special character. For instance, they had sent out guns of the very lightest class that could be manufactured; not 9 or 10-pounders, but guns mounted on special carriages. There were other matters connected with the transport which would also be of very special requirements. He would further remind the Committee that the troops were at great distances from each other in a very difficult country. Again, there were certain questions on which the Government had thought it wise to send out a financial officer to settle accounts, and endeavour to get an audit on the spot, which, although rough-and-ready, would be the best obtainable. Many of the advances which had been made, so far as his opinion went, came out of the Military Chest. His right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer had promised that a careful account should be rendered to Parliament; and he (Colonel Stanley) could say that he desired nothing more earnestly than that every information should be laid before the Committee concerning the items in question at the earliest opportunity.

Mr. O'SHAUGHNESSY said, he thought that, as the sum of £1,500,000 was going to be voted, some view should be taken of the position in which they stood. For the second time they had been brought into war, and asked to vote money for that war, while they were told, if any question was raised as regarded the propriety of voting the money, that their course was unpatriotic, and against the interests of the Colony and country, which were at stake. Such an answer was very unsatisfactory to the people, and was utterly inconsistent with, and opposed to, the Constitution of this country, no matter what might be found in black-letter books on the subject. That they should be hurried into war, and have no discretion left to them but to pay when asked, was a condition of things which could not last very long. Somebody must be fixed with the blame of the Zulu War. The organs of the Government among the Press had been saying for some time that Sir Bartle Frere was the cause of the war. If that was the case, he had committed a great crime, and it should not go unpunished. If the Government made out a case, and threw it upon his shoulders, he must bear the charge; if they did not try to prevent the war, the country would revenge itself upon the Government; but if, on the other hand, Sir Bartle Frere had been made the scapegoat, justly or unjustly, the matter would not be allowed to pass. He would, if nobody else did, place a Notice of impeachment of the Government on the Paper.

Mr. BIGGAR said, it had been stated that the Government were not to blame for this war. Then, if that was the case, and if Sir Bartle Frere was the cause of it, why did they not recall him? It was as clear as noon-day that either the Government at the Cape or at home were to blame for the war. It appeared to him that the hon. Baronet (Sir Henry Holland) was on the horns of a dilemma. He had also raised another point—namely, that arbitration was held, the result of which was in favour of the Zulu King. They decided, it would appear, that the King was perfectly in the right, but that the other party should keep the property. With regard to the mode of carrying on the war, they had recent experience of English warfare in Afghanistan, where the English troops massacred in cold blood a number of prisoners bound and unarmed. That was not, in his opinion, in accordance with the rules of civilized warfare; and he feared they might have further instances of this system in the present war.

Mr. W. H. JAMES inquired whether it would not be possible to have the casualties among the rank and file telegraphed in future, in the case of disaster, as well as of the officers?

Sir MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH said, that as long ago as last summer he had addressed a despatch to the Governors of the South African Colonies, requesting full information in the case of any casualties, and a fortnight ago he had repeated that request to Sir Bartle Frere. He would add one word with regard to what had passed that evening. He had listened to the speeches of several hon. Members, most of whom had said that they would not discuss the policy and causes of the war, and had then entered into an expression of opinion upon one or more points of the subject. There were, no doubt, great differences of opinion thereon; but it seemed to him that the right view had been expressed by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers), when he said that the present was not the time for discussion upon the causes of the war. He would, therefore, only say that he wished to enter his protest against such language as had been made use of by the hon. and learned Member for Louth, who had applied the words "wicked" and "audacious" to the Ultimatum sent to Cetewayo by Sir Bartle Frere. On behalf of Sir Bartle Frere, he must ask even those who were most disposed to blame him, at any rate to hear what he had to say for himself before they condemned him.

MR. CALLAN said, that if the war was wicked and impious, as he believed it to be, they ought to divide upon it. No Party combination ought to prevent them from expressing their opinion on the money Vote. What would be the use of expressing an opinion on the policy of a war after the money was voted?

Vote *agreed to.*

House *resumed.*

Resolution to be reported *To-morrow;*

Committee to sit again *To-morrow.*

MOTION.

ARMY DISCIPLINE AND REGULATION BILL.

LEAVE. FIRST READING.

COLONEL STANLEY: Sir, in rising to move for leave to bring in a Bill to amend the Law relating to the Discipline and Regulation of the Army, I cannot but feel conscious of the difficulty of the task before me, and I cannot but wish that my noble Friend and Predecessor (Viscount Cranbrook), who, in the first instance, had this subject brought under his consideration, were here at this moment, by his clear diction and his strong common sense, to make this somewhat complicated matter clear to the House. I do not propose, at this time of the night, to go back into various questions which might otherwise be of considerable interest, nor to trace from remote ages the manner in which the military law of the country grew up; but there are one or two points to which I must advert to show that even from the earliest times it was found necessary that a short, summary, and stringent law should be applied to such forces as were kept under arms. In early days, of course, the proceedings of martial law were of considerable stringency, but were, at the same time, very well defined. Dating from the earlier days of the courts of chivalry—from almost feudal times—we trace them in the form of the Court of the High Constable and of the Earl Marshal, and in that form passing from the jurisdiction of the Earl Marshal—almost a military office—they continue down to the middle of the 16th century. Then came the time when the absolute government of the Army was over, and the Army was almost entirely administered by Articles of War, framed under the Prerogative of the Crown. When the Court of the High Constable and the Earl Marshal had been extinguished, there was still a necessity for a tribunal to deal with military offences; and in 1625 a Commission was issued to certain military officers and civilians authorizing them to punish military offenders, and he was sorry to say "other dissolute offenders," by martial law. Articles of War were issued for their guidance. Three or more persons constituted a Court, and their sentences required the sanction of the Crown before they could be carried out. These Articles contain an outline of the present system, without the present statutory authority. The first part deals with the martial law; the second with the Articles of War, growing out of it, as they now do out of the Mutiny Act; the third with the court martial to try and sentence offenders; and the fourth with the general confirmation of the sentence before execution. The same necessity for this Court seems to have existed under the Commonwealth as under Royal authority; and in 1642 the then Lord General seems to have found himself under the necessity of strengthening his hands by obtaining summary powers to deal with military offences; and he obtained them, for on the 6th of September, 1642, it is recommended that

> "Special power be given him for the restraining and punishing of disorderly soldiers according to the custom of war;"

and apparently on the very same day the laws and ordinances for the better government of the Army were on his authority framed and confirmed. From time to time military orders and articles for the government of guards and garrisons were issued, and in some cases special commissions were given to Commanders-in-Chief for the framing of Articles of War. Under that system the Army appears to have been administered until we come to something approaching the Mutiny Act in 1689. That was directly traceable to the following incident:—Several regiments which had enlisted under James II. were ordered by William III. to embark for Holland. Eight hundred of the men mutinied, and declared James to be their King, and that they would live and die by him. On the 13th of March leave was given to introduce the Mutiny Bill, and on the 15th the Government, desiring to suppress the soldiers now in rebellion, issued a Proclamation declaring them, and all that adhered to them, rebels and traitors. That Bill passed through all its stages by the 28th, and I hope the Bill I now ask leave to introduce may pass as quickly. It received the Royal Assent five days after, and it came into operation on the 12th of April following. That Bill was contained in 10 sections. The 1st section enabled the Government to punish any officer or soldier

> "Inciting, causing, or joining in mutiny, or deserting the Army, with death or such punishment as by court martial shall be inflicted."

Other sections declared the number and rank of the officers who were to constitute the court martial; section 8 limited the Act and prescribed the form of the proceedings; while the 10th further prescribed that all capital cases should only be tried between certain hours of the day. That Act made no provision for the discipline or government of the Army in minor matters, and made no mention of the Articles of War. Apparently, therefore, the Parliament, by the Mutiny Act, while it strengthened the authority of William III. over the Army by enabling him to punish certain *quasi*-political offences, left the Army in every other respect to be governed by the Prerogative clauses. Further proof of it is shown by the fact that a court martial was held at Exeter in 1696, when certain men were found guilty under the 23rd Article and sentenced to be shot to death. No such section appears in the Mutiny Act. From that time to the present, although there have been important and considerable changes both in the Mutiny Act and in the Articles of War, the same general line has still been followed. There have been Mutiny Acts passed by Parliament, and Articles of War expressed the Prerogative of the Crown, although in later years statutory power is given to these Articles by a Statute passed by this House. But, passing to the more immediate business, I now come to the circumstances under which it is my duty to lay this Bill on the Table of the House. In 1869—whether following or in consequence of the Courts Martial Commission I am not at this moment prepared to say—instructions were given to the Parliamentary Counsel to prepare a Bill to consolidate the law relating to the Army. It was clear that such a step was necessary, for the Courts Martial Commission commented very strongly in their Report on the necessity of drafting the military law in a clearer form. Instructions were accordingly given to Parliamentary Counsel—I believe in the year 1871 an Army Discipline Bill was handed over to Mr. Davidson, the then Judge Advocate General. His untimely death—a death which, I am sure, those Members who were acquainted with him must deeply regret, for he was a person of great judicial power and of large views—was a loss to Parliament at that time, for it put a stop to any further proceedings in relation to the Bill. The subject was again taken up, I believe, by Parliamentary Counsel under instructions from Lord Cardwell in the Autumn of 1872. A War Office Committee, consisting of officers high in the Service, went through a large portion of the Army Discipline Bill in March, 1873, and suggested certain alterations, which, I believe, were introduced at that period by Counsel. Another pause ensued; some of the questions raised by the then recent organization were not settled, and the Secretary of State for War thought it best to postpone the Bill for another Session. During the Vacation of 1873, Mr. Ayrton was appointed Judge Advocate General, and on the 13th of November he took up the subject, and undertook to conduct the Bill through Parliament. He suggested that the Bill should be altogether assimilated to the Mutiny Act, and that the clauses relating to billeting, moving of troops, and enlistment should, so far as they are included in the Mutiny Act, be inserted in the

Army Discipline Bill. Bills were prepared, were submitted to Mr. Ayrton; and he introduced into the Bill, then called the Army Discipline Bill, so much of them as was necessary for the consolidation of the Mutiny Act; but he omitted the enactments of the Army Enlistment Act, 1870, and two other enactments, which had previously found a place in the Mutiny Act. The change which took place at this time in the composition of the House caused us the disadvantage of losing from our discussions on this point the services of Mr. Ayrton; but with a public spirit and good feeling, which is an example to many of us, although both out of office and out of Parliament, he did not relax from his labours until he had thoroughly completed his revision of the Bill and forwarded it to the Parliamentary Counsel, who afterwards reprinted it in the form as he settled it. We then found ourselves in this position. From the time of the Courts Martial Commission—a period of nearly 10 years—the military law had been so far condemned that, although we were anxious to adhere to its provisions, all felt it was in a confused state, and must reasonably be re-drawn. Pressing business before the House prevented the introduction of the Bill by successive Secretaries of State; but it was always felt—and I think that those who were most intimate with the subject have felt it strongest—that, like the dancing bear, of which it was said that the wonder was not that he danced so well, but that he danced at all, the wonder was not that the officers of the Army administered the law as they found it in the Mutiny Act with so little complaint, but that they were able to administer it at all. When, therefore, attention was called to it in the House, it was felt that many of the sections could not be theoretically or practically defended. My right hon. Friend, now Viscount Cranbrook, gave a pledge to the House that at the earliest possible moment he would have the Bill re-drafted; and he expressed his confidence that 1877 would be the last year in which the present form of the Mutiny Act would be submitted to the House. Owing to the force of circumstances, it was found impossible to proceed with the re-drafting of the Bill in 1877. In 1878 the natural desire of the House for the assimilation of the law was more definitely expressed, and a definite statement was made by Viscount Cranbrook during the course of the debate, that he would at once place a Bill before a Parliamentary Committee to be appointed from Members of this House. Then, Sir, came a change in the *personnel* of the War Office, and when I succeeded to my present position I found myself with a Bill which had been making considerable progress, but was, in many respects, far from complete. Notwithstanding the extraordinary efforts of the able Parliamentary Counsel, it was found impossible to lay the Bill before the Committee in a complete form. Indeed, at one time suggestions were made that the Committee should be asked to postpone their sittings; but I felt that a pledge, especially given under such circumstances, should be redeemed at any hazard, and, therefore, I laid the draft before the Committee, without professing that it was a complete measure. They reported upon it; and I am bound to say that their Report seemed to me as favourable, on the whole, as it could possibly be, under the circumstances in which it was presented to them. If I may venture to do so, I should wish to bear my humble testimony and extend my sincere thanks and those of the Government to my hon. and learned Relative opposite (Sir William Harcourt) for the pains and care with which he piloted this Bill through the deliberations of the Committee. In acknowledging his kindness, I am happy to state that, as far as possible, the Bill which I now ask leave to introduce follows the general lines of the Bill laid before the Committee. The Bill was to consolidate and amend the Mutiny Act and the Articles of War; and though I am afraid it looks rather bulky and formidable, I hope hon. Members will not think it unduly so, when they remember that the Mutiny Act contained 110 clauses, the Articles of War 192; and, further, that we have endeavoured, in certain matters, to bring within the scope of the Bill portions of the Enlistment Act. Heavy as the task has been in some respects, it has not been our wish that the Bill should be too much changed in character. A great many alterations take place; but they are mostly in form and construction, although there are some extremely important changes in principle made here and there, upon which I will very briefly touch. It is divided into five parts:—Enlistment, billeting, empressment of carriages, certain miscellaneous provisions, and the application of the Act, together with certain saving clauses and definitions. The first part, again, is sub-divided under the heads—crimes and punishments, courts martial, and execution of sentences. As to the first part—crimes and punishments—we have retained the old language where it is clear, believing it is more easily read and interpreted, its very familiarity to the soldier being a point of some importance. We have, however, taken a distinct departure in one respect, and we now classify offences by grouping together offences of a similar character, ranging the various groups, as between themselves, in a manner which is intended to impress the soldier with their relative importance. Thus we have—first, misbehaviour in the field—the greatest crime a soldier can commit—by sentinel on duty; mutiny and insubordination, by way of showing that, after misconduct in the field, mutiny ranks next; then desertion, absence without leave, disgraceful conduct, drunkenness, and other offences, which I will not detain the House by specifying. With regard to crimes and punishments, these appear to me the chief differences in principle. We have differentiated between offences on active service and those not on active service, active service being, by the way, defined as meaning service in war or when in occupation of an enemy's country. We have farther defined, or attempted to define, desertion, which has been so far extended as to include merely abandoning one regiment for another. We have now endeavoured to restrict it to quitting or deserting the Service. We have found it necessary to set up again, as in one of the earliest Mutiny Acts, the crime of fraudulent enlistment as such, not treating it as desertion, but as a fraudulent breach of an engagement, with a view to a fraudulent contract. The Bill then proceeds to declare a scale of punishments, and in this we follow the precedent of the Naval Discipline Act, making a considerable deviation from the existing practice. At present punishments are constantly designated as "such punishments as a general or other court martial may award." The Bill defines the maximum punishment, and then, under the head "Scale of punishments," provision is made that a court martial may award that or a less punishment. Passing next to courts martial, we have re-arranged the old law, but we have maintained the principle. Now, courts martial will be divided into two classes in respect of the mode in which they are convened. First of all, courts martial are now convened under the authority of the Statute alone; and, secondly, under authority, derived mediately or immediately by Warrant from the Crown. The first class, under Act of Parliament, are regimental courts martial and detachment courts martial; secondly, general courts martial and district courts martial. I should add to these a fifth sort, detachment general courts martial—which can be convened without Warrant—having the powers of a general court martial, but only under special circumstances, for the protection of the life and property of the inhabitants of a country in which the troops are acting. The law will remain unaltered for regimental or detachment courts martial, which will still be convened by Statute; but we do not see the advantage of keeping up the separate name for detachment general courts martial, and we propose to merge it, with its functions, into regimental courts martial, keeping the extraordinary powers merely under the same circumstances which under the former Act rendered extraordinary powers necessary. General courts martial will remain unaltered, the convening authority being, as hitherto, either a Warrant directly from the Queen, or from a person authorized by order from Her. The district court martial has been altered as to the mode in which it is convened. The authority to convene a general court martial we now intend to carry with it, first, the authority to convene a district court martial; and, secondly, to delegate to another officer the power to convene a district court martial. The matter is a little complicated; but the result stands in this way. Practically, every court martial, except a general court martial, will derive authority from the Statute, although in the case of district courts martial the authority will be exercised by a person who has a derivative authority under Warrant of the Crown. There is some difficulty in explaining who are the confirming authorities; but, practically, we have thought it best to allow the law to remain the same under the Bill as it is at present. We have endeavoured, however, to clear up the language, and to make it perfectly intelligible as to who is the confirming authority under the various circumstances in which he has to exercise these functions. The confirming authority for a general court martial is appointed by Warrant; and in case of a district court martial, confirming power is given to the officer having power to convene the court martial. Before we come to the matter of procedure, there is one matter whichdoes not come under courts martial, but so nearly trenches on their functions that I think it better to allude to it here, and point out the reasons which, so long ago as 1869, were urged in favour of the change. The Courts Martial Commission, in their Report, say—

> "It is a question whether the frequency of regimental courts martial does not tend to diminish, in the mind of the soldier, that dread of them which ought to exist if they are to have their proper weight as preventives of indiscipline and crime, and it is submitted for our consideration whether the powers of commanding officers might not be advantageously increased, so as to lessen the number of trials. Some of the evidence was in favour of abolishing regimental courts altogether. We are not prepared to recommend the latter course; but we concur in the view that the jurisdiction of the commanding officer may be safely extended, and we recommend that his power of imprisonment be extended from seven to twenty-one days."

After very careful consideration, we have found it advisable to extend to commanding officers this further power of sentence, recommended by the Commission of 1869, and we have also given the commanding officer the power, as urged upon the House by the hon. and gallant Member for Galway (Major Nolan), that, in the case of a non-commissioned officer, there should be some power given to the commanding officer to deal with offences in a less summary and strict way. At the present time, if a non-commissioned officer comes before the commanding officer charged with any crime there is practically no middle course between sending that officer before a court martial or letting him off, without punishment, altogether, or with merely a reprimand. Under the altered circumstances of the Army, and under the very strong wish we have to obtain good non-commissioned officers, and, when we have got them, to encourage them to remain in the performance of their very arduous duties, we have thought it right to give the commanding officer the power to reduce a non-commissioned officer, by one or more grades, as he shall think fit. I am quite aware there is much to be urged on both sides. Many eminent military authorities hold to the view that a non-commissioned officer who once commits himself has so lost caste that he would never be able to assume a position of authority, and that his reduction to the ranks must ensue. Practically, I am bound to say that the effect of that is that—I do not say in many cases, but not infrequently—a non-commissioned officer obliged to be reduced is, within a very few days, after re-instated. It might not be wise to punish a non-commissioned officer, not altogether, perhaps, for some fault of his own, by putting him down in all cases to the bottom of the list; and, therefore, we have given the commanding officer power to reduce a man one or more grades. But while we give this power to the commanding officer, with a view to diminishing the frequency of regimental courts martial, and so of giving them their proper weight in the maintenance of discipline, we have also given in these two cases the power of appealing from the sentence of the commanding officer to the court. We have not thought it right that the power of forfeiting pay, liberty, or rank should be left, without appeal, in the hands of any one person, however good that person may be. Passing on to the procedure, the first thing I have to mention is, that we have effected an alteration in the form of oath taken by members of a court martial. The Commission pointed out that the present form was very vague and unsatisfactory, and recommended that the oath should be that now used under the Naval Discipline Act. That is a very simple form, and it amounts to this—that the officers are sworn to try and determine the charge under the provisions of the Act of Parliament. Another important alteration suggested by the Courts Martial Commission we have thought it advisable to carry out—that where there is a verdict of acquittal on all the charges, that acquittal shall be pronounced in open court. At the present time, until the finding of a court martial is approved the prisoner, even although there may be a verdict of acquittal, is detained in custody, sometimes owing to inevitable circumstances, for a considerable period. We think that justice will be better done by the discharge of the prisoner at once, where the acquittal extends to all the charges. Of course, in cases where there is only a partial acquittal, the detention will still continue. We have also taken power to the courts—as in the Naval Discipline Act—to find a prisoner guilty of a less grave offence than that with which he is charged. For instance, a prisoner charged with stealing may be found guilty of embezzlement or fraudulent misapplication, according to the circumstances. With regard to penal servitude, we have, I am sorry to say, been obliged to recognize the absolute necessity which exists in the Army, as at present constituted, for some punishment more severe than mere imprisonment. Although the subject has received our very careful consideration, we have not found ourselves at liberty to remove from the Bill the punishment of penal servitude in certain cases. But we have laid down that it is only to be carried out in the same manner as sanctioned in the United Kingdom; and, in the majority of instances, that will really amount to penal servitude being carried out in this country. With regard to imprisonment, we have also taken into consideration that which, I venture to say, was, no doubt, I will not say an abuse, but a wrong use of a former system, and we have endeavoured to provide that punishment shall not be cumulative beyond a certain extent. I confess this is a subject on which I have, perhaps, more doubt than any other portion of the Bill. We know that soldiers are not always to be dealt with by kind treatment alone; and though I believe, in the majority of cases, that is the way to deal with them, yet there are a certain number of men who must be in fear of a sufficient punishment in order to keep them within proper and reasonable control. We thought it right to limit the period of imprisonment to the maximum of two years. We have also given power to the courts martial, who do not appear hitherto to have possessed it, in certain cases where offences have been committed from insanity to find a special verdict that the prisoner is insane, and he will then be ordered to be detained during Her Majesty's pleasure. I have now spoken of the chief measures of procedure, and I propose to pass to another subject of considerable importance — that of enlistment. The Bill, as now drawn, makes certain changes, slight though they may be in form, in the Reserve Act, and these I think it necessary to bring to the notice of the House. When the Reserve Act was brought in, there are those who will remember the discussion which took place, and how, rather as a matter of compromise than otherwise, the limitation of service was introduced in the Bill, and it was prescribed that a soldier should serve not less than so many years with the Colours previous to his subsequent service in the Reserve. We have now taken greater powers of elasticity in many ways. We have taken power to enlist men for a less period than 12 years, although not wholly for Army service; and we also take power to the Secretary of State to allow a man to enter the Reserve, though he had not served in the Army for three years. It was thought at that time that three years were necessary as a minimum, and that a man could not be trained as an efficient soldier in less. But it was altogether left out of sight that in these days, when men enlisted early, they must be passed through all their stages of service before they had reached years of decrepitude. There might be circumstances under which you may wish to bring back into the Army, to pass him into the Reserve, some man who has served with credit in the Army before. The cases were not infrequent during last spring, when men, thoroughly trained soldiers, would produce their discharge, and being still within the ages for enlistment, would offer themselves for service in the Army. We had to take them as soldiers without the power we should otherwise have exercised of passing them through the ranks and into the Reserve. That power we propose to take, and I hope it will be of advantage to the Service. We have also taken corresponding power with the view of clearing up a point as to which there was some doubt. At present there is some doubt whether a Reserve man can volunteer for service. We should be, on all occasions, anxious to employ a Reserve man, to have the Army assume its largest dimensions; and there are other occasions when, if men are anxious to come forward for actual service, there may be strong reasons for employing them. Even with the proceedings of last week in remembrance, there are many occasions on which we should be glad to have them back. What was intended was, no doubt, a good object—to keep the Reserve locked up for national emergency. But we hope that these great emergencies, which justify calling out the Reserves, will only occur occasionally; whereas there may be many occasions when strong drafts are wanted, and then it may be desirable to employ men who come forward with their own consent. We have thought it worth while sacrificing something of the Reserve in order to use these men. We make also an important change in the enlistment. It is a difficult subject for those who are not familiar with it; but I trust I shall make it clear, as far as I can. From time immemorial enlistment has been held to consist in the passage of a coin, usually a shilling, given by the recruiter to the recruit. Men, too, often were enlisted in a state when they were ignorant of what they had done; and having regard also to the circumstance that a man might engage for the greater portion of his lifetime to serve the Crown, the law thought it right to interpose a delay of not less than 24 hours, or more than 96, before the man could go before a magistrate and complete the forms which we recognize under the term attestation. He is asked certain questions as to his age, married or single, whether he has served before, and so on. He is bound, under penalty, to reply to these accurately, and he is then attested in the presence of the magistrate for the Service. But in these days, when recruits are pretty well awake to what they are doing, we do not see any reason why we should not alter this, do away with the enlistment shilling, and make the attestation before the magistrate the real enlistment. What will happen, therefore, will be this. The recruit engages himself to the recruiter to appear before the magistrate. When taken there he, presumably, must be in a fit state to enter into a contract, and then and there without further delay before the magistrate he will enter into a regular contract of service. This will have the advantage of preventing that disagreeable beginning of a soldier's service which is not really the fault of the men but the system. We say a man shall not be attested for 24 hours, but we do not give him the privileges of a soldier; we do not give him a billet, or any place in barracks; but we keep him hanging about, often in very discreditable localities, until the following morning, when he comes up before the magistrate. We think, on the whole, that it would be better to balance the thing fairly. We think that the recruit is wide awake enough to see that the attestation before the magistrate is what he is bound to. At present, if he wishes to be off his bargain between the time he receives the shilling and the attestation, he pays smart money of about £1. We intend to alter that. If a recruit, between the time when he first meets the recruiter and the time he is to present himself for attestation, chooses to disappear, that is a matter to be settled between him and the recruiter who enlisted him. The real contract will begin from the attestation, and from that time he will become, to all intents and purposes, a soldier, and subject to the privilege of being at once brought into barracks, and removed from the evil communications I have mentioned. Then, after attestation, a soldier can at present only obtain his discharge as an indulgence, and he pays, in most cases, a sum amounting to about £20. I think there is no injustice in giving a man the power to claim his discharge at any time within three months of his enlistment, not as a favour but of right, on repayment of what we fairly estimate the cost he has put the country, amounting to about £10. He will claim that not as an indulgence but as a right, and no doubt many men who have changed their minds and find the Service different to what they expected, and who can do better in civil life, will avail themselves of this right we propose to give them. Well, then, I come to another portion of the Bill which, simple though it may look, is of very great importance. We feel at this moment that there are many men in prison whose lives are passing away discreditably to themselves and uselessly to their country. If, by any means in our power, we can render these men useful soldiers, it is our duty to do so; and I, therefore, propose to ask for power to transfer men under sentence for certain crimes for general service. We shall not do it lightly, or where the punishment is such as a light sentence from courts martial; but we do feel that there are many cases of desertion, and other crimes, which have really arisen from young men being led away into bad company; and we think, in the present days of short service, there is little injustice in calling upon a man to fulfil part of his term in an engagement, not in this country but in some one of her Dependencies. Many men get into temptation in this country who, in many cases, I believe, will own themselves unable to keep out of it, who will, nevertheless, in the Colonies or in India turn out good soldiers. We have also taken power, under certain circumstances, to allow a man to be moved from his regiment as a prisoner. When regiments are sent abroad drafts have to be obtained, and some men, whether by carelessness or in some cases perhaps with intent, manage to get into trouble just before their draft or regiment leaves, and instead of going with it, and performing their duty, they have to be left behind in prison. We propose that, under certain circumstances, men may be removed as prisoners with their regiment, giving power to liberate them on the voyage, or subsequently, so enabling them to wipe away their disgrace and return to the colours. We think this is fair to the men all round. It throws the work upon those who would wish to shirk their duty, and relieves the good soldier from the duty otherwise unfairly thrust upon him. At present, a soldier forfeits his service for the time when he is passing under imprisonment, or detained for trial, or is a prisoner of war. Well, we propose to remove these forfeitures; but we provide that the soldier guilty of desertion or of fraudulent enlistment, or of becoming a prisoner of war without due cause, shall forfeit all prior service. It sounds severe; but desertion is so formidable that, feeling the responsibility of what I do, I am bound to ask the House to give us sufficient power to deal with it; but otherwise we do not intend to forfeit service for any kind of imprisonment, or for not performing duty. The fact is, curiously enough, under present circumstances, the man who is constantly losing service for being in prison is really very often approaching the end of his sentence almost in a retrograde manner. The soldier who has enlisted for six years, and has spent one in prison, has seven years, under present circumstances, to serve before he can get his discharge, or be removed from the Army. We think that is treating it in the wrong way, because it causes us to keep a bad man when we would rather replace him by a good one. We intend, then, that prison service shall no longer be barred, but shall run on exactly as if he were in the ranks. That enables us to prevent the ranks from becoming clogged with men we want to get rid of. I am happy to say, also, that the state of the recruiting market is such as to enable us to pick our men, and to get good men to replace the bad. We have made re-engagement a matter of indulgence. We find, practically, that very often re-engagement leads to loss, and we intend to allow it only as a matter of indulgence, and we do not intend to give it as a matter of right. With regard to old soldiers left at the depôt when the regiment goes abroad, we propose to take power when a man is within two years of his time, or when he is unfit for foreign service, not merely to transfer him to the home battalion, but, if we think fit, to transfer him prematurely to the Reserve. With regard to the laws of billeting, we have not introduced any very considerable change; but we have assimilated the English and Irish laws, which formerly differed to a very great extent. I do not think it necessary to keep up in Ireland what does not exist in England; and I propose that billeting in private houses there shall be given up. In respect to taking carriages on an emergency, and when necessary for the public use, we have endeavoured to bring the law more into harmony with the times in which we live; but, at the same time, we do not feel ourselves altogether free to part with the power of billeting, or of taking carriages. We have also settled the mode in which the route is to be issued; and we have endeavoured to define the position of that person who has been alluded to in Acts of Parliament for 100 years, but has never before existed in real life—the billet master, or civil authority of billets. We now come to the application of the Act. There is one point upon which there has always been a difference of opinion, and it is a subject of considerable difficulty; but I have not thought it my duty to shrink from endeavouring to interpret the law in respect to it. There has always been a question whether half-pay officers were under the Act or not. The words of the Act are "commission or on pay." As they receive pay, no doubt they do come under the terms of the Act. It has always been held to be vague, and the application has never been carried into effect within recent times, although I am advised that it is applicable. But the House will bear in mind that there is a new class of half-pay officers growing up, or rather a class who are very much in the position of half-pay officers—namely, persons who, by their own choice, have chosen to retire with a pension, that pension carrying with it a liability to a call for service under certain limits of age. We do not think it right that an officer, who served yesterday and may serve to-morrow, should be able entirely to throw aside his military status. If he chooses the position at his free option, we think it not too much to ask that the man who wears the uniform of the country and receives its pay should be so far subject to military law that it can deal with him in cases of grave misconduct. It is a subject which must always be one of some doubt, and I approach it myself, I confess, with diffidence. But I feel strengthened in the view I take by feeling that there are many officers who are placed in a similar position, and to whom I will refer a little later on in connection with the Auxiliary Forces. We define generally the Regular Forces as officers and men who are continuously serving. It will be borne in mind that Viscount Cardwell's Act of 1871 place the Auxiliary Forces, of whatever nature, when training and exercising with the Militia or Regular Forces, under the Mutiny Act. We provide under this Bill, also, that whenever the Militia and the Volunteers are brigaded with the Regulars, that in relation to military law they shall be placed in precisely the same position. Viscount Cardwell's Act recognizes the Auxiliary Forces as coming in direct relation to the Army, as it was then understood. They form part of the general Land Forces, and, when together, should be brought under the same discipline. We think it right to be consistent, and we think where Forces are so much intermingled it is advisable to recognize the fact, and to place the Militia and the Volunteers upon precisely the same footing as officers and men of the Regular Army, when they are attached to them. A Volunteer, then, while serving with the Regular Forces—which is entirely at his own choice—shall become liable to this Act, exactly as if he were the soldier whose duty he is anxious to undertake. We propose, also, subject to due inquiry and satisfactory assurances that they will discharge their duty with ability and discretion, as we enable Regular officers to serve upon courts martial upon Volunteers and Militia, to enable, at the discretion of the general officer, Militia and Volunteer officers to be members of courts martial for the trial of officers and men of the Regular Service. It is difficult to define, and many people will doubt the wisdom of this course; but it is accepted by the highest military authority, and those who are most conversant with the discipline of the Army have not hesitated to give to this principle an unqualified adhesion. My noble Friend associated with me at the War Office, and my hon. and gallant Friend the Financial Secretary, state that, so far as they can ascertain, the Volunteer Forces are quite as willing as the Militia were to see themselves placed on this footing of liability, and that they would accept the liability and the position offered to them in connection with the Regular Forces. The Regular Forces are those officers and soldiers who are on continuous military service; the Reserve Forces are the Forces raisable under the Army and Militia Reserve Acts; the Auxiliary Forces are the Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers. These constitute the various branches of the Land Forces, or the Army generally; and the differences existing between them are defined by their conditions of service. The Regular Forces are engaged to devote the whole of their time to the service of Her Majesty; the Reserve Forces become, when called upon, a substantial part of the Regular Forces; the Militia engage to give a limited portion of their time, and they are not compellable to serve out of the United Kingdom; while the Volunteers and Yeomanry engage to give their services only in case of an invasion, or a dread of invasion, or for purposes of training and instruction. In the Repeal Bill, which it will be necessary to introduce as a matter of form, I propose, with the assent of the House, to eliminate that provision which places the Yeomanry in a rather invidious position —namely, their special liability to be called out in case of civil disturbance. We see no reason in these days why the Yeomanry should not serve for the purpose for which their supply was voted in the Estimates, and why they should not take their proper place, which is to serve as Light Cavalry, and to act as part of the Army of the country. We propose to place them upon the same footing as the Volunteers, and to relieve them from the very onerous and invidious position in which they are now placed by the existing Act. When any of these men come up on actual military service this Bill regards them as soldiers to all intents and purposes. We have only made more clear that which the House assented to under Viscount Cardwell's Act; but we put it on a footing which we hope will not be misunderstood by the country, and will be appreciated by those to whom it refers. I am anxious that this Bill should be brought in. It is a matter of too great length to explain in all its provisions; but I am sure the House will far better understand the Bill from having it before them, and I only wish that I had been able to place the matter more clearly. The amount of matter was, however, so great, and the Bill was of such an extent, that I felt the shorter and more explicit I could make my statement the better. One word I would like to say, and I trust it will not be in the slightest degree misconstrued as being anything whatever in the nature of putting undue pressure on the House. This Bill, though of some dimensions, with the exceptions which I have stated, is practically a revision and a codification of the existing law. The House, as distinctly as it could affirm anything without an actual vote, declared that it was unwilling again to pass the Mutiny Act in its present form. I do not suppose that even those who might oppose it most would wish that the Army should be left without any discipline, or without any regulation. I cannot but feel that it will be my duty, though I should be loth to do it, if we cannot get well forward with this Bill, to propose a short Bill, continuing the existing Mutiny Act for a short space of time. Considering the very strong objections taken to the existing Bill by hon. Gentlemen above and below the Gangway upon the opposite side of the House, and by many hon. Members behind me, I felt it was my duty, as early as possible, to lay this Bill upon the Table of the House. I do not wish to speak of myself, although I have spared no effort in this matter; but I am bound to say that not one single moment has been lost by the very able Parliamentary counsel, by my Colleagues, and by my advisers. Through the summer time and the winter to the present day they have been unremitting in their efforts; and I felt I must not shrink from endeavouring to place it as early as I could before the House. I have done my utmost to redeem the promise given by my Predecessor. I am anxious that the present Mutiny Act should not be passed again in its present form; but, on the other hand, I must lay the matter frankly before the House. Unless we can pass this Act in a reasonable time, it will be necessary to apply for a short Bill to continue the Mutiny Act. It is a course I should deprecate, because it is asking the House to stereotype, for a further period, a law they were at that moment condemning. Without putting any undue pressure on the House, I think it right to indicate the position in which we stand, and now I must leave the Bill to recommend itself. I have not attempted to recommend it by any extraneous support, or by any attempt at bringing highly-coloured illustrations of matters of sentiment into connection with it. It is a strict matter of business; and I have endeavoured, I hope not altogether without success, to place it before the House in a business-like manner. I have only to express the hope that the House will see that this is not a matter of Government or of Party, but of business, will deal with it in a business-like way, and in a manner becoming its own duty.

Motion made, and Question proposed,

"That leave be given to bring in a Bill to amend the Law relating to Discipline and Regulation of the Army."—(*Mr. Secretary Stanley.*)

Sir WILLIAM HARCOURT said, he had no voice to support his right hon. and gallant Friend at any length; but he wished to say that he agreed fully with the observation that this was no question of Party. He was sure that his right hon. and gallant Friend would receive from both sides of the House all the assistance he desired in carrying so desirable a measure to its completion.

SIR ALEXANDER GORDON asked what was to be done with respect to the Articles of War?

COLONEL MURE said, there was one thing which he had not heard mentioned. It was one of the recommendations of the Committee that a check should be put on the power of revising officers to increase the sentences awarded by courts martial. He hoped that the point would be dealt with in the new Bill.

MAJOR NOLAN observed that there was no concealing the fact that the Bill would greatly strengthen the hands of the Crown and of the War Office. The Bill could be divided into two parts—namely, the administrative and judicial portion. The administrative part, which dealt with re-enlistment and the re-engagement of the Reserves and soldiers going on foreign service, seemed to be excellent; but, as to the second part, which included the alterations proposed in judicial matters—such as altering the number of cases in which soldiers could be tried by the commanding officer, and in giving commanding officers greater powers, and in bringing fresh classes under the scope of the Act—they were all subjects which would require great consideration, and he was afraid they were contrary to existing usage. He might observe that, in his opinion, the appeal given to a soldier from the decision of his commanding officer to a court martial would be altogether illusory.

MR. PARNELL thought the preferable course to adopt under the circumstances would be to allow the old Mutiny Acts to stand for another year rather than to run hastily through a Bill like the present. This was the more necessary, as the present Bill was not intended for one year only, but as an Act to be enforced by a sort of continuous Act from year to year. He would venture to point out to the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War that he could hardly ask the House to pass a Bill of such a complicated character as this, involving such great changes, and such points of detail, in the limited number of Sittings at the disposal of the Government between that time and the 26th of April. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman had hinted that if there was not sufficient time to pass the Bill he would propose to continue by a short Act the present Mutiny Act. In his opinion, that would be a course much open to objection, for there were great Constitutional reasons why the present Mutiny Bills should not be continued by a continuous Act. But still, if the right hon. and gallant Gentleman was really determined to carry out this Bill during the present Session, and to give the House full opportunities for discussion, he could see no reason why there should not be a general understanding that the Army and Marine Mutiny Acts of last year should not be passed without opposition. But unless some pledge were given by the Government, it would be a very questionable course, for it was not probable that there would be time to carry this Bill by the 26th of April. If, however, by a common understanding, the Government were allowed to pass the old Mutiny Acts without opposition, and afterwards, in pursuance of their pledge, to proceed to make the best Act possible out of the materials which had been furnished, every object would be attained.

SIR HENRY HAVELOCK, having listened very attentively to the interesting and lucid statement of the Secretary of State for War, thought the right hon. and gallant Gentleman was perfectly correct in saying that the alterations proposed followed very closely the suggestions and representations made by the Committee over which the hon. and learned Gentleman (Sir William Harcourt) so ably presided. He could not exactly enter into the objections of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Meath (Mr. Parnell), nor, he confessed, could he understand the course he proposed. It appeared to him that at the various Sittings of the Committee he had had an opportunity of raising all the questions, which, no doubt, the hon. Member would give them an opportunity of hearing again in that House. He thought that if this Bill were at once printed and circulated, the necessity of adjourning the matter for another year would not arise.

MR. PARNELL said, that he did not propose any such course; all he meant to say was that they could do with the old Acts until this Act could be passed, and when passed it should at once supersede the old Acts.

Sir HENRY HAVELOCK would repeat his suggestion that if the Bill were printed and circulated at once, then, between the present time and the 26th of April, hon. Members would have every opportunity of raising objections and making Amendments. He believed that long before that date the Bill could be worked into an effective Act. He wished to say, with regard to the proposed alterations now announced, that he could not express his entire concurrence with them, nor did he endorse every principle laid down. There was one point, in particular, with which he could not at all agree. He alluded to the changes in the position of half-pay officers; for he was not prepared to say whether the alterations suggested with regard to those officers would not make a grave and material alteration in their Constitutional position. But nearly all the alterations enumerated by the Secretary of State for War were in the direction of recognizing fraudulent re-enlistment as a breach of a commercial contract instead of an offence for which there should be a great punishment, and such alterations were decidedly in the right direction. More especially, he thought, that the power of giving soldiers, who might have been misled into desertion, an opportunity of retrieving their character by serving faithfully abroad was a step that would recommend itself to the House. He did not intend to take up the time of the House by dwelling on the various points; but would only say that, with the alterations now proposed, the old Acts might be converted into a good, wise, and humane law.

Major O'BEIRNE said, that as a Member of the Committee he must state his opinion that the Report made by it was both incomplete and unsatisfactory. Various important suggestions were made by different Members of the Committee which were hardly listened to; and hon. Members making those suggestions were repeatedly told that, owing to pressure of time, there was no opportunity of taking proper evidence. Amongst the suggestions made was one raising the important question as to whether a Court of Inquiry should be placed under well-defined rules, and also whether there should be courts of appeal to refer the decisions of courts martial to. There were several other important questions, intimately connected with this Bill, which were not listened to. He might mention that as to whether the Commander-in-Chief should be placed under the five years' rule or not, the present Commander-in-Chief had been 20 years at the head of the Army; and it was a most important matter to decide whether or not he ought to be placed under the five years' rule. For his part, he did not see why any distinction should exist in his case. He thought the Committee should be re-appointed, to discuss these and other very important questions.

Colonel STANLEY: I will endeavour to answer, to the best of my power, the various questions which have been addressed to me; but I must first thank the House for the very courteous manner in which they have received my statement. With regard to the question of the hon. and gallant Gentleman (Sir Alexander Gordon), I have to say this—we have preserved in the new Bill all the powers of the Crown contained in the former Mutiny Act. As a matter of fact, when we came to specify the different crimes, it was found of so little practical advantage to specify the Articles of War side by side with the statutory provisions, that we have only referred to them. I do not say that under no circumstances will a change be made; but I think, as a matter of fact, we should be content with keeping the power. I think that it is right, in a Bill of these dimensions, not to allow any matters to be unnecessarily introduced; but wherever any powers exist in any Article they will not be allowed to fall into desuetude. With respect to the question put by the hon. and gallant Member for Renfrewshire (Colonel Mure), we have not given distinct instructions in the Bill as to courts martial; but, as the hon. and gallant Gentleman is aware, some matters cannot properly find a place in the Statute, but will have to be dealt with by regulations. The regulations will be brought under the notice of the House, and will then admit of challenge. I am afraid of addressing the hon. and gallant Member for Galway (Major Nolan) in his absence, and cannot, therefore, perfectly reply to his question. I may say, however, that I hope he will find his fears as to the power of commanding officers, and as to bringing other classes under the power of the War Office, altogether fallacious, and that the change proposed will prove beneficial. With regard to the proposal of the hon. Member for Meath (Mr. Parnell), I confess that I am placed in a position of some difficulty. It is clear that if the Army is not to be left without any Discipline Bill whatever, you must have either the existing Bill or some other. No man had more objections to the existing Act than the hon. Member for Meath; and I thought that he, above all men, would have been glad to welcome any change. But if we do not pass this Bill before the present Mutiny Act expires, it is obvious we must have some provision for carrying on the government of the Army. I expressly guarded myself from putting any undue pressure on the House; although I did express a hope that we might make such progress with the Bill as to render the continuance of the present Mutiny Bill unnecessary. In answer to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Sunderland (Sir Henry Havelock), I may say that it is perfectly impossible to explain all the different points of this Bill in a limited time—and I wish the Bill to explain itself as soon as possible. With respect to the question of half-pay officers, I admitted that though I have done my best to adopt what I believe to be a course consistent with the existing law, and in accordance with the altered circumstances under which officers now retire, yet I am in a position of some difficulty; and I have no doubt considerable good will result from a discussion being raised upon the question in this House. With regard to the observations of the hon. and gallant Member for Leitrim (Major O'Beirne), I must say that I do not see what good would be likely to result from the re-appointment of a Committee for the purposes of the Bill. I do not think it came within the purview of that Committee to deal either with the tenure or the limit of Staff appointments. I think I have now answered the questions put to me; but I ought, perhaps, to have stated that this Bill technically—even when passed into law—will have no force except as representing a code of discipline for the Army. In that respect I hope it will be, more or less, permanent; but it will receive annual force, and be brought under the notice of Parliament, from year to year, by an annual Army Discipline and Regulation Act—a short Bill, reciting the number of men voted in the first Vote of the Estimates, and adopting this Bill and giving it effect until such time as the annual Act itself will expire. I trust I have answered the various questions put to me; and I hope there will be other opportunities granted on further progress of this Bill, when I shall be able to give fuller explanations.

MR. BIGGAR wished to say one word on behalf of his hon. Friend the Member for Meath (Mr. Parnell). What he wished to convey was that if there was not sufficient time to pass this Bill before the 26th of April then that the present Mutiny Bill should be renewed, subject to a pledge by the Government to give sufficient time to push this Bill through during the remainder of the Session. Then, so soon as this Bill became law, the old Mutiny Act should be dropped, and the new one take its place. In that way there would be a Bill of some sort; and at the earliest possible moment an amended Act would become law.

COLONEL STANLEY: I think I quite understood the point which was raised by the hon. Member for Meath; but it is necessary we should bear in mind that there are other parties to be considered besides those sitting in this House—namely, the officers and men of the Service—and we must have this Bill in their hands by some definite date, so that they may know the law under which they are acting. We have two alternatives—the one to confirm the present Bill, and the other to pass a better Bill to supersede it. I confess I see little advantage in taking up the time, which might be well occupied in passing this Bill through Committee, in passing the present Mutiny Act. It would be far preferable to add a clause to the present Mutiny Act that it should exist only to the end of the Session. What we want is one Mutiny Act, and not three.

Question put, and *agreed to.*

Bill *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. Secretary STANLEY, Mr. Secretary CROSS, Mr. WILLIAM HENRY SMITH, and The JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL.

ORDERS OF THE DAY.

—⟜○⟜—

ASSIZES BILL.—[Bill 83.]

(*Sir Matthew Ridley, Mr. Secretary Cross.*)

COMMITTEE.

Order for Committee read.

Sir HENRY JAMES said, that although he supported the Bill—the object of which was to give effect to a wish expressed by the House in relation to the Assizes Act of 1876—yet there were one or two practical disadvantages to the present Assize system. He was encouraged by the fact that the right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary was amenable to suggestions to point out to him the matters to which he referred. The House was aware that this Bill carried into effect what had already been sanctioned by the Assizes Act of 1876, and practically carried out the expression of opinion of this House, that it was desirable that no prisoner should be kept in custody untried for more than the space of three months. He should give his most cordial support to the Bill; but there were one or two practical objections to the system of centralization which it effectuated. The object of centralization was solely for the purpose of economizing judicial power; and if there were more judicial power, he did not think that anyone would wish the system of centralization to be carried out. It was desirable that prisoners should be tried in the counties where their crimes were committed, inasmuch as it brought home the administration of justice to the criminal classes, and had a good effect upon the community. The trial of prisoners in their own counties had a good effect also upon those concerned in the administration of justice—as the magistrates—and he knew of no class which benefited by the removal of prisoners from their own county, except the public, by the fact that judicial power was economized. As matters remained at present, there were no means of carrying out the opinion of the House, except by the system of centralization. But the practical objections that occurred to that system were worthy of consideration. Prisoners were, before conviction, supposed to be innocent, and it was, no doubt, desirable that they should be left as short time as possible in prison untried. But the system of centralization produced some evils. The effect of removing a prisoner a distance from the county where he had committed his crime took away some of his means of defence, and removed him from the persons who could come forward to help him. He had to take with him all his witnesses—perhaps the clergyman of his parish—to testify to his character; and as he could not, as a rule, pay his witnesses, it could not be expected that volunteer witnesses would give up their time to go long distances in order to testify to his character. The result was that prisoners went to trial without the witnesses whom they would have had if tried in their own county town. That was an injury inflicted upon those very persons for whom this system of Assizes had been established. Again, when before the magistrates, a prisoner, no doubt, employed a solicitor to defend him; but when tried hundreds of miles off, his solicitor could not conduct his defence, and thus prisoners were frequently left undefended at their trial. Therefore, those persons, for whose interests these Acts were passed, were sent to a distance from places where their offences had been committed without witnesses and without legal advice or assistance. Another matter which fell heavily on those concerned he would call attention to. No doubt, the Government might say they had done something to mitigate this evil by giving an allowance of £20, if a Judge certified to that effect. But that did not apply to witnesses to character, to whom no compensation was given. It was a great practical evil, and had been drawn to his attention by persons who had been witnesses, that when prisoners were sent to trial, witnesses for the prosecution had to attend, frequently under circumstances of great hardship. Amongst the witnesses were married women with families, and girls under 15 years of age; and to those persons the only allowance made was for their own expenses for travelling and for keep. Although the distance might be from the Welsh side of Monmouthshire to Gloucester, they had to travel without anyone to take charge of them, and to stop for days in a strange town where they knew no one, because the only expenses allowed to such witnesses were for themselves, and not for anyone to accompany them. No doubt, this was a small matter; but to those people on whom it fell it became a great grievance.

It would be better for the House to take notice of this small matter, and prevent the hardship from arising. He had been told of an instance where a whole family were kept nearly a week in a town, and the only money paid to them was to one member of the family as a witness. No doubt, so long as the judicial strength remained where it was, this system of centralization must be adopted; but he hoped that it would not be carried into effect, except where absolutely necessary. It had an evil effect, both upon the public, by reason of removing the administration of justice from before their eyes, and upon prisoners and witnesses in subjecting them to hardships.

VISCOUNT EMLYN wished to know whether, if the Bill passed, the full Winter Sessions could be abolished? He had understood that it was not intended to abolish them.

SIR MATTHEW WHITE RIDLEY observed, that the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Taunton (Sir Henry James) had only done justice to his right hon. Friend the Home Secretary in stating that he had endeavoured to carry out the grouping of counties in such a manner as to minimize the inconveniences which must of necessity attend the system, and so to give effect to the expressed wish of the House that prisoners should not remain untried for more than three months. No doubt, some disadvantages resulted from the system of centralization. But if, in some cases, witnesses had to go a considerable distance, yet, at the present time, they had frequently to go as great a distance when trials took place in their own counties. To meet the expenses incurred, an allowance of £20 was made. He must also observe that the object of these Acts was not only to economize judicial power, but to save also the time of sheriffs, jurors, and other persons necessarily concerned in the transaction of judicial business. The House would see that this Bill was a necessary sequence to the principle laid down by the House—that no prisoner should remain in custody for a longer period than three months.

MR. PAGET remarked that the Bill provided that the Winter Assize Act of 1876 should be construed as if it were therein enacted, with the substitution of Spring Assizes for Winter Assizes, and of the months of March, April, and May, for the months of November, December, and January respectively. He should like to know whether the Act was to extend the Winter Assizes into those months of the Spring?

MR. ASSHETON CROSS said, it was clear that the Bill enabled the Judges to hold four Assizes in the year by groups of counties. The months were purposely omitted, in order to make that possible; and it would be impossible for that to take place if they kept the Assizes to the Winter. This Act was passed to enable them to hold Assizes in two or three other months. The Judges were now framing a scheme for the regulation of Assizes, by which those for criminal and civil business were to be held early in the year, and criminal Assizes only were to be held in the Spring.

Bill *considered* in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

VISCOUNT EMLYN observed, that in his county (Carmarthen) the Spring Assizes were held in January. He wished to know whether, under this Bill, a power would not be given to abolish either or both of the full Assizes now held in every county, and to substitute for them Assizes for a union of counties. He hoped that words would be inserted in the Bill to make it clear that this would not be done.

SIR HENRY JAMES said, that, as he understood, the Assizes in which civil and criminal business took place were to be held in the counties; but that the criminal business only was to be held elsewhere. With reference to the Spring Assizes being held in January, that only occurred through the old Winter Assizes being carried over Christmas. If there was any doubt, it could be put at rest by providing, upon the Report of the Bill, that only two Assizes should take place out of the counties.

MR. PAGET suggested that a provision should be inserted carrying into effect the regulation that two distinct holdings of Assize should be held in the counties.

MR. ASSHETON CROSS did not think that any difficulty could arise with regard to the Bill on the point suggested; but he would undertake that, if necessary, words should be added to make the provisions perfectly clear.

Bill *reported*, without Amendment; to be read the third time *To-morrow.*

SUMMARY JURISDICTION BILL.

(*Mr. Secretary Cross, Mr. Attorney General, Mr. Solicitor General, Sir Matthew Ridley.*)

[BILL 69.] SECOND READING.

Order for Second Reading read.

Motion made, and Question proposed, " That the Bill be now read a second time."—(*Mr. Assheton Cross.*)

Mr. HOPWOOD said, that he felt some regret to see a Motion on the Paper by his right hon. Friend the Home Secretary to refer this Bill to a Select Committee. He was so confident that this matter had been thoroughly ventilated during the time that it had been before the House—namely, the last two years—that he regretted to see even the slightest obstruction opposed to it. He should have thought that the time which would be spent in sending this Bill to a Select Committee might have been spared, for he did not see what fresh information could be required.

Mr. ASSHETON CROSS said, that he was quite as anxious as the hon. and learned Member that this Bill should pass speedily. For a long time he had expressed his opinion that a great number of persons were sent to prison who never ought to go there. He thought no person ought to go to gaol unless he had been tried. The experience he had gained in the Office which he had at present the honour to hold had impressed him strongly in favour of the Bill brought forward by the hon. Member for Derby (Mr. M. T. Bass) as to imprisonment for debt, and he should be glad to see it pass in some form or other. His feeling was that if a man went to prison he ought to be punished; and if a man did not deserve punishment he ought not to go to prison. He had viewed the inside of gaols, and it was anything but a pleasant sight to see the number of persons idling away their time there—absolutely useless members of society. He hoped the time would come, and during the period that he held his present position, when a salutary change would be made in this respect. The hon. and learned Member had asked him why he had sent this Bill to a Select Committee? He had done so for three reasons. In the first place, he could not foretell whether a great number of Amendments would be set down to the Bill or not. There were certain other matters which prevented his seeing his way clearly to carry the Bill through if a considerable number of Amendments were set down; but, having discussed those Amendments upstairs, they would be more readily disposed of in the House. In the next place, there were technical matters relating to warrants, and things of that kind, which wanted to be scrutinized by learned gentlemen accustomed to the administration of justice. Lastly, this Bill only applied to England; for with regard to Ireland, he was happy to say that the law there was in a much more advanced state than in this country. The English law was a step or two behind the Irish law; and, therefore, it would be impossible to make this Bill, in its present form, applicable to Ireland as well as England, because it would not fit into the Irish Summary Jurisdiction Acts. Therefore, he thought that if the Irish Members who took an interest in the question were enabled to discuss the question in Committee, they would be enabled to appreciate more fully a Bill which the Attorney General for Ireland would introduce dealing with the Irish law. That, he thought, would be the best course and most acceptable to the Irish Members and the people of Ireland. For the reasons he had stated, he wished to send the Bill before a Select Committee; and he hoped that the House would allow him to take the Chair on that Committee, and that no time would be lost in bringing the matter forward.

Mr. W. S. STANHOPE said, that considerable anxiety had been expressed by some magistrates in Yorkshire as to the scope of the Bill. A largely increased power was given by it to Petty Sessions, and a Committee of Quarter Sessions had been appointed to consider those provisions. He was glad to hear that the Bill would be referred to a Select Committee.

Motion *agreed to.*

Bill read a second time, and *committed* to a Select Committee.

And, on March 18, Committee *nominated* as follows:—Mr. Secretary Cross, Mr. Dodson, Mr. Attorney General, Mr. Attorney General for Ireland, Mr. Watkin Williams, Mr. Hopwood, Mr. Woodd, Mr. Paget, Mr. Courtauld, Mr. Spencer Stanhope, Colonel Colthurst, Mr. Floyer, Mr. Walter, Mr. Rodwell, and Sir Colman Rashleigh:—Five to be the quorum.

ANCIENT MONUMENTS BILL—[BILL 52.]
(*Sir John Lubbock, Mr. Beresford Hope, Mr. Osborne Morgan, Sir Richard Wallace.*)

COMMITTEE. [*Progress 14th February.*]

Committee *deferred* till *To-morrow.*

Notice taken, that 40 Members were not present; House counted, and 40 Members not being present,

House adjourned at One o'clock.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Friday, 28th February, 1879.

ARMY EDUCATION—LITERARY AND PHYSICAL COMPETITIONS.

OBSERVATIONS.

EARL FORTESCUE rose to call the attention of the House to the Report of the Joint Committee of the War Office and the Civil Service Commissioners appointed to consider whether the present literary examinations for the Army should be supplemented by physical competition. The noble Earl said, he felt some apology was due from him as a civilian for troubling their Lordships on such a subject. But he had been brought much into contact with the Army by his personal investigations into the sanitary condition of our barracks and military hospitals in 1856—investigations which he had been led to make after years of experience in sanitary administration, by observing the excessive sickness and mortality among our troops even at home compared with the civil population; though most soldiers were in the prime of life, and all had been certified as sound before admission into the ranks. Those investigations cost him personally very dear, for whilst he was engaged in them he contracted a sickness which destroyed one of his eyes, and permanently impaired the sight of the other, and which sent him an exile abroad for many successive winters. But this had not diminished the interest which had thus been kindled in him about the Army—an interest latterly increased by having two sons holding commissions in it. In calling attention to the Report of the Commissioners, he might, perhaps, be allowed to remark that he had never on any occasion when he had addressed their Lordships on this subject grounded the views he had laid before them on any hardship done to deserving young men by their being excluded from the Army by the operation of the present system. He had always rested his case exclusively on the injustice done to the Public Service by the selection of any but those who promised to make in every way the most efficient officers. One of the chief reasons for instituting competitive examinations, after the abolition of Army Purchase, was the overwhelming number of candidates who were anxious to obtain the honour of serving the Queen in the Army. It was justly said—"Let Her Majesty take the best of them." He had always accepted this principle; but what he desired to see was that the best men "all round" should be those who obtained commissions, and not merely those who were most advanced in book learning; and he did not see how the really best men could be secured without supplementing intellectual with physical competition. The Secretary of State for War was reported in *Hansard* to have said last year that the officers who had recently joined the Army were not at all of a lower standard now than those who joined before competitive examination became the rule; far from that, taking them all round, a finer body of young men could not be found. But, even if—which he (Earl Fortescue) did not doubt—that was the case, the remark was quite irrelevant. For the question was not whether the general physique of the successful candidates, under the present system, was good; but whether, under an improved system, it would not be better. When Purchase was abolished, it was not abolished on the ground that the British officers at that time were, as a rule, inefficient. Not to go back to the old successes of the Army in the Peninsula and at Waterloo, he ventured to say that for many years our Army, small as it was, had been rendered illustrious by many glorious deeds of arms, both as regarded gallantry and skill. The conquest of Afghanistan, the conquest of Scinde and the Punjaub, and more especially the Crimean War and the Indian Mutiny, shed a high lustre on our Army. The disasters in Afghanistan did not arise from any default of our regimental officers, but from the successful treachery of the Native Leaders, from the credulity of our diplomatists, and the helplessness of our bed-ridden General. The suffering and losses in the Crimean War were less attributable to the Military than to the Civil Department. He ventured to say that the competitive system of examination was not introduced into the Army because the Purchase system had given them bad officers, but simply because, though the general results of that system were good, it was thought to be improvable, and that still better results might be obtained. This was equally the case now. Therefore, the argument of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War was utterly beside the question. Considering how small and costly our Army was, it was of the utmost importance to bring it up to the highest pitch of efficiency attainable; and they ought to be satisfied with nothing less, not only with regard to the general body of officers, but with regard, as far as practicable, to every individual officer. He thought they heard a great deal too much of the unfair advantage which might be given to some candidates by having certain tests of physical excellence allowed to count in examinations—as if the object was to give as equal a chance as possible to men of unequal qualifications—in sporting language, to handicap unequal horses so as to secure a good race, instead of letting the really best horse win. But he considered that their object ought to be simply to get the best article they could for their money—to get the young man selected as an officer whose qualifications in every way, physically, intellectually, and morally, afforded the best promise of future efficiency in the performance of his duties. When he brought the subject before their Lordships last year, he suggested that riding should be one of the subjects allowed to count in examinations. Strong objection was made to this suggestion on the ground that only the sons of rich men had an opportunity of learning horsemanship. This, however, certainly did not apply to walking, running, leaping, or swimming. But he (Earl Fortescue) did not believe riding was near as costly an accomplishment as it was often stated to be, and he believed that a deal might be very cheaply learned at the riding-school in most large towns during their dull season. In the country, he had certainly known many young men, sons of far from wealthy parents, who somehow or other managed to get frequently mounted. But, assuming it to be as costly as it was said to be, he did not see why the claims of a candidate, coming already qualified in that respect to render the Queen service, should be ignored. He did not see why such a candidate should not be considered, *cæteris paribus,* preferable to another, who, if he learned to ride, must learn not at his own but the country's expense. In engaging servants, people asked themselves which out of the number of candidates were the most likely to be useful, not whether they had been placed in comparison with others at unfair disadvantage as regarded their training for service. And that, he thought, ought to be the principle adopted in selecting officers for the Army. He put the question altogether on the ground of economy. There was an accumulation of authorities in favour of adding physical to purely intellectual qualifications, to which he would now call attention. Before he adverted to the Report of the Joint Committee, however, he must be allowed to tender his thanks to Her Majesty's Government for having named a Committee which comprised men of such high military and scientific attainments, and of such high literary character. The list of names spoke for itself. Three were distinguished officers, two of the civilians were of well-known literary culture, and the Chairman, the noble Lord opposite (Lord Hampton), had for some 40 years taken a prominent part in the House of Commons, and had held some of the highest Offices in the State. All these unanimously reported in favour of the desirableness of the addition of physical qualifications in examinations for the Army. The Committee had sought the best advice and information which could be obtained from various sources—from the Army Medical Department, from Inspectors of Military Gymnasia, and from the Superintendent of the Woolwich Riding Establishment, and had printed 23 replies to letters which had been addressed by them to the Heads of the three great

Military Colleges and the Masters of the great educational institutions of the country—such as Eton, Harrow, Rugby, Uppingham, Marlborough, and others. Of these, nine were strongly favourable to physical competition, fifteen were favourable, one doubtful, one was for a qualifying examination, one was rather against than for it, and only three were strongly against the proposal. The Report states—

"On the general question of the desirableness of the proposed addition we apprehend that there can be little difference of opinion. Whether regard be had to the direct utility of physical vigour in the discharge of military duties, or to its importance as connected with valuable mental and moral qualities, we entertain no doubt that some account should be taken of it in such examinations, provided that the value set upon it be not such as to depreciate superior intellectual ability, that proper tests can be agreed upon, and that satisfactory means can be found of applying those tests. . . . We recommend that competitions should be held under the following six heads: (1) riding; (2) walking; (3) running; (4) leaping; (5) swimming; (6) gymnastics. . . . We propose that no candidate should be allowed to enter as a competitor under more than three heads, and that the total number of marks allotted to the physical competition should be obtainable by adequate proficiency in any three. . . . We have already intimated our opinion that nothing should be done to interfere with the reward due to superior intellectual merit. But in competitions for entrance to the Royal Military College, as in most large competitions, it is commonly found that below the degree of superior merit, and on each side of the line which separates the successful from the unsuccessful, there occurs a long list of candidates showing a comparative level of mediocrity; and we consider that no undue weight will be given to physical excellence, if it be allowed practically to decide the question of success or failure among candidates of this class, while helping also to determine the position of the others. Looking, therefore, to the fact that at these examinations, in which about 100 candidates are usually selected, the average difference between the 50th and the 150th is about 1,000 marks, we think that the desired result would be attained if the method of marking were so arranged as to give about 1,000 marks to the best candidate in the physical competition."

Sir John Adye strongly opposed, but the Governor of Sandhurst and the Commandant of the Staff College quite as strongly supported, the Committee's recommendations. Sir Archibald Alison says—

"It seems to me very advisable that, in a profession where (especially in the junior ranks) physical fitness in addition to mental capacity is of great consequence, a certain weight should be given to these qualities. . . . No one can have a higher regard for literary qualifications than I have; but I think it is a mistake to attach, in examinations, no value whatever to physical ones in an essentially (physically speaking) hard-working profession like the Army."

The Rev. E. Thring, the very successful Master of Uppingham, writes—

"In my opinion the proposal to give marks for physical qualifications in the Civil Service is most valuable. Much harm is done in the world by men who are all head, and have none of the powers or sympathies of ordinary humanity; who, in the good old phrase, 'have never been boys.' Such men often attain to power, but are bad rulers of men. On this account, as well as on the more obvious one of common usefulness, I hail the acknowledgment of physical life-power."

The Rev. H. M. Butler, of Harrow, writes—

"In my judgment the change proposed would be a decided and important improvement."

The Rev. J. J. Hornby, of Eton, writes—

"With regard to these proposals generally, I must say that I welcome them very warmly."

The Rev. E. H. Bradby, of Haileybury, says—

"Among those who come between the 50th and the 150th on the list in a Sandhurst, or even Woolwich examination, I should much prefer, had I to pick men for Her Majesty's service, those who could ride or run or swim well, for instance, to those who could not. The tendency of the change would be to make idlers and 'loafers' (if the expression may be pardoned) among the clever boys look to their physical exercises, and to give a fairer chance to a very useful class of young Englishmen, who are in some danger of being crushed out by the purely literary character of our present competitions."

He quoted last year the opinion of the late Sir John Burgoyne, who expressed to him his fear lest mere book learning should have too much weight given it to the exclusion of other qualifications for the Army; and he had mentioned that the present Bishop of Exeter, when, as Head Master of Rugby, he had a commission in the Army placed at his disposal, instituted a competitive examination for it, partly physical, partly intellectual, which resulted in its being won by a good, but not the best scholar in the school — the captain of the cricket eleven. He hoped that the principle of the recommendation of this very able Committee, fortified by the preponderance of opinion of the best educational and military authorities would prevail, and that physical as well as intellectual competition would be adopted as a test of qualification for admission into Her Majesty's Service. Perhaps he might be asked why he had not earlier expressed his views upon this subject? But his reason was that though he had long entertained them he had, perhaps weakly, shrunk from publicly expressing them while his son was preparing for the Army, lest he should be supposed to be actuated by personal rather than public considerations. As soon, however, as his son had won his commission in competitive examination in 1876, he took the earliest opportunity of publicly speaking elsewhere on the subject, and last year had addressed their Lordships upon it. With regard to that son and some other young friends of his just embarked for South Africa, he must add that he did not think they would be likely to discharge their duties the less efficiently there, because from their boyhood they had been accustomed to hunt and shoot, to ride and walk long distances over rough ground in the pursuit of sport, to surmount obstacles, to disregard fatigue, and cheerfully endure the inclemency of the weather.

VISCOUNT BURY said, he was sure the noble Earl need not have made the excuse for not bringing this matter forward sooner that he did not wish to be suspected of having interested motives. He was struck by the admission of the noble Earl at the end of his speech that the young officers who had gone out to South Africa would not be the less efficient because they had been accustomed from their earliest youth to hunt, ride, walk long distances, and disregard fatigue and inclement weather. Now, these young officers were only fair specimens of the young officers they now got in the Army, and this was rather an argument against the noble Earl, that they ought to adopt some system other than was now pursued. In fact, the noble Earl admitted that they now got young men who were well qualified, and all he desired was that they should take some course by which they could obtain young men better qualified still. No doubt the thing to be done was to get the very best officers they could. It would be a very bad excuse to say that to introduce such and such a competition or to refrain from introducing such and such a competition in the Army would be unfair to this or to that candidate. That would be no argument at all—what they wanted to do was to get the best men for the Public Service. Some time ago it would have been possible, in the old days of nomination, to select this or that man, and to those who were not selected it would not be a cause of complaint, and nothing would have been said against the fairness of the selection. But now, after deliberate consideration, they had resorted to a different principle, and competitive examination had been resorted to. The first principle of this system, and one without which it could not continue to exist, was strict fairness to all competitors; and when a man had in open competition, with a fair field and no favour, come to the front, they were bound to assume that they had got what they wanted—namely, the best man for the Public Service. The noble Earl's suggestion was that the system, as at present administered, had so far broken down that purely intellectual examination did not give them the best men for the Public Service. If that were proved, and it could be shown that a better class of men could be obtained by introducing some such physical qualification as the noble Earl had intimated, and as the Committee had recommended, then no doubt it would be the duty of the Government, at all hazards and all inconveniences, to introduce such a modification into their scheme of examination as would enable a physical competition to be held. But the testimony which had been brought before the War Office, and indeed before the Committee themselves, was that they did get a body of as fine young men as they could obtain by any other means; and that being the case—it not being necessary on account of the physical deterioration of our young officers, or of the class of men who offered themselves for that position, it not being alleged that there was any reason on account of such physical deterioration to resort to any further system—it was a matter of grave consideration whether the system which had been established, and which worked so well, should be thrown aside. No one could have a greater admiration than he for the great ability and industry displayed by the Committee who had made this Report. Their authority was deservedly great, and from the high position they occupied their opinion was worth much attention. But they had been rather hesitating in their approval of this scheme of physical competition. His noble Friend (Earl Fortescue) had read a part of Paragraph 14 of the Report; but he did not allow sufficient weight to the first line, which said—

> "We have already intimated our opinion that nothing should be done to interfere with the reward due to superior intellectual merit."

If they were to give marks for physical competition, how was it possible not to interfere with the purely intellectual competition—the literary competition? Sir John Adye said—

> "I do not recommend the present proposal for the following reasons:—The number of marks proposed to be given are considerable, and will therefore really influence the general rule."

The opinion of the Governor of the Royal Military College was that the physical competition which it was proposed to introduce would not be compatible, and would certainly interfere with the purely literary competition now existing. If the system of intellectual examination had not been proved to be insufficient, and as it was not even alleged that they did not get now properly qualified young men to present themselves for examination, then, was it worth while, in face of such evidence, to change the present system? The noble Earl had quoted Dr. Carver, the Head Master of Dulwich College, who said that high moral energy might exist in connection with a sickly and feeble frame. That was quite true; but had they any allegation that they had now among their young officers men of feeble and sickly frames? Quite the contrary. Dr. Carver himself admitted that he had generally found those young men who were most distinguished in physical competitions in the school were also those found most generally at the top of the literary examinations. It was in evidence from other quarters that it was a general rule that when physical fitness and development were found in the young men who were of the age that those young men were who came up for examination, that mental fitness generally existed as well. Therefore, there was no need for changing the present system. Under these circumstances, the Under Secrerary of State for War, calling to his assistance some of the military authorities whom he had constantly around him, consulted with them whether it would be advisable to introduce such a change; and the result he had arrived at was that it would not be advisable and would be almost impracticable. He (Viscount Bury) had now shown why it would be inexpedient and unnecessary to make any change at the present moment. He would now show that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to carry out such a change. First of all, when and how were they to introduce these physical examinations? Seven or eight hundred young men now came up to London for examination twice a year; they were quartered at various lodgings in town—as the noble Earl no doubt knew—somewhat to the embarrassment of their fathers and guardians; they had to remain knocking about London during the whole time of these examinations. It was very inconvenient that they should be detained longer in town than was absolutely necessary. When were they to introduce these physical examinations, and where were they to introduce them? About three-fifths of the young men who came up were, to use their own phrase, "spun in the preliminary;" in other words, were found wanting in the first stage of the examination. Those young men were at once, or as soon as possible, sent back to their homes, and dismissed with the usual information that they were not to go in for further examination. So large a proportion of young men being dismissed, it would be obviously not worth while to examine the whole 800 or 900 young men in physical competition before the intellectual competition commenced. If they only passed on for physical examination those who had already proved themselves to a certain extent intellectually qualified, they would introduce that antagonism between physical and intellectual qualifications which it was the object of the Committee themselves entirely to keep out of consideration. Supposing they did adopt that course, were they to examine them all before they went in for their final literary examination, or were they to examine only those who finally passed for commissions? These were practical considerations to consider before a change was made. It was only fair to the noble Earl who brought forward this subject that he should go into details on this point. If they were to examine all the young men, they must either give marks for their physical acquirements, or they must make them undergo a pass examination in physical qualifications. He would suppose the case of a gentleman whose son had been educated for the Army for some years, and had passed his preliminary and final literary examination, but who was rejected because he could not run a certain number of miles an hour or leap a bar 4 feet 2 inches in height. That gentleman would, he thought, have every right to complain of such a system, and he appealed to the common sense of the House whether they would be able to keep it up for a single year. If they were to give marks for physical excellence, then they would have to decide how far these should displace the marks for intellectual ability. Should it be found that physically qualified men ceased to come forward to compete for admission to the Army, then it would be time enough to make a change. It must be borne in mind that at present all the candidates were subjected to medical examination—and, as he thought, to too many such examinations—they were examined every time they presented themselves for a fresh literary competition. They had therefore, at the present moment, every guarantee that neither the feeble nor cripples were admitted into the Army—that none, in fact, would be admitted into the Service but those who were sound in life and limb. The noble Earl had quoted *Hansard* to prove that his right hon. and gallant Friend the Secretary of State for War had out of Office approved of these physical examinations. It was true that his right hon. and gallant Friend the Secretary of State for War was at first disposed to carry out the recommendation of the Committee; but, on considering it and taking the opinion of military authorities, he found that difficulties of an insurmountable nature presented themselves against giving effect to it, and, therefore, he would not advise the Government or Parliament to endeavour to carry it out.

LORD HAMPTON said, he could not agree with what had fallen from his noble Friend the Under Secretary of State for War, that the difficulties referred to were insurmountable; and he must express his regret at the decision which the War Office authorities had come to. This proposal of the Committee had been supported by the weight of very great authorities, and the Committee—of which he was himself a Member—were unanimous in their opinion as to what ought to be done. The Committee examined the subject with very remarkable care, and had entered into every detail; and in justice to them he felt bound to say that they did not leave out of view any consideration in reference to those physical difficulties which had been mentioned by his noble Friend the Under Secretary of State for War, and had arrived conclusively at the opinion that there was nothing in those difficulties which ought to be considered as being insuperable. His noble Friend opposite (Earl Fortescue) had referred to the Appendix to the Report. In it their Lordships would find set forth the opinions of three distinguished Military Officers and of 18 Head Masters of their great Public Schools in favour of the Report, and they were men who were eminently calculated to pronounce an opinion upon such a subject as this. It was true that Sir Joseph Hawley was not in favour of the scheme; but Sir Archibald Alison and General Napier had expressed strong opinions the other way, and the chief educational authorities in the country had supported their views. He believed that an almost unanimous welcome had been accorded to it—out-of-doors no one hardly ever heard a different opinion. Wherever he went he heard it stated that the training of young men as officers for the Army should not be so exclusively literary, but that they should have a sound physical training. He must acknowledge that the difficulty had been met in a fair and courteous and conciliatory spirit by the authorities and the War Office. His own conviction was that the adoption of the plan recommended by the Committee would have brought about a very great practical improvement upon the present system of training those young men; and therefore he deeply regretted that the authorities at the War Office should have deemed the difficulties insuperable.

THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE said, that it might be expected that he should say a few words on this interesting subject. He would say that he felt strongly with the noble Lords who had addressed the House; but he must honestly confess that when he came to the question of bringing the proposed system into practice, he found that it would be utterly impossible to do so—he did not himself see how it could be done; and two distinguished officers who signed the Report, being present when the question was further discussed, could not give any plan as to how their own recommendation could be carried out. If the recommendation should be adopted, it would change the whole present system of education, and changing the whole system was an extremely grave matter. How could they bring in marks for physical examination without its telling against the literary examination? They could not add to or diminish the marks without upsetting the system that now prevailed. There might be very good grounds for doing this; and possibly there might be found a system for combining the two things; but he and his noble Friend at the War Office, having given every consideration to the matter, he did not see how it was possible to combine the two things. There was one reason why they need be in no great hurry, and that was that there was not the slightest complaint to make with the existing state of things. The other day his representative, General Lysons, the Quartermaster General, went down to Sandhurst, and he said that he never saw a finer or a better set of young men than he saw there; young men better physically qualified or worthier to become officers in the Army had not presented themselves for some years. He himself also had been struck with the qualifications of the young men; and, therefore, he did not think that there was any necessity for making a change—unless, indeed, they could in some way combine the two systems of literary and physical competition. There were, however, already physical exercises at Sandhurst as well as at other places; so that the young officers had this advantage already. He himself thought it better that these advantages should be given at the large Schools and Colleges after the students entered those places. Before they entered them they might largely depend upon the means of their parents or guardians. He trusted that it would be understood that he did not in the least go against the Committee in their sentiments and desires to introduce into the Army efficient and physically competent young men; but he must say that he had no reason to doubt that they were now in the position of having very well qualified young men in the Service.

VISCOUNT HARDINGE said, he must decline to believe, until more evidence to the contrary was shown, that the proposal of the Committee could not be carried out. It might be difficult but was not impossible; and he held emphatically in this matter that if there was a will there would be a way. Colonel Stanley, the Secretary of State for War, speaking in the House of Commons on this subject, said that the *onus probandi* rested on those who advocated the change of showing that the supply of young men for the Army with proper physical qualifications was insufficient; and the illustrious Duke the Commander-in-Chief was highly satisfied with the appearance of the young officers turned out under the present system; but it was really quite impossible to judge of a man's powers of endurance by his looks; it required the physical fatigues and dangers of a campaign to show what was in him. As to riding, he had been told on high authority that officers in India rode infamously, and as they came from Sandhurst the inference was that riding there was not, to say the least of it, what it should be. This, he understood, was the opinion of the illustrious Duke himself.

THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE said, he was not aware of having expressed any opinion of the kind. What he had said on the subject was that he should have liked to see more time devoted to riding than was the case; but he had found no fault with what at present existed. It was desirable, of course, that men should ride as well as possible.

VISCOUNT HARDINGE said, he had misunderstood the illustrious Duke. He certainly thought that the course of study at Sandhurst was not sufficient to enable a man to learn to ride well. If, however, a man had not had the opportunity of riding as a boy, there were other athletic exercises, such as walking or swimming, in which he might excel —so that it could not be said that the poor student would occupy a less favourable position than the rich. It was said that the advocates of this change wished secretly to undermine the principle of competitive examination; but the Committee in their Report studiously guarded themselves against that imputation. The intellectual boy, as they explained, would always be at the top; but when, coming down the list, they reached a low level of mediocrity, intellectual might, as they very reasonably suggested, be supplemented by physical acquirements. As to the medical examination, it was not by any means so strict as it might be. The candidates, he understood, only had their chests tapped and their legs examined for varicose veins; and some greater security than at present existed as to the physical capabilities of officers certainly seemed to him to be required.

Viscount CARDWELL said, his noble Friend opposite (Viscount Hardinge) had done something to infuse a fresh vitality into a discussion which, after the crushing speech of the illustrious Duke, had appeared to have been extinguished. He first told their Lordships that if this method was not adopted the medical examination must be made more strict, and according to the noble Viscount's knowledge it was not strict enough. Then let them make it more strict if that were necessary, and they would entirely accomplish the object the Committee had in view. The noble Viscount had furnished them with another important fact, and had told them that it was impossible to know what the physical condition of an officer was until he had gone through an arduous campaign. Where was this arduous campaign to be held? Was it to be held at Aldershot or at Sandhurst? Surely he could not have it before the Committee, for they would eschew what was called by one of the principal advocates of the scheme the vulgarity of a public exhibition, and they would work it by some plan of a private competition, on some different and various methods which they had laid down. Then it was absolutely impossible to accomplish the object in the manner suggested by his noble Friend. That was exactly the thing which the illustrious Duke held out to their Lordships during the late Session. He said he would be delighted if there were such qualifications added; but he said it was a serious question on which he was not prepared to give an offhand opinion. The Secretary of State for War expressed very much the same opinion in the House of Commons. He (Viscount Cardwell) was not at all surprised at the opinion so decidedly expressed to-night by the illustrious Duke, or at the conclusion at which the War Office had arrived. It had been held that they now got the best officers. Sir John Ayde said so, and their Lordships had been told so by some of the best of the other witnesses whose testimony was given in the Appendix to the Report of the Committee. He recommended the whole of this evidence to the same careful consideration of their Lordships as it had received at the hands of the illustrious Duke and the authorities at the War Office; and he thought the more time they spent in investigating the subject the more they would arrive at the same conclusion which he was happy to hear Her Majesty's Government had come to.

Lord TRURO said, that upon the introduction of competitive examinations, not only in the War Department, but in the Civil Service Departments, they were somewhat overdone, and the same thing had happened in the Medical Service. For instance, in the Prerogative Court, a long correspondence took place when a man was wanted who could bring up a coal-scuttle. What was required in men was moral force of character, and the power of discrimination, so that they might be able to read the characters of others, and that alone would qualify men for command. While, on the one hand, it was most important that attention should be paid to the physical powers and bodily strength of these young men, yet it was by no means desirable to introduce competitive examinations for the purpose of obtaining the best men of that sort, and to abandon the system of mental and educational competition which now existed; but far more than all for consideration were the moral requirements of these young officers.

Earl FORTESCUE, in reply, said, that the proposal of the Committee was not that this competition should be compulsory, but that it should be voluntary. It would, therefore, only apply to a limited number of the candidates. There was no wish to interfere with the reward for superior intellectual merit. The object which he held should be sought and attained by the Government, and which was recommended by the Committee, was to give facilities for the selection of the best men "all round" among the intellectual mediocrities examined at the competitions for commissions. Far from denying the frequent concurrence in the same individual of bodily strength and activity with great intellectual power and application, he had himself called their Lordships' particular attention to the fact last year, and had then mentioned as a proof of it the habitual superiority at cricket and football of the Engineers, the most scientific of the scientific branches of the Army. He remained unsatisfied, as he was happy to find the noble Lord the Chairman of the Committee (Lord Hampton) was, of the absolute impracticability of the scheme, though he had no doubt of the difficulty of organizing it. He (Earl Fortescue) confessed, however, that he did not despair, considering the weight of authority which the Committee had elicited, and the general feeling in its favour out-of-doors, and above all its accordance with common sense, that sooner or later, like other improvements denounced in the first instance as impracticable and unnecessary, the scheme would in the course of a few years be adopted, and be found to work easily and satisfactorily.

House adjourned at a quarter before Seven o'clock, to Monday next, Eleven o'clock.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Friday, 28*th February*, 1879.

MINUTES.]—SUPPLY—*considered in Committee —Resolutions* [February 27] *reported.*

WAYS AND MEANS—*considered in Committee*— £4,250,000, Consolidated Fund.

PRIVATE BILL (*by Order*) — *Second Reading— Referred to Select Committee*—Thames River (Prevention of Floods).

PUBLIC BILLS—*Ordered—First Reading*—Petty Customs (Scotland) Abolition Act Amendment* [91]; Vaccination Acts (Ireland) Amendment* [90].

First Reading—Army Discipline and Regulation* [88].

Second Reading—Valuation of Property [71]; Select Vestries [54], *debate adjourned.*

Committee—Report—Ancient Monuments [52-89].

Third Reading—Assizes [83], and *passed.*

PRIVATE BUSINESS.

THAMES RIVER (PREVENTION OF FLOODS) BILL (*by Order.*)

SECOND READING.

Order for Second Reading read.

SIR JAMES M'GAREL-HOGG, in rising to move that the Bill be now read a second time, said, he hoped he should be allowed to allude to a few of the circumstances which had induced the Metropolitan Board of Works to undertake to deal with this very important subject. He thought it would be in the remembrance of most hon. Members of that House that in the year 1874, in the months of March and April, and again in the year 1875, some very disastrous floods occurred in the Metropolis which did a vast amount of damage, and more especially to the poorer classes of the community. The Metropolitan Board being aware of this, and fearing that a like calamity might occur again, considered it incumbent upon them to try and do their best in order to provide some adequate remedy for the evil. Although they were in themselves the local authority, they had not in their own hands the power of inducing or making either the vestries, or district boards, or individuals raise the height of the river walls, or banks, or premises abutting upon the River Thames. They carefully considered the whole matter, and in the end took what they conceived to be the most proper course. Acting under Section 69 of the Metropolis Local Management Act, they addressed themselves to the various vestries and district boards, calling their attention to the disastrous effect of previous floods, and asking them, as far as was possible, to do everything in their power to aid the Metropolitan Board in their efforts to find a remedy. Some of the persons written to intimated that they would be ready to assist the Board; but others, in the replies which they sent to the Board, stated that although Section 69 of the Act of 1855 conferred certain powers upon them, still, in consequence of their not possessing the power of entry, they could do nothing more than write, as they had no power of enforcing the execution of any work.

Upon this, the Metropolitan Board had a careful survey made of the whole of the river banks. They caused notices to be sent to every one of the riparian owners, and they pointed out to all of them—whether they were large owners or only small owners—the disastrous effects which had been hitherto produced by the flooding of the river, and asked them to co-operate with the Metropolitan Board in doing everything in their power to remedy the evil in the future. About 1,000 notices, in round numbers, were sent out by the Metropolitan Board of Works; and he was glad to be able to tell the House that out of those 1,000 notices very nearly 600 had, up to the present time, complied with the requisition—or rather friendly notice—sent to them asking them to undertake the necessary works. Among the favourable replies received were many from the largest riparian owners—such as the wharfingers and the Railway Companies who had property bordering the river. It was not necessary that he should enter into this part of the question at greater length. All he would say was that the Metropolitan Board went as far as they could in the matter; but they found that still more remained to be done. They therefore introduced a Bill into Parliament in 1877. It gave rise to some discussion in the House of Commons, and was ultimately referred to a Hybrid Committee. That Committee passed a Resolution expressing an opinion that the charge ought to be distributed over the whole of the Metropolis. It was only right to say that, in the first place, a Motion was made in the Committee that the expenses should be halved; but it was lost by a majority of 2. The other Motion—that the cost should be distributed over the whole of the Metropolis—was carried, he thought, by a majority of 3—he was not quite sure whether it was 3 or 4. The Metropolitan Board wished, as far as possible, to consult the wishes of the Committee, without entirely ignoring their own views, or the views of the general inhabitants throughout the length and breadth of London—amounting to about 4,000,000, or perhaps to about 3,500,000, so far as the riverside property was concerned. Many persons were of opinion that they ought not to stir further in the matter; but in deference to the views of the Committee of the House of Commons, to which the Board thought all proper respect should be paid, the Metropolitan Board brought in and intrusted to his charge last Session a Bill in which provision was made that the works for the prevention of floods, whether upon property belonging to the district boards, to vestries, or to individuals, should be paid for by the people on the banks or the riparian owners, and that the compensation should be paid for entirely out of the general purse of the Metropolis. It appeared to him that that was a very fair mode of apportioning the expenses. That Bill was brought in by himself as Chairman of the Metropolitan Board of Works last year; but an hon. Friend of his who objected to it immediately gave Notice of opposition, taking the somewhat unusual course of trying to prevent the Bill from even being brought in. Fortunately, at the end of the Session, his hon. Friend went away, and then he managed to get the Bill introduced. He was unable, however, to get a second reading for it, the close of the Session being so near that it was perfectly hopeless to expect to pass it through the House. He therefore took what he considered to be a proper course, and withdrew the Bill, so that the opponents of the measure should not be put to unnecessary expense. He now came to the present year. The Metropolitan Board, still feeling it their duty to do all in their power to try and induce those with whom the liability rightly rested to raise the banks of the river in order to prevent the destruction of property by the flooding of the Thames, had again intrusted the Bill to his care. But this time he had brought in the Bill as a Private Bill, and he had taken this course expressly to provide that the Bill being a Private Bill should come before the House, and that the House should give a decision upon the matter. All he could say was that if the decision of a Select Committee or of the House were adverse to the proposals now made by the Metropolitan Board of Works, the Board would not be prepared to accept the responsibility of any future floods. If the House came to the conclusion that it was not right to pass the Bill, the responsibility would certainly be taken off his shoulders and would rest upon those who would not allow such a Bill, brought in as a compromise, to go as he desired it to go, and he hoped the House would allow it to go, to a Private Bill Committee upstairs. Under all the circumstances of the case, he sincerely trusted that the House would consent to read the Bill a second time. He felt quite sure that the House would not allow a Bill of this important character, and dealing with such an important subject, to be thrown out of the House of Commons until it had received a full and fair hearing. At the proper time evidence would be tendered to the House in support of the provisions of the measure. Already the Bill had excited considerable attention in the Metropolis, and he was not surprised at it. He held in his hand a paper containing four or five pages of reasons against the Bill. When the proper time arrived, and he had the power of replying, he should reply to any objections which might be urged against the Bill. In the meantime, he asked the House to read the Bill a second time and refer it in the usual course to a Private Bill Committee. That course had already been taken in regard to a Bill introduced by the Corporation of the City of London. It was only this very week—namely, Tuesday last—that the Bill brought in by the Corporation for the improvement of Leadenhall Market was read a second time and referred to a Select Committee in the usual way. He, representing the Metropolitan Board, now asked the House of Commons to take the same course in regard to the present measure which had been accorded to the Bill brought in by the City of London—namely, to give the Bill a second reading, and insure for it a fair and just hearing before the tribunal of a Private Bill Committee. On behalf of the Metropolitan Board he asked for a Committee of Members who would all attend the inquiry and listen to all the evidence tendered to them on the matters they would be called upon to decide. He wished to avoid, if possible, taking a decision from a tribunal composed of Members who could not hear all the evidence, and only came in at the last moment to give a vote against the Bill, with their minds prepared beforehand. Without further comment, he asked the House to read the Bill a second time in order that it might go before a Select Committee.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."—(*Sir James M'Garel-Hogg.*)

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE, who had upon the Paper a Notice to move that the Bill be read a second time this day six months, remarked that his hon. Friend the Chairman of the Metropolitan Board of Works (Sir James M'Garel-Hogg) had been illuminated by a flash of what Balzac used to call "retrospective perspicacity." He had found out this year what he ought to have found out a year ago, and had converted the measure into a Private Bill in order to get rid of opposition in its early stages. Unfortunately, he (Sir Charles W. Dilke) was in the position of being hoist with his own petard, because he had suggested, when the Bill was before the House two years ago, that it should be brought in as a Private Bill. It seemed that his hon. Friend had this year followed the advice which was then rendered to him. With regard to the Bill itself, he wished to point out that his hon. Friend was, no doubt unintentionally, altogether misleading the House, when he wished them to believe that the Bill was only opposed by himself (Sir Charles W. Dilke) and a few hon. Members whose constituents were in some way interested in the matter. The great majority of his constituents were interested in the contrary way to the view which he took, so that he was perfectly unprejudiced in the matter. In point of fact, a similar Bill, but not exactly the same, was brought in two years ago, and referred, as his hon. Friend (Sir James M'Garel-Hogg) told them, to a Hybrid Committee. The hon. Baronet had that day laid great stress upon his desire, not only that the present Bill should be read a second time, but that it should be referred to a Private Bill Committee. In the last part of his speech the hon. Baronet four or five times over used those words. He (Sir Charles W. Dilke) would say at once, from a fear of being misunderstood, and for reasons which he would give directly, that he should not divide against the second reading of the Bill. He should confine himself to giving a warm support to the Motion, which he had no doubt would be made by the hon. and gallant Member for Southwark (Colonel Beresford), after the Bill should have been read a second time, that it be referred to a Hybrid Committee of the House. He thought it ought to be referred to a Committee which was not simply a Private Bill Committee, but a Hybrid Committee, which was a larger Committee, and one nominated partly by the House and partly by the Committee of Selection. Such a Committee would be a perfectly impartial Committee, and he trusted that the right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary (Mr. Assheton Cross), whom he saw in his place, would support that proposition. The right hon. Gentleman had taken great interest in the subject in the past; and perhaps it might not be known to hon. Members of the House, who did not follow Metropolitan questions, that the right hon. Gentleman had over and over again corresponded with the Metropolitan Board of Works, and pointed out the obstinacy of a small majority of the Board in regard to this question. If the right hon. Gentleman supported the reference of the Bill to a Hybrid Committee instead of to a Private Bill Committee, he would be only following out the course which he had previously taken in the matter. He had not succeeded in gathering from his hon. Friend the Chairman of the Metropolitan Board (Sir James M'Garel-Hogg) whether he intended to agree to the Motion for referring the Bill to a Hybrid Committee or not. If his hon. Friend did, then he (Sir Charles W. Dilke) had nothing more to say. As he had already said, he should not oppose the second reading. If, on the other hand, his hon. Friend would not agree to the proposal to refer the Bill to a Hybrid Committee, but persisted in referring it to a Private Bill Committee, then he (Sir Charles W. Dilke) would state briefly why he had thought it wise to place upon the Paper a Motion against the second reading of the Bill, but why he should not divide the House upon that Motion. He should not move the rejection of the Bill, because he did not wish in any way to seem to prevent legislation. On the other hand, he did consider that it would be useless for the House to pass a Bill of this kind, when they knew perfectly well that the great majority of impartial witnesses who looked into the matter two years ago came strongly to the conclusion that the Bill ought to be cast in a wholly different form. Then, again, it must be borne in mind that the House had no security whatever, if the Committee this year took the same view as that which was taken by the Committee two years ago, that his hon. Friend the Chairman of the Metropolitan Board would not immediately drop the Bill, as he did before. If the Committee altered the Bill in order to make it acceptable to the House, then he feared that his hon. Friend would drop the Bill, and the great expense the different localities would have been put to in opposing the Bill would be entirely lost, and they would have to come before Parliament again. The House knew very well that it would be impossible to pass any Bill that would not entail a considerable expense, and it was for that reason he had placed a Notice against the Bill upon the Paper. At the same time, he felt that if he divided against the second reading his motives might be misunderstood. Therefore, while his opinions remained really unchanged, he felt that he could not take upon himself the responsibility of dividing against the Bill. He might add that he had taken the trouble to find out whether it was possible for the House, if the Bill was altered by the Committee, and the Committee this year took the same view of the matter as the Committee took two years ago—if it would be possible for the House to carry on the Bill in the event of its being dropped by the Board of Works, and for some Member of the Committee to take charge of it, even if the hon. Baronet dropped it. One of the reasons which weighed with him (Sir Charles W. Dilke), in deciding not to divide upon the second reading, was the belief that there was one precedent for this course. He believed it would be possible, although it was not often done, for the Chairman of the Committee, or some other Member of it, to go on with the Bill, even if the Metropolitan Board retired from it. If he were right, as he believed he was, in thinking there was a precedent for this course, then, whatever his views were in regard to the Bill as it stood, he would allow it to be read a second time, in the hope that it would then be referred to a Hybrid Committee.

Mr. RAIKES observed, that as the hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke) did not propose to proceed with the Motion of which he had given Notice, he did not think it was necessary to take up much further the time of the House in considering the matter. The observations which had just been made by the hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea were exceedingly moderate. He had expressed the views of those who considered themselves somewhat aggrieved by the course taken by the Metropolitan Board of Works in promoting the Bill this year in its present form. The House had heard from the two hon. Members who had already spoken what the object of the Bill was. The House were also aware that a Bill similar to the present one was introduced two years ago by the Metropolitan Board of Works, and that upon that occasion it was referred to a Hybrid Committee. That Committee, which was presided over by the hon. Member for Elgin, took a great deal of evidence upon the whole question, and the result of their labours was very largely to modify the character of the Bill. The Metropolitan Board of Works, being dissatisfied with the finding of the Committee, ultimately withdrew the Bill, In the course of last year the Bill was introduced again as a Public Bill; but as it did not comply with the requirements of the Committee, opposition was offered to it in its earliest stage. This year, the hon. Baronet the Chairman of the Metropolitan Board of Works (Sir James M'Garel-Hogg) had taken care to introduce the Bill as a Private Bill, and not as a Public Bill, and had therefore secured for it a discussion on a very early day. Objection, however, had been taken in some quarters to that course. A Petition had been presented by the Lambeth Vestry, who were largely affected by the Bill, and who stated in it that they represented the opinion, not merely of Lambeth, but of Fulham and other parts of the district. They objected to the Bill being treated as a Private Bill, because they were of opinion that it came under Standing Order 194, which required that all Bills promoted by the Metropolitan Board of Works, which proposed to raise money, should be treated as Public Bills. He thought that the view taken by the Petitioners was a mistake in this particular instance; because, although the Bill brought in last Session did contain borrowing powers, the Bill brought in this Session did not contain such borrowing powers. All the financial portion of the Bill was confined to temporary advances by the Metropolitan Board of Works to persons who might require aid in carrying out the works necessary for raising the river banks. It did not in any way require any permanent advance to be made, and it made no addition to the debt of the Metropolitan Board of Works. Therefore, he thought the Bill stood clear of the objection which was taken to it under the Standing Orders, and was properly entitled to be introduced into the House as a Private Bill. Having said so much in justification of the course taken by his hon. Friend the Chairman of the Metropolitan Board of Works (Sir James M'Garel-Hogg) in introducing the Bill in that form, he felt bound, at the same time, to point out that his hon. Friend could not object to the Bill being treated as part of a public question, inasmuch as the Metropolitan Board themselves had twice endeavoured to deal with it as a Public Bill. It was not open, therefore, to the Metropolitan Board to object to any course taken by the House in referring the Bill to a Hybrid Committee, because in this particular instance it happened to make its appearance on the Paper in the shape of a Private Bill. He did not wish at this stage of the Bill to go into questions *pro* and *con* that were likely to be raised before a Committee upstairs. The House would probably be aware that the main issue to be tried was whether the incidence of the taxation for the purpose of protecting the river banks from floods was to fall mainly upon the river population, or was to be spread over the larger area of the Metropolis generally? That was a very large and important question, and was one that was gone into by the Committee of 1877. He thought the Motion which had been placed on the Paper by the hon. and gallant Member for Southwark (Colonel Beresford) appeared to be well calculated to meet the difficulties of the case, and, with the permission of the House, he would for a moment call attention to it. The hon. and gallant Member proposed that the Bill be committed

> "To a Select Committee of Eleven Members; and that the Report of the Select Committee of 1877 be referred to the said Committee; that all Petitions against the Bill be referred to the Committee, and that such Petitioners as pray to be heard by them-

> selves, their Counsel, or Agents, be heard upon their Petitions if they think fit, and Counsel heard in favour of the Bill against such Petitioners. That the Committee have powers to alter and modify the Bill as regards the incidence of taxation for the works proposed to be authorised by the Bill."

Perhaps it would not be out of place to refer the House to the instruction given to the Committee of 1877. That Committee consisted also of 11 Members, six of whom were nominated by the House and the remainder by the Committee of Selection. The instruction given to them was that they should have power to inquire into and report upon the most equitable mode of charging and meeting the expenses to be incurred under the Bill. It would be seen, therefore, that the Motion about to be proposed by the hon. and gallant Member for Southwark (Colonel Beresford) would have practically the same effect as the instruction given to the Committee of 1877, and the Committee to whom this Bill might be referred would have the additional advantage of being enlightened by the Report of that Committee. The Committee themselves took more than ordinary pains in investigating the question, and arrived at a clear decision in regard to it. But the hon and gallant Member for Southwark did not, he (Mr. Raikes) thought, fully grasp the importance of dealing with the matter by a Hybrid Committee. He had put his Resolution, perhaps very excusably, from a want of acquaintance with the technical Forms of the House, in a shape that would imply there should be a Public Committee. Now, that he (Mr. Raikes) did not think would be a desirable course. They all knew that the attendance of hon. Members on a Public Committee was not as regular as that which was secured on a Private Bill Committee, and it was exceedingly desirable that the tribunal to whom this Bill was to be referred should be one that should sit upon it as far as possible *de die in diem*. They might, he thought, expect more from a Hybrid Committee than from an ordinary Select Committee. Of course, hon. Members were aware that, in appointing a Select Committee on an occasion of this sort, they expected the Committee more to hear evidence than to enter into the general question; and it was almost impossible to appoint Members upon the Committee who would give the daily attendance which was obtained from a Committee nominated by the Committee of Selection. He would, therefore, suggest to the hon. and gallant Member for Southwark that he should so far modify his proposal, when it came before the House, as to make his reference one to a Hybrid Committee, and not to a Select Committee. He ventured to think, after the statements which had now been made to the House, that the hon. and gallant Member for Southwark might, without much further discussion, find himself in a position to agree to that Motion; and if he did, it should be with a thorough understanding with the Metropolitan Board of Works that, if the Bill was to be read a second time and then referred to a Hybrid Committee, in the event of the Committee coming to a decision which they did not like, the House of Commons should not be treated in the same manner as they had been treated before by the Metropolitan Board of Works. It should be understood that if any change in the provisions of the Bill, however important, was arrived at as the deliberate conclusion of the Committee, it should be accepted by the Metropolitan Board. The House would certainly expect that that course would be taken, and that they should not be called upon again to sanction an inquiry which the Metropolitan Board would decline to accept. He hoped the Bill would now be read a second time, so that the hon. and gallant Member for Southwark might have an opportunity of submitting his proposition to the House.

Mr. ASSHETON CROSS was anxious to say a word or two, as his name had been mentioned by the hon. Baronet the Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles W. Dilke). For some time he had taken considerable interest in this question, and he thought it would be unwise for the House to reject the second reading of the Bill. The matter was one that required the immediate attention of Parliament; but after the Report of the Committee of 1877, he did not think they ought to read the Bill a second time without coming to a clear understanding that, in the first place, it should be carefully considered by a Committee upstairs, and, in his opinion, by a Hybrid Committee instead of an ordinary Private Bill Committee, and that the conclusion arrived at by the Committee should be acquiesced in by the Metropolitan Board of Works. He would not detain the House further. He entirely agreed, as far as the formation of the Committee was concerned, with every word that had fallen from the Chairman of Ways and Means (Mr. Raikes). He should like to add one word more, and it was this. It was a matter of vital importance, and almost essential to the well-being of the inhabitants of London, that the question should be settled. It was absolutely necessary, for the protection of the life and health of the people in the low-lying districts bordering the Thames, that the matter should be at once taken in hand. Therefore, he hoped the House would fairly understand that if the Bill was considered by a Hybrid Committee upstairs, and they came to a decision upon it, whatever that decision might be, when the Committee had arrived at a decision, the House would, at all events, insist on the Bill being gone on with and passed into law. With these few observations, he trusted that the House would read the Bill a second time, and at once proceed to the consideration of the Motion of the hon. and gallant Member for Southwark (Colonel Beresford), modified as suggested by his hon. Friend the Chairman of Ways and Means (Mr. Raikes).

SIR **ALEXANDER GORDON** said, that as it appeared probable the Bill would be referred to a Committee, he wished to express a hope that the Members appointed upon the Committee would have no interest in the questions to be considered. The last Committee appointed in 1877 consisted of 10 Members, and five of them had a direct interest in the question in one way or the other. He did not think it proper that a question of this importance should be referred to a Committee largely composed of those who had a direct interest in the question.

COLONEL **BERESFORD** intimated that he entirely fell in with the views which had been expressed by the Chairman of Ways and Means (Mr. Raikes).

SIR **JAMES M'GAREL-HOGG** thought he might, perhaps, be allowed to say that, having brought the Bill in, having heard the views expressed by hon. Members who had taken part in the debate, and being very unwilling on all occasions to take up unnecessary time in a fruitless discussion, he would be very happy to accept the suggestion of the Chairman of Ways and Means (Mr. Raikes). He was quite ready to accept the proposal of the hon. and gallant Member for Southwark (Colonel Beresford) to refer the Bill to a Hybrid Committee; but, under all the circumstances of the case, he hoped the Chairman of Ways and Means would not object to an addition to the Motion, requiring that all Petitions against the Bill should be presented on or before the 6th of March. He believed that his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Southwark was perfectly willing to accept an Amendment to that effect; and it was a matter of great convenience, as well as of importance, that, in regard to a Bill of this kind, all Petitions against it should be deposited early. It would be hardly fair to those who took a great interest in the matter that any lengthened period should be allowed for the presentation of Petitions. He hoped that his hon. Friend the Chairman of Ways and Means would have no objection to this suggestion, and on that understanding he would propose to amend the Motion of the hon. and gallant Member for Southwark, by inserting after the word "Petitions" in the fourth line, the words "presented against the Bill be presented before the 6th of March." If that were done, he should be quite ready to accept the Motion. He might add, in conclusion, that as far as he had any influence as Chairman of the Metropolitan Board, he would take care and use that influence to insure that, whatever decision was come to by the Committee, should be thoroughly and entirely acquiesced in. He would certainly do his best to see that the views of the Committee were carried out, because he thought the time had now arrived when something should be done to prevent the terrible calamities which resulted from the overflowing of the river.

SIR **JOSEPH M'KENNA** was glad that the hon. Gentleman the Chairman of the Metropolitan Board of Works was ready to come to an understanding in regard to the decision of the Committee; but he objected to the proposal to curtail the period allowed for the presentation of Petitions against the Bill. Ten days after the second reading of a Bill was the usual time allowed to anyone who had a *locus standi* against a Private Bill to enter an opposition. Even ten days was a very short time;

but in this case the hon. Baronet wished to shorten it, and proposed the 6th of March—which would only allow six days, one of them being a Sunday. He thought, when the Bill had passed a second reading, that they should not encumber it with any such proposition. He would expect the time for entering opposition to be extended.

Motion *agreed to.*

Bill read a second time.

COLONEL BERESFORD moved—

"That the Bill be committed to a Select Committee of Eleven Members, and that the Report of the Select Committee of 1877 be referred to the said Committee:—That all Petitions against the Bill be referred to the Committee, and that such Petitioners as pray to be heard by themselves, their Counsel, or Agents, be heard upon their Petitions, if they think fit, and Counsel heard in favour of the Bill against such Petitioners:—That the Committee have power to alter and modify the Bill as regards the incidence of taxation for the works proposed to be authorized by the Bill."

He had no objection to the proposal of his hon. Friend (Sir James M'Garel-Hogg), that all Petitions against the Bill should be presented on or before the 8th of March.

MR. SPEAKER: I wish to point out to the hon. and gallant Member for Southwark that when a Committee of this character is appointed it is usual to state how many are to be appointed by the House and how many by the Committee of Selection.

COLONEL BERESFORD proposed that six should be appointed by the House, and five by the Committee of Selection.

SIR JAMES M'GAREL-HOGG asked if this was the proper time to move his Amendment?

MR. SPEAKER: It will come afterwards.

Motion made, and Question proposed,

"That the Bill be committed to a Select Committee of Eleven Members, Six to be appointed by the House, and Five by the Committee of Selection, and that the Report of the Select Committee of 1877 be referred to the said Committee:—That all Petitions against the Bill be referred to the Committee, and that such Petitioners as pray to be heard by themselves, their Counsel, or Agents, be heard upon their Petitions, if they think fit, and Counsel heard in favour of the Bill against such Petitioners:—That the Committee have power to alter and modify the Bill as regards the incidence of taxation for the works proposed to be authorized by the Bill."

MR. RAIKES was glad that the hon. and gallant Member for Southwark had adopted the suggestion made to him as to making the Committee a Hybrid Committee, and agreeing that six Members should be nominated by the House and the remaining five by the Committee of Selection. The Chairman of the Metropolitan Board of Works had pleaded for a somewhat shorter time than usual for Petitions to be lodged against the Bill, and had suggested the 6th of March. He understood that there would be no objection to accept the 8th of March, and he thought that would be a solution of the difficulty which the House would accede to. It gave a clear week from to-morrow for Petitions to be sent in; and it must be borne in mind that, in promoting the Bill, the Metropolitan Board of Works were acting as a public body in the performance of a public duty, and that it was not desirable to give extended facilities, which would only result in adding to their trouble and expense. It was desirable that a day should be named beyond which Petitions should not be allowed to be deposited, and he did not think that the 8th of March would be either too late or too early a day. He thought if the hon. Baronet would make this proposition, the hon. and gallant Member for Southwark would accede to it.

SIR JAMES M'GAREL-HOGG then moved his Amendment.

Amendment proposed,

In line 5, after the word "Bill," to insert the words "presented on or before the 8th day of March."—(*Sir James M'Garel-Hogg.*)

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted."

COLONEL BERESFORD expressed his willingness to accept the Amendment.

Question put, and *agreed to.*

Main Question, as amended, put.

Ordered, That the Bill be committed to a Select Committee of Eleven Members, Six to be appointed by the House and Five by the Committee of Selection, and that the Report of the Select Committee of 1877 be referred to the said Committee:—That all Petitions against the Bill presented on or before the 8th day of March be referred to the Committee, and that such Petitioners as pray to be heard by themselves, their Counsel, or Agents, be heard upon their Petitions, if they think fit, and Counsel heard in favour of the Bill against such Petitioners:—That the Committee have power to alter and modify the Bill as regards the incidence of taxation for the works proposed to be authorized by the Bill.

QUESTIONS.

REPRESENTATION OF THE CITY—THE FANMAKERS COMPANY.

QUESTION.

MR. W. H. JAMES asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether his attention has been called to the proceedings of the Court of Aldermen on the 18th instant, when that Court authorised the sale through the Fanmakers' Company to one hundred and forty persons the right for life to vote for the representation of the City of London at the price of £15 for each such right to vote; and, whether, considering that the number of residents within the City has of late years largely diminished, and that the number of liverymen already amounts to 6,720 persons, he will take steps to abolish this sale of the franchise for political purposes?

MR. ASSHETON CROSS: Sir, I am told that in 1809 the Fanmakers' Company petitioned the Court of Aldermen to be created a livery company, and after consideration that petition was granted, and it was then provided that the number of the livery should not exceed 60, and that the fine for admission was to be £15 a-piece. The Fanmakers' Company, I am told, have recently exhibited great activity in connection with the "mystery of fanmaking;" and it became necessary, in consequence of the number of applications for admission, either to refuse applicants or to apply to the Court of Aldermen, according to the ancient custom, to increase the number of the livery. This application was made by a memorial to the Court of Aldermen, and they agreed that the number of the livery should be increased to 200—that is, an increase of 140. I suppose they were within their right in doing that, and I am told there is no reason to suppose that this was done for political purposes. Further than that I have no answer to make.

MR. W. H. JAMES pointed out that the right hon. Gentleman had not said whether he intended to take any steps in the matter.

MR. ASSHETON CROSS: Sir, I said that further than that I have no answer to give.

IRELAND—REPORT OF THE POOR LAW AND LUNACY COMMISSIONERS.

QUESTION.

MR. FRENCH asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland, If he can inform the House when the Report of the Poor Law and Lunacy Commissioners (Ireland), presented on the 14th February, is likely to be in the hands of Members?

MR. J. LOWTHER: Sir, with regard to the Report of the Poor Law and Lunacy Commissioners, I find that it is a lengthy document, and though a copy of it is, I understand, available for reference, some days will elapse—perhaps a fortnight—before it can be generally circulated; but the utmost despatch will be observed in getting it ready.

SOUTH AFRICA—THE ZULU WAR—FURTHER DESPATCHES.—QUESTION.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON: Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Colonies will be able to state to the House, Whether the Government have received any further telegrams from Madeira in addition to that which has been published as having been addressed to the War Office?

SIR MICHAEL HICKS - BEACH: Sir, the only further telegram I have received is one from Sir Henry Bulwer, giving the names of officers and men of the Colonial and European Forces ascertained to have been killed at Isandula. It contains 58 names. The only commissioned officers named in it are Lieutenant Scott, Quartermaster London, Quartermaster-Sergeant Bullock, Captain Wrottlesly, Captain Bradstreet, and Quartermaster Hitchcock, of the Newcastle Mounted Rifles. I will take care that the full list shall at once be published in the newspapers.

ORDERS OF THE DAY.

SUPPLY.—COMMITTEE.

Order for Committee read.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

INDIAN FINANCE—THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT, 1858.

MOTION FOR A SELECT COMMITTEE.

MR. FAWCETT, in rising to call attention to the inadequate control now exercised over the expenditure of the Revenues of India, and to move—

> "That a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into and report upon the operation of 'The Government of India Act, 1858,' and the other Acts amending the same;"

said, that so far as he was concerned, he believed that what he was about to say might just as well be spoken by any hon. Member on the other side of the House as by one who sat on the Liberal Benches. He rejoiced, too, that his Motion was to be seconded by one who held a high position on the other side of the House. He referred to his hon. Friend the Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate), who was the only survivor on the other side of the House of that famous Committee which sat in 1853 on the affairs of the Government of India, and of which the late Mr. Thomas Baring was the Chairman. On his own side of the House, the only survivors of that Committee were the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone), and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of London (Mr. Lowe). In order to justify the Motion which he had placed on the Paper, it would be necessary to show, in the first place, that the financial condition of India at the present moment was not satisfactory, and that this was due to inadequate control; and then to prove that such an inquiry as he suggested was likely to bring about the desired result. During the last few years a great change had come over the feeling in this country with which questions relating to India were regarded. Opinions which were now generally accepted were five years ago regarded as simply the unreasoning conclusions of a pessimist. The cardinal propositions which he had to submit to the House he would range under six heads. He should show, in the first place, that the net Revenue, or the real available Revenue, of India was less than £38,000,000; secondly, that the Expenditure of that country was increasing more rapidly than its Revenue; thirdly, that the ordinary Revenue was only barely sufficient to meet the ordinary Expenditure, and that, therefore, nothing was left to meet the contingencies of war or of famine; fourthly, that all available sources of taxation were nearly exhausted, and that, therefore, additional expenditure had to be met by increased borrowing; that was also the case with the money spent on Public Works, and the result was that the Debt of the country had steadily and rapidly increased, having doubled within the last 20 years; fifthly, that the Military Expenditure of the country was enormous, and had rapidly increased since the amalgamation of the two Armies, until they were met by the alarming fact that it absorbed about 45 per cent of the entire net Revenue; and, sixthly, that there was an increasing charge upon the Revenue arising out of the loss by exchange, which was perpetually being aggravated by the increase in the Home Charges, which diminished the demand for silver in the East. These six propositions, he submitted, correctly described the financial position of India at the present moment. If the accuracy of any one of these propositions was disputed, he would refer to a fact stated in an announcement which was lately made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The right hon. Gentleman had stated that a loan of £2,000,000 to India, without interest, would be proposed in aid of the expenses of the war in Afghanistan. Now, if India was not legally responsible for the expenses of that war, she ought not to be made to pay them; and if she was so responsible, as the Government said she was, then would not the proposal of such a loan, without interest, to India, be little less than a proclamation of the insolvency of the finances of that country. The Expenditure in India had been steadily increasing, and the control over the Expenditure was inadequate. If it was the fact that the financial condition of India was capable of no improvement, it simply showed that they could not financially govern India; that there was nothing before them but bankruptcy; and that the sooner they wound up the concern the better. But, for his own part, he took no such despairing view of the outlook. He believed it was possible for the House to secure a wiser and better administration of the finances of India, which would cause her resources to be more rapidly developed, and place the finances on a secure and sound basis. When, some 23 years ago, it was proposed to transfer the government of India from the Company to the Crown, there was a certain enthusiasm of public opinion in favour of the abolition of the Company; and, as was so often the case, they rushed precipitately to a conclusion. The merits of the Company were ignored, and its defects prominently brought forward. It was forgotten that the Company provided real and efficient guarantees for economical administration, and that the safeguards which were to be substituted for them were likely to prove, as they had proved, comparatively inefficient. A distinguished and experienced authority, who had served in India in the day of the Company, and also after the transfer—Sir Charles Trevelyan—comparing the government of India under the Company with its government under the Crown, said that the financial administration under the former was "frugal, independent, and resistant to exacting external pressure;" whereas, under the latter, it had been profuse and squeezable. The old East India Company was one of the most powerful Corporations in the world. Its influence was felt in every county and every borough in England. It had great influence in this House, and associated with it was a body having a direct personal interest in the economical administration of the finances of India. If any charge was thrown improperly on India, the old Directors in this House, and the powerful proprietary out-of-doors, would offer an effectual opposition to such a proceeding. The result of that system was that the administration was frugal. The only contention was whether that frugality had not been carried to the length of parsimony. It would be well for India if there were a little of that frugality or parsimony now. When the Company was abolished, both political Parties felt it necessary, if possible, to impose some financial check on the Secretary of State similar to that which had been imposed by the Court of Directors on the President of the Board of Control. The Council of the Secretary of State was accordingly constituted, because it was felt if the Secretary of State was to act alone, and being simply a Member of the English Government, that the financial interests of India would be perpetually sacrificed to the exigencies of English political life. The greatest possible pains were taken, therefore, to give authority and power to the Council. Its members were at first appointed for life, and held their offices on the same tenure as those of the English Judges. That they might be cut off from political influence, they were not permitted to sit in this House. In 1869, however, an Act was passed essentially changing the position of the Council. No longer were the offices of its members to be permanent. They were to be appointed by the Secretary of State; but they were only to hold their offices for 10 years, and at the end of that term they were to be re-appointed by the Secretary of State if he so willed it. It was obvious how important was the change which was thus introduced. If the object of the Council was simply to advise the Secretary of State, there might be good reason for providing for the frequent flow of promotion; but if the object of the Council was to exercise financial control over the Secretary of State, it was of the first importance that they should be made as independent as possible, and so placed that they need not care whether they pleased or displeased the Secretary of State, provided they did their duty. Now, nothing was further from his intention than to bring any charge against the members of the Indian Council. It was impossible, without further inquiry, for any fair-minded man to arrive at a conclusion whether the inadequacy of the financial control lately exercised was due to the Council not having sufficient power, or to its members not making sufficient use of the power intrusted to them. The Council had no power of initiation. They could not bring forward any motion on which they wished to express an opinion, or raise any discussion on any subject on which they desired to offer advice. All they could do was to express their opinion on subjects brought under their notice by the Secretary of State. Under the old system, on the other hand, every despatch had to be submitted to the Directors of the Company, and even secret despatches had to be submitted to the secret committee of the Directors, consisting of the Chairman, Deputy Chairman, and the senior Director of the Company, and, according to the evidence given by Lord Ellenborough before the Committee of 1853, the secret committee of Directors had a right to comment on those despatches, and their comments were brought under the notice of the Cabinet. Thus there was a most important check upon the Secretary of State. At the present time, there was no power of remonstrance on the part of the Council; it was left solely to the Secretary of State to determine what subjects should, or should not, be considered in the secret department. The second great point of difference between the new and old system was this. If, at the present time, a charge were thrown illegally on the Revenues of India, there was no one possessing a legal status to resist the charge; whereas, in the days of the Company, the Directors had a legal status in the Queen's Bench, so that the matter could be tried, as a question of strict law, by the highest Court in the Realm. The third point of difference was, that if a Bill were brought forward in that House affecting India, there was now no security that it would be submitted to or ever considered by the Council, or by any independent body connected with India. Formerly, not only could the members of the Company who sat in that House watch the progress of Bills, but the Company, the Court of Proprietors, or the Directors could be heard at the Bar of the House in opposition to any measure they disapproved. At the present time, the Council was deprived of all powers of controlling subjects of policy; but, under the old *régime,* such was the power of the directors in such matters that, in one memorable instance, the Court of Directors recalled a Governor General because they objected to his policy. Further, if any charge were improperly thrown on the Revenues of India, it was uncertain whether the Council would resist it, and, if they did so, they would have no means of bringing the influence of public opinion to bear on behalf of India; but formerly the Directors of the Company could secure a public discussion through the Court of Proprietors, and the people who were interested had then an opportunity of coming to the rescue; but under the new system all such means of control had passed away. This description of the differences between the old and the present systems of governing India was sufficient to show how weak were the existing guarantees for economy and good administration, as compared with those which existed before the government of India was transferred to the Crown. As to the inadequacy of the financial control, he was prepared to bring forward certain specific facts in illustration of that, which, he thought, could not be gainsaid. Some years ago, a table was issued from the Department of the Controller of the Finances of India, showing the cost of administration under the old and the present systems. In 1856, two years before the abolition of the Company, the cost of administering India — excluding the Army and Public Works Expenditure— was £14,900,000. In 15 years from that time the cost had advanced to £23,200,000, or, in other words, there had been an increase of more than 60 per cent. This increase had continued up to the present time. The cost of stationery and printing in 1856 was £120,000; in 1870-71 it was £230,000; and in 1876-7, it was £440,000, being an increase of nearly 400 per cent. The cost of the Medical Service in 1856 was £170,000; in 1870-71 it was £520,000; and in 1876-7 it was £590,000. The charge for interest in 1856 was £2,200,000; in 1870-71 it was £3,200,000; and in 1876-7 it was £4,400,000. He believed it could be shown that no inconsiderable portion of this remarkable increase in all the items of administration was due to extravagance; but, assuming that not a shilling of the money had been wasted, the matter was not less serious, for they were distinctly living beyond their income, and so long as they continued doing so their embarrassment must increase, till their position in India would become one of hopeless insolvency. He wished now to direct attention to the exact nature of the financial control which had been exercised during the period to which he had referred, when the cost of administration, excluding Army and Public Works Expenditure, had increased by 60 per cent. They were told that the Council was to exercise a supreme financial control. Official Returns in the Appendix to a Blue Book enabled him to give the House a considerable amount of information concerning the financial control of the Council. In directing attention to these facts, he desired to make no charge whatever against the Council, for it was impossible to say that the fact of their not having exercised control was not due to defects in the Act which they were called upon to administer. In numerous instances, he believed, it would be found that it was of little use for the Council to resist because items of expenditure were not brought under their consideration until the outlay had been actually incurred, and all they had to do was to sanction the expenditure after the money had been paid. In the period to which he had referred, the work of dissent was done by an extremely small minority of the Council. He would consider some of the acts of extravagance which during that period were sanctioned, or at least unchallenged by dissent. The Elphinstone Land Company, whose shares were at 330 rupees, the Indian Government bought for 1,000 rupees a-share. The manager of that Company was a member of the firm of Fleming, Nicol and Co., of Glasgow Bank notoriety, and if the secret history of the purchase ever became known, he believed extraordinary disclosures would be made. In any case, no one could deny that £1,000,000 of the money of the Indian people was sacrificed in that transaction. The Orissa Works, which could not be sold in London for £600,000, were purchased for £1,000,000, and £70,000, in addition, was distributed among the officials of the Company during the period referred to. £11,000,000 had been wasted on barracks. The household expenses of the Governor of Bombay were also enormously increased, and it would be easy to cite numerous other instances of reckless extravagance. Since the Act of 1858 was passed a great event, so far as India was concerned, had happened. This event was not expected, and therefore it could not be provided for in the Act of 1858. When that Act was passed India had an Army of her own, and she controlled the large item of her Military Expenditure. Since then the two Armies had been amalgamated, and charge after charge and change after change had been made without a single thought being given as to what the effect on India would be, and without the Indian authorities being consulted. For instance, the pay of the English soldier had been raised 2*d*. a-day, entailing an additional charge of £250,000 a-year on India. The short-service system had been established, which, although it might be a good thing for England, was the most costly system that could be devised for India. But, whether for good or ill, there was no official record to show that a single person connected with the Government of India had been consulted before these changes were made. All the best Indian authorities were opposed to short service, and Lord Canning, who was then Viceroy, protested against it. The change, however, was carried out in the most high-handed manner. The subject was never even mentioned to the Council of the Secretary of State for India until the Secretary came down and said—" Gentlemen, it is no use protesting; your protest will be simply waste paper. The matter has been already decided by the English Cabinet." Yet this change had thrown a charge of £3,000,000 or £4,000,000 a-year on India, and, more than anything else, had led to her financial embarrassment. He had reserved to the last the strongest possible argument which he could advance in support of his Resolution—namely, that the Act of 1858 and the subsequent Acts relating to the Government of India had been so worded that the highest Ministerial and legal authorities differed diametrically as to the meaning and intent of the Statutes. The result was that the law was uncertain, that to a great extent it was disregarded, and that it was concentrated in the hands of the Secretary of State. He would prove it by reference to a remarkable debate on the Bill of 1869, which made the tenure of office by the Council of the Secretary of State no longer permanent. When the Bill was passing through the House of Lords there was a most remarkable debate; he referred to it for no Party purpose, for he agreed with the opinions then expressed by Lord Cairns and Lord Salisbury, and disagreed with those expressed on the other side. Lord Salisbury, ex-Secretary of State, laid down this doctrine in the plainest manner—that by the letter and spirit of the Act of 1858 the Council of the Secretary of State had been intrusted with supreme control, not only on questions purely of expenditure, but upon almost all questions of policy, because there was no question of policy which did not sooner or later involve the question of expense. Lord Salisbury compared the financial control of the Council with the control of the House of Commons over the Expenditure of England. This interpretation of the Act of 1858 was endorsed by Lord Cairns and Lord Chelmsford; but Lord Hatherley, who was then Lord Chancellor, said that no Court of Law would for a moment support the construction put upon the Act by Lord Cairns. If Lord Chancellors and ex-Lord Chancellors, Secretaries of State and ex-Secretaries of State differed diametrically as to the meaning of an Act by which 250,000,000 of people were governed, could it need any words to show that inquiry was necessary and that the time had come when the Act of 1858 ought to be put upon a certain and intelligible basis? Lord Lyveden, who was President of the Board of Control when the first Indian Act of 1858 was introduced, said that the Court of Directors had successfully resisted the whole of the charge for the Persian War being thrown on the Revenues of India, and half the charge was thrown on England; and he added it was felt at the time that if the control of the Board of Directors was abolished it would be absolutely necessary to give similar control to some other body. Therefore this Act was passed. But he believed the Council had not been so much as consulted as to what portion of the expense of the Afghan Campaign should be borne by India. In the same debate, in answer to the Duke of Argyll, Lord Cairns made the remarkable declaration that, even if Russia were to invade Afghanistan, the consent of the Council must be obtained before war was declared against Russia. But such was the uncertainty of the law that Lord Cairns was a Member of the Government which 10 years later invaded Afghanistan, and not only did not obtain the consent of the Council, but, as they knew from the Ministerial answer given in that House, did not even consult it. He knew that members of the Council were as anxious as men could be to have an opportunity of recording their opinions. So great was the uncertainty of the law that the authority and control of the Council were being gradually frittered away. He knew members of the Council who, if this Committee were granted, would come forward and boldly say, rather than such a state of things should continue, it would be better the Council of the Secretary of State should be abolished. If they wanted to get at the opinion of these 15 men of great Indian experience, as in November last, it was felt to be a great misfortune that the members of the Council could not be consulted. They could only learn indirectly what their opinions were. The two most important clauses in the Act were the 54th and 55th, which declared that if India engaged in war the fact must be announced within one month if Parliament was sitting, and within three months if Parliament was not sitting, and that the Revenues of India could not be employed beyond the Frontiers of India without the consent of Parliament; but scarcely any two lawyers agreed as to the extent to which these two clauses controlled each other. The facts he had brought forward showed that the Act of 1858 urgently needed amendment. The rule in matters of importance and difficulty was that legislation should be preceded by inquiry. In the days of the Company the Charter used to be renewed for only 20 years, and at each interval there was an inquiry into the government of India. Among the many labours to which they could look back with pride there was nothing they could refer to with greater satisfaction than the records of the Committees which sat on the Government of India in 1808, 1832, and 1853. On each of these Committees there sat most eminent men. On that of 1808 Lord Castlereagh, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Wilberforce, and the Duke of Wellington sat. On that of 1832 were Mr. Robert Grant, Mr. Charles Grant, Sir George Grey, and almost every man of eminence in the House. On the Committee of 1853 were Mr. Macaulay, Mr. Cobden, Mr. Hume, Lord John Russell, Lord Palmerston, and others most familiar with the subject. These were precedents for such a Committee as he now asked for. But, it might be objected, the time was unsuitable. Why? Because it was said they were on the eve of a Dissolution. But the most important of the three Committees to which he had referred—that of 1832—sat in the Session when the Reform Bill was passed and when a Dissolution was certain in the autumn. That Committee took most exhaustive evidence and made a most memorable and able Report. Why should a Committee not sit in 1879?

Another reason why there should be no delay with regard to this inquiry was that no evidence could be more important than that of Lord Lawrence, Sir Charles Trevelyan, and others who had filled important official positions both under the old and new systems. But Lord Lawrence was advancing in years, and, except Lord Northbrook, he was the only survivor of the illustrious men who had filled the office of Viceroy, and was the only Viceroy who had held an official position before the East India Company was abolished, and the loss of his views, founded on his vast knowledge and experience, would be irreparable. No dispassionate person would deny that the financial position of India at present was unsatisfactory; and that if things were permitted to go on a financial embarrassment would soon arise which would not only put a severe strain on our resources, but would cause taxation to be imposed on the people, which they would regard as an intolerable burden, and make them feel that the rule of England was the reverse of a blessing. In bringing this Motion forward he was not actuated by any Party motive. He believed that all parties alike desired that our Indian Empire should rest on the growing contentment of the people; and he asked the House, before it was too late, resolutely to set to work to place on a secure and more economical basis the finances of a country whose poverty must excite their commiseration, and the well-being of whose people should engage their anxious, their watchful, and their constant care. The hon. Member concluded by moving the Resolution of which he had given Notice.

Amendment proposed,

To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into and report upon the operation of 'The Government of India Act, 1858,' and the other Acts amending the same,"—(*Mr. Fawcett,*)

—instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

MR. A. MILLS said, he believed the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett) had done good service in bringing forward this question, but doubted whether this was a seasonable time to make such an inquiry as was proposed. There were two or three clauses of the Act of 1858 that were obviously inconsistent. He would more particularly mention the 41st and the 27th clauses. The former provided that there should be no actual expenditure from the Revenues of India without the control of the Secretary of State in Council, and that no appropriation of any such Revenues should be made without a majority of votes in the Council; while the 27th clause was to the effect that any order not being an order for which a majority of votes was necessary might, after the commencement of the Act, be sent by the Secretary of State without a meeting of the Council. It was thus competent for the Secretary of State—although he could not, without the consent of the Council, order so insignificant a charge on the Revenues of India as the cost of mending an armchair in the India Office—on his own authority to send a despatch which might involve India in a costly war without the slightest possibility of any control being exercised by the Council, though that, in truth, was the very object and function of the Council. If the House desired to treat the matter seriously and wisely, it could only do so by amending the Act of 1858. That would have to be done sooner or later; though he could not say whether or not the appointment of a Committee was the best way of approaching the subject. With regard to another point: the hon. Member for Hackney had alluded to the increased charge thrown on the Indian Revenue by the Amalgamation Act of 1860. Probably very few persons realized what that increase was; but it was a fact that under the old system, before the Amalgamation Act, the average military charge in India was £12,000,000; while the average since the passing of that Act was no less than £16,000,000. That sum was solely for the ordinary military charges, and not for such exceptional expenses as those consequent on an Afghan War. The main point was, whether it was possible so to construct the whole government of India as to keep the power and responsibility in the hands of the Secretary of State, at the same time investing the Council with a real financial control. He did not think that would be impossible, particularly as the Indian Council were elected on the ground of their knowledge of Indian finance, and as the exercise of their discretion in time past had proved their capacity for power. The hon. Member for Hackney had described the Council as tongue-tied, and unable to criticize the Secretary of State. That was, to some extent, an exaggeration; but the point was, not that members of the Council could not express their opinions freely, but that they had little or no controlling power. Sooner or later some step must be taken in amending the Act of 1858, and, in his (Mr. Mill's) opinion, the sooner the better. It was no objection to immediate action to talk of the present House as a moribund Parliament. To that phrase he strongly objected. But, after all, if their political future was but brief, that very fact ought all the more to stimulate their energies; otherwise it might be argued with equal force that the entire Session ought to be spent in idleness and inactivity.

Mr. GRANT DUFF agreed with a great many, though by no means with all, the observations that had fallen from his hon. Friend the Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett). The hon. Member wished to persuade the House that the financial control now exercised over Indian expenditure was inadequate, and sought a remedy in the appointment of a Select Committee to consider the working of the Government of India Act and the other Acts amending the same. After listening to his hon. Friend's statement, he still held the opinion that among the many and great evils that already afflicted, and the still greater evils that threatened, Indian finance, an inadequate control over expenditure found no place. If an elaborate machinery of control, constantly and carefully worked during the last 20 years, could have made our Indian expenditure a thing agreeable to contemplate, we should have had great reason to be satisfied. But the machinery for controlling Indian expenditure had been, at various periods of our history, very indifferent; and the evils that were wrought even in the worst times by a defective system of control were as nothing compared to the ill effects of errors in our general policy. If the state of the finances of India were, as he admitted it to be, a subject for uneasiness and alarm, it was the result of grave errors in recent policy, not of any defective control. It would be generally admitted that an effective financial control over the Indian Executive must be exercised in England, and by the one authority greater than the Viceroy—namely, the Secretary of State and his Council. Some persons imagined that the power of the Council was shadowy. He maintained that it was enormous, and would mention one fact. He could speak only of what had occurred under the administration of the Duke of Argyll; but, except on very rare occasions, the same procedure had, no doubt, been followed by all Secretaries of State for India. While the Duke of Argyll was at the India Office, there must have been something over 100 questions submitted for the decision of the Indian Council every week. He was there for more than five years, and he had never once overruled his Council, so that, in that time, they had said as a body "Yes" or "No" to nearly 30,000 questions, many of them of the greatest possible importance. Could a body be said to have only a shadowy power to which not only every question directly relating to any appropriation to be made, or any grant to be given, from the Revenues of India was necessarily submitted, but which, in practice, decided upon almost every large question connected with India? He said upon almost every question, for there were, as was well known, certain reservations made in the legislation which governed the powers of the Council. There were some people—not very many, he believed—who would sweep away these reservations, and who thought that every question connected with India should be finally decided by the vote of the Indian Council. There were others who thought that every question should be submitted to it, and that its advice should necessarily be taken on absolutely every subject. To the first of these propositions he would be entirely opposed; against the second he should have a good deal to advance if this were the time to discuss it. He would only now observe that the question resolved itself into this—Was Parliament to be the supreme arbiter of Indian as of all other affairs, or was it not? If Parliament was not to remain the supreme arbiter, he did not know that this high trust could be in better hands than those of the Indian Council, consisting, as it did, of the picked men of Indian experience. But was Parliament prepared, on the advice of any Committee, however composed, to abdicate its power into the hands of any Council, however able? This would be to take a most momentous step—to go back not only upon the legislation of 1858, but on that of 1784. For, although before 1858 there was what was called a double Government, Parliament had been the supreme arbiter of Indian affairs for two generations and a-half before the abolition of the Court of Directors and the Board of Control. If anyone doubted this, let him re-read the debates which arose in the Session of 1858, and more especially the speech of his right hon. Friend the Member for the University of London (Mr. Lowe), in which he narrated his experiences of the so-called double Government, gained as Secretary to the Board of Control. That speech had not been answered by any debater, and never would be answered either by philosopher or by historian. He had heard out-of-doors that it would be desirable to amend the Government of India Act in the sense of having something like the old Secret Committee, which consisted of the President of the Board of Control and the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Court of Directors; but hon. Members who had examined into the question must have found that the "Secret Committee" was simply another name for the President of the Board of Control; and he should be much surprised to learn that, even in recent affairs which did not come before the Council, individual counsellors had not exercised more influence than was ever exercised by the "two chairs" in the old days of the Company. But it was said the Court of Directors exercised a very real power in that they were able to recall the Governor General. In one case in all history the Court did so; and in that particular instance he should be very much surprised if the Governor General was not recalled with the good wishes of the Ministry of the day. But should not the Council have the same power? If it had, you would have this anomaly—a Cabinet irresponsible to Parliament would have the power of opposing on a vital matter a Cabinet responsible to Parliament, and the very first time it did so the power would be taken away. The Court of Directors had represented at least the money interests of the proprietors; whereas the Indian Council would have no constituency to fall back on. His hon. Friend the Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett) always looked back upon the rule of the Company as a kind of golden age. But that golden age was about as sterling metal as other golden ages. We had not yet learned to govern India with perfect wisdom; but we were a good deal nearer doing so than we had been 20 years ago, owing, in great measure, to the continuous action of enlightened English opinion exerted through Parliament upon the great, broad questions of Indian affairs. He spoke only of the great broad questions, for he thought that all that interference with details which some persons had tried to induce the House to engage in had been either mischievous or futile. Details should be left exclusively to the authorities in India, to the Indian Council, and to the Secretary of State. He wished to express no opinion upon the question whether it would or would not be expedient at the beginning of a new Parliament to have a Committee selected from both Houses, and on which every man who had a considerable acquaintance with Indian affairs should serve, to discuss the present system of Indian government. That Committee, however, if it was to do any good, must be presided over by a statesman of the greatest authority. He also expressed no opinion as to whether the Government of India Act might not be amended. He thought that much might be said for a short declaratory Act to settle the question, which had been discussed in "another place" in the year 1869, as to what the statutory powers of the Council with reference to finance were meant by Parliament to be. These questions, however, were not now before the House. The question before them was whether they should refer to a Select Committee of that House alone, at a moment when they had, thanks to the accidents of Elections, by no means a large number of men of Indian experience in it, and when the House, even if it lived out its days, was certainly not very far from its end, the whole constitution of Indian government, on the ground of the control now exercised over expenditure not being sufficient. He thought that the control now exercised by the Council over expenditure was sufficient. This was not the time, and a Select Committee of that House alone was not the way, to inquire into the Government of India Act, and he must accordingly decline to support his hon. Friend the Member for Hackney. He should be very sorry, however, if anyone were to suppose that he did not think the state of Indian finances very unsatisfactory, or that the Government of India Act was susceptible of amendment. The Indian Government, when the late Government handed it over to their Successors, was in the position of a great landowner who was somewhat embarrassed, but could just pay his way. It was now in the position of a great landowner who, having had a succession of bad years from no fault of his own, had bad the folly to involve himself in an expensive lawsuit with a neighbour, the least unsatisfactory issue of which would be the acquisition of an estate which would be a *damnosa hæreditas* indeed, requiring an expenditure upon it which might easily, in a few years' time, lead him to destruction.

Mr. ONSLOW said, he differed from the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett) with respect to the financial condition of the old East India Company, which was its great weakness; and he had been surprised to hear the hon. Member assert that economy had been one of the strongest points of that Company. The following figures he had carefully tabulated from the records of the House, and he could vouch for their accuracy. From the years 1814 to 1860, inclusive, there had only been surpluses in 13 years, amounting together to £8,895,000, while there had been deficits in the remaining 33 years amounting to £72,200,000—that was, an average surplus for 13 years of £684,200, and an average deficit for 33 years of £5,540,000. Between 1800 and 1859 the Debt had been increased in 44 years, while it had been diminished in 15 years only; so that, up to that time, we had in the aggregate a huge deficit, and a substantial accretion of Debt. When Mr. Wilson went out to India, in 1859, there had been a deficit for four years, amounting to £37,000,000. And all this was under the old East India Company. Thus it was clear that during the rule of that Company there were far larger deficits than since the Crown had taken the affairs of India under its direct control. Now, he would be the last person to blame too much the acts of the old East India Company; but, still, the figures adduced would, he thought, show that however much there might have been a desire for economy, still the East India Company were not successful in the administration of the finances of India. It had been truly remarked that the finance of India was a matter of surprise, because the chief part of the Revenue was derived from opium, and it was never known whether the Estimate would in any year be realized or exceeded; while at any time numerous little wars, or panics, or famines, or even cyclones, might overthrow the best calculations. In these circumstances, he could not see how the appointment of a Committee of that House could prevent the finance of India being a matter of surprise. It was impossible all at once to Americanize Indian institutions, which must be dealt with tentatively and gradually. He believed that the waste of money in India was not owing to the extravagance of Viceroys or of their Councils, but to the pressure brought to bear upon the Secretary of State by hon. Members in that House, who compelled him to force the Viceroys to spend money on objects which the latter were aware would be of no practical use, or, at all events, not so useful as many other projects. Taking the case of the building of the barracks in India: every hon. Member in that House respected Miss Nightingale, who had done so much good for our soldiers; but that lady, having gone out to India and seen the condition of the barracks there, had put such pressure upon that House, and upon the Secretary of State, that no less than £12,000,000 had been spent upon the erection of new barracks there which were practically of very little use, and, therefore, that money might be said to have been thrown away in pursuit of this philanthropic object. He did not see how the Viceroy could have resisted the pressure that was then brought to bear upon him, though, backed by his Council, he should have refused to consent to this extravagant expenditure. It must, however, be remembered that that extravagance originated, not in India, but at home. It was also owing to pressure at home that so many millions more than were necessary were spent in relief of the Famine in 1874. It was impossible for any Committee sitting even three days a-week to frame an adequate Report upon this subject in the course of a single Session. The hon. Member for Hackney said that their great object should be the contentment of the people of India; but he met that statement by asserting that the people of India were far more contented now than they were under the rule of the old East India Company. The hon. Member had further objected to the members of the Council being appointed for 10 years only; but that was far better than the old system, under which many members scarcely did anything in return for the large salaries they received, owing to physical incapacity. He could assure the hon. Member that hon. Members on that side of the House took quite as deep an interest in the welfare of India as he did; and he trusted that in discussing this question Party feelings would not be allowed to interfere. On these grounds, he submitted that no practical good would result from the proposal of the hon. Member being agreed to.

MR. LAING said, he recognized the very difficult position in which the finances of India now stood. The word "unsatisfactory" had been used; but to his mind that word was not strong enough, for the country was now drifting with accelerating rapidity into the gulf of bankruptcy. He disagreed with the policy of taxing any further the people of India for the purpose of getting a surplus, and the Government should exercise a wise economy by so managing the finances as not to increase the deficits. If a wise and prudent policy had been followed, India would now have found herself in a much better position than she was in. If the military expenditure had been economically managed, she might have found herself in a position of perfect solvency, with a surplus and diminished taxation. India had been overtaken by financial and commercial calamities which nobody could foresee. They should remember, that according to Sir John Strachey's figures, the whole net Revenue of India was beween £37,000,000 and £38,000,000 sterling. It was a complete delusion to talk about £70,000,000. Out of that sum they had been affected to the extent of not less than £5,000,000 a-year by two unforeseen calamities. The depreciation of silver had led to an estimated loss in the current year of £3,500,000; and they had also had a succession of Famines calling for a heavy expenditure, and for a Famine Insurance Fund which was estimated at £1,500,000. Those two items took away £5,000,000 out of the £37,500,000, which was all they had to meet the whole expenditure of India. The military expenditure, which was, in round numbers, £17,000,000, had to be defrayed out of the £37,500,000, or rather out of the £32,500,000, which was all they had left if they made those inevitable deductions for the loss by the exchange on silver, and for the necessity of providing against the recurrence of Famine. They had been going on steadily from bad to worse financially in India, and spending more than they received. The pressure of the Debt during 20 years had been doubled, and during the last few years, owing to the depreciation of silver and the Afghan War, that Debt was going on at an accelerating rate. They were coming very closely up to the point where the people of India must look fairly in the face the question of what they were going to do if India, very much from the consequences of their policy, became insolvent. If they could not either increase the Revenue or diminish the Expenditure, the simplest child in a national school could tell them there was only one result before them—namely, that, as had happened with Turkey, Egypt, Spain, and other countries, they would find India landed in financial bankruptcy. Now, he maintained that they could not increase the Revenue of India. That was proved by a sort of *reductio ad absurdum.* The attempt was made last year to establish a Famine Insurance Fund. It was found that to keep up the show of solvency they must raise £1,500,000 by fresh taxation from the people of India, and they were driven to such straits that they had to impose a 5 per cent licence-tax on men earning 4*s.* per week, and also to increase the salt tax. That was proof positive that they could not increase their available Revenue by any mode of laying on additional taxation. They had given the last turn to the screw. Their Revenue was all derived from about six sources. They could not increase the land revenue, except, perhaps, by means of improved cultivation—a very slow and gradual process. Their receipts from opium were very precarious. They were liable to be affected by contingencies arising in China, and by the competition of the native-grown product in that country. When they tried to increase their opium revenue in one year, that tended to diminish it in the following year. If it went up one year, it generally went down the next, and they could not reckon on any steady increase from that source. It had been held out to them that they were to cover the expenses of the Afghan War by the extra receipts from opium, but that prospect had vanished. Another head of Revenue was the Customs. An impending Dissolution was in the air, and they had heard of the pressure which Lancashire was likely to employ to obtain the remission of the Indian import duties. It was therefore more likely that they would have a diminution rather than an increase of the Indian Customs revenue. Again, the salt tax was now at a much higher point than it ought to be, and it was very desirable to equalize it by levelling it downwards. Neither could they look for much more from Stamps. In fact, taxation in India had reached its extreme limits, if it did not already even go beyond the bounds which humanity and political prudence should prescribe for it. Then, as to their expenditure—£17,000,000 of which was for the Army—no doubt, by a vigorous and close economy, they could save a little here and there; but they had really a very small amount to work upon. The £4,500,000 of interest upon the Debt they could not touch; neither could they cut down the superannuations. The charges for law, justice, and police, over a country as big as Europe, and containing nearly 200,000,000 of population, took £5,500,000—a sum which could not easily be reduced. Then they had only about £7,000,000 left. The general administration and miscellaneous expenditure absorbed about £3,500,000. As regarded the loss from the alteration in the value of silver, they could no more evade it than they could evade the effect of a bad season on the harvest. The position in which they now were with regard to the question of the stock of silver brought them face to face with the Army expenditure. When he was in India he had to meet a deficit of £6,000,000, which had to be cleared away in two years. That was only to be done by economy, and economy in India meant military reduction. Of the £6,000,000 reduction, £5,000,000 were in the Army and Navy. Was there any prospect whatever of the military expenditure now being reduced? That was the whole problem; and it was a question not of detail but of policy. The British Government had increased the expenses of the Army in India, first by the amalgamation of the Services, by doing away with a separate Indian Army, contrary to the best advice at the time, and by the introduction of an extravagant Staff system; and, second, by the short-service system, which had led to a great increase in the cost of transport. Well, that was gone; and he would be too sanguine if he hoped they would get back to the old system. What remained? It only remained to reduce the numbers of the Army. If India could have been kept in a state of peace—no external wars—the swell of the great Mutiny tempest subsiding, the country being traversed by railways and growing richer, he thought the wise policy would have been to follow up the labours of Lord Mayo and Lord Northbrook. He spoke from no Party point of view. The death of Lord Mayo was deeply to be lamented. If they could have had a second Lord Mayo instead of Lord Lytton, and Lord Mayo's policy supported by the Home Government, the country might have effected large military reductions, and, instead of an expenditure of £17,000,000, which would be augmented by the Afghan War and the extension of the Frontier, they might have done with £15,000,000 or £15,500,000. Both ends might have been made to meet, notwithstanding the silver calamity, without fresh taxation. As matters stood now, what was the prospect? Did anyone suppose that the Afghan War was going to cost anything like the figure—£950,000—thrown out by the Government? They might as well call it £95,000. Mr. Forbes was certainly not a bad authority. He was the correspondent of *The Daily News*, and was so well known to them all by his admirable accounts of military affairs. He was the best military correspondent, one would say, and he said it was perfectly childish to suppose that they would get out of the Afghan War without paying £5,000,000; that if they did, they would be exceedingly well off. Most hon. Members recollected the China and Abyssinian Wars, the Estimates, and the ultimate Expenditure. It appeared to him (Mr. Laing) that the £2,000,000 talked of had been arrrived at by a rough estimate that the war would cost £4,000,000, and that England would pay half. As to the £2,000,000 to be advanced to India as a loan without interest, did anyone suppose that that "loan" would ever be repaid by India unless by India raising fresh loans? Would it be paid out of savings of Revenue? What was the conclusion they must come to? That there was something impending, and that upon the eve of a General Election it was not desirable to impose more taxes on the people of England than were necessary. Therefore, that loan was put to a suspense account, without any idea that it would be repaid. Whatever might be the cost of the Afghan War, did anyone suppose that they could get a diminution of military expenditure by extending the Frontier of India—by securing a scientific Frontier? He had seen in some influential organs of the Press—or organs that used to be influential—the statement that now they had got a scientific Frontier, they had nothing to do but to reduce their Army one-half. That was so puerile, that he might pass it by. An extended Frontier required a large number of stations and garrisons, and the men at those extreme points would be no longer available at a distance in India. There was one great mistake made—and it was, in his opinion, the only mistake made by Canning—after the Mutiny. The opportunity ought to have been seized to disband the Native Armies, which now, he believed, were numerically stronger than their own Army. They could not risk again the dangers which were incurred during that Mutiny. Then, were they prepared to say boldly to these Native Princes—"This sort of thing cannot go on. You must disarm. We will protect you against internal and external enemies?" Unless something of that kind was done, it would be impossible to diminish the Indian Army, especially as it from time to time became necessary to send portions of that Army to distant points from which they could not return promptly to repress disturbances that might arise in other parts of the country. On this point there were no greater authorities than Lord Sandhurst, who combined the qualities of a statesman with those of a soldier, and Sir Henry Norman. The first of those authorities had stated his opinion that to extend the Frontier of India into Afghanistan would involve an additional annual expenditure of no less than £3,000,000; and Sir Henry Norman's view was, that the maintenance of a so-called "scientific Frontier" would cost at least an additional £1,500,000 per annum. If they were going to put £1,500,000 sterling as the additional expense to their military expenditure, he wanted to know how, if they put that on the top of the deficit which they had owing to their loss by the exchange in silver and the Famine Fund, they proposed to go on? Had the Government fully looked that matter in the face? Did the Government propose additional taxation? If not, how was the augmented expenditure to be met? Unless the Government were prepared to levy fresh taxation, how long did they imagine they could go on tiding over their difficulties by fresh loans, unless those loans were backed up by British guarantees? He warned the Government that such a condition of things could not last very long, and in the end England would have to pay the bill. In these circumstances, he ventured to urge that it was high time the House of Commons investigated the matter; and he was of opinion that the appointment of a Committee, before which witnesses could be examined who were thoroughly conversant with the subject, would tend to the education—the necessary education —of Her Majesty's Ministers in one of the most important branches of the duty which they had to perform, and that such education would re-act upon the Viceroy, who had to manage the affairs of India on the spot.

MR. NEWDEGATE: Mr. Speaker, while I rejoice that this debate has been carried on with comparative freedom from Party feeling in the temper of the discussions which I remember during the existence of the East India Company, still I feel that the position of this House, although we have the advantage of the experience of the hon. Member who has just sat down (Mr. Laing), is greatly weakened by the Statutes, which forbid any member of the Indian Council from occupying a seat in Parliament. I regret that prohibition all the more, because in the last resort, as was ably stated by the late Secretary of State for India, the Parliament of England must be held responsible for the government of India. This House owes reparation to the people of that country. In 1869 Statutes, which at present govern India, were passed. There was a debate in the House of Lords, where these measures were introduced; and in the course of discussion the highest legal authorities at that time—Lord Cairns, Lord Hatherley, and the highest Indian authorities, including at least one ex-Governor General of India—were at variance with each other as to the purport of these Bills, and the interpretation to be put upon their provisions. These Bills came down to this House, and here there was positively scarcely one word spoken upon either Bill, at any of their stages. It was one of the most extraordinary instances I ever knew, in my somewhat long experience, of important measures passing this House without debate. Here was an Act—the principal Act—which totally changed the responsibility of the several persons of the Body entrusted with the supreme Executive Government of India, and yet these Bills were allowed to slip through the House of Commons without the semblance of debate. I, for one, expected that these Bills would be deferred to another Session; still I was on the watch; but the principal stage, the final stage, of these Bills passed at 40 minutes after 12 o'clock at night, quite at the end of the Session. These Bills were passed without one word of real debate, and without apparently the slightest consideration. I refer hon. Members to *Hansard* for the verification of that statement. There were doubts as to the interpretation of the principal Act of 1869. We know that these doubts existed after the measure passed the House of Lords. The manner in which the Act was allowed to slip through this House in 1869 is a strong additional reason in support of the Motion of the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett). It appeared to me that the hon. Member for the Elgin Burghs (Mr. Grant Duff), the late Under Secretary of State for India, spoke as if the Motion of the hon. Member for Hackney had reference only to the financial affairs of India. That supposition seems to me very strange, when I remember that the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Grant Duff) has had considerable Indian experience, and must have known that measures have subsequently passed greatly altering—reforming, I suppose it is called—the Act of 1858. What are the terms of the Motion of the hon. Member for Hackney?—

> "That a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into, and report upon, the operation of the Government of India Act, 1858, and the other Acts amending the same,"

the chief of which subsequent Acts is the Act of 1869. Perhaps the House will allow me to show how grave a change was made in the form of government in India by that Act, or rather two Acts, c. 97 and c. 98 of 1869. I will refer to an authority, which cannot be supposed to be influenced by any Party considerations. In the *Statesman's Year Book for* 1867 I find the following description of the form of government at that time:—

> "The administration of the Indian Empire is entrusted by the Charter of August 2, 1858, to a Council of State for India. The Council consists of fifteen members, of whom seven are elected by the Court of Directors from their own body, and eight are nominated by the Crown. Vacancies in the Council, if among those nominated, are filled up by Her Majesty, and if among the elected, by an election by the other members of the Council; but the major part of the Council must be of persons who have served or resided 10 years in India, and have not left India more than 10 years previous to the date of their appointment."

Here is a description, of the present form of government, taken from the *Statesman's Year Book for* 1877, and I quote from this authority because it gives a summary, and I have almost invariably found this work reliable—

> "The Government of the Indian Empire is entrusted by Act 21 and 22, Victoriæ cap. 106, amended by 32 and 33 Victoriæ, cap. 97, to a Secretary of State for India, aided by a Council of fifteen members, of whom at first seven were elected by the Court of Directors from their own body, and eight were nominated by the Crown. In future, vacancies in the Council will be filled up by the Secretary of State for India."

I need not point out to the House how enormous is the change which has taken place in the constitution of the Government of India, consequent upon the passing of this Act. As I have already stated, the leading Members of the House of Lords differed as to the purport and interpretation of the first and chief of the two Acts of 1869. I think this is a ground why this House, which allowed the Acts of 1869 to pass without debate, ought to make reparation to the people of India by now performing the duty which we ought to have performed in 1869. Reference has been made to the Revenues of India at various periods under the East India Company's administration. The hon. Member for Guildford (Mr. Onslow) stated that there were larger excesses of expenditure, larger deficits during the rule of the Company than there have been since the Crown has taken the affairs of India under its control, and that a great deal of pressure for the expenditure of money in India really originated in this country. I would remind the hon. Member that there have been great practical changes in the Government of India during the long period to which he referred, and that the cost of the acquisition of large territories must involve the outlay of capital as well as income. A Petition was presented to this House, in 1858, by my late Friend, Mr. Thomas Baring, on behalf of the East India Company, who were then aware that the Government of India would be transferred to the Crown. In that document they say—

> "Your Petitioners cannot well conceive a worse form of government for India than a Minister with a Council, whom he should be at liberty to consult or not at his pleasure, or whose advice he should be able to disregard, without giving his reasons in writing, and in a manner likely to carry conviction. Such an arrangement, your Petitioners submit, would be really liable to the objections, in their opinion, erroneously urged against the present system. Your Petitioners respectfully represent, that any body of persons, associated with the Minister, which is not a check, will be a screen. Unless the Council is so constituted as to be personally independent of the Minister, unless it feels itself responsible for recording an opinion on every Indian subject, and pressing that opinion on the Minister, whether it is agreeable to him or not, and unless the Minister, when he overrules their opinion, is bound to record his reasons, their existence will only serve to weaken his responsibility, and to give the colourable sanction of prudence to measures, in the framing of which those qualities have had no share."

These statements were made in 1858, and had weight in the framing of the Statute of that year, 11 years before the Act of 1869, which gave effect to the system thus deprecated by anticipation, was passed; and I ask whether, in the result, the prediction of the Petitioners, this body of experts, has not been in many respects fulfilled—whether, by having passed the Act of 1869, without due consideration in this House, we have not really reduced the Council to total and speechless subordination to the Secretary of State; whether having reduced the Council to such a position, there is not great danger of its becoming, unconsciously perhaps, simply a screen for the Secretary of State, instead of its serving as a check upon both his legislative acts and upon the expenditure? I fully admit that my knowledge of these subjects is old; that it has been drawn from my having served on the Committee of 1853, and taken part in the debates of that year, and also in the discussions of 1858, when I enjoyed the confidence of the late Lord Derby. But I, humbly and respectfully, submit, that since the year 1858 the House of Commons has never seriously considered this most important subject, the form and method of the Government of India; and I respectfully urge that the time has come when, in justice to the people of India, and ultimately in justice to the people of this country, this House is bound to repair the oversight and neglect of 1869, and gravely to consider the form of government to which it will delegate the exercise of the supreme authority over India. The House cannot divest itself of responsibility in this matter. Are we to give up India? I ask the House that question. If we are not to give up India, then, I would ask, whence is this deficit of Revenue, the great excess of Indian expenditure, to be supplied? Must not any ultimate deficit be supplied out of the Revenues of this country? I, for one, believe that this country will not give up India. But I can see that, if we are to go on guaranteeing debt, it will land us in grave difficulties. Guaranteeing debt is simply the equivalent of postponing payment. Therefore, on the part of the people of England, I urge the House to adopt the proposal of the hon. Member for Hackney; and I cannot conceive any hon. Member of the House, or any Member of Her Majesty's Government, would find that he had suffered in the estimation of the constituencies of this country, if they were to turn their attention to this great and important task. I see the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham (Mr. John Bright) in his place. We have long differed on questions of commercial policy. I must say that I view with apprehension the fact that the commercial difficulties and other causes are inducing the local Governments of the Colonies and of India to impose heavy import duties upon the produce of this country, in the case of some Colonies amounting to from 17 to 20 per cent. If there be any value in the doctrines of Free Trade, I trust that my right hon. Colleague for Birmingham will apply himself to urging the application of those doctrines within the British Empire.

Mr. E. STANHOPE said, that when he heard the Notice of the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett) given, he confessed it was with some regret he learned that the hon. Member thought it his duty to bring this somewhat delicate question under the attention of the House; because it might appear to some persons out-of-doors who were unacquainted with the subject to imply that some difficulty had arisen in the matter, and that the relations between the Secretary of State and his Council had reached a point requiring the interposition of the Legislature. Nothing could possibly be further from the fact. The relations between the Council of India and the noble Lord the Secretary of State, and he might add also the late Secretary of State, were cordial and harmonious. The machinery which had been devised by the wisdom of Parliament for the government of India was working almost without friction; and if difficulties should arise, or had arisen, in the course of business, he was confident they would be overcome, as they had been overcome, by the exercise of tact or of forbearance either on the one side or on the other. Hon. Members who had addressed the House had called its attention, to a very considerable extent, to the existing position of Indian finance. The hon. Member for Orkney (Mr. Laing) would forgive him if he did not follow him into all the intricacies of that subject—the more that many of them were not involved in the question before the House. He proposed rather to address himself to the substantial point at issue; but, at the same time, he could not allow one or two statements of the hon. Member for Orkney to pass without a word of reply. The hon. Member had attempted to ridicule the Estimate brought forward in December last as to the expense of the Afghan Expedition. He was glad to be able to inform the House that as far as he had any information at that moment—and he would have better next week—the Estimate of the Government had been borne out completely. He had stated what he believed would be required during the course of the present financial year, and he had reason to believe, from private letters he had received, that the Estimate would not be exceeded. He would reserve a statement as to the expenditure in the next financial year until the introduction of the Budget. He should like also to say a word as to what was constantly repeated in that House with reference to the salt tax. A great number of hon. Members appeared to think the increase in the salt tax was for the purpose of providing a Famine Insurance Fund. This was not at all the fact. The increase had been made for the purpose of equalizing the salt duty all over India. He should be much surprised if it were not found at the conclusion of the financial year that this step had been a bold and wise one, which had led to a considerable increase in the consumption of salt in Northern India and, he hoped, to no decrease in the South. The hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett) had alluded to the present financial condition of India; and here he felt bound to say that he had a deep debt of gratitude to the hon. Member for a recent utterance of his in relation to that subject. He referred to an article from his pen in one of the monthly magazines. If the controversies on this question were always conducted in the fair and candid tone in which that article was written, they might soon be able to arrive at some means of improving the financial condition of India. He could hardly be expected to enter into a discussion of the broad and general propositions which the hon. Member had laid down to-night with reference to Indian finance. He was quite ready to admit that they contained a great deal of truth; but they also contained a great deal that would necessitate explanation on his part. He should be prepared to go into details on a suitable occasion; but if he refused to go into all the hon. Member's propositions at present, he hoped it would not be understood that he assented to them all. But there was one of his statements which he would allude to at once. The hon. Member had characterized the proposed loan of £2,000,000 to India during the coming financial year as, if legal, practically a proclamation of bankruptcy. Such a statement was really very hard.

MR. FAWCETT : I did not say it was illegal. I said, that if it was contended that India ought to bear the whole charge of the war and you then advanced her money without interest, it shows she cannot pay it.

MR. E. STANHOPE said, that if it was felt necessary that India should pay the expenses of the war, and £2,000,000 were advanced to her without interest, that was, according to the hon. Member, a proclamation of bankruptcy. The statement was a very hard one from the hon. Member for Hackney, who took so great an interest in the affairs of India, as he must be aware of the very difficult position they were at present placed in owing to the loss experienced by exchange. This was a matter beyond the control of Government, and one entirely independent of foreign affairs. The loss by exchange amounted during the present financial year to £3,500,000, and during the coming year it was expected to be still greater. In these peculiar circumstances, it was not fair to speak of the proposed loan as a proclamation of bankruptcy. The hon. Member had called attention to the very great growth of expenditure which had arisen since the time of the East India Company. No Minister who was responsible for the finance of India could fail to admit that this growth of expenditure, and the consequent charge on the Indian Revenue, was a source of very great anxiety. If any means of diminishing it could be suggested, Members would grasp at them with great satisfaction. But he must remind the hon. Member of statements that had been made upon this subject. The hon. Member for Orkney (Mr. Laing) pointed out the extreme difficulty of really reducing any expenditure except the Army expenditure; and Lord Northbrook had stated in the summer that he could not look forward in the immediate future to any substantial reduction of expenditure. And the fact really was that if any reduction of expenditure was to be made it would not be by general recommendations from home on the part of the Secretary of State or the Council of India, but only by constant and unremitting scrutiny of every financial detail in India itself. The hon. Member for Hackney said the expenditure of India had grown since the time when its government was transferred to the Crown. But so also had the expenditure of England in the same period. If the hon. Gentleman would take the trouble to compare the receipts and the expenditure of India in 1856-7, just before the Mutiny, with the last accounts received, making allowance at the same time for the Famine charges, which had been very large, and also for the loss by exchange, he would find that the Revenue had grown within that period to a very much larger extent than the expenditure. He made this statement after a careful comparison of the figures. But they must remember why this increase of expenditure had arisen. They had exercised a civilizing influence over the whole of India. They had made roads and railways; they had established educational agencies and Courts of Justice throughout the land; and in every way made improvements in the country and developed its resources. When the old East India Company was referred to, it ought to be borne in mind that in the 46 years preceding the Mutiny there were 33 years of deficit. When the old Company was abolished, what was the position of the Crown? It was left with a Treasury exhausted by the Mutiny, and great efforts had to be made under unparalleled difficulties to repair the disaster. The hon. Member contended that the financial control over India had become much worse since 1869, when an Act was passed by right hon. Gentlemen opposite which rendered the Council less independent than it had been before. In that year the Duke of Argyll had pointed out with great force in the House of Lords that, though it was no doubt very desirable to have the Council independent of the Secretary of State, there were, nevertheless, great evils in allowing old gentlemen who had outgrown their experience in India to remain members of the Council. One of the most urgent necessities was to have men of fresh Indian experience on the Council, in order that the Secretary of State might obtain the latest information as to facts. That was the object of the Act of 1869, and it seemed to him to have worked extremely well in this respect. The hon. Member had further argued that the Council exercised no control over the finance of India, because in a certain number of years which he named there was only a small number of dissents. But to take the dissents as an indication of the usefulness of the Council was to degrade that Council to a position he hoped he should never see it occupy. If one member of the Council differed from the rest, he had an opportunity of influencing his colleagues, and very often also the Secretary of State; and if he failed to convince them of the justice of his views, the House would be very slow in believing that he must necessarily be in the right and everybody else quite wrong. The hon. Member had also urged that if an illegal charge was made upon the finances of India, there was no one now, as in the old East India Company's days, who had a legal status to oppose that charge. The hon. Member could never have heard of the Auditor of Indian Accounts, who was independent of the Secretary of State, and who was appointed for the express purpose of examining financial details, and seeing whether or not those details had received the sanction of the Council, or were otherwise legally authorized. The hon. Member had spoken of ambiguity existing in the Act of 1858. No one who had examined some of the clauses could deny that there were points of extreme difficulty which were perfectly open to argument. In 1869, as the hon. Member had stated, the Marquess of Salisbury found the occasion opportune, because the Government of the day had a Bill before Parliament to amend the Government of India Act, 1858, to call the attention of the House to the law as regards the control of the Council of India; he explained the matter to their Lordships, and he asked the Government, if they felt any doubt on the matter, to consider whether words could not be introduced to make the intention of the Act perfectly clear. In answer, the Duke of Argyll made a speech, which showed the manner in which he interpreted the law. The Duke of Argyll said—

> "It is the opinion of all whom I have consulted, including the Law Officers of the Crown, that under the present Statute it is unquestionably in the power of the Secretary of State for India to order in India any service which may appear to be required. . . . . The Secretary of State is supreme in all matters whatever, except simply such matters as were included under the principle of the financial veto of Mr. Pitt (alluding to 26 Geo. III., c. 8), that is, direct grants or appropriations of money to persons either here or in India, which might be made for purposes of political jobbery. That I believe to be the state of the law; and if it be, I need hardly say that it makes the Secretary of State practically supreme in all matters, whether they do or do not cost money."—[3 *Hansard*, cxcv. 1074-5.]

After that, it would have been surprising if Lord Cairns had sat still. Such a statement of the law, and of the intention of Parliament in carrying the Act of 1858, could not be passed over by Members of the Government and of the Party who were responsible for it. Lord Cairns returned to the attack, and demolished the argument of the Duke of Argyll in a few sentences. But, on the part of the Government of the day, it was again answered that, in their belief, there was no practical difficulty in the matter; if there had been, they would have been perfectly prepared to deal with it; but, looking at the whole matter impartially, no practical difficulty had arisen, and Parliament ought not to interfere in so delicate a matter when no actual necessity had been shown for the amendment of the law. Ten years had passed, and practical experience had given an interpretation to the law of 1858 which had met with general acceptance. No doubt, it might be said that the wording of the Statute was open to various interpretations; but, at the same time, when they found that the law had been interpreted in a particular way, and had been acted upon without difficulty, the House would be reluctant to say it was a matter with which it ought to interfere. The hon. Member for the Elgin Burghs (Mr. Grant Duff) had pointed out with great force that no difficulty had arisen, and he could cordially coincide with the hon. Gentleman's views, and could say that since the hon. Member ceased to be connected with the India Office the same was the case. He desired the House to consider two or three practical reasons why the proposal of the hon. Member for Hackney was simply an impossible one. The suggestion was, that the Council of India should be made perfectly independent and should be given absolute control over the finances of India.

Mr. FAWCETT said, he carefully guarded himself against making any such suggestion as that now attributed to him.

MR. E. STANHOPE: But the hon. Member's observations pointed to a large increase of the powers of the Council of India; because he showed that under the old system certain things were done by the old East India Company which the Council could not do, and left the House to infer that all the mischief that was arising was in consequence of that change. The hon. Member pointed out that the Council had no power of initiating business; that all the Bills that the Government thought it necessary to submit to Parliament did not necessarily come under the consideration of the Council; and also that questions of policy did not come now before the Council, as he thought they formerly did, under the review of the Company. These propositions were very well worthy of consideration; but if the House looked at them a little more closely, it would find that they pointed to arrangements which would reduce the Government of India Act of 1858 to a practical absurdity. If every penny spent in India or England was to be voted by the Council of India in England; if the Governor General of India was to have no power to expend money in India such as he had before the Act of 1858 and had enjoyed since; and if every single appropriation of money to the Services, whether in England or in India, was to come before the Council and be voted by the majority, the Government of India Act would be simply unworkable; and the first thing that would be done by any Government, whether of one side or of the other, would be to say that such a state of things was incompatible with the proper government of India and must be immediately altered. The second objection he had to the proposition of the hon. Member for Hackney was that it would practically hand over the whole foreign policy of this country, if it in any way touched Indian interests, to an utterly irresponsible body. The Cabinet, which represented Imperial interests and was called into existence by and had the support of the majority in this country, would devise a certain policy for the protection of those Imperial interests; and, according to the hon. Member for Hackney, that policy was to be liable to be overhauled by a body of gentlemen in the Council of India who, whatever their merits, were appointed to that Council solely for the purpose of looking after Indian interests, and not with reference to other considerations.

MR. FAWCETT explained that he simply drew a comparison between the power exercised by the Directors of the East India Company and that of the Council. If he had had a distinct Motion to propose about the Council, he should have moved it; but he did not advocate that the Council should have these functions.

MR. E. STANHOPE said, that the hon. Member brought these things forward as reasons why the Government was more expensive now than then. [MR. FAWCETT said he quoted Lord Cairns.] Yes; he quoted the speech of Lord Cairns, and went on to urge that under the Act the Council had the power by law of which he was speaking. The proposition which the hon. Gentleman had stated in the House led to a practical absurdity; and Lord Cairns had urged that, if the law were so, it ought to be altered. The Cabinet was intrusted with the consideration of important questions affecting Imperial interests. It was bound by ties of common political interest, and it conducted its deliberations in perfect secrecy. If the Indian Council had the functions suggested, and the Cabinet had to submit to the Council questions of foreign policy in any way affecting India, the secrets of the Cabinet would be known to gentlemen not bound by the same considerations of secrecy, and in some cases gentlemen of opposite political opinions, and thus a great Constitutional change would be effected. The Act of 1858 had given to the Government, or the Secretary of State for India for the time being, the power of declaring war without consulting the Council. Was it to be supposed that Parliament really meant he was to have the power of declaring war without consulting his Council, if it had not also meant that he should have the power of ordering the expenditure necessary for the purpose? That this was contemplated was shown by the fact that the Act provided that, in that particular case in which it was clear the Council of India could not have control, Parliament should be informed of the declaration of war, and the finances of India should not be applied to the purpose without the consent of Parliament. He hoped that no Secretary of State would attempt to get rid of his own responsibility by saying that he had been forced to act against his will by a majority of his Council. Certainly, the present Secretary of State had done nothing of the kind, but had taken the responsibility of having initiated the Frontier war, and had submitted the matter to the judgment of Parliament, which had expressed its approval by decisive majorities. He did not believe for a moment it was the intention of the Act of 1858 to render Indian finance independent of Parliament. If the hon. Member's construction of the Act could be upheld, the Council could snap their fingers at Parliament and at the Cabinet, and could refuse a particular expenditure, in spite of anything the Government or the House could say. Of course, under such circumstances, the Government of India would be reduced to a deadlock. He did not suggest that any gentleman likely to be appointed to the Indian Council would bring matters to such a pass; but he was bound to point out what would be the inevitable result, if the construction which the hon. Member put upon the Act was correct. Then the hon. Gentleman said there were great acts of extravagance committed by the Indian Government; and he seemed to suggest that all that could be put right if they were to resort to something like the old system of administration, and to give a power of control to some body of gentlemen outside of Parliament. It appeared to him that many of the acts of extravagance to which the hon. Gentleman alluded, if they were so, had actually been sanctioned by the Council of India; and, therefore, apparently, the way to check such extravagance would be to make the Secretary of State really responsible in the matter. He hoped, however, the House would not suppose he thought that the financial control of the Council ought to be anything but a reality. Indeed, he thought it was a reality now. The hon. Member for the Elgin Burghs (Mr. Grant Duff) had conclusively proved that the Council exercised very important functions in controlling Indian expenditure. That financial control was limited, however, by practical considerations. Was Parliament, in the ultimate resort, to have the control or not? The exact limit of the functions of the Secretary of State and of the Council it would be somewhat difficult to define in precise terms, and he was not going now to lay down any authoritative expression of opinion on the subject. The jurisdiction of the Council arose upon drafts of despatches laid before it by the Secretary of State. Those drafts were first sent to a Committee for consideration, and subsequently they were submitted to the Council. The Council had absolute power over those drafts if they embodied any financial question, and it could overrule the Secretary of State and uphold that overruling. Hon. Gentlemen should not narrow their view by considering this question solely in respect of the exact interpretation of an Act of Parliament. He was quite prepared to meet the question which had been raised as to the object and intention of the Act of 1858. Was the object and intention of that Act to diminish the responsibility of the Secretary of State? He believed the object was to establish a Department of the Government strictly subject to Parliamentary control, and likewise to establish a Council of responsible Advisers to assist the Secretary of State on Indian questions. Secondly, it was intended to impose a check on the Secretary of State for India in cases where Parliament was unable or unwilling to interfere. These powers had, in his judgment, been well exercised by the Council. He did not know that anybody could suggest anything which could take the place of the Council. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Hackney said they ought to inquire at once into these questions, because it was desirable to have, while they could obtain it, the opinion of Lord Lawrence. He thought no man could give a better opinion than the noble Lord, who had served under the old and the new systems, and who, moreover, had been Governor General of India. But, in point of fact, Lord Lawrence was examined by a Committee of that House in 1873, when he expressed a general approval of the existing state of affairs. The noble Lord was asked—

> "Is it your opinion that, on the whole, the Council is effective for the purpose of controlling the expenditure in India?"

And his reply was—

> "I think they are effective. It really comes to this, it seems to me, whether the expenditure

which is proposed is really a politic one or not. If the Council consider it impolitic, they have ample means of opposing the expenditure."

He thought the Council did exercise a perfectly practical control over the finances of India in all those cases in which they could really exercise any such control; and as he did not see that the hon. Member for Hackney had made out any particular case with regard to defects in the existing system, he asked the House not to grant the Inquiry which the hon. Gentleman desired. The hon. Member for Orkney (Mr. Laing), who spoke with great experience on this subject, had also proposed the appointment of a Committee, but on very different grounds. He, for one, would not shrink from any assistance that any Member of the House might be willing to render to the Government with respect to Indian finance. Undoubtedly, they had great difficulties to deal with, and if any assistance could be given to them they would be glad to receive it. With regard, however, to the appointment of a Committee to roam over the whole condition of Indian finance, he thought they had had sufficient experience of such an Inquiry in the last Parliament. A Committee sat during a considerable number of Sessions; but, after examining a great many questions, it was unable to arrive at any report at all. On that ground, also, he believed that the Committee now proposed would not do any good. The hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett) asked for a Committee, not only on financial grounds, but to inquire into the whole constitution of the government of India. Nobody would be more ready than he himself was to admit that the Act for the Government of India was not to be regarded as a perfect one, and in quiet times, no doubt, any Government would be ready to consider whether there were not details which might be amended; but they had already before them the facts necessary for the full consideration of the case. The Constitution of India was a thoroughly anomalous one, and it was almost impossible to reconcile their despotic government in India with their representative institutions in England. It would not bear straining. And he thought it would not be strained while they had on the Indian Council gentlemen like those who now composed it. Believing that no practical difficulty had arisen in the administration of affairs at the India Office, and considering, in particular, the control which the Government of the day ought to exercise in India and in England, he asked the House to reject the proposition of the hon. Member for Hackney.

SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL said, he could not help observing that some of the statements of the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for India had exhibited the spirit and audacity of youth. As regarded the expenses of the Afghan War, he said he had received accounts from India, from which he had reason to believe that the expenses of that war, even on the scale on which it had been carried on, would not up to the end of the financial year exceed the moderate figure which had been suggested at the beginning of the war. He had no doubt the hon. Gentleman had received such accounts; but he did not believe a word of them. Nothing but the most audacious cooking of accounts could reduce the expenses of the war to that figure. He would much rather trust the estimate made by the hon. Member for Orkney (Mr. Laing), than whom there could be no better financial authority. He acquitted the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for India of all blame of cooking accounts; but there was another point in regard to which he could not acquit him of blame. That was with reference to the salt tax. His Predecessor had made a similar statement—that it had not been the object to raise the Revenue, but to equalize the Revenue in different parts of India. The hon. Gentleman mnst have a very short memory indeed. A Budget was produced in India, the object of which avowedly was to establish a considerable increase in the total amount of Revenue to be received from the salt of the people of India; there was a large increase in the salt revenue, to produce a Famine Fund, and that increase was actually imposed.

MR. E. STANHOPE: £300,000 was subsequently given up, so that really there was no increase whatever.

SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL said, he was quite aware of that. It was the result of a debate in that House, in which very strong opinions were expressed; and the Government did give up the spoil they attempted to appropriate at the expense of the poor ryots of India. It was, therefore, somewhat audacious in the hon. Gentleman to take the high tone he did, as if the Government had never attempted to raise the salt tax revenue. He was disappointed that the hon. Gentleman had, in such decided terms, refused to concede anything to the proposal of the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett). He had not only refused the Committee, but he held out no hope of granting it in the future. It appeared to him (Sir George Campbell) that the hon. Member for the Elgin Burghs (Mr. Grant Duff) and the Under Secretary of State for India were agreed between themselves to oppose this Resolution as both holding the English official view. If arguments were wanted to show the necessity of a Committee, the Under Secretary of State for India himself had supplied them. He told them that the Duke of Argyll, as Secretary of State, took one view of the Act of 1858, and that Lord Cairns took a diametrically opposite view; that the relations between the Secretary of State and his Council could not be defined, and yet that practically the system worked well; but he (Sir George Campbell) had a very decided opinion that it did not work well. He was the only Member in the House, he believed, who had been a Member of the Council of India, and he regretted that the Government had decided on their line of policy before they had heard him. A period of more than 20 years had elapsed since the Act for the Government of India was passed, and it was time that a Committee should inquire into the radical change which then was made. Comparisons had been made between the government of India under the East India Company and the present system of government; but the advantage was, in many respects, by no means in favour of the present system. A great Debt was, no doubt, accumulated during the time of the Mutiny; but the East India Company was not fairly chargeable with it. As regarded the favourable side of the administration of the East India Company, he could not help thinking that it operated very beneficially as a check upon the Board of Control, and that it possessed other and very considerable advantages. The members of the Company lived, as it were, in a glass house; they were afraid that their authority might be abolished, and they were, on that account, particularly cautious, especially in their treatment of the Services under them. They presented to them a firm front; whereas nowadays he regretted to observe an inclination to yield to their demands, with what seemed to him to be somewhat excessive liberality. The East India Company, moreover, were an independent body, and were able to resist pressure such as that which was so frequently brought to bear on Members of that House. As to public works, the great system of railways was instituted under the *régime* of the Company, while, as a financial body, it was infinitely superior to the Council of India, and was able more thoroughly to check the construction of imprudent works. Besides, the Council of India carried on its proceedings in absolute privacy; and nothing, he imagined, could have a more depressing effect on any man than that his advice and arguments on any particular question should be altogether concealed from the public. In fact, the position of members of Council appeared to be gradually approaching that of permanent clerks, thus showing a great misapprehension of their position, tending, in his opinion, to produce very injurious results. There was, moreover, he was sorry to perceive, a growing disposition to govern India by telegrams and private communications, which was calculated to have the effect of completely checkmating the Council. That system had increased by "leaps and bounds" under the government of Lord Lytton; so that in a late important correspondence there occurred an important hiatus of 15 or 18 months, with respect to which there was not a scrap of Correspondence furnished to the House, although there must have been communications between the Indian and the Home Governments during that time. There was a growing tendency on the part of the Government in India, too, to claim to mark as secret and confidential any despatches it might write; but it was not, he believed, ever intended by Parliament that it should have that power. He had, up to the present time. treated the subject before the House on general grounds with reference to that question of administration; but directing his observations specially to finance, he must say he strongly felt that no sufficient check was exercised either by the Council of India, or by Parliament over it; while he thought it was absolutely necessary that such a check should be exercised over so large a Revenue as was raised in India. The construction of the Act was a matter on which the greatest difference existed. It was impossible to say what power the Council had and what power it had not. By means of telegrams, private letters, and political despatches sent to India, the power of the Council was evaded. In reality, the authority of the Council was vain, illusory, and dormant. It exercised no effective control whatever. In no case of a serious expenditure of the Revenues of India did the Council exercise control. He had known many cases in which a large portion—in fact, a great majority—of the members of the Council were opposed to a certain expenditure; but he had never heard of a single case in which they had succeeded in arresting that expenditure. The Secretary of State possessed immense power. Some members of the Council were old, and some not so old. Some of the members were men of independent minds, and some were subject to influence. The general result was, that a man of great position and power like the Secretary of State was able to have his own way. There were various means by which he could have his way by hook or by crook. If he did not get a majority, he had the power of withdrawing the proposition, to bring it forward some other day when he could get a majority. Her Majesty's Ministers were able at their discretion to expend the finances of India, and he thought it was well worth inquiry whether some improved method might not be devised. Then, going to India, he had seen a good deal of the Government of India, and he was bound to say the Government in that country was not equal to the task of a continuous and systematic administration of the finances of India. Just as men acquired a good deal of experience they went out of office, and they had not that settled and continuous policy which they would have were the members of the Government more settled. In reality, too much power rested with the Governor General himself; everything was too much dependent on his individual will and character. It seemed to him that the Council of the Governor General did not always contain men of the same independence as it did generations ago; nor were the Governors General men of the same calibre as the Governors General of former days. Great oscillations of policy took place. He could not imagine a greater contrast between the character of the late Governor General, Lord Northbrook, and that of the present Governor General, Lord Lytton. In former days the Company exercised independence with regard to the appointment of the members of the Council, but now-a-days the Council was a good deal packed. Though some of the members were very able men, they might also have some who were pretty much of the opinion of the Governor General, and amenable to his influence. In old days members of the Council received a higher salary than any Deputy or Lieutenant Governor, and there was no promotion for members of the Council. They were men over whom the Governor General had no control whatever. Now-a-days the members of the Council received less salary, and there were high posts in the gift of the Governor General, which were more highly paid than a membership of the Council, and to which the members of Council looked for promotion. That had, to a considerable degree, undermined the independence of the members of the Council. They had, besides, men sent out for special work, and those men, not having strong opinions beyond their own special Department, were generally controlled by the Governor General and went with him. The result was, the Governors General were usually enabled to carry out the principle of *divide et impera*. Very great questions had to be dealt with. During the last 20 years very great changes had taken place in India. The Natives had been educated, and the consequence was that a Native Free Press had sprung up. The mode of dealing with Native Independent States was vacillating and uncertain, and there was a growing tendency upon the part of those States to set themselves in opposition to the Government, though at present this opposition had only shown itself mainly in newspaper articles. As to the Army, he did not see the means of effecting a reduction of the Army by which India could be saved from bankruptcy, as every important question in regard to its constitution had to be considered. As regarded the Civil Service, he must say he only gleaned knowledge of some defects of that Service after he had left it. He was inclined to think that there were some great evils in connection with it, especially in reference to the system by which men in that Service were so long kept in one particular groove, so that they were prevented from acquiring general knowledge of men and things. He thought a great deal ought to be done for India in the matter of agriculture which they did not require the Government to do in this country. In the great and growing interests of India it was necessary that the strongest tribunal that it was possible to obtain should look into these matters and try to ascertain, not only whether the machinery of government was now sufficient, but whether, in the great changes taking place, there was a Government calculated to promote the permanent welfare of India in the future.

Mr. O'DONNELL rose to express his intention to vote with the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett). At the same time, he must say he was strongly convinced that all the propositions for getting more control over the expenditure of the Indian Revenues were perfectly illusory. He was only too much afraid that nothing short of a great catastrophe in India would recall this House to a sense of its responsibilities. From year to year the control of the House of Commons over their great dependencies was becoming more and more nominal, and the House was becoming more and more a mere recording office. The Minister of a particular Department imposed his will on the House, and very often he was really less morally responsible for what went on in his Department than any other Member of the House. India was at that moment separated from this country by a wider gulf of misunderstanding and discontent than at any former period. Every class in India was discontented, and every class had reason to be discontented. There was plenty of good-will towards India in the Service and among the Government officials; but, somehow, routine, red-tapeism, and all the obstacles which laid between the real consideration of India and the intelligence and good-will of the House, prevented anything like the application of a real remedy for the evils under which the people of India laboured. It was all very well for ex-officials to speak disparagingly of Native criticism, the hostility of the Native Press, and the antagonism between the Native Governments and the British Government. In his opinion, they ought to go beyond those expressions of Native discontent to the grievances which lay beneath. It had been mentioned on both sides of the House, and by the leading organs of both Parties, that they must reduce the armies of the Native Princes. These Princes were, no doubt, firmly convinced that their own stability was bound up with the stability of British Rule in India, and they and many other classes in Indian society were loyal to the British Government for the best of all reasons—namely, that that they feared a far worse state of things would follow if that Rule were removed. But every class was so badly off, Native industry was so oppressed, every description of Native capacity was so heavily handicapped, the cultivators were so ground down by taxation, which was stupid still more than unjust, the artizans were so worried by the licence tax, Zemindars were so offended by our violations of the Perpetual Settlement, and neighbouring States were so alarmed by continual threats of interference, that amidst the uncertainty and growing disbelief in the promises of the Government, which their stagey Imperialism had excited, the bonds of loyalty were growing weaker and weaker, owing to the meddling and muddling, and blundering and blustering, and promising and never-performing policy of the Government. This House had no means of getting at Indian opinion except in a roundabout manner, and if they did not remedy that, they would reap the usual fruits of ignorance. He believed that the only control which could be exercised over the expenditure of the Revenues of India would have to be exercised by the representatives of Native opinion themselves. This House must face the problem of giving representation to India. He was not going to say what form that representation must have; but some bodies must be recognized which would give the House of Commons a mirror in which they might see the drift of genuine Native opinion. Every year that they neglected that they approached, if not a catastrophe, at least a serious danger. And the catastrophe might arise at any moment. Take the question of the reduction of Native Armies. The Native Princes might refuse to reduce them, and they would at once be in the midst of a crisis. He did not attribute to Government an immediate intention of that kind; but this House had such a want of real control over Indian affairs, that they might find themselves embarked in a war with the Native States in India without so much as a week's notice. They had a war in South Africa, and yet they received assurances up to the close of last Session of a most optimist character. It might be the same with regard to India. How not to do it, seemed to be the rule in regard to India, and it would continue to be so until Parliament determined to have a share in the control of the country commensurate with its responsibility.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, I think before we actually divide, I ought to say one or two words upon the view which Her Majesty's Government takes of the proposition of the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett). I think no question could be more serious or difficult than that of the relations which should exist between the Governments of the United Kingdom and of India. We have confided to us the administration of one of the largest and most heterogeneous Empires that the world has ever seen, and of all the Members of that Imperial family whose interest we have to consider, there is none more interesting, and none which presents problems of greater delicacy and difficulty, than the great Empire of India. I fully grant that the question is one deservingly claiming attention from time to time at the hands of the Government and of Parliament, and also that great advantages arose under the old system from the Inquiries which used to take place before the Committees of the House before the Charters of the East India Company were renewed. Those periodical Inquiries gave fair and natural opportunity for investigating the whole conduct of the business of our Indian Empire, alike as to defects which existed, and remedies which might be applied. I have no doubt that the great Committees to which the hon. Member for Hackney referred deserved the encomia which he passed upon them; but there is some little difference between what I may call the natural opportunities which the expiry of the Charters of the East India Company afforded for inquiry, and that which the hon. Member now proposes to create. The Inquiries made in former days were called for by the circumstances of the case, and were entered upon by our forefathers without any special charges being made against the Administration of the day. They were not tinged with anything in the nature of political difference or criticism, but were Inquiries which naturally took place when you were going to give a fresh lease of power to a Company who occupied a peculiar and a remarkable position. But we are now asked to institute an Inquiry with special reference to what the hon. Gentleman describes as a defect in the control now exercised over the Government of India. Further, the Committee for which the hon. Gentleman asks is not to be appointed in order to institute a mere general Inquiry as to the condition of affairs, but is to start with the foregone conclusion that there is something wrong in the control we now exercise over the Government of India, coupled with the assumption that the finances of the Empire are in a state of great embarrassment, if not of alarming danger. The hon. Member for Orkney (Mr. Laing) has addressed a very interesting speech to the House; but his argument was simply directed to show that the finances of India are in such a state that, unless something be done promptly, the Government would speedily find themselves confronted with a danger such as we have never seen in that part of the world. If that is the sort of reason for appointing this Committee, we must ask the nature of the dangers with which we are likely to be confronted, before we can form any opinion as to the remedy which the Committee may be expected to afford. The hon. Member for Orkney said he considered the real advantage of the Committee would arise from the fact that it would educate Her Majesty's Ministers; but if that is so, its office must be not so much to consider the possibility of providing a better control of Indian finance, as to inquire into the way in which this and former Governments have managed the affairs of the Empire since the passing of the Act of 1858. That is a large question, and one which might be discussed with advantage; but I doubt very much whether a Committee of this House, appointed as is now proposed, would be the best means of carrying on such an Inquiry. We have been told that in considering the financial position of India, we ought to inquire as to larger questions of policy as well as of detail, and to ask how far the policy which has been pursued has tended to bring about the state of things complained of. The hon. Member for Orkney, having proved to his own satisfaction that the Revenue of India was absolutely inelastic, proceeded to consider the manner in which the expenditure could be reduced, and from the premisses he laid down, deduced the conclusion that the whole matter turned upon a reduction of the Army, which could alone bring about an equilibrium. But, if that course were adopted, it would give rise to great questions of policy with regard to our Frontier neighbours and the Native States within our own Dominions, and would, in fact, raise many points with which I think no Committee of this House would be competent to deal—certainly, not a Committee appointed upon the basis suggested by the Motion of the hon. Member for Hackney. I wish to lay down what I consider to be a cardinal principle in all our dealings with India. I think the cardinal principle on which we ought to go is this—that we ought to concentrate authority where we intend to fix responsibility. If you impose on a particular body in the State responsibility for the administration of your affairs, you must give full power to that body. And from that I think we come to a distinction between two classes of Indian affairs. We sin, I think, very often in both directions when we come to matters of expenditure which are not properly left to the administration of the local authority—for these are responsible, not the Government in India, but the Government of the Secretary of State also. I treat the whole of the Indian Administration for that purpose as one. But when you deal with matters which properly belong to the local or Indian authority, then you ought to be careful how Parliament interferes with the authority you have set up. On the other hand, when you deal with matters which properly belong to the Imperial authority, then you must take care that you do not allow your local authority to interfere with you, or to impede the authority you mean to hold responsible. As an illustration, I might mention the case of salaries or retiring allowances to Civil servants—in matters of that sort, we all agree in theory that these are matters which ought not to be dealt with by the Imperial Parliament, but by some Indian authority. What do we do now? In point of fact, we constantly say that Indian matters are not of general interest, and do not attract much attention in this House. Very often I admit they do not; but very frequently, when a grievance arises which interests a certain number of hon. Members, then we find a comparatively large number coming down to the House; they fight the cause intrusted to them—they make out the cause intrusted to them—in the name, perhaps, of some individual who thinks he has not been properly treated by the Indian Government. Well, an official replies for the Indian Office, and he is aided very likely by some ex-official Members, but they receive, comparatively, little support; and very often Resolutions and Votes are passed in this House which have a tendency to impose burdens upon India in matters to which we have little or nothing to say. These may be small matters, but they sometimes extend to even larger matters. The hon. Member for Orkney (Mr. Laing), and others, have referred to questions connected with the Army in India; and he has said, with truth, that arrangements made some years ago with India in respect of the amalgamation of the Army and the formation of Staff corps led to considerable expense. Well, Sir, that was because from time to time different pleas were brought forward in Parliament on behalf of the officers of the Army, and one concession after another was wrung from India by the action of Parliament. And, therefore, if you are going to consider this whole question with a view to establish a system of administration, such as will give fair play to India and prevent too much pressure being put upon her resources, you will have to see how you can control the action of Parliament in matters in which Parliament ought not to interfere. There is a very great distinction indeed between the position of the Government intrusted with Indian affairs and the old East India Company. It has been said, and with truth, that under the old system you had a really independent body. Whatever may have been the faults and defects of the East India Company, it had at least this recommendation—that it was an independent authority. Well, you got rid of that body, and why? Because it stood in the way of Imperial action in matters which properly belonged to Imperial policy and government. But, in so doing, you got rid of a body which had, as to a class of expenditure, advantages which no Council can have, because no Council you can ever set up can have the kind of independence the East India Company had. You may put upon your Council gentlemen of great ability, large experience, high character; but it is impossible that any Council you can establish can have any real independence of action in these matters, unless you are prepared to uphold their independence and to resist any attempts to encroach upon it. I know myself from experience how difficult it is to fight the battle of India and the Indian Council, when we have to meet a body of Gentlemen here who are supported by English opinion, and who claim some kind of what they call justice and consideration for some interest which they say was set aside by the Indian Council, whilst we claim that the Indian Government or Council ought in respect of such matters to be supported because they are responsible for that class of expenditure. But with respect to great Imperial questions—questions as to the policy of the Imperial Government—we are and must be responsible. In matters for which the Indian Government are not responsible the Imperial Government are; and where you are to exact responsibility you must concentrate power. Now, Sir, we have heard something as to the construction of certain sentences in the Act of 1858. I am not prepared to say that there is not some inconsistency on the face of one or two of those clauses; but I think it is quite clear what the real and overriding intention of Parliament was, and it was this—That there should be a proper division of authority; that in all matters connected with the expenditure of the Revenues of India power should be given to the Council to put a check upon the Secretary of State, and that he and they should be responsible for the Revenues of India, except in certain cases which were excepted. But with respect to the general power, I believe it is fairly exercised in the way that Parliament intended it should be. The hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett) says that is not so, because he picks some six or seven instances, in which he says there was no protest against the action of the Secretary of State on the part of the Council. But the truth is, that that is an argument which does not at all commend itself to one. It seems to go the other way. The truth is, that in these cases—and I am acquainted with one or two of them—there was no protest, because the Council agreed with the Secretary of State. They were prepared to take upon themselves the responsibility of the application of the Revenues of India in the way in which they were applied. That may show that the Council is an inefficient body; but it does not show that they have not properly acted upon the powers confided to them in 1858. It is a mistake to think that the Council is always guided and overruled by the Secretary of State in matters of expenditure; or that, because so large a number of cases are passed through, there was no freedom of action on the part of the Council. I know a great number of cases which occurred when I was Secretary of State in which the Council prevailed over me in matters of expenditure properly belonging to them, and as to which the responsibility properly rested upon them; and I know, too, that it is continually the case that the Secretary of State takes the opinion of the majority of the Council, and that that opinion is freely acted upon. But, on the other hand, I think the view of those who framed the Act of 1858, with regard to the responsibility of the Government of the day in great questions of policy, has been properly acted upon, and is now being properly acted upon. No man can serve two masters, and there cannot be two authorities responsible for the conduct of a policy affecting the interests of the Empire. It may be quite right that the Government here should decline responsibility for irrigation works, or other local matters in India; but in questions of war or peace, great turning questions in politics, responsibility must not be thrown upon the members of the Indian Council. If the views of this country, as expressed by the Government, were to be thwarted by a body like the Indian Council, however admirable or excellent its members might be in their own line, it would be a state of things which could not last. I say it is entirely consistent with the Act of 1858, that responsibility for the Imperial policy should rest with the Government of the day, and not upon the Council of India. Should a proper and legitimate opportunity arise for the appointment of a Committee to inquire into the general administration of Indian affairs, I do not say it would not be well to embrace it; but I do say that an Inquiry, undertaken in the manner proposed, and upon the suggestions we have heard to-night, would rest upon a false basis, not justified by the state of the facts, and that it would be more likely to lead to political differences and Party wrangling, than to the advantage of India or of the Empire.

Mr. JOHN BRIGHT: Sir, whatever may be the course the House may take on this question, I should like to take the opportunity of expressing my obligation to the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett) for the speech he has made. Reference has already been made to an article contributed by him to one of those Reviews which interest us so much and give us so much instruction month by month—I mean *The Nineteenth Century*. I think it would be wise for every hon. Member of this House to read that article carefully, and, having read it, to ask himself whether this is not a great question—one of the greatest in fact that we have had before Parliament for many years in connection with the condition of India? I think that this is a question which we ought to discuss and determine without being biassed in the slightest degree by that Party feeling which so often disturbs and destroys our wisdom on both sides of the House. Many hon. Members perhaps did not hear the speeches of the hon. Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett) and the hon. Member for Orkney (Mr. Laing). Those two speeches, carefully heard, reveal, I think, the true gravity of the case before us. The hon. Member for Hackney has, I think, investigated this question with more than a common desire to arrive at the truth. The hon. Member for Orkney has himself been in India in a very high official position in connection with this very question of finance which has been so much discussed to-night. After hearing these speeches it is impossible to say that this is not a question pressing upon the House of Commons, and pressing specially on Her Majesty's Government at the present moment. The Motion before the House includes much more than hon. Members would suppose from hearing the speech from the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Motion is this—

> "That a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into and report upon the operation of 'The Government of India Act, 1858,' and the other Acts amending the same."

Now, the Act of 1858 was one which made a complete revolution in the Government of India. It destroyed the East India Company; it established here a Secretary of State; it transferred the power of government directly to a high Officer of the Crown; and, in point of fact, it made a complete change in the whole administration of that vast Empire. Now, this Committee which is moved for, if it were appointed would no doubt go into the main question whether the transference of that power was a wise one, and whether the power so given to the Secretary of State had been wisely employed during the 20 years which had elapsed since that period. I know nothing connected with the Government of India that it would not be possible and competent for this Committee to inquire into under the words of this Motion. I think even there is something more important for the future than the question of the temporary embarrassment of the finances—and I, for my part, am inclined to think that that embarrassment is more likely to be permanent; but that question at this moment is very much aggravated by the policy of Her Majesty's Government, which has received the approbation of a very large majority of this House. In my opinion, whenever a real and thorough reform in Indian finance, administration, and government is undertaken and effected, it will have much more to do with the Government in India than with any portion of our arrangements for Indian government in this country. The question which the hon. Member for Hackney asks is not merely one to gratify curiosity, but is one which, if fairly answered, would beset the whole question of the Government of India. It would lay bare its virtues so far as they go, and also lay bare its vices—for I think they are many—so far as they go. I would therefore ask the Government whether it is worth while for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to get up to-night and give us the sort of speech which he has made? It differs from the speech of the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for India. He was, I may almost say, loud in contrast with the hon. Gentlemen who have spoken on this side of the House. We might have supposed that the old times had come back, when we had members of the East India Company speaking as if nothing could be more prosperous than the condition of India. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has confined his remarks almost entirely to the question of the relationship between the Secretary of State and the Council; but when he approached the end of his speech he was obliged to admit that the time has nearly come when it would be very desirable to have such an Inquiry as the House instituted during the existence of the Company. In 1853 there was a Committee of this very kind. I was not on it, though I believe I took more interest in the question than any other hon. Member of the House at that time. The object of the Committee was to get an agreement that the Company should be continued, and I recollect that the then responsible authority in this House made a speech one night five hours long. He rose at 5 o'clock and spoke until 10 o'clock, and during the whole five hours his language was one continued eulogy of the East India Company. I succeeded him, and I spoke till 12. Sir Charles Wood, the then President of the Board of Control, and myself, in fact, occupied the whole evening. I thought that I had answered his speech, but the House of Commons did not agree with me. And yet what happened? In five minutes time the whole of the eulogy was blown to the winds. The President of the Board of Control, his Colleagues, and almost everybody else, admitted that the East India Company itself was an absurdity and an antiquated arrangement which could not be continued any longer. The moment the Mutiny broke out the India Company was at once got rid of. Some hon. Members, who do not know so much of the subject as I have known, have been talking as if the India Company were something that might be well worth resuscitating. For my part, I do not believe we shall ever again have anything like it. Although there is much to blame in the present system of government in India, that Government has done a great many things of great advantage to India which the India Company never attempted; and which, if it had attempted, it would have failed in accomplishing. I recollect charging Mr. Mangles and Sir James Hogg, then in this House, with this fact, that in 14 years, according to their own Returns, the India Company had not expended so much on roads, bridges, and permanent works as the Corporation of the City of Manchester, with 350,000 or 400,000 of inhabitants, had expended in the same time for the advantage of their population. The East India Company fell as it deserved to fall, and I am sorry that its successor has not been more fortunate than it has been. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, during a great portion of his speech, argued as if there were really no case for Inquiry, and then towards the end he seemed to relent somewhat, and feel that he was not sure of his ground, and to give more hope that at some not remote period he would consent to some kind of Inquiry. I think that if there is to be an Inquiry, it cannot come a day too soon. Reference has been made, in the course of the debate, to the prospect of a Dissolution. I presume that there will be a Dissolution in the course of this year. That has been the usual Constitutional course ever since the Septennial Act was passed. ["No, no!"] I see there is an hon. Gentleman on the other side who is very much afraid of a Dissolution. We are not afraid of a Dissolution on this side, and I have no doubt that many hon. Gentleemen on the other side are not afraid. If there is to be an Inquiry, the sooner we have it the better, because these misfortunes that we see before us, not looming in the distance, but close upon us, are growing greater almost every day, and Parliament cannot one day too soon apply its mind and its utmost attention to the great and grave difficulties which are before us. Recollect what you have done in India. According to the statement of my hon. Friend the Member for Hackney (Mr. Fawcett), you extract from the people of India everything that can be extracted with safety; you do not know where you can turn for another tax of the smallest amount; you have put on a licence tax, which is in point of fact an income tax, upon a man having no more income than 4*s.* a-week; your salt tax is, I suppose, 2,000 per cent upon the ordinary common cost of salt, and having done all this, you have borrowed so much that you cannot borrow any more. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has offered to lend, or rather he has suggested that he will lend—and I suppose he is meditating it as he meditated the Rhodope Grant—to the Indian Government £2,000,000, for which the Indian Government is to pay no interest. That is exactly the terms upon which the people of this country lent to the Turkish Government. These terms were not in the agreement, but that has been the result. The money has been lent, and no interest paid. We call the Turkish Government bankrupt; but we say that the Indian Government is only in a position of momentary and temporary embarrassment. I ask you to turn back to the speech which Sir Robert Peel made in 1842. I have not referred to it for many years, but I recollect that he pointed out to the House what might happen if the time should arise when there would be great confusion and embarrassment in the finances of India, and to what an enormous and perilous extent a disturbance in the finances of India might affect the finances of this country. We have approached the time that Sir Robert Peel referred to, and I recollect that people thought when he spoke he was going too far away to find an argument in favour of the great change which he was anxious to make for the purpose of restoring the financial equilibrium of the country. We have come now to that point and, I say, that, listening to this debate, in which I had not the least intention of taking any part, I have been impressed with the seriousness of the position in which we are placed, and I am astounded that the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who does know his multiplication table—I think I have known Ministers who did not—who was brought up at the feet of my right hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich, and who, if he were not on that Bench, would in many financial questions agree with him — I am astounded, I say, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should have given his consent to the recent policy of the Government in India, which must aggravate to an extent which we cannot measure, the great malady which affects that country at this moment. There is no doubt whatever that the policy which the Government have adopted within the last six months—a policy in which they have given up and repudiated the wisdom of our wisest Indian administrators—must aggravate to an enormous extent the disasters which have overtaken Indian finance and the difficulties with which this House is now called upon to grapple. I think the Government ought to have received the proposition of the hon. Member for Hackney with sympathy and with an offer of assistance. They might have objected to his words and suggested something better; but, now that the question has been brought before the House and seriously discussed, I think they ought to have consented to a Committee which should have given a thorough investigation into all the troubles which now beset the question of Indian finance. I do not ask for a Committee entirely on the ground of finance. My opinion is, as I have already said, that nothing which you can do here can materially affect the question of finance. That question is one which arises in India, and must be determined in India. I have come to the conclusion I stated here in 1858, that it was absolutely impossible—and years are proving it to be impossible—that India could be managed by a half-a-dozen members of the Indian Council, who are appointed only for five years, and who are, on the average, not more than two years and a-half in office, with a Governor General at their head who is not more than five years in office, and is for the first year or two, in a manner, learning the business of his great office. You have a Governor General who had never been in India before his appointment, who had never been in this House, who had never been connected directly or indirectly with the politics of England. You have half-a-dozen such gentlemen as I have described, presided over by such a Governor General, undertaking to manage the whole affairs of 200,000,000 of persons, of 20 different nations, speaking 20 different languages; and to say that such a thing can be done by half-a-dozen gentlemen sitting in Calcutta, with such a Governor General at their head, is to make one of the most astounding assertions that could possibly be put into language. There never can be a Government which can be just to the character of England, and which can be just to that enormous population, until you have India separated into more completely independent Governments, so that the Governor of every Province and the members of his Council shall be nearer to those whom they govern, shall be more intimately acquainted with all their circumstances and requirements, shall not be required to carry on great policies on the Frontiers and aggressive wars, but shall be required to make annually his direct account to the Secretary of State here, by whom all these things will be judged. Before I conclude with regard to that Council, I should like to state what, perhaps, many hon. Members do not know, that when the India Bill was before the House, Lord Palmerston, I believe, agreed with me that it would be well to have no Council at all. The Council was partly established to make it easy to transfer the Indian Government from one body to another, and a great many of the old East Indian body were put upon it. Lord Palmerston was very much against having a Council so numerous, and one evening he came to me in the House and asked if I would support a proposition to have it reduced. He thought a Council of seven would be abundant for all purposes. I rather smiled—for I did not agree with Lord Palmerston in many things—and I told him that there was not the slightest chance of getting the House to agree to his proposal, considering the position the Government were in with their Friends and the Company. The proposal was submitted to the House, but it did not pass. Lord Palmerston did not think that there should be a Council at all; but that if there was to be one, it should be a small body that would be confidentially consulted by the Indian Secretary. He had no idea that the Council should have the sort of power over the Indian Secretary that the directors of the East India Company had. That is my opinion still; and though in that I differ from many hon. Members of the House, and, perhaps, from my hon. Friend the Member for Hackney, I still feel bound to support this proposition, because, according to the words of the Reference, the Committee would be able to examine the whole question of the government of India. There is no single thing which any man could bring before that Committee in regard to the government of India which it would not be entitled to inquire into. I am sorry that the Chancellor of the Exchequer has not come out with a little more courage. He gave us to hope that there would be some sort of Inquiry at some time. If he thinks there is not enough of pressure now, before next year's Budget there will be a good deal more; but I would recommend him—and I am giving him disinterested advice—to agree to the appointment of this Committee. If he does not like the words of the Motion, let him take an early opportunity of submitting to the House a proposition for the appointment of a Committee, with a Reference such as he approves. Whatever the House does, let it not allow this great question to escape, as if there had been no discussion to-night. There has not been in our time a question of graver moment, or one more entitled to the most earnest consideration and deliberation of the House.

Question put.

The House *divided*:—Ayes 139; Noes 100: Majority 39.—(Div. List, No. 30.)

Main Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," by leave, *withdrawn.*

Committee *deferred* till *Monday* next.

SUPPLY.—REPORT.

Resolutions [27th February] *reported.*

OUR POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA.

OBSERVATIONS.

MR. O'DONNELL said, that as the Supply was in reference to South African proceedings, he felt bound to say a few words. He fully recognized the necessity of placing their position in South Africa beyond danger, and he fully sympathized with the friends of those who had lost their lives lately; but he thought he was called on to protest at every stage against the policy of the Government in South Africa. Considering the general feeling of hon. Members of the House, that there had been no hindrance to the Government in the strengthening and restoration of their position, he thought the Government were bound to give the House some satisfaction that the future policy to be pursued would cease to be a policy of selfish aggrandizement — a policy of inhuman butchery of the Native population. In the latest news from South Africa they had been given the glad assurance that the colours of the 24th Regiment had been rescued; but there was another item of information which ought to bring the blush of shame to the cheek of any man with a spark of humanity in his breast. They read of the destruction of a Native kraal and the burning down of 250 Native huts. He would ask the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for the Colonies, if he intended to propose that some decoration ought to be established to reward that branch of South African Service which consisted in the burning down of Native huts? No matter what might be said of the stolidity and intellectual darkness of a savage race, he could not but believe that the memory of those excesses would for many a year tend to keep alive the flame of dissatisfaction among the Native population of South Africa, and he considered the Government ought to give some assurance against their repetition. It was, perhaps, the brightest, proudest, most glorious page in the history of this country which recorded how, urged on by the heroic virtues of a Wilberforce, the chains were struck off the limbs of black men transported from their Native land. Were they now going to enter on a policy the reverse of that of Wilberforce, and to follow the black man to his native home, to steal the land from under his feet and reduce him to a state of permanent Helotry, even in those forests in which he might be supposed to remain safe from us. [*Laughter.*] It was easy to laugh at that. Hon. Members could sneer and laugh at protests from that side of the House; but the inhuman policy in South Africa would unquestionably have its consequences, just as the policy of Spain in South America had consequences which, in their day of exultation, the great conquerors of South America never dreamed that their haughty country would come to see.

Resolutions *agreed to.*

Mr. O'Donnell

VALUATION OF PROPERTY BILL.

(*Mr. Sclater-Booth, Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Salt.*)

[BILL 71.] SECOND READING.

Order for Second Reading read.

Mr. SCLATER-BOOTH, in moving that the Bill be now read a second time, said, he thought he would best consult the wishes of the House by not repeating his arguments of last year in favour of the measure. It was substantially the same measure which had been read a second time last year, and some of the most important portions of which, up to the 17th or 18th clauses, had gone through Committee. The Government had, within the last few years, given more in aid of local expenditure; a local Budget was now brought before the House annually; increasing interest was being taken in local taxation and expenditure; and for those, as well as for many other reasons, it was extremely desirable that an uniform system of valuation should be established not only in every Union, but also throughout every county—especially seeing that in the course of a short time the county rate would have to contribute towards certain local charges. The Bill had year after year been criticized by some of the most experienced assessment committees in the Kingdom, who had given him the benefit of their advice and assistance, and by the greater number of whom it was not only understood and appreciated, but earnestly desired that it should become law. Since the measure had been under the notice of Parliament, indeed, the rules which it laid down for the guidance of future committees had been more and more acted upon under the law as it stood. The Bill though, to some extent one of consolidation, contained a great deal of new matter, and, it having now passed through a fresh edition, he felt confidence in recommending it to the House. With respect to the alterations in the Bill, he might state that, in accordance with what had been decided in Committee last year, he had eliminated the appeal to Petty Sessions. In future the appeals would lie to the Quarter Sessions, while a new tribunal would secure the interests of the county rate. The appeal to Quarter Sessions had also been disembarrassed from objections which formerly applied to it.

The gross rental column in the valuation list would be deemed to be the value. As to the functions of the surveyors of taxes, he had adopted a suggestion made by the representatives of an influential Poor Law Conference, which coincided with the language of the 38th clause. No one could now scruple to accept the language of that clause. The general effect of the alterations would be that actual rent would more and more determine the value of property, both for Imperial and local purposes. They were now looking to some measure of value for the whole Kingdom, and nothing so well as rent could be adopted as a measure of value. He could, therefore, assure the hon. Member for Falkirk Burgh (Mr. Ramsay), who took so much interest in the Valuation Law in Scotland, and wished to refer this Bill to a Select Committee, that, so far as his object was to make rent a criterion of value, he entirely agreed with him. He would, however, point out to the hon. Member, that the value of the hereditaments of this country was not always a matter of rent as between landlord and tenant, for a vast amount of house property was not held on rack rent at all, and in other cases houses were occupied by their owners. And there was, therefore, some difficulty in applying the principle. With regard to the Amendment of which his right hon. Friend the Member for the City of London (Mr. Hubbard) had given Notice, he thought it was extremely hard that a proposal which had exclusive reference to the incidence of the property tax should be brought forward, he would not say as an obstruction, but as a dilatory plea to the progress of this Bill. His right hon. Friend desired that the property tax should be assessed on the rateable value. But until this Bill had been in operation for a considerable period, it was impossibls that there could be a rateable value column which could be relied upon for the assessment of the property tax, or, indeed, any other Imperial tax. The Amendment would, therefore, defer the Bill for a long time, and he put it to his right hon. Friend whether he would not do better for his own object to depend on the Bill which he had already introduced on his own responsibility, with the view of re-adjusting the incidence of the property tax as to Schedules A and B, and rather to make common cause with him in passing the present Bill as an essential preliminary to the carrying out of his own proposal?

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."—(*Mr. Sclater-Booth.*)

MR. J. G. HUBBARD assured his right hon. Friend that it was with no pleasure to himself that he rose to offer what might seem to be obstruction to this Bill. It was a Bill for which he had been labouring since 1867, and he hailed the Bill with great satisfaction, with one very grave exception. His right hon. Friend might lead them to suppose that the subject of his Amendment had no necessary connection with the Bill; but his Amendment was—

> "That no Valuation Bill, providing in a Valuation List a common authority for the assessment of rates and taxes, can be satisfactory unless it provides a common measure of value for such assessment by levying Imperial taxes as well as local rates upon the rateable value."

The Bill touched Imperial taxes. The 31st clause made the valuation list the authority for all local rates, income tax, and house tax. But it did more; it decreed that, while rates were to be levied on the rateable value, taxes were to be levied on the gross value. Had his right hon. Friend left out the last part of that clause, he would have a right to complain of his Amendment. That clause maintained the present vicious system, and it legalized in an unprecedented manner injustice and extortion in the name of the Queen. In the Bill now before the House there was a Schedule which provided a certain scale of deductions from the gross value of property through which the rateable value was to be ascertained; but while local rates and payments were to be levied upon the rateable value, the Queen's taxes were to be collected upon the gross value, which was from 10 to 33 per cent more. The real property of this country was greatly encumbered. It had been computed that landed property was in the aggregate mortgaged to the extent of one-half; but, while some properties were free, others were heavily mortgaged, and thus it occurred that a property of £2,000 nominal, but of £1,800 effective rental, was assessed to income tax on £2,000, and being liable to a mortgagee for £1,600 interest, left but £200 to the owner. Yet he was charged income tax on £2,000, and recouping himself to the extent of £1,600, was practically paying on his residue twice as heavily as the capitalist mortgagee. While commending a remedy for this grievance to the attention of the House, he could not but remark that this unfair proposal in the 31st clause was thrust into the Bill by the Inland Revenue Department. The President of the Local Government Board was the victim of that Department. He did not want to take away from the receipts of the Chancellor of the Exchequer; he wished to see the tax levied equitably. He charged Somerset House with being over-zealous in an ungodly attempt to lay burdens on the backs of landowners and house owners. When this House passed the Inhabited House Duty, it gave to the Revenue officers the privilege of assessing an annual value, and when they voted an income tax it was to be assessed on the profits of lands and houses. He wanted to know whether a man with £2,000 a-year in house property, who only got £1,500 a-year from it, should be dealt with as if he had £2,000 a-year profits? If he did not get the £2,000, they had no right to tax him on that amount. In 1860 the population was 19,900,000; now it was 24,800,000—an increase of 25 per cent. The house duty in 1860 was £23,000,000 odd; it was now £47,000,000 odd. The houses chargeable with income tax in 1860 amounted to £48,780,000, and in 1878 to £90,451,000 in value. What did that mean? It did not mean that houses had increased in that proportion or numbers, for that increase could not exceed the growth of the population; but it meant that the assessable value had been forced up 75 per cent in 18 years by the combined efforts of assessment committees and tax surveyors. He would close his appeal to the House by a warning. Many years since this country, in the Great War, had to struggle for existence, and in order to pay our way we issued paper money so lavishly that it greatly depreciated in value, and the issues of the Bank of England fell to a discount of 25 per cent. Attempts were made by Lord King and others to protect themselves against this depreciation in the currency, but the attempts were disapproved by the Government; and Mr. Vansittart introduced a Bill into the House of Commons, which was passed into law, enacting that the bank note was equal in value to the coin it represented, and that any persons giving or taking it at any but its nominal value should be guilty of a misdemeanor. This clause, despite the earnestness of Horner and the eloquence of Canning, became law, under the influence of the Government and its followers. The proposal in the Valuation Bill was not less mischievous and absurd, and he asked the House whether they would tolerate such another anomaly in legislation? The proposal in the 31st clause was as absurd and intolerable as that of Mr. Vansittart, and it was infinitely more injurious? It would inflict on the people a grievance which stirred them up against the Government they ought to respect and the laws they ought to obey, and made taxpaying a nuisance, instead of what it ought to be—a pleasure. He begged to move the Amendment which stood in his name.

Sir JOSEPH M'KENNA, in seconing the Amendment, said, he opposed the Bill for the reasons so clearly stated by the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Hubbard) who had proposed the Amendment, and also on the ground that if such a measure were applied to Ireland, it would work still greater injustice, and therefore, lest he might be accused hereafter when a Bill was introduced for Ireland, that he had allowed the principle to pass unchallenged on the present occasion. He considered the principle of charging income and rates on the scale adopted hitherto and continued by this Bill unjust; and, therefore, he felt called upon to oppose its application to England.

Amendment proposed,

To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "no Valuation Bill, providing in a Valuation List a common authority for the assessment of rates and taxes, can be satisfactory unless it provide a common measure of value for such assessment by levying Imperial taxes as well as local rates upon the rateable value,"—(*Mr. Hubbard*),

—instead thereof,

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

Mr. KNOWLES regretted that the right hon. Gentleman had made no provision in the Bill for a uniform method of assessing mineral property. He was unable to understand why that description of property was excluded from the Bill, unless it was that the President of the Local Government Board sympathized with land valuers and that class of persons. The present system was very unsatisfactory and unjust. He would vote against the second reading of the Bill, unless his right hon. Friend promised to introduce a clause dealing with the matter he had mentioned.

MR. RYLANDS said, that the changes introduced in the Bill removed, to a considerable extent, the objections which had been taken to the Bill of last year. The subject to which the hon. Member for Wigan (Mr. Knowles) had referred might be considered in Committee, and he would second his hon. Friend in the matter. He objected to the Amendment, because it raised the question of the incidence of the Income and Property Tax by a side wind. He hoped the House would be disposed some day to deal with that subject in a serious spirit; but he was not prepared to raise that question at the present moment. He would vote for the second reading of the Bill, trusting that certain changes might be made in its clauses in Committee.

MR. STORER pointed out that there was an unjust incident of taxation as between the urban and the rural occupier which ought to be remedied. As an illustration of the grievance, he might mention that a farmer in the neighbourhood of a town with which he was acquainted occupied a farm at a rent of £400 a-year, and derived an income from it of £200 per annum, yet he contributed exactly the same sum to the local rates as certain large works in the town, which were let at £400 a-year but returned many thousands annually.

MR. STANSFELD said, the only fault he had to find with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the City of London (Mr. J. G. Hubbard) was for introducing his Motion on the second reading of this Bill. The subject was a remanet of the late Government's questions, and had been introduced in successive Sessions, and always been postponed. It was essentially a Bill of clauses, and he thought the House would be of opinion that it was not desirable to spend any great length of time in discussing it at that stage. The hon. Member for South Nottinghamshire (Mr. Storer), who had just sat down, seemed to him to be labouring under a delusion as to the objects of the Bill. The question of rating did not arise in the debate on a matter of valuation. The question for the House, at that moment, was solely the Amendment of the right hon. Gentleman, and he would forgive him (Mr. Stansfeld), he trusted, when he suggested that that Amendment was really irrelevant to the Question then before the House, because the right hon. Gentleman had fallen into precisely the same error as the hon. Member who had preceded him. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for the City of London was of opinion that the taxes ought to be made upon the same value as the rates. Whether that value should be the gross value or the rateable value was another question. But the Bill did not affect that question in the slightest degree. It was a Bill to fix upon an uniform system for assessing the gross and rateable value of property, and it left the question raised by the right hon. Gentleman entirely intact as to whether income tax should be levied upon rateable value or upon the gross, as was the case at the present moment. According to the present law, the income tax was levied upon the gross value of property. He did not deny that that mode frequently pressed unduly, but he did deny that that was the proper occasion to discuss the justice of that principle. The right hon. Gentleman ought to regard this stage of the Bill as a preliminary to the occasion when he would have every opportunity of bringing forward his views. This Bill would ascertain the gross value and the rateable value of property, and the right hon. Gentleman could not object to the proposal of the Government that those gross and rateable values should be arrived at in some uniform manner. It appeared to him that the sole objection to the second reading of the Bill was a matter which did not properly arise in the debate on that question, and, therefore, he hoped the House would accord the Bill a second reading.

MR. PELL said, he could not support the Amendment—one reason being that he thought the Bill had been sufficiently discussed. He entirely agreed with the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Stansfeld) that they would do better to defer further discussion until the proper time—namely, when the Bill went into

Committee. He must say also that he regarded the Amendment with some suspicion; for, in his own mind, he did not see that it was one which would recommend itself to the owners of real property. The effect of the right hon. Gentleman's Amendment would be to entirely disorganize and unsettle the existing arrangements for the assessment of real property. There was one point upon which he felt some regret, because the subject was rather a "hobby" of his. He was sorry to see that the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Sclater-Booth) had not done anything for the better assessment of railways. There was a clause in the Bill, truly, which authorized the calling in of a professional man in those cases; but it was very obvious that railway property had now become so enormous and important that it could hardly be assessed in the same way as ordinary property. He could not help thinking, therefore, that opportunities should be given to call in a professional valuer who would make a professional survey of all railway property in his county, and thus afford substantial data on that subject, which, under present conditions, must be only a matter of conjecture.

Sir WALTER B. BARTTELOT thought that they must congratulate the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Local Government Board for having introduced this measure, framed as it was very much in accordance with the principles laid down last year in Committee. He sympathized with the right hon. Member for the City of London (Mr. J. G. Hubbard), and he thought the House generally sympathized with him in the Motion he had made; but he could not agree with his hon. Friend the Member for South Leicestershire (Mr. Pell), who suggested that there was no necessity for bringing forward this question. The hon. Member knew perfectly well — probably no other hon. Member in the House knew so well — the difference between the assessment for the income tax, the county rate, and that for the poor rate. They were three distinct and different modes of assessment. Therefore, when the President of the Local Government Board brought in his Bill, which was to assimilate and place exactly on the same footing these different assessments, naturally his right hon. Friend the Member for the City of London thought that was a fair opportunity for discussing that grievance of which he thought he had a right to complain. Though his right hon. Friend had a perfect right to bring forward this question, yet the second reading of this Bill was not the proper time to do so. ["No, no!"] He saw his right hon. Friend did not agree to that; but this question was essentially one for the Committee. He (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) was not going to argue that question; but he thought the suggestion thrown out by the hon. Member for South Leicestershire did deserve some consideration — namely, that whereas the income tax was levied upon the gross value, ought not the whole of the taxes to be levied upon the gross also? He believed it was so in Scotland, except as regarded the poor rate. But one thing he thought no one would deny—all these taxes ought for the future to be placed on the same footing. The right hon. Gentleman the President of the Local Government Board had made an important statement on the question of rent. He believed that subject to be at the bottom of the Bill; for if rent was to be a criterion, they might depend upon getting very much nearer to the value of property than had ever been done before. What was wanted was to strengthen the hands of the county authorities so that the whole of these modes of assessment might be looked into, and thus enable them to place all the rates of the different Unions in the county on the same footing. What people objected to was the difference in the mode of assessment in the various Unions which now existed. He hoped his right hon. Friend the President of the Local Government Board might have fair treatment in the consideration of the Bill. He certainly did not think these Bills—which were of very great interest to the counties and of very large importance—obtained a fair share of the time and attention of the House, and he also was of opinion that his right hon. Friend the President of the Local Government Board did not obtain from the Government the opportunities accorded to other Departments, which the great and varied interest intrusted to his charge demanded.

Mr. HIBBERT said, he did not agree that the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. J. G. Hubbard) was wrong in bringing forward his Amendment at the present time. He (Mr. Hibbert) was of opinion that it would have been entirely out of place in Committee, though he sympathized with the views of his right hon. Friend. He was sure no tax could be levied more unfairly and unjustly than a house and land tax upon the gross value. The question was one of great difficulty, for if the Amendment were carried, the Chancellor of the Exchequer would be placed in a very awkward position in making an income tax upon England, Scotland, and Ireland, there being a different system of assessment in each Kingdom. He should like to see the whole matter as affecting the three Kingdoms considered by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, with a view of placing the tax upon a much more fair and reasonable footing. The Amendment would only apply to England. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. J. G. Hubbard) would be satisfied with the discussion which had taken place, and not press the Amendment to a Division. There were some alterations which would make the Bill much more acceptable in Lancashire — namely, greater assessment boards were proposed to be left out. In Lancashire, which was thickly populated, the difficulty was not so much felt, but there were counties in which there were five or six greater assessment boards with five or six different authorities outside the county authorities, and it was impossible under those circumstances to have anything approaching uniformity. He had put down a Question the previous evening on the subject of the valuation of mines. Though he did not say it was a perfectly simple matter, he thought it would prove not so difficult as it was supposed to be. He trusted that when the Bill was in Committee his hon. Friend the Member for Wigan (Mr. Knowles) would introduce a plan on some definite system for valuing mines. At present in some counties there were three or four systems for valuing mines, which naturally gave rise to great difficulties in the assessment of that kind of property.

MR. SCLATER-BOOTH said, he would not trespass long on the patience of the House, but he thought there were two or three questions to which he might refer. He did not at all deny that he sympathized with the remarks of the hon. Member who had last spoken, but they must bear in mind that this Bill was not a final measure, but only a preliminary to one dealing with County Boards. The hon. Member for South Leicestershire (Mr. Pell) raised a very serious question. If the hon. Gentleman thought he (Mr. Sclater-Booth) could settle this question of the rating of railways by a clause in a Valuation Bill, then the hon. Gentleman was a much more sanguine man than he. If every hon. Member representing a particular class of property were to bring forward a clause to provide for the special valuation of that property, he asked when was this Bill to pass? It would be extremely unfair towards the Bill. Let the Bill pass, however, and he should be most happy to produce a Rating Bill which would deal with all the questions not contained in this Bill. He trusted that after the debate on this question referring to England, the hon. Member (Mr. Ramsay) would not attempt to delay the progress of the measure.

MR. BIGGAR said, he was not informed whether the right hon. Member the Mover of the first Amendment would proceed with it or not. With regard to the Bill, he thought the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Local Government Board had tried to bring it forward on a former occasion, when he was counted out. That, of course, was very unpleasant; but now the right hon. Gentleman had placed hon. Members in that position that he was bound to get a hearing for the Motion. He could not imagine that any person could depend upon the principle that a ratepayer was bound to pay taxes on the actual value of that which he occupied or received rent for. As regarded rateable property, a fair and honest principle was that of a certain reduction from the gross value on account of the many different deductions which had to come off in proportion to the amount for waste. The result was under the former system, that in the case of the income tax an unfortunate occupier really paid from 20 to 50 per cent more than he actually put in his pocket. He could not believe that such a principle could be upheld, and he thought this was the opportunity for deciding the question as to whether the income tax should be paid on the gross value or on what the income really was. For that reason he thought the House would do well to support the Amendment.

Mr. RAMSAY said, he should be very sorry to do anything in the way of obstruction; but he would state in a few words his objections to the Bill in its present form. He found that in this Bill there was no alteration of the existing law, under which it was admitted on all hands that the diversity of the rating was very great indeed. He thought that any plan which would make the principle the same in England as in Scotland would be an improvement. It was said that the circumstances were somewhat different in England; but he was not aware of any one principle of difference between the relations of property in England and those in Scotland. If a tenant took a farm, the rent payable was accepted as the sole criterion of value, and he was glad to hear the right hon. Gentleman say that he was prepared to accept rent as the real criterion. If an owner be the occupier in Scotland, then the rent was taken to be the letting value to a tenant. The Valuation Act of 1854 provided that occupiers and proprietors should be bound to give an account of the rent paid to the owner, and in that way each parish in Scotland was provided with a uniform system of valuation; but the result of the present law in England was that in every parish there was a different mode of assessment. The result of the passing of the Valuation Act for Scotland was that whereas in the 12 years preceding the passing of that Act the valuation of the county in which he resided had only increased £11,000, in the first valuation under the Act the increase was £34,000 in the one year. And it had continued to increase every year since, having advanced from £291,236 in 1855-6 to £449,082 in the year 1878-9. He had statistics on the subject, which, if time permitted, he should have wished to have brought before the attention of the House; but, under the circumstances, he would briefly state that he did not believe the Bill as it then stood would secure that uniform valuation which it was expected to do.

Amendment, by leave, *withdrawn.*

Main Question put, and *agreed to.*

Bill read a second time, and *committed* for *Thursday* next.

Mr. Biggar

ASSIZES BILL.—[Bill 83.]

(*Sir Matthew Ridley, Mr. Assheton Cross.*)

THIRD READING.

Order for Third Reading read.

Bill read the third time accordingly.

Verbal Amendments made.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill do pass."—(*Sir Matthew Ridley.*)

Mr. COLE, in moving the Adjournment of the Debate, said, that he should like to know the nature of the Amendments to be proposed. He had a strong objection to the Bill as it stood, and he opposed it on several grounds. It was supposed to be a great advantage to prisoners; but he certainly thought, in that respect, it was no advantage at all. Under the Bill, which grouped several counties, it was impossible for prisoners to bring their witnesses to the place where they were to be tried. For instance, prisoners were brought from the Land's End to be tried at Exeter, the result being that persons not having large means were completely debarred from bringing their witnesses up to the Assizes. That, he thought, was a very great hardship; and, instead of assisting prisoners, he thought it the reverse. If prisoners were obliged to bring up their witnesses from the extreme ends of the counties, then the expense of so doing ought to be paid by the Government. He should wish to move the insertion of a clause that it should be in the power and discretion of the Judges to allow the expenses of those witnesses. That was not so in the Bill, expenses only being allowed in the case of witnesses bound over by the committing justices. Again, why were jurymen taken from one county to try all the prisoners for three counties? It was very hard upon the sheriff of the county to have to provide for the trial of prisoners from three counties, instead of those from his own particular county, and it was also very hard upon the grand jurors of the county in which the Assizes was held. Then, again, another extraordinary provision was, that the sheriff of the county in which the trial was held had to attend the hanging of prisoners capitally convicted coming from the counties grouped with his own county. That was the effect of the section, which was very plain. The section said—

> "Notwithstanding anything in the Act of 1877 where judgment of death has been passed on any convict at any assize, the judgment may be carried into effect in any prison in which the convict was confined for safe custody prior to his removal for trial and that the sheriff of the county for which such assizes were held shall be charged with the execution of that judgment, and shall for that purpose have the same jurisdiction and powers, and be subject to the same duties in the prison in which the judgment is to be carried into execution, although such prison is not situate within his county, as he has by law with respect to the common gaol of his county, or would have had if the Prison Act, 1865, and the Prison Act, 1877, had not passed."

Therefore, the result was perfectly clear that if a prisoner was sentenced to be executed he returned to the prison within which he was confined before he was tried, and the sheriff attending the Assize had to be present at the execution. [MR. ASSHETON CROSS dissented.] The right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary shook his head; but he (Mr. Cole) thought it was clear, on a proper construction of the section, that the sheriff of the county in which the Assizes were held for the three or four counties comprised within the group must attend the hanging of every prisoner from any and all of those counties. It was so, indeed; and he therefore submitted that that section required very careful consideration and amendment. He undertook to say that no lawyer could read that 3rd section without coming to his conclusion.

MR. J. W. BARCLAY seconded the Motion.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Debate be now adjourned." —(*Mr. Cole.*)

MR. MORGAN LLOYD said, the subject was of very great importance, and one which ought to be fully discussed by the House. He thought, however, the present was not a convenient opportunity for doing so. There was a necessity for the passing of the Bill on account of the Assizes to be held in April next, which, though intended for the trial of prisoners only, would be held in every county, unless the Bill became law before that time. He hoped, therefore, the hon. and learned Member (Mr. Cole) would withdraw his Amendment and allow the Bill to pass. The Home Secretary had promised that the House should have an opportunity of discussing the general question on a future occasion, which would be much better than to attempt to discuss a question of so much complication and importance on the third reading of a Bill intended to remedy a temporary difficulty. He thought the subject was worthy of the consideration of the House. He believed that in many counties grand jurors had made representations against the plan of holding four Assizes a-year, many of them saying three times were sufficient, while some thought two Assizes were sufficient in many places. While expressing no opinion on this question, he thought the mind of the country was not made up on the subject, and that the House should, therefore, have the opportunity for discussing the question in all its bearings.

MR. ASSHETON CROSS said, he quite agreed with the remarks which had fallen from the hon. and learned Member who had last spoken (Mr. Morgan Lloyd). He thought that the whole question as to the holding of the Assizes was one on which the judgment of the House should be deliberately asked at some future Sitting. The arrangement, which at that moment was almost concluded, and had received the sanction of the Judges, was that the Assizes were fixed for the 22nd April, and that arrangement being settled for this year, at all events, the only question was whether the Judges were to go to every single place, although there might be only one or two prisoners, or whether the system which had hitherto been carried out, of grouping one or two counties together, should be adopted. Therefore, it would not be possible to take the general discussion upon the matter at the present time, though he quite agreed with the Mover of the adjournment as to the desirability of discussion. The Bill would never have been brought forward unless it had been to endeavour by it to avoid a great waste of time and trouble to all the sheriffs and Judges, who, if the Bill were not passed, would have to go to every town and Assize county. That being so, he hoped the House would consent to the third reading of the Bill, in order that the Government might be allowed to obtain an Order in Council for the settlement of the Assize in April as proposed. The only Amendment of the Bill was a practical one to insure the holding of two different Assizes in each separate county annually. The object of the 3rd clause was simply to provide for extreme cases. In some of the Welsh counties it was no longer thought necessary that there should be a gaol in each county capital —that was the general opinion of the Welsh counties. The sole object of the 3rd clause was to enable the sheriff of the county to which a condemned prisoner belonged, where there was no gaol, to attend the execution in the adjoining county where there was a gaol. Under the old system, the sheriff of the county to which the prisoner belonged, where there was no gaol, would not have had the right to attend the execution in the prison of an adjoining county under the new Prisons Act. The clause was simply intended to give the sheriff of the county to which the prisoner belonged the right of being present at the execution in whatever gaol to which the prisoner might be sent in default of there being a gaol in his own county. There was no intention, under the clause, to compel the attendance of the sheriffs of the county in which the Assizes were held at the execution of prisoners from foreign counties. If, however, on consideration it was found that the clause required any alteration the more clearly to express that view, he would see that some word should be inserted in the other House.

Mr. HERSCHELL said, with reference to the groupings of counties, the system of taking adjoining counties, and grouping them, would, no doubt, be convenient for some people; but in some cases it would be more advantageous for everybody — prisoners included — to group them, not simply because they were adjoining counties, but with a due regard to the facilities of communication between the various Assize towns and districts.

Mr. ASSHETON CROSS said, if he understood his hon. and learned Friend, his suggestion was that the groupings should be arranged on a basis of *Bradshaw.*

Mr. COLE said, that after the explanation of the right hon. Gentleman, he would withdraw his Motion for the adjournment of the debate.

Motion, by leave, *withdrawn.*

Original Question put, and *agreed to.*

Bill *passed.*

Mr. Assheton Cross

SELECT VESTRIES BILL.—[Bill 54.]

(*Mr. James, Mr. Herschell, Mr. Joseph Cowen.*)

SECOND READING.

Order for Second Reading read.

Mr. W. H. JAMES, in moving that the Bill be now read a second time, said, that it provided for the nomination of the overseers of particular districts by any independent ratepayers in the place of the members of a customary vestry who were co-optatively elected. He had been anxious a year ago to obtain a Return from the Local Government Board, in order to show how many of these select vestries existed. The expense and difficulty in the way, however, were so great, as he was informed by the President of the Local Government Board, that he was unable to grant it. That select vestries were numerous, especially in the North of England, was notorious. The state of the law relative to the vestry and the overseer was extremely confused and anomalous. They originated at a time when the system of Local Government was entirely different to that of the present day. He was not prepared at that time of night to go into long statements; but wished to point out that it was a very considerable hardship where an overseer received his nomination from the members of a select vestry merely, the ratepayers having no voice in the matter. He knew of a particular instance where independent ratepayers attended at the sitting of a select vestry, and pointed out this injustice. Yet the nomination by the ratepayers in this case was refused by the chairman of the meeting. He did not think it fair that a matter which affected the ratepayers of a particular home parish should be decided by a self-elected body who often lived at a considerable distance. The origin of the select vestry by usage was at a time when the whole of their parochial affairs relating to civil government were in the hands of ecclesiastics. The hon. Member concluded by moving the second reading.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."—(*Mr. James.*)

Mr. SCLATER-BOOTH said, he was always reluctant to oppose a Bill promoted by a private Member, as he recognized the difficulties with which they were beset. At the same time, he thought this was an occasion on which the hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. James) had not made out any real or very good case. No select vestries could nominate an overseer who was appointed by the magistrates. There was no law which allowed that. He could not gather from the remarks of the hon. Member the abuses to which he had referred, and his information was gained from the best authorities most likely to know. He was very reluctant to move that the Bill be read that day six months, as he hoped it would be withdrawn. He would therefore move the adjournment of the debate.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Debate be now adjourned."—(*Mr. Sclater-Booth.*)

MR. HERSCHELL said, his name was on the back of the Bill; but he was not aware that it was coming on that night. The abuse which he understood was complained of was in the case of a vestry not elected by the inhabitants, but self-elected, and where the power of nominating an overseer by a self-elected body was the same as that held by the vestry chosen by the inhabitants in the ordinary way.

Motion *agreed to.*

Debate *adjourned* till *Friday* next.

ANCIENT MONUMENTS BILL.—[BILL 50.]

(*Sir John Lubbock, Mr. Beresford Hope, Mr. Osborne Morgan, Sir Richard Wallace.*)

COMMITTEE. [*Progress 21st February.*]

Bill *considered* in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

EARL PERCY said, he did not wish to revert to the causes of the Bill having been postponed; but it had been necessary to put down Amendments. It was perfectly impossible for them to consider that Bill carefully then, and have full discussion on points which should have been raised on the second reading. He really thought at that hour of the night they could not be expected to go into this lengthy subject. He would move that the Chairman report Progress.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."—(*Earl Percy.*)

SIR JOHN LUBBOCK said, he saw no reason why they could not proceed. He thought that a number of the Amendments were consequential Amendments—that was, if the first were disposed of, the others would follow. There would be a saving of much time if they proceeded, and he believed it would be in accordance with the convenience of hon. Members as it would avoid the necessity of bringing them on another occasion to the House on the subject.

MR. BERESFORD HOPE said, his noble Friend (Earl Percy) had no intention to obstruct; but gainsayers might misinterpret him, and say that under his guidance this Bill was becoming itself an ancient monument. He thought that the Committee might well go on, considering how the House had been most suspiciously counted out of late.

MR. MACARTNEY said, they had latterly had some good advice from the hon. Member for the University of Cambridge (Mr. Beresford Hope); but he (Mr. Macartney) would venture to impress upon the House that if they went into the consideration of the Bill, and if the Amendments were argued at the length they ought to be, they would be met with cries of "Divide, divide!"

Question put.

The Committee *divided:*—Ayes 38; Noes 54: Majority 16.—(Div. List, No. 31.)

Clause 1 (Definitions) *agreed to.*

Clause 2 (Appointment of Commissioners).

SIR HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON moved as an Amendment—In page 1, lines 24 and 25, to leave out from "Inclosure Commissioners for England and Wales," to end of line 10 in page 2, and insert, "Trustees of the British Museum."

EARL PERCY asked whether the Government had the consent of the Trustees of the British Museum to undertake these duties, and what reasons the Government had for thinking that those gentlemen were specially fitted for the duties under the Act?

SIR HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON said, the Government had ascertained that the Trustees of the British Museum were willing to undertake the charge placed upon them by the Bill. The reasons of the Government for choosing those gentlemen were that they believed them to be thoroughly competent to deal with the subjects contained in the Bill, and also with the interests of those possessing ancient monuments, and so give confidence in the working of the Bill without any undue expense to the country.

Amendment *agreed to;* words *inserted* accordingly.

Clause, as amended, *agreed to.*

Clause 3 (Mode of applying Act to Monuments).

MR. RIDLEY, in moving, as an Amendment, in page 2, line 20, Sub-section 2, to leave out "subject to appeal in the manner hereinafter provided," and insert, "subject as hereinafter provided," said, he trusted the Committee would see that, by passing this Amendment, the shape of the Bill would be materially improved so far as it related to monuments not mentioned in the Schedule. Her Majesty's Judges had proved themselves competent to decide every description of difficult questions; but he thought they could be hardly expected to say accurately whether a monument was really of ancient Roman or Saxon origin or not. He had ventured to suggest a more suitable mode of appeal by moving his Amendments, which provided that a Return should be annually made to the Houses of Parliament of all monuments to which it was proposed to apply the Act.

Amendment *agreed to;* words *inserted* accordingly.

EARL PERCY (for Lord FRANCIS HERVEY) moved the following Amendments:—In page 2, line 22, to leave out "is," and insert "being;" in page 2, line 23, to leave out "public," and insert "national;" in page 2, line 23, after "preservation," to insert "would, but for the application of this Act, be in danger of serious injury or destruction." Also in page 2, line 24, after "pleasure ground," to insert—

> "Provided always, That this Act shall not be applied for the first time to any Monument after the thirty-first day of December, one thousand eight hundred and eighty five."

SIR JOHN LUBBOCK said, he should be happy to accept the second Amendment, but he could not accept the others. Under the first Amendment, the Act could not be applied to any monument without implying that the owner of the monument was likely to destroy it, a suggestion which was far from the intention of the Act.

EARL PERCY thought the hon. Baronet (Sir John Lubbock) had then made a great admission. If these monuments were not in danger of being destroyed, what was the object of the Bill?

MR. BERESFORD HOPE explained that the Bill was intended to apply to monuments which were in danger of destruction from neglect and similar causes, in cases where owners, who lived at a distance perhaps, took insufficient interest in their preservation, though they never would actively sanction their destruction.

Second Amendment *agreed to;* word *substituted* accordingly.

Remaining Amendments, by leave, *withdrawn.*

MR. SERJEANT SPINKS moved, as an Amendment, to leave out Sub-section 2. His Amendment proposed to prevent the Bill from applying to any ancient monuments, not mentioned in the Schedule, which at any future time might be discovered. There were a considerable number of ancient monuments mentioned in the Schedule of the Bill, and as the Bill had been many years before the House, he thought there was not any great probability of the further discovery of any really important monuments to which this Act ought to be applied. However, after the Bill had become an Act of Parliament, it might be considered beneficial to include newly-discovered ancient monuments under the provisions of the Act—a course which would probably give great annoyance to the proprietors of the land upon which the monuments were discovered. It seemed to him much better not to insert the sub-section, and thus narrow the operation of the Bill to those monuments which at present existed. As far as the monuments mentioned in the Schedule were concerned, every landowner upon whose property they existed had had the opportunity of going before a Select Committee, and that Committee had decided which monuments were fit and proper to be included in the Bill; but as regards future monuments there would be no opportunity of questioning their fitness before a Committee of the House, the only remedy being to go to a Court of Law. He therefore thought it would be much better to accept the Amendment, and then the promoters of the Bill could bring in a Bill in the future to deal with the question of any monuments that might be discovered in the future.

SIR JOHN LUBBOCK hoped the hon. and learned Member for Oldham (Mr. Serjeant Spinks) would not press the Amendment, as any monuments which in the future might acquire special interest, perhaps from the destruction of others, would only be dealt with after due consideration.

Amendment, by leave, *withdrawn.*

MR. RIDLEY moved, as an Amendment, to insert in page 2, line 35—

"A Return shall be made to both Houses of Parliament not later than the thirty-first day of March in each year, setting forth every such notice which shall be given during the twelve months next preceding the date of such Return, or since the date of the last Return, and the description and situation of the monument in respect of which each and every of such notices shall have been given; and this Act shall not apply to any monument other than the several monuments specified in the said first Schedule until the expiration of four calendar months from the date of the Return of the notice relating thereto, nor shall this Act apply to any such monument if within the said four calendar months it shall be otherwise ordered by either of the said Houses of Parliament.

"Provided always, That whenever any such notice has been served as aforesaid it shall not be lawful for any person to injure, or to permit injury to be done to the monument specified in such notice between the time of the service of such notice and the expiration of four calendar months from the date of the Return thereof to the said Houses of Parliament as aforesaid, without the consent of the said Commissioners, and whoever shall unlawfully and wilfully so injure or permit injury to be done to any such monument shall be liable to be prosecuted as mentioned in the ninth Section of this Act."

Amendment *agreed to.*

Clause, as amended, *agreed to.*

Clause 4 (Notice to be given to Commissioners of intended injury to a monument to which this Act has been applied).

EARL PERCY moved, as an Amendment, to leave out in page 2, line 38, after "Commissioners" to end of Clause, and insert—

"For a period not exceeding six months from the date of such application. In case the Commissioners shall not within six months from the date upon which this Act shall have been applied to a monument have agreed with the owner to purchase it, or a part thereof, the right of the owner over such monument shall revive and continue to be the same in all respects as if this Act had not been passed."

He hoped that hon. Members would believe he was reluctant to trespass upon their patience, and he was almost ashamed at that hour to go on at any length. It, however, had not been his wish to do so; and he, therefore, must proceed with his Amendment, which embodied his main objection to the measure before the Committee. He had always objected to the measure, not from any disregard to, or an absence of interest in, these ancient monuments, which all who had any respect for antiquity must venerate, and especially so now that the hon. Baronet opposite (Sir John Lubbock) had enlightened the world upon these antiquities so well and ably. It made them feel grateful to the ancients for giving the hon. Baronet the opportunity thus to instruct them. But he could find no advantage in the establishment of the precedent contained in the Bill. This was a first attempt to take property compulsorily, for a purpose not distinctly of utilitarian character. If the hon. Baronet had taken steps to inform the House of any real objection to the present system, he should have been in a position to have met him. As far as he was aware, the House was entirely ignorant of the necessity for this measure, except the statement of the hon. Baronet; and, although he was an undoubted authority, he (Earl Percy) thought they should not accept the word of any hon. Member on behalf of a measure which introduced quite a new feature. He could conceive a case, where a landowner was not resident, in which an ancient monument might be neglected; and there it might be desirable to give the Commissioners power to make arrangements with him to take charge of the monument if he was not prepared to see that it was properly preserved.

Amendment proposed,

In page 2, line 38, after the word "Commissioners," to leave out all the words to the end of the Clause, in order to insert the words "for a period not exceeding six months from the date of such application. In case the Commissioners shall not within six months from the date upon which this Act shall have been applied to a monument have agreed with the owner to purchase it, or a part thereof, the right of the owner over such monument shall revive and continue to be the same in all respects as if this Act had not been passed."—(*Earl Percy.*)

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Clause."

Sir JOHN LUBBOCK said, that perhaps he might be allowed to remind the Committee that Lord Stanhope, the then President of the Society of Antiquaries, had given a strong opinion in favour of the Bill, and that he himself, on several subsequent occasions, had brought forward much evidence on the subject. Therefore, the Committee would see that there was no question of the *ipse dixit* of any one hon. Member on the subject. As regarded the Amendment, they would by it simply have a board of gentlemen to look after these monuments ; but he could not help thinking that the action would be incomplete unless there was a right to purchase. If the House thought it was wise to adopt the Amendment, however, he was quite ready to bow to its decision.

Mr. MORGAN LLOYD said, the Amendment seemed to him to go to the very principle of the Bill, which would be worth very little if it were carried with the Amendment, because it would give power to the owner of a monument by doing nothing to defeat its object.

Mr. MACARTNEY was of opinion that the passing of the Amendment would be most desirable. The strong objection to the clause was that an owner would constantly have suspended over him the liability of an action in a superior Court. Then, he thought the manner in which possession was attained by the Bill was exceptional. In other circumstances, where property was taken possession of by the public, it was bound to be paid for beforehand—that was so under the Land Clauses Act. Under this clause they were not bound to do so, without going into a superior Court of Law. That had a most unjust bearing upon a man of small property, who might be the owner of a valuable monument which he did not wish to sell.

Sir JOHN LUBBOCK said, he did not wonder at the opposition of the hon. Member for Tyrone (Mr. Macartney), if he thought those were the principles of the Bill. It was only if the owner wished to destroy the monument that the Commissioners would have the power to purchase it.

Mr. HERSCHELL remarked that under the Amendment, if any owner of a monument wished to destroy it, and sweep it from the face of the earth, he had only to hold the Commissioners at arm's length for six months, and then sweep away the monument as if nothing had happened.

Question put.

The Committee *divided*:—Ayes 48; Noes 28: Majority 20.—(Div. List, No. 32.)

Mr. ONSLOW said, he thought the hon. Baronet opposite (Sir John Lubbock) ought to be satisfied with the progress that night, and not keep them from their beds any longer in view of the hard work next week. He would move to report Progress.

Sir JAMES M'GAREL-HOGG seconded the Motion.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again." — (*Mr. Onslow.*)

Mr. ANDERSON said, the hon. Member for Guildford (Mr. Onslow) was the last man who should make that appeal. The hon. Member had been engaged for the last 10 days in constantly counting the House, and causing business to be postponed when it came on at early hours, and now he was in another way preventing its coming on at—not a late hour—10 minutes past 2 A.M.

Question put.

The Committee *divided*:—Ayes 34; Noes 38: Majority 4.—(Div. List, No. 33.)

Clause *agreed to.*

Clause 5 (Owners, &c., may require Commissioners either to consent to injury, or to acquire power of restraint); and Clause 6 (Power of restraint in case of injury to a monument), severally *agreed to.*

Clause 7 (Appeal from Commissioners in certain cases).

On Motion of Mr. Herschell, Clause *struck out.*

Clause 8 (Acquisition of monuments or of power of restraint by agreement with persons interested); Clause 9 (Penalty on persons unlawfully destroying or injuring a Monument); Clause 10 (Access of Commissioners to monuments); Clause 11 (Proceedings for ascertaining and paying compensation); and Clause 12 (Treasury may authorize expenses), severally *agreed to.*

Clause 13 (Expenses of the Commission).

EARL PERCY said, he could not let the clause pass without remark. He should like to have some statement from the Government as to the expense to be incurred under the Bill. It should be a consideration for the Government, at a time when money was supposed to be in much demand, whether this expenditure should be sanctioned.

SIR JOHN LUBBOCK said, money would only be expended under the following circumstances. If an owner of a monument wished to destroy it, he would give notice to the Commissioners, who, if they had not already funds in hand, would place the notice before the Treasury. If the Treasury thought proper to expend the money they could do so. If not, the Commissioners' duty would be to communicate this decision to the owner, and the result would be that the monument would be unfortunately destroyed. He did not think the expenditure would be great, as the monuments did not require to be repaired—they simply wanted to be left alone.

SIR HENRY SELWIN-IBBETSON said, there would be no considerable expense in carrying out the provisions of the Bill.

MR. SHAW LEFEVRE remarked that very much the same principle was carried out in France, where no landowner had ever refused to put an ancient monument in his possession under the protection of the law. He supposed that landowners in France were much the same in this respect as those in England. He firmly believed that if this Bill passed into law there would not be a single landowner who would not at once put his monuments under the protection of the Act.

EARL PERCY said, the hon. Gentleman the Member for Reading (Mr. Shaw Lefevre) was the first person he had ever heard say that landowners in France were in the same position as landowners in England. He must press for the omission of this clause.

MR. HERSCHELL thought the noble Lord (Earl Percy) was under a misapprehension as to this clause. If Parliament did not supply the means for purchase in these instances, the result would be that the monument would be destroyed. That was the only result. If it were not desired by Government to retain the monument, then the Vote for its purchase would not be necessary.

Clause *agreed to.*

Clause 14 (Reports on monuments).

MR. PELL moved, as an Amendment, to add in page 6, at end of Clause—

> "And of the monuments transferred by them to any local authority, or in respect of which any power of restraint has been by them transferred to any local authority under the provisions of this Act."

Amendment *agreed to;* words *added.*

Clause, as amended, *agreed to.*

Clause 15 (Service of Notices) *agreed to.*

Clause 16 (Provision for defining the site of a monument).

On the Motion of Sir JOHN LUBBOCK, Amendment made, in page 7, line 22, by leaving out from "except" to "situated" in line 25.

Clause, as amended, *agreed to.*

Clause 17 (Transfer of a monument to a local authority).

MR. MACARTNEY (for Lord FRANCIS HERVEY) moved, as an Amendment, to insert in page 7, line 32, after "situate," "with the consent of such local authority."

Amendment *agreed to;* words *inserted* accordingly.

MR. PELL moved, as an Amendment, to insert in page 7, line 36, after "Act"—

> "Except the power of incurring expenses for the purposes of this Act, and except the duty of reporting to Parliament."

Amendment *agreed to;* words *inserted* accordingly.

EARL PERCY objected to the clause as amended. He could not see the advantage of the action of the local authorities which might gradually devolve upon a Town Council or Board of Guardians.

SIR JOHN LUBBOCK hoped the noble Lord opposite (Earl Percy) would not press his objection. As an instance of the authority contemplated under the clause, he might refer to the Devil's Dyke, near Brighton. That was of great interest to the people of Brighton, who had shown a desire to retain it under local control.

Clause, as amended, *negatived.*

Clause 18 (Provision as to public works) *agreed to.*

Clause 19 (Saving of informalities).

EARL PERCY thought the clause very comprehensive. In fact, it covered almost everything which could occur.

MR. MARTEN was of opinion that the words covered a large area.

MR. HERSCHELL said, it was simply so to cover any informality on immaterial points.

Clause *agreed to.*

Clause 20 (Saving of the Duchy of Cornwall); and Clause 21 (Short title), severally *agreed to.*

SCHEDULE I.

LORD KENSINGTON moved, as an Amendment, to insert in page 10, after line 26, "the Pentre Evan Cromlech, Pembrokeshire, Nevern."

Amendment *agreed to;* words *inserted* accordingly.

MR. MACARTNEY (for Mr. ELLIOT) moved to leave out, in page 10, line 31, "Cæsar's Camp, Wimbledon."

SIR JOHN LUBBOCK said, that although the monument was considerably effaced he had consulted his hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Surrey (Sir Henry Peek), who had expressed his opinion that it would be a pity to leave it out.

Amendment, by leave, *withdrawn.*

Schedule, as amended, *agreed to.*

Schedule II. *agreed to.*

House *resumed.*

Bill *reported;* as amended, to be considered upon *Monday* 10th March, and to be *printed.* [Bill 89.]

MOTIONS.

ARMY OFFICERS (GUARDS AND LINE).

MOTION FOR AN ADDRESS.

MAJOR O'GORMAN moved for an Address for a Return of the nominal roll of all Officers—Guards and Line—who had volunteered for service at the Cape, distinguishing those who had passed the Staff College.

Motion made, and Question proposed,

"That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying Her Majesty that She will be graciously pleased to give directions that there be laid before this House a Return of the nominal roll of all Officers (Guards and Line) who have volunteered for service at the Cape, distinguishing those who have passed the Staff College."—(*Major O'Gorman.*)

COLONEL STANLEY said, he could not see the advantage of the Return. It was quite obvious that many officers volunteered over other officers quite as anxious for service. The information would be very voluminous, and he could not understand what purpose it could serve, except to illustrate the fact that certain officers had been sent out to the Cape. These officers would not stand in the way of the promotion of the officers of the 24th or any other regiment. He was bound to demur to the Return.

Question put.

The House *divided:*—Ayes None; Noes 53.—(Div. List, No. 34.)

WAYS AND MEANS.

Considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

(1.) *Resolved,* That, towards raising the Supply granted to Her Majesty, the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury be authorised to raise on or before the 31st March 1879, any sum of money not exceeding £4,250,000, by an issue of Exchequer Bonds.

(2.) *Resolved,* That the principal of all Exchequer Bonds which may be so issued shall be paid off at par, at the expiration of one year from the date of such Bonds.

(3.) *Resolved,* That the interest of such Exchequer Bonds shall be payable half-yearly, and shall be charged upon and issued out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom, or the growing produce thereof.

(4.) *Resolved,* That, towards making good the Supply granted to Her Majesty for the service of the year ending on the 31st day of March 1879, the sum of £4,250,000 be granted out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom.

Resolutions to be reported upon *Monday* next;

Committee to sit again upon *Monday* next.

PETTY CUSTOMS (SCOTLAND) ABOLITION ACT AMENDMENT BILL.

On Motion of Mr. JAMES BARCLAY, Bill to amend the Act thirty-three and thirty-four Victoria, chapter forty-two, for the abolition of Petty Customs, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. JAMES BARCLAY and Mr. COWAN.

Bill *presented,* and read the first time. [Bill 91.]

VACCINATION ACTS (IRELAND) AMENDMENT BILL.

On Motion of Mr. JAMES LOWTHER, Bill to amend the Acts relating to Vaccination in Ireland, *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. JAMES LOWTHER and Mr. ATTORNEY GENERAL for IRELAND.

Bill *presented,* and read the first time. [Bill 90.]

House adjourned at Three o'clock till Monday next.

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TO

HANSARD'S PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES,

VOLUME CCXLIII.

FIRST VOLUME OF SESSION 1878-9.

Explanation of the Abbreviations.

In Bills, Read 1º, 2º, 3º, or 1ª, 2ª, 3ª, Read the First, Second, or Third Time.—In Speeches, 1R., 2R., 3R., Speech delivered on the First, Second, or Third Reading.—*Amendt.*, Amendment.—*Res.*, Resolution.—*Comm.*, Committee.—*Re-Comm.*, Re-Committal.—*Rep.*, Report.—*Consid.*, Consideration.—*Adj.*, Adjournment or Adjourned.—*cl.*, Clause.—*add. cl.*, Additional Clause.—*neg.*, Negatived.—*M. Q.*, Main Question.—*O. Q.*, Original Question.—*O. M.*, Original Motion.—*P. Q.*, Previous Question.—R. P., Report Progress.—*A.*, Ayes.—*N.*, Noes.—*M.*, Majority.—*1st. Div.*, *2nd. Div.*, First or Second Division.—*l.*, Lords.—*c.*, Commons.

When in this Index a * is added to the Reading of a Bill, it indicates that no Debate took place upon that stage of the measure.

When in the Text or in the Index a Speech is marked thus *, it indicates that the Speech is reprinted from a Pamphlet or some authorized Report.

When in the Index a † is prefixed to a Name or an Office (the Member having accepted or vacated office during the Session) and to Subjects of Debate thereunder, it indicates that the Speeches on those Subjects were delivered in the speaker's private or official character, as the case may be.

Some subjects of debate have been classified under the following "General Headings:"—ARMY — NAVY — INDIA — IRELAND — SCOTLAND — PARLIAMENT — POOR LAW—POST OFFICE—METROPOLIS — CHURCH OF ENGLAND — EDUCATION — CRIMINAL LAW — LAW AND JUSTICE — TAXATION, under WAYS AND MEANS.

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Moved, "That, Her Majesty having directed a Military expedition of Her Forces charged upon Indian Revenues to be despatched against the Ameer of Afghanistan, this House consents that the Revenues of India shall be applied to defray the expenses of the Military operations which may be carried on beyond the external frontiers of Her Majesty's Indian Possessions" (*Mr. Edward Stanhope*) *Dec* 16, 876

Amendt. to leave out from "That," and add "this House is of opinion that it would be unjust that the Revenues of India should be applied to defray the extraordinary expenses of the Military operations now being carried on against the Ameer of Afghanistan" (*Mr. Fawcett*) *v.*; Question proposed, "That the words, &c.;" after long debate, Debate adjourned

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Africa—South Africa—The Re-inforcements—Condition of the Regiments
Moved, "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for a Return in a Tabular form showing (1) ages, (2) length of service, (3) number of privates who have not completed their drill and musketry instruction, of the non-commissioned officers, corporals, and privates of 2nd-21st, 58th, 3rd-60th, Rifles, 91st, and 94th, at present under orders for the Cape of Good Hope, as they embark for active service; also the number of men from each regiment left at home on account of physical unfitness, and the number drawn from other regiments to complete the battalions" (*Lord Truro*) *Feb* 18, 1400; after short debate, Motion agreed to
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The Cape Colony—The Mounted Police, Question, Mr. Gorst; Answer, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach *Dec* 9, 301; Question, Lord Randolph Churchill; Answer, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach *Feb* 14, 1193

Africa—South Africa—Commons—*cont.*
The Cape Colonies—Telegraphic Communication, Question, Colonel Mure; Answer, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach *Dec* 10, 529
Expenses of the War, Questions, Mr. Whitwell, Mr. Childers; Answers, The Chancellor of the Exchequer *Dec* 12, 636
The Transvaal and Zululand—The Boundary Dispute, Question, Mr. Whitbread; Answer, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach *Dec* 16, 855
The Zulu King — The British Ultimatum, Questions, Mr. Courtney, Mr. Whitwell; Answers, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach *Dec* 16, 858

The Re-inforcements
Questions, Colonel Mure; Answers, The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach *Feb* 13, 1072
Condition of the Regiments, Question, Colonel Mure; Answer, Colonel Stanley *Feb* 14, 1192; Question, Colonel Mure; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1196
Artillery Re-inforcements, Question, General Sir George Balfour; Answer, Colonel Stanley *Feb* 17, 1309
The Army Reserve, Question, Sir Henry Havelock; Answer, Colonel Stanley *Feb* 21, 1603
Composition of the Forces, Question, Mr. Whitwell; Answer, Colonel Stanley *Feb* 27, 1838
Catholic Chaplains, Question, Mr. Errington; Answer, Colonel Stanley *Feb* 20, 1517
Presbyterian and Wesleyan Chaplains, Questions, Mr. Cowan, Mr. Waddy; Answers, Colonel Stanley *Feb* 25, 1749

Employment of the Native Indian Army, Question, Sir George Campbell; Answer, Colonel Stanley *Feb* 17, 1310

The Papers, Correspondence, and Despatches
Question, Observations, The Marquess of Hartington; Reply, The Chancellor of the Exchequer *Feb* 17, 1317
Sir Bartle Frere's Despatches, Dec 10 *and Jan* 23, Question, Lord Robert Montagu; Answer, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach *Feb* 27, 1830; Question, Sir Charles W. Dilke; Answer, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, 1834
Defeat at Isandlana — Further Despatches, Questions, The Marquess of Hartington; Answers, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach *Feb* 20, 1522; *Feb* 28, 1974

Massacre of Kaffirs in Griqualand, Question, Dr. Cameron; Answer, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach *Feb* 18, 1407
The Native Contingent, Question, Sir Alexander Gordon; Answer, Lord Eustace Cecil *Feb* 18, 1409
The Zulu King—Negotiations, Question, Mr. James; Answer, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach *Feb* 20, 1510
Transmission of Intelligence, Questions, Mr. Otway; Answers, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach *Feb* 21, 1605
The Boundary Award, Questions, Mr. Dillwyn; Answers, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach *Feb* 24, 1650

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Africa—South Africa—Commons—*cont.*
The Zulu War—The Vote of Credit, Observations, The Chancellor of the Exchequer *Feb* 27, 1854
Policy in South Africa, Observations, Mr. O'Donnell *Feb* 28, 2034

Airlie, Earl of
Criminal Law—Bail in Charges of Fraud, 1596, 1599
India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations, Res. 298

Ancient Monuments Bill
(*Sir John Lubbock, Mr. Beresford Hope, Mr. Osborne Morgan, Sir Richard Wallace*)
c. Motion for Leave (*Sir John Lubbock*) *Dec* 9, 404; Motion agreed to; Bill ordered; read 1° * [Bill 52]
Read 2°, after short debate *Dec* 17, 967
Order for Committee read; Moved, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair" *Feb* 14, 1273; Moved, "That the Debate be now adjourned" (*Earl Percy*); after short debate, Question put; A. 33, N. 81; M. 48 (D. L. 6)
Question again proposed, "That Mr. Speaker, &c.;" Moved, "That this House do now adjourn" (*Mr. Onslow*); Motion withdrawn
Original Question put, and agreed to; Committee—r.p.
Committee *Feb* 21, 1638 [House counted out]
Committee *Feb* 27, 1941 [House counted out]
Committee; Report *Feb* 28, 2053 [Bill 89]

Anderson, Mr. G., *Glasgow*
Ancient Monuments, Comm. *cl.* 4, 2060
Eastern Question—Treaty of Berlin—Speech of the Prime Minister at Guildhall, 524
England—Condition of the Country—Prevalent Distress, 950
Factory Legislation (India), 1656
Habitual Drunkards, Comm. *cl.* 17, 1716
India—Afghanistan—The War—Alleged Massacre in Khost, 1312
Parliament—Orders of the Day, 1323
Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1570; Amendt. 1573, 1581, 1666, 1678, 1699
Racecourses (Metropolis), 2R. 1271; Comm. 1390, 1391
Rivers Conservancy, 1520
Sale of Food and Drugs Act (1875) Amendment, 2R. 1273
Slave Trade in the Red Sea, 1656
Turkey—Rhodope District—Grant in Aid, Notice of Res. 735; Withdrawal of Notice, 865, 962

Arbuthnot, Colonel G., *Hereford*
Army Organization—The Brigade Depôt System, Res. 1873
Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1539

Army
Miscellaneous Questions
Army Education—Literary and Physical Competitions, Observations, Earl Fortescue; Reply, Viscount Bury; debate thereon *Feb* 28, 1941

[*cont.*

Army—*cont.*
Army (*India*)
Increased Expenses, Question, General Sir George Balfour; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer *Feb* 17, 1315
Officers on Sick Leave, Questions, Major O'Beirne; Answers, Mr. E. Stanhope *Dec* 12, 638; *Feb* 20, 1512
Service in India, Question, Sir George Campbell; Answer, Colonel Stanley *Feb* 17, 1309
Travelling Expenses—The 3rd Hussars, Question, Major O'Beirne; Answer, Mr. E. Stanhope *Feb* 27, 1832

Army Medical Department, Questions, Mr. Lyon Playfair, Mr. Errington; Answers, Colonel Stanley *Dec* 12, 632
Breech-loading Ordnance, Question, Major Nolan; Answer, Lord Eustace Cecil *Feb* 14, 1192
Commissariat Department, Question, Sir Henry Havelock; Answer, Colonel Stanley *Dec* 13, 741
Longford Barracks, Question, Mr. Errington; Answer, Colonel Stanley *Feb* 20, 1517
The Defeat at Isandlana—The 24th Regiment, Questions, Major O'Gorman; Answers, Colonel Stanley *Feb* 20, 1514; *Feb* 25, 1752; *Feb* 27, 1836
Transport Service, Question, Sir Baldwyn Leighton; Answer, Colonel Stanley *Feb* 27, 1837

The Auxiliary Forces
Army Reserves — Militia, Question, Mr. J. Holms; Answer, Colonel Stanley *Feb* 20, 1508
Militia Fines, Question, Colonel Naghten; Answer, Colonel Stanley *Feb* 27, 1829
Militia Training, Question, Viscount Emlyn; Answer, Colonel Stanley *Feb* 27, 1832
Sergeant Instructors of Volunteers, Question, Colonel Barne; Answer, Colonel Stanley *Feb* 27, 1838
Volunteer Force—Finance and Organization—Report of the Committee, Question, Colonel Kennard; Answer, Colonel Stanley *Dec* 17, 956; Observations, Viscount Bury; short debate thereon *Feb* 14, 1162

Army Officers (*Guards and Line*)
Moved, "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying Her Majesty that She will be graciously pleased to give directions that there be laid before this House a Return of the nominal roll of all Officers (Guards and Line) who have volunteered for service at the Cape, distinguishing those who have passed the Staff College" (*Major O'Gorman*) *Feb* 28, 2063; after short debate, Question put; A. None; N. 53 (D. L. 34)

Army Organization—The Brigade Depôt System
Amendt. on Committee of Supply *Feb* 27, To leave out from "That," and add "in the opinion of this House, the Brigade Depôt system requires amendment, as it is costly, unsatisfactory, and inadequate to the require-

[*cont.*

Army Organization—The Brigade Depôt System—cont.
ments of home and foreign service" (*Major O'Beirne*) *v.*, 1872; Question proposed, "That the words, &c.;" after short debate, Question put, and agreed to

Army—The Artillery—Breech-loading and Muzzle-loading Guns
Amendt. on Committee of Supply *Feb* 27, To leave out from "That," and add "the great difference which exists between our cannon and those which find favour with Foreign Powers calls for careful investigation, and that it would be unwise to further postpone experiments on such classes of breech-loading guns as are now possessed by other Powers" (*Major Nolan*) *v.*, 1861; Question proposed, "That the words, &c.;" after short debate, Motion withdrawn

Army—Volunteer Force—Courts of Inquiry
Moved, That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for Return showing the number of courts of inquiry held in each year in the volunteer force since its establishment; the number of volunteers of all ranks, the number of adjutants, and the number of instructors in each year on which such were held, and the several offences charged (*The Lord Truro*) *Feb* 21, 1600; after short debate, Motion withdrawn

Army Discipline and Regulation Bill
(*Mr. Secretary Stanley, Mr. Secretary Cross, Mr. William Henry Smith, The Judge Advocate General*)
c. Orders of the Day subsequent to Supply postponed *Feb* 27, 1853
Motion for Leave (*Colonel Stanley*) *Feb* 27, 1909; after short debate, Question put, and agreed to; Bill ordered
Read 1° * *Feb* 28 [Bill 88]

Artizans' and Labourers' Dwellings Act, 1875—Operation of Act
Question, Sir Ughtred Kay-Shuttleworth; Answer, Mr. Assheton Cross *Dec* 9, 306

Artizans' Dwellings Act (1868) Extension Bill
(*Mr. Torrens, Sir Thomas Chambers, Mr. Goldney*)
c. Ordered; read 1° * *Dec* 6 [Bill 31]

ASHLEY, Hon. A. Evelyn M., *Poole*
China—Chefoo Convention, 638
Consecration of Churchyards Act (1867) Amendment, 2R. 1802
India—Afghanistan—Negotiations with the Ameer, 525
Mercantile Marine, 1651

Asia, Central—Merv and Bokhara
Question, The Earl of Camperdown; Answer, The Marquess of Salisbury *Dec* 10, 406

ASSHETON, Mr. R., *Clitheroe*
Consecration of Churchyards Act (1867) Amendment, Leave, 209
Parliament—Orders of the Day, 1332
Supply—War in South Africa—Vote of Credit, 1894

Assizes Bill
(*Sir Matthew Ridley, Mr. Secretary Cross*)
c. Ordered; read 1° * *Feb* 19 [Bill 83]
Read 2°, after short debate *Feb* 24, 1702
Committee; Report, after short debate *Feb* 27, 1935
Read 3°, after debate *Feb* 28, 2048

ASTLEY, Sir J., *Lincolnshire, N.*
Racecourses (Metropolis), 2R. 1267

ATTORNEY GENERAL, The (Sir J. HOLKER), *Preston*
Bankers' Books (Evidence), 2R. 1158
Clergy Co-operative Association, 1304
Ecclesiastical Courts—Dean of Arches, 859
India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Res. 905
London Bankruptcy Court—Exclusion of Reporters, 1523
Married Women's Property Act, 1870, 306, 853
Parliament—Ministerial Statement, 1119
  Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, Report, 769, 771
Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices, Leave, 1391

BAILEY, Sir J. R., *Herefordshire*
Education Department — School Inspectors, 1616

BALFOUR, Major-General Sir G., *Kincardineshire*
Africa, South—Zulu War—Artillery Re-inforcements, 1309
Army—Artillery—Breech-loading and Muzzle-loading Guns, Res. 1867
India—Miscellaneous Questions
  Afghan Papers, 202
  Army—Increased Expenses, 1315
  East India Railway, 1604
  Revenue and Expenditure—Indian Budget, 1197
India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), 204; Res. 989
Parliament—Ministerial Statement, 1125
  Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, 153; Report, 537
Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1366, 1565
Supply—Exchequer Bonds, 1886

BALFOUR, Mr. A. J., *Hertford*
Burial Law Amendment, Leave, 206; 2R. 1447, 1487
India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Res. 996

Bank Deposits
Moved, "That, in the opinion of this House, it is worthy of the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, whether a moderate and discriminating scale of Stamp or composition Duties may, with advantage to the interests of the Country and of the Banks, be hereafter applied to all interest-bearing deposits in the Banks of the United Kingdom, and whether a Bill on the subject should be introduced to Parliament at an early date" (*Sir Joseph M'Kenna*) *Feb* 25, 1754; after debate, Motion withdrawn

Bankers' Books (Evidence) Bill
(*Sir John Lubbock, Mr. Herschell, Sir Charles Mills, Mr. Rodwell*)
c. Ordered; read 1°* *Dec* 16 [Bill 65]
Read 2°, after short debate *Feb* 13, 1158
Committee *—R.P. *Feb* 17

Banking Laws Amendment Bill
(*Mr. James Barclay, Mr. Baxter, Mr. James Cowan, Mr. Courtney*)
c. Considered in Committee; Resolution agreed to, and reported; Bill ordered; read 1°* *Feb* 14 [Bill 73]

Bankruptcy Act (1869) Amendment Bill
(*Mr. Sampson Lloyd, Mr. Norwood, Mr. Whitwell, Mr. Ripley*)
c. Ordered; read 1°* *Dec* 13 [Bill 64]

Bankruptcy Bill—French Law of Bankruptcy
Question, Sir George Bowyer; Answer, Mr. Assheton Cross *Feb* 27, 1828

Bankruptcy Law Amendment Bill
(*The Lord Chancellor*)
l. Presented; read 1ª, after short debate *Feb* 17, 1286 (No. 8)

Bankruptcy (Scotland) Bill
(*Dr. Cameron, Mr. Baxter, Mr. Mackintosh, Mr. M'Laren, Mr. Ramsay*)
c. Ordered; read 1°* *Dec* 11 [Bill 59]

Barclay, Mr. J. W., *Forfarshire*
Assizes, 3R. 2049
Scotland—Agricultural Hypothec and Office of Lord Clerk Register, 1406
Criminal Law—Mr. Barr, Case of, 1829

Bar Education and Discipline Bill
Question, Dr. Kenealy; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer *Feb* 18, 1405

Barne, Lt.-Colonel F. St. John N., *Suffolk, E.*
Army—Sergeant Instructors of Volunteers, 1838

Barrington, Right Hon. Viscount (Vice Chamberlain of the Household)
H.R.H. the Grand Duchess of Hesse (Princess Alice)—Her Majesty's Answer to the Address, 1317
Parliament—Queen's Speech—Her Majesty's Answer to Address, Report, 1018

Barttelot, Colonel Sir W. B., *Sussex, W.*
Civil Service Estimates, Motion for a Select Committee, 1420
India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Res. 928
Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1360, 1539; Amendt. 1676
Valuation of Property, 2R. 2043

Bath, Marquess of
India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Res. 465

Baxter, Right Hon. W. E., *Montrose, &c.*
Civil Service Estimates, Motion for a Select Committee, 1411
Ecclesiastical Salaries (India), 1508
Railways—Railway Brakes, 633, 634

Beach, Right Hon. Sir M. E. Hicks- Secretary of State for the Colonies), *Gloucestershire, E.*
Africa, South—Miscellaneous Questions
  Cape Colony—Mounted Police, 301, 1193
  Despatches, 1830, 1834, 1974
  Griqualand—Massacre of Kaffirs, 1408
  Telegraphic Communication, 529
  Transmission of Intelligence, 1605
  Transvaal and Zululand—Boundary Dispute, 855, 858
  Zulu King—Negotiations, 1510
  Zululand—The Award, 1650, 1651
  Zulu War, 1522;—Re-inforcements, 1074
Supply—War in South Africa—Vote of Credit, 1904, 1905, 1908
Windward Islands—Coolies in Grenada, 304, 305, 1407

Beaconsfield, Earl of (First Lord of the Treasury)
H.R.H. the Grand Duchess of Hesse (Princess Alice), Address of Condolence, 945
India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Res. 298, 509, 513, 518
Parliament—Ministerial Statement, 1041, 1056
  Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, 74

Beauchamp, Earl (Lord Steward of the Household)
Employers Liability for Injuries to Servants, 405
H.R.H. the Grand Duchess of Hesse (Princess Alice)—Her Majesty's Answer to Address of Condolence (December 17), 1041
Parliament—Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, 218

BENETT-STANFORD, Mr. V. F., *Shaftesbury*
Racecourses (Metropolis), 2R. 1272

BENTINCK, Mr. G. W. P., *Norfolk, W.*
Parliament—Orders of the Day, 1323
Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1349, 1565, 1566
Railway Accidents, 1508

BERESFORD, Colonel F. M., *Southwark*
Parliament—Questions—Standing Orders, 954
Thames River (Prevention of Floods), 2R. 1969; Amendt. 1971, 1972

BIGGAR, Mr. J. G., *Cavan Co.*
Army Discipline and Regulation, Leave, 1934
Parliament—Orders of the Day, 1337
Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1383, 1440, 1571, 1588, 1678, 1685, 1696; Amendt. 1699, 1701
Poor Law (Ireland)—Belfast Union Workhouse, 1646
Supply—War in South Africa—Vote of Credit, 1908
Valuation of Property, 2R. 2046

Bills of Sale (Ireland) Bill
(*Mr. Meldon, Mr. O'Shaughnessy*)
c. Ordered; read 1° * *Dec* 6 [Bill 45]

BIRLEY, Mr. H., *Manchester*
Lancashire and Yorkshire Water Supply, Motion for an Address, 1781

BLAKE, Mr. T., *Leominster*
Clergy Co-operative Association, 1303

BLENNERHASSETT, Mr. R. P., *Kerry*
Borough Franchise (Ireland), Res. 1220

Borneo—The British Borneo Company
Question, Sir Charles W. Dilke; Answer, Mr. Bourke *Dec* 10, 523

Borough Franchise (Ireland Bill
(*Mr. Blennerhassett, Major O'Gorman, Sir Joseph M'Kenna, Mr. Richard Power*)
c. Ordered; read 1° * *Dec* 9 [Bill 49]
Bill withdrawn * *Feb* 13

BOURKE, Hon. R. (Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs), *Lynn Regis*
Africa—Zanzibar—Slave Trade, 951
Borneo—The British Borneo Company, 523
China—Chefoo Convention, 638, 1308
Cyprus, Island of—Law of England, 1313, 1314
  Mr. Di Cesnola, 637; Explanation, 744
Eastern Question—Treaty of Berlin—Miscellaneous Questions
  Article 24, 199
  Despatches, 302
  Greek Frontier, 1194, 1310, 1603
  Religious Liberty in Bulgaria, 1835

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BOURKE, Hon. R.—*cont.*
England and Portugal—Commercial Relations, 1834
India—Afghanistan—Cabul, Mission to—Mr. Marshall's Despatch, 530
  Russia and the Ameer—General Kauffmann, 196
Japan—John Hartley, Case of, 857
Parliament—Ministerial Statement, 1131
Parliament—Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, 134; Report, 662, 663, 671, 672, 673
Persia—Employment of Russian Officers, 1649
Russia and Persia, 739
Russia and Turkey—The Definitive Treaty, 1303; Personal Explanation, 1606
Slave Trade in the Red Sea, 1656
Spain—The "Lark" and "Octavia," 1316
Treaty of Prague—Article 5, 1650
Turkey—Miscellaneous Questions
  Commercial Treaties, 952
  Papers and Correspondence, 1517
  Reforms—Anglo-Turkish Convention, 526

BOWYER, Sir G., *Wexford Co.*
French Law of Bankruptcy—Bankruptcy Bill, 1828
India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Res. 908, 911, 912
Parliament—Business of the House, Res. Motion for Adjournment, 1576

BRADY, Dr. J., *Leitrim Co.*
Disqualification by Medical Relief, 3R. 1280

BRAND, Right Hon. H. B. W., (*see* SPEAKER, The)

BRIGGS, Mr. W. E., *Blackburn*
Railway Accidents, 1509

BRIGHT, Right Hon. J., *Birmingham*
Indian Finance—Government of India Act, 1858, Motion for a Select Committee, 2027

BRIGHT, Mr. J., *Manchester*
India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Res. 1034
Parliament—Business of the House, Res. Motion for Adjournment, 1382, 1571

BRISTOWE, Mr. S. B., *Newark*
Education Department—School Inspectors, Res. 1611

BROWN, Mr. A. H., *Wenlock*
Lancashire and Yorkshire Water Supply, Motion for an Address, 1783
Water Companies Bills—Public Health Acts, 1513

BROWN, Mr. J. C., *Horsham*
Education Department—Offending Teachers, 1752

BRUEN, Mr. H., *Carlow Co.*
Cattle Disease—American Cattle Trade, 1407

BULWER, Mr. J. R., *Ipswich*
Habitual Drunkards, Comm. *cl.* 25, 1721
India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Res. 938

Burial Grounds Bill
(*Mr. Wilbraham Egerton, Earl Percy, Mr. Heygate, Mr. Birley*)
c. Ordered ; read 1°* *Dec* 13 [Bill 63]

Burial Law Amendment Bill
(*Mr. Balfour, Lord Francis Hervey, Mr. Wait*)
c. Considered in Committee *Dec* 6, 206 ; Resolution agreed to, and reported ; Bill ordered ; read 1°* [Bill 10]
Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2°" *Feb* 19, 1447
Amendt. to leave out "now," and add "upon this day six months" (*Mr. Beresford Hope*) ; Question proposed, "That 'now,' &c. ;" after long debate, Debate adjourned

Burials Bill
(*Mr. Osborne Morgan, Mr. Lefevre, Mr. William M'Arthur, Mr. Richard*)
c. Considered in Committee ; Resolution agreed to, and reported ; Bill ordered ; read 1°* *Dec* 6 [Bill 42]

BURT, Mr. T., *Morpeth*
Parliament—Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, Report, 787

BURY, Viscount (Under Secretary of State for War)
Africa, South—Re-inforcements, 1641, 1642 ;—Cavalry Equipments, 1601
Africa, South—Re-inforcements, Address for a Return, 1401
Army Education—Literary and Physical Competitions, 1947
Volunteer Force—Courts of Inquiry, Address for a Return, 1600
Volunteer Force—Finance and Organization, Report of Committee, 1162, 1179

CADOGAN, Earl (Under Secretary of State for the Colonies)
Africa, South—Zululand—Importation of Arms and Munitions, 1503, 1507
Zulu War, 1501 ;—Despatches, 1825 ;—Re-inforcements, 1181
Africa—Cape Frontier Mounted Police, Motion for an Address, 175
Parliament—Ministerial Statement, 1060, 1061 ; Personal Explanation, 1183

CAIRNS, Earl (*see* CHANCELLOR, The Lord)

CALLAN, Mr. P., *Dundalk*
Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1592
Supply—War in South Africa—Vote of Credit, 1909

CAMBRIDGE, Duke of (Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief)
Africa, South—Zulu War—Re-inforcements—Cavalry Equipments, 1601
Army Education—Literary and Physical Competitions, 1952, 1954

CAMERON, Dr. C., *Glasgow*
Africa, South — Griqualand — Massacre of Kaffirs, 1407
Habitual Drunkards, 2R. 1159, 1386 ; Comm. *cl.* 2, 1705 ; *cl.* 8, Amendt. *ib.* ; *cl.* 9, 1706 ; *cl.* 11, Amendt. 1709, 1713, 1714 ; *cl.* 14, Amendt. *ib.* ; *cl.* 23, Amendt. 1717, 1718, 1719 ; *cl.* 25, 1720 ; Motion for reporting Progress, 1721
Post Office (Telegraphic Department)—Continental Telegraph Charges, 1507
Public Health Act—Small-pox in the Metropolis, 1645

CAMPBELL, Sir G., *Kirkcaldy, &c.*
Africa, South — Zulu War — Native Indian Army, 1310
Egypt—Finance, 1633
India—Address of General Roberts, 1188
Army—Service in India, 1309
India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Res. 929
Indian Finance—Government of India Act, 1858, Motion for a Select Committee, 2014
London Bankruptcy Court—Exclusion of Reporters, 1523
Parliament—Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, Report, 671, 672, 847
Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1559
Supply—Exchequer Bonds, 1887
War in South Africa—Vote of Credit, 1890, 1894, 1906
Turkey—Loans, 1829
Rhodope Commission, Withdrawal of Notice, 866

CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN, Mr. H., *Stirling, &c.*
Joint Stock Banks, 1306

CAMPERDOWN, Earl of
Asia, Central—Merv and Bokhara, 406

CARDWELL, Viscount
Army Education—Literary and Physical Competitions, 1955
India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Res. 508
Volunteer Force—Finance and Organization, Report of Committee, 1176

CARNARVON, Earl of
Africa, South—Zululand—Importation of Arms and Munitions, 1505
India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Res. 290
Parliament—Ministerial Statement, 1064
Russia, Plague in—Sanitary Precautions, Motion for a Paper, 1184, 1187, 1823

CARTWRIGHT, Mr. W. C., *Oxfordshire*
- Eastern Question—Treaty of Berlin—Article 24, 198, 310
- Egypt—Cairo, Disturbances at, 1521
  - Finance, 1622, 1629
- England and Portugal—Commercial Relations, 1833
- Turkey—Miscellaneous Questions
  - Finance, 1518
  - Proposed Guaranteed Loan, 523

CASTLEREAGH, Viscount, *Down*
- Parliament—Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, 85

Cathedral Statutes Bill [H.L.]

(*The Lord Bishop of Carlisle*)

l. Presented; read 1ª* *Feb* 13 (No. 4)

CAVE, Right Hon. S. (Paymaster General), *New Shoreham*
- Municipal Corporations, Report of Royal Commission, 1655

CAVE, Mr. T., *Barnstaple*
- India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Res. 911

CAVENDISH, Lord F. C., *Yorkshire, W.R., N. Div.*
- Public Accounts, Instruction to the Committee, 1595

CECIL, Lord E. H. B. G. (Surveyor General of Ordnance), *Essex, W.*
- Africa, South—Zulu War—Native Contingent, 1409
- Army—Breech-loading Ordnance, 1192
- Army—Artillery—Breech-loading and Muzzle-loading Guns, Res. 1870

CHAMBERLAIN, Mr. J., *Birmingham*
- Borough Franchise (Ireland), Res. 1240
- India—Afghanistan—Amendments on Address, 177, 380
- Licensing Laws Amendment, Leave, 210
- Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1377, 1584
- Supply—War in South Africa—Vote of Credit, 1903, 1904
- Turkey—Rhodope Commission, Withdrawal of Notice, 868; Motion for Adjournment, 964, 967

CHAMBERS, Sir T., *Marylebone*
- Leadenhall Market and Improvements, 2R. 1735, 1748
- Racecourses (Metropolis), 2R. 1270

CHANCELLOR, The LORD (Lord CAIRNS)
- Bankruptcy Law Amendment, 1R. 1286
- Criminal Law—Bail in Charges of Fraud, 1598
- India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Res. 421, 442, 485

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CHANCELLOR, The LORD—*cont.*
- Jurisdiction of County Courts (England)—County Courts, 1R. 1394
- Masters and Workmen—Workman's Compensation, 1R. 1285
- Parliament—Queen's Speech, 3
- Roll of the Lords, 218
- Supreme Court of Judicature Acts Amendment, 1R. 1394

CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER (Right Hon. Sir S. H. NORTHCOTE), *Devon, N.*
- Africa, South—Miscellaneous Questions
  - Expenses of the War, 635, 636
  - Papers, 1318
  - Re-inforcements, 1073, 1196
  - Vote of Credit, 1854
- Ancient Monuments, Comm. 1274
- Bank Deposits, Res. 1770
- Bar Education and Discipline, 1405
- Borough Franchise (Ireland), Res. Motion for Adjournment, 1261
- Coinage—Worn Silver Coin, Withdrawal of, 299
- Consecration of Churchyards Act (1867) Amendment, Leave, 208
- Eastern Question—Treaty of Berlin—Speech of the Prime Minister at Guildhall, 524
- Egypt—Miscellaneous Questions
  - Cairo, Disturbances at, 1521
  - Commissioners of Daira Lands, 857
  - Finance, 1624, 1629
- Employers Liability, 1750
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The Chefoo Convention, Question, Mr. Evelyn Ashley; Answer, Mr. Bourke *Dec* 12, 638; Question, Mr. Richard; Answer, Mr. E. Stanhope *Feb* 17, 1311
Thibet—Trade to Chung-King, Question, Sir Charles W. Dilke; Answer, Mr. Bourke *Feb* 17, 1308

CHURCHILL, Lord R., *Woodstock*
Africa, South—Cape Colony—Mounted Police, 1193
Borough Franchise (Ireland), Res. 1231, 1234

Church of Scotland Bill
(*Sir Alexander Gordon, Mr. Mackintosh*)
c. Considered in Committee *Dec* 6, 211; after short debate, Resolution agreed to, and reported; Bill ordered; read 1°* [Bill 39]

Civil Service Estimates
Moved, "That a Select Committee be appointed to consider and report upon the Civil Service Estimates in the order in which they appear" (*Mr. Dillwyn*) *Feb* 18, 1409; after debate, Question put; A. 95, N. 158; M. 63 (D. L. 14)

Clergy Co-operative Association — Joint Stock Companies Act, 1 & 2 Vict. c. 106, *ss.* 29, 31
Question, Mr. Blake; Answer, The Attorney General *Feb* 17, 1303

Clerical Disabilities Bill (*Mr. Goldney, Mr. Hibbert, Sir Windham Anstruther*)
c. Considered in Committee; Resolution agreed to, and reported; Bill ordered; read 1°* *Dec* 6 [Bill 18]

Coal Mines—The Abercarne Explosion
Questions, Mr. Macdonald; Answers, Mr. Assheton Cross *Feb* 17, 1305

COCHRANE, Mr. A. D. W. R. Baillie-*Isle of Wight*
Parliament — Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, Report, 784

COGAN, Right Hon. W. H. F., *Kildare*
Parliament—Ministerial Statement, 1124

Coinage — Withdrawal of Worn Silver Coin
Question, Mr. Monk; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer *Dec* 9, 299

COLE, Mr. H. T., *Penryn, &c.*
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Poor Law—Metropolitan Unions—Oakum Picking by Female Paupers, 948

COLLINS, Mr. E., *Kinsale*
Bank Deposits, Res. 1760

Colonial Marriages Bill
(*Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen, Sir Thomas Chambers*)
c. Ordered; read 1°* *Dec* 6 [Bill 17]

Condition of the Country—The Prevalent Distress
Questions, Mr. J. G. Hubbard, Mr. Mundella, Mr. Anderson, Mr. Hanbury-Tracy; Answers, Mr. Assheton Cross, Mr. Sclater-Booth *Dec* 17, 949

Consecration of Churchyards Act (1867) Amendment Bill
(*Mr. Monk, Mr. Grantham, Mr. Forsyth*)
c. Considered in Committee *Dec* 6, 206; after short debate, Resolution agreed to, and reported; Bill ordered; read 1°* [Bill 13]
Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2°" *Feb* 26, 1791
Amendt. to leave out "now," and add "upon this day six months" (*Mr. Ernest Noel*); Question proposed, "That 'now,' &c.;" after debate, Question put; A. 129, N. 160; M. 31 (D. L. 29)
Words added; main Question, as amended, put, and agreed to; 2R. put off for six months

Contagious Diseases Acts Repeal Bill
(*Sir Harcourt Johnstone, Mr. Stansfeld, Mr. Whitbread, Mr. Mundella*)
c. Ordered; read 1°* *Dec* 6 [Bill 34]

Contagious Diseases (*Animals*) *Act*, 1878
Cattle from the United States, Questions, Mr. Rathbone, Mr. Chaplin, Mr. Mundella, Mr. W. E. Forster; Answers, Lord George Hamilton *Feb* 14, 1189
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Mersey Dock and Harbour Board, Question, Mr. Mac Iver; Answer, Lord George Hamilton *Feb* 25, 1753
The American Cattle Trade, Question, Mr. Bruen; Answer, Mr. J. Lowther *Feb* 18, 1407

Convention (Ireland) Act Repeal Bill
(*Sir Joseph M'Kenna, Mr. P. J. Smyth, Mr. Downing*)
c. Ordered; read 1°* *Dec* 6 [Bill 4]

Coope, Mr. O. E., *Middlesex*
Joint Stock Banks, 1072

Copyright Bill (*Mr. Edward Jenkins, Mr. Herschell, Mr. Dillwyn, Mr. Forsyth*)
c. Considered in Committee; Resolution agreed to, and reported; Bill ordered; read 1°* *Dec* 9 [Bill 53]
Legislation, Question, Mr. E. Jenkins; Answer, Lord John Manners *Feb* 17, 1308

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Coroners Bill (*Mr. Secretary Cross, Mr. Attorney General, Mr. Solicitor General, Sir Matthew Ridley*)
c. Ordered; read 1°* *Feb* 14 [Bill 67]
Read 2°*, and referred to Select Comm. *Feb* 20
The Select Committee, Question, Mr. Pell; Answer, Mr. Assheton Cross *Feb* 24, 1655

Cottesloe, Lord
Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act, 1878—Dairies, Cowsheds, and Milkshops Order, 1879, 1639

Cotton, Mr. Alderman W. J. R., *London*
Leadenhall Market and Improvements, 2R. 1740

County Boards Bill—Urban and Rural Sanitary Districts—County Maps
Question, Mr. Stansfeld; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth *Feb* 20, 1509

County Courts Bill (*Mr. Norwood, Sir J. Eardley Wilmot, Mr. Rowley Hill*)
c. Ordered; read 1°* *Dec* 6 [Bill 40]

County Courts Bill [H.L.]
(*The Lord Chancellor*)
l. Presented; read 1ª* *Feb* 18 (No. 12)

County Infirmaries (Ireland) Bill
(*Mr. Meldon, Mr. Shaw, Mr. Errington, Mr. Arthur Moore*)
c. Ordered; read 1°* *Dec* 6 [Bill 46]

Courtney, Mr. L. H., *Liskeard*
Africa, South—Zulu King, 858
Assizes, 2R. 1703
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Cowan, Mr. J., *Edinburgh*
Africa, South—Zulu War—Presbyterian and Wesleyan Chaplains, 1749

Cowen, Mr. J., *Newcastle-on-Tyne*
Criminal Law—The Rev. H. J. Dodwell, 1748
Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1528
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CROSS, Right Hon. R. A. (Secretary of State for the Home Department), *Lancashire, S.W.*
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Cruelty to Animals Bill
(*Mr. Holt, Mr. Ashley, Mr. Hardcastle, Sir Charles Legard, Mr. Charles Wilson*)
c. Ordered; read 1°* *Dec* 6 [Bill 28]

Customs Bill of Entry—The Commission on Official Statistics
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Judicial Administration—The Law of England —The Ordinances, Questions, Sir Henry James; Answers, Mr. Bourke *Feb* 17, 1313
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DEASE, Mr. E., *Queen's Co.*
Parliament—Privilege—The Press, 1846

Debtors Act, 1869, Amendment Bill [H.L.]
(*The Lord Chancellor*)
l. Presented; read 1ª* *Feb* 17 (No. 9)

DE LA WARR, Earl
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DENISON, Mr. C. BECKETT-, *Yorkshire, W.R., E. Div.*
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DILLWYN, Mr. L. L., *Swansea*
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Turkey—Rhodope Commission, Withdrawal of Notice, 869, 959

Dispensaries (Ireland) Bill (*Mr. Bruen, Mr. Downing, Mr. Mulholland, Dr. Ward*)
c. Ordered; read 1° * *Dec* 16 [Bill 66]

Disqualification by Medical Relief Bill (*Mr. Rathbone, Sir John Kennaway, Sir Charles W. Dilke, Mr. Ritchie*)
c. Ordered; read 1° * *Dec* 6 [Bill 22]
Read 2°, after short debate *Dec* 11, 623
Order for Committee read; Moved, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair" *Dec* 16, 943; Moved, "That the Debate be now adjourned" (*Mr. Serjeant Spinks*); after short debate, Question put, and negatived
Original Question put, and agreed to; Committee; Report
Considered * *Dec* 17
Moved, "That the Bill be now read 3°" *Feb* 14, 1276
Amendt. to leave out "now read 3°," and add "re-committed" (*Mr. Pell*) *v.*; Question proposed, "That 'now read 3°,' &c.;" after short debate, Question put; A. 65, N. 40; M. 25 (D. L. 7)
Main Question put, and agreed to; Bill read 3°, with an amended Title
l. Read 1ª * (*Lord Aberdare*) *Feb* 17 (No. 6)

District Auditors Bill (*Mr. Sclater-Booth, Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson, Mr. Salt*)
c. Ordered; read 1° * *Feb* 17 [Bill 79]
Read 2° * *Feb* 21

DODSON, Right Hon. J. G., *Chester*
Cyprus, Island of—Chart of Surveys, 1306
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DOWNING, Mr. M'Carthy, *Cork Co.*
Parliament—Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, 154
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DUFF, Mr. M. E. Grant, *Elgin, &c.*
India — The Maharajah of Cashmere, 1404, 1645
Indian Finance—The Government of India Act, 1858, Motion for a Select Committee, 1987
Parliament—Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, Report, Motion for Adjournment, 622, 640, 663

Duration of Parliament Bill (*Mr. John Holms, Mr. Joseph Cowen, Dr. Cameron, Mr. Collins, Mr. Henry Samuelson*)
c. Ordered; read 1° * *Dec* 6 [Bill 36]

Ecclesiastical Courts—The Dean of Arches
Question, Mr. Newdegate; Answer, The Attorney General *Dec* 16, 859

Education Department
Industrial Schools, Questions, Mr. W. E. Forster; Answers, Lord George Hamilton *Feb* 25, 1751
Offending Teachers, Question, Mr. J. C. Brown; Answer, Lord George Hamilton *Feb* 25, 1752
Revision of the Education Code, Question, Mr. Arthur Mills; Answer, Lord George Hamilton *Feb* 20, 1519
The Revised Code — Certificated Teachers, Question, Mr. Mundella; Answer, Lord George Hamilton *Dec* 16, 854

Education Department—School Inspectors
Amendt. on Committee of Supply *Feb* 21, To leave out from "That," and add "in the opinion of this House, arrangements ought to be at once made to provide that in future, before being appointed to an independent post, newly appointed School Inspectors should have one year's training under an experienced Inspector, unless they have been previously engaged in the education of children for a sufficient time to make this unnecessary" (*Mr. Rathbone*) *v.*, 1607; Question proposed, "That the words, &c.;" after short debate, Question put, and agreed to

Egerton, Hon. A. F. (Secretary to the Board of Admiralty), *Lancashire, S.E.*
Cyprus, Island of—Chart of Surveys, 1306

Egerton, Hon. Wilbraham, *Cheshire, Mid.*
Burial Law Amendment, 2R. 1473

Egypt
Despatch of Ships of War, Question, Mr. Elliot; Answer, Mr. W. H. Smith *Feb* 25, 1752
Disturbances at Cairo, Question, Mr. W. Cartright; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer *Feb* 20, 1521
Finance, Observations, Mr. H. Samuelson; debate thereon *Feb* 21, 1619
The Commissioners of the Daira Lands, Question, Mr. B. Samuelson; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer *Dec* 16, 857

Elcho, Lord, *Haddingtonshire*
Turkey—Rhodope Commission, Report of, 300, 958, 959, 962

Election Petitions (Costs) Bill
(*Major Nolan, Mr. Gray, Mr. Macdonald, Mr. Patrick Martin*)
c. Ordered; read 1° * *Feb* 14 [Bill 72]

Elective County Boards (Ireland) Bill
(*Major Nolan, Mr. O'Clery, Mr. Fay, Mr. O'Sullivan*)
c. Ordered; read 1° * *Dec* 6 [Bill 7]

Ellenborough, Lord
Africa, South—Zulu War—Re-inforcements—Cavalry Equipments, 1600

Elliot, Sir G. *Durham, N.*
Parliament—Ministerial Statement, 1116, 1117

Elliot, Mr. G. W., *Northallerton*
Egypt—Despatch of Ships of War, 1752

Elphinstone, Lord
Africa, South—Re-inforcements—Disembarkation, 1402

Emlyn, Viscount, *Carmarthen*
Army—Militia Training, 1832
Assizes, Comm. 1937, 1938

Employers and Workmen Act, 1875 (Extension to Seamen) Bill
(*Mr. Burt, Mr. Joseph Cowen, Mr. Mundella, Mr. Gourley, Mr. Gorst*)
c. Ordered; read 1° * *Dec* 6 [Bill 21]

Employers' Liability for Injuries to their Servants—Legislation
Question, Earl De La Warr; Answer, Earl Beauchamp *Dec* 10, 405; Question, Mr. Macdonald; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer *Feb* 25, 1750

Employers' Liability for Injuries to Servants Bill (*Mr. Brassey, Mr. Morley, Mr. M. Bass, Mr. Sullivan*)
c. Ordered; read 1° * *Feb* 14 [Bill 75]

Employers' Liability for Injuries to Servants Bill (*Mr. Macdonald, Dr. Cameron, Mr. Meldon, Mr. Earp, Mr. Burt*)
c. Ordered; read 1° * *Feb* 17 [Bill 80]

England and Portugal—Commercial Relations
Question, Mr. W. Cartwright; Answer, Mr. Bourke *Feb* 27, 1833

Errington, Mr. G., *Longford Co.*
Africa, South—Zulu War—Re-inforcements—Catholic Chaplains, 1517
Army—Army Medical Department, 632
Longford Barracks, 1517
Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1680, 1699
Prisons (Ireland) Act—Medical Officers, 1654
Racecourses (Metropolis), Comm. 1389, 1390
Windward Islands—Coolies in Grenada, 304, 1407

Estcourt, Mr. G. B. S., *Wiltshire, N.*
Highways and Locomotives Act, 1878, 1192

Fawcett, Mr. H., *Hackney*
- Government of India Act, 1858—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), 307
- India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), 84, 202, 203; Res. 884; Amendt. 885, 940, 1311
- India—Augmentation of the Military Forces, 527
- Indian Despatches—Opinions of the Council of India, 201
- Indian Finance—The Government of India Act, 1858, Motion for a Select Committee, 1975, 2005, 2008, 2010
- New Forest—Stony Cross Inclosure, 1654, 1655
- Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1588
- Parliament — Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, 192; Report, 540, 835

Fitzmaurice, Lord E. G., *Calne*
- Highways Act, 1878—Clause 16, 1515

Floods and Conservancy Boards—Legislation
- Question, Mr. Chaplin; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer *Feb* 14, 1198

Foljambe, Mr. F. J. S., *East Retford*
- Parliament — Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, Report, 698

Forster, Sir C., *Walsall*
- Burial Law Amendment, 2R. 1472

Forster, Right Hon. W. E., *Bradford*
- Borough Franchise (Ireland), Res. 1213, 1264
- Consecration of Churchyards Act (1867) Amendment, 2R. 1814, 1817
- Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act, 1878—Cattle from the United States, 1191
- Education Department — Industrial Schools, 1751, 1752
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- India—Afghanistan—Further Correspondence, 309
- Indian Despatches—Opinions of the Council of India, 200, 202
- Lancashire and Yorkshire Water Supply, Motion for an Address, 1787
- Leadenhall Market and Improvements, 2R. 1741
- Parliament—Ministerial Statement, 1142
  - Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, 137; Report, 392
- Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1361, 1549
- Windward Islands—Coolies in Grenada, 305

Forsyth, Mr. W., *Marylebone*
- Consecration of Churchyards Act (1867) Amendment, 2R. 1796
- Parliament — Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, Report, 593, 596

Fortescue, Earl
- Army Education—Literary and Physical Competitions, 1941, 1956

French, Hon. C., *Roscommon*
- Ireland—Report of the Poor Law and Lunacy Commissioners, 1974

Friendly Societies Act (1875) Amendment Bill

(*Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson*)

Legislation, Question, Sir Charles W. Dilke; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer *Dec* 16, 854

c. Ordered * *Feb* 25 [House counted out]

Read 1° * *Feb* 26 [Bill 85]

Gas Companies—The Electric Light—Legislation
- Question, Sir Wilfrid Lawson; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer *Feb* 17, 1315

Giffard, Sir H. S. (see Solicitor General, The)

Gladstone, Right Hon. W. E., *Greenwich*
- India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Res. 895, 896, 897
- India—Afghanistan—Mission to Cabul, Mr. Marshall's Despatch, 530
- Parliament — Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, 111; Report, 179, 541, 548, 554, 572, 606, 614
- Turkey—Rhodope Commission—Withdrawal of Notice, 870

Gordon, Sir A., *Aberdeenshire, E.*
- Africa, South—Zulu War—Native Contingent, 1409
- Army Discipline and Regulation, Leave, 1929
- Church of Scotland, Leave, 211
- Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1539
- Parliament — Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, Report, 793
- Supply—War in South Africa—Vote of Credit, 1895, 1906
- Thames River (Prevention of Floods), 2R. 1969

Gorst, Mr. J. E., *Chatham*
- Africa, South—Cape Colony—Mounted Police, 301
- Parliament—Orders of the Day, 1328, 1332
  - Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, Report, 791
- Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1361, 1379, 1527, 1581

Goschen, Right Hon. G. J., *London*
- Egypt—Finance, 1636
- India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), 203; Res. 942
- Indian Coinage Act—The Currency, 1315
- Parliament—Order of Business, 1522
- Parliament — Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, 123; Report, 189, 354, 716, 725, 728, 729

Gourley, Mr. E. T., *Sunderland*
Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1373
Thames Traffic Regulation, 743 ;—Official Committee, 1520
United States—Treaty of Washington—Fishery Award, 305

Grant, Mr. A., *Leith*
India (Finance)—Indian Taxation, 1604

Grantham, Mr. W., *Surrey, E.*
Burial Law Amendment, 2R. 1498

Granville, Earl
Africa, South—Zulu War, 1501 ;—Despatches, 1825
H.R.H. the Grand Duchess of Hesse (Princess Alice), Address of Condolence, 947
India—Afghanistan—Russian Mission at Cabul, 1161, 1162
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Gray, Mr. E. D., *Tipperary*
Borough Franchise (Ireland), Res. 1203
Parliament—Ministerial Statement, 1154

Gregory, Mr. G. B., *Sussex, E.*
Consecration of Churchyards Act (1867) Amendment, 2R. 1799
Disqualification by Medical Relief, 2R. 626
Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1359, 1571
Parliament—Ministerial Statement, 1125

Grenada—Ill-treatment of Coolies—The Papers
Question, Mr. Errington ; Answer, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach *Feb* 18, 1407

Grey, Earl
India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Motion for Adjournment, 298, 406, 513
Parliament — Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, Amendt. 47, 62, 82

Gun Licence Act (1870) Amendment Bill
(*Sir Alexander Gordon, Mr. Clare Read, Mr. M'Lagan, Mr. Mark Stewart*)
c. Ordered ; read 1° * *Dec* 10 [Bill 57]

Habitual Drunkards Bill
(*Dr. Cameron, Mr. Clare Read, Mr. Ashley, Sir Henry Jackson, Mr. Edward Jenkins, Mr. William Holms, Mr. O'Shaughnessy*)
c. Ordered ; read 1° * *Dec* 6 [Bill 47]
2R. *Feb* 13, 1159 [House counted out]
Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2°" *Feb* 17, 1384

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Habitual Drunkards Bill—cont.
Amendt. to leave out "now," and add "upon this day six months" (*Mr. Dillwyn*); Question proposed, "That 'now,' &c. ;" after short debate, Question put, and agreed to
Main Question put, and agreed to ; Bill read 2°
Committee—R.P. *Feb* 24, 1704
Committee * ; Report *Feb* 27

Habitual Drunkards [*Salaries, Stamp Duty, &c.*]
c. Considered in Committee *Feb* 24, 1704 ; Resolution agreed to
Resolution reported *Feb* 26

Halifax Viscount
India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Res. Amendt.* 245
Parliament—Ministerial Statement, 1056

Hall, Mr. A. W., *Oxford*
Parliament — Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, 88

Hall-Marking (*Gold and Silver*)
Select Committee appointed, "to inquire into the operation of the Acts relating to the Hall-Marking of Gold and Silver manufactures" (*Sir Henry Jackson*) *Feb* 26
And, on March 5, Committee nominated ; List of the Committee, 1822

Hamilton, Lord G. F. (Vice President of the Committee of Council on Education), *Middlesex*
Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act, 1878—Miscellaneous Questions
Cattle from the United States, 1190, 1192
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Education Acts—Revised Code—Returns, 855, 1519
Education Department—Miscellaneous Questions
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Russia, Plague in—Sanitary Precautions, 1834

Hampton, Lord
Army Education—Literary and Physical Competitions, 1951

Hankey, Mr. T., *Peterborough*
Bank Deposits, Res. 1764
Civil Service Estimates, Motion for a Select Committee, 1414
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Harcourt, Sir W. G. V., *Oxford City*
Army Discipline and Regulation, Leave, 1928
Cyprus, Island of—Mr. Di Cesnola, 637
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HARCOURT, Sir W. G. V.—*cont.*
  Indian Despatches—Opinions of the Council of India, 201
  Parliament—Ministerial Statement, 1090, 1113, 1114, 1115, 1117
    Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, 183; Report, 750, 771
  Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1524
  Turkey—Papers and Correspondence, 1517
    Rhodope Commission, Withdrawal of Notice, 867

HARCOURT, Lt.-Col. E. W., *Oxfordshire*
  Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1593

HARDCASTLE, Mr. E., *Lancashire, S.E.*
  India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Res. 1018

HARDINGE, Viscount
  Army Education—Literary and Physical Competitions, 1954

HARDY, Mr. A. GATHORNE-, *Canterbury*
  Parliament—Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, Report, 694

HARTINGTON, Right Hon. Marquess of, *New Radnor*
  Africa, South—The Papers, 1317
    Zulu War, 1522;—Despatches, 1974
  Borough Franchise (Ireland), Res. 1254
  H.R.H. the Grand Duchess of Hesse (Princess Alice)—Address of Condolence, 861
  India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Res. 1033
  Parliament—Miscellaneous Questions
    Business of the House, 1522, 1606
    Ministerial Statement, 1104, 1111, 1151
    Orders of the Day, 1327
    Privilege—The Press, 1850
    Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, 95, 177, 178, 191; Report, 399, 402, 807, 822
  Parliament — Business of the House, Res. Amendt. 1361, 1379, 1383, 1440, 1549, 1582, 1585, 1666, 1673, 1698, 1701
  Turkey—Rhodope Commission, Withdrawal of Notice, 863, 965

HAVELOCK, Sir H. M., *Sunderland*
  Army—Commissariat Department, 741
    Zulu War—Army Reserve, 1603
  Army Discipline and Regulation, Leave, 1930, 1931
  India—Afghanistan—Miscellaneous Questions
    Augmentation of the Military Forces, 635
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HAY, Lord W., *Haddington Burghs*
  Parliament—Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, Report, 688

HAY, Admiral Right Hon. Sir J. C. D., *Stamford*
  Army—Artillery—Breech-loading and Muzzle-loading Guns, Res. 1869
  Parliament—Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, Report, 712
  Russia and Persia, 738
  Supply—War in South Africa—Vote of Credit, 1889

HENRY, Mr. Mitchell, *Galway Co.*
  Criminal Law—John Nolan, Case of, 308, 1519
  Habitual Drunkards, Comm. *cl.* 9, 1706, 1707; *cl.* 11, 1710, 1712; *cl.* 17, 1715; *cl.* 25, 1720
  India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Res. 941
  Parliament—Miscellaneous Questions
    Ministerial Statement, 1101
    Orders of the Day, 1320, 1334
    Privilege—The Press, 1841, 1846, 1853
    Public Business, Committee on, 204
  Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1382, 1535, 1573, 1666, 1672; Amendt. 1677, 1692

HERMON, Mr. E., *Preston*
  Bank Deposits, Res. 1766
  Civil Service Estimates, Motion for a Select Committee, 1413
  Railway Commission—Expenses, 1310

HERSCHELL, Mr. F., *Durham*
  Ancient Monuments, Comm. *cl.* 4, 2059; *cl.* 13, 2061; *cl.* 19, 2063
  Assizes, 3R. 2051
  Habitual Drunkards, Comm. *cl.* 23, 1719
  India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Res. 939
  Select Vestries, 2R. 2053
  Turkey—Rhodope Commission, 962

HERVEY, Lord F., *Bury St. Edmunds*
  Ancient Monuments, 2R. 968; Comm. 1274
  Burial Law Amendment, 2R. 1480
  Habitual Drunkards, Comm. *cl.* 9, 1708; *cl.* 23, 1718
  India—Financial Condition, 956

Hesse—Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Hesse (Princess Alice)

LORDS—
  Moved, "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, to express the deep concern of this House at the great loss which Her Majesty has sustained by the death of Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Hesse, Princess Alice of Great Britain and Ireland, second daughter of Her Majesty the Queen, and to condole with Her Majesty on this melancholy occasion
  "To assure Her Majesty that this House will ever feel the warmest interest in whatever concerns Her Majesty's domestic relations; and to declare the ardent wishes of this House for the happiness of Her Majesty and of her family" (*The Earl of Beaconsfield*) *Dec* 17, 945; after short debate, on Question, agreed to, nemine dissentiente
  Her Majesty's Answer reported *Feb* 13, 1041

Hesse—Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Hesse (*Princess Alice*)—cont.

Commons—

Moved, "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, to express the deep concern of this House at the great loss which Her Majesty has sustained by the death of Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Hesse, Princess Alice of Great Britain and Ireland, second daughter of Her Majesty the Queen, and to condole with Her Majesty on this melancholy occasion

"To assure Her Majesty that this House will ever feel the warmest interest in whatever concerns Her Majesty's domestic relations; and to declare the ardent wishes of this House for the happiness of Her Majesty and of her Family" (*Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer*) *Dec* 16, 859; after short debate, Address agreed to

Her Majesty's Answer reported *Feb* 17, 1317

Heygate, Mr. W. U., *Leicestershire, S.*
  Ancient Monuments, Comm. 1276
  Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1441

Hibbert, Mr. J. T., *Oldham*
  Consecration of Churchyards Act (1867) Amendment, 2R. 1806
  Parochial Board (Scotland), 1749
  Valuation of Property, 2R. 2044

Highways Act, 1878—*Clause* 16
  Question, Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth *Feb* 20, 1515

Highways and Locomotives (*Amendment*) *Act*, 1878
  Question, Mr. Pell; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth *Feb* 13, 1074; Question, Mr. Estcourt; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth *Feb* 14, 1192; Question, Sir Henry Jackson; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth, 1198

Hill, Mr. A. Staveley, *Staffordshire, W.*
  Licensing Laws Amendment, Leave, 209, 210

Hogg, Lt.-Colonel Sir J. M'Garel-, *Truro*
  Ancient Monuments, Comm. *cl.* 4, 2060
  Parliament—Questions—Standing Orders, 956
  Thames River (Prevention of Floods), 2R. 1958, 1969, 1971; Amendt. 1972

Holker, Sir J. (*see* Attorney General, The)

Holland, Sir H. T., *Midhurst*
  Supply—War in South Africa—Vote of Credit, 1894

Holms, Mr. J., *Hackney*
  Army—Army Reserves—Militia, 1508
  Inland Revenue—Customs Department—Reorganization, 303

Hope, Mr. A. J. B. Beresford, *Cambridge University*
  Ancient Monuments, Comm. 1274, 2054; *cl.* 3, 2056
  Burial Law Amendment, Leave, 206; 2R. Amendt. 1453, 1483
  Consecration of Churchyards Act (1867) Amendment, Leave, 207; 2R. 1807
  India—Afghanistan—Amendments on Address, 186
  Parliament—Miscellaneous Questions
    Business of the House, 1499
    Orders of the Day, 1319, 1332
    Privilege—The Press, 1849
  Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1351, 1353, 1357; Amendt. 1381, 1524, 1573, 1579, 1663, 1669, 1672, 1678, 1697
  Parliament—Public Business (Half-past Twelve Rule), Res. 1438

Hopwood, Mr. C. H., *Stockport*
  Metropolitan Improvements Act — Artizans' Dwellings—Gray's Inn Road, 1405
  Prisons Act—Miscellaneous Questions
    Female Prisoners (Rules), 1652
    Kirkdale Gaol, 1302
    Salford Gaol (Rules), 1647
  Summary Jurisdiction, 2R. 1939
  Vaccination Acts—Joseph Abel, Case of, 1521

Houghton, Lord
  Africa—Cape Frontier Mounted Police, Motion for an Address, 174
  India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Res. 462
  Tramways, Select Committee appointed, Amendt. 1502

Hours of Polling (Boroughs) Bill
(*Mr. Chamberlain, Sir Charles W. Dilke, Dr. Cameron, Major Nolan, Mr. Mundella, Mr. Rathbone, Mr. Henry Samuelson*)
c. Ordered; read 1° * *Dec* 6 [Bill 11]

Howard, Mr. E. S., *Cumberland, E.*
  Lancashire and Yorkshire Water Supply, Motion for an Address, 1773, 1790

Hubbard, Right Hon. J. G., *London*
  Consecration of Churchyards Act (1867) Amendment, 2R. 1811, 1814
  England—Condition of the Country—Prevalent Distress, 949
  India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Res. 936, 957
  Metropolitan Improvements Act — Artizans' Dwellings—Gray's Inn Road, 1405
  Valuation of Property, 2R. Amendt. 2038

Hypothec Abolition (Scotland) Bill
(*Mr. Vans Agnew, Mr. Baillie Hamilton, Sir George Douglas, Colonel Alexander*)
c. Ordered; read 1° * *Dec* 6 [Bill 3]

INCHIQUIN, Lord
Parliament—Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, 18

INDIA
MISCELLANEOUS QUESTIONS
Augmentation of the Military Forces, Question, Mr. Fawcett; Answer, Mr. E. Stanhope *Dec* 10, 527; Question, Sir Henry Havelock; Answer, Mr. E. Stanhope *Dec* 12, 635
East India—Council of the Governor General—Opinions of the Members—Despatches, Questions, Mr. W. E. Forster; Answers, Mr. E. Stanhope *Dec* 6, 200
East Indian Railway, Question, General Sir George Balfour; Answer, Mr. E. Stanhope *Feb* 21, 1604
Ecclesiastical Salaries, Question, Mr. Baxter; Answer, Mr. E. Stanhope *Feb* 20, 1508
Factory Legislation, Question, Mr. Anderson; Answer, Mr. E. Stanhope *Feb* 24, 1656
Financial Condition of India, Question, Lord Francis Hervey; Answer, Mr. E. Stanhope *Dec* 17, 956
Indian Taxation, Question, Mr. Grant; Answer, Mr. E. Stanhope *Feb* 21, 1604
Revenue and Expenditure—The Indian Budget, Question, General Sir George Balfour; Answer, Mr. E. Stanhope *Feb* 14, 1197
Frontier Maps, Question, Captain Pim; Answer, Mr. E Stanhope *Dec* 13, 740
Indian Coinage Act—The Currency, Question, Mr. Goschen; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer *Feb* 17, 1315
Indian Railways—Shipment of Railway Material, Question, Mr. Rylands; Answer, Mr. E. Stanhope *Feb* 24, 1644
The Maharajah of Cashmere, Questions, Mr. Grant Duff; Answers, Mr. E. Stanhope *Feb* 18, 1404; *Feb* 24, 1645
The Viceroy's Council—Marquess of Salisbury's Despatch Feb 28, 1876, Questions, Sir William Harcourt; Answers, Mr. E. Stanhope *Dec* 10, 527
[See title *Afghanistan*]

India—East India (Public Works)
Ordered, That a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into and report as to the expediency of constructing Public Works in India with money raised on loan, both as regards financial results and the prevention of famine; That the Committee do consist of Seventeen Members; List of the Committee *Feb* 19, 1499
Ordered, That the Minutes of the Evidence taken before the Select Committee on East India (Public Works), in the last Session of Parliament, be referred to the Select Committee on East India (Public Works) (*Mr. Edward Stanhope*) *Feb* 20

Indian Finance—The Government of India Act, 1858
Amendt. on Committee of Supply *Feb* 28, To leave out from "That," and add "a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into and report upon the operation of 'The Government of India Act, 1858,' and the other Acts

[*cont.*

Indian Finance—The Government of India Act, 1858—cont.
amending the same" (*Mr. Fawcett*) *v.* 1975; Question proposed, "That the words, &c.;" after long debate, Question put; A. 139, N. 100; M. 39 (D. L. No. 30)

Inhabited House Duty and Income Tax Bill (*Mr. Hubbard, Mr. Sampson Lloyd*)
c. Ordered; read 1° * *Dec* 6 [Bill 38]

Intemperance
Moved that a Select Committee be appointed for the purpose of inquiring into the prevalence of habits of intemperance, and into the manner in which those habits have been affected by recent legislation and other causes (*The Lord Aberdare*) *Feb* 14, 1187; Motion agreed to; List of the Committee

Interments in Churchyards Bill
(*Mr. Ritchie, Mr. Gorst, Mr. Woodd, Mr. Sampson Lloyd*)
c. Considered in Committee *Dec* 6, 209; Resolution agreed to, and reported; Bill ordered; read 1° * [Bill 24]

Intoxicating Liquors (Ireland) Bill
(*Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Dease, Mr. Meldon, Mr. Whitworth*)
c. Considered in Committee; Resolution agreed to, and reported; Bill ordered; read 1° * *Dec* 6 [Bill 32]

IRELAND
MISCELLANEOUS QUESTIONS
Board of Works, The
Re-organization, Question, Major Nolan; Answer, Mr. J. Lowther *Dec* 6, 199; Question, Major Nolan; Answer, Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson *Dec* 10, 528
Clare Castle Pier and Harbour, Question, Mr. Stacpoole; Answer, Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson *Feb* 20, 1512
Colonel M'Kerlie, Questions, Major O'Beirne; Answers, Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson, Colonel Stanley *Feb* 13, 1071

Cork and Macroom Railway—Action against Directors, Question, Major O'Gorman *Feb* 27, 1837; [No Answer]
Divinity School, Dublin University, Questions, Mr. Plunket; Answers, Mr. J. Lowther *Feb* 17, 1317; *Feb* 24, 1658
Fairs and Markets, Question, Observations, Viscount Midleton; Reply, The Duke of Richmond and Gordon *Feb* 27, 1826
Irish University Education—Legislation, Question, The O'Donoghue; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer *Feb* 17, 1307
Law and Justice—Court of Bankruptcy, Question, Sir Joseph M'Kenna; Answer, Mr. J. Lowther *Dec* 13, 741
National Education—National School Teachers, Question, Mr. Meldon; Answer, Mr. J. Lowther *Feb* 14, 1198

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Ireland—*cont.*

Peace Preservation Act, 1875—*Donegal,* Question, Mr. O'Donnell; Answer, Mr. J. Lowther *Dec* 12, 639

Poor Law
Belfast Union Workhouse, Question, Mr. Biggar; Answer, Mr. J. Lowther *Feb* 24, 1646
Removal of Irish Paupers, Question, Mr. M'Carthy Downing; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth *Dec* 12, 636; Question, Mr. O'Reilly; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth *Feb* 14, 1196; Question, Mr. O'Donnell; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth *Feb* 27, 1835

Prince Viceroy of Ireland, Question, Mr. Stacpoole; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer *Feb* 17, 1307
Poor Law and Lunacy Commissioners' Report, Question, Mr. French; Answer, Mr. J. Lowther *Feb* 28, 1974
Purchase of Land—Occupying Tenants, Question, Mr. Shaw Lefevre; Answer, Mr. J. Lowther *Dec* 6, 200
Royal Hibernian Military School (*Dublin*), Question, Major O'Beirne; Answer, Mr. J. Lowther *Dec* 16, 856
Sale of Intoxicating Liquors—Rate of Duty, Question, Mr. O'Sullivan; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer *Feb* 24, 1643

Ireland—Borough Franchise
Amendt. on Committee of Supply *Feb* 14, To leave out from "That," and add "the restricted nature of the Borough Franchise in Ireland as compared with that existing in England and Scotland is a subject deserving the immediate attention of Parliament, with a view of establishing a fair and just equality of the Franchise in the three Countries" (*Mr. Meldon*) *v.*, 1199; Question proposed, "That the words, &c.;" after long debate, Question put; A. 256, N. 187; M. 69 (D. L. 4)

Jackson, Sir H. M., *Coventry*
Highways and Locomotives (Amendment) Act, 1878, 1198

James, Sir H., *Taunton*
Assizes, Comm. 1935, 1938
Cyprus, Island of—Law of England, 1313, 1314
India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Res. 981, 986
Parliament—Ministerial Statement, 1129
Racecourses (Metropolis), 2R. 1267, 1269

James, Mr. W. H., *Gateshead*
Africa, South—Zulu King—Negotiations, 1510
Charity Commission, The, 740
Leadenhall Market and Improvements, 2R. 1738; Amendt. 1747
Representation of the City—Fanmakers Company, 1973
Select Vestries, 2R. 2052
Supply—War in South Africa—Vote of Credit, 1908

Japan—Case of John Hartley
Question, Mr. Mark Stewart; Answer, Mr. Bourke *Dec* 16, 856

Jenkins, Mr. E., *Dundee*
Copyright, 1308
Parliament—Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, Report, 780
Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1353, 1374; Amendt. 1375, 1380
Turkey—Miscellaneous Questions
Financial Reforms — M. De Tocqueville, 1307
Reforms—Anglo-Turkish Convention, 525
Rhodope Commission, 961

Jersey, Earl of
India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Res. 467

Joint Stock Banks (Accounts) Bill
(*Dr. Cameron, Mr. Stevenson, Mr. Benjamin Whitworth, Mr. Pennington, Mr. James Stewart*)
c. Considered in Committee; Resolution agreed to, and reported; Bill ordered; read 1°* *Dec* 6 [Bill 23]

Joint Stock Banks (Auditing of Accounts) (Scotland) Bill
(*Mr. M'Laren, Sir Alexander Gordon, Sir George Balfour, Mr. Whitwell*)
c. Ordered; read 1°* *Dec* 11 [Bill 58]

Joint Stock Banks—Legislation
Question, Mr. Coope; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer *Feb* 13, 1072; Question, Mr. Campbell-Bannerman; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer *Feb* 17, 1306

Jurors' Remuneration Bill
(*Mr. H. B. Sheridan, Sir Henry Jackson, Mr. Joseph Cowen, Mr. Whitwell, Mr. Burt, Mr. Wheelhouse, Mr. O'Connor Power*)
c. Ordered; read 1°* *Feb* 19 [Bill 81]

Kay-Shuttleworth, Sir U. J., *Hastings*
Artizans' and Labourers' Dwellings Act, 1875, 306

Kenealy, Dr. E. V., *Stoke-upon-Trent*
Bar Education and Discipline, 1405
Criminal Law—Castro or Orton, The Convict, 1840
John Nolan, Case of, 1519
Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1556

Kennard, Colonel E. H., *Lymington*
Army—Auxiliary Forces, 956

Kensington, Lord, *Haverfordwest*
Ancient Monuments, Comm. Schedule 1, Amendt. 2063

Kimberley, Earl of
Parliament—Ministerial Statement, 1068

KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN, Right Hon. E. H., *Sandwich*
Consecration of Churchyards Act (1867) Amendment, Leave, 207; 2R. 1820
Criminal Law—Murder in Kent, 205
Parliament—Orders of the Day, 1332
Public Business, Committee on, 303
Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1357, 1531, 1679, 1687

KNOWLES, Mr. T., *Wigan*
Valuation of Property, 2R. 2040

LAING, Mr. S., *Orkney, &c.*
Civil Service Estimates, Motion for a Select Committee, 1428
India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Res. 912
Indian Finance—The Government of India Act, 1858, Motion for a Select Committee, 1993

Lancashire and Yorkshire Water Supply
Moved, "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying Her Majesty to issue a Royal Commission to inquire into the supply of water to the manufacturing districts of Lancashire and the West of Yorkshire, and any deficiencies likely to arise therein; and, whether it is necessary or expedient to resort to the Westmoreland and Cumberland Lakes to make good any deficiencies in such supply; and, if so, to what extent, and under what conditions, such resort should be sanctioned" (*Mr. Edward Howard*) *Feb* 25, 1773; after short debate, Motion withdrawn

Landlord and Tenant (Ireland) Bill
(*Mr. Herbert, Mr. King-Harman, Mr. Dease*)
c. Ordered; read 1°* *Dec* 6 [Bill 26]

Landlord and Tenant (Ireland) (No. 2) Bill
(*Mr. Downing, Mr. Butt, Mr. Shaw*)
c. Ordered; read 1°* *Dec* 9 [Bill 51]

Landlord and Tenant (Ireland) Act (1870) Amendment Bill
(*Mr. Daniel Taylor, Mr. Thomas Dickson, Mr. Benjamin Whitworth*)
c. Ordered; read 1°* *Dec* 6 [Bill 41]

Land Titles and Transfer
Select Committee of last Session, "to inquire and report whether any and what steps ought to be taken to simplify the Title to Land, and to facilitate the transfer thereof, and to prevent frauds on purchasers and mortgagees of Land," re-appointed *Dec* 11; List of the Committee, 631
Ordered, That the Evidence taken before the Select Committee on Land Titles and Transfer, of Session 1878, be referred to the Select Committee on Land Titles and Transfer (*Mr. Osborne Morgan*) *Feb* 18

LAW, Right Hon. H., *Londonderry Co.*
Borough Franchise (Ireland), Res. 1236

Law and Justice
Courts of Justice, The New, Question, Mr. Osborne Morgan; Answer, Mr. Gerard Noel *Feb* 18, 1404
London Bankruptcy Court—Exclusion of Reporters, Question, Sir George Campbell; Answer, The Attorney General *Feb* 20, 1523

LAWRENCE, Lord
India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Res.* 261

LAWSON, Sir W., *Carlisle*
Gas Companies—The Electric Light, 1315
India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Res. 939, 998
Licensing Laws Amendment, Leave, 210

Leadenhall Market and Improvements Bill (by Order)
c. Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2°" (*Sir Charles Forster*) *Feb* 25, 1729
Amendt. to leave out "now," and add "upon this day six months" (*Sir Charles W. Dilke*); Question proposed, "That 'now,' &c.;" after short debate, Amendt. withdrawn
Main Question put, and agreed to; Bill read 2°
Moved, "That the Bill be committed to a Select Committee" (*Mr. James*); Question put; A. 83, N. 137; M. 54 (D. L. 28); Bill committed

LEATHAM, Mr. E. A., *Huddersfield*
Parliament — Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, Report, 585

LEFEVRE, Mr. G. J. Shaw, *Reading*
Ancient Monuments, Comm. *cl.* 13, 2061
Ireland — Purchase of Land — Occupying Tenants, 200
Parliament—Ministerial Statement, 1123, 1142
Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1556, 1674, 1675, 1679, 1686, 1697

LEGARD, Sir C., *Scarborough*
Racecourses (Metropolis), 2R. 1271; Comm. 1388

LEIGHTON, Sir B., *Shropshire, S.*
Army—Transport Service, 1837

LEITH, Mr. J. F., *Aberdeen*
India—Afghanistan—North West Frontier—Lord Napier of Magdala, 953

LENNOX, Lord H. G. C. G., *Chichester*
Navy—H.M.S. "Thunderer," Explosion on Board, 1651

LESLIE, Sir J., *Monaghan*
Borough Franchise (Ireland), Res. 1219

Lewis, Mr. C. E., *Londonderry*
Borough Franchise (Ireland), Res. 1206

Libel Law Amendment Bill
(*Mr. Hutchinson, Dr. Cameron, Mr. Joseph Cowen, Mr. Puleston, Mr. Morley, Mr. Waddy, Mr. Edward Jenkins, Mr. Gourley, Mr. Sullivan*)
c. Ordered; read 1° * *Dec* 6 [Bill 43]

Licensing Boards (Scotland) Bill
(*Mr. Fortescue Harrison, Sir George Balfour, Dr. Cameron*)
c. Considered in Committee; Resolution agreed to, and reported; Bill ordered; read 1° * *Dec* 6 [Bill 15]
Bill withdrawn * *Feb* 13

Licensing Boards (Scotland) (No. 2) Bill
(*Mr. Fortescue Harrison, Sir George Balfour, Dr. Cameron*)
c. Ordered; read 1° * *Feb* 19 [Bill 82]

Licensing Laws Amendment Bill
(*Mr. Staveley Hill, Mr. Mundella, Mr. Rodwell*)
c. Considered in Committee *Dec* 6, 209; after short debate, Resolution agreed to, and reported; Bill ordered; read 1° * [Bill 25]

Lloyd, Mr. M., *Beaumaris*
Ancient Monuments, Comm. *cl.* 4, 2059
Assizes, 2R. 1703; 3R. 2049
Habitual Drunkards, Comm. *cl.* 11, 1711
India—Afghanistan—Afghan Correspondence, 525
Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1694, 1698

Lloyd, Mr. S. S., *Plymouth*
Bank Deposits, Res. 1762

Local Government — Urban and Rural Sanitary Districts—County Maps
Question, Mr. Stansfeld; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth *Feb* 20, 1509

Longford, Earl of
Africa, South—Zulu War—Re-inforcements, 1180

Lowe, Right Hon. R., *London University*
Civil Service Estimates, Motion for a Select Committee, 1418

Lowther, Right Hon. J. (Chief Secretary for Ireland), *York City*
Cattle Disease—American Cattle Trade, 1407
Ireland—Miscellaneous Questions
  Board of Works, 199
  Divinity School, Dublin University, 1317, 1658
  Land, Purchase of, 200
  Law and Justice—Court of Bankruptcy, 742
  National School Teachers, 1198
  Peace Preservation Act, 1875—Donegal, 639

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Lowther, Right Hon. J.—cont.
  Poor Law—Belfast Union Workhouse, 1647
  Report of the Poor Law and Lunacy Commissioners, 1974
  Royal Hibernian Military School (Dublin), 856
Ireland—Borough Franchise, Res. 1250
Parliament—Ministerial Statement, 1148, 1149
Racecourses (Metropolis), 2R. 1268, 1269, 1270

Lubbock, Sir J., *Maidstone*
Ancient Monuments, Leave, 404; 2R. 967, 968; Comm. 1274, 1275, 1276, 2053; *cl.* 3, 2055, 2057; *cl.* 4, 2059; *cl.* 13, 2061; *cl.* 16, Amendt. 2062; *cl.* 17, *ib.*; Schedule 1, 2063
Bankers' Books (Evidence), 2R. 1158
Parliament—Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, 170
Parliament—Public Business (Half-past Twelve Rule), Res. Amendt. 1437, 1440

Lunacy Laws, The—Legislation
Question, Mr. P. A. Taylor; Answer, Mr. Assheton Cross *Dec* 13, 735; Question, Mr. Dillwyn; Answer, Mr. Assheton Cross *Feb* 17, 1308

Lusk, Sir A., *Finsbury*
Leadenhall Market and Improvements, 2R. 1733
Parliament—Orders of the Day, 1334

Macartney, Mr. J. W. E., *Tyrone*
Ancient Monuments, Comm. 1275, 2054; *cl.* 4, 2059; *cl.* 17, Amendt. 2062; Schedule 1, Amendt. 2063
Civil Service Estimates, Motion for a Select Committee, 1432
Habitual Drunkards, Comm. *cl.* 17, 1717

MacDonald, Mr. A., *Stafford*
Coal Mines—Abercarne Explosion, 1305
Employers' Liability, 1750
Mines Regulation Act, 1872—Dinas Mine, 1403
Parliament—Ministerial Statement, 1118
Supply—War in South Africa—Vote of Credit, 1896

MacIver, Mr. D., *Birkenhead*
Contagious Diseases Animals Act, 1878 — Mersey Dock and Harbour Board, 1753
Education Department — School Inspectors, Res. 1612

McKenna, Sir J. N., *Youghal*
Bank Deposits, Res. 1754, 1773
Borough Franchise (Ireland), Res. 1230
Law and Justice (Ireland)—Court of Bankruptcy, 741
Parliament—Orders of the Day, 1328
Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1375, 1567
Racecourses (Metropolis), Comm. 1391
Thames River (Prevention of Floods), 2R. 1970
Valuation of Property, 2R. 2040

Mackintosh, Mr. C. F., *Inverness, &c.*
Law and Justice (Scotland)—Judicial Business of Nairnshire, 741

McLaren, Mr. D., *Edinburgh*
Church of Scotland, Leave, 211
Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1590, 1686
Register House Buildings, Edinburgh, 1647

Makins, Lieut.-Colonel W. T., *Essex, S.*
Habitual Drunkards, Comm. *cl.* 9, 1708

Manners, Right Hon. Lord J. J. R. (Postmaster General), *Leicestershire, N.*
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Parliament — Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, Report, Motion for Adjournment, 399, 531, 537, 539, 540
Post Office Savings Banks, 1194
Telegraphic Department—Continental Telegraph Charges, 1507

Marriage with a Deceased Wife's Sister Bill
(*Sir Thomas Chambers, Mr. Morley, Dr. Cameron*)
c. Ordered ; read 1° * *Dec* 6 [Bill 30]

Married Women's Property Act, 1870
Case of Mrs. M'Carthy, Question, Mr. P. A. Taylor ; Answer, The Attorney General *Dec* 16, 853
Legislation, Question, Mr. P. A. Taylor ; Answer, The Attorney General *Dec* 9, 306

Married Women's Property (Scotland) Bill (*Mr. Anderson, Sir Robert Anstruther, Mr. Orr Ewing, Mr. M'Laren, Mr. Lyon Playfair*)
c. Ordered ; read 1° * *Dec* 6 [Bill 1]

Marten, Mr. A. G., *Cambridge*
Disqualification by Medical Relief, 2R. 627
Parliament — Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, Report, 378

Martin, Mr. P., *Kilkenny Co.*
Ancient Monuments, Comm. *cl.* 19, 2063
Burial Law Amendment, 2R. 1467
Consecration of Churchyards Act (1867) Amendment, 2R. 1821
Parliament—Ministerial Statement, 1145, 1149

Medical Act (1858) Amendment Bill
(*Dr. Lush, Sir Trevor Lawrence, Sir Joseph M'Kenna*)
c. Ordered ; read 1° * *Dec* 6 [Bill 2]

Medical Act, 1858—*Legislation*
Question, Mr. A. Mills ; Answer, Lord George Hamilton *Dec* 16, 854

Medical Act, 1858, Amendment Bill [H.L.]
(*The Lord President*)
l. Presented ; read 1ª, after short debate *Feb* 24, 1722 (No. 16)

Medical Act (1858) Amendment (No. 2) Bill
(*Mr. Arthur Mills, Mr. Childers, Mr. Goldney*)
c. Ordered ; read 1° * *Feb* 26 [Bill 86]

Medical Acts—The Medical Council
Question, Mr. Waddy ; Answer, Lord George Hamilton *Feb* 14, 1195

Medical Appointments Qualification Bill
(*Mr. Errington, Mr. Blennerhassett*)
c. Ordered ; read 1° * *Dec* 12 [Bill 61]

Meldon, Mr. C. H., *Kildare*
Borough Franchise (Ireland), Res. 1199
National Education (Ireland)—National School Teachers, 1198
Parliament—Ministerial Statement, 1158

Mercantile Marine
Armed Merchant Vessels, Question, Sir Edward Watkin ; Answer, Mr. W. H. Smith *Dec* 13, 739
Legislation, Question, Mr. Evelyn Ashley ; Answer, Viscount Sandon *Feb* 24, 1651

Metropolis
Representation of the City—The Fanmakers Company, Question, Mr. W. H. James ; Answer, Mr. Assheton Cross *Feb* 28, 1973
Thames Traffic Regulation—The Official Committee, Questions, Mr. Gourley ; Answers, Viscount Sandon *Dec* 13, 743 ; *Feb* 20, 1520

Metropolitan Fire Brigade—Legislation
Question, Mr. Ritchie ; Answer, Mr. Assheton Cross *Feb* 20, 1511

Metropolitan Improvements Act—Artizans' Dwellings—Gray's Inn Road
Question, Mr. Hopwood ; Answer, Mr. Assheton Cross *Feb* 18, 1405

Midleton, Viscount
Fairs and Markets (Ireland), 1826
India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Res. 475

Mills, Mr. A., *Exeter*
Education Department—Education Code, 1519
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Indian Finance—The Government of India Act, 1858, Motion for a Select Committee, 1985
Medical Act, 1858, 854
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Mines Regulation Act, 1872—*The Dinas Mine*
Question, Mr. Macdonald; Answer, Mr. Assheton Cross *Feb* 18, 1403

Money Laws (Ireland) Bill
(*Mr. Delahunty, Mr. Richard Power*)
c. Considered in Committee; Resolution agreed to, and reported; Bill ordered; read 1°* *Dec* 6 [Bill 12]

Monk, Mr. C. J., *Gloucester City*
Ancient Monuments, Comm. 1275
Coinage—Worn Silver Coin, Withdrawal of, 299
Consecration of Churchyards Act (1867) Amendment, Leave, 206, 208; 2R. 1791, 1821
Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1697
Public Accounts, Instruction to the Committee, 1595

Montagu, Right Hon. Lord R., *Westmeath*
Africa, South—Despatches, 1830
Civil Service Estimates, Motion for a Select Committee, 1422
India—Afghanistan—Repulse of the Mission, 196, 198
  Russian Policy, 199, 526
Parliament—Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, *140, 150, 158

Montgomery, Sir G. G., *Peeblesshire*
Bank Deposits, Res. 1770

Morgan, Mr. G. Osborne, *Denbighshire*
Burial Law Amendment, 2R. 1487, 1490
Consecration of Churchyards Act (1867) Amendment, Leave, 208; 2R. 1798, 1812
India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Res. 924
Law Courts, The New, 1404

Mowbray, Right Hon. J. R., *Oxford University*
Parliament—Orders of the Day, 1322
Parliament—Public Business (Half-past Twelve Rule), Res. 1435, 1440

Mundella, Mr. A. J., *Sheffield*
Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act, 1878—Cattle from the United States, 1190
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India—Afghanistan, War in—Indian Finance—Bombay, 952
India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Res. 1014
Licensing Laws Amendment, Leave, 210
Parliament—Public Business (Half-past Twelve Rule), Res. 1437

Municipal Corporations (Property Qualification Abolition) Bill
(*Mr. Mundella, Mr. Chamberlain, Mr. Burt, Mr. Sullivan*)
c. Ordered; read 1°* *Dec* 6 [Bill 9]

Municipal Corporations — Report of the Royal Commission
Question, Mr. Hanbury-Tracy; Answer, Mr. Stephen Cave *Feb* 24, 1655

Municipal Franchise (Ireland) Bill
(*Major O'Gorman, Sir Joseph M'Kenna, Mr. Richard Power, Mr. Blennerhassett*)
c. Ordered; read 1°* *Feb* 14 [Bill 74]

Muntz, Mr. P. H., *Birmingham*
Bank Deposits, Res. 1768
Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1563, 1565

Mure, Colonel W., *Renfrew*
Africa, South — Cape Colonies — Telegraphic Communication, 529
  Zulu War—Re-inforcements, 1072, 1074, 1192, 1193, 1196
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Naghten, Colonel A. R., *Winchester*
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Question, Lord Henry Lennox; Answer, Mr. W. H. Smith *Feb* 24, 1651
Navy Promotion — Order in Council, 1872, Question, Mr. Serjeant Simon; Answer, Mr. W. H. Smith *Feb* 25, 1750

Newdegate, Mr. C. N., *Warwickshire, N.*
Civil Service Estimates, Motion for a Select Committee, 1426
Consecration of Churchyards Act (1867) Amendment, Leave, 207; 2R. 1803
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New Forest—Stony Cross Inclosure
  Question, Mr. Fawcett; Answer, Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson *Feb* 24, 1654

NEWPORT, Viscount, *Shropshire, N.*
  Noxious Vapours, 1516

NOEL, Right Hon. G. J. (First Commissioner of Works), *Rutland*
  Consecration of Churchyards Act (1867) Amendment, 2R. Amendt. 1794, 1822
  Courts of Justice, The New, 1404

NOEL, Mr. E., *Dumfries, &c.*
  India—Afghanistan—Statement of the Viceroy (Lord Lytton) 10th October, 737

NOLAN, Major J. P., *Galway Co.*
  Army—Breech-loading Ordnance, 1192
  Army — Breech-loading and Muzzle-loading Guns, Res. 1861
  Army Discipline and Regulation, Leave, 1929
  Borough Franchise (Ireland), Res. 1234, 1235
  Burial Law Amendment, 2R. 1497
  Habitual Drunkards, Comm. *cl.* 17, 1717
  India—Afghanistan—Newspaper Correspondents, 529, 852
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    Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, 169; Report, 731
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NORTH, Colonel J. S., *Oxfordshire*
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  Parliament—Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, 64, 67, 69

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  Question, Viscount Newport; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth *Feb* 20, 1516

O'BEIRNE, Major F., *Leitrim*
  Army Discipline and Regulation, Leave, 1931
  Army Organization—The Brigade Depôt System, Res. 1872
  Army (India)—Officers' Sick Leave, 638, 1512
    Payment of Travelling Expenses — 3rd Hussars, 1832
  Ireland—Board of Works—Colonel M'Kerlie, 1071, 1072
    Royal Hibernian Military School (Dublin), 856
  Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1567

O'BRIEN, Sir P., *King's Co.*
  India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Res. 841
  Parliament—Ministerial Statement, 1146
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O'CLERY, Mr. K., *Wexford Co.*
  Parliament—Orders of the Day, 1335
    Ministerial Statement, 1147
    Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, 171, 173
  Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1568, 1695

O'CONOR DON, The, *Roscommon Co.*
  Racecourses (Metropolis), Comm. 1390

O'DONNELL, Mr. F. H., *Dungarvan*
  Africa, South—Our Policy, 2034
  Indian Finance—Government of India Act, 1858, Motion for a Select Committee, 2019
  Ireland — Peace Preservation Act, 1875 — Donegal, 639
    Poor Law—Removal of Irish Paupers, 1835
  Parliament—Ministerial Statement, 1121
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  Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1590, 1681; Amendt. 1684, 1694, 1700
  Treaty of Berlin—Religious Liberty in Bulgaria, 1835

O'DONOGHUE, The, *Tralee*
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O'GORMAN, Major P., *Waterford*
  Army—24th Regiment, 1514, 1572, 1836
  Army Officers (Guards and Line), Motion for an Address, 2063
  Borough Franchise (Ireland), Res. 1264
  Ireland—Cork and Macroom Railway—Action against Directors, 1837
  Parliament—Ministerial Statement, 1149, 1157
    Rules and Orders, 1515
  Racecourses (Metropolis), Comm. Motion for Adjournment, 1390
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O'LEARY, Dr. W. H., *Drogheda*
  Borough Franchise (Ireland), Res. 1258, 1259
  Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1590

ONSLOW, Mr. D. R., *Guildford*
  Ancient Monuments, Comm. Motion for Adjournment, 1275, 1276; *cl.* 4, Motion for reporting Progress, 2060
  Indian Finance—The Government of India Act, 1858, Motion for a Select Committee, 1991
  Parliament—Orders of the Day, 1328
  Persia—Employment of Russian Officers, 1649
  Racecourses (Metropolis), 2R. Amendt. 1265; Comm. Amendt. 1387, 1390

O'REILLY, Mr. M. W., *Longford Co.*
  Borough Franchise (Ireland), Res. 1242
  Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act, 1878—Farm Dairies, 1198
  Poor Law (Ireland)—Removal of Irish Poor, 1196

O'SHAUGHNESSY, Mr. R., *Limerick*
Borough Franchise (Ireland), Res. 1245
Disqualification by Medical Relief, 2R. 626
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Public Accounts, Nomination of Committee, 1446
Supply—War in South Africa—Vote of Credit, 1907

O'SULLIVAN, Mr. W. H., *Limerick Co.*
Sale of Intoxicating Liquors (Ireland)—Rate of Duty, 1643

OTWAY, Mr. A. J., *Rochester*
Africa, South—Transmission of Intelligence, 1605
Russia and Turkey—The Definitive Treaty, 1303

Outlawries Bill
c. Read 1° * *Dec* 5

Oyster and Mussel Fisheries Order (Blackwater, Essex) Bill
(*Mr. J. G. Talbot, Viscount Sandon*)
c. Ordered; read 1° * *Feb* 17 [Bill 76]

PAGET, Mr. R. H., *Somersetshire, Mid*
Assizes, Comm. 1937, 1938
Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act, 1878—Farm Dairies, 1197
Criminal Law Punishment—Admission of the Press, 1831
Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1672

Parliament
LORDS—
MEETING OF THE PARLIAMENT *Dec* 5
The Session of Parliament was opened by Commission
Her Majesty's Most Gracious Speech delivered by The LORD CHANCELLOR *Dec* 5, 3
ROLL OF THE LORDS—Garter King of Arms attending, delivered at the Table (in the usual manner) a List of the Lords Temporal in the Sixth Session of the Twenty-first Parliament of the United Kingdom *Dec* 5
The Lord Chancellor acquainted the House that the Clerk of the Parliaments had prepared and laid it on the Table (*P.P.* No. 1) *Dec* 9
The Queen's Speech having been reported by The LORD CHANCELLOR; An ADDRESS TO HER MAJESTY thereon moved by The Earl of RAVENSWORTH (the Motion being seconded by Lord INCHIQUIN) *Dec* 5, 5
Amendt. moved, to insert after the first paragraph ("We beg humbly to express to your Majesty our sorrow that the great calamity [*cont.*

PARLIAMENT—LORDS—*cont.*
should have occurred of a war with the Ameer of Afghanistan, and we feel it to be our duty very respectfully to express to your Majesty our regret that as soon as your Majesty's servants were satisfied that war had become so probable as to impose upon them the necessity of ordering costly preparations for it to be commenced, they did not advise your Majesty to summon Parliament to meet with the least possible delay, in order that due provision might be made for the expense to be incurred, and that an opportunity might be offered to Parliament, before the war was begun, of considering the grounds on which it was to be undertaken, and of forming a judgment as to its justice and necessity") (*The Earl Grey*), 47; after long debate, Question put, Whether the said words shall be there inserted? resolved in the negative
Then the original Motion was agreed to
HER MAJESTY'S ANSWER TO THE ADDRESS reported *Dec* 9, 218

Chairman of Committees—The Earl of Redesdale appointed, *Nemine Dissentiente*, to take the Chair in all Committees of this House for this Session *Dec* 5
Committee for Privileges—appointed *Dec* 5
Sub-Committee for the Journals—appointed *Dec* 5
Appeal Committee—appointed *Dec* 5
Office of the Clerk of the Parliaments and Office of the Gentleman Usher of the Black Rod—Select Committee appointed; List of the Committee *Feb* 27, 1827

Private Bills
Orders in relation thereto *Feb* 21
Private Bills—Standing Orders Committee appointed; List of the Committee *Feb* 27, 1827
Opposed Private Bills—Committee appointed; List of the Committee *Feb* 27, 1827

Business of Parliament, Ministerial Statement, The Earl of Beaconsfield; debate thereon *Feb* 13, 1041; Personal Explanation, Earl Cadogan; Observations, Earl Granville *Feb* 14, 1183
Arrangement of Public Business, Question, Earl Granville; Answer, The Duke of Richmond and Gordon *Feb* 18, 1393

COMMONS—
The QUEEN'S SPEECH having been reported by Mr. SPEAKER; An humble Address thereon moved by Viscount CASTLEREAGH (the Motion being seconded by Mr. HALL) *Dec* 5, 85; after long debate, Amendt. proposed, in paragraph 3, line 1, to leave out "To express our regret," and insert "Humbly to thank Her Majesty for informing us" (*Mr. Edward Stanhope*) *v.*; Question, "That the words, &c," put, and negatived
Words inserted; main Question, as amended, proposed; after further debate, main Question put, and agreed to
Committee appointed to draw up the said Address; List of the Committee, 173 [*cont.*

PARLIAMENT—COMMONS—*cont.*

Afghanistan (*Expenses of Military Operations*), Notice of Resolution, Mr. E. Stanhope *Dec* 5, 84

Afghanistan—Amendments on the Address (*on Report*), Notice of Amendments, Mr. Whitbread, Mr. Chamberlain; Observations, Question, Mr. Whitbread; Reply, The Chancellor of the Exchequer *Dec* 6, 176

Report of Address brought up, and read *Dec* 6, 205

Moved, "That the said Address be now read a second time;" Moved, "That the Debate be adjourned till Monday next" (*Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer*); Motion agreed to

Debate resumed *Dec* 9, 310

Amendt. to leave out from "That," and add "this House disapproves the conduct of Her Majesty's Government which has resulted in the War with Afghanistan" (*Mr. Whitbread*) *v.*; Question proposed, "That the words, &c.;" after long debate, Debate adjourned

Debate resumed *Dec* 10, 530; after long debate, Debate further adjourned

Debate resumed *Dec* 12, 639; after long debate, Debate further adjourned

Explanations (*Cyprus—Afghanistan*), Mr. Bourke, Mr. E. Stanhope *Dec* 13, 744

Debate resumed *Dec* 13, 745; after long debate, Question put; A. 328, N. 227; M. 101

Div. List, A. and N., 847

Main Question put, and agreed to

Her Majesty's Answer to the Address reported *Dec* 17, 1018

Privileges—Ordered, That a Committee of Privileges be appointed *Dec* 5

Printing—Select Committee appointed; List of the Committee *Dec* 9, 405

Public Petitions, Select Committee appointed; List of the Committee *Feb* 18, 1444

Selection, Committee of Selection nominated; List of the Committee *Feb* 14, 1281

Standing Orders, Select Committee on Standing Orders nominated; List of the Committee *Feb* 14, 1281

Business of the House

Question, Mr. Beresford Hope; Answer, Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson *Feb* 19, 1499; Question, Observations, The Marquess of Hartington; Reply, The Chancellor of the Exchequer *Feb* 21, 1606

Order of Business—The Army and Navy Estimates, Questions, The Marquess of Hartington, Mr. Goschen; Answers, The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. W. H. Smith *Feb* 20, 1522

Questions—Standing Orders, Question, Colonel Beresford; short debate thereon *Dec* 17, 954

Rules and Orders—Alteration of Question, Observations, Major O'Gorman; Reply, Mr. Speaker *Feb* 20, 1515

Committee on Public Business, Questions, Mr. Newdegate, Mr. Mitchell Henry; Answers, Mr. Speaker, The Chancellor of the Exchequer *Dec* 6, 204; Question, Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer *Dec* 9, 303

Order—Question of Procedure, Observations, Mr. Rylands *Feb* 27, 1878

[*cont.*

PARLIAMENT—COMMONS—*cont.*

Meeting of the House, Resolved, That this House will meet To-morrow at Two of the clock (Ash Wednesday) (*Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer*) *Feb* 25

Representation of the City—The Fanmakers Company, Question, Mr. W. H. James; Answer, Mr. Assheton Cross *Feb* 28, 1973

Parliament — Business of Parliament — Ministerial Statement

Order for Committee (of Supply) read; Moved, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair" (*Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer*) *Feb* 13, 1076

After long debate, Amendt. to leave out from "That," and add "the omission of all reference to legislation on the questions of Reform in the Land Laws and of the University Education of Ireland, both in the Queen's Speech and in the Statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer this evening, is calculated to produce great discontent in Ireland, and is an ill return for the increased burthens which the warlike policy of the Government is calculated to entail on the Irish as well as on the British people" (*Major Nolan*) *v.* 1143; Question proposed "That the words, &c.;" after further debate, Question put; A. 72, N. 25; M. 47 (D. L. 3)

Main Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker, &c.;" Motion withdrawn

Parliament — Business of the House — Resolutions

Moved, "That the Orders of the day be postponed until after the Notice of Motion relating to the Business of the House" (*Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer*) *Feb* 17, 1318

After short debate, Amendt. to leave out from "That," and add "this House will forthwith resolve itself into a Committee to consider the Resolutions of Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer on the Business of the House" (*Mr. Rylands*) *v.* 1331; Question proposed, "That the words, &c.;" after further short debate, Question put; A. 192, N. 75; M. 117 (D. L. 8)

Main Question put; A. 185, N. 53; M. 132 (D. L. 9)

First Resolution

Moved, "That, whenever the Committee of Supply or the Committee of Ways and Means stands as the first Order of the Day on a Monday, Mr. Speaker shall leave the Chair without putting any question" (*Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer*) *Feb* 17, 1337

After short debate, Amendt. to leave out "or the Committee of Ways and Means" (*Mr. Dillwyn*), 1351; Question proposed, "That the words, &c.;" after further short debate, Question put, and negatived

Amendt. after "Supply" to insert "appointed for the consideration of the ordinary Army, Navy, and Civil Service Estimates" (*The Marquess of Hartington*), 1361; Question

[*cont.*

Parliament—Business of the House—cont.

proposed, "That those words be there inserted;" after short debate, Question put, and agreed to

Amendt. to insert, at the end of the last Amendt., the words "excepting Votes on Account" (*Mr. Edward Jenkins*), 1375; Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted;" after short debate, Moved, "That the Debate be now adjourned" (*Mr. Henry Samuelson*); after further short debate, Motion withdrawn; original Question put; A. 69, N. 143; M. 74 (D. L. 10)

Amendt. after the word "Monday," to insert "and the Motion being made, That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair" (*Mr. Beresford Hope*) *Feb* 17, 1381; Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted;" Moved, "That the Debate be now adjourned" (*Mr. Jacob Bright*); after short debate, Question put, and agreed to; Debate adjourned

Debate resumed *Feb* 20, 1524; after long debate, Amendt. (*Mr. Beresford Hope*) withdrawn

Amendt. after the word "Monday" to insert "in the months of June, July, and August (*Major Nolan*), 1573; Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted;" after short debate, Question put; A. 68, N. 161; M. 93 (D. L. 17)

Amendt. after the word "Monday" to insert "provided there be not on the Paper any Amendment relevant to the class of Estimates about to be discussed" (*Mr. Anderson*), 1574; Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted;" Moved, "That the Debate be now adjourned" (*Sir George Bowyer*); after short debate, Question put; A. 57, N. 143; M. 86 (D. L. 18)

Original Question again proposed; Moved, "That this House do now adjourn" (*Mr. Rylands*); after short debate, Question put; A. 43, N. 121; M. 78 (D. L. 19)

Original Question again proposed; Moved, "That the Debate be now adjourned" (*Mr. Dillwyn*); Motion agreed to; Debate adjourned

Debate resumed *Feb* 24, 1658

After short debate, Amendt. to the said proposed Amendt. to insert, after "Amendment," "or Notice" (*Sir Charles W. Dilke*); Question proposed, "That the words 'or Notice' be there inserted;" after further short debate, Amendt. to the proposed Amendt. and original Amendt. withdrawn

Amendt. after "shall," in line 3, of the First Resolution, to insert "except on first going into Committee on the ordinary Army, Navy, or Civil Service Estimates respectively" (*Sir Charles W. Dilke*), 1666; Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted;" after short debate, Amendt. withdrawn

Amendt. at the end of the First Resolution, to add "except an Amendment relative to the Class of Estimates which has been set down for consideration on that day be moved, in which case Mr. Speaker shall be bound to propose the question in respect of such Amendment: Provided always, That the Member of the Government who proposes to move the Estimates upon that day may make his statement with Mr. Speaker in the Chair" (*Mr. Beresford Hope*), 1669; Question proposed, "That those words be there added;" after short debate, Question put; A. 79, N. 191; M. 112 (D. L. 20)

Amendt. at the end of the First Resolution, to add "unless on going into Committee an Amendment be moved or Question asked relevant to the Votes to be considered on that day" (*Sir Charles W. Dilke*), 1674; Question proposed, "That those words be there added;" after short debate, Amendt. withdrawn

Amendt. at the end of the First Resolution, to add "unless an Amendment be moved relating to the Class of Estimates proposed to be taken in Supply on first going into Committee on the Army, Navy, and Civil Services respectively" (*Sir Walter B. Barttelot*), 1676; Question proposed, "That those words be there added"

Amendt. to the said proposed Amendt. after "moved," to insert "or Question raised" (*Sir Charles W. Dilke*); Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted;" Question put, and agreed to

Question again proposed, "That the words 'unless an Amendment be moved or Question raised relating to the Class of Estimates proposed to be taken in Supply on first going into Committee on the Army, Navy, and Civil Services respectively,' be there added," 1677

Amendt. to leave out "Class of" (*Mr. Whitwell*); Question, "That the words 'Class of' stand part of the proposed Amendment," put, and negatived

Question again proposed, "That the words 'unless an Amendment be moved or Question raised relating to the Estimates proposed to be taken in Supply on first going into Committee on the Army, Navy, and Civil Services respectively,' be there added"

Amendt. after "Navy, and" to insert "the several Classes of the" (*Mr. Mitchell Henry*); Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted;" after short debate, Question put; A. 49, N. 88; M. 39 (D. L. 21)

Question again proposed, "That the words 'unless an Amendment be moved or Question raised relating to the Estimates proposed to be taken in Supply on first going into Committee on the Army, Navy, and Civil Services respectively,' be there added," 1684

Amendt. to the said proposed Amendt. after "Services," to insert "and the Classes relating to Law, Justice, Education, and Public Works in Ireland" (*Mr. O'Donnell*); Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted;" after short debate, Question put; A. 31, N. 131; M. 100 (D. L. 22)

Question, "That the words 'unless an Amendment be moved relating to the Estimates proposed to be taken in Supply on first going into Committee on the Army, Navy, and Civil Services respectively,' be added to the First Resolution," put, and agreed to

Main Question, as amended, proposed, "That, whenever the Committee of Supply appointed for the consideration of the ordinary Army,

[*cont.* [*cont.*

Parliament—Business of the House—cont.

Navy, and Civil Service Estimates stands as the first Order of the Day on a Monday, Mr. Speaker shall leave the Chair without putting any Question, unless an Amendment be moved or Question raised relating to the Estimates proposed to be taken in Supply on first going into Committee on the Army, Navy, and Civil Services respectively," 1693

Amendt. at the end of the Question, to add "unless Notice has been given of an Amendment to be offered to the Question calling attention to any grievance arising out of the conduct of the Government or the administration of the Laws" (*Mr. Parnell*); Question proposed, "That those words be there added;" after short debate, Question put; A. 47, N. 139; M. 92 (D. L. 23)

Main Question, as amended, again proposed

Amendt. at the end of the Question, to add "and on Fridays Notices of Motion shall have precedence of Orders of the Day" (*Mr. O'Connor Power*), 1697; Question proposed, "That those words be there added;" after short debate, Question put; A. 50, N. 139; M. 89 (D. L. 24)

Main Question, as amended, again proposed

Amendt. at the end of the Question, to add "Provided always, That when Notice of a Motion has been given which, but for this Rule, would have been moved on a Monday, the next succeeding Committee of Ways and Means shall be a first Order of the Day, and Notices applicable on going into Committee of Supply on Monday shall be transferred to going into Committee on Ways and Means" (*Mr. Biggar*), 1700; Question proposed, "That those words be there added;" after short debate, Amendt. withdrawn

Main Question, as amended, put; A. 130, N. 50; M. 80 (D. L. 25)

After short debate, further Consideration of Resolutions relating to the Business of the House deferred till Thursday 6th March

Parliament — Kitchen and Refreshment Rooms (House of Commons)

Ordered, That a Standing Committee be appointed to control the arrangements of the Kitchen and Refreshment Rooms, in the department of the Serjeant at Arms attending this House; List of the Committee *Dec* 16, 944

Parliament — Parliamentary Reporting— Re-appointment of the Select Committee

Question, Mr. Newdegate; Answer, Mr. W. H. Smith *Dec* 16, 857

Ordered, That the Select Committee of last Session on Parliamentary Reporting be re-appointed; List of the Committee *Feb* 19, 1500

Ordered, That the Evidence taken before the Select Committee on Parliamentary Reporting, of Session 1878, be referred to the Select Committee on Parliamentary Reporting (*Mr. William Henry Smith*)

Parliament—Privilege—The Press

Observations, Mr. Mitchell Henry *Feb* 27, 1841

Moved, "That the said article contains libellous reflections upon certain Members of this House in breach of the Privileges of this House" (*Mr. Mitchell Henry*), 1847; after short debate, Motion withdrawn

Parliament—Public Accounts

Nomination of Select Committee, Sir Walter Barttelot, Lord Frederick Cavendish, Mr. Cubitt, Mr. Goldney, nominated Members of the Committee of Public Accounts; Moved, "That Mr. Hankey be one other Member of the said Committee" (*Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson*) *Feb* 18, 1445; after short debate [House counted out]

Instruction to the Committee, Moved, "That it be an Instruction to the Committee of Public Accounts, That they have power to consider whether any alteration in the Law is desirable, providing that a statement in each case in which the Naval and Military Departments have obtained the sanction of the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury to any expenditure not provided for in the sums appropriated to such services in the Votes contained in the Appropriation Act, setting forth the representation made to them by the respective Department, shall be laid upon the Table of the House within a limited period after such sanction shall have been given" (*Mr. Monk*) *Feb* 20, 1595; after short debate [House counted out]

Members nominated to the Committee *Feb* 25, 1790

Parliament—Public Business (Half-past Twelve Rule)

Moved, "That, except for a Money Bill, no Order of the Day or Notice of Motion be taken after half-past Twelve of the clock at night, with respect to which Order or Notice of Motion a Notice of Opposition or Amendment shall have been printed on the Notice Paper, or if such Notice of Motion shall only have been given the next previous day of sitting, and objection shall be taken when such Notice is called" (*Mr. Mowbray*) *Feb* 18, 1435

Amendt. in line 1, after "Bill," to insert "or a Bill which has passed through Committee of the whole House" (*Sir John Lubbock*); Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted;" after short debate, Question put; A. 57, N. 81; M. 24 (D. L. 15)

Main Question put, and agreed to

Moved, "That the said Resolution be a Standing Order of the House" (*Mr. Mowbray*); after short debate, Question put; A. 79, N. 36; M. 43 (D. L. 16)

PARLIAMENT—HOUSE OF LORDS

Dec 6, 1878—Hugh MacCalmont Lord Cairns, Lord Chancellor of Great Britain, created a Viscount and Earl of the United Kingdom, by the style and title of Viscount Garmoyle in the County of Antrim, and Earl Cairns

Sat First

Dec 9, 1878—The Lord Windsor

[*cont.*

PARLIAMENT—HOUSE OF COMMONS
New Writs Issued
During Recess
For Truro City, *v.* Sir Frederick Martin Williams, baronet, deceased
For Peterborough Borough, *v.* George Hammond Whalley, esquire, deceased
1878
Dec 5—*For* Maldon, *v.* George Montagu Warren Sandford, esquire, Manor of Northstead
For Bristol, *v.* Kirkman Daniel Hodgson, esquire, Chiltern Hundreds
Dec 9—*For* Londonderry County, *v.* Richard Smyth, esquire, deceased
For Borough of New Ross, *v.* John Dunbar, esquire, deceased
1879
Feb 13—*For* Norfolk County (Northern Division), *v.* Colonel James Duff, deceased
For Cambridge County, *v.* Hon. Eliot Constantine Yorke, deceased
For Cork County, *v.* Timothy M'Carthy Downing, esquire, deceased
For South Warwickshire, *v.* Earl of Yarmouth, Controller of Her Majesty's Household
For Haddington District of Burghs, *v.* Lord William Hay, now Marquess of Tweeddale

New Members Sworn
1878
Dec 5—Hon. William John Wentworth Fitz-William, *Peterborough*
Lord Colin Campbell, *County of Argyll*
Samuel Rathbone Edge, esquire, *Newcastle-under-Lyme*
Arthur Tremayne, esquire, *Truro*
Dec 12—George Courtauld, esquire, *Maldon*
Dec 16—Lewis Fry, esquire, *Bristol*

1879
Feb 13—Edward Birkbeck, esquire, *Norfolk County* (Northern Division)
Edward Hicks, esquire, *Cambridge County*
Feb 14—Lieutenant Colonel Charles George Tottenham, *New Ross Borough*
Sir Thomas M'Clure, baronet, *Londonderry County*
Feb 21—Earl of Yarmouth, *Warwick County* (Southern Division)
Colonel Daniel La Zouche Colthurst, *Cork County*
Feb 27—Sir David Wedderburn, baronet, *Haddington District of Burghs*

Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices Bill (*Mr. Attorney General, Mr. Secretary Cross, Mr. Solicitor General*)
c. Motion for Leave (*Mr. Attorney General*) *Feb* 17, 1391; after short debate, Motion agreed to; Bill ordered; read 1°* [Bill 78]

Parliamentary Franchise Bill
(*Mr. Elliot, Mr. Rodwell, Mr. Serjeant Spinks*)
c. Ordered* *Feb* 25
Read 1°* *Feb* 26 [Bill 84]

PARNELL, Mr. C. S., *Meath*
Army Discipline and Regulation, Leave, 1929, 1930
Assizes, 2R. 1702
Civil Service Estimates, Motion for a Select Committee, 1432
Parliament—Ministerial Statement, 1156
Privilege—The Press, 1852
Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1374, 1378, 1443, 1560, 1573, 1667, 1673, 1680, 1690; Amendt. 1694, 1699
Supply—War in South Africa—Vote of Credit, 1888

Patents for Inventions Bill
(*Mr. Anderson, Mr. Mundella, Mr. Dalrymple, Mr. Alexander Brown*)
c. Ordered; read 1°* *Dec* 10 [Bill 55]

Patents for Inventions Bill
(*Mr. Attorney General, Mr. Secretary Cross, Mr. Solicitor General*)
c. Ordered; read 1°* *Feb* 17 [Bill 77]

PEEL, Right Hon. Sir R., *Tamworth*
Parliament — Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, Report, 571, 572, 575, 579
Turkey—Rhodope Commission, Withdrawal of Notice, 869

PEEL, Mr. A. W., *Warwick Bo.*
Rivers Conservancy and Prevention of Floods, 1306

PELL, Mr. A., *Leicestershire, S.*
Ancient Monuments, Comm. *cl.* 14, Amendt. 2062; *cl.* 17, Amendt. *ib.*
Coroners, Select Committee, 1655
Disqualification by Medical Relief, 3R. Amendt. 1276, 1278
Highways and Locomotives (Amendment) Act, 1878, 1074
Valuation of Property, 2R. 2042

PENZANCE, Lord
Bankruptcy Law Amendment, 1R. 1301

PERCY, Right Hon. Earl, *Northumberland, N.*
Ancient Monuments, Comm. Motion for Adjournment, 1273, 1276; Motion for reporting Progress, 2053; *cl.* 2, 2054; *cl.* 3, Amendt. 2055, 2056; *cl.* 4, Amendt. 2057; *cl.* 13, 2061; *cl.* 17, 2062; *cl.* 19, 2063
Burial Law Amendment, 2R. 1496
Habitual Drunkards, 2R. 1387; Comm. *cl.* 9, 1707; *cl.* 11, 1709, 1712; *cl.* 17, 1716
Parliament — Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, Report, Motion for Adjournment, 734, 745

Permissive Prohibitory Liquor Bill
(*Sir Wilfrid Lawson, Sir Thomas Bazley, Mr. Richard, Dr. Cameron, Mr. Dalway, Mr. Downing, Mr. Charles Lewis*)
c. Considered in Committee; Resolution agreed to, and reported; Bill ordered; read 1°* *Dec* 6 [Bill 6]

Persia—Employment of Russian Officers
Question, Mr. Onslow; Answer, Mr. Bourke *Feb* 24, 1649

Petty Customs (Scotland) Abolition Act Amendment Bill
(*Mr. James Barclay, Mr. Cowan*)
c. Ordered; read 1°* *Feb* 28 [Bill 91]

Pim, Captain B., *Gravesend*
India—Frontier Maps, 740
"Princess Alice" Calamity, 737

Playfair, Right Hon. Mr. Lyon, *Edinburgh and St. Andrew's Universities*
Army—Army Medical Department, 632
India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Res. Motion for Adjournment, 937, 968, 970, 978
Lancashire and Yorkshire Water Supply, Motion for an Address, 1789

Plunket, Hon. D. R., *Dublin University*
Ireland—Divinity School, Dublin University, 1317, 1658

Plunkett, Hon. R. E., *Gloucester, W.*
Parliament — Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, Report, 798

Police Superannuation—Legislation
Question, Sir Charles Russell; Answer, Mr. Assheton Cross *Feb* 27, 1833

Poor Law
Miscellaneous Questions
Deportation of Irish Poor, Question, Mr. M'Carthy Downing; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth *Dec* 12, 636; Question, Mr. O'Reilly; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth *Feb* 14, 1196; Question, Mr. O'Donnell; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth *Feb* 27, 1835
Liverpool—Alleged Misconduct of Poor Law Officers, Question, Mr. Stansfeld; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth *Dec* 13, 742
Metropolitan Unions — Oakum Picking by Female Paupers, Question, Mr. Cole; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth *Dec* 17, 948
Urban and Rural Sanitary Districts—County Maps, Question, Mr. Stansfeld; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth *Feb* 20, 1509

Poor Law Amendment Act (1876) Amendment Bill (*Mr. Mellor, Mr. Merewether, Sir Charles Forster, Mr. Mundella, Mr. Serjeant Simon, Mr. Hibbert, Mr. Torrens*)
c. Ordered; read 1°* *Dec* 6 [Bill 44]
Read 2°* *Feb* 26

Poor Law Guardians (Election by Ballot) (Ireland) Bill (*Mr. Errington, Mr. Blennerhassett, Mr. O'Reilly*)
c. Ordered; read 1°* *Dec* 6 [Bill 35]

Post Office
Post Office Savings Banks, Question, Mr. Wait; Answer, Lord John Manners *Feb* 14, 1193
Telegraphic Department — Continental Telegraph Charges, Question, Dr. Cameron; Answer, Lord John Manners *Feb* 20, 1507

Power, Mr. J. O'Connor, *Mayo*
Borough Franchise (Ireland), Res. 1248
Parliament—Miscellaneous Questions
Ministerial Statement, 1144
Orders of the Day, 1333
Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, 164
Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1658, 1674, 1686, 1695; Amendt. 1697
Public Accounts, Nomination of Committee, 1445

Prague, Treaty of (Austria and Germany) —Article 5
Question, Mr. J. Cowen; Answer, Mr. Bourke *Feb* 24, 1649

Prenuptial Contracts Bill
(*Mr. O'Shaughnessy, Mr. Courtney, Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Joseph Cowen*)
c. Ordered; read 1°* *Dec* 11 [Bill 60]
2R. *Feb* 24, 1721 [House counted out]

"Princess Alice" Calamity
Question, Captain Pim; Answer, Mr. Assheton Cross *Dec* 13, 737

Prisons Act
Kirkdale Gaol, Question, Mr. Hopwood; Answer, Mr. Assheton Cross *Feb* 17, 1302
Rules—Female Prisoners, Question, Mr. Hopwood; Answer, Mr. Assheton Cross *Feb* 24, 1652;—*Salford Gaol*, Question, Mr. Hopwood; Answer, Mr. Assheton Cross *Feb* 24, 1647

Prisons (Ireland) Act—Medical Officers
Question, Mr. Errington; Answer, Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson *Feb* 24, 1654

Prosecution of Offences Bill
(*Mr. Secretary Cross, Mr. Attorney General, Mr. Solicitor General, Sir Matthew Ridley*)
c. Ordered; read 1°* *Feb* 14 [Bill 68]
Read 2°* *Feb* 20

Public Health Act (1875) Amendment Bill (*Mr. Alexander Brown, Mr. Whitwell, Mr. Ryder*)
c. Ordered; read 1° * *Dec* 6 [Bill 33]

Public Health Act (1875) Amendment (Interments) Bill
(*Mr. Marten, Mr. Greene, Mr. Cole*)
c. Ordered; read 1° * *Dec* 12 [Bill 62]

Public Health Acts
Back-to-Back Houses, Question, Sir Sydney Waterlow; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth *Feb* 20, 1511
Diphtheria in North London, Question, Sir Charles W. Dilke; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth *Feb* 24, 1644
Small-pox in the Metropolis, Question, Dr. Cameron; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth *Feb* 24, 1645

Public Works Loans Bill (*Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson*)
c. Ordered; read 1° * *Feb* 14 [Bill 70]

Puleston, Mr. J. H., *Devonport*
Russia, Plague in—Sanitary Precautions, 1834

Racecourses (Metropolis) Bill
(*Mr. Anderson, Sir Thomas Chambers, Sir James Lawrence*)
c. Ordered; read 1° * *Dec* 6 [Bill 48]
Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2°" *Feb* 14, 1265
Amendt. to leave out "now," and add "upon this day six months" (*Mr. Onslow*); Question proposed, "That 'now,' &c.;" after short debate, Question put; A. 102, N. 53; M. 49 (D. L. 5)
Main Question put, and agreed to; Bill read 2°
Order for Committee read; Moved, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair" *Feb* 17, 1387
Amendt. to leave out from "That," and add, "this House will, upon this day six months, resolve itself into the said Committee" (*Mr. Onslow*); *v.* Question proposed, "That the words, &c.;" after short debate, Question put; A. 64, N. 30; M. 34 (D. L. 11)
Question again proposed, "That Mr. Speaker, &c.;" Moved, "That the Debate be now adjourned" (*Mr. Stacpoole*); Question put; A. 24, N. 61; M. 37 (D. L. 12)
Question again proposed, "That Mr. Speaker, &c.;" Moved, "That this House do now adjourn" (*Major O'Gorman*); Question put; A. 18, N. 64; M. 46 (D. L. 13)
Original Question put, and agreed to; Committee—R.P.

Raikes, Mr. H. C. (Chairman of Committees of Ways and Means), *Chester*
Ancient Monuments, Comm. 1274
Habitual Drunkards, Comm. *cl.* 11, 1713, 1714; *cl.* 23, 1718; *cl.* 25, 1721

Raikes, Mr. H. C.—*cont.*
Lancashire and Yorkshire Water Supply, Motion for an Address, 1788, 1789
Leadenhall Market and Improvements, 2R. 1745
Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1368, 1551
Thames River (Prevention of Floods), 2R. 1964, 1972

Railways
The Railway Commissioners — Legislation, Question, Mr. A. Mills; Answer, Mr. J. G. Talbot *Dec* 12, 639; Question, Mr. D. Taylor; Answer, Viscount Sandon *Dec* 16, 856;—*Expenses*, Question, Mr. Hermon; Answer, Viscount Sandon *Feb* 17, 1310
Continuous Footboards, Question, Mr. Thomson Hankey; Answer, Viscount Sandon *Feb* 21, 1602
Railway Brakes, Questions, Mr. Baxter, Mr. D. Taylor; Answers, Mr. J. G. Talbot *Dec* 12, 633
Railway Accidents—Legislation, Questions, Mr. Bentinck, Mr. Briggs; Answers, Viscount Sandon *Feb* 20, 1508
Writ of Elegit, Question, Observations, The Duke of St. Albans; Reply, The Earl of Redesdale *Feb* 24, 1727

Ramsay, Mr. J., *Falkirk, &c.*
Education Department — School Inspectors, 1616
Valuation of Property, 2R. 2047

Rathbone, Mr. W., *Liverpool*
Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act, 1878—Cattle from the United States, 1189
Disqualification by Medical Relief, 2R. 623; Comm. 944; 3R. 1279
Education Department — School Inspectors, Res. 1607, 1619
India—Afghanistan—Amendments on Address, 193

Rating of Towns (Ireland) Bill
(*Mr. O'Shaughnessy, Mr. Butt, Sir Joseph M'Kenna*)
c. Ordered; read 1° *Dec* 6 [Bill 14]

Ravensworth, Earl of
Parliament — Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, 5

Redesdale, Earl of (Chairman of Committees)
Railways—Writ of Elegit, 1728
Tramways, Select Committee appointed, 1501, 1502

Relief of Insane Poor Bill (*Mr. Rodwell, Sir Baldwin Leighton, Mr. Bristowe*)
c. Ordered; read 1° * *Dec* 6 [Bill 27]

Representation of the City—The Fanmakers Company
Question, Mr. W. H. James; Answer, Mr. Assheton Cross *Feb* 28, 1973

[*cont.*

RICHARD, Mr. H., *Merthyr Tydvil*
 China—Chefoo Convention, 1311
 Consecration of Churchyards Act (1867) Amendment, 2R. 1808

RICHMOND AND GORDON, Duke of (Lord President of the Council)
 Conservancy of Rivers, 1302
 Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act, 1878—Dairies, Cowshed, and Milkshops Order, 1879, 1639
 Fairs and Markets (Ireland), 1826
 India—Afghanistan—The War, 174
 Medical Act, 1858, Amendment, 1R. 1722
 Parliament—Public Business, 1393
 Russia, Plague in—Sanitary Precautions, Motion for a Paper, 1184, 1639, 1824

RIDLEY, Sir M. W. (Under Secretary of State for the Home Department), *Northumberland, N.*
 Ancient Monuments, Comm. *cl.* 3, Amendt. 2055, 2057
 Assizes, 2R. 1702; Comm. 1937
 Habitual Drunkards, Comm. *cl.* 11, 1712, 1714
 Parliament — Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, Report, 389
 Racecourses (Metropolis), 2R. 1272

RIPON, Marquess of
 Conservancy of Rivers, 1301
 India — Afghanistan — The War — Address of General Roberts, 1393
 India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Res. 469
 Medical Act, 1858, Amendment, 1R. 1726

RITCHIE, Mr. C. T., *Tower Hamlets*
 Customs Re-organization, 1643
 Disqualification by Medical Relief, 2R. 629
 India—Afghanistan—Peiwar Column, 84
 Interments in Churchyards, Leave, 209
 Metropolitan Fire Brigade, 1511
 Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1676

Rivers Conservancy and Prevention of Floods—Legislation
 Question, The Marquess of Ripon; Answer, The Duke of Richmond and Gordon *Feb* 17, 1301; Question, Mr. Arthur Peel; Answer, Mr. Assheton Cross *Feb* 17, 1306

Rivers Conservancy Bill
 Question, Mr. Anderson; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth *Feb* 20, 1520

ROBERTS, Mr. J., *Flint, &c.*
 Burial Law Amendment, 2R. 1477

RUSSELL, Sir C., *Westminster*
 Police Superannuation, 1833

Russia
 The Plague
  Medical Reports, Question, Mr. Waddy; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth *Feb* 14, 1195
  Sanitary Precautions, Question, Observations, The Earl of Carnarvon; Reply, The Duke of Richmond and Gordon *Feb* 14, 1184; Question, Lord Stanley of Alderley; Answer, The Duke of Richmond and Gordon *Feb* 24, 1638; Question, Observations, The Earl of Carnarvon; Reply, The Duke of Richmond and Gordon *Feb* 27, 1823; Question, Mr. Puleston; Answer, Lord George Hamilton *Feb* 27, 1834

Russia and Persia
 Question, Sir John Hay; Answer, Mr. Bourke *Dec* 13, 738
 Russian Officers in Persia, Question, Mr. Onslow; Answer, Mr. Bourke *Feb* 24, 1649

Russia and Turkey—The Definitive Treaty
 Question, Mr. Otway; Answer, Mr. Bourke *Feb* 17, 1303; Personal Explanation, Mr. Bourke *Feb* 21, 1606

RYLANDS, Mr. P., *Burnley*
 Civil Service Estimates, Motion for a Select Committee, 1430
 Customs Bill of Entry—The Commission on Official Statistics, 1833
 India—Afghanistan—Conferences at Umballa, 742
 Indian Railways—Shipment of Railway Material, 1644
 Parliament—Miscellaneous Questions
  Orders of the Day, Amendt. 1329
  Public Business—Question of Procedure, 1878
  Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, 187; Report, 401, 704
 Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1340, 1383, 1540; Motion for Adjournment, 1586, 1675
 Turkey—Rhodope Commission, 958
 Valuation of Property, 2R. 2041

ST. ALBANS, Duke of
 Railways—Writ of Elegit, 1727

Sale of Food and Drugs Act (1875) Amendment Bill
(*Mr. Anderson, Mr. P. A. Taylor, Mr. Whitwell*)
c. Ordered; read 1°* *Dec* 10 [Bill 56]
 Read 2°, and committed to a Select Committee, after short debate *Feb* 14, 1273

Sale of Intoxicating Liquors on Sunday Bill (*Mr. Stevenson, Mr. Charles Wilson, Mr. Birley, Mr. Osborne Morgan, Mr. William M'Arthur, Mr. James*)
c. Ordered; read 1°* *Dec* 6 [Bill 20]

SALISBURY, Marquess of (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs)
- Asia, Central—Merv and Bokhara, 406
- India—Afghanistan—Russian Mission at Cabul, 1161, 1162
- India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Res. 499
- Parliament—Ministerial Statement, 1060
  - Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, 54, 62
- Turkey—Convention for the Suppression of the Slave Trade, 406

SALT, Mr. T., *Stafford*
- Disqualification by Medical Relief, 2R. 630; Comm. 943

SAMUELSON, Mr. B., *Banbury*
- Egypt—Commissioners of Daira Lands, 857
- Finance, 1619

SAMUELSON, Mr. H. B., *Frome*
- Parliament—Ministerial Statement, 1115, 1117
- Parliament—Business of the House, Res. Motion for Adjournment, 1378
- Turkey—Miscellaneous Questions
  - Constantinople, Protectorate of, 742
  - Proposed Guaranteed Loan, 951
  - Rhodope Commission, 963

SANDON, Right Hon. Viscount (President of the Board of Trade), *Liverpool*
- Mercantile Marine, 1651
- Railway Accidents, 1508, 1509
- Railway Commission, 856;—Expenses, 1310
- Railways—Continuous Footboards, 1603
- Thames Traffic Regulation, 743, 1520
- Weights and Measures Act, 41 & 42 Vict. c. 49, 736

SCLATER-BOOTH, Right Hon. G. (President of the Local Government Board), *Hampshire, N.*
- Disqualification by Medical Relief, 3R. 1279
- England—Condition of the Country—Prevalent Distress, 950
- Highway Act, 1878—Clause 16, 1516
- Highways and Locomotives (Amendment) Act, 1878, 1075, 1192, 1198
- Lancashire and Yorkshire Water Supply, Motion for an Address, 1784
- Noxious Vapours, 1516
- Parochial Board (Scotland), 1749
- Poor Law—Miscellaneous Questions
  - Irish Poor, Deportation of, 636, 1196, 1835
  - Liverpool—Alleged Misconduct, 743
  - Metropolitan Unions—Oakum Picking by Female Paupers, 948
- Public Health Act—Miscellaneous Questions
  - Back-to-Back Houses, 1511
  - Diphtheria in North London, 1644
  - Small-pox in the Metropolis, 1645
  - Water Companies, 1513
- Rivers Conservancy, 1521
- Russia, Plague in—Medical Reports, 1195
- Sale of Food and Drugs Act (1875) Amendment, 2R. 1273

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SCLATER-BOOTH, Right Hon. G.—*cont.*
- Select Vestries, 2R. Motion for Adjournment, 2052
- Urban and Rural Sanitary Districts—County Maps, 1510
- Vaccination Acts—Joseph Abel, Case of, 1521
- Valuation of Property, 2R. 2036, 2045

SCOTLAND

MISCELLANEOUS QUESTIONS
- *Agricultural Hypothec and Office of Lord Clerk Register*, Question, Mr. J. W. Barclay; Answer, Mr. Assheton Cross *Feb* 18, 1406
- *Criminal Law—Case of Mr. Barr*, Question, Mr. J. W. Barclay; Answer, The Lord Advocate *Feb* 27, 1829
- *Law and Justice—Judicial Arrangements*, Question, Colonel Mure; Answer, Mr. Assheton Cross *Dec* 13, 739;—*Judicial Business of Nairnshire*, Question, Mr. Fraser-Mackintosh; Answer, The Lord Advocate *Dec* 13, 741
- *Parochial Board—Legislation*, Question, Mr. Hibbert; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth *Feb* 25, 1749
- *Register House Buildings, Edinburgh*, Question, Mr. M'Laren; Answer, Mr. Assheton Cross *Feb* 24, 1647

SELBORNE, Lord
- India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Res. 450

Select Vestries

l. Bill, *pro formâ*, read 1ª *Dec* 5

Select Vestries Bill

(*Mr. James, Mr. Herschell, Mr. Joseph Cowen*)

c. Ordered; read 1° * *Dec* 10 [Bill 54]
- 2R., after short debate, Debate adjourned *Feb* 28, 2052

SELWIN-IBBETSON, Sir H. J. (Secretary to the Treasury), *Essex, W.*
- Ancient Monuments, Comm. *cl.* 2, 2054; *cl.* 13, 2061
- Charity Commission, The, 740
- Civil Service Estimates, Motion for a Select Committee, 1416
- Customs Bill of Entry—The Commission of Official Statistics, 1833
- India—Afghanistan, Amendments on Address, Motion for Adjournment, 178
- Inland Revenue—Customs Department—Reorganization, 303, 1643
- Ireland—Board of Works, 528;—Colonel M'Kerlie, 1071;—Clare Castle Pier and Harbour, 1512
- Leadenhall Market and Improvements, 2R. 1743
- Licensing Laws Amendment, Leave, 210
- New Forest—Stony Cross Inclosure, 1654, 1655
- Parliament—Business of the House, 1499
- Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1371, 1440, 1563, 1592, 1679
- Prisons (Ireland) Act—Medical Officers, 1654

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SELWIN-IBBETSON, Sir H. J.—*cont.*
Public Accounts, Nomination of Committee, 1445
Racecourses (Metropolis), 2R. 1270; Comm. Motion for reporting Progress, 1391
Supply — Supplementary Vote of Credit — Queen's Colleges, Ireland, 1837

SHAFTESBURY, Earl of
Turkey—Convention for the Suppression of the Slave Trade, 405

SHAW, Mr. W., *Cork Co.*
Bank Deposits, Res. 1765
Parliament—Privilege—The Press, 1851

SHERLOCK, Mr. Serjeant D., *King's Co.*
Public Accounts, Nomination of Committee, 1445

SIDMOUTH, Viscount
Africa, South—Re-inforcements—Disembarkation, 1401, 1402
  Zululand—Importation of Arms and Munitions, 1502, 1507

SIMON, Mr. Serjeant J., *Dewsbury*
Navy Promotion—Order in Council, 1872, 1750
Parliament — Business of the House, Res. Amendt. 1350, 1360, 1580, 1691, 1697
Parliament—Public Business (Half-past Twelve Rule), Res. 1438
Spain—The "Lark" and "Octavia," 1316
Turkey—Rhodope Commission, Report of the, 300, 301, 528; Withdrawal of Notice, 869

Slave Trade in the Red Sea—Convention with the Porte
Question, The Earl of Shaftesbury; Answer, The Marquess of Salisbury *Dec* 10, 405; Question, Mr. Anderson; Answer, Mr. Bourke *Feb* 24, 1656

Slave Trade, The (Zanzibar)
Question, Mr. Whitwell; Answer, Mr. Bourke *Dec* 17, 951

SMITH, Right Hon. W. H. (First Lord of the Admiralty), *Westminster*
Egypt—Ships of War, Despatch of, 1752
Mercantile Marine—Armed Merchant Vessels, 739
Navy — H.M.S. "Thunderer," Explosion on Board, 1652
Navy Promotion—Order in Council, 1872, 1751
Parliament—Miscellaneous Questions
  Ministerial Statement, 1112, 1113, 1114, 1115, 1117
  Order of Business, 1522
  Parliamentary Reporting, Re-appointment of Committee, 857
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SMOLLETT, Mr. P. B., *Cambridge*
Borough Franchise (Ireland), Res. 1223
India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Res. 919

SOLICITOR GENERAL, The (Sir H. S. Giffard), *Launceston*
India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Res. 986

SOMERSET, Duke of
India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations), Res. 288

SOMERSET, Lord H. R. C. (Comptroller of the Household), *Monmouthshire*
Parliament—Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, 53

Spain—The "Lark" and the "Octavia"
Question, Mr. Serjeant Simon; Answer, Mr. Bourke *Feb* 17, 1316

SPEAKER, The (Right Hon. H. B. W. BRAND), *Cambridgeshire*
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Egypt—Finance, 1622
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Parliament—Miscellaneous Questions
  Orders of the Day, 1336
  Privilege—The Press, 1846
  Public Business, Committee on, 204
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  Questions—Standing Orders, 955
  Rules and Orders, 1515
Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1356, 1380, 1549, 1676
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Turkey—Rhodope Commission, 958, 959, 962

SPINKS, Mr. Serjeant F. L., *Oldham*
Ancient Monuments, Comm. *cl.* 3, Amendt. 2056
Disqualification by Medical Relief, Comm. Motion for Adjournment, 943

Spirits in Bond Bill (*Mr. O'Sullivan, Major Nolan, Mr. Blennerhassett, Captain Pim, Mr. Stacpoole*)
c. Considered in Committee; Resolution agreed to, and reported; Bill ordered; read 1º* *Dec* 6 [Bill 19]

STACPOOLE, Mr. W., *Ennis*
Ireland—Board of Works—Clare Castle Pier and Harbour, 1512
  Prince Viceroy of Ireland, 1307
Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1594
Racecourses (Metropolis), 2R. 1272; Comm. 1388; Motion for Adjournment, 1389

STANHOPE, Hon. E. (Under Secretary of State for India), *Lincolnshire, Mid*
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Cyprus, Afghanistan—The late Debate, Explanation, 744
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India—Afghanistan (Expenses of Military Operations) — Application of the Revenues of India, Res. 876, 884, 896, 897, 940, 941, 942, 970, 1016
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Parliament—Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, 138, 139, 149, 150, 156; Amendt. 158; Report, 314, 349, 354, 361, 365, 366, 548, 554, 823

STANHOPE, Mr. W. T. W. S., *Yorkshire, W.R.*
Summary Jurisdiction, 2R. 1940

STANLEY OF ALDERLEY, Lord
Russia, Plague in—Sanitary Precautions, 1638

STANLEY, Right Hon. Colonel F. A. (Secretary of State for War), *Lancashire, N.*
Africa, South—Zulu War—Miscellaneous Questions
Native Indian Army, 1310
Presbyterian and Wesleyan Chaplains, 1749, 1750
Re-inforcements, 1193, 1309, 1838;—Catholic Chaplains, 1517

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India—Service in India, 1309
Longford Barracks, 1517
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Militia Fines, 1829
Militia Training, 1832
Reserves—Militia, 1508
Sergeant Instructors of Volunteers, 1838
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24th Regiment, 1514, 1752, 1836
Zulu War—Army Reserve, 1603
Army Officers (Guards and Line), Motion for an Address, 2064
Army Organization—The Brigade Depôt System, Res. 1875
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Ireland—Board of Works—Colonel M'Kerlie, 1072
Parliament—Ministerial Statement, 1097
Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1701
Straits Settlements—Perak Expedition, 1658
Supply—War in South Africa—Vote of Credit, 1906

STANSFELD, Right Hon. J., *Halifax*
Poor Law—Liverpool—Alleged Misconduct, 742
Urban and Rural Sanitary Districts—County Maps, 1509
Valuation of Property, 2R. 2041

STEWART, Mr. M. J., *Wigton Bo.*
Japan—John Hartley, Case of, 856

STORER, Mr. G., *Nottinghamshire, S.*
Valuation of Property, 2R. 2041

Straits Settlements, The — The Perak Expedition—Medals
Question, Colonel North; Answer, Colonel Stanley *Feb* 24, 1657

SULLIVAN, Mr. A. M., *Louth Co.*
Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1554, 1689
Parliament — Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, 166
Supply—War in South Africa—Vote of Credit, 1900

Summary Jurisdiction Bill
(*Mr. Secretary Cross, Mr. Attorney General, Mr. Solicitor General, Sir Matthew Ridley*)
c. Ordered; read 1°* *Feb* 14 [Bill 69]
Read 2°, and committed to a Select Committee, after short debate *Feb* 27, 1939
Committee nominated *Mar* 18; List of the Committee, 1940

SUPPLY
Resolved, "That this House will, upon Monday next, resolve itself into a Committee to consider of the Supply to be granted to Her Majesty" *Dec* 13
[See *Parliament—Business of Parliament—Ministerial Statement*]

Miscellaneous Questions
Finance—Exchequer Bonds, Questions, Mr. Whitwell, Mr. Childers; Answers, The Chancellor of the Exchequer *Feb* 24, 1657
Supplementary Vote of Credit—The Queen's Colleges in Ireland, Question, Major Nolan; Answer, Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson *Feb* 27, 1837
The Supplementary Estimates, 1878—*The Kaffir War*, Question, Mr. Whitwell; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer *Feb* 27, 1838
The Vote of Credit—The Zulu War, Observations, The Chancellor of the Exchequer *Feb* 27, 1854

Supply—Civil Service Estimates
Moved, "That a Select Committee be appointed to consider and report upon the Civil Service Estimates in the order in which they appear" (*Mr. Dillwyn*) *Feb* 18, 1409; after debate, Question put; A. 95, N. 158; M. 63 (D. L. 14)

SUPPLY
Considered in Committee *Feb* 27
(1.) £2,750,000, Exchequer Bonds; after short debate, Vote agreed to, 1881
(2.) £1,500,000, War in South Africa (Vote of Credit); Vote agreed to, 1888
Resolutions reported *Feb* 28, 2034; after short debate, Resolutions agreed to

Supreme Court of Judicature Acts Amendment Bill (*The Lord Chancellor*)
l. Presented; read 1ª *Feb* 18, 1394 (No. 11)

Synan, Mr. E. J., *Limerick Co.*
Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1544, 1672
Parliament—Orders of the Day, 1328

Talbot, Mr. J. G. (Secretary to the Board of Trade), *Kent, W.*
Burial Law Amendment, 2R. 1485, 1487
Railway Commissioners, 639
Railways—Railway Brakes, 633

Taylor, Mr. D., *Coleraine*
Railway Commission, 856
Railways—Railway Brakes, 633

Taylor, Mr. P. A., *Leicester Bo.*
Criminal Law Punishment—Admission of the Press, 1831
Habitual Drunkards, 2R. 1384
Lunacy Laws, 735
Married Women's Property Act, 1870, 306, 853

Tenants' Improvements in Towns (Ireland) Bill
(*Major Nolan, Mr. Patrick Martin, Mr. O'Sullivan*)
c. Motion for Leave (*Major Nolan*) *Dec* 9, 403; Motion agreed to; Bill ordered; read 1°* [Bill 50]

Thames River (Prevention of Floods) Bill (by Order)
c. Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2°" (*Sir James M'Garel Hogg*) *Feb* 28, 1958; after short debate, Motion agreed to; Bill read 2°
Moved, "That the Bill be committed to a Select Committee of Eleven Members, Six to be appointed by the House, and Five by the Committee of Selection, and that the Report of the Select Committee of 1877 be referred to the said Committee:—That all Petitions against the Bill be referred to the Committee, and that such Petitioners as pray to be heard by themselves, their Counsel, or Agents, be heard upon their Petitions, if they think fit, and Counsel heard in favour of the Bill against such Petitioners:—That the Committee have power to alter and modify the Bill as regards the incidence of taxation for the works proposed to be authorized by the Bill"
Amendt. in line 5, after "Bill," to insert "presented on or before the 8th day of March" (*Sir James M'Garel Hogg*); Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted;" Question put, and agreed to
Main Question, as amended, put, and agreed to

Thames Traffic Regulation—The Official Committee
Questions, Mr. Gourley; Answers, Viscount Sandon *Dec* 13, 743; *Feb* 20, 1520

Torrens, Mr. W. T. M., *Finsbury*
Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1576

Tracy, Hon. F. S. A. Hanbury-, *Montgomery*
England—Condition of the Country—Prevalent Distress, 950
Municipal Corporations, Report of Royal Commission, 1655

Tramways
Moved, That a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the regulations which it may be desirable to impose in relation to the construction and use of Tramways (*The Earl of Redesdale*) *Feb* 20, 1501
Moved after ("Tramways") to add ("and the relation of Tramways on which carriages are conveyed by steam to the present imposition of the passenger duty") (*The Lord Houghton*); on Question, "That the words, &c.?" resolved in the negative; original Motion agreed to; List of the Committee, 1502

Trevelyan, Mr. G. O., *Hawick, &c.*
Parliament—Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, Report, 368

TRURO, Lord
Africa, South—Re-inforcements, Address for a Return, 1400
Africa, South—Zulu War—Re-inforcements, 1179, 1180, 1182, 1640, 1642
Army—Volunteer Force—Courts of Inquiry, Address for a Return, 1600
Army Education—Literary and Physical Competitions, 1956
Volunteer Force—Finance and Organization, Report of Committee, 1178

TURKEY
The Eastern Question
The Treaty of Berlin
Article 24, Question, Mr. W. Cartwright; Answer, Mr. Bourke *Dec* 6, 198
Despatches—Cyprus—Jurisdiction of Courts of Law, Questions, Sir Charles W. Dilke; Answers, Mr. Bourke *Dec* 9, 301
Speech of the Prime Minister at Guildhall, Question, Mr. Anderson; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer *Dec* 10, 524
The Greek Frontier, Questions, Mr. Wait, Sir Charles W. Dilke; Answers, Mr. Bourke *Feb* 14, 1194; Question, Sir Charles W. Dilke; Answer, Mr. Bourke *Feb* 21, 1603
French Circular Despatch, Question, Mr. W. Cartwright; Answer, Mr. Bourke *Feb* 17, 1310
Religious Liberty in Bulgaria, Question, Mr. O'Donnell; Answer, Mr. Bourke *Feb* 27, 1835

MISCELLANEOUS QUESTIONS
Commercial Treaties, Question, Mr. Whitwell; Answer, Mr. Bourke *Dec* 17, 952
Convention for the Suppression of the Slave Trade, Question, The Earl of Shaftesbury; Answer, The Marquess of Salisbury *Dec* 10, 405; Question, Mr. Anderson; Answer, Mr. Bourke *Feb* 24, 1656
Financial Reform—M. de Tocqueville, Question, Mr. E. Jenkins; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer *Feb* 17, 1307
Rumoured Guaranteed Loan, Question, Mr. W. Cartwright; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer *Dec* 10, 523; Question, Mr. H. Samuelson; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer *Dec* 17, 951
Finance—Mr. Harrison—Loans, Question, Mr. W. Cartwright; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer *Feb* 20, 1518; Question, Sir George Campbell; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer *Feb* 27, 1829
Papers and Correspondence, Question, Sir William Harcourt; Answer, Mr. Bourke *Feb* 20, 1517
Protectorate of Constantinople, Question, Mr. H. Samuelson; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer *Dec* 13, 742
Reforms — The Anglo-Turkish Convention, Question, Mr. E. Jenkins; Answer, Mr. Bourke *Dec* 10, 525
Rumoured Anglo-Turkish Convention, Question, Mr. Dillwyn; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer *Dec* 16, 858
[See title *Cyprus, Island of*]

Turkey—The Rhodope Commission
Report, Questions, Lord Elcho, Mr. Serjeant Simon; Answers, The Chancellor of the Exchequer *Dec* 9, 300; Question, Mr. Serjeant Simon; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer *Dec* 10, 528
The Rhodope District—Grant in Aid, Notice of Resolution, The Chancellor of the Exchequer; Notice of Amendment, Mr. Anderson *Dec* 13, 735
Withdrawal of Notice *Dec* 16, 862
Moved, "That this House will, at the rising of the House this day, adjourn till Thursday the 15th February next" *Dec* 17
Observations, Mr. Rylands, 958; after short debate, Moved, "That the debate be now adjourned" (*Mr. Chamberlain*); after further short debate, Motion withdrawn
Original Question put, and agreed to

Ulster Tenant Right Bill
(*Mr. Macartney, Mr. Charles Lewis, Mr. William Wilson*)
c. Ordered; read 1°* *Dec* 6 [Bill 37]

United States of America—The Treaty of Washington—The Fishery Award
Question, Mr. Gourley; Answer, The Chancellor of the Exchequer *Dec* 9, 305

Vaccination Acts—Case of Joseph Abel
Question, Mr. Hopwood; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth *Feb* 20, 1521

Vaccination Acts (Ireland) Amendment Bill (*Mr. James Lowther, Mr. Attorney General for Ireland*)
c. Ordered; read 1°* *Feb* 28 [Bill 90]

Valuation of Lands (Scotland) Amendment Bill (*Sir Windham Anstruther, Mr. Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Graham Montgomery*)
c. Ordered; read 1°* *Dec* 6 [Bill 16]

Valuation of Property Bill
(*Mr. Sclater-Booth, Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Salt*)
c. Ordered; read 1°* *Feb* 14 [Bill 71]
Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2°" *Feb* 28, 2036
Amendt. to leave out from "That," and add "no Valuation Bill, providing in a Valuation List a common authority for the assessment of rates and taxes, can be satisfactory unless it provide a common measure of value for such assessment by levying Imperial taxes as well as local rates upon the rateable value" (*Mr. Hubbard*) *v.*; Question proposed, "That the words, &c.;" after short debate, Amendt. withdrawn
Main Question put, and agreed to; Bill read 2°

Volunteer Corps (Ireland) Bill
(*Mr. O'Clery, Major Nolan, Lord Francis Conyngham, Major O'Beirne*)
c. Ordered; read 1° * *Dec* 6 [Bill 5]

Voters Registration (Ireland) Bill
(*Mr. Meldon, Mr. Butt, Mr. Mitchell Henry*)
c. Ordered; read 1° * *Dec* 6 [Bill 29]

WADDY, Mr. S. D., *Barnstaple*
Africa, South—Zulu War—Presbyterian and Wesleyan Chaplains, 1750
Assizes, 2R. 1703
Habitual Drunkards, Comm. *cl.* 11, 1714; *cl.* 17, 1716
Medical Acts—Medical Council, 1195
Russia—Plague in—Medical Reports, 1195

WAIT, Mr. W. K., *Gloucester*
Post Office Savings Banks, 1193
Treaty of Berlin—The Greek Frontier, 1194

WALTER, Mr. J., *Berkshire*
Civil Service Estimates, Motion for a Select Committee, 1434
Consecration of Churchyards Act (1867) Amendment, 2R. 1800
Parliament—Orders of the Day, 1325
Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1544

Waste Lands Reclamation (Ireland) Bill
(*Mr. Collins, Mr. MacCarthy, Mr. Downing, Major Nolan*)
c. Ordered; read 1° * *Dec* 6 [Bill 8]

Watch-Cases (Hall-Marking) Bill
(*Sir Henry Jackson, Mr. Eaton, Sir Andrew Lusk, Mr. Torr*)
c. Considered in Committee; Resolution agreed to, and reported; Bill ordered; read 1° * *Feb* 26 [Bill 87]

Water Companies Bills—Public Health Acts
Question, Mr. A. H. Brown; Answer, Mr. Sclater-Booth *Feb* 20, 1513

WATERLOW, Sir S. H., *Maidstone*
Leadenhall Market and Improvements, 2R. 1745
Public Health Act—Back-to-Back Houses, 1511

WATKIN, Sir E. W., *Hythe*
Mercantile Marine—Armed Merchant Vessels, 739

WATNEY, Mr. J., *Surrey, E.*
Disqualification by Medical Relief, 2R. 629

WAYS AND MEANS
Resolved, "That this House will, upon Monday next, resolve itself into a Committee to consider of the Ways and Means for raising the Supply to be granted to Her Majesty *Dec* 13

MISCELLANEOUS QUESTIONS
41 & 42 *Vict. c.* 49—*Weights and Measures Act—Legislation*, Question, Mr. J. Cowen; Answer, Viscount Sandon *Dec* 13, 736
The Customs Department—Re-organization, Question, Mr. J. Holms; Answer, Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson *Dec* 9, 303; Question, Mr. Ritchie; Answer, Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson *Feb* 24, 1643

WAYS AND MEANS
Considered in Committee *Feb* 28
(1.) Resolved, That, towards raising the Supply granted to Her Majesty, the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury be authorised to raise on or before the 31st March 1879, any sum of money not exceeding £4,250,000, by an issue of Exchequer Bonds
(2.) Resolved, That the principal of all Exchequer Bonds which may be so issued shall be paid off at par, at the expiration of one year from the date of such Bonds
(3.) Resolved, That the interest of such Exchequer Bonds shall be payable half-yearly, and shall be charged upon and issued out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom, or the growing produce thereof
(4.) Resolved, That, towards making good the Supply granted to Her Majesty for the service of the year ending on the 31st day of March 1879, the sum of £4,250,000 be granted out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom
Resolutions reported *Mar* 3

WHEELHOUSE, Mr. W. St. James, *Leeds*
Education Department—School Inspectors, 1614
Habitual Drunkards, Comm. *cl.* 25, Amendt. 1720
Lancashire and Yorkshire Water Supply, Motion for an Address, 1778

WHITBREAD, Mr. S., *Bedford*
Africa, South—Transvaal and Zululand—Boundary Dispute, 855
Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1370, 1543
Parliament—Queen's Speech, Address in Answer to, 176, 184, 185, 196; Report, Amendt. 310, 314, 361, 365, 366

WHITWELL, Mr. J., *Kendal*
Africa—Zanzibar—Slave Trade, 951
Africa, South—Miscellaneous Questions
  Expenses of the War, 635
  Zulu King, 858
  Zulu War—Re-inforcements, 1838
Army Organization—The Brigade Depôt System, Res. 1878
Finance—Exchequer Bonds, 1657
Habitual Drunkards, Comm. *cl.* 11, 1709
Parliament—Questions—Standing Orders, 955
Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1376; Amendt. 1677

[*cont.*

WHITWELL, Mr. J.—*cont.*
Supply — Supplementary Estimates, 1878 — Kaffir War, 1838
War in South Africa—Vote of Credit, 1897
Turkey—Commercial Treaties, 952

Windward Islands, The — Coolies in Grenada
Questions, Mr. Errington, Mr. W. E. Forster; Answers, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach *Dec* 9, 304

Workman's Compensation Bill [H.L.]
(*The Earl De La Warr*)
l. Presented *Feb* 17, 1283; after short debate, Bill read 1ª (No. 7)

YORKE, Mr. J. R., *Gloucestershire, E.*
Parliament—Business of the House, Res. 1569, 1588

ERRATA.

Page 693, lines 20 and 21 from top, *for* right hon. Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers), *read* hon. Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Hall).

Page 1619, Egypt—Finance—Observations—*for* Mr. H. Samuelson, *read* Mr. B. Samuelson.

END OF VOLUME CCXLIII., AND FIRST VOLUME OF
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